Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data
Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware
Encryption Layer version 1.1.0 Security
Target
Version 0.4
April 12, 2024
Prepared for:
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
2600 Paramount Pl #200
Fairborn, OH 45324
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 2 of 27
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE......................................................................................................................3
1.2 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................................4
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................................4
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ..............................................................................................................................5
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................6
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE...........................................................................................................................6
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................................7
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....................................................................7
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ..................................................................................................8
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.........................................................................................................................9
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...............................................................................................9
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................................10
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP).................................................................................................................16
5.1.3 Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................16
5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................17
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................19
5.2.1 Development (ADV).............................................................................................................................19
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)................................................................................................................19
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) .....................................................................................................................20
5.2.4 Security Target (ASE)..........................................................................................................................21
5.2.5 Tests (ATE) ..........................................................................................................................................21
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)...........................................................................................................22
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................23
6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................23
6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION ..............................................................................................................................25
6.3 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................25
6.4 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................25
7. KEY MANAGEMENT DESCRIPTION.........................................................................................................27
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components......................................................................................................10
Table 2 Assurance Components ...............................................................................................................................19
Table 3 3rd
Party Hardware Components ...............................................................................................................21
Table 4 Cryptographic Algorithms..........................................................................................................................24
Table 5 Key Identification.........................................................................................................................................27
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 3 of 27
1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System
1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer provided by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. The TOE is being evaluated
as a hardware full drive encryption solution.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
• Conformance Claims (Section 2)
• Security Objectives (Section 3)
• Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
• Security Requirements (Section 5)
• TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
• Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement. Operations performed
in the Protection Profiles are not marked in the ST. The conventions below are for ST operations exclusively.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1
requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a selection
would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions, and
strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… big things …”).
• Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version
1.1.0 Security Target
ST Version – Version 0.4
ST Date – April 12, 2024
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption
Layer version 1.1.0
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 4 of 27
TOE Developer – Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Evaluation Sponsor – Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware
Encryption Layer version 1.1.0.
The TOE provides hardware Full Drive Encryption of a removable drive.
1.4 TOE Description
The Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Layer (hereafter referred to as
the TOE) is a hardware encryption layer that is used for Data-At-Rest (DAR) encryption as part of the underlying
rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server, denoted as the Curtiss-Wright DTS1+ CSFC/ECC Cryptographic
Data Transport System Plus (DTS) (hereafter referred to as the DTS1+). The underlying DTS1+ is intended for use in
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance
Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the DTS1+ is an easy to use, turnkey,
rugged network File Server that houses one Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC) that provides quick off load of
data. The RMC can be easily removed from one DTS1+ and installed into any other DTS1 providing full, seamless
data transfer between one or more networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground). In addition to
the software-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1+ (see the separate ST corresponding to that evaluation), the
DTS1+ provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC.
To be in compliance with NIAP technical decision 606, the TOE may use the serial cable for management or use
SSH if done on a private, dedicated network.
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a hardware Full Drive Encryption solution that can accept a Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC)
which contains a data drive within.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a ruggedized solution to
secure Data at Rest (DAR).
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by DTS1+ (HW Layer):
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
1.4.1.2.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption
including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message
authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation,
key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These
primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys
and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 5 of 27
1.4.1.2.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user
intervention.
1.4.1.2.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services necessary to manage the full drive encryption using a
command line interface.
1.4.1.2.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fails, the TOE will not go into an
operational mode.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Curtiss-Wright DTS1+ CSfC 1-Slot Data Transport System (CSfC) User Guide, DDOC0199-000-A9 [User Guide]
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 6 of 27
2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components,
CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 2 Extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components,
CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
• Part 3 Conformant
• Package Claims:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 and
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0
+ Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 (FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E)
• Technical Decisions:
TD No. PP Applies? Rationale
TD0769 FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0767 FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0766 FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0765 FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0764 FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0760 FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0759 FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0606 FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E Yes Product is a NAS
TD0464 FDEEEcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0460 FDEEEcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
TD0458 FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E Yes SFR is claimed
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. As explained previously, the security problem definition,
security objectives, and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 7 of 27
3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and this section reproduces
only the corresponding Security Objectives for the operational environment for reader convenience. The
FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E offers additional information about the identified security objectives, but that has not
been reproduced here and the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
In general, the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E has defined Security Objectives appropriate for Full Drive Encryption
and as such are applicable to the Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware
Encryption Layer TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.INITIAL_DRIVE_STATE The OE provides a newly provisioned or initialized storage device free of protected
data in areas not targeted for encryption.
OE.PASSPHRASE_STRENGTH An authorized administrator will be responsible for ensuring that the passphrase
authorization factor conforms to guidance from the Enterprise using the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL The Operational Environment will provide a secure physical computing space such than an
adversary is not able to make modifications to the environment or to the TOE itself.
OE.PLATFORM_I&A The Operational Environment will provide individual user identification and authentication
mechanisms that operate independently of the authorization factors used by the TOE.
OE.PLATFORM_STATE The platform in which the storage device resides (or an external storage device is
connected) is free of malware that could interfere with the correct operation of the product.
OE.POWER_DOWN Volatile memory is cleared after power-off so memory remnant attacks are infeasible.
OE.SINGLE_USE_ET External tokens that contain authorization factors will be used for no other purpose than to
store the external token authorization factor.
OE.STRONG_ENVIRONMENT_CRYPTO The Operating Environment will provide a cryptographic function
capability that is commensurate with the requirements and capabilities of the TOE and Appendix A.
OE.TRAINED_USERS Authorized users will be properly trained and follow all guidance for securing the TOE and
authorization factors.
OE.TRUSTED_CHANNEL Communication among and between product components (i.e., AA and EE) is
sufficiently protected to prevent information disclosure.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 8 of 27
4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The
FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E defines the following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this
ST the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be consulted for more information in regard to those CC extensions.
Extended SFRs:
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor Acquisition
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining (Initiator)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2: Key Chaining (Recipient)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
- FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
- FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: Protection of Data on Disk
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
- FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
- FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 9 of 27
5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that
serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The refinements and operations already
performed in the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements
have been copied from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E and any residual operations have been completed herein.
Of particular note, the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E made a number of refinements and completed some of the
SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes if
necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E. The FDEEEcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E should be
consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System
1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS:
Cryptographic
support
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: Authorization Factor Acquisition
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b): Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b): Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c): Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(b): Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE Controlled
Hardware)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(e): Cryptographic Key Destruction (Key Cryptographic
Erase)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Destruction Timing)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction
(Destruction Timing)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): Cryptographic Key and Key Material
Destruction (Power Management)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Cryptographic Key Destruction Types
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c): Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(d): Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(d): Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): Cryptographic operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): Cryptographic Operation (AES Data
Encryption/Decryption)
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 10 of 27
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic operation (Key Encryption)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(g): Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: Cryptographic Key Derivation
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1: Key Chaining (Initiator)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2: Key Chaining (Recipient)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: Cryptographic Password Construct and
Conditioning
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Random Bit Generation
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and
Initialization Vector Generation)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: Validation
FDP: User data
protection
FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: Protection of Data on Disk
FMT: Security
management
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1: Management of Functions Behavior
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1: Security Roles
FPT: Protection of
the TSF
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_FUA_EXT.1: Firmware Update Authentication
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: Protection of Key and Key Material
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1: Power Saving States
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2: Timing of Power Saving States
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Trusted Update
Table 1 TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.1.1 Authorization Factor Acquisition (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept the following authorization factors: [a submask derived from a password
authorization factor conditioned as defined in FCS_PCC_EXT.1]. (TD0759 applied)
5.1.1.2 Timing of Authorization Factor Acquisition (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall reacquire the authorization factor(s) specified in FCS_AFA_EXT.1 upon transition
from any Compliant power saving state specified in FPT_PWR_EXT.1 prior to permitting access
to plaintext data.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 11 of 27
5.1.1.3 Cryptographic key generation (Symmetric Keys) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator
as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the
following: no standard.
5.1.1.4 Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Keys) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys using a Random Bit Generator
as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 and specified cryptographic key sizes [256 bit] that meet the
following: no standard.
5.1.1.5 Cryptographic Key Generation (Data Encryption Key) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1.1(c)
Refinement: The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation method [
- accept a DEK that is wrapped as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [256 bits].
5.1.1.6 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(a)
Refinement: The TSF shall [erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory
when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets
the following: a key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM.4(d).
5.1.1.7 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Power Management) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(a)
The TSF shall [erase] cryptographic keys and key material from volatile memory when
transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1 that meets the
following: a key destruction method specified in FCS_CKM_EXT.6.
5.1.1.8 Cryptographic Key Destruction (TOE-Controlled Hardware) (FDEEEcPP20:FCS_CKM.4(b))
FDEEEcPP20:FCS_CKM.4.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [
o [single overwright consisting of [
▪ zeros
▪ [F’s]
o - removal of power to the memory]
- For non-volatile memory [that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction
shall be executed by a [
o [single] overwrite consisting of zeros followed by a read-verify,
o [single] overwrite consisting of ones followed by a read-verify,
o overwrite with a new value of a key of the same size followed by a read-verify,
o [single] overwrite consisting of [data from an RBG] followed by a read-verify
And if the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again
up to [zero] times, whereupon an error is returned
] that meets the following: no standard.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 12 of 27
5.1.1.9 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Software TOE, 3rd
Party Storage) (FDEAAcPP20:FCS_CKM.4(d))
FDEAAcPP20:FCS_CKM.4.1(d)
Refinement: The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [
- For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [
o [single overwright consisting of [
▪ zeros
▪ ones
o - removal of power to the memory]
- For non-volatile storage that consists of the invocation of an interface provided by
- the underlying platform that [logically addresses the storage location of the key and
performs a
o [single] overwrite consisting of [
▪ zeros
▪ ones]
] that meets the following: no standard.
5.1.1.10 Cryptographic Key Destruction (Key Cryptographic Erase) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(e))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4.1(e)
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method by using the appropriate method to destroy all encryption keys encrypting the
key intended for destruction that meets the following: no standard.
5.1.1.11 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)
The TSF shall destroy all keys and key material when no longer needed.
5.1.1.12 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Destruction Timing)
(FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(a)
The TSF shall destroy all keys and keying material when no longer needed.
5.1.1.13 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in
plaintext when transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
5.1.1.14 Cryptographic Key and Key Material Destruction (Power Management)
(FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1(b)
The TSF shall destroy all key material, BEV, and authentication factors stored in plaintext when
transitioning to a Compliant power saving state as defined by FPT_PWR_EXT.1.
5.1.1.15 Cryptographic Key Destruction Types (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall use [FCS_CKM.4(b)] key destruction methods.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 13 of 27
5.1.1.16 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(a)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (verification) in accordance
with a [Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater] that
meet the following:[
• FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and Appendix D,
Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-384]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes].
5.1.1.17 Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(a)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (verification) in accordance
with a [Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm with a key size of 256 bits or greater] that
meet the following:[
• FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 6 and Appendix D,
Implementing 'NIST curves' [P-384]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4, for ECDSA
schemes].
5.1.1.18 Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-256, SHA-384] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.1.1.19 Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(b)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [SHA-256, SHA-384] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
5.1.1.20 Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(c)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic keyed-hash message authentication in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384] and
cryptographic key sizes [256, 384] that meet the following: [ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7
'MAC Algorithm 2'].
5.1.1.21 Cryptographic Operation (Message Authentication) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(c))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(c)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform [message authentication] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384] and cryptographic key sizes [256
and 384-bit keys used in [HMAC]] that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7
'MAC Algorithm 2'.
5.1.1.22 Cryptographic operation (Key Wrapping) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(d))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(d)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform key wrapping in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES in the following modes [KW] and the cryptographic key size [256 bits] that meet
the following: AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, [NIST SP 800-38F].
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 14 of 27
5.1.1.23 Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrapping) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(d))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(d)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform key wrapping in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES in the following modes [KW] and the cryptographic key size [256 bits] that meet
the following: AES as specified in ISO/IEC 18033-3, [NIST SP 800-38F].
5.1.1.24 Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f))
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(f)
The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [XTS] mode and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [XTS as specified in IEEE 1619].
5.1.1.25 Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f))
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1.1(f)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform data encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES used in [XTS] mode and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that
meet the following: AES as specified in ISO /IEC 18033-3, [XTS as specified in IEEE 1619].
5.1.1.26 Cryptographic Key Derivation (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept [a conditioned password submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined
in [NIST SP 800-132] , using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the
output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
5.1.1.27 Cryptographic Key Derivation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall accept [a conditioned password submask] to derive an intermediate key, as defined
in [NIST SP 800-132] , using the keyed-hash functions specified in FCS_COP.1(c), such that the
output is at least of equivalent security strength (in number of bits) to the BEV.
5.1.1.28 Key Chaining (Initiator) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a key chain of: [intermediate keys originating from one or more
submask(s) to the BEV using the following method(s): [key derivation as specified in
FCS_KDF_EXT.1]] while maintaining an effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and
an effective strength of [not applicable] for asymmetric keys.
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide at least a [256 bit] BEV to [the encryption engine] [- without validation
taking place].
5.1.1.29 Key Chaining (Recipient) (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall accept a BEV of at least [256 bits] from the AA.
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall maintain a chain of intermediary keys originating from the BEV to the DEK using
the following method(s): [- key wrapping as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)] while maintaining an
effective strength of [256 bits] for symmetric keys and an effective strength of [not applicable] for
asymmetric keys.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 15 of 27
5.1.1.30 Cryptographic Password Construct and Conditioning (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1.1
A password used by the TSF to generate a password authorization factor shall enable up to [64]
characters in the set of upper case characters, lower case characters, numbers, and [no special
characters] and shall perform Password-based Key Derivation Functions in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-256], with [1000] iterations, and output
cryptographic key sizes [256 bits] that meet the following: NIST SP 800-132. (TD0764 applied)
5.1.1.31 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [[NIST
SP 800-90A]] using [HMAC_DRBG (any)].
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [[one] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security
Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.1.32 Random Bit Generation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with [[NIST
SP 800-90A]] using [HMAC_DRBG (any)].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy
from [[one] hardware-based noise source(s)] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 'Security
Strength Table for Hash Functions', of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.1.1.33 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
(FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [use salts that are generated by a [DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]].
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use [no nonces].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [- XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-negative integers,
assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer]. (TD0760 applied)
5.1.1.34 Cryptographic Operation (Salt, Nonce, and Initialization Vector Generation)
(FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [use salts that are generated by a [DRBG as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1]].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall use [no nonces].
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall create IVs in the following manner [- XTS: No IV. Tweak values shall be non-
negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer].
(TD0760 applied)
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 16 of 27
5.1.1.35 Validation (FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform validation of the [BEV] using the following method(s): [- key wrap as
specified in FCS_COP.1(d)]
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require validation of the BEV prior to forwarding the BEV to the EE.
FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [- block validation after [three] consecutive failed validation attempts].
5.1.1.36 Validation (FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform validation of the BEV using the following method(s): [- key wrap as
specified in FCS_COP.1(d)]
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require the validation of the BEV prior to allowing access to TSF data after exiting
a Compliant power saving state.
FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [- block validation after [three] consecutive failed validation attempts].
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
5.1.2.1 Protection of Data on Disk (FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform Full Drive Encryption in accordance with FCS_COP.1(f), such that the
drive contains no plaintext protected data.
FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall encrypt all protected data without user intervention.
5.1.3 Security management (FMT)
5.1.3.1 Management of Functions Behavior (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [use of Compliant
power saving state] to [authorized users].
5.1.3.2 Specification of Management Functions (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
a) forwarding requests to change the DEK to the EE,
b) forwarding requests to cryptographically erase the DEK to the EE,
c) allowing authorized users to change authorization values or set of authorization values used
within the supported authorization method,
d) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
e) [[import a wrapped DEK]]] (TD0767 applied)
5.1.3.3 Specification of Management Functions (FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
a) change the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.1, when reprovisioning or when commanded,
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 17 of 27
b) erase the DEK, as specified in FCS_CKM.4(a),
c) initiate TOE firmware/software updates,
d) ][import a wrapped DEK]]].
5.1.3.4 Security Roles (FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [authorized user].
FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.1.4 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.4.1 Firmware Update Authentication (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_FUA_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_FUA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall authenticate the source of the firmware update using the 10 digital signature
algorithm specified in FCS_COP.1(a) using the RTU that contains [the public key].
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_FUA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only allow installation of update if the digital signature has been successfully
verified as specified in FCS_COP.1(a).
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_FUA_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall only allow modification of the existing firmware after the successful validation of
the digital signature, using a mechanism as described in FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2.
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_FUA_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall return an error code if any part of the firmware update process fails.
5.1.4.2 Protection of Key and Key Material (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [
• only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e),
• only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria [
o The plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in
FCS_KYC_EXT.1]
]. (TD0769 applied)
5.1.4.3 Protection of Key and Key Material (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [
• only store keys in non-volatile memory when wrapped, as specified in FCS_COP.1(d)
or encrypted, as specified in FCS_COP.1(g) or FCS_COP.1(e),
• only store plaintext keys that meet any one of the following criteria [
o The plaintext key is not part of the key chain as specified in
FCS_KYC_EXT.2]
]. (TD0769 applied)
5.1.4.4 Power Saving States (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [G3].
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 18 of 27
5.1.4.5 Power Saving States (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall define the following Compliant power saving states: [G3]. (TD0464 applied)
5.1.4.6 Timing of Power Saving States (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1
For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the
Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:
user-initiated request,
[no other conditions].
5.1.4.7 Timing of Power Saving States (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.2.1
For each Compliant power saving state defined in FPT_PWR_EXT.1.1, the TSF shall enter the
Compliant power saving state when the following conditions occur:
user-initiated request,
[no other conditions].
5.1.4.8 TSF Testing (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self- tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests].
5.1.4.9 TSF Testing (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self- tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests].
5.1.4.10 Trusted Update (FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the
TOE [firmware].
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[firmware].
FDEAAcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE software using a digital signature as
specified in FCS_COP.1(a) by the manufacturer prior to installing those updates.
5.1.4.11 Trusted Update (FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the
TOE [firmware].
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
Refinement: The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to initiate updates to TOE
[firmware].
FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
Refinement: The TSF shall verify updates to the TOE [firmware] using a [authenticated firmware
update mechanism as described in FPT_FUA_EXT.1] by the manufacturer prior to installing
those updates.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 19 of 27
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have
effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability survey
Table 2 Assurance Components
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 20 of 27
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 21 of 27
5.2.3.2 TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Security Target (ASE)
5.2.4.1 Cryptographic operation (Hash Algorithm) (ASE_TSS.1(c))
ASE_TSS.1(c).1
Refinement: The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR,
including a proprietary Key Management Description (Appendix E), and [Entropy Essay, 3rd
party hardware components (including model/version numbers)].
ASE_TSS.1(c).1: Section 7 provides the TOE’s Key Management Description, the separate Entropy Documentation
and Analysis document provides the TOE’s Entropy Essay, and the TOE includes the following 3rd
party hardware
components.
Component Version/Part Number
Microcontroller NXP ARM7 Processor P/N LPC4367JET100E
Cyprus Storage Chip Cyprus FM24V05
Entropy Chip Microchip ATECC608B
HW Encryption Chip Enova X-Wall MX+ using AES XTS
Table 3 3rd
Party Hardware Components
5.2.5 Tests (ATE)
5.2.5.1 Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 22 of 27
5.2.6 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.6.1 Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 23 of 27
6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
6.1 Cryptographic support
The Cryptographic support function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.1: The TOE supports a password authorization factor, and the password
may be up to 64 characters (bytes) in length and can be composed of uppercase and lowercase letters and
numbers.
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_AFA_EXT.2: The TOE does not have any power-saving states beyond power-on and
power-off. After transitioning from the power-off to the power-on state, the user must authenticate before the
TOE will allow data to be read from or written to the drive.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(b): The TOE generates 256-bit KEKs using its SHA-256
HMAC_DRBG. The TOE stores these keys in its hardware keystore (dedicated, separate memory).
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.1(c): The TOE can accept injection of externally supplied 256-bit DEKs. The
TOE uses its cmkey interface to load the externally generated DEKs. The TOE AES-KW unwraps injected
DEKs using the 256-bit KEK stored internally.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(a): When the TOE powers off (as the TOE has no other power
states other than on and off), all values in normal SRAM memory drain to a zero state (as opposed to the
FRAM—see below).
• FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(b), FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(d): The TOE includes a working memory, a
separate Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), and an entropy chip with internal EEPROM. The TOE includes
working memory RAM as part of its microcontroller, and this serves as the working memory in which the
TOE stores the AES-KW key (derived from the password and salt) and the most recently used PSK or KEK
(as part of a DEK import operation), and working copies of loaded DEKs (unwrapped during authentication).
The TOE destroys these values when power is removed.
The TOE possesses an FRAM in which the TOE stores the encrypted DEKs (the TOE can store copies of up
to 32 encrypted DEKs for the administrator and allows creation of only a crypto officer account). The TOE
utilizes its entropy chip to store the PSK. Individual DEKs may be overwritten by the administrator loading
a new DEK and specifying the key ID containing of key to be overwritten. Additionally, any operator may
request that the TOE zeroize its keys, in which case, the TOE will overwrite its FRAM and entropy chip
storage with (in this order) random data from the RBG, all zeros, and then all ones (in accordance with the
DoD requirements for a standard erase).
The TOE’s internal microcontroller SRAM and FRAM are byte-addressable for both read and write
operations. The TOE’s entropy chip’s internal EEPROM allows word addressing (4-byte access) as well as
32 bytes accessing, with a requirement that the 32-byte accesses being block aligned. However, the
underlying EEPROM technology allows directly reading/writing of cells as 4-byte words (as opposed to a
Flash technology in which reads/writes may occur on a 4-byte word access, while erase operations must
occur only on some larger, sector/block basis).
• FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_CKM.4(e): The TOE can, in effect, cryptographically erase all stored DEKs (in
addition to directly clearing the encrypted DEKs) by destroying the salt value associated with the operator's
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 24 of 27
password. Once destroyed, no one can derive the AES-KW key needed to decrypt encrypted DEKs without
the 256-bit salt value.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(a): The TOE considers keys that the operator has
explicitly requested to be deleted as no longer necessary, and if zeroized, the TOE deems all keys other than
the PSK as no longer needed. For those keys, the TOE will erase its hardware keystore (FRAM circuit).
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_CKM_EXT.4(b): The TOE has the Compliant power saving state of
G3 (Mechanical Off).
• FDEEEcPP20:FCS_CKM_EXT.6: The TOE clears its keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4(d).
• FCS_COP.1: The TOE’s Curtiss-Wright Crypto Firmware (version 2.0) contains cryptographic algorithm
implementations that following NIST standards and has received the following CAVP algorithm certificates.
Note that the TOE includes the Enova X-Wall MX+ using AES XTS hardware chip (version xF and xN).
SFR Algorithm NIST Standard Cert#
FCS_COP.1(a) (Verify) ECDSA P-384 w/SHA-384 Verify FIPS 186-4, ECDSA A5103
FCS_COP.1(b) (Hash) SHA-256/384 Hashing FIPS 180-4 A5103
FCS_COP.1© (Keyed Hash) HMAC-SHA-256/384 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 A5103
FCS_COP.1(d) (Key Wrap) AES-256 KW FIPS 197, SP 800-38F A5103
FCS_COP.1(f) (AES) AES-256 XTS Encrypt/Decrypt IEEE 1619 4013
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 (Random) SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG SP 800-90A A5103
Table 4 Cryptographic Algorithms
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(a): The TOE utilizes ECDSA P-384 with SHA-384 signatures
to verify the authenticity of firmware updates. Upon receiving a candidate update and the accompanying
signature file, the TOE uses an embedded public key to verify the ECDSA signature against the received
image. The verification uses SHA-384 and follows the FIPS 186-4 ECDSA format.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(b): The TOE implements the SHA-256 and SHA-384
algorithms and uses the SHA-256 algorithm as part of PBKDFv2 key derivation and also as part of its
HMAC_DRBG. The TOE uses SHA-384 hashing when verifying trusted update ECDSA P-384 signatures
and then calculating HMAC-SHA-384 checksums.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP(c): The TOE implements HMAC-SHA-256/384 using a
256/384-bit key, the SHA-256/384 hash algorithm, a 512/1024-bit block size, and an output MAC length of
256/384-bits. The TOE uses its HMAC-SHA-256 implementation during PBKDFv2 key derivation and
during HMAC_DRBG random number generation. The TOE uses its HMAC-SHA-384 implementation to
ensure the integrity of exported KEKs and imported DEK, as well as to augment admin authentication.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(d): The TOE uses AES-KW (compliant with NIST SP 800-
38F) to encrypt the DEKs stored in FRAM and to unwrap DEKs injected by an administrator.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_COP.1(f): The TOE possesses an AES XTS implementation
dedicated to drive encryption/decryption. The TOE’s implementation exclusively uses 256-bit keys.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KDF_EXT.1: The TOE uses 800-132 PBKDF in counter mode using
SHA-256 and 1000 iterations and a 256-bit salt to transform the operator's password into a key for
wrapping/unwrapping.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_KYC_EXT.1/2: The TOE uses PBKDFv2 to transform the operator's
password into a 256-bit BEV, and then uses that BEV to AES-KW unwrap the DEKs stored in the TOE
hardware key store. The AES-KW unwrap operation will verify whether the operator supplied the correct
password. If the operator supplied the correct password, then the TOE will have access to the DEK values
(in memory).
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 25 of 27
• FDEAAcPP20E:FCS_PCC_EXT.1: The TOE allows passwords up to 64-bytes (characters in length), and
the TOE checks to only allow uppercase/lowercase letters and numbers. The TOE will reject a password
containing other characters. The TOE conditions passwords by combining them with a 256-bit salt using
PBKDFv2.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The TOE includes an SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG that it
seeds with at least 256-bits of entropy from a hardware-based noise source.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_SNI_EXT.1: The TOE generates its salts (the admin account has a
256-bit salt used during PBKDFv2 derivation) using its SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG. The TOE generates no
nonces but generates it 256-bit AES XTS tweaks (used for data partition encryption) using its
HMAC_DRBG.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FCS_VAL_EXT.1: A password is required when the machine is power
cycled. The TOE validates the operator’s password by attempting an AES-KW decrypt/unwrap operation. If
the AES-KW decryption operation fails, then the TOE treats this as an invalid login and increments its failed
login attempts counter.
If the counter reaches three, the TOE enters an error state and fails to accept any new passwords. It needs to
be rebooted.
6.2 User data protection
The User data protection function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEEEcPP20E:FDP_DSK_EXT.1: The TOE provides hardware-based FDE and encrypts the entirety of the
drive through an AES-256 XTS block based encryption. The TOE sits as an In-Line Encryptor (ILE) in the
SATA path between the NAS and the drive. Because of its position, the ILE guarantees that all data written
to and read from the drive is encrypted. The User Guide describes the TOE’s initialization process and setup
for the HW-layer. The TOE maintains a separate, unencrypted, internal Flash chip to house its Rocky Linux-
based firmware that is beyond the RMC drive that the TOE encrypts. The HW-layer performs block based
encryption of the entire drive leaving no sectors/blocks unencrypted.
6.3 Security management
The Security management function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_MOF.1: The TOE claims no Compliant power saving states beyond power on and off.
Only the authorized administrator can issue the shutdown command. Note the only accounts on the TOE are
authorized administrators.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FMT_SMF.1: The TOE allows an administrator to change a DEK,
overwrite a DEK, cryptographically erase all DEKs, import a wrapped DEK using the cmkey command. The
TOE supports changing of the authorization factor (the administrator can zeroize the TOE and then
reinitialize the TOE to change the associated password) using the cmkey command to zeroize and the cmlogin
command to set a new password.
• FDEAAcPP20E:FMT_SMR.1 – The TOE maintains an administer role that can administer the TOE.
6.4 Protection of the TSF
The Protection of the TSF function satisfies the following security functional requirements:
• FDEEEcPP20E :FPT_FUA_EXT.1: The TOE uses an internal ECDSA P-384 public key (hardcoded within
the TOE’s existing microprocessor firmware image, stored within the microprocessor) to verify new
firmware images before writing the firmware to the TOE’s internal storage.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 26 of 27
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_KYP_EXT.1: The TOE stores keys in its FRAM chip (part of its
hardware keystore), which acts like non-volatile memory. The TOE stores all keys in encrypted form
(encrypted with an AES-KW key derived from the operator’s password plus an internal salt), with the
exception of the Pre-Shared Key (PSK). The PSK exists to protect the export of a transient KEK from the
TOE. After export, the administrator can then use the KEK to wrap an DEK for import into the TOE, and
the transient KEK is not kept across a reset of the TOE. In this way, the PSK does not participate in the key
chain protecting DEKs, but instead, only provides an extra layer of transient protection during DEK injection.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_PWR_EXT.1/2: The TOE provides the Compliant power-saving state
G3, mechanical off. The TOE enters this state when the user shuts off the device or when the administrator
issues the shutdown command. The TOE must be fully rebooted from this state.
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE includes the following power-up Known
Answer Tests (KATs) to ensure that each of its cryptographic algorithms operates correctly.
- ECDSA verify test
- SHA-256/384 hashing tests
- HMAC-SHA-256/384 hashing test
- AES-ECB encryption/decryption test
- AES256 keywrap/keyunwrap test
- AES-XTS encryption/decryption test
- SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG tests (including SP 800-90A section 11.3 health tests)
- PBKDF2 hash test
- integrity test
• FDEAAcPP20E/FDEEEcPP20E:FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE allows field updates to the HW-layer’s
firmware that have been signed and delivered by Curtiss Wright. The TOE will verify the ECDSA P-384
with SHA-384 signature of the update image, and if valid, the TOE will update its firmware.
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions DTS1+ HW Layer Security Target Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Page 27 of 27
7. Key Management Description
The key management description explains each key, cryptomodule and overall encryption architecture. Each key is
identified in the table below.
Key Identifier Storage
Location
How Key
Protected
How key
Derived/Generated
Strength
of Key
When Key
Destroyed
User Passphrase Memory -
transient
N/A N/A N/A Immediately after use
with all zeroes
Wrap Key Memory N/A The TOE uses 800-132
PBKDF using HMAC-
SHA-256 and a number of
iterations and a 256-bit salt
to transform the operator's
password into a Wrap Key
256 bits After use with all
zeroes and upon
power-cycle
Data Encrypton
Key (DEK)
FRAM AES KW
Encrypted
Generated from approved
DRBG or injected from
outside (wrapped with
KEK)
256 bits Upon overwrite or
upon zeroization
with random data, all
zeroes and then all
ones
Pre-Shared Key
(PSK)
Entropy
Chip
Plaintext Injected during
manufacturing
256 bits Upon destructive
zeroization with all
zeroes
Key Encryption
Key (KEK)
Memory N/A Generated from approved
DRBG
256 bits After use with all
zeroes and upon
power-cycle
User
Authentication
Token
FRAM AES KW
Encrypted
Generated from approved
DRBG
256 bits Upon zeroization
with random data, all
zeroes and then all
ones
Table 5 Key Identification
The TOE’s encryption engine was custom developed by the vendor to provide HW-based full drive encryption. The
TOE consists of a microcontroller with custom firmware and HW components. The microcontroller handles the
operator authentication, key management, and firmware update verification.
The HW component receives the DEK from the microcontroller and then encrypts/decrypts data written to/read from
the encrypted partition/drive. The TOE encrypts the keys its internal, dedicated FRAM memory, it provides no access
to this memory, and only exposes the encrypted Flash Storage Module (drive) to network-attached clients. The TOE
ensures that access to the FSM/drives is always encrypted, and does not permit plaintext access to protected partitions
or drives. Because the TOE utilizes a dedicated processor and dedicated internal FRAM, the TOE only provides
access to the FSM/drives once fully initialized and after receiving the administrator's password.
The TOE uses the following cryptographic implementations:
1. HW AES-XTS encryption/decryption – a pure hardware chip to accelerate full drive encryption operations.
2. Curtiss-Wright microcontroller cryptographic implementation - used for all other cryptographic needs
(authentication, key management, and trusted update image verifications).