KECS-CR-12-23
Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control
Software V2.0.0.03.00
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0379-2012
2012. 3. 30
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2012.3.30 -
Certification report for Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-
5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for Samsung SCX-5737FW
SCX-5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00 of Samsung Electronics.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................8
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................10
6. Documentation...................................................................................................12
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................13
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................14
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................14
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE) ........................................................14
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ..................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).............................................16
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ...........................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)...........................................................................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..........................................................17
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ................................................................18
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................19
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................20
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................21
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL3+ evaluation of Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control
Software V2.0.0.03.00 from Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an embedded software product for MFPs (Multi-
Function Peripherals) as an IT product. It controls the operation of the entire MFP,
including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP controller.
The TOE Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00
composed of the following components:
 Embedded control software V2.0.0.03.00 provided by Samsung Electronics.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on February 27, 2012. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) KOSYAS had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6].
The ST has no conformance claim to the Protection Profile (PP). All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL3 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon functional components
in CC Part 2, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE is operated in an internal network protected by a firewall. User is connected
to the TOE and may perform jobs that are allowed. The TOE is intended to operate in a
network environment that is protected by a firewall from external malicious attacks (e.g.,
DoS attack), and with reliable PCs and authenticated servers. A user is able to access
the TOE by using a local user interface, PC from a remote user, or a Remote User
Interface, as shown below.
Certification Report Page 6
Remote FAX
Remote FAX
TOE
TOE
Storage Server
· FTP Server
· SMTP Server
· SMB Server
Storage Server
· FTP Server
· SMTP Server
· SMB Server
Authentication
Server
· Kerberos
· SMB
· LDAP
Authentication
Server
· Kerberos
· SMB
· LDAP
Firewall
IPSEC
PSTN
IPSEC
External Network Internal Network
U.NORMAL
Install
· Printer Driver
· Scan Driver
U.ADMINISTRATOR
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
· Web
AP
AP U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL
W
i
r
e
l
e
s
s
I
P
S
E
C
W
i
r
e
l
e
s
s
I
P
S
E
C
SSL
U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL
W
i
r
e
l
e
s
s
I
P
S
E
C
Infrastructure Mode
Ad-hoc Mode
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
The local user interface (LUI) is designed to be accessed by users and a local
administrator. The users can operate copy, scan, and fax functions through the LUI. In
the case of a scanning job, users can operate the scanning job using the LUI and
transfer the scanned data to a certain destination by email addresses, server PCs, or
client PCs. Users can also use their PCs to print out documents or to access the TOE
through the internal network. The administrator can enable/disable Automatic Image
Overwrite, start/stop Manual Image Overwrite, and change a Password via the LUI.
The administrator can access the TOE through the Remote User Interface (WEBUI)
using a web browser supporting SSL protocol. From there, they can add/change/delete
user accounts, change the web administrator’s ID and password, enable/disable the
security audit service, and download the security audit report. The user account
information that requires asking for internal authentication by TOE (only for network-
scan services such as scan manager, scan to e-mail, scan to FTP, scan to SMB) can
be stored on the hard disk drive of the MFP. All of the information stored on the hard
disk drive is protected by the TOE. In the case of external authentication by trusted
authentication servers (Kerberos, LDAP, SMB server), all the account information
Certification Report Page 7
stored on a network authentication server is assumed to be protected from external
environmental space
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is product package consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type Identifier Release Delivery Form
SW SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control
Software
V2.00.03
.00
MFP
(Note: The SW is
contained in ROM and
EEPROM)
DOC MFP Security Administrator Guide V3.00 Softcopy
Network Administrator’s Guide V3.00
SCX-5837FW SCX-5739FW User Guide V1.2
[Table 1] TOE identification
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(September 1, 2009)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(July 20, 2011)
TOE Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control Software
V2.0.0.03.00
Certification Report Page 8
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~
CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
EAL EAL3+(augmented by ALC_FLR.2)
Protection Profile IEEE Std 2600.1-2009 Version 1.0
Developer Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
February 27, 2012
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [6] by security objectives and
security requirements. The TOE provides security features to identify and authenticate
authorized users, to generate audit records of the auditable events, and to securely
manage the TOE functionality and authorized user accounts information.
For more details refer to the ST [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [6], chapter 3.3):
 The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
 TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
 Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
Certification Report Page 9
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance
and documentation, and to correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures.
 Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
 A firewall is installed between the internal network and the external network to
protect the TOE from intrusion from outside.
 The authentication servers (i.e. LDAP, Kerberos, and SMB Server) provide a
secure remote authentication for U.NORMAL.
 The FTP, SMB server, and mail servers that store fax and scan data
transmitted from the TOE are managed securely.
 Certificate for SSL communication is installed by U.ADMINISTRATOR and the
TOE is managed through the secure channel.
 All of the external servers(Storage, Authentication Server) that connected with
the TOE via network supports IPSEC.
 All of the client PCs that connected with the TOE via network supports SSL.
 The AP is enabled and securely managed by administrator.
It is assumed that the TOE is installed and operated based on the following hardware
and operating system.
Specifications SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW
LCD 4.3" Color Touch-Screen 4.3" Color Touch-Screen
CPU
Samsung 600 MHz
(Chrus 4)
Samsung 600 MHz
(Chrus 4)
System Memory 256 MB 256 MB
MSD 4 GB Flash Memory 4 GB Flash Memory
SD Card 2 GB 2 GB
FAX
Compatibility ITU-T G3, ECM ITU-T G3, ECM
Comm.
System
PSTN / PABX PSTN / PABX
Modem
Speed
33.6 Kbps 33.6 Kbps
Interface
Hi-Speed USB 2.0,
Ethernet 10/100/1000 base
TX,
USB host 2.0
Hi-Speed USB 2.0,
Ethernet 10/100/1000 base TX,
USB host 2.0
Certification Report Page 10
Extra Information
Simplex :Up to 35 ppm in
A4 (37 ppm in Letter)
Simplex :Up to 35 ppm in A4
(37 ppm in Letter)
OS VxWorks 6.8
DB DB V4.16.0
[Table 3] Required non-TOE Hardware and OS
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 4] and [Figure 5] show architectural information and the logical scope of the
TOE.
System Board
Identification&
authentication
Security
Management
Security Audit
Self-testing
Fax Data Control
EEPROM
NVRAM
Image Overwrite
Network Access
Control
Print
Copy
Scan
Fax
SoC Hardware Platform
Control
Panel
Data Encryption
F
A
X
B
O
A
R
D
N
I
C
System UI
Interface
Secure
Communication
TOE
DADF
Finisher
Engine
H/W
S/W
MSD
MSD
Renote Fax
Renote Fax
Server
· Authenticaition
· Storage
Server
· Authenticaition
· Storage
Emulation
U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
U.ADMINISTRATOR
U
S
B
U.NORMAL
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
U.ADMINISTRATOR
[Figure 2] Architectural Information of the TOE
Certification Report Page 11
[Figure 3] Logical boundary of the TOE
 Identification & Authentication
The TOE receives user’s information (e.g. ID, password, domain, etc.) through either
the LUI or the WEBUI, and performs identification & authentication functions using the
acquired information. Then the TOE authorizes user according to the identification &
authentication result. The TOE also provides the Common Access Control & TOE
Function Access Control based on the user role assigned to user ID by administrator.
 Network Access Control
The TOE provides a network access control function to control ports and protocols
used in network protocol services provided by the MFP. Through this function,
administrator can control access from external network by enabling/disabling or altering
port numbers of various protocols. And the TOE also provides IP filtering /Mac filtering
functions to control access from external network.
 Security Management
The TOE provides a management function to manage security functions (e.g. security
audit, image overwrite, etc.) provided by the TOE. Through this function, administrator
can enable/disable security functions, manage TSF data and the security attributes,
and maintain security roles.
Certification Report Page 12
 Security Audit
The TOE stores and manages internal events occurring in the MFP. Audit logs are
stored on the hard disk drive and can be reviewed or deleted or exported by
administrator through the remote user interface.
 Image Overwrite
The TOE provides an image overwrite function to securely delete temporary files and
job files (e.g. printing, copying, scanning, and faxing jobs). This function is classified as
two functions: automatic image overwriting and manual image overwriting. An
Administrator can execute the image overwriting function only through the local user
interface.
 Data Encryption
The TOE provides a data encryption function to protect data (e.g. job information,
configuration information, audit logs, etc.) stored on the hard disk drive from
unauthorized access.
 Fax Data Control
The TOE provides a fax data control function to examine fax image data formats (MMR,
MR, or MH of T.4 specification) received via the PSTN port and check whether received
data is suitable.
 Self-testing
The TOE provides a self-testing function to verify the TSF’s correct operation and the
integrity of TSF data and executable code.
 Secure Communication
The TOE provides a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product to
protect user data or TSF data that are transmitted or received over network.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
MFP Security Administrator Guide V3.00 January 10, 2012
Network Administrator’s Guide V3.00 January 10, 2012
SCX-5837FW SCX-5739FW User Guide V1.2 January 10, 2012
Certification Report Page 13
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. The
developer’s tests were performed on each distinct operational environment of the TOE
(see chapter 1 of this report for details about operational environment of the TOE).
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined in the functional specification, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer tested subsystems including their interactions, and analyzed testing
results according to the assurance component ATE_DPT.1.
Therefore the developer tested all SFRs defined in the ST [6].
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests (a total of 112 tests), and conducted
a total of 32 independent testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The
evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST
[7]. The evaluator considered followings when devising a test subset:
 TOE security functionality: The TOE is an embedded software product for
MFPs (Multi-Function Peripherals) as an IT product. It controls the operation of
the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP
controller, and
 Developer's testing evidence: The evaluator analyzed evaluation deliverables
for ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.1, and ATE_FUN.1 to understand behavior of the
TOE security functionality and to select the subset of the interfaces to be
tested, and
 Balance between evaluator's activities: The targeted evaluation assurance
level is EAL3+, and the evaluator tried to balance time and effort of evaluator's
activities between EAL3+ assurance components.
Also, the evaluator conducted a total of 18 penetration testing based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities. These tests cover privilege check of executable code, bypassing
security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, weak cryptography, flaws in
Certification Report Page 14
networking protocol implementation, vulnerability scanning using commercial tools,
disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing
basic attack potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00. The
TOE is an embedded software product for MFPs as an IT product. It controls the
operation of the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP
controller.
The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number including release number. The
TOE identification information is provided GUI.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL3+.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
Certification Report Page 15
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The ST doesn't define any extended component. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be use as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer uses a CM system that uniquely identifies all configuration items, and
the ability to modify these items is properly controlled. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.3.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, and the
evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in accordance with CM
capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.3.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.1.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Certification Report Page 16
The evaluator shall examine the flaw remediation documentation provided to determine
that discovered security flaws be tracked and corrected by the developer. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_FLR.2
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing
subsystems and enough information about the SFR-supporting and SFR-non-
interfering subsystems for the evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and
accurately implemented. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.2.
The developer has provided a description of the TSFIs in terms of their purpose,
method of use, and parameters. In addition, the actions, results and error messages of
each TSFI are also described sufficiently that it can be determined whether they are
SFR-enforcing, with the SFR-enforcing TSFI being described in more detail than other
Certification Report Page 17
TSFIs. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.3.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), and a TOE design description (which describes
the architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed). In addition, there is a security architecture
description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to explain how its
security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested the TSF subsystems against the TOE design and the
security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_DPT.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing Basic attack potential in the operational
Certification Report Page 18
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.2.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing Basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.3 ALC_CMS.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.3 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1 ALC_DVS.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_FLR.2 ALC_FLR.2.1.E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.2 ADV_TDS.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.2.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.3 ADV_FSP.3.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 19
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ADV_FSP.3.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.2 AVA_VAN.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.2.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.4E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 Since the image overwrite can only be done manually, the administrator of the
TOE should perform it regularly to protect user data.
 Since the audit data storage is overwritten by the image overwrite, make sure
that the audit data is exported for backup before launching the image overwrite
function.
 A system administrator should enable the IPSec provided by the TOE for a
safe communication between the TOE and IT entities such as a system
administrator’s PC, general user’s PC, and authentication server; and set up
the IPSec for IT entities.
 An administrator is recommended to enable the alarm for an authentication
Certification Report Page 20
failure of a secure print user so that it can be taken care of immediately.
 The TOE is delivered with the default password of the system administrator. A
system administrator who will operate the TOE should first change the
password. It is recommended that Web and local system administrators
change the password periodically for the sake of security.
 Use the TOE function to configure allowed administrator’s IP’s so that
unauthorized access can be blocked.
11. Security Target
The Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00 Security
Target v1.2, January 10, 2012 [6] is included in this report by reference.
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
DBMS Database Management System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request For Comments
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SSH Secure Shell
SSL Secure Socket Layer
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Multi-Function Printer, MFP MFP is a machine that incorporates the functionality of
multiple devices (copy, print, scan, or fax) in one.
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LUI, Local User Interface An interface for a system administrator and a general
user to access, use, or manage the TOE directly.
Web UI, Web User
Interface
An interface for a system administrator and a general
user to access, use, or manage the TOE through a web
service.
Image Overwrite A function to delete all stored files on the hard disk drive.
The image data is overwritten three times by using DoD
5200.28-M standard. The TOE provides Manual Image
Overwrite function.
Manual Image Overwrite Only an authorized local administrator can invoke this
feature. Once invoked, the Manual Image Overwrite
overwrites all stored files, including image files and
preserved files.
Image file Temporary files of user data that are stored on the MSD
in a format that the TOE can process during a scan,
copy, or fax job.
Preserved file Files stored on the MSD by a user in a format of
electronic image file. There are two types to store a file
on the MSD: Public and Secured. When a user stores a
document as Public, all users can access and use the
file. A file stored as Secured can only be accessed by
the user who stored the file. When storing a file as
Secured, the user must set a PIN required to access the
file. Then the file can only be accessed by entering the
PIN.
Stored file Every stored file on the MSD. It includes preserved files
and temporary files(image files)
Secure print When a user stores a file in an MFP from a remote client
PC, the user must set security printing configuration and
assign a PIN on the file. Then the user can access the
file by entering the PIN through the LUI of the MFP,
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
Certification Report Page 22
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~ CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004, July 2009
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (September 1,
2009)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security (July 20, 2011)
[5] Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00
Evaluation Technical Report V2.0, February 27, 2012
[6] Samsung SCX-5737FW SCX-5739FW Control Software V2.0.0.03.00 Security
Target v1.2, January 10, 2012