EMC® Corporation
EMC VNXe™ OE v3.1.1 with Unisphere and VNXe3200™
Hardware
Security Target
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL): EAL2+
Document Version: 1.2
Prepared for: Prepared by:
EMC® Corporation Corsec Security, Inc.
176 South Street
Hopkinton, MA 01748
United States of America
13135 Lee Jackson Memorial Hwy., Suite 220
Fairfax, VA 22033
United States of America
Phone: +1 (508) 435 1000 Phone: +1 (703) 267 6050
http://www.emc.com http://www.corsec.com
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Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................4
1.1 PURPOSE................................................................................................................................................................4
1.2 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................................4
1.3 PRODUCT OVERVIEW..........................................................................................................................................5
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................................7
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE........................................................................................8
1.4.2 TOE Environment...................................................................................................................................................9
1.5 TOE DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................................................10
1.5.1 Physical Scope.......................................................................................................................................................10
1.5.2 Logical Scope ........................................................................................................................................................11
1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not included in the TOE.................................12
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................13
3 SECURITY PROBLEM ..........................................................................................................14
3.1 THREATS TO SECURITY......................................................................................................................................14
3.2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..........................................................................................................15
3.3 ASSUMPTIONS.....................................................................................................................................................15
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES......................................................................................................16
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................................................16
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT..................................................................16
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives.........................................................................................................................................16
4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives ...............................................................................................................................17
5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS ..............................................................................................18
6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................19
6.1 CONVENTIONS...................................................................................................................................................19
6.2 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................19
6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit..................................................................................................................................21
6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection....................................................................................................................22
6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication................................................................................................25
6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management.................................................................................................................26
6.2.6 Security Assurance Requirements..................................................................................................................29
7 TOE SECURITY SPECIFICATION......................................................................................30
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY.....................................................................................................................30
7.1.1 Security Audit........................................................................................................................................................31
7.1.2 User Data Protection..........................................................................................................................................31
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication....................................................................................................................32
7.1.4 Security Management........................................................................................................................................33
8 RATIONALE..........................................................................................................................35
8.1 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS RATIONALE.............................................................................................................35
8.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE..................................................................................................................35
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats ....................................................................................35
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies .....................................................................................37
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions...........................................................................37
8.3 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ......................................................38
8.4 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................38
8.5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ...........................................................................................................38
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE Objectives............................................38
8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...............................................................................................41
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale.......................................................................................................................................41
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9 ACRONYMS ..........................................................................................................................43
9.1 ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................................................................43
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 VNXE SYSTEM .........................................................................................................................................................5
FIGURE 2 DEPLOYMENT CONFIGURATION OF THE TOE...................................................................................................8
List of Tables
TABLE 1 ST AND TOE REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................4
TABLE 2 CC AND PP CONFORMANCE.............................................................................................................................. 13
TABLE 3 THREATS ................................................................................................................................................................. 14
TABLE 4 ASSUMPTIONS......................................................................................................................................................... 15
TABLE 5 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.................................................................................................................. 16
TABLE 6 IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................................... 16
TABLE 7 NON-IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................... 17
TABLE 8 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................. 19
TABLE 9 FILE STORAGE ACCESS CONTROL SFP MANAGEMENT..................................................................................... 26
TABLE 10 AUTHORIZED ROLES............................................................................................................................................ 28
TABLE 11 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.............................................................................................................................. 29
TABLE 12 MAPPING OF TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY TO SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................. 30
TABLE 13 THREATS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING ....................................................................................................................... 35
TABLE 14 ASSUMPTIONS: OBJECTIVES MAPPING............................................................................................................... 37
TABLE 15 OBJECTIVES: SFRS MAPPING............................................................................................................................... 38
TABLE 16 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES................................................................................................ 41
TABLE 17 ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................................................................... 43
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), and the ST organization. The
TOE is EMC VNXe™ OE v3.1.1 with Unisphere and VNXe3200™ Hardware, and may be referred to as
the TOE or “VNXe” throughout the remainder of this document. The TOE contains a combination File
(IP1
) and Block (iSCSI2
over IP, and FC3
) operating environment with Unified Management (Unisphere).
The TOE provides storage and access controls for block services over IP and FC and standard IP-based file
sharing protocols.
1.1 Purpose
This ST is divided into nine sections, as follows:
 Introduction (Section 1) – Provides a brief summary of the ST contents and describes the
organization of other sections within this document. It also provides an overview of the TOE
security functionality and describes the physical and logical scope for the TOE, as well as the ST
and TOE references.
 Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides the identification of any Common Criteria (CC),
Protection Profile, and Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) package claims. It also identifies
whether the ST contains extended security requirements.
 Security Problem (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security policies, and
assumptions that pertain to the TOE and its environment.
 Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives that are satisfied by the TOE
and its environment.
 Extended Components (Section 5) – Identifies new components (extended Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) and extended Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)) that are not
included in CC Part 2 or CC Part 3.
 Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE.
 TOE Security Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the TOE
that satisfy the security functional requirements and objectives.
 Rationale (Section 8) - Presents the rationale for the security objectives, requirements, and SFR
dependencies as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
 Acronyms (Section 9) – Defines the acronyms and terminology used within this ST.
1.2 Security Target and TOE References
Table 1 below shows the ST and TOE references.
Table 1 ST and TOE References
ST Title EMC® Corporation EMC VNXe™ OE v3.1.1 with Unisphere and VNXe3200™
Hardware Security Target
ST Version Version 1.2
ST Author Corsec Security, Inc.
ST Publication Date 2015-07-08
1
IP – Internet Protocol
2
iSCSI – Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
3
FC – Fibre Channel
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ST Title EMC® Corporation EMC VNXe™ OE v3.1.1 with Unisphere and VNXe3200™
Hardware Security Target
TOE Reference TOE Software:
EMC VNXe OE v3.1.1.5395470
EMC VNXe Unisphere v3.1.1.5395470
EMC VNXe Unisphere CLI4
v3.0.0.1.16
TOE Hardware:
EMC VNXe3200 DPE5
V32D12AN2 P/N 100-542-455-11
EMC VNXe3200 DPE V32D12AN5QS25 P/N 100-542-441-01
EMC VNXe3200 DAE6
V32-DAE-12 P/N 100-542-104-01
EMC VNXe3200 DAE V32-DAE-25 P/N 100-563-628
Disk Drives:
EMC KSHWXG8J SAS7
P/N 005049804PWR
EMC SS162511 CLAR100 EFD8
P/N 5050500
EMC Z1X1972R NL-SAS P/N 005050143PWR
1.3 Product Overview
The Product Overview provides a high-level description of the product that is the subject of the evaluation.
The following section, TOE Overview, will provide the introduction to the parts of the overall product
offering that are specifically being evaluated.
Figure 1 VNXe System
VNXe/Unisphere allows an organization to manage its storage needs separately from its application and
file servers. This allows greater control over storage allocation, fault tolerance, and backups versus storage
that is directly attached to individual application or file servers. In a typical deployment scenario, hosts9
connect to VNXe/Unisphere over an IP-based network through standard IP-based networking equipment
(routers and switches as needed) or through a typical SAN architecture using FC equipment. These hosts
are then configured to use storage on VNXe3200 hardware in the form of Logical Units or file systems for
their applications.
VNXe includes the VNXe Operating Environment v3.1.1, which provides RAID10
and storage capabilities.
The product provides the ability to combine several individual drives into useful logical groups, provides
4
CLI – Command Line Interface
5
DPE – Disk Processor Enclosure
6
DAE – Disk Array Enclosure
7
SAS – Serial-Attached SCSI
8
EFD – Enterprise Flash Drive
9
Host – a host is a term used to generically define systems accessing storage on the TOE, whether that acces is Block-
based access or File-based access
10
RAID – Redundant Array of Independent Disks
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fault tolerance for stored data, and manages access to stored data. The product is designed to allow
customers to scale both system performance and storage capacity.
VNXe Operating Environment v3.1.1 software includes the Unisphere management software that allows
administrators to manage and configure the VNXe. The VNXe3200 is the hardware platform, which
includes back-end disk arrays. Together these components provide three main features:
 Block services (iSCSI over IP, and FC)
 File services (Network File System (NFS) and Common Internet File System (CIFS)11
)
 A unified management suite that allows administrators to configure all parts of the VNXe from a
single management console.
VNXe users access storage through traditional IP-based block and file protocols. VNXe can present itself
as one or more standard network-based file servers to IP-based client machines (as a NAS12
), or as a block
storage device to application servers with iSCSI and FC. Administrators manage VNXe and control the
policies that govern access to storage with VNXe Operating Environment v3.1.1 software.
The product runs Unified13
Block and File protocols, allowing the product to provide and control access to
storage from both IP-connected clients and clients connecting via FC.
CSX14
implements the File and Block functionality. CSX is an execution environment built on a Linux
kernel that processes and performs the actual transfer of data between the back-end disk drives and clients.
Each CSX process provided by VNXe can host one or more “virtual servers” that present shared services to
IP-based and FC-based hosts. Protocols that VNXe supports include:
 CIFS15
versions 2 and 3
 NFS16
versions 2 and 3
 iSCSI
 FC
Administrators can configure the type of protocols that are supported for that server per process. IP-
connected hosts, with the appropriate access privileges, can then use VNXe to store and access data.
VNXe is responsible for enforcing all access permissions for user data. Each File-based “virtual server” on
VNXe can be configured to interface with an LDAPv3-compatible or Network Information Service (NIS)
server. When a request for data access is made from a File-based client machine, VNXe utilizes the
LDAPv3-compatible server or NIS server for authentication, checks the Access Control List (ACL) of the
requested file or directory, and either grants or denies access to the user. User data is stored directly on
storage provided by VNXe3200.
The VNXe3200 platform includes disk drives and other hardware to run the system (such as memory and
processor). The VNXe hardware offers options to choose the capacity and performance of storage by
customizing the number and capacity of SSD, NL-SAS17
, and SAS18
disks in the system.
The disk storage is configured to provide a storage system for use by VNXe users. The block storage
portion of VNXe allows this storage system to store and retrieve block units of data for VNXe users. Each
11
CIFS is the Microsoft implementation of System Message Block (SMB)
12
NAS – Network Attached Storage
13
Unified refers to both Block and File storage functionality being present on the same storage system.
14
CSX – Common Software eXecution
15
CIFS is a platform-independent file sharing system commonly used by Microsoft Windows network file sharing
16
NFS is a platform-independent file sharing system commonly used by UNIX and UNIX variants for file sharing
17
NL SAS – Near Line Serial Attached Small Computer System Interface (SCSI)
18
SAS – Serial Attached SCSI
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of these block units is associated with a Logical Unit, which is in turn associated with a Logical Unit
Number (LUN). Individual elements of the storage system are presented to VNXe as Logical Units. Each
Logical Unit is a useable storage system volume that VNXe can expose to the user.
The VNXe Operating Environment v3.1.1 software contains utilities and a user interface for installing and
configuring VNXe, maintaining the system, and monitoring system performance.
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE Overview summarizes the usage and major security features of the TOE. The TOE Overview
provides a context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the TOE type, describing the product, and
defining the specific evaluated configuration.
The hardware and software TOE is the EMC VNXe™ OE v3.1.1 with Unisphere and VNXe3200™
Hardware. The TOE is a mid-to-high capacity storage system. The VNXe Operating Environment v3.1.1
provides RAID and virtual storage capabilities, one or more NAS servers that allow IP-based clients to
connect and use storage, an interface by which the TOE provides access controls for storage under
management by VNXe. The VNXe3200 includes the hardware needed to access and provide storage and
the disk storage itself.
The TOE is managed by authorized users through the UEMCLI19
and the Unisphere GUI20
interfaces.
Unisphere GUI is an Adobe Flex application that runs within a web browser. To access the functions
available via Unisphere GUI, an authorized user must open a web browser and enter the IP address or
hostname of the VNXe management port. UEMCLI is a command line interface that provides access to
common functions for monitoring and managing the TOE. The UEMCLI provides access to functions for
storage provisioning, status and configuration information retrieval, and other TOE administrative
functions. UEMCLI commands can also be used to automate management functions via shell scripts and
batch files.
The TOE software provides RAID storage architectures, fault detection, isolation, and diagnosis
capabilities. It enables the use of virtual storage elements (LUNs) to improve performance and capacity
utilization.
The TOE provides NAS services that allow hosts on an IP network to access file systems via one of the
supported file-based protocols (CIFS and NFS). The TOE presents this storage as one or more file servers
on the customer’s network. Client systems that attempt to access the file systems must pass TOE access
controls before the TOE allows the access to occur. The TOE provides Storage Area Network (SAN)
services that allow hosts to access storage as Logical Units via iSCSI or FC.
The TOE also performs identification and authorization of TOE Administrators, and Users; discovery and
monitoring of File-side and Block-side components; storage configuration and allocation; status and
configuration information display; and event management. The TOE hardware provides the physical
storage and processing resources necessary for the TOE to function.
Figure 2 shows the details of the deployment configuration of the TOE:
19
UEMCLI – Unified Element Manager Command Line Interface
20
GUI – Graphical User Interface
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Figure 2 Deployment Configuration of the TOE
In the diagram above, Application Servers are shown to make use of the block protocols in order to access
storage on the TOE. This is because users typically access storage via the file protocols. Application
Servers, which can include any type of applications requiring the use of storage (such as database servers,
web servers, trouble-ticket systems, custom applications, and more), typically use block protocols to store
and retrieve data requested by users.
1.4.1 Brief Description of the Components of the TOE
The following sections describe the technologies and concepts related to the TOE.
1.4.1.1 Logical Units and File Systems
A central concept of the TOE is an abstraction called a Logical Unit. The TOE presents storage to hosts on
the IP network in the form of Logical Units and File Systems. The TOE software provides for the
management of Logical Units and File Systems. Each Logical Unit represents a unit of storage to a host,
analogous to a local disk drive. However, the Logical Unit provided by the TOE is not constrained to be a
single individual disk. In fact, a typical deployment would have Logical Units that span multiple individual
disks that are grouped into a RAID Group.
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Each LUN can then be mounted by hosts. When this mechanism is used, a host can only access LUNs that
the host has been permitted to access. It is also possible that multiple hosts are given access to the same
LUNs. This is used in cases where the host has been deployed in such a way as to manage multiple servers
accessing the same LUN, for example, in a clustered environment.
1.4.1.2 Storage Processors (SPs)
The SP hardware (with VNXe3200 Operating Environment v3.1.1 software) is responsible for interfacing
with the front-end IP-based clients and the back-end disks within the VNXe3200. The SP provides
administrators with the ability to manage the TOE and establish Logical Units and RAID Groups.
1.4.1.3 Disk Array Enclosures (DAEs)
The DAE hardware houses the disks in the storage array and provides connectivity to users attempting to
access storage or stored data. The VNXe3200 storage system supports up to 150 drives on 25-disk 2.5”
(SSD and SAS) enclosures or 12-disk 3.5” (SAS and NL SAS) enclosures21
.
1.4.1.4 Disk Processor Enclosure (DPE)
The DPE houses two SPs and can hold up to 25 2.5” SSD drives and SAS or 12 3.5” SAS and NL SAS
drives.
1.4.1.5 RAID Groups
A RAID Group is a collection of individual disks. The TOE supports a variety of disk types and capacities
(chosen by the customer when the product is purchased). In a RAID Group, disks of a similar type are
typically grouped together. This RAID Group can then be configured by an administrator with various
attributes, such as which RAID level to provide. In this manner, an administrator can manage the TOE
through successive levels of abstraction.
1.4.1.6 Unisphere
Unisphere is the Adobe Flex GUI used to manage the TOE. Administrators must log into Unisphere in
order to manage the TOE or the policies that control user access. Management functionality is presented in
the form of multiple screens that contain graphical elements, such as fields, buttons, and boxes. Unisphere
also provides utilities to maintain and install the TOE.
1.4.2 TOE Environment
The TOE is intended to be deployed in a secure data center that protects physical access to the TOE. The
TOE is intended to be connected to an IP network with the constituent servers managed by administrators
operating under a consistent security policy with the administrators that manage the TOE. Management
workstations need to meet the following requirements to run UEMCLI and Unisphere:
1.4.2.1 Unisphere CLI (UEMCLI)
 32-bit Windows
1.4.2.2 Unisphere
 Adobe Flash Player v11
 Mozilla Firefox v28
The TOE relies on secure access provided by the network to which it is attached. The purpose of the TOE
is to mediate access to user data for File-based users and Block-based application servers connected to an
IP or FC network. Hosts connecting to the TOE to access storage must use CIFS, NFS, iSCSI, or FC.
21 For a list of supported disk drives, please refer to EMC VNXe Series Storage Systems Disk and OE
Matrix, available at https://support.emc.com/products/30951_VNXe3200/Documentation/.
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An LDAPv3-compliant Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller is included within the TOE
Environment in order to provide remote password-based authentication for the TOE for administrators and
CIFS File-based users. A NIS Server is also included within the TOE environment for remote password-
based authentication to the TOE for NFS File-based users. A Network Time Protocol Server is included
within the TOE Environment in order to synchronize the system time of the TOE with the rest of the
deployment environment.
1.5 TOE Description
This section primarily addresses the physical and logical components of the TOE that are included in the
evaluation.
1.5.1 Physical Scope
Figure 2 above illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the overall solution and ties
together all of the components of the TOE.
The essential physical components for the proper operation of the TOE in its minimal configuration are:
 TOE:
o Software:
 EMC VNXe Operating Environment v3.1.1 software (includes EMC VNXe
Unisphere)
 EMC VNXe Unisphere CLI (UEMCLI) v3.0
o Hardware:
 EMC VNXe3200 DPE – includes two SPs
 EMC VNXe3200 DAE
 EMC EFD and SAS disk drives
 TOE Environment:
o Management workstation used to access the Unisphere GUI via a web browser or the
UEMCLI (the workstation and web browser are not included within the TOE boundary)
o LDAPv3-compatible Server (Active Directory)
o NTP Server (Active Directory)
o NIS Server
o Application Servers accessing Block storage
o Client Systems accessing File storage
1.5.1.1 Guidance Documentation
The following guides are required reading and part of the TOE:
 EMC Unisphere for VNXe Online Help
 EMC VNXe Unisphere CLI22
User Guide
 EMC VNXe Security Configuration Guide
 EMC VNXe Series Quick Start
 EMC VNXe Series Using a VNXe3200 System with Fibre Channel or iSCSI LUNs
 EMC VNXe Series Using a VNXe3200 System with NFS File Systems
 EMC VNXe Series Using a VNXe3200 System with CIFS File Systems
 EMC VNXe3200 Operating Environment v3.1.1.5395470 Release Notes
 VNXe Series VNXe3200 Hardware Information Guide
 EMC VNXe3200 Installation Guide
22
CLI – Command Line Interface
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1.5.2 Logical Scope
The logical boundary of the TOE will be broken down into the following security classes which are further
described in sections 6 and 7 of this ST. The logical scope also provides the description of the security
features of the TOE. The security functional requirements implemented by the TOE are usefully grouped
under the following Security Function Classes:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
1.5.2.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for all administrator actions that result in a configuration change and all
login attempts. Authorized administrators can view the audit records.
1.5.2.2 User Data Protection
The User Data Protection function implements functionality necessary to protect user data which is
entrusted to the TOE. This functionality is primarily enforced by the storage management processes in the
TOE. File-based users accessing the TOE are identified and authenticated by the TOE Environment. The
TOE verifies that the identification and authentication is successful before granting these users access to
files and directories managed by the TOE. Each file and directory has an Access Control List (ACL) that
contains the access privileges for users of the TOE to that object. Files are accessed via CIFS and NFS.
The TOE protects user data primarily in two additional ways. First, it ensures that only the users or
application servers that have been granted access to LUNs have access to those LUNs. Second, it ensures
the integrity of the data entrusted to it through its use of RAID levels.
1.5.2.3 Identification and Authentication
This function of the TOE is used to verify the successful identification and authentication of each
administrator of the TOE and each File-based TOE user. (both user and administrator I&A are performed
by the TOE environment). In the case of Unisphere administrators, the TOE provides username and
password verification functionality via a remote LDAPv3-compatible server. Administrators are assigned a
role to determine what aspects of the TOE they are allowed to manage. This functionality is configured by
an Administrator. File users (CIFS or NFS) are also authenticated via a remote LDAPv3-compatible server
or NIS server.
1.5.2.4 Security Management
The Security Management functionality of the TOE specifies several aspects of management of the TOE
Security Functionality (TSF). Proper management of the TSF is required to properly mediate access to the
storage that the TOE provides.
The TOE is managed by authorized users through the Unisphere GUI and the UEMCLI. Unisphere GUI is
an Adobe Flex application that runs within a web browser. UEMCLI is a command line interface that
provides access to common functions for monitoring and managing the TOE.
The Security Management function provides administrators with the ability to properly manage and
configure the TOE storage. Administrators are assigned a role that governs what aspects of the TOE they
are authorized to manage. Configuration of RAID settings and administrator access is all supported
through this security function.
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1.5.3 Product Physical/Logical Features and Functionality not
included in the TOE
Features/Functionality that are not part of the evaluated configuration of the TOE are:
 Event Enabler
 REST interface
 SMI-S interface
 VASA interface
 File-level retention
 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
notification functionality
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2 Conformance Claims
This section and Table 2 provide the identification for any CC, Protection Profile (PP), and EAL package
conformance claims. Rationale is provided for any extensions or augmentations to the conformance
claims. Rationale for CC and PP conformance claims can be found in Section 8.1.
Table 2 CC and PP Conformance
Common Criteria
(CC) Identification
and Conformance
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Release 4, September 2012; CC Part 2 conformant; CC Part 3 conformant; PP
claim (none); Parts 2 and 3 Interpretations of the CEM as of 2014-12-11 were
reviewed, and no interpretations apply to the claims made in this ST.
PP Identification None
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL2+ augmented with Flaw Reporting Procedures (ALC_FLR.2)
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3 Security Problem
This section describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used and the
manner in which the TOE is expected to be employed. It provides the statement of the TOE security
environment, which identifies and explains all:
 Known and presumed threats countered by either the TOE or by the security environment
 Organizational security policies with which the TOE must comply
 Assumptions about the secure usage of the TOE, including physical, personnel and connectivity
aspects
3.1 Threats to Security
This section identifies the threats to the IT23
assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by
the security environment. The threat agents are divided into two categories:
 Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a low skill level, limited resources to alter TOE configuration settings or
parameters and no physical access to the TOE.
 TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to possess
a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and
physical access to the TOE. (TOE users are, however, assumed not to be willfully hostile to the
TOE.)
[Both are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring protection are the TSF24
and
user data saved on or transitioning through the TOE and the hosts on the protected network. Removal,
diminution and mitigation of the threats are through the objectives identified in Section 4 Security
Objectives. Table 3 below lists the applicable threats.
Table 3 Threats
Name Description
T.DATA_CORRUPTION Data could become corrupted due to hardware failure or incorrect
system access by users of the TOE or attackers.
T.IMPROPER_SERVER A system connected to the TOE could access data that it was not
intended to gain access by bypassing the protection mechanisms of the
TOE.
T.IMPROPER_CONFIG The TOE could be misconfigured to provide improper storage or
enforce improper access to user data.
T.MEDIATE_ACCESS Access to user data could be improperly granted to users who should
not have access to it.
T.UNAUTH An unauthorized user could access data stored by the TOE by
bypassing the protection mechanisms of the TOE.
23
IT – Information Technology
24
TSF – TOE Security Functionality
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3.2 Organizational Security Policies
An Organizational Security Policy (OSP) is a set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines imposed by an
organization on the operational environment of the TOE. There are no Organizational Security Policies
defined for this evaluation.
3.3 Assumptions
This section describes the security aspects of the intended environment for the evaluated TOE. The
operational environment must be managed in accordance with assurance requirement documentation for
delivery, operation, and user guidance. Table 4 lists the specific conditions that are required to ensure the
security of the TOE and are assumed to exist in an environment where this TOE is employed.
Table 4 Assumptions
Name Description
A.MANAGE There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the information it contains.
A.NOEVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided for the TOE and its environment.
The TOE is on an internal network and the environment protects
against all external access to the operating system.
A.TIMESTAMP The IT environment provides the TOE with the necessary reliable
timestamps.
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4 Security Objectives
Security objectives are concise, abstract statements of the intended solution to the problem defined by the
security problem definition (see Section 3). The set of security objectives for a TOE form a high-level
solution to the security problem. This high-level solution is divided into two part-wise solutions: the
security objectives for the TOE, and the security objectives for the TOE’s operational environment. This
section identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its supporting environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The specific security objectives for the TOE are listed in Table 5 below.
Table 5 Security Objectives for the TOE
Name Description
O.AUDIT The TOE must record audit records for data accesses and use of the
TOE functions on the management system.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW The TOE must provide authorized administrators with the ability to
review the audit trail.
O.ADMIN The TOE must provide a method for administrative control of the
TOE.
O.PROTECT The TOE must protect data that it has been entrusted to protect.
O.I&A The TOE will verify that users have been uniquely identified and
authenticated before granting those users access to the TSFs where
authentication is required.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment
This section describes the environmental objectives.
4.2.1 IT Security Objectives
Table 6 below lists the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the environment.
Table 6 IT Security Objectives
Name Description
OE.SECURE_SERVERS The TOE Environment must provide properly configured
authentication servers and client machines to communicate with
the TOE.
OE.TIME The TOE environment must provide reliable time stamps to the
TOE.
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNMENT The TOE Environment must provide accurate World Wide Names
for each system that communicates with the TOE.
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4.2.2 Non-IT Security Objectives
Table 7 below lists the non-IT environment security objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing
technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the
TOE hardware and/or software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or
administrative measures.
Table 7 Non-IT Security Objectives
Name Description
NOE.MANAGE Sites deploying the TOE will provide competent TOE administrators
who will ensure the system is used securely.
NOE.NOEVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that TOE administrators are non-
hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all administrator guidance.
NOE.PHYSICAL The TOE will be used in a physically secure site that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
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5 Extended Components
There are no extended SFRs or SARs defined for this evaluation of the TOE.
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6 Security Requirements
This section defines the SFRs and SARs met by the TOE. These requirements are presented following the
conventions identified in Section 6.1.
6.1 Conventions
There are several font variations used within this ST. Selected presentation choices are discussed here to
aid the Security Target reader.
The CC allows for assignment, refinement, selection and iteration operations to be performed on security
functional requirements. All of these operations are used within this ST. These operations are performed
as described in Part 2 of the CC, and are shown as follows:
 Completed assignment statements are identified using [italicized text within brackets].
 Completed selection statements are identified using [underlined text within brackets].
 Refinements are identified using bold text. Any text removed is stricken (Example: TSF Data)
and should be considered as a refinement.
 Extended Functional and Assurance Requirements are identified using “EXT_” at the beginning of
the short name.
 Iterations are identified by appending a letter in parentheses following the component title. For
example, FAU_GEN.1a Audit Data Generation would be the first iteration and FAU_GEN.1b
Audit Data Generation would be the second iteration.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the SFRs for the TOE. This section organizes the SFRs by CC class. Table 8
identifies all SFRs implemented by the TOE and indicates the ST operations performed on each
requirement.
Table 8 TOE Security Functional Requirements
Name Description S A R I
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation 

FAU_SAR.1 Audit review  
FDP_ACC.1a Subset access control   
FDP_ACF.1a Security attribute based access control   
FDP_ACC.1b Subset access control   
FDP_ACF.1b Security attribute based access control   
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity  


FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition  


FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action    
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action    
FMT_MSA.1a Management of security attributes 

 
FMT_MSA.1b Management of security attributes 

 
FMT_MSA.3a Static attribute initialisation 

 
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Name Description S A R I
FMT_MSA.3b Static attribute initialisation 

 
FMT_MTD.1a Management of TSF data 

 
FMT_MTD.1b Management of TSF data 

 
FMT_MTD.1c Management of TSF data 

 
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions  
 
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles  
 
Note: S=Selection; A=Assignment; R=Refinement; I=Iteration
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6.2.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events, for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c) [all administrator actions that result in a configuration change to the storage array, all
administrator login attempts].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [no other audit relevant information].
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [the Administrator, Storage Administrator, and Operator roles] with the
capability to read [all audit information] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
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6.2.3 Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1a Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1a Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1a
The TSF shall enforce the [Block Storage Access Control SFP25
] on [
a) Subjects: Hosts (application servers)
b) Objects: LUNs
c) Operations: Read and write
].
Application note: the Subjects are application servers connected to the TOE acting on behalf of an
authorized user.
FDP_ACF.1a Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1a Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3a Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1a
The TSF shall enforce the [Block Storage Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following:
[
Subject attributes:
1. iSCSI Qualified Name (IQN)
2. World Wide Name (WWN)
Object attributes:
1. IQN access list
2. WWN access list
].
FDP_ACF.1.2a
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed:
[
A valid subject of the TOE is allowed to read and write to TOE storage if the IQN or WWN of the
subject is included in the host list, the subject has been granted access to the LUN, and (for FC)
the host list entry is mapped to an initiator with access to the LUN
].
FDP_ACF.1.3a
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following no
additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of
subjects to objects].
FDP_ACF.1.4a
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on no additional rules the
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
FDP_ACC.1b Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1b Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1b
The TSF shall enforce the [File Access SFP] on
[
a) Subjects: Users (accessing storage from client machines)
25
SFP – Security Functional Policy
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b) Objects: CIFS shares and NFS mounts
c) Operations: Read, Write, Execute
].
Application Note: The CIFS naming convention has been used for operations. NFS v2 and NFS v3 access
supports the following subset of commands: Create, Read, Write, Delete, Change Ownership, Read
Permissions, Change Permissions, Read Attributes, Write Attributes.
FDP_ACF.1b Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1b Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3b Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1b
The TSF shall enforce the [File Storage Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following:
[
Subject attributes:
1. Username
2. Authentication status (success or failure)
3. IP address (for NFS access)
Object attributes:
1. NFS Mount permissions: Unix-style ACLs for each file and directory (Read, Write, and
Execute).
2. CIFS Share permissions: NT-style DACLs26
for each file and directory (No Access, Full
Control, Modify, Read & Execute, List Folder Contents, Read, Write, Special Permissions).
].
FDP_ACF.1.2b
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [A valid subject of the TOE is allowed to perform
an operation if the contents of the Access Control List (containing permissions) for the object
authorizes the Subject to perform the desired operation. A user must be successfully
authenticated by the TOE Environment in order to be associated with the permissions and
privileges configured for that user].
FDP_ACF.1.3b
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules:
[
1. For CIFS access subjects that are members of the group Domain Administrators shall be
authorized to backup, restore, and take ownership of all objects and control over the overall
share permissions for the entire domain
2. For NFS access, the user must access the NFS mount from a computer running an IP
address listed in the allowed hosts configuration for the TOE
3. For NFS access, subjects that are authorized as superusers (root) can perform all
operations on all objects
4. For root users accessing an NFS mount, access will be permitted if the host the root user
is using to connect to the NFS mount is listed under the “trusted hosts” list in the TOE
configuration.
].
FDP_ACF.1.4b
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [A valid subject of the
TOE is explicitly denied the ability to perform an operation if the contents of the Access Control
List for the object explicitly deny the Subject to perform the desired operation. A user that has
failed authentication is not granted access to any object].
26
DACL – Discretionary Access Control List
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FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2.1
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors]
on all user data objects, based on the following attributes: [parity data for RAID 5 and RAID 6;
mirrored data for RAID 1+0].
FDP_SDI.2.2
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [reconstruct the user data for RAID 5 and
RAID 6; replace erroneous data with the mirrored data for RAID 1+0; and notify an
administrator].
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6.2.4 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
Administrators users: [role].
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
User Authentication applies to users accessing File-based storage on the TOE as well as administrators
accessing management functionality via the management interfaces.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
User Identification applies to users accessing File-based storage on the TOE as well as administrators
accessing management functionality via the management interfaces.
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6.2.5 Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MSA.1a Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1a Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1a
The TSF shall enforce the [Block Storage Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [query,
modify, delete] the security attributes [WWN and IQN access lists] to [the Administrator and
Storage Administrator roles].
Application Note: The Block Storage Access Control SFP does not actually control access to the security
attributes; rather, these attributes are used in the enforcement of the Block Storage Access Control SFP
and are restricted by role-based access control.
FMT_MSA.1b Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1b Subset access control
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1b
The TSF shall enforce the [File Storage Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to [modify,
delete, [add]] the security attributes [the attributes listed under “Attributes” in Table 9] to [the
roles listed under “Role/permissions required” in Table 9].
Table 9 File Storage Access Control SFP Management
Access type Attributes Role/permissions
required
CIFS share Domain Administrator Administrator or Storage
Administrator
NFS mount Host and Trusted Host access lists
(IP addresses for each allowed
system)
Administrator or Storage
Administrator
CIFS file and directory permissions CIFS file and directory DACLs CIFS user with Domain
Administrator membership,
File Owner, or Change
Permissions in DACL for the
file, directory, or share
NFS file and directory permissions NFS file and directory ACLs NFS user with root, File
Owner, or Change
Permissions in the ACL for the
file or directory
Application Note: The File Storage Access Control SFP does not actually control access to the security
attributes; rather, these attributes are used in the enforcement of the File Storage Access Control SFP and
are restricted by role-based access control.
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FMT_MSA.3a Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1a Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1a
The TSF shall enforce the [Block Storage Access Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2a
The TSF shall allow the [Administrator and Storage Administrator] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.3b Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1b Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1b
The TSF shall enforce the [File Storage Access Control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2b
The TSF shall allow the [Object Owner] to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MTD.1a Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1a
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [query] the [all administrative information for the TOE] to [the
Administrator, Storage Administrator, and Operator roles].
FMT_MTD.1b Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1b
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify, delete, [create]] the [LUNs and RAID Groups] to [the
Administrator and Storage Administrator roles].
FMT_MTD.1c Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1c
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify, delete, [create]] the [user accounts] to [the
Administrator Role].
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
[
a) Management of Block Storage Access Control SFP attributes
b) Management of File Storage Access Control SFP attributes
c) Viewing administrative information
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d) Manage storage
e) Manage users
].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [the authorized roles identified in Table 10].
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Table 10 Authorized Roles
Role Description
Operator Can only perform monitoring activities in
Unisphere. Read-only access.
Storage Administrator Can configure Unisphere and provision and reclaim
storage.
Administrator All administration capabilities.
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6.2.6 Security Assurance Requirements
This section defines the assurance requirements for the TOE. Assurance requirements are taken from the
CC Part 3 and are EAL2+ augmented with ALC_FLR.2. Table 11 Assurance Requirements summarizes
the requirements.
Table 11 Assurance Requirements
Assurance Requirements
Class ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Class ALC : Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM Coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
Class ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
Class AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Class ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
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7 TOE Security Specification
This section presents information to detail how the TOE meets the functional requirements described in
previous sections of this ST.
7.1 TOE Security Functionality
Each of the security requirements and the associated descriptions correspond to security functionality.
Hence, the security functionality is described by how it specifically satisfies each of its related
requirements. This serves to both describe the security functionality and rationalize that the security
functionality satisfies the necessary requirements. Table 12 lists the security functionality and their
associated SFRs.
Table 12 Mapping of TOE Security Functionality to Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Functionality SFR ID Description
Security Audit FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
User Data Protection FDP_ACC.1a Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1a Security attribute based access
control
FDP_ACC.1b Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1b Security attribute based access
control
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity
Identification and Authentication FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any
action
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any
action
Security Management FMT_MSA.1a Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1b Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3a Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.3b Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1a Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1b Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1c Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management
functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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7.1.1 Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for startup and shutdown of the audit function, all administrator actions
that result in a configuration change, and all login attempts. Audit records contain the date and time of the
event, the type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome of the event. Authorized
administrators can view the audit records from the CLI or GUI. Audit records are presented to
administrators in a clearly understandable format.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAR.1.
7.1.2 User Data Protection
This section describes the various User Data Protection SFRs claimed.
7.1.2.1 File Storage Access Control SFP
The TOE enforces the File Storage Access Control SFP27
on each user of the TOE based on the security
attributes of that user. The TOE supports three different user types: File Users, who are controlled by the
File Access Control SFP, Block Users, who are controlled by the Block Access SFP, and administrators
who are constrained as described by the Security Management functionality. File Users are any users
accessing data or storage on the TOE via one of the file protocols (CIFS or NFS). Block Users are any
users accessing data or storage on the TOE via one of the block protocols (iSCSI, or FC) from a client
machine. Block users are typically application servers and not actual human users. Administrators are any
users accessing one of the management interfaces for the TOE.
File Storage Access Control SFP: All access to storage is performed via a CIFS or NFS client on behalf
of the user. These clients are basic pieces of software (such as the CIFS client within Windows Explorer)
used to map and access file-based storage. The TOE enforces the File Storage Access Control SFP on
users connecting to the storage on the TOE for NFS and CIFS. After successful authentication for NFS
users, the TOE checks user permissions for each file or directory’s ACL on each user’s access request to
determine if the user has appropriate permissions to access the files or directories. After successful
authentication for CIFS users, the TOE checks user permissions for each file or directory’s DACL on each
user’s access request to determine if the user has appropriate permissions to access the files or directories.
The ability to connect to an NFS mount or CIFS share is granted to users by Administrators or Storage
Administrators. Users are associated with CIFS shares via an access list, while a list of IP addresses is
associated with NFS mounts as an access list.
Individual file and directory access control management is granted to CIFS users with File Owner or
Change Permissions set in the DACL for the user. NFS users with the root role can modify permissions for
all files and directories, or users with the File Owner or Change Permissions for any given file or directory
can manage access controls for those particular files and directories.
A Linux/Unix host can mount to the VNXe hosted NFS Shared Folder Server if the host has been explicitly
authorized to the NFS Shared Folder Server. Similarly, a Windows user can map to the VNXe hosted CIFS
Shared Folder Server if the user has been explicitly authorized to the CIFS Shared Folder.
The export of a CIFS Shared Folder Server is based off of the Server Configuration LDAP setting. The
VNXe hosted CIFS Shared Folder Server must be in a Windows domain with an LDAPv3-compatible
server set up. A Windows client machine can map to the share only if it is a member of the defined domain.
For CIFS access, subjects that are members of the group Domain Administrators shall be authorized to
backup, restore, and take ownership of all objects.
27
SFP – Security Functional Policy
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Client machine access to the VNXe hosted NFS Shared Folder Server can be configured based on IP
address or network host name, IP subnet range, or a Netgroup. For the NFS access protocol, users
connecting to TOE storage who are superusers can perform all operations on all objects. Clients must be
recognized as “trusted” by the system in order to submit a root request, otherwise it will be mapped to the
“nobody” role.
Each file and directory has an ACL associated with it. Each ACL has a set of permissions that are granted
or explicitly denied to that user. Whenever a user requests an access to a file or directory, the TOE utilizes
its File Storage Access Control SFP (stored with each file and directory) to decide whether or not that
access is permitted.
7.1.2.2 Block Storage Access Control SFP
The TOE also provides the User Data Protection security function to manage access from Block-based
application servers to configured Logical Units. The purpose of the TOE’s storage is to allow high speed,
scalable, fault-tolerant storage separate from individual application servers. The TOE provides this
functionality to IP-connected hosts.
Using the Security Management security function, Administrators of the TOE can configure Logical Units
to provide storage to client machines. LUNs allow Administrators to limit access to one or more specified
application servers. When an iSCSI application server requests a list of available LUNs from the TOE, the
TOE Environment provides an IQN, or a WWN for FC application servers. This IQN or WWN is used to
identify the application servers to the TOE. If the iSCSI application server has a host object created to
represent itself on the TOE, the TOE then provides a list of LUNs that the application server has been
granted access to. FC is slightly more complicated by requiring the physical adapters to be connected to
the application server (either through the SAN fabric or otherwise). Once the host is connected to the
proper Host Bus Adapter (HBA), the WWN for the host can be associated with a host object on the TOE as
is done with iSCSI. After all of this, each successive request to read or write information to or from a
LUN, the TOE ensures that only authorized application servers have access to the LUNs to which they
have been given access.
7.1.2.3 RAID
The TOE also provides for the integrity of user data. When creating RAID Groups from individual disk
drives, an Administrator can configure RAID levels 1/0, 5, or 6. Each of these provides fault tolerance for
integrity errors or individual disk drive failure. The TOE provides mechanisms to check data integrity
continuously while reading and writing data to individual disks. Integrity errors or drive errors are fixed
on-the-fly. Additionally, Administrators can configure “hot spare” disk drives. These “hot spares” are
used when a disk failure has been detected by the system. Once a failure has been detected, the drive that
has been lost will be recreated on the “hot spare”. The Administrator can then replace the failed drive and
configure it as a new “hot spare”. This process is provided while real-time access to user data continues.
When an integrity error occurs, the TOE notifies the administrator of the error. This notification is an alert
that is placed in a log file. Administrators can view alerts via the Alerts page of Unisphere or from the
UEMCLI.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FDP_ACC.1a, FDP_ACF.1a, FDP_ACC.1b,
FDP_ACF.1b, FDP_SDI.2.
7.1.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE environment performs identification and authentication of both Administrators and File-based
Users. The purpose of the identification and authentication function is to allow the TOE to restrict access
to both administrative functions and to user data based upon the authenticated identity and associated
attributes of a user. Both user (File) as well as administrator access to the TOE is covered via the I&A
claims. The TOE uses a NIS server or LDAPv3-compatible server in the TOE environment to provide
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authentication services. Once the username and password has been verified, the TOE uses the message
returned from the LDAP or NIS server to assign a role to users and administrators.
7.1.3.1 Administrative I&A
Unisphere Administrators can access the TOE through a web browser or through a command line interface.
The TOE supports authentication against Active Directory or an LDAPv3-compatible authentication server.
The first action that administrators must take when attempting to interact with the TOE is to provide a
username and password. Before identification and authentication, the administrator is not able to access
any TOE security functionality.
7.1.3.2 User I&A
Windows environments use an LDAPv3-compatible server or a NIS server for authentication. A Windows
host can only map to a CIFS Shared Folder Server if the Windows host is on the same domain as the
VNXe, and the Windows domain with an LDAPv3-compatble server is set up.
For NFSv2 and NFSv3, users are authenticated against a NIS server. The server from which the request is
coming is identified and authenticated based on the username and password. If the user ID is “root” then
the host must also be assigned as a “trusted host” within the TOE configuration.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2.
7.1.4 Security Management
Unisphere Administrators are primarily responsible for managing and configuring system objects. This
includes managing the use of storage and NFS mount and CIFS share access controls for Block and File.
Storage management is primarily the tasks associated with LUNs provided by the storage system, grouping
those LUNs into useful groupings called LUN groups. The Administrator creates and manages storage for
the TOE, and (for file services) maps shares on those file servers to configured file systems. The
Administrator is responsible for configuring the access control mechanisms to be supported by each
“Storage Resource”. All of this, in addition to managing users, user access to LUNs, and managing RAID
groups, is accomplished via Unisphere and UEMCLI.
Administrators, storage administrators, and operators may use Unisphere or UEMCLI to query all
administrative information on the TOE. This includes all TOE configuration settings, all storage
information, and all user accounts on the system. Only users with the administrator role may manage users.
User accounts can only be managed via UEMCLI or Unisphere.
Client machines accessing the TOE via CIFS and NFS protocols have restrictive default attributes and are
not granted any access to data until the TOE verifies that each user has been identified and authenticated by
the LDAPv3-compatible server or NIS server in the TOE Environment. Once authenticated, the user is
granted access according to the DACL (CIFS) or ACL (NFS) associated with each file and directory. CIFS
and NFS file and directory attributes that can be modified include read, write, and execute permissions.
For CIFS users, the user is granted access to the share based on whether they have read and write
permissions for the whole share, as granted by a Domain Administrator via a CIFS client (no permissions
are set by default). For NFS, the IP address of the system accessing storage must be authorized before any
access is allowed. In these ways, access to storage via the File Storage Access Control SFP are restrictive
by default.
Unisphere and UEMCLI administrators with the Administrator or Storage Administrator role can modify
the NFS access lists and CIFS Domain Administrator attributes. Domain Administrators can modify CIFS
share permissions via a CIFS client, and users assigned file owner or change permissions rights for a file
can modify the read, write, and execute settings for each file.
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Application servers accessing the TOE via block protocols have restrictive default values and are required
to be listed in the TOE configuration with a valid WWN or IQN in order access stored data. Additionally,
the WWN must be mapped to a valid initiator in order to access the storage for FC.
The TOE provides mechanisms to govern which hosts can access which LUNs. The Security Management
function allows Administrators to properly configure this functionality. Additionally, the storage
management portion of Unisphere allows administrators to manage the RAID settings for storage, although
this can also be managed via UEMCLI.
Administrators of the TOE are assigned one of the roles described in Table 10 above. Section 7.1.2 above
describes how the Block and File Access Control SFPs are managed.
TOE Security Functional Requirements Satisfied: FMT_MSA.1a, FMT_MSA.1b, FMT_MSA.3a,
FMT_MSA.3b, FMT_MTD.1a, FMT_MTD.1b, FMT_MTD.1c, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1.
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8 Rationale
8.1 Conformance Claims Rationale
This Security Target conforms to Part 2 and Part 3 of the Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Release 4.
8.2 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, and assumption that
compose the Security Target. Sections 8.2.1, 8.2.2, and 8.2.3 demonstrate the mappings between the
threats, policies, and assumptions to the security objectives are complete. The following discussion
provides detailed evidence of coverage for each threat, policy, and assumption.
8.2.1 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Threats
Table 13 below provides a mapping of the objectives to the threats they counter.
Table 13 Threats: Objectives Mapping
Threats Objectives Rationale
T.DATA_CORRUPTION
Data could become corrupted due
to hardware failure or incorrect
system access by users of the TOE
or attackers.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by
allowing an administrator to
properly configure the
mechanisms of the TOE.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT counters this threat
by providing mechanisms to
protect the data that has been
entrusted to the TOE.
T.IMPROPER_SERVER
A system connected to the TOE
could access data that it was not
intended to gain access by
bypassing the protection
mechanisms of the TOE.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by
allowing an administrator to
properly configure the
mechanisms of the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE Environment must
provide properly configured
authentication servers and client
machines to communicate with
the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS counters
this threat by ensuring that each
server connected to the storage
area network operates properly
and does not intentionally
compromise data.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT counters this threat
by providing adequate
mechanisms to give only
authorized servers access to the
appropriately authorized data.
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNME
NT
The TOE Environment must
provide accurate World Wide
Names for each system that
communicates with the TOE.
OE.PROPER_NAME_ASSIGNME
NT counters this threat by
ensuring that the World Wide
Names provided to the TOE are
accurate. This allows the
mechanisms provided by
O.PROTECT to properly protect
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Threats Objectives Rationale
data.
T.IMPROPER_CONFIG
The TOE could be misconfigured
to provide improper storage or
enforce improper access to user
data.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by
allowing an administrator to
properly configure the
mechanisms of the TOE.
O.I&A
The TOE will verify that users
have been uniquely identified and
authenticated before granting
those users access to the TSFs
where authentication is required.
O.I&A counters this threat by
ensuring that all authorized
administrators are properly
identified and authenticated by the
TOE Environment and that the
TOE has verified their successful
identification and authentication.
T.MEDIATE_ACCESS
Access to user data could be
improperly granted to users who
should not have access to it.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by
allowing an administrator to
properly configure the
mechanisms of the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS
The TOE Environment must
provide properly configured
authentication servers and client
machines to communicate with
the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS counters
this threat by ensuring that the
servers that communicate with
the TOE on behalf of a user are
managed securely.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT counters this threat
by providing mechanisms to
protect the data that has been
entrusted to the TOE.
O.I&A
The TOE will verify that users
have been uniquely identified and
authenticated before granting
those users access to the TSFs
where authentication is required.
O.I&A counters this threat by
ensuring that all users have been
properly identified and
authenticated by the TOE
Environment prior to the TOE
providing access to user data.
T.UNAUTH
An unauthorized user could access
data stored by the TOE by
bypassing the protection
mechanisms of the TOE.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record audit
records for data accesses and use
of the TOE functions on the
management system.
O.AUDIT counters this threat by
ensuring that the TOE tracks all
management actions taken against
the TOE.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW
The TOE must provide authorized
administrators with the ability to
review the audit trail.
O.AUDIT_REVIEW counters this
threat by ensuring that
administrators can review the
audited changes to the TOE
configuration.
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
O.ADMIN counters this threat by
allowing an administrator to
properly configure the
mechanisms of the TOE.
OE.SECURE_SERVERS OE.SECURE_SERVERS counters
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Threats Objectives Rationale
The TOE Environment must
provide properly configured
authentication servers and client
machines to communicate with
the TOE.
this threat by ensuring that the
servers that communicate with
the TOE on behalf of a user are
managed securely. Depending
upon the access mechanism
chosen, the TOE may depend
upon these servers for
identification and authentication of
users.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
O.PROTECT counters this threat
by providing mechanisms to
protect the data that has been
entrusted to the TOE.
O.I&A
The TOE will verify that users
have been uniquely identified and
authenticated before granting
those users access to the TSFs
where authentication is required.
O.I&A counters this threat by
ensuring that users have been
properly identified and
authenticated by the TOE
Environment prior to the TOE
providing access to user data.
Every Threat is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives counter all defined threats.
8.2.2 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies defined for this evaluation.
8.2.3 Security Objectives Rationale Relating to Assumptions
Table 14 below gives a mapping of assumptions and the environmental objectives that uphold them.
Table 14 Assumptions: Objectives Mapping
Assumptions Objectives Rationale
A.MANAGE
There are one or more competent
individuals assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the
information it contains.
NOE.MANAGE
Sites deploying the TOE will
provide competent TOE
administrators who will ensure
the system is used securely.
NOE.MANAGE upholds this
assumption by ensuring that those
responsible for the TOE will
provide competent individuals to
perform management of the
security of the environment, and
restrict these functions and
facilities from unauthorized use.
A.NOEVIL
Administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
NOE.NOEVIL
Sites using the TOE shall ensure
that TOE administrators are non-
hostile, appropriately trained, and
follow all administrator guidance.
NOE.NOEVIL upholds this
assumption by ensuring that
administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow
all administrator guidance.
A.PHYSICAL NOE.PHYSICAL NOE.PHYSICAL upholds this
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Assumptions Objectives Rationale
Physical security will be provided
for the TOE and its environment.
The TOE is on an internal network
and the environment protects
against all external access to the
operating system.
The TOE will be used in a
physically secure site that protects
it from interference and
tampering by untrusted subjects.
assumption by ensuring that
physical security is provided
within the domain for the value of
the IT resources protected by the
operating system and the value of
the stored, processed, and
transmitted information.
A.TIMESTAMP
The IT environment provides the
TOE with the necessary reliable
timestamps.
OE.TIME
The TOE environment must
provide reliable time stamps to
the TOE.
OE.TIME upholds this assumption
by ensuring that the environment
provides reliable time stamps to
the TOE.
Every assumption is mapped to one or more Objectives in the table above. This complete mapping
demonstrates that the defined security objectives uphold all defined assumptions.
8.3 Rationale for Extended Security Functional
Requirements
There are no extended functional requirements defined for this evaluation.
8.4 Rationale for Extended TOE Security
Assurance Requirements
There are no extended assurance requirements defined for this evaluation.
8.5 Security Requirements Rationale
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective.
8.5.1 Rationale for Security Functional Requirements of the TOE
Objectives
Table 15 below shows a mapping of the objectives and the SFRs that support them.
Table 15 Objectives: SFRs Mapping
Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.ADMIN
The TOE must provide a method
for administrative control of the
TOE.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that the TOE shall
successfully authenticate each
administrator before allowing
management of the TOE.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that the TOE will
properly identify and authenticate
all administrators.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
FMT_MSA.1a
Management of security attributes
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that security attributes of
the TOE can only be changed by
authorized administrators.
FMT_MSA.1b
Management of security attributes
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that security attributes of
the TOE can only be changed by
authorized administrators or
users with the appropriate
permissions.
FMT_MSA.3a
Static attribute initialisation
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that restrictive values for
data access are provided and the
TOE administrator can change
them when a data object is
created.
FMT_MSA.3b
Static attribute initialisation
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that restrictive values for
data access are provided, and the
Object Owner can change them
when a data object is created.
FMT_MTD.1a
Management of TSF data
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that the ability to query
TSF data is granted only to certain
roles managed by the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1b
Management of TSF data
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that the ability to modify
TSF data is granted only to certain
roles managed by the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1c
Management of TSF data
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that the ability to modify
TSF data is granted only to certain
roles managed by the TOE.
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management
functions
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that each of the
management functions are utilized
to securely manage the TOE.
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
This SFR supports O.ADMIN by
ensuring that specific roles are
defined to govern management of
the TOE.
O.AUDIT
The TOE must record audit
records for data accesses and use
of the TOE functions on the
management system.
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
The requirement meets this
objective by ensuring that the
TOE maintains a record of defined
security-related events, including
relevant details about the event.
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Objective Requirements Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.AUDIT_REVIEW
The TOE must provide authorized
administrators with the ability to
review the audit trail.
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
The requirement meets the
objective by ensuring that the
TOE provides the ability to
review the audit trail.
O.I&A
The TOE will verify that users have
been uniquely identified and
authenticated before granting
those users access to the TSFs
where authentication is required.
FIA_ATD.1
User attribute definition
This SFR supports O.I&A by
ensuring that the TOE maintains
security attributes for
administrative users.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before any
action
This SFR supports O.I&A by
ensuring that the TOE verifies the
successful authentication of each
Administrator and user prior to
granting access to the TSF.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before any
action
This SFR supports O.I&A by
ensuring that the TOE and TOE
Environment identify each
Administrator and user prior to
granting access to the TSF.
O.PROTECT
The TOE must protect data that it
has been entrusted to protect.
FDP_ACC.1a
Subset access control
This SFR supports O.PROTECT
by ensuring that the TOE has an
access control policy that ensures
that only authorized servers can
gain access to data within the
TOE.
FDP_ACC.1b
Subset access control
This SFR supports O.PROTECT
by ensuring that the TOE provides
access control functionality to
manage access to data protected
by the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1a
Security attribute based access
control
This SFR supports O.PROTECT
by ensuring that the TOE provides
access control functionality to
manage access to data within the
TOE.
FDP_ACF.1b
Security attribute based access
control
This SFR supports O.PROTECT
by ensuring that the TOE has an
access control policy which
ensures that only authorized users
gain access to data protected by
the TOE.
FDP_SDI.2
Stored data integrity
This SFR supports O.PROTECT
by ensuring that the TOE protects
the stored user data from
integrity errors.
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8.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL2+ was chosen to provide a moderate level of assurance that is consistent with good commercial
practices. As such, minimal additional tasks are placed upon the vendor assuming the vendor follows
reasonable software engineering practices and can provide support to the evaluation for design and testing
efforts. The chosen assurance level is appropriate with the threats defined for the environment. The TOE
is expected to be in a non-hostile position and embedded in or protected by other products designed to
address threats that correspond with the intended environment. At EAL2+, the TOE will have incurred a
search for obvious flaws to support its introduction into the non-hostile environment.
The augmentation of ALC_FLR.2 was chosen to give greater assurance of the developer’s on-going flaw
reporting procedures.
8.5.3 Dependency Rationale
The SFRs in this ST satisfy all of the required dependencies listed in the Common Criteria, applicable PPs,
and SFRs explicitly stated in this ST. Table 16 lists each requirement to which the TOE claims
conformance and indicates whether the dependent requirements are included. As the table indicates, all
dependencies have been met.
Table 16 Functional Requirements Dependencies
SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1  Although FPT_STM.1 is
not included, the TOE
Environment provides
reliable timestamps to
the TOE. An
environmental objective
states that the TOE will
receive reliable
timestamps, thereby
satisfying this
dependency.
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 
FDP_ACC.1a FDP_ACF.1a 
FDP_ACF.1a FDP_ACC.1a 
FMT_MSA.3a 
FDP_ACC.1b FDP_ACF.1b 
FDP_ACF.1b FDP_ACC.1b 
FMT_MSA.3b 
FDP_SDI.2 None Not applicable
FIA_ATD.1 None Not applicable
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is
not claimed, FIA_UID.2
is claimed and is
hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1.
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SFR ID Dependencies Dependency
Met
Rationale
FIA_UID.2 None Not applicable
FMT_MSA.1a FMT_SMR.1 
FDP_ACC.1a 
FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_MSA.1b FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FDP_ACC.1b 
FMT_MSA.3a FMT_MSA.1a 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MSA.3b FMT_MSA.1b 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.1a FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.1b FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_MTD.1c FMT_SMF.1 
FMT_SMR.1 
FMT_SMF.1 None Not applicable
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1  Although FIA_UID.1 is
not claimed, FIA_UID.2
is claimed and is
hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1.
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9 Acronyms
This section and Table 17 define the acronyms used throughout this document.
9.1 Acronyms
Table 17 Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ACL Access Control List
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria
CIFS Common Internet File System
CLI Command Line Interface
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSX Common Software eXecution
DPE Disk Processor Enclosure
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EFD Enterprise Flash Drive
FAST Fully Automated Storage Tiering
FC Fibre Channel
GUI Graphical User Interface
HBA Host Bus Adapter
HDD Hard Disk Drive
HIPAA
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996
ID Identifier
IP Internet Protocol
IQN iSCSI Qualified Name
iSCSI Internet Small Computer System Interface
IT Information Technology
LUN Logical Unit or Logical Unit Number
MCx Multicore x
NAS Network Attached Storage
NFS Network File System
NIS Network Information Service
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Acronym Definition
NL SAS Near Line Serial Attached SCSI
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
REST Representational State Transfer
SAN Storage Area Network
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SAS Serial Attached SCSI
SCSI Small Computer System Interface
SFP Security Functional Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMB System Message Block
SMI-S Storage Management Initiative Specification
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
SP Storage Processor
SSD Solid State Drive
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UEMCLI Unified Element Manager Command Line Interface
VASA vStorage APIs for Storage Awareness
VP Virtual Pool
WWN World Wide Name
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