National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System
1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11437-2024
Dated: 24 April 2024
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jim Donndelinger
Meredith Martinez
Dave Thompson
The Aerospace Corporation
Bryan Major
Robert Wojcik
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Yoel Fortaleza
John Messiha
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................5
3 Architectural Information...................................................................................................6
3.1 TOE Description.........................................................................................................6
3.2 TOE Architecture .......................................................................................................6
3.3 Physical Boundaries ...................................................................................................6
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................6
4.1 Cryptographic support................................................................................................7
4.2 User data protection....................................................................................................7
4.3 Security management .................................................................................................7
4.4 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................7
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope...............................................................................7
6 Documentation ...................................................................................................................8
7 IT Product Testing..............................................................................................................8
7.1 Developer Testing ......................................................................................................9
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................9
8 Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................................9
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)....................................................................9
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)......................................................................9
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD).......................................................10
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)...........................................10
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).......................10
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ..............................................................10
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ...............................................................................11
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations..........................................................................11
10 Security Target .................................................................................................................11
11 Glossary............................................................................................................................11
12 Bibliography.....................................................................................................................12
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Plus Hardware Encryption Layer solution provided by Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions. It
presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in March 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption
Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus
Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Curtiss-Wright
Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version
1.1.0 Security Target, Version 0.4, April 12, 2024 and analysis performed by the Validation
Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer
version 1.1.0
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019 and collaborative Protection
Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition, Version 2.0 + Errata
20190201, February 1, 2019
ST Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware
Encryption Layer version 1.1.0 Security Target, Version 0.4, April 12, 2024
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0, Version 0.4, April 23, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Developer Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Jim Donndelinger, Meredith Martinez, and Dave Thompson of The Aerospace
Corporation. Bryan Major and Robert Wojcik of Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Lab.
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System
1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0.
The TOE provides hardware Full Drive Encryption of a removable drive.
3.1 TOE Description
The Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Layer
(hereafter referred to as the TOE) is a hardware encryption layer that is used for Data-At-Rest
(DAR) encryption as part of the underlying rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file
server, denoted as the Curtiss-Wright DTS1+ CSFC/ECC Cryptographic Data Transport
System Plus (DTS) (hereafter referred to as the DTS1+). The underlying DTS1+ is intended
for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and
Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Easily integrated into network
centric systems, the DTS1+ is an easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses
one Removable Memory Cartridge (RMC) that provides quick off load of data. The RMC can
be easily removed from one DTS1+ and installed into any other DTS1 providing full,
seamless data transfer between one or more networks in separate locations (e.g. ground =>
vehicle => ground). In addition to the software-based FDE layer provided by the DTS1+ (see
the separate ST corresponding to that evaluation), the DTS1+ provides a hardware-based Full
Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMC.
To be in compliance with NIAP technical decision 606, the TOE may use the serial cable for
management or use SSH if done on a private, dedicated network.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a hardware Full Drive Encryption solution that can accept a Removable
Memory Cartridge (RMC) which contains a data drive within.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure. The TOE provides a
ruggedized solution to secure Data at Rest (DAR).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Security management
4. Protection of the TSF
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4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and
block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key
derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation,
salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These
primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation
and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entire drive (so that no plaintext exists) and
does so without user intervention.
4.3 Security management
The TOE provides each of the required management services necessary to manage the full
drive encryption using a command line interface.
4.4 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to
perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is
failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fails, the TOE will not go into an operational
mode.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents (from here on referred to as the PPset):
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
• collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019
That information has not been reproduced here and the PPset should be consulted if there is
interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
PPset as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the
product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the
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devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their
effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Full Drive Encryption Protection Profiles and performed by
the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific Full
Drive Encryption models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the PPset and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Curtiss-Wright DTS1+ CSfC 1-Slot Data Transport System (CSfC) User Guide,
DDOC0199-000-A9
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied upon
when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Curtiss-Wright
Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0, Version 0.3
April 12, 2024 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
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7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the PPset including the tests associated with optional
requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices, provides a list of test tools,
and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Data Transport
System 1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the
SARs contained in the PPset.
8.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0 products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the PPset related to the examination of the information
contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the PPset and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) on 4/23/2024 with the following search terms: "DTS1-Slot
Plus", "Disk encryption", "Drive encryption", "Key destruction", "Key sanitization", "Linux
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8.8", "Opal management software", "SED management software", "Password caching",
"Curtiss-Wright", "Defense Solutions Data Transport System", "Curtiss Wright Crypto
Firmware", "ARM7 Processor", "P/N LPC4367JET100E", "Cyprus FM24V05",
"ATECC608B", "Enova X-Wall MX+", "AES XTS".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
9 Validator Comments/Recommendations
All validator comments and recommendations are adequately addressed in the Assumptions
and Clarification of Scope section.
10 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System
1-Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0 Security Target, Version 0.4, April 12,
2024.
11 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
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• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
12 Bibliography
The following documents were used in the evaluation of this product and in the production of
this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
4. collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption - Encryption Engine,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Full Drive Encryption Authorization Acquisition,
Version 2.0 + Errata 20190201, February 1, 2019.
6. Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus Hardware
Encryption Layer version 1.1.0 Security Target (ST), Version 0.4, April 12, 2024.
7. Assurance Activity Report (AAR) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0, Version 0.4, April 23, 2024.
8. Detailed Test Report (DTR) Supplement for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-
Slot Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0, Version 0.3, April 12, 2024.
9. Detailed Test Report (DTR) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot Plus
Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0, Version 0.1, April 23, 2024.
10. Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) for Curtiss-Wright Data Transport System 1-Slot
Plus Hardware Encryption Layer version 1.1.0, Version 0.4, April 23, 2024.
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11. Curtiss-Wright DTS1+ CSfC 1-Slot Data Transport System (CSfC) User Guide
(AGD), DDOC0199-000-A9