National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2,
x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches
running EXOS 31.3.100
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11301-2022
Dated: October 28, 2022
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6982
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell
Anne Gugel
Lauren Hardy
Randy Heimann
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
Chris Thorpe
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cornelius Haley
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
iii
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 3
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
4.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
4.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
4.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 8
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ..................................................................... 10
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 11
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 12
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 12
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 12
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 16
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 16
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 16
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 16
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 17
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 18
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 19
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 20
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 21
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 22
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 23
1
1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series
(x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100.
It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in October 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria
Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-
G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100.
The TOE identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a NIAP approved
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version
of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Extreme Networks
ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches
running EXOS 31.3.100 Security Target Version 1.0, 10/25/2022 and analysis performed by
the Validation Team.
2
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant
List (PCL).
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product and its evaluation
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Evaluated Product Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435,
x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March
2020
ST Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435,
x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100 Security Target, Version
1.0, 10/25/2022
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series
(x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS
31.3.100 version 0.2, 10/25/2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor &
Developer:
Extreme Networks, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
CCEVS Validators Anne Gugel, Lauren Hardy, Randy Heimann, Linda Morrison, Clare Parran, Chris
Thorpe
3
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-
G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100. The
TOE provides high density layer 2/3 switching with low latency cut-through switching and
IPv4 and IPv6 unicast and multicast routing to enable enterprise aggregation and core
backbone deployments. The TOE consists of a hardware appliance with embedded software
components.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Details regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The underlying architecture of each TOE appliance consists of hardware that supports
physical network connections, memory, and processor and software that implements routing
and switching functions, configuration information and drivers. While hardware varies
between different appliance models, the EXOS software is shared across all platforms.
EXOS is composed of subsystems designed to implement operational, security, management,
and networking functions. Hardware-specific device drivers that reside in the kernel provide
abstraction of the hardware components. A dedicated cryptographic module is integrated
with protocol libraries that implement secure channel functionality. A control plane
subsystem that includes Internet Protocol (IP) host stack, which can be further subdivided
into protocol and control layers, implements switching and routing functions. A system
management subsystem, that includes an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) module, implements an administrative interface and maintains configuration
information.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The physical boundary of the TOE is the Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-
G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100. EXOS
is based on Linux Kernel version 4.14.200.
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X440-G2-12t-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
4
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X440-G2-12p-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24t-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24p-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-48t-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-48p-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24t-10GE4-
DC
CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-48t-10GE4-
DC
CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24x-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24fx-GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-12t8fx-GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24t-GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X460-G2-24t-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48t-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
5
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X460-G2-24p-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48p-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24x-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48x-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24t-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48t-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24p-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48p-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-16mp-32p-
10GE4
CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24p-24hp-
10GE4
CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)Marvell
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24ht-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X435-8T-4S
Broadcom
BCM53549
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-8P-4S
Broadcom
BCM53549
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-8P-2T-W
Broadcom
BCM53548
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-24T-4S
Broadcom
BCM53547
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
6
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X435-24P-4S
Broadcom
BCM53547
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X465-24W C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-48T C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-48P C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-48W C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465i-48W C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X465-24MU C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X465-24MU-24W C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X465-24S C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-24XE C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X695-48Y-8C C3758 Intel Atom Denverton 8
5520-24T
Broadcom
BCM56377
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-24W
Broadcom
BCM56377
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-48T
Broadcom
BCM56376
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-48W
Broadcom
BCM56376
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-12MW-36W
Broadcom
BCM56375
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-48SE
Broadcom
BCM56376
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-24X
Broadcom
BCM56375
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
The Operational Environment of the TOE includes:
• The SSH client that is used to access the management interface
• The management workstation that hosts the SSH client
• Audit server for external storage of audit records
• NTP server for synchronizing system time
• Certificate Authority and OCSP servers to support X.509
7
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The TOE generates audit records for all security-relevant events. For each audited events,
the TOE records the date and time, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome
of the event. The resulting records are stored locally and can be sent securely to a designated
audit server for archiving. Security Administrators, using the appropriate CLI commands,
can also view audit records locally. The TOE provides a reliable timestamp relying on the
appliance’s built-in clock or using an NTP server.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE performs the following cryptographic functionality:
• Encryption, decryption, hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, random
number generation, signature generation and verification utilizing a dedicated
cryptographic library
• Cryptographic functionality is utilized to implement secure channels
o SSHv2
o TLS v1.2
• Entropy is collected and used to support seeding with full entropy
• Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) internally stored and cleared when no longer in
use
• X509 Certificate authentication integrated with TLS protocol.
The TOE uses a dedicated cryptographic module to manage CSPs and implements deletion
procedures to mitigate the possibility of disclosure or modification of CSPs. Additionally,
the TOE provides commands to on-demand clear CSPs (e.g. host RSA keys), that can be
invoked by a Security Administrator with appropriate permissions.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) managed by an Authentication,
Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) module that stores and manages permissions of all
users and their roles. The TOE requires users to provide their assigned unique username and
8
password before any administrative access to the system is granted. Each authorized user is
associated with an assigned role and role-specific permissions that determine their access to
TOE features. The AAA module stores the assigned role of each user along with all other
information required for that user to access the TOE.
The TOE supports X509v3 certificate validation during negotiation of TLS protected syslog.
Certificates are validated as part of the authentication process when they are presented to the
TOE and when they are loaded into the TOE.
4.4 Security management
The TOE allows remote administration using an SSHv2 session, and local administration
using a console. Both remote and local administration are conducted over a Command Line
Interface (CLI) terminal that facilitates access to all of the management functions used to
administer the TOE.
There are two types of administrative users within the system: Security Administrator and
User. All of the management functions are restricted to Security Administrators, including:
managing user accounts and roles, rebooting and applying software updates, administering
the system configuration, and reviewing audit records. The term “Security Administrator” is
used to refer to any administrative user with the appropriate role to perform the relevant
functions
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of measures to protect the integrity of its security features.
• The TOE protects CSPs, including stored passwords and cryptographic keys, so they
are not directly viewable or accessible in plaintext.
• The TOE ensures that reliable time information is available for both log
accountability and synchronization with the operating environment.
• The TOE performs self-tests to detect internal failures and protect itself from
malicious updates.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE will display a customizable banner when an administrator initiates an interactive
local or remote session. The TOE also enforces an administrator-defined inactivity timeout
after which any inactive session is automatically terminated. Once a session (local or remote)
has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects remote sessions by establishing a trusted path secured using SSH between
itself and the administrator. The TOE prevents disclosure or modification of audit records by
establishing a trusted channel using TLS between itself and the audit server. Mutual
9
authentication using client-side x.509v3 certificates is supported by the TOE’s TLS client
for syslog over TLS.
10
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Protection Profile for Network Devices and performed by the
evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
11
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Extreme Networks ExtremeXOS Common Criteria Configuration Guide 31.3.100,
Version 9037401-00, Rev AA, October 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that which may be
available online, was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be
relied upon to configure or operate the device as evaluated. Consumers are encouraged to
download the CC configuration guide (CCECG above) from the NIAP website.
12
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report for Extreme Networks
ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches
running EXOS 31.3.100, Version 1.0, October 25,2022 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e including the tests associated with
optional requirements. Section 3.4.1 of the AAR lists the tested devices, provides a list of
test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
13
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following series of appliances all running EXOS
software version 31.3.100:
• ExtremeSwitching Series x440-G2
• ExtremeSwitching Series x460-G2
• ExtremeSwitching Series x435
• ExtremeSwitching Series x465
• ExtremeSwitching Series x695
• 5520 Series
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X440-G2-12t-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-12p-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24t-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24p-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-48t-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-48p-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24t-10GE4-
DC
CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-48t-10GE4-
DC
CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24x-10GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24fx-GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
14
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X440-G2-12t8fx-GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X440-G2-24t-GE4 CN7010
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon III 1
X460-G2-24t-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48t-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24p-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48p-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24x-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48x-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24t-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48t-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24p-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-48p-GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-16mp-32p-
10GE4
CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
15
Model CPU CPU Mfg
CPU
Type
Micro
Architecture
CPU
Cores
X460-G2-24p-24hp-
10GE4
CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)Marvell
MIPS Octeon II 2
X460-G2-24ht-10GE4 CN6120
Marvell
(formerly
Cavium)
MIPS Octeon II 2
X435-8T-4S
Broadcom
BCM53549
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-8P-4S
Broadcom
BCM53549
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-8P-2T-W
Broadcom
BCM53548
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-24T-4S
Broadcom
BCM53547
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X435-24P-4S
Broadcom
BCM53547
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex-A72
Armv7
4
X465-24W C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-48T C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-48P C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-48W C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465i-48W C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X465-24MU C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X465-24MU-24W C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X465-24S C3338 Intel Atom Denverton 2
X465-24XE C3538 Intel Atom Denverton 4
X695-48Y-8C C3758 Intel Atom Denverton 8
5520-24T
Broadcom
BCM56377
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-24W
Broadcom
BCM56377
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-48T
Broadcom
BCM56376
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-48W
Broadcom
BCM56376
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-12MW-36W
Broadcom
BCM56375
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-48SE
Broadcom
BCM56376
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
5520-24X
Broadcom
BCM56375
ARM
Cortex-
A
Cortex A72
ARMv8
4
16
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Extreme
Networks ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series
Switches running EXOS 31.3.100 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the NDcPP22e.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Extreme Networks ExtremeSwitching
Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS
31.3.100 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
17
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities and fuzz testing. None of the public search for
vulnerabilities, or the fuzz testing uncovered any residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there
are no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following
sources:
• National Vulnerability Database (<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search>)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/>)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities>)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (<http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories> )
• Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (<http://www.exploitsearch.net>)
• Tenable Network Security (<http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search>)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (<https://www.exploit-db.com/>)
The search was performed on 10/06/2022 with the following search terms: "Extreme",
"EXOS", "XOS", "TLS", "SSH", "Intel Atom", "Cavium Octeon", "BCM53549", "OpenSSL
18
2.0.16", "BCM56375", "BCM56376", "BCM56377", "BCM53547", "BCM53548",
"Broadcom".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
19
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in Extreme Networks
ExtremeXOS Common Criteria Configuration Guide 31.3.100, Version 9037401-00, Rev
AA, October 2022. No versions of the TOE and software, either earlier or later were
evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in
the operational environment, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can
be drawn about their effectiveness.
20
11 Annexes
Not applicable
21
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465,
x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100 Security Target version 1.0,
October 25, 2022.
22
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
23
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
[5] ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series
Switches running EXOS 31.3.100 Security Target Version 1.0, 10/25/2022 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report for ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465,
x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100, Version 1.0,
10/25/2022 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2, x465, x435,
x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100, Version 1.0, 10/25/2022
(DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for ExtremeSwitching Series (x440-G2, x460-G2,
x465, x435, x695) and 5520 Series Switches running EXOS 31.3.100, Version 0.2,
10/25/2022 (ETR)