Palo Alto Networks
M-200, M-300, M-600, and
M-700 Hardware, and Virtual
Appliances all running
Panorama 10.2
Security Target
Version: 1.0
Date: January 30, 2023
Panorama 10.2 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
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Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
www.paloaltonetworks.com
© 2023 Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Palo Alto Networks is a registered trademark of Palo Alto Networks. A list of our trademarks
can be found at https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/company/trademarks.html. All other marks mentioned herein may be
trademarks of their respective companies.
Panorama 10.2 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
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Table of Contents
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................1
1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION.............................................................................................1
1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS.......................................................................................................................................2
1.3 CONVENTIONS ......................................................................................................................................................4
1.3.1 Terminology................................................................................................................................................4
1.3.2 Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................5
2. PRODUCT DESCRIPTION.......................................................................................................................................6
2.1 TOE OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................................7
2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE.............................................................................................................................................8
2.2.1 Physical Boundaries..................................................................................................................................8
2.2.2 Logical Boundaries ................................................................................................................................. 12
2.3 TOE DOCUMENTATION .................................................................................................................................... 14
2.4 EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY .............................................................................................................................. 14
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION................................................................................................................... 16
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ....................................................................................................................................... 17
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT...................................................................... 17
5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................................................... 19
5.1 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................................... 19
5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................. 19
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU).............................................................................................................................. 20
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ............................................................................................................... 23
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA).............................................................................................. 29
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT) ............................................................................................................... 31
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT).................................................................................................................. 32
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)................................................................................................................................... 33
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)............................................................................................................... 33
5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................................................... 34
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION...................................................................................................................... 35
6.1 SECURITY AUDIT ................................................................................................................................................ 35
6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT................................................................................................................................ 36
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION........................................................................................................... 44
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................................................. 46
6.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF.................................................................................................................................. 47
6.6 TOE ACCESS...................................................................................................................................................... 50
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS............................................................................................................................... 50
7. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS........................................................................................................................ 51
8. RATIONALE............................................................................................................................................................. 52
Panorama 10.2 Security Target Palo Alto Networks
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Deployment..............................................................................................................................................7
Figure 2: TOE Architecture..............................................................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Platforms......................................................................................................................................................9
Table 2 Excluded Features............................................................................................................................................ 14
Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components ........................................................................................................ 19
Table 4 Auditable Events .............................................................................................................................................. 21
Table 5 Assurance Components.................................................................................................................................. 34
Table 6 Cryptographic Functions................................................................................................................................ 36
Table 7 FIPS 186-4 Conformance............................................................................................................................... 38
Table 8 Private Keys and CSPs .................................................................................................................................... 39
Page 1 of 52
1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions,
ST conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is a centralized management appliance running
version 10.2, provided by Palo Alto Networks Inc. Panorama is available as a virtual or physical appliance,
each of which supports licenses for managing up to 25, 100, or 1,000 next-generation firewalls.
The physical appliances include the M-200, M-300, M-600, and M-700 models and the virtual appliances
include Panorama virtual appliances which are used to simplify central management and collect information
on activity across all managed firewall and Wildfire appliances. Information can include network traffic, user
activity, threats which allows for the TOE to centrally analyze, investigate, and report on the aggregated
data.
The focus of this evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices. (See section 1.2 for specific version information).
The only capabilities covered by the evaluation are those specified in the aforementioned Protection Profile,
all other capabilities are not covered in the evaluation. The security functionality specified in [NDcPP]
includes protection of communications between the TOE and trusted external IT entities (trusted channel),
protection of communications between the TOE and remote administrators (trusted path), identification and
authentication of administrators, auditing of security-relevant events, ability to verify the source and
integrity of updates to the TOE, implementation of session idle timeout, and the restricted use of FIPS
Approved algorithms and protocols.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Product Description (Section 2)
• Security Problem Definition (Section 3)
• Security Objectives (Section 4)
• IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
• Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
• Rationale (Section 8).
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Palo Alto Networks M-200, M-300, M-600, and M-700 Hardware, and Virtual Appliances all
running Panorama 10.2 Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – January 30, 2023
TOE Identification – Palo Alto Networks M-200, M-300, M-600, and M-700 Hardware, and Virtual
Appliances all running Panorama 10.2.
The Panorama virtual appliance is supported on the following hypervisors:
• VMware
o VMware ESXi with vSphere 7.0
• Microsoft Hyper-V Server 2012 R2, Server 2016, or Server 2019
• Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) on Ubuntu 18.04 or 20.04 LTS
Evaluation testing included the following:
Page 2 of 52
VMware ESXi 7.0:
• Dell PowerEdge R740 Processor: Intel Xeon Gold 6248 (Cascade Lake microarchitecture) with
Broadcom 57416 NIC
• Memory: 128 GB RDIMM
Hyper-V 2019 on Microsoft Hyper-V Server 2019and KVM 4 on Ubuntu 20.04:
• Dell PowerEdge R740 Processor: Intel Xeon Gold 6248 (Cascade Lake microarchitecture) with
Broadcom 57416 NIC
• Memory: 128 GB RDIMM
TOE Developer – Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017
1.2 Conformance Claims
This ST and the TOE it describes are conformant to the following CC specifications: This ST is conformant
to:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 [NDcPP].
The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this PP and have been accounted for in the ST development
and the conduct of the evaluation:
• TD0527 – Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates solely to evaluation activities so it does not affect
the ST.
• TD0528 – NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE because FCS_NTP_EXT.1 is not claimed.
• TD0536 – NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates solely to evaluation activities so it does not affect
the ST.
• TD0537 – NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates solely to evaluation activities so it does not affect
the ST.
• TD0538 – NIT Technical Decision for Outdated link to allowed-with list
o This TD is a semantic issue with the claimed PP that was corrected. It does not affect the ST or
the evaluation of the TOE.
• TD0546 – NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE; it relates to FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1, which is not claimed by
the ST.
• TD0547 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN
o This TD is applicable to the TOE.
• TD0555 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test
Page 3 of 52
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to test evaluation activities so it does not
affect the ST.
• TD0556 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to test evaluation activities so it does not
affect the ST.
• TD0563 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to an application note that clarifies the
intent of FAU_GEN.1.2. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0564 – NIT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria
o This requirement is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to the evaluation of AVA_VAN.1. It
does not affect the ST because the additional ST evidence required to address this TD is already
addressed by TD0547.
• TD0569 – NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to test evaluation activities so it does not
affect the ST. Note specifically that while the title of the TD references FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1,
which the ST does not claim, the TD also affects FCS_TLSS_EXT.1, which is within the TOE’s
logical boundary.
• TD0570 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to clarifying how the PP reader should
interpret FIA_AFL.1. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0571 – NIT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to clarifying how the PP reader should
interpret the requirements that relate to FIA_AFL.1. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0572 – NIT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but relates entirely to guidance on the interpretation of
mandatory and allowable reference identifiers for cases where the TSF must validate the
identifier of a presented X.509 certificate. It does not affect the ST.
• TD0580 – NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e
o The TD affects a selection in FCS_CKM.2.
• TD0581 – NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
o The TD adds a selection to FCS_CKM.2 that the ST has applied.
• TD0591 – NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors
o The TD applies to virtual network devices and affected the assumptions.
• TD0592 – NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE. The TD modifies introductory text to remove a
contradictory statement about local audit storage. It does not affect any SFR claims.
• TD0631 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key Authentication for SSH Server
o This TD is applicable to the TOE; the wording of FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 is updated and the required
selection is added to FMT_SMF.1.1,
• TD0632 – NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE. It adds a selection to FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 but the TSF does
not claim the added behavior.
• TD0633 – NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE because the TOE does not claim IPsec functionality.
• TD0634 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification Required for Testing IPv6
Page 4 of 52
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but affects test evaluation activities only; it does not affect the
ST.
• TD0635 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters
o This TD is applicable to the TOE but affects test evaluation activities only; it does not affect the
ST.
• TD0636 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH
o This TD is not applicable to the TOE because the TOE does not claim SSH client functionality.
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Conformant.
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that
may be applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
• All operations performed in this ST are identified according to conventions described in [NDcPP].
• The ST author does not change operations that have been completed by the PP authors nor undo
the formatting. For example, if the text is italicized, bolded, or underlined by the PP author, the ST
author will not undo it. In this way operations have been identified.
• Selection/Assignment operations completed by the PP author remain as described in the [NDcPP].
• Selection/Assignment operations completed by the ST author was bolded to show that it was
completed by the ST author and not taken as-is from the PP.
• Iteration operations completed by the ST author are identified with (1), (2), and (next number) with
descriptive text following the name (e.g. FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1(1) HTTPS Protocol (TLS Server)).
1.3.1 Terminology
The following terms and abbreviations are used in this ST:
Authentication
Profile
Define the authentication service that validates the login credentials of administrators
when they access Panorama.
Device Group Group the managed firewalls into logical units. A device group enables grouping based
on network segmentation, geographic location, organizational function, or any other
common aspect of firewalls that require similar policy configurations.
Log Collector Aggregate logs from managed firewalls. When generating reports, Panorama queries
the Log Collectors for log information, providing you visibility into all the network
activity that your firewalls monitor.
PAN-DB A mode where the TOE functions as a URL filtering database as an on-premise
appliance.
Role-Based
Access Control
Define the privileges and responsibilities of administrative users (administrators). Every
administrator must have a user account that specifies a role and authentication method.
Page 5 of 52
Security
Profile
A security profile specifies protection rules to apply when processing network traffic.
The profiles supported by the TOE include the IPsec crypto Security profile, IKE
Network profile, and Vulnerability profile.
Security Zone A grouping of TOE interfaces. Each TOE interface must be assigned to a zone before it
can process traffic.
1.3.2 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology
Security
CM Configuration Management
CLI Command Line Interface
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
FSP Functional Specification
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GCM Galois/Counter Mode
GUI Graphical User Interface
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PP Protection Profile
REST Representational State Transfer
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
SA Security Association
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VM Virtual Machine
VPN Virtual Private Network
Page 6 of 52
2. Product Description
Palo Alto Networks Panorama management appliances provide centralized monitoring and management of
Palo Alto Networks next-generation firewalls and Wildfire appliances. It provides a single location from
which administrators can oversee all applications, users, and content traversing the whole network, and then
use this knowledge to create application enablement policies that control and protect the network. Using
Panorama for centralized policy and firewall management increases operational efficiency in managing and
maintaining a network of firewalls.
This evaluation only includes the Panorama physical and virtual appliance models as identified in section 1.1.
Palo Alto Networks next-generation firewalls were evaluated previously, and information about them and
Wildfire are provided for completeness only.
The Palo Alto next-generation firewalls are network firewall appliances and virtual appliances on specified
hardware used to manage enterprise network traffic flow using function-specific processing for networking,
security, and management. The next-generation firewalls let the administrator specify security policies based
on an accurate identification of each application seeking access to the protected network. The next-
generation firewall uses packet inspection and a library of applications to distinguish between applications
that have the same protocol and port, and to identify potentially malicious applications that use non-
standard ports. The next-generation firewall also supports the establishment of Virtual Private Network
(VPN) connections to other next-generation firewalls or third-party security devices.
The WildFire appliance provides an on-premises WildFire private cloud, enabling the analysis of suspicious
files in a sandbox environment without requiring the firewall to send files out of network. The WildFire
appliance can be configured to host a WildFire private cloud where the firewall is configured to submit
samples to the local WildFire appliance for analysis. The WildFire appliance sandboxes all files locally and
analyzes them for malicious behaviors using the same engine the WildFire public cloud uses.
Panorama enables the administrator to effectively configure, manage, and monitor the firewalls and Wildfire
appliances with central oversight. Even though firewall and Wildfire appliances can be managed locally, by
using Panorama to manage the appliances, the following three major benefits can be achieved:
1. Centralized Configuration and Deployment - To simplify central management and rapid
deployment of the firewalls and WildFire appliances on the network, use Panorama to pre-stage
the firewalls and WildFire appliances for deployment. Administrators can then assemble the
firewalls into groups and create templates to apply a base network and device configuration and
use device groups to administer globally shared and local policy rules.
2. Aggregated Logging with Central Oversight for Analysis and Reporting - Collect information on
activity across all the managed firewalls on the network and centrally analyze, investigate, and
report on the data. This comprehensive view of network traffic, user activity, and the associated
risks empowers the administrators to respond to potential threats using the rich set of policies to
securely enable applications on the network.
3. Delegated Administration - Enables administrator to delegate or restrict access to global and local
firewall configurations and policies.
Page 7 of 52
TOE
Figure 1: TOE Deployment
2.1 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is one or more Palo Alto Networks management appliance(s) that include
Panorama M-200, M-300, M-600, and M-700 appliances and virtual appliances all running version 10.2.
Panorama is available as a virtual or physical appliance, each of which supports licenses for managing up to
25, 100, or 1,000 firewalls. The TOE type is a network device as specified in the NDcPP.
In a deployment architecture, the Panorama security management appliance provides the capability to
remotely manage multiple firewall appliances that control network traffic flow and WildFire appliances that
analyze suspicious files traversing the network. However, since the firewall and Wildfire appliances are in
the operational environment, these capabilities (i.e., stateful inspection filtering, IPsec VPN gateway, IPS/IDS
threat prevention) are not evaluated (out of scope). Only the secure communication channels from
Panorama to firewalls and Wildfires are claimed.
The administrators can deploy Panorama in the following system modes:
• Panorama - The appliance functions as a management server to manage firewalls and Dedicated
Log Collectors. The appliance also supports a local Log Collector to aggregate firewall logs. This
mode is the default mode.
• Management-Only - The appliance is a dedicated management appliance for your firewalls and
Dedicated Log Collectors. The appliance has no firewall log collection capabilities.
• Log Collector - The appliance functions as a Dedicated Log Collector. In this deployment, the
appliance has no web interface for administrative access, only a command line interface or CLI.
When in Log Collector mode, Panorama is intended to be managed by another manager in Panorama
or Management-Only mode (NOTE: this function is not evaluated). However, it provides a CLI with
all of the administrative functions necessary to configure and manage the device.
Regardless of which system mode is deployed, the TOE must also be configured to run in the Common
Criteria mode of operation described below. In addition, the TOE satisfies all mandatory SFRs regardless of
system modes though some selection-based requirements such as HTTPS may not be relevant (for example,
Log Collector mode does not support web interface).
Page 8 of 52
Common Criteria Mode of Operation
The TOE is compliant with the capabilities outlined in this Security Target only when operated in Common
Criteria mode (now referred to as FIPS-CC mode). FIPS-CC mode is a special operational mode in which the
FIPS requirements for startup and conditional self-tests as well as algorithm selection are enforced. In this
mode, only CC Approved cryptographic algorithms and key sizes are available. All tested models were placed
into the evaluated configuration by the lab, including the enabling of FIPS-CC mode.
2.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE high-level architecture is divided into four main subsystems: system software (SS); database (DB);
hardware (HW) and the hardened Linux-Derived operating system (OS). The system software provides
system management functionality including proprietary software, management interfaces (CLI and GUI),
cryptographic support (Palo Alto Networks Crypto Module), logging service (syslog-ng and auditd), web
service (nginx), and authentication service. The database provides a data repository for audit logs, user
account data, system data, configuration data, system log (i.e., syslog), and configuration logs. The operating
system provides a customized Linux kernel to enforce domain separation, memory management, disk access,
file I/O, network stacks (IPv4/IPv6), and communications with the underlying hardware components
including the network interface cards (NICs), memory, CPUs, and hard disks. Only services and libraries
required by the system software and DB are enabled in the OS. The virtual appliances will include the
hypervisor as well (not shown in figure 2).
The following diagram depicts both the hardware and software architecture of the TOE.
TOE
Figure 2: TOE Architecture
2.2.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE consists of the following components:
• Hardware appliance-includes the physical port connections on the outside of the appliance cabinet
and a time clock that provides the time stamp used for the audit records.
DB
Linux-Derived Operating System
…
System Software
DB
auditd
syslog-ng
HW CPU Memory HDD/SSD Net I/O
DB
Crypto Module
NGINX
Page 9 of 52
• Virtual appliances installed on specified hardware - the VM-Series supports the exact security
functionalities available in the physical form factor appliances, allowing an administrator to safely
enable physical or virtual appliances that enable applications flowing into, and across your virtual
computing environments. The VM software and the appliances are both included in the TOE. The
time clock, as well as CPU, ports, etc., are provided by VM environment (hypervisor) hosting the
VMs. VMs are deployed in the system using Intel CPUs.
• Panorama OS software v10.2 – the software/firmware component that runs the appliance. For
VMs, Panorama OS is software and for hardware appliances, Panorama OS is firmware. Panorama
OS is built on top of a Linux kernel and runs along with NGINX (the web server that Palo Alto
Networks uses), syslog-ng, sshd, Palo Alto Networks Crypto Module, and various vendor-developed
applications that implement its capabilities.
The physical boundary of the TOE comprises the whole appliance (M-200, M-300, M-600, and M-700); and
the virtual appliances on specified hypervisor and hardware. The models only differ in their performance
capability (e.g., processor speed, memory, and disk space), but they all provide the same security
functionality.
The appliance attaches to a physical network and includes the following ports:
• M-200: 3 RJ-45 10Mbps/100Mbps/1000Mbps ports for network/management traffic (Ethernet
ports); 1 RJ-45 10Mbps/100Mbps/1000Mbps port to access the device GUI through an Ethernet
interface (management port); and 1 console port for connecting a serial console (management
console port).
• M-300: 1 RJ-45 100Mbps/1000Mbps/10000Mbps ports for network/management traffic
(Ethernet ports); 1 RJ-45 100Mbps/1000Mbps/10000Mbps port to access the device GUI through
an Ethernet interface (management port); and 1 console port for connecting a serial console
(management console port).
• M-600: 3 RJ-45 10Mbps/100Mbps/1000Mbps ports for network/management traffic (Ethernet
ports); 2 10 GigE ports for network/management traffic (Gigabit Ethernet ports); 1 RJ-45
10Mbps/100Mbps/1000Mbps port to access the device GUI through an Ethernet interface
(management port); and 1 console port for connecting a serial console (management console port).
• M-700: 1 RJ-45 100Mbps/1000Mbps/10000Mbps ports for network/management traffic
(Ethernet ports); 2 10 GigE ports for network/management traffic (Gigabit Ethernet ports); 1 RJ-45
100Mbps/1000Mbps/10000Mbps port to access the device GUI through an Ethernet interface
(management port); and 1 console port for connecting a serial console (management console port).
In the evaluated configuration, the TOE can be managed by:
• A computer either directly connected or remotely connected to the Management port via an RJ-45
Ethernet cable. The Management port is an out-of-band management port that provides access to
the GUI/API via HTTPS or CLI via SSH. The computer is part of the operational environment and
required to have a web browser (for accessing the GUI) and SSH client (for accessing the CLI).
System logs, which record information about the system such as authentication attempts, session idle
timeout, and sessions establishment, termination, failures, are logged and stored locally by default.
Configuration logs, which record all management actions are also logged and stored locally by default.
Table 1 TOE Platforms
Page 10 of 52
Product
Identification
Illustration Description
M-200 Processor: Intel Xeon E5-
2620 (Ivy Bridge)
Memory: 128 GB DDR4
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: Undisclosed
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 16 TB (4 8TB
RAID disks)
SSD Storage Space: 240
GB
M-300 Processor: Intel Xeon
Silver 4310 (Ice Lake)
Memory: 256 GB DDR4
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: Undisclosed
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 32 TB (4 x 8TB
RAID disks)
SSD Storage Space: 480
GB
M-600 Processor: Intel Xeon E5-
2680 (Broadwell)
Memory: 256 GB DDR4
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: Undisclosed
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 48 TB (12 8TB
RAID disks)
SSD Storage Space: 240
GB
M-700 Processor: Intel Xeon
Silver 4316 (Ice Lake)
Memory: 512 GB DDR4
Page 11 of 52
Product
Identification
Illustration Description
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: Undisclosed
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 48 TB (12 8TB
RAID disks)
SSD Storage Space: 480
GB
Virtual Appliances
On VMware
ESXi
Processor: See section 1.1.
Memory: Up to 64 GB
(min 16 GB)
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: 10,000 logs per
second
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 24 TB (12
virtual logging disks)
SSD Storage Space: N/A
On Hyper-V Processor: See section 1.1.
Memory: Up to 32 GB
(min 8 GB)
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: 10,000 logs per
second
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 24 TB (12
virtual logging disks)
SSD Storage Space: N/A
On KVM Processor: See section 1.1.
Memory: Up to 32 GB
(min 8 GB)
Maximum Logging Rate as
Manager: 10,000 logs per
second
Page 12 of 52
Product
Identification
Illustration Description
Maximum Log Storage on
Appliance: 24 TB (12
virtual logging disks)
SSD Storage Space: N/A
The operational environment includes the following:
• Syslog server
• Palo Alto Networks Firewall or Wildfire appliances
• Workstation
o Web browsers - Chrome (version 96 or later), Firefox (version 94.0.2 or later), Safari
(version 12.0.3 or later on Mac, and version 5.1.7 or later on Windows and iOS), and
Microsoft Edge (Release 942 or later) browser.
o SSHv2 client
2.2.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
2.2.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for security relevant events including the events specified
in [NDcPP]. By default, the TOE stores the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator. The
TOE can also be configured to send the logs securely to a designated external log server.
2.2.2.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms that provide key management, random bit
generation (RBG), encryption/decryption, digital signature generation and verification, cryptographic
hashing, and keyed-hash message authentication features in support of higher-level cryptographic
protocols, including SSH and TLS. Note that to be in the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be
configured in FIPS-CC mode, which ensures the TOE’s configuration is consistent with the FIPS standard
and [NDcPP]. All physical and virtual appliance included in the TOE (Palo Alto Networks Crypto Module) are
CAVP-validated and details are provided in the TOE Security Summary (TSS):
• The M-Series appliance are covered by CAVP certificates (#A2906).
o AES - [FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption]
o RSA, ECDSA, DSA - [FCS_COP.1/SigGen and FCS_CKM.1]
o SHS - [FCS_COP.1/Hash]
o HMAC - [FCS_COP/1/KeyedHash]
Page 13 of 52
o DRBG - [FCS_RBG_EXT.1]
o KAS - [FCS_CKM.2]
• The Panorama virtual appliances are covered by CAVP certificates (#A2907).
o AES - [FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption]
o RSA, ECDSA, DSA - [FCS_COP.1/SigGen and FCS_CKM.1]
o SHS - [FCS_COP.1/Hash]
o HMAC - [FCS_COP/1/KeyedHash]
o DRBG - [FCS_RBG_EXT.1]
o KAS - [FCS_CKM.2]
2.2.2.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE requires all users accessing the TOE user interfaces to be successfully identified and authenticated
before they can access any security management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers network
accessible (HTTPS, SSH) and direct connections to the GUI and SSH for interactive administrator sessions
and HTTPS for XML and REST APIs.
The TOE supports the local (i.e., on device) definition and authentication of administrators with username,
password, and role (set of privileges), which it uses to authenticate the human user and to associate that
user with an authorized role. In addition, the TOE can authenticate users using X509 certificates and can be
configured to lock a user out after a configurable number of unsuccessful authentication attempts.
2.2.2.4 Security Management
The TOE provides a GUI, CLI, or API (XML and REST) to access the security management functions. Security
management commands are limited to administrators and are available only after they have provided
acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The TOE provides access to the GUI/CLI
locally via direct RJ-45 Ethernet cable connection and remotely using an HTTPS/TLS or SSHv2 client.
The TOE provides a number of management functions and restricts them to users with the appropriate
privileges. The management functions include the capability to configure the audit function, configure the
idle timeout, and review the audit trail. The TOE provides pre-defined Security Administrator, Audit
Administrator, and Cryptographic Administrator roles. These administrator roles are all considered Security
Administrator as defined in the [NDcPP] for the purposes of this ST.
2.2.2.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity
of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not
accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time
information is available (e.g., for log accountability).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it can detect when it is failing. It also includes
mechanism to verify TOE updates to prevent malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
2.2.2.6 TOE Access
The TOE provides the capabilities for both TOE- and user-initiated locking of interactive sessions and for
TOE termination of an interactive session after a period of inactivity. The TOE will display an advisory and
consent warning message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE before establishing a user session.
Page 14 of 52
2.2.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with remote administrators using SSH or HTTP over TLS
(HTTPS). SSH and TLS ensure both integrity and disclosure protection.
The TOE protects communication with the syslog server, Palo Alto Networks firewalls and Wildfire
Appliances using TLS connections.
2.3 TOE Documentation
Palo Alto Networks Inc. offers a series of documents that describe the installation of Palo Alto Networks
Panorama as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the applicable security features.
For Panorama v10.2, these documents include:
• Palo Alto Networks Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide (CCECG) for Panorama 10.2
• Panorama Administrator’s Guide Version 10.2, Last Revised: See Link Below
https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/panorama/10-
2/panorama-admin/panorama-admin.pdf
• VM-Series 10.2 Deployment Guide, Last Revised: See Link Below
https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/vm-series/10-2/vm-
series-deployment/vm-series-deployment.pdf
• PAN-OS® and Panorama 10.2 API Guide, Last Revised: See Link Below
https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/pan-os/10-2/pan-os-
panorama-api/pan-os-panorama-api.pdf
2.4 Excluded Functionality
The list below identifies features or protocols that are not evaluated or must be disabled, and the rationale
why. Note that this does not mean the features cannot be used in the evaluated configuration (unless
explicitly stated so). It means that the features were not evaluated and/or validated by an independent third
party and the functional correctness of the implementation is vendor assertion. Evaluated functionality is
scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in Security Target. In particular, only
the following protocols implemented by the TOE have been tested, and only to the extent specified by the
security functional requirements: TLS, HTTPS, SSH. The features below are out of scope.
Table 2 Excluded Features
Feature Description
Telnet and HTTP Management
Protocols
Telnet and HTTP are disabled by default and cannot be enabled
in the evaluated configuration. Telnet and HTTP are insecure
protocols which allow for plaintext passwords to be
transmitted. Use SSH and HTTPS only as the management
protocols to manage the TOE.
External Authentication Servers The NDcPP does not require external authentication servers.
Shell and Console Access The shell and console access are only allowed for pre-
operational installation, configuration, and post-operational
maintenance and trouble shooting.
API request over HTTP By default, the TOE support API requests over HTTPS only.
API request over HTTP is disabled and cannot be enabled in
the evaluated configuration.
Page 15 of 52
Feature Description
Stateful inspection filtering, VPN
gateway, IPS/IDS threat
prevention, URL filtering (PAN-
DB), Log forwarding, and
Malware sandboxing.
These features are provided by Palo Alto Networks firewalls
and Wildfire appliances and are not included in this evaluation.
Only the secure TLS connections between the firewalls and
Wildfire to the TOE were evaluated.
Centralized Device
Management.
These features (e.g., Policy Template and Push, Device Group)
were not evaluated. Only the secure TLS connections between
the firewalls and Wildfire to the TOE were evaluated.
Online Certificate Status
Protocol
CRL (not OCSP) is to be used in the evaluated configuration.
Any features not associated with
SFRs in claimed NDcPP
NDcPP forbids adding additional requirements to the Security
Target (ST). If additional functionalities are mentioned in the ST,
it is for completeness only.
Page 16 of 52
3. Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition (composed of organizational
policies, threat statements, and assumption) from [NDcPP].
In general, the [NDcPP] has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for network infrastructure
devices, such as firewalls, routers, managers and as such is applicable to the Palo Alto TOE. NOTE:
A.COMPONENTS_RUNNING is not applicable because this is not a distributed TOE. [NDcPP] also has
virtualization assumptions that are applicable to the virtual TOE only.
Page 17 of 52
4. Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from
the [NDcPP]. The security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these
objectives characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their
operational environment.
In general, the [NDcPP] has presented Security Objectives appropriate for network infrastructure devices,
such as is applicable to the Palo Alto TOE. NOTE: OE.COMPONENTS_RUNNING is not applicable because
this is not a distributed TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the
environment.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other
than those services necessary for the operation,
administration and support of the TOE.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that
traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will
be covered by other security and assurance measures in
the operational environment.
OE.UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an
administrator on a regular basis in response to the release
of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to
access the TOE must be protected on any other platform
on which they reside.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
guidance documentation in a trusted manner.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed
to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the
TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the
TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be
trusted.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no
unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual
information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material,
PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the
equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
Page 18 of 52
OE.VM_CONFIGURATION For vNDs, the Security Administrator ensures that the VS
and VMs are configured to
• reduce the attack surface of VMs as much as
possible while supporting ND functionality (e.g.,
remove unnecessary virtual hardware, turn off
unused inter-VM communications mechanisms),
and
• correctly implement ND functionality (e.g., ensure
virtual networking is properly configured to
support network traffic, management channels,
and audit reporting). The VS should be operated
in a manner that reduces the likelihood that vND
operations are adversely affected by virtualisation
features such as cloning, save/restore,
suspend/resume, and live migration.
If possible, the VS should be configured to make use of
features that leverage the VS’s privileged position to
provide additional security functionality. Such features
could include malware detection through VM
introspection, measured VM boot, or VM snapshot for
forensic analysis.
Page 19 of 52
5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope
the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the [NDcPP].
The SARs are the set of SARs specified in [NDcPP].
5.1 Extended Requirements
All the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the [NDcPP]. The [NDcPP] defines all the
extended SFRs (*_EXT) and since they are not redefined in this ST, the [NDcPP] should be consulted for
more information regarding those CC extensions.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Palo Alto TOE.
Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FAU: Security Audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2: User Identity Association
FAU_STG_EXT.1: Protected Audit Event Storage
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2: Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption: Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen: Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash: Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash: Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash
Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: HTTPS Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1: SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(1): TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
(Web UI Connection)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(2): TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
(Firewall and WF Connections)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2: TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
Page 20 of 52
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1: Authentication Failure Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev: X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2: X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3: X.509 Certificate Requests
FMT: Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate: Management of Security Functions
Behaviour
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData: Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared,
symmetric and private keys)
FPT_APW_EXT.1: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_STM_EXT.1: Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
FTA: TOE Access FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted
Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF Trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin: Trusted Path
5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
FAU_GEN.1 – Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual
user accounts are required for administrators).
• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the
information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
Page 21 of 52
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the
action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• [no other actions];
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 4
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three
of Table 4.
Table 4 Auditable Events
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an HTTPS
session.
Reason for failure
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a SSH session. Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(1)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(2)
Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 Failure to establish a TLS session. Reason for failure
FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is
met or exceeded.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
Page 22 of 52
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a
certificate
Any addition, replacement or
removal of trust anchors1
in the
TOE's trust store
Reason for failure of certificate
validation
Identification of certificates
added, replaced or removed as
trust anchor in the TOE's trust
store
FIA_X509_EXT.2(1)
FIA_X509_EXT.2(2)
None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual
update
None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF
data.
None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the
update attempt (success or failure)
None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time -
either Administrator actuated or
changed via an automated process.
(Note that no continuous changes to
time need to be logged. See also
application note on
FPT_STM_EXT.1)
For discontinuous changes to
time: The old and new values for
the time. Origin of the attempt
to change time for success and
failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if
“terminate the session” is
selected)
The termination of a local session by
the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session
by the session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive
session.
None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Identification of the initiator and
target of failed trusted channels
establishment attempt.
1
Importing CA certificate(s) or generating CA certificate(s) internally will implicitly set them as trust anchor.
Page 23 of 52
Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record
Contents
Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path.
Termination of the trusted path.
Failures of the trusted path
functions.
None.
FAU_GEN.2 – User Identity Association
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 – Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity
using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself [
• TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data
locally].
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule:
[overwrite oldest records first]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix
B.3;
• ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the
following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;
• FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet
the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix
B.1
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC
3526].
] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].112 bits.
Page 24 of 52
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version
2.1;
• Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;
• Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
• FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups
listed in RFC 3526].
] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by TD0580 and TD0581.
FCS_CKM.4 – Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a
[single overwrite consisting of [a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF’s
RBG]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by
the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a
[[three]-pass] overwrite consisting of [[a different alternating
patterns that does not contain any CSP]];
that meets the following: No Standard.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, CTR, GCM] mode and cryptographic key
sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3,
[CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in
ISO 19772].
FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048
bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits],
Page 25 of 52
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256
bits, 384 bits, 521 bits]
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
that meet the following: [
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or
RSASSAPKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital
Signature scheme 3,
• For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-
521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4
].
FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256,
384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, implicit] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384,
512] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following:
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 – Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in
accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that
accumulates entropy from [[one] platform-based noise source] with minimum of [256
bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of
the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1 – HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3 If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall [not require client authentication, not
establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.
Application Note: By default, the TOE acting as a HTTPS server does not perform
mutual authentication for HTTPS client/user. If the TOE is configured for mutual
Page 26 of 52
authentication, the TLS client/user certificate must be valid, or the TOE will not establish
a HTTPS session (second selection).
Application Note: The TOE in Log Collector system mode does not claim HTTPS as the
web interface is disabled in this mode.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 – SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) [4251, 4252,
4253, 4254, 4344, 5656, 6668].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following
authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-
based].
Application Note: This SFR was modified by TD0631.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K]
bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128cbc,
aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-
gcm@openssh.com].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation
uses [ssh-rsa] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key
algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1,
hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, implicit] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all
other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and
[ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange
methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used
for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to
protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached,
rekey needs to be performed.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 – TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] and reject all other TLS and SSL
versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
Page 27 of 52
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifiers of the following types:
[identifiers defined in RFC 6125, Ipv4 address in CN or SAN] are matched to
reference identifiers.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted
channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
• Not implement any administrator override mechanism].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall [present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension
with the following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other
curves] in the Client Hello.
Application Note: The TOE connecting to the syslog server acts as a TOE client.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 - TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication using
X.509v3 certificates.
Application Note: The TOE optionally supports mutual authentication for the secure
syslog server connection.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(1) - TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication (Web UI Connection)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1(1) The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all
other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following
ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
Page 28 of 52
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2(1) The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0,
and [none].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3(1) The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [Diffie-Hellman parameters
with size [2048 bits], ECDHE curves [secp256r1, secp384r1] and no other curves]].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4(1) The TSF shall support [session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC
5077].
Application Note: For the management connection, the TOE is the TLS server. Mutual
authentication is supported but must be configured.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(2) - TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication (Firewall and WF Connections)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1(2) The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346)] and reject all
other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following
ciphersuites:
[
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2(2) The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0,
and [none].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3(2) The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [Diffie-Hellman parameters
with size [2048 bits], ECDHE curves [secp256r1, secp384r1] and no other curves]].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4(2) The TSF shall support [session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC
5077].
Application Note: For the management connection, the TOE is the TLS server. Mutual
authentication is supported but must be configured.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 - TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication of TLS clients
using X.509v3 certificates.
Page 29 of 52
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted
channel if the client certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
• Not implement any administrator override mechanism
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.3 The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the identifier contained in a
certificate does not match an expected identifier for the client. If the identifier is a
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), then the TSF shall match the identifiers
according to RFC 6125, otherwise the TSF shall parse the identifier from the
certificate and match the identifier against the expected identifier of the client as
described in the TSS.
Application Note: For the management connection, the TOE is the TLS server. Mutual
authentication is supported but must be configured. For the connections to the WF or
firewall, mutual authentication is required.
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1 – Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-10]
unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to
authenticate remotely using a password.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF
shall [prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using
any authentication method that involves a password until [unlock] is taken by an
Administrator, prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote
session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator
defined time period has elapsed].
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 – Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and
lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”,
“#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, [“'”, “+”, “,”, “-”, “.”, “/”, “:”, “;”, “<”, “=”, “>”, “[”,
“\”, “]”, “_”, “`”, “{”, “}”, and “~”]];
2. Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [8] and [15]
characters.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 – User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [[ICMP]].
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
administrative user.
Page 30 of 52
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 – Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, certificate-based, SSH public key-
based] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 – Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the
authentication is in progress at the local console.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev – X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation supporting a
minimum path length of three certificates.
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate as a trust
anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in
the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag
set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3,
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following
rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity
verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP
Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints
extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 – X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for [TLS], and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a
certificate, the TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
Page 31 of 52
FIA_X509_EXT.3 – X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1 The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able
to provide the following information in the request: public key and [Common
Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2 The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the
CA Certificate Response.
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate - Management of Security Functions Behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual
update to Security Administrators.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData – Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security
Administrators.
FMT_SMF.1 – Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature]
capability prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
[
o Ability to configure the list of TOE-provided services available before an entity
is identified and authenticated, as specified in FIA_UIA_EXT.1;
o Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE’s trust store;
o Ability to manage the TOE’s trust store and designate X509v3 certificates as
trust anchor;
o Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
].
Application Note: This SFR was modified by TD0631.
FMT_SMR.2 – Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely;
are satisfied.
Page 32 of 52
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 – Protection of TSF data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric key, and private
keys.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 – Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 – Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
FPT_TST_EXT.1 – TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power
on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [
• AES Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Sign Known Answer Test
• RSA Verify Known Answer Test
• RSA Encrypt/Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Sign Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Verify Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• DRBG SP800-90A Known Answer Tests
• SP 800-90A Section 11.3 Health Tests
• DH Known Answer Test
• ECDH Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135 KDF Known Answer Tests
• Firmware Integrity Test
].
Page 33 of 52
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 – Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently
executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE
firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates
to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the
TOE using a [digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
5.2.6 TOE Access (FTA)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 – TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
FTA_SSL.3 – TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-
configurable time interval of session inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4 – User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own
interactive session.
FTA_TAB.1 – Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security
Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the
TOE.
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 – Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel
between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server,
[[Firewall and Wildfire]] that is logically distinct from other communication channels and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [
• transmitting audit records to an audit server using TLS
].
Page 34 of 52
FTP_TRP.1/Admin – Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH, HTTPS] to provide a communication path
between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other
communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the
channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the
trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator
authentication and all remote administrive actions.
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to [NDcPP].
Table 5 Assurance Components
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ASE: Security Target Evaluation ASE_INT.1: ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1: Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1: Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1: Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_ECD.1: Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1: Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1: TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Consequently, the evaluation activities specified in the following Supporting Documents apply to the TOE
evaluation:
• Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, December-2019, Version 2.2
Page 35 of 52
6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
6.1 Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 The TOE is designed to be able to generate log records for security relevant and other
events as they occur. The events that can cause an audit record to be logged include
starting and stopping the audit function (also startup and shutdown of system), any use
of an administrator command via the Web Interface or CLI, as well as all of the events
identified in Table 4 (which corresponds to the audit events specified in the [NDcPP].
All log records include the following contents: date/time, event type, user ID (i.e.,
username, IP address) or component (i.e., ssh, syslog), and description of the event
including success or failure. For user-initiated actions, the User ID is included in the log
records. For cryptographic key operations, the key name—or certificate name if the key
is embedded in certificate or certificate request—is also logged. Furthermore, based on
the event, the description of the event will include additional information as required in
Table 4. Please refer to the CC AGD [CCECG] for the complete list of mandated audit
logs and contents.
FAU_GEN.2 The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific username
and/or network entity (identified by source IP address) that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 The audit trail generated by the TOE comprises several logs, which are locally stored in
the TOE file system on the hard disk:
• Configuration logs—include events such as when an administrator configures the
security policies, user management, cryptographic functions, audit functions
(e.g., enable syslog over TLS connection), and when an administrator configures
which events gets audited.
• System logs—include events such as user login and logout, session
establishment, termination, and failures.
The size of each log file is administrator configurable by specifying the percentage of
space allocated to each log type on the hard disk. If the log size is reduced, the TOE
removes the oldest logs when the changes are committed. When a log reaches the
maximum size, the TOE starts overwriting the oldest log entries with the new log entries.
Maximum disk space is platform dependent, and it depends on the hard disk drive
installed on the system. By default, the TOE allocates 25% to system log and 30% to
configuration log. On an M-200, that is 12.48 GB and 14.98 GB, respectively. On VM,
it’s 4% each with about 633 MB allocated for each log type but this will depend on the
size of the virtual disk allocated.
The TOE stores the audit records locally and protects them from unauthorized deletion
by allowing only users in the pre-defined Audit Administrator role to access the audit
Page 36 of 52
trail with delete privileges. The pre-defined Audit Administrator role is part of the
Security Administrator role as defined by the [NDcPP]. The TOE is a single standalone
component that stores audit data locally. The TOE does not provide an interface where
a user can modify the audit records, thus it prevents modification to the audit records.
The TOE can be configured to send generated audit records to an external Syslog server
in real-time using TLSv1.2. When configured to send audit records to a syslog server,
audit records are also written to the external syslog as they are written locally to the
internal logs.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_COP.1/*
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms provided by Palo Alto
Networks Crypto Module supporting the cryptographic functions below. The following
functions have been certified in accordance with the identified standards.
Table 6 Cryptographic Functions
Functions Standards Certificates
Asymmetric Key Generation
FFC key pair generation (key
size 2048 bits)
FIPS PUB 186-4 Appliances:
DSA #A2906
ECDSA #A2906
RSA #A2906
VMs:
DSA #A2907
ECDSA #A2907
RSA #A2907
ECC key pair generation (NIST
curves P-256, P-384, P-521)
Note that TLS and SSH each use
any of P-256, P-384, or P-521,
and certificate generation uses
only P-256 or P-384.
FIPS PUB 186-4
RSA key generation (key sizes
2048, 3072, 4096 bits)
Note that TLS uses 2048-bit
RSA keys while certificate and
SSH RSA key pair generation
use 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit
keys
FIPS PUB 186-4
FFC Schemes using Diffie-
Hellman group 14 that meet
the following: RFC 3526 and
SP 800-56Ar3
RFC 3526
NIST SP 800-56Ar3
Cryptographic Key Establishment
RSA based key establishment RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 RSA = N/A
Appliances:
ECDSA based key
establishment
NIST SP 800-56Ar3
Page 37 of 52
FFC based key establishment NIST SP 800-56Ar3 KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
#A2906
VMs:
KAS-ECC-SSC
KAS-FFC-SSC
#A2907
Key establishment scheme
using Diffie-Hellman group 14
that meets the following: RFC
3526 and SP 800-56Ar3
RFC 3526
NIST SP 800-56Ar3
AES Data Encryption/Decryption
AES CBC, CTR, GCM (128,
256 bits)
AES as specified in ISO
18033-3
CBC as specified in ISO
10116
CTR as specified in ISO
10116
GCM as specified in ISO
19772
Appliances:
AES #A2906
VMs:
AES #A2907
Signature Generation and Verification
RSA Digital Signature
Algorithm (rDSA) (modulus
2048, 3072, 4096)
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 5.5, using PKCS #1
v2.1 Signature Schemes
RSASSA-PSS
and/or
RSASSAPKCS1v1_5;
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital
signature scheme 2
or
Digital Signature scheme 3
Appliances:
RSA #A2906
VMs:
RSA #A2907
ECDSA (NIST curves P-256,
P-384, and P-521)
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”,
Section 6 and Appendix D,
Implementing “NIST curves”
P-256, P-384, ISO/IEC
14888-3, Section 6.4
Appliances:
ECDSA #A2906
VMs:
ECDSA #A2907
Cryptographic Hashing
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384
and SHA-512 (digest sizes
160, 256, 384 and 512 bits)
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 Appliances:
SHS #A2906
VMs:
SHS #A2907
Keyed-hash Message Authentication
Page 38 of 52
• HMAC-SHA-1 (block
size 512 bits, key size
160 bits and digest
size 160 bits)
• HMAC-SHA-256
(block size 512 bits,
key size 256 bits and
digest size 256 bits)
• HMAC-SHA-384
(block size 1024 bits,
key size 384 bits and
digest size 384 bits)
• HMAC-SHA-512
(block size 1024 bits,
key size 512 bits and
digest size 512 bits)
ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 Appliances:
HMAC #A2906
VMs:
HMAC #A2907
Random Bit Generation
CTR_DRBG (AES) from a
hardware-based noise source
with one independent
software-based noise source
of 256 bits of non-
determinism
ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Appliances:
DRBG #A2906
VMs:
DRBG #A2907
The TOE implements the ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Deterministic Random Bit Generator
(DRBG) based on the AES 256 block cipher in counter mode (CTR_DRBG(AES)). The
TOE instantiates the DRBG with maximum security strength, obtaining the 256 bits of
entropy to seed the DRBG. The hardware-based entropy source is described in the
proprietary Entropy Design document. The TOE generates asymmetric cryptographic
keys used for key establishment in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes, FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECC schemes, and FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1 for FFC schemes.
While the TOE generally fulfills all of the FIPS PUB 186-4 requirements without
extensions, the following table specifically identifies the “should”, “should not”, and
“shall not” conditions from the publication along with an indication of whether the TOE
conforms to those conditions with deviations rationalized. Key generation is among
the identified sections.
Table 7 FIPS 186-4 Conformance
FIPS PUB 186-4
“should”, “should not”, or
“shall not”
Implemented
accordingly?
Rationale for
deviation
FIPS PUB 186-4
Appendix B.1
B.1.1 should Yes N/A
B.1.2 should Yes N/A
FIPS PUB 186-4
Appendix B.3
Page 39 of 52
B.3.1 shall not Yes N/A
FIPS PUB 186-4
Appendix B.4
B.4.1 should Yes N/A
B.4.2 should Yes N/A
The TOE performs cryptographic RSA-based key establishment in accordance with
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”, NIST Special
Publication 800-56A for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes, and NIST
Special Publication 800-56A for finite field-based key establishment schemes. The
TOE acts as both a sender and as a recipient for all supported key establishment
schemes (RSA, ECC, FFC). The TOE does not reveal specific details about an error (e.g.,
decryption error) for RSA-based key establishment schemes. For TLS, the domain
parameters used for the finite field-based key establishment scheme are compliance
with FIPS 186-4. For SSH, the TOE uses Diffie-Hellman Group 14 that meets RFC 3526
section 3 key establishment scheme. Per SP 800-56Ar3, only the safe primes (e.g.,
MODP-2048) defined in Sections 3 of RFC 3526 can be used. NOTE: RFC 7919
(FFDHE) is not supported.
The claimed key generation and key establishment algorithms used for each function is
summarized below.
FCS_CKM.1:
- X.509 key pair generation: ECDSA (256, 384), RSA (2048, 3072, 4096)
- SSH RSA key pair generation: RSA (2048, 3072, 4096)
- SSH: FFC DH Group 14
FCS_CKM.2:
- SSH: FFC DH Group 14, ECC (256, 384)
- TLS: ECC (256, 384, 521), FFC (2048), RSA (2048)
The SHA-1/SHA-2 hash function is associated with the digital signature
generation/verification and corresponding HMAC functions.
FCS_CKM.4
Table 8 Private Keys and CSPs
CSP
#
CSP/Key Name Type Description
1
RSA Private Keys RSA RSA Private keys for verification
of signatures, authentication or
key establishment.
(RSA 2048, 3072, or 4096-bit)
2
ECDSA Private
Keys
ECDSA ECDSA Private key for
verification of signatures and
authentication
(P-256, P-384, P-521)
3
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
TLS
Secret
Secret value used to derive the
TLS session keys
Page 40 of 52
4
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components
DH Diffie-Hellman private FFC or EC
component used in TLS
(DHE 2048, ECDHE P-256, P-
384, P-521)
5
TLS HMAC Keys HMAC TLS integrity and authentication
session keys (HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-
384, HMAC-SHA2-512)
6
TLS Encryption
Keys
AES TLS encryption session keys
(128 and 256 CBC or GCM)
7
SSH Session
Integrity Keys
HMAC Used in all SSH connections to
the security module’s command
line interface.
(HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-
256, HMAC-SHA2-512)
8
SSH Session
Encryption Keys
AES Used in all SSH connections to
the security module’s command
line interface.
(128 and 256 bits in CBC and
CTR, or 128 and 256 bits in GCM)
9
SSH ECDH/DH
Private
Components
ECDH ECDH and Diffie-Hellman private
component
(DH 2048 bits, ECDH P-256, P-
384, P-521)
16
Firmware code
integrity check
HMAC
ECDSA
Used to check the integrity of
crypto-related code. (HMAC-
SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256)
*Keys used to perform power-up
self-tests are not CSPs and do not
need to be zeroized
17
Firmware Content
Encryption Key
AES-256 Used to encrypt/decrypt
firmware, software, and sensitive
content.
18
Password Password Authentication string with a
minimum length of 6 characters.
Stored hashed with SHA-256 and
nonce.
19
DRBG Seed /State DRBG AES 256 CTR DRBG used in the
generation of a random values.
The TOE performs a key error detection check on each internal, intermediate transfer
of a key. The TOE stores persistent secret and private keys in encrypted form (AES
encrypted) when not in use. The KEK (Key Encryption Key) is the Firmware Content
Page 41 of 52
Encryption Key (also known as the Master Key). The KEK is not stored encrypted but
is protected either using 1.) Cryptod (Palo Alto Networks proprietary key storage
module) 2.) External HSM. By default, HSM (hardware security module) is not used as
it needs to be configured. If stored by Cryptod (evaluated configuration), then it is
destroyed by the TOE’s overwriting method. If it is stored via External HSM
(operational environment), it is protected by the HSM and is out of scope. The TOE
also zeroizes (i.e., overwrites) non-persistent cryptographic keys as soon as their
associated session has terminated. In addition, the TOE recognizes when a private key
expires and promptly zeroizes the key on expiration. The TOE does not permit
expired private signature keys to be archived.
Private cryptographic keys, plaintext cryptographic keys, and all other critical security
parameters stored in intermediate locations for the purposes of transferring the
key/critical security parameters (CSPs) to another location are zeroized immediately
following the transfer. Zeroization is done by overwriting the storage location with a
random pattern, followed by a read-verify. Note that plaintext cryptographic session
keys and CSPs are only ever stored in volatile memory. For non-volatile memories other
than EEPROM and Flash, the zeroization is executed by overwriting three times using
a different alternating data pattern each time. This includes the SSD storage. This
includes all CSPs that are not stored in volatile memory such as private keys, KEK,
hashed passwords, and entropy seeds. Note: Only the KEK is stored in plaintext and is
zeroized as noted below. It is used to encrypt all the private keys and other sensitive
data.
For volatile memory and non-volatile EEPROM and Flash memories, the zeroization is
executed by a single direct overwrite consisting of a pseudo random pattern, followed
by a read-verify. Sensitive data in volatile memory includes session keys such as
encryption keys, integrity keys, pre-Master secret, etc. For non-volatile memory, the
only plaintext key that is stored is the KEK. When a new KEK is generated, the old KEK
is destroyed via key store APIs that overwrites the old KEK. The KEK is erased when
the administrator initiates the zeroization function, which overwrites the KEK three or
more times using an alternating pattern of ones and zeroes. Destruction of all
encrypted stored keys is accomplished indirectly through destruction of the KEK that
encrypted them.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(1)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1(2)
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2
The TOE can be configured as a TLS server for mutual certificate-based authentication
for secure connections. To enable certificate-based authentication, the TOE must be
configured to use a client certificate profile using the Panorama > Certificate
Management > Certificate Profile tab. The TOE uses TLS service profiles to specify a
certificate and the allowed protocol versions for TLS services. The TOE (as a TLS client)
uses TLSv1.2 to initiate a TLS connection to external syslog server. The TOE (as TLS
server) receives inbound remote administration TLS traffic on the management (MGT)
interface from TLS client (e.g., web browser, firewall, Wildfire). The key agreement
parameters of the server key exchange message consist of the key establishment
parameters generated by the TOE: Diffie-Hellman parameters with key size of 2048
bits, ECDSA implementing NIST curves secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1. The
TOE supports session resumption using session tickets for a single context (no
configuration needed). The TOE checks if session tickets expire which would trigger a
full handshake. The session tickets are encrypted with AES encryption and 128-bits
encryption key plus 256-bits HMAC-SHA-256 key; and adhered to the structural
format provided in section 4 of RFC 5077. This interface does not support fallback
authentication for TLS. The TOE denies connections from clients requesting
connections using SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 by default and shall not establish a
trusted channel if the fully qualified distinguished name (FQDN) in the subject or
Page 42 of 52
Subject Alternative Name (SAN) field contained in a certificate does not match the
expected identifier for the peer. The TOE will match the FQDN identifier according to
RFC 6125.
The TOE can be configured as a TLS server to permit inbound remote administration
traffic (HTTPS) in which the peer initiates handshake and peer authentication is
performed via username and password credentials. The TOE’s HTTPS protocol
complies with RFC 2818 and is implemented using TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and TLS 1.1
(RFC 4346). The key agreement parameters of the server key exchange message
consist of the key establishment parameters generated by the TOE: Diffie-Hellman
parameters with key size 2048 bits (group 14), ECDSA implementing NIST curves
secp256r1 and secp384r1. The TOE supports session resumption using session tickets.
The session tickets are encrypted with AES encryption and 128-bits encryption key
plus 256-bits HMAC-SHA-256 key; and adhered to the structural format provided in
section 4 of RFC 5077. Fallback to password-based authentication is not supported.
The TOE denies connections from clients requesting connections using SSL 2.0, SSL
3.0, or TLS 1.0 by default.
The TOE can be configured as a TLS client for secure communication to an external
audit server. The TOE presents the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups
Extension in the Client Hello with the secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 NIST
curves and is configured when FIPS-CC mode is enabled. The TOE verifies that the
presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125 and only
establishes a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid. The TOE compares the
external server’s presented identifier to the reference identifier by matching the
certificate FQDN (hostname) or IPv4 address in the SAN field or CN (of subject Field)
of the server certificate. The SAN is checked first and if there is any match, the
connection is allowed. The TOE supports wildcards for server authentication using
FQDN (hostname) only. The only supported IP address format for IPv4 is specified in
RFC 3986. The CN field is composed of IPv4 addresses that follow the rules described
in RFC 3986. All networking addresses are in big-endian order, when converting
between types, all strings will convert to the machine byte order (little endian or big-
endian) and in the case of little endian, it is flipped to big-endian and then compared.
Certificate pinning is not supported but mutual authentication is supported.
This is list of TLS ciphersuites supported for this interface. TOE (as TLS client) to syslog
server connection (same ciphersuites for mutual authentication if configured). Support
TLSv1.2 only and RSA, DHE (finite-field based), and ECDHE (elliptic curve-based)
schemes.
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
Page 43 of 52
TOE (as TLS server) for the Web UI management connection (same for mutual
authentication). Supports TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 only, and DHE (finite-field based) and
ECDHE (elliptic curve-based) schemes.
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
TOE (as TLS server) connection to firewall or Wildfire connection (mutual
authentication required). Supports TLSv1.1 or TLSv1.2 only, and DHE (finite-field
based), and ECDHE (elliptic curve-based) schemes.
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC
5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 The TOE supports SSHv2 (compliant to RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 4344, 5656,
and 6668) with AES encryption/decryption algorithms (aes128cbc, aes256-cbc,
aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com) with
key sizes of 128 and 256 bits. No optional characteristics are supported. The TOE also
supports HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512, implicit MAC (aes128-
gcm@openssh.com and aes256-gcm@openssh.com) for integrity and authenticity.
Both encryption and integrity algorithms are administrator-configurable and while
3DES, HMAC-MD5, diffie-hellman-group-1 are also supported, they are all disabled
when FIPS-CC mode is enabled. Only the Approved encryption and integrity algorithms
along with key exchange algorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,
ecdh-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-nistp521 and authentication public-key algorithm
ssh-rsa are permitted in the evaluated configuration. If the SSH client (in the
operational environment) only supports non-Approved algorithms, the SSH connection
will be rejected by the TOE.
The TOE uses Palo Alto Networks Crypto Module implementation to support the
SSHv2 connections. The password authentication timeout period is 60 seconds
allowing clients to retry only 4 times. In addition, both public-key (RSA) and password-
based authentication can be configured with password-based being the default
method. For password, the TOE verifies the user identity when the username is
entered. For public-key, the administrator must associate the public key to the user.
SSH packets are limited to 256 Kbytes and any packet over that size will be dropped
(i.e., not processed farther and buffer containing the packet will be freed). The TOE
manages a tracking mechanism for each SSH session so that it can initiate a new key
Page 44 of 52
exchange (rekey) when either a configurable amount of data (10 – 4000 MBs) or time
(10 – 3600 seconds) has passed, whichever threshold occurs first. In the evaluated
configuration, the administrator should not configure the SSH data rekey threshold to
be more than 1024 MBs.
6.3 Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
FIA_UAU.7
The TOE is designed to require users to be identified and authenticated before they
can access any of the TOE functions. The only capabilities allowed prior to users
authenticating are the display of the informative (login) banner and responding to
ICMP request (e.g., ping or ICMP echo reply).
The TOE maintains user accounts which it uses to control access to the TOE. When
creating a new user account, the administrator specifies a username (i.e., user identity
or ID), a password or X.509v3 certificate/common access card, and a role. Certificate-
based authentication is only supported on the GUI. To enable client certificate-based
authentication (i.e., mutual authentication), the TOE must be configured to use a
client certificate profile using the Panorama > Certificate Management > Certificate
Profile tab. When a client certificate profile is enabled, each administrator must use a
client certificate for access to the TOE via TLS. The client certificate must identify the
domain name (in this case, the username) in the SAN (first) or CN (second if SAN is
not present). The TOE will match the presented username to the username in the
local database and associated role. Only one role is specified in the user account per
user.
The TOE uses the username and password attributes to identify and authenticate the
user when the user logs in via the GUI, CLI, or API. With public key-based
authentication, a digital signature is exchanged and verified, in lieu of a password. The
TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered, and the private keys are never
transmitted. For CLI, GUI, or API, the default authentication method is password. The
administrators must configure public-key authentication which is supported for both
SSH and HTTPS sessions. It uses the role attribute to specify user permissions and
control what the user can do with the GUI or CLI.
The administrator can logon to the GUI or API by using a secure connection (HTTPS)
from a web browser or to CLI by using a secure connection (SSHv2) from a SSH client.
The TOE provides access to the GUI/CLI/API locally via direct RJ-45 Ethernet cable
connection and remotely using an HTTPS/TLS or SSHv2 client. The administrator
enters the IP address of the TOE and their username and password. The TOE also
can be configured to require a client certificate (mutual authentication) and
additionally require the username and password or not (i.e., 2-factor authentication).
The credentials may be supplied by a CAC or retrieved from the client computer.
Regardless of whether a user logs in using an HTTPS or SSH connection, a logon is
successful when the username and password provided by the user matches a defined
account on the TOE or when the username and digital signature is verified by the
TOE.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Passwords can be composed of upper and lower case letters, numbers and special
characters (“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, “'”, “+”, “,”, “-”, “.”, “/”, “:”, “;”, “<”,
“=”, “>”, “[”, “\”, “]”, “_”, “`”, “{”, “}”, and “~”). The minimum password length is
configurable by the administrator from 8 up to 15 characters. Note in FIPS-CC mode,
the minimum password length cannot be configured below 8. The maximum
Page 45 of 52
password length is 31 characters. For example, if the administrator configures the
minimum password length as 15, you can only create passwords from length of 15 to
31.
FIA_AFL.1 The TOE logs all unsuccessful authentication attempts in the System Log and tracks
the number of failed attempts via internal counters. The TOE can be configured to
lock a user or authorized IT entity out after a configurable number (1 – 10) of
unsuccessful authentication attempts. The lock can be configured to last a specified
amount of time (1 – 60 minutes) during which providing the correct credentials will
still not allow access (i.e., locked out), or until an administrator logs in to unlock the
locked user. A setting of “0” will lock out the user indefinitely. In this case, the
Administrator must unlock the locked user. These settings can be configured for both
HTTPS/TLS and SSH remote administration connections but applies to password
authentication only. Public-key authentication is not vulnerable to weak passwords
that can be brute-forced. It’s recommended that at least one administrator, preferably
the Superuser role (predefined ‘admin’ account), is configured with public-key
authentication for SSH. In the rare situation where all administrators (customer
created) are locked out at the same time, the Superuser role (predefined ‘admin’
account) with public-key authentication can be used to login and unlock users. In
addition, the user can also wait until the lockout time expires.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication
for TLS (server authentication and mutual authentication) and HTTPS connections.
Public key infrastructure (PKI) credentials, such as RSA keys and certificates are
stored in the TOE’s underlying file system on the appliance. Certificates and their
associated private key are stored in a single container: the Certificate File. The
PKCS#12 file consists of an Encrypted Private Key and X.509 Certificate. By default,
all the private keys are protected since they are always stored in encrypted format
using AES-256. The physical security of the appliance (A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION)
protects the appliance and the certificates from being tampered with or deleted. In
addition, the TOE identification and authentication security functions protect an
unauthorized user from gaining access to the TOE.
The TOE supports Certificate Revocation List (CRL) status verification for certificate
profiles. CRL supports RFC 5280 and 5759 supporting strong Suite B ECDSA
algorithms and curve sizes for signing CRLs.
The TOE uses the following rules for validating the extendedKeyUsage2
field:
• Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication
purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
• Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication
purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
The TOE validates a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension is present and the cA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates. The TOE
forms a Certificate trust path by ensuring that the basic constraints are met, proper
key usage parameters exist, the CA flag exists, performing a revocation check of each
certificate in the path and performing the validity of the CA certificate. The TOE will
not treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is not
present or the cA flag is not set to TRUE. The TOE supports certificate path validation
for a minimum path length of three certificates and terminates with a trusted CA
certificate (i.e., Root certificate). The Administrator must import or generate a root
CA certificate and store it in the TOE trust store. To use only a specific trusted
FIA_X509_EXT.2
2
Certificates are not used for trusted updates or executable code integrity.
Page 46 of 52
certificate, the Administrator must specify only that certificate in the Certificate
Profile and tied that Profile to a TLS connection.
The TOE downloads and caches the last-issued CRL for every CA listed in the trusted
CA list of the TOE. Caching only applies to validated certificates; if a TOE never
validated a certificate, the TOE cache does not store the CRL for the issuing CA. Also,
the cache only stores a CRL until it expires. The TOE supports CRLs only in
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) or PEM format.
When the certificate status is unknown or cannot be determined, the TLS session is
blocked. This is the default for TLS connections and cannot be changed.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 The authorized administrator may generate a certificate request as specified in RFC
2986 and provide the following information in the request: public key, Common
Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, and Country. The administrator may also
import a certificate and private key into the TOE from an enterprise certificate
authority or obtain a certificate from an external CA. The TOE provides the ability for
administrators to generate a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) with a multi-level
organizational unit. When the administrators import a certificate based on the CSR,
the TOE will check to make sure the certificate chain are present in the TOE.
Otherwise, the TOE will reject the certificate and will not associate it with the CSR.
6.4 Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
The TOE provides a GUI management interface and CLI to support security
management of the TOE. The GUI is accessible via direct connection to the
management port on the device (local access), or remotely over HTTPS. Note
the TOE in Log Collector mode does not support GUI. The CLI is accessible via
direct connection to the management port on the device (local access), or
remotely over SSHv2. The restricted role-based privileges enable only
authorized administrators to configure the TOE functions such as updating the
TOE and manipulating TSF data. For example, the ability to manage the TOE’s
trust store is restricted to Administrators only. The users must be identified and
authenticated by the TOE prior to any access to the management functions
(including those that manipulate the TSF data).
FMT_SMF.1 The security management functions provided by the TOE include, but are not
limited to:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session
termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital
signature capability prior to installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for
FIA_AFL.1;
• Ability to configure the list of TOE-provided services available before
an entity is identified and authenticated, as specified in FIA_UIA_EXT.1;
Page 47 of 52
• Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
• Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
• Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
• Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE’s trust store;
• Ability to manage the TOE’s trust store and designate X509v3
certificates as trust anchor
• Ability to manage the trusted public keys database
The GUI, CLI, and API (XML and REST) provide the same supported
management functionality. With regards to the TSF management functions
above, they are available on all interfaces. The local interface supports the use
of a dedicated Ethernet port that only supports communication with a
whitelisted local IP address.
FMT_SMR.2 The TOE controls user access to commands and resources based on user role.
Users are given permission to access a set of commands and resources based
on their user role. By default and in Panorama and Management-Only modes,
the TOE has the following pre-defined administrator roles: Superuser,
Superuser (Read-Only), and Panorama Administrator. These administrator roles
(except Read-Only) are all considered Security Administrator as defined in the
[NDcPP] for the purposes of this ST. For example, a user with Superuser role
can create, modify, or delete user accounts but user with Read-Only role
cannot. All roles can administer the TOE both locally and remotely via CLI or
web UI, and a user account can only be assigned one role at a time. In Log
Collector mode, only the Superuser role is supported and there is only one user
account.
• Superuser—Full read-write access to Panorama and all device groups,
templates, and managed firewalls including user and role management
(create, modify, delete).
• Superuser (Read-Only)—Read-only access to Panorama and all device
groups, templates, and managed firewalls.
• Panorama Administrator—Full access to Panorama except for the
create, modify, or delete administrators or roles.
6.5 Protection of the TSF
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Certificates and their associated private key are stored in a single container: the
Certificate File. The PKCS#12 file consists of an Encrypted Private Key and X.509
Certificate. By default, all the private keys are protected since they are always stored
in encrypted format using AES-256. The TOE prevents the reading of all keys by
encrypting them with a Master Key using AES-256. The TOE does not provide an
interface to read the Master Key. The TOE is designed specifically to prevent access
to locally-stored cryptographically protected passwords and does not disclose any
keys stored in the TOE. The TOE protects the confidentiality of user passwords by
hashing the passwords using SHA-256. The TOE does not offer any functions that
will disclose to any users a stored cryptographic key or password.
FPT_APW_EXT.1
Page 48 of 52
FPT_TST_EXT.1 The TOE meets self-test requirements and therefore provides self-tests at start-up
to demonstrate the correct operation of: key error detection, cryptographic
algorithms, and RNG. Conditional self-tests are also run during the course of normal
operation. The self-tests verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code and TSF
data. The TOE performs the following Power-on self-tests:
• AES Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES GCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Encrypt Known Answer Test
• AES CCM Decrypt Known Answer Test
• RSA Sign Known Answer Test
• RSA Verify Known Answer Test
• RSA Encrypt/Decrypt Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Sign Known Answer Test
• ECDSA Verify Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• HMAC-SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• SHA-1 Known Answer Test
• SHA-256 Known Answer Test
• SHA-384 Known Answer Test
• SHA-512 Known Answer Test
• DRBG SP800-90A Known Answer Tests
• SP 800-90A Section 11.3 Health Tests
• DH Known Answer Test
• ECDH Known Answer Test
• SP 800-135 KDF Known Answer Tests
• Firmware Integrity Test – verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256.
If the calculated result does not equal the previously generated result, the
software/firmware test shall fail.
A known-answer test involves operating the cryptographic algorithm on data for
which the correct output is already known and comparing the calculated output with
the previously generated output (the known answer). If the calculated output does
not equal the known answer, the known-answer test shall fail.
The TOE performs the following Conditional Self-Tests within the cryptographic
module when the conditions specified for the tests occur:
1. Continuous Random Number Generator (RNG) test – performed on NDRNG
and DRBG
2. RSA Pairwise Consistency Test
3. ECDSA Pairwise Consistency Test
4. Firmware Load Test – Verify using RSA 2048 with SHA-256 signature on
firmware at time of load. If the digital signature cannot be verified, the test
shall fail.
The RNG continuous random number generator test is performed on each RNG and
tests for failure to a constant value as follows:
1. If each call to a RNG produces blocks of n bits (where n > 15), the first n-bit
block generated after power-up, initialization, or reset shall not be used, but
shall be saved for comparison with the next n-bit block to be generated. Each
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subsequent generation of an n-bit block shall be compared with the
previously generated block. The test shall fail if any two compared n-bit
blocks are equal.
2. If each call to a RNG produces fewer than 16 bits, the first n bits generated
after power-up, initialization, or reset (for some n > 15) shall not be used but
shall be saved for comparison with the next n generated bits. Each
subsequent generation of n bits shall be compared with the previously
generated n bits. The test fails if any two compared n-bit sequences are
equal.
The TOE performs the following pair-wise consistency tests for public and private
keys:
1. If the keys are used to perform an approved key transport method or
encryption, then the public key shall encrypt a plaintext value. The resulting
ciphertext value shall be compared to the original plaintext value. If the two
values are equal, then the test shall fail. If the two values differ, then the
private key shall be used to decrypt the ciphertext and the resulting value
shall be compared to the original plaintext value. If the two values are not
equal, the test shall fail.
2. If the keys are used to perform the calculation and verification of digital
signatures, then the consistency of the keys shall be tested by the calculation
and verification of a digital signature. If the digital signature cannot be
verified, the test shall fail.
If a self-test fails, the TOE enters an error state and outputs an error indicator. The
TOE doesn’t perform any cryptographic operations while in the error state. All data
output from the TOE is inhibited when an error state exists. Should one or more
power-up self-tests fail the module will reboot and enter a maintenance state in
which the reason for the reboot can be determined.
The methods above are sufficient to ensure the correct functionality of the TSF as
the self-tests encompass the cryptographic functionality and the integrity of the
entire TOE software/firmware executable code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Authorized administrators may query the current software/firmware version of the
TOE (command ‘show system info | match sw-version’). When updates are installed,
the TOE need to be rebooted for the change to take place (no delayed activation).
When updates are available from Palo Alto, an administrator can obtain and install
those updates from updates.paloaltonetworks.com if there is an internet connection.
For an additional layer of protection, Palo Alto Networks has chosen to sign (using
RSA-2048) all content that is downloaded to the TOE. If the TOE is not connected
to the internet, the administrators can download the updates and upload it to the
TOE.
When the TOE update package and its corresponding digital signature is downloaded
or uploaded; the digital signature is checked automatically by TOE by verifying the
signature using the public key (corresponding to the RSA key used to create the
signature). Palo Alto Networks manages the update server and guarantees that
images are digitally signed. Public keys are stored and protected on the TOE’s file
system. If the signature is verified, the update is performed; otherwise, the update is
not performed.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 The TOE is a hardware appliance or a virtual appliance image installed on a
virtualization platform that includes a hardware-based real-time clock. The
hardware hosting the VM-Series provides the time clock, as well as CPU, ports, etc.,
which are provided by VM hypervisor. The TOE’s embedded OS manages the clock
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and exposes administrator clock-related functions such as set time. The clock is used
for audit record time stamps, measuring session activity for termination, and for
cryptographic operations based on time/date.
6.6 TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value
after which the inactive local or remote session will be terminated regardless of
authentication methods (e.g., password, public-key, x509v3 certificate). The TOE can
be configured by an administrator to set an interactive session timeout value (any
integer value from 1 to 1,440 minutes) with default set to 60 minutes. The function is
disabled by default and the administrator must follow the CC AGD to configure the
session idle timeout value. A remote session that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing
from the remote client) for the defined timeout value will be terminated. A local session
that is similarly inactive for the defined timeout period will be terminated. The users will
be required to re-enter their user ID and their password or perform public-key or
certificate-based authentication, so they can establish a new session once a session is
terminated. An API session automatically terminated after the API call completes.
FTA_SSL.3
FTA_SSL.4 The TOE provides both local and remote users the ability to logout (or terminate) their
sessions as directed by the user.
FTA_TAB.1 The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner that will appear prior to
authentication when accessing the TOE via either a direct or remote connection to the
management port in order to access the Web Interface (HTTPS) or CLI (SSH).
6.7 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 The TOE can be configured to send audit records to external Syslog server(s) using TLS
in real-time. The TOE permits the TSF to initiate communication with the Syslog server,
using TLS trusted channel. The TOE communicates with its authorized entities over TLS
only and all communication are sent over the trusted channel, including the TOE initial
communication. The TOE communicates with firewall and Wildfire over TLS
connections. Mutual authentication is supported but must be configured for all TLS
channels. The underlying TLS algorithms are supported by CAVP-validated
cryptographic mechanisms included in the TOE implementation.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin The TOE provides SSH and HTTPS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2) to support secure remote
administration. HTTPS is supported in Panorama and Management-Only modes.
Administrators can initiate a remote session that is secured (from disclosure and
modification) using CAVP-validated cryptographic operations, and all remote security
management functions require the use of this secure channel. In FIPS-CC mode, telnet
and HTTP are disabled permanently.
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7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST is exact conformant to the [NDcPP].
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8. Rationale
This Security Target includes by reference the [NDcPP] applicable Security Problem Definition, Security
Objectives, and Security Assurance Requirements. The Security Target makes no additions to the [NDcPP]
assumptions. Security Functional Requirements have been reproduced verbatim with the Protection Profile
operations completed except where refinements were made by the ST author and formatted per the defined
convention. Operations on the security requirements follow [NDcPP] application notes and evaluation
activities. The Security Target did not add or remove any security requirements. Consequently, [NDcPP]
rationale applies and is complete.