MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
REF: 2011-10-INF-836 v1
Target: Público
Date: 17.04.2012
Created by: CERT8
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2011-10 KONA 102J1 ePassport BAC v1.1
Applicant: KEBTechnology Co., Ltd.
References:
[EXT-1364] Certification request of KONA 102J1 ePassport BAC
[EXT-1564] Evaluation Technical Report of KONA 102J1 ePassport BAC
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1, as requested in [EXT-
1364] dated 30/05/2011, and evaluated by the laboratory Applus LGAI Technological
Center S.A., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-1564] received on
01/03/2012.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY ..............................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION..............................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES .......................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT............................................................................7
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS....................................................................................7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY.................................................................................8
ARCHITECTURE..............................................................................................................................................10
DOCUMENTS ....................................................................................................................................................10
PRODUCT TESTING........................................................................................................................................10
PENETRATION TESTING..........................................................................................................................11
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .................................................................................................................11
EVALUATION RESULTS................................................................................................................................12
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM.......................................12
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................12
GLOSSARY........................................................................................................................................................13
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................................13
SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................14
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CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ [ICAO-01].
The TOE provides the security level of EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE type is “the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control”, compatible with the expected TOE
type described in the [PP-BAC].
Developer/manufacturer: Korea Electronic Banking Technology Co., Ltd.
Sponsor: Korea Electronic Banking Technology Co., Ltd.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A.
Protection Profile: BSI-CC-PP-0055. Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control, version
1.10.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 r3 EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2.
Evaluation end date: 01/03/2012.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 (augmented
with ALC_DVS.2) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the
laboratory Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL4 +
ALC_DVS.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 r3 and the CEM v3.1 r3.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ [ICAO-01].
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• the NXP J3A081 Revision 3 Secure Smartcard Controller (named JCOP
v2.4.1), comprising of
o the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC NXP Secure
Smart Card Controllers P5CD081V1A),
o the IC Embedded Software (operating system): JCOP v2.4.1 Revision
3,
• the MRTD application: ePassport Kona102J1 v1.1 Applet that is compliant
with [ICAO-01].
• the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE is conformant with the Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0055, Common
Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Basic Access Control, version 1.10 [PP-BAC].
The TOE covered by this Certification Report addresses the protection of the logical
MRTD
(i) in integrity by writeonly-once access control and by physical means, and
(ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the
TOE. The inspection system
(i) reads optically the MRTD,
(ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means of Document Basic
Access Keys.
After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides
read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure
messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO-01], normative appendix 5.
This Certification Report does not cover the Active Authentication and the Extended
Access Control as optional security mechanisms.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL4 and the evidences required by the additional component ALC_DVS.2,
according to Common Criteria v3.1 r3.
Assurance Class Assurance components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV: Development
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
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Assurance Class Assurance components
automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 r3:
Class Components
FAU: Security Audit FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS_CKM.1/Cryptographic key generation - Generation of
Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key
Derivation
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple DES
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-
use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of
Terminal by the TOE
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control –
Basic Access Control
FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
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Class Components
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling
of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key
Write
FMT: Security Management
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key
Read
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT: Protection of the Security
Functions
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1
Security Target: Kona102J1 ePassport with BAC Security Target v1.1.
Protection Profile: BSI-CC-PP-0055. Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control, version
1.10.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 r3 EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1 shall implement a set of security
policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
Policy 01: P.Manufact - Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC]
Protection Profile (paragraph 73).
Policy 02: P.Personalization - Personalization of the MRTD by
issuing State or Organization only
This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC]
Protection Profile (paragraph 74).
Policy 03: P.Personal_Data - Personal data protection policy
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This security policy is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC]
Protection Profile (paragraph 75).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption 01: A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on step 4
to 6
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection
Profile (paragraph 54).
Assumption 02: A.MRTD_Delivery - MRTD delivery during steps 4
to 6
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection
Profile (paragraph 55).
Assumption 03: A.Pers_Agent - Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection
Profile (paragraph 56).
Assumption 04: A.Insp_Sys - Inspection Systems for global
interoperability
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection
Profile (paragraph 57).
Assumption 05: A.BAC-Keys - Cryptographic quality of Basic
Access Control Keys
This assumption is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection
Profile (paragraph 59).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Kona102J1 ePassport
v1.1, although the agents implementing attacks have an Enhanced-Basic attack
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potential according to the assurance level of EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 and always
fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
Threat 01: T.Chip_ID - Identification of MRTD’s chip
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 63).
Threat 02: T.Skimming - Skimming the logical MRTD
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 64).
Threat 03: T.Eavesdropping - Eavesdropping to the communication
between TOE and inspection system
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 65).
Threat 04: T.Forgery - Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 66).
Threat 05: T.Abuse-Func - Abuse of Functionality
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 68).
Threat 06: T.Information_Leakage - Information Leakage from
MRTD’s chip
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 69).
Threat 07: T.Phys-Tamper - Physical Tampering
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 70).
Threat 08: T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
This threat is included in the ST and it is described in the [PP-BAC] Protection Profile
(paragraph 71).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
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The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Environment objective 01: OE.MRTD_Manufact - Protection of the
MRTD Manufacturing
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 94).
Environment objective 02: MRTD_ Delivery - Protection of the
MRTD delivery
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 95).
Environment objective 03: OE.Personalization - Personalization of
logical MRTD
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 96).
Environment objective 04: OE.Pass_Auth_Sign - Authentication of
logical MRTD by Signature
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 97).
Environment objective 05: OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of
Basic Access Control Keys
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 98).
Environment objective 06: OE.Exam_MRTD - Examination of the
MRTD passport book
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 100).
Environment objective 07: OE.Passive_Auth_Verif - Verification by
Passive Authentication
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 101).
Environment objective 08: OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD - Protection of
data from the logical MRTD
This security objective for the environment is included in the ST and it is described in the
[PP-BAC] Protection Profile (paragraph 102).
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in
the associated security target.
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ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is a composition of IC hardware and embedded software that controls the
IC.
The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and
application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet
(holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless
these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
1. “(SP-03-01) Kona102J1 ePassport with EAC Security Target v1.2”, in a lite
and public version.
2. “(SP-03-05) Kona102J1 ePassport Proprietary Command Manual v1.0”, May
2011. KEBT.
3. “(SP-03-06) Kona102J1 ePassport Technical Manual v1.0”, May 2011. KEBT.
4. “(SP-03-08) Kona102J1 ePassport Life-Cycle Definition v1.0”, August 2011.
KEBT.
5. “(SP-03-11) Kona102J1 ePassport Delivery Procedure v1.1”, December 2011.
KEBT.
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been
performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the
security functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is
appropriate to the function that is intended to test.
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All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the
established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the
obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluation team has applied a
sampling strategy on the developer functional tests in the testing platform
implemented in the evaluation laboratory. The evaluation team has concluded the
obtained information during the repeated tests was enough to reproduce tests
devised by the developer, identify the functionality tested, confirm the expected
results and gain confidence on developer’s tests as the information was complete
and coherent.
Moreover, additional tests where proposed independently of the developer. These
tests covered the ePassport BAC functionalities and tested the underlying RNG.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in
the cases where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the
evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security problem
nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment, the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests.
Within these activities all aspects of the security architecture which were not covered
by functional testing have been considered.
The implementation of the requirements of the provided platform's ETR for
Composition and guidance, as well as of the security mechanisms of the applet in
general have been verified by the evaluation team. An appropriate test set was
devised to cover these potential vulnerabilities.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Enhanced-Basic has
been successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security
target when all measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its name and version number Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1.
The composite TOE includes:
• the NXP J3A081 Revision 3 Secure Smartcard Controller (named JCOP
v2.4.1), comprising of
o the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC NXP Secure
Smart Card Controllers P5CD081V1A),
o the IC Embedded Software (operating system): JCOP v2.4.1 Revision
3,
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• the MRTD application: ePassport Kona102J1 v1.1 Applet that is compliant
with [ICAO-01], and
• the associated guidance documentation.
The GET DATA command*
available in the TOE can be used by TOE’s consumers
(Issuers) to verify if the acquired product corresponds to the certified version of the
TOE. The first 5 bytes of GET DATA command response included below, specifically
correspond to the certified TOE, Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1.
GET DATA response:
10 21 01 00 00 (5 bytes) Æ Kona102J1 ePassport version 1.1
* Specific detail on GET DATA command can be found in “(SP-03-05) Kona102J1 ePassport Proprietary Command Manual
v1.0” which is distributed along with the TOE.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1 has been evaluated against the Security
Target Kona102J1 ePassport with BAC Security Target v1.1.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus LGAI
Technological Center S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation
due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL4 +
ALC_DVS.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 r3 and the CEM v3.1 r3.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
• The developer follows all the underlying platform security recommendations
and contributes with additional countermeasures to enforce the security of the
whole product. Therefore the Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1 fulfils the
requirements of CC version 3.1 with an evaluation assurance level EAL4 +
ALC_DVS.2.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product Kona102J1 ePassport v1.1, a positive resolution is proposed.
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Additionally, the Certification Body wants to clarify that the GET DATA command
cited in this Certification Report, provides information strictly related to the code
masked in the ROM of the TOE.
GLOSSARY
BAC Basic Access Control
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAC Extended Access Control
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
LDS Logical Data Structure
MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine Readable Zone
OC Organismo de Certificación
PP Protection Profile
ROM Read-Only Memory
ST Security Target
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
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[PP-EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control, version 1.10. BSI-CC-PP-0056.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI.
[ICAO-01] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine
Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization.
[ICAO-03] Internal Civil Aviation Organization. Machine Readable Travel Documents,
Part 3, Vol 1 - Specifications for Electronically Enabled MRTDs with Biometric
Identification Capability, version 3, edition 2008, International Civil Aviation
Organization.
[TR-03] Technical Guideline TR-03110. Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI).
[PRE] ORDEN PRE/2740/2007 Reglamento de evaluación y certificación de
seguridad de las tecnologías de la información. 19/09/2007.
[CCDB-2008-04-001] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 2.7
February 2009.
[CCDB-2007-09-001] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
Devices Version 1.0 Revision 1. September 2007
[AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices Version 1.5. February 2009
[C5401456] AVA_VAN.5 evaluation methodology M0. 2009-03-10
[ARC] ADV_ARC guidance Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) Version
1.0 draft 1. June 2008
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body: Kona102J1 ePassport with BAC Security Target
v1.1.
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