TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-11
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Certification Report
STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with
specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1
Sponsor and developer: SAMSUNG Electronics Co. Ltd.
Innovative AP Development Team(S.LSI)
DSR, Samsungjeonja-ro 1-1,
Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-Do
South Korea
Evaluation facility: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
Germany
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300043-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300043-01
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 11 December 2024
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 7
2.3.1 Assumptions 7
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software,
version 2.0 and 2.1. The developer of the STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720
with specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1 is SAMSUNG Electronics Co. Ltd. located in
Hwaseong-si, South Korea and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A
Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a Secure Sub-System (3S), implemented in a SoC as defined in the Protection Profile
[PP]. The TOE implements a processing unit, security components as well as volatile and non-volatile
memories (hardware). The TOE also comprises dedicated firmware for loading the composite software
from TOE-external memories and software components for cryptographic purposes and random
number generation.
The evaluation and certification of this TOE was performed to support reuse of the 3S into the final
SoC that is targeting conformance to [PP] to fulfil the composition requirements [COMP]. The TOE
has dependencies to be considered when integrated into the final SoC that need to be verified
before the TOE is fully integrated into the final SoC. In accordance with [PP] integration guidance
[AGD_IIG] is provided for the TOE. The users of the TOE, developers of the SoC, must strictly
follow the guidance and must successfully pass an (integration) certification of this 3S TOE
integrated in the final SoC in order for the 3S SoC product to claim EAL5+ and/or AVA_VAN.5
resistance and before starting a subsequent composite evaluation with its Embedded Software
(ES).
The TOE has been evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH located in Essen, Germany. The
evaluation was completed on 11 December 2024 with the approval of the ETR. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of
S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1, the security
requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is
intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of
S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1 are advised to
verify that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to
the comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security
measures), AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis) and ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw
Reporting Procedures).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of
S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1 from
SAMSUNG Electronics Co. Ltd. located in Hwaseong-si, South Korea.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware STRONGV3P10_In04lpe TRONGV3P10 2.0
Secure JTAG Controller of SoC 2.0/2.1
Software Secure Boot loader 1.2
AH3 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library (optional) 1.03
DTRNG Library 1.2
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the
STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software,
version 2.0 and 2.1. For details, see section 2.5 of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST-Lite], Chapter 1.3.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE encompasses the following features:
• Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High and Low
Supply Voltage detectors and Supply Voltage Glitch detector
• Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure topology
• Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks
• Life time detector for protection of detector signals
• Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure topology
• Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks, such as Random Branch
Insertion and ROM and RAM encryption mechanisms
• Dedicated hardware mechanisms against Fault Injection attacks, such as redundancy
• Memory encryption and bus scrambling
• Integrity checks on memories and buses
• Secure TDES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support
• TORNADOTM-H cryptographic coprocessor
• Key Manager: KDF
• ECC/ Parity/ CRC-32 calculators
• One True Random Number Generator (TRNG HS_MRO9) that meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS-
20/31
• SHA-2/ SHA-3/ HMAC hardware engines
• SHA3 / SHAKE
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• Secure AXI Bridge
• Memory Management Unit (MMU)
• Secure JTAG Controller
• The IC Dedicated Software includes:
- AH3 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA library for the support of RSA, ECC and SHA
cryptographic operations (optional)
- DTRNG library built around a TRNG hardware block
- Secure Boot Loader is a loader for copying the firmware from an external FLASH
storage into the internal SRAM
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST-Lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
The TOE has dependencies to be considered when integrated into the final SoC that need to be
verified before the TOE is fully integrated into the final SoC. The evaluation and certification of
this TOE was performed to support reuse of the 3S into the final SoC that is targeting conformance to
[PP] to fulfil the composition requirements [COMP]. The integration of the TOE into the specific final
SoC is out of the scope for this evaluation.
During integration of the 3S into the final SoC, specific evaluation activities must be performed. The
[ETRfI] and the integration guidance [AGD_IIG]) were generated to support this process.
2.4 Architectural Information
A simplified TOE architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST-Lite] of the TOE can be
depicted as follows:
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
KITT2 HW DTRNG FRO M and DTRNG FRO M Library Application Note 1.2
PKA Library API Manual (AH0 Secure RSA/ECC/SHA Library API Manual) 1.05
STRONGV3P10 of S5AV920 32-bit RISC Microcontroller for Secure Element
Platform User’s Manual
0.4
Security Application Note For STRONGV3P10 for S5AV920 0.8
S5AV920 Chip Delivery Specification 0.0
STRONG Secure Bootloader Manual for S5AV920 1.03
CORTEX-M35P Reference manual 0.0
Integration Guide 0.6
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
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2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
Based on a list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment created
during vulnerability analysis the evaluators devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests when
they were of the opinion, that those potential vulnerabilities could be exploited in the TOE’s operational
environment. While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture were considered for
penetration testing.
Source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the development of
test cases and were used to find input for testing. The code inspection also supported the testing
activities because they enabled the evaluator to verify implementation aspects that could hardly be
covered by test cases. For penetration testing the evaluator took all security functionalities into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed
for the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities.
The total test effort expended by the evaluator was 132 person days or 18.86 weeks. During that test
campaign, 2% of the total time was spent on physical attacks, 5% overcoming sensors and filters,
18% perturbation attacks, 26% retrieving keys with FA, 37% side-channel attacks, 5% exploitation of
test features, 7% attacks on RNG.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
performed on a test vehicle that was consistent with the TOE components described in the [ST].
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities
For (composite SoC integration) evaluations of the TOE integrated in the final SoC environment,
please consult the [ETRfI] for details.
For embedded SW composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
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2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of multiple site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reports.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of
S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support integration evaluations to an SoC a
derived document [ETRfI] was provided and approved. To support future composite evaluations
according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when the integrated TOE is used as
platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of
S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.0 and 2.1, to be CC Part
2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with
AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2 and ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the
resistance against certain attacks.
The evaluation and certification of this TOE was performed to support reuse of the 3S into the final
SoC that is targeting conformance to [PP] to fulfil the composition requirements [COMP]. The TOE
has dependencies to be considered when integrated into the final SoC that need to be verified
before the TOE is fully integrated into the final SoC. In accordance with [PP] integration guidance
[AGD_IIG] is provided for the TOE. The users of the TOE, developers of the SoC, must strictly
follow the guidance and must successfully pass an (integration) certification of this 3S TOE
integrated in the final SoC in order for the 3S SoC product to claim EAL5+ and/or AVA_VAN.5
resistance and before starting a subsequent composite evaluation with its Embedded Software
(ES).
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
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cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The Taurus1, STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with Specific IC Dedicated
Software, Version 2.0/2.1, ST (Security Target), version 0.10, 07 November 2024 [ST] is included here
by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
DES Data Encryption Standard
DDR Double Date Rate
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SOC System on Chip
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[AGD_IIG] Integration Guide, version 0.6, 07 November 2024.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY),
8120782768 / NSCIB-CC-2300043-01, version 5, 09 December 2024
[ETRfC] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP), 8120782768 / NSCIB-CC-2300043-01, version 4, 11 November 2024
[ETRfI] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR INTERGATION (ETR INT),
8120782768 / NSCIB-CC-2300043-01, version 2, 11 November 2024
[JIL-VA-SoC] Guidance for Vulnerability Analysis and Penetration Testing of a Secure Sub-
System within a System-on-Chip, Version 3.0, March 2023 (sensitive with
controlled distribution).
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP] Secure Sub-System in System-on-Chip (3S in SoC), Version 1.5, 28 February
2022, registered under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0117
[ST] Taurus1, STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with
Specific IC Dedicated Software, Version 2.0/2.1, ST (Security Target), version
0.10, 07 November 2024
[ST-lite] Taurus1, STRONGV3P10_In04lpe of S5AV920/S5AV820/S5AV720 with
Specific IC Dedicated Software, Version 2.0/2.1, ST (Security Target Lite),
version 0.1, 07 November 2024
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)