TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
2022-01
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Certification Report
Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library
v1.2.10
Sponsor and developer: Google LLC
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-0228971-CR2
Report version: 1
Project number: 0228971_2
Author(s): Jordi Mujal
Date: 28 July 2022
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 9
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 10
2.6.4 Test results 10
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 10
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.9 Evaluation Results 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 12
4 Definitions 12
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
The presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Titan
H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10. The developer of the Titan H1D3 Secure
Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10 is Google LLC located in Mountain View, USA and they
also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE is a Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library. The TOE is used in smartphone, servers and
personal computers to increase the security of the platform including but not limited to secure boot,
user authentication, and user data protection.
The H1D3 Secure Microcontrollers are provided in one of three packages referenced H1D3M, H1D3C
and H1D3P. The Secure Microcontroller is a flash-based secure microcontroller platform. A RISC-V
core named Soteria alongside RAM, ROM and flash memories and cryptographic hardware
accelerators provides the root to run secure applications. The TOE includes a Crypto Library. The
image loaded and verified by the TOE bootloader stored in ROM includes the Crypto Library in
addition to the Embedded Software.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in section 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the H1D3 User Guidance as referenced in
the [ST]. As such it is vital that meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and
the hardware part of the TOE is maintained.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 08 November 2021. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS
Brightsight B.V. and was completed on 28 July 2022 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes are:
- A new version of the Crypto Library.
- Updated guidance documents.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto
Library v1.2.10, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Titan H1D3
Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: security enforcing
modules), ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures), and AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the
specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with
Crypto Library v1.2.10 from Google LLC located in Mountain View, USA.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
H1D3 Secure Microcontroller (packaged as H1D3M, H1D3P or
H1D3C)
3
Software
Bootloader (embedded in ROM) 7f4bdb
Crypto Library 1.2.10
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Titan H1D3
Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of this
report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.5.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE maintains:
• the integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories as defined in the [ST].
• the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by the
TOE.
This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.
The Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10 basically provides the following
hardware features:
• Memory Protection Unit (MPU)
• HMAC- SHA256, SHA256
• AES and TDES hardware engines
• Public Key cryptographic coprocessor
• A True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
• A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRGB) based on HMAC
• Environmental sensors.
In addition, the TOE provides the following software features as part of the IC Dedicated Software:
• Bootloader
• Cryptographic library, providing the following services or access to HW co-processors:
• RSA signature verification
• EC Key Generation
• ECDSA
• ECDH
• AES (CBC, ECB, CMAC, GCM, and CRT)
• TDES (CBC, ECB)
• SHA256
• HMAC SHA-256
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2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the Secure Microcontroller hardware and the IC Dedicated Software.
The following hardware features are provided:
• RISC-V Soteria CPU with a single execution mode
• Memory Protection Unit (MPU)
• Flash memory
• RAM memory
• ROM memory
• OTP memory (Fuse)
• HMAC-SHA256, SHA256, AES and TDES hardware engines
• Public Key cryptographic coprocessor
• A True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
• A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) based on HMAC
• Environmental sensors
A block diagram is given in Figure 1 below.
The TOE’s IC Dedicated Software comprises the bootloader and the Crypto Library. The bootloader is
stored in ROM. The image loaded and verified by the TOE bootloader includes the Crypto Library in
addition to the Embedded Software. The Crypto Library is described in section 2.2 above.
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2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Name Version Date
H1D3 Preparatory Guidance 2.2 2022-07-02
Cryptolib v1.2.10 API User Guidance 2022-06-28
Addendum Cryptolib v1.2.10 API User
Guidance
1.1 2022-07-02
H1D3C Datasheet 1.2 2021-06-30
H1D3M Datasheet 1.2 2021-06-30
H1D3P Datasheet 1.2 2021-06-30
H1D3 Register Specification 2
2021-09-30
H1D3 User Guidance 1.3 2021-09-28
H1D3 Code Signing 1.1 2021-09-28
H1D3 SPI flashing instructions 1.2 2021-10-08
Soteria Technical Reference Manual 1.3 2021-10-08
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
For the hardware parts of the TOE, the developer performed three categories of testing: pre-silicon
testing (simulation/emulation), post-silicon testing and production testing. These test categories are
combined to achieve a good coverage and depth of testing, both on the design of the hardware parts
of the TOE and on each of the manufactured ICs.
For the software parts of the TOE, the developer performed three categories of testing: simulation
tests (including code coverage analysis), emulation and on-TOE testing. These categories were
applied to the TOE to achieve a good coverage and depth of testing. All tests were executed using an
automated framework.
The tests performed by the evaluator are selected focusing on the verification of security features, with
a focus on functionality that cannot be covered with code coverage analysis (e.g. cryptographic
operations). Repeating the tests requires the same equipment used by the developer, which is not
always available at the ITSEF. Therefore, all selected tests were witnessed remotely at the
developer’s site.
During recertification, the functional testing was performed again on the latest version of the Crypto
Library. The developer executed the same test strategy as in the original evaluation.
All test results were as expected. No deviations were found.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in the classes ASE, ADV and AGD the evaluator considers whether
potential vulnerabilities can already be identified due to the TOE type and/or specified behaviour in
such an early stage of the evaluation.
2 The version of this document is linked to the TOE hardware version ‘3’
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• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review is performed on the TOE focused
on the Secure IC, Cryptographic Library and Bootloader. During this attack-oriented analysis, the
protection of the TOE is analysed using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation
classes. This results in the identification of (additional) potential vulnerabilities. For this, analysis
will be performed taking into account the attack methods in [JIL-AM] and applicable attack papers
with rating according to [JIL-AAPS].
• All potential vulnerabilities are analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable. The potential vulnerabilities are addressed by
penetration testing, a guidance update or in other ways that are deemed appropriate.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 50 weeks. During that test campaign, 38% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks, 60% on side-channel testing, and 2% on logical tests.
During recertification, the total test effort expended by the evaluators was 6 weeks. During that test
campaign, 33% of the total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 66% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
During the baseline certification, the testing was performed on the TOE (H1D3) and on an earlier
version of the TOE (H1D2). The differences between these two versions have been analysed. They
have no impact on the test results; hence the test results of the earlier version apply also to the TOE.
It should be noted that the hardware version also uniquely identifies the Bootloader, which is in ROM.
During this certification, the testing was performed on the CL version specified in the [ST] and on an
earlier version of the TOE CL. The differences between these versions have been analysed. They
have no impact on the test results; hence the test results of the earlier versions apply also to the TOE.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of site certificates and Site Technical Audit Reuse reports.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with
Crypto Library v1.2.10. The TOE can be identified as described in the H1D3 Preparatory Guidance as
referenced in the [ST]. The hardware version can be read from a dedicated register, whereas the
Crypto Library version can be determined from its commit hash through the provided API.
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2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Reports for the audited
sites3 audited during baseline certification, namely [STAR MTV], [STAR SVL], [STAR EAG], [STAR
GDC], and [STAR TSMC Fab3].
It should be noted that a sample of three out of twenty-eight data centres (selected by the scheme)
were audited to demonstrate that consistent security measures are applied across all data centers.
The result of the audits performed at the three data centres is documented in the single Site Technical
Audit Report [STAR GDC].
To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided
and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be considered when
this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Titan H1D3 Secure
Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to
meet the requirements of EAL 4 augmented with ATE_DPT.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. This
implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_0084].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in section 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the H1D3 User Guidance as referenced in
the [ST]. Therefore, it is vital to maintain meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a “high attack potential”, appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
3 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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3 Security Target
The Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10 Security Target, revision 3.3, 9
July 2022. [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CL Crypto Library
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
MITM Man-in-the-Middle
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with
Crypto Library v1.2.10” – EAL4+, 20-RPT-1236, v5.0, 27 July 2022
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “Titan H1D3 Secure
Microcontroller with crypto Library v1.2.10” – EAL4+, 21-RPT-1028, version
5.0, 27 July
[JIL-AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January 2020
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[JIL-AAPS] JIL, (Mandatory) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.1,
June 2020
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5,
28 March 2019
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10 Security Target,
revision 3.3, 9 July 2022.
[ST-lite] Titan H1D3 Secure Microcontroller with Crypto Library v1.2.10 Security Target
Lite, Revision 3.3, 25 July 2022.
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[STAR MTV] Site Technical Audit Report – Mountain View (MTV)-2015, 21-RPT-430, v3.0,
23 August 2021
[STAR SVL] Site Technical Audit Report – Google Sunnyvale TC1, 21-RPT-431, v2.0, 30
June 2021
[STAR EAG] Site Technical Audit Report – EAG Santa Clara, 21-RPT-429, v2.0, 30 June
2021
[STAR GDC] Site Technical Audit Report – Google Data Centres, 21-RPT-986, v3.0, 28
October 2021
[STAR TSMC
Fab3]
Site Technical Audit Report – TSMC Fab3, 21-RPT-1080, v2.0, 28 October
2021
(This is the end of this report.)