BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
for
LANCOM Systems Operating System
LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN
from
LANCOM Systems GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.72
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
VPN Router Firmware
LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN
from LANCOM Systems GmbH
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 24 May 2013
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
6 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with
IPsec VPN was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 13 May 2013. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH
is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: LANCOM Systems GmbH.
The product was developed by: LANCOM Systems GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5 Publication
The product LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN has
been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
LANCOM Systems GmbH
Adenauerstr. 20 / B2
52146 Würselen
9 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
This page is intentionally left blank.
10 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of software used to construct virtual private
networks (VPNs) between networks or between the TOE and a remote access client. The
LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN is the operating
system LCOS (software) for the LANCOM CC series routers. The TOE provides all
functions to manage a secure IPsec connection. Thus temporary or mobile sites of a
company, home offices, branch offices or co-locations of an enterprise or public entity can
be connected to each other or to a central site at the headquarters safely by the use of the
TOE at each location. Also, the TOE can manage IPsec connections from mobile users
facilitating LANCOM AVC (Advanced VPN Client) software on their mobile devices. The
LANCOM Advanced VPN Client is considered part of the IT environment.
The TOE implements the security functions IPsec, packet filtering, configuration
management and key management.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2. Thus the
TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
IPSEC:
IPSEC.1 – IPsec Internet Key
Exchange (IKE)
IPSEC.2 – IPsec Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP)
IPSEC.3 – IPsec Security Associations,
Security Policies and Routing
The TOE in conjunction with the cryptographic
acceleration engine implements IPsec protocols.
Confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity are
provided for IP packets protected by IPsec. The
administrator defines which traffic must be
protected by IPsec by configuring routes with a
VPN peer as the gateway.
Packet Filtering:
PACKETFILTER.1 – Packet Filtering
The TOE performs packet filtering as a part of the
IP router by applying the firewall rules to IP
packets traversing the IP router. The
administrator defined firewall rules can either
allow an IP packet to be routed, dropped or
rejected.
Configuration and Management:
CONFIG.1 – System Messages
CONFIG.2 – Management
The TOE generates audit records to provide a log
of security relevant events during TOE operation.
Management and configuration of the TOE are
performed on a command line interface (CLI)
which can be accessed either locally via a serial
configuration port, or remotely via a SSH network
connection.
12 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
Remote Management:
REMOTE.1
Secure Shell (SSH) is used for remote
management of the TOE by the administrator.
Remote management via SSH provides full
access to the command line interface as it would
be available via the serial console. Remote
administration via SSH provides confidentiality
and integrity of the management session, which
is completely ensured by TOE components
without use of the cryptographic acceleration
engine. SSH also provides protection against
replay attacks by using a unique session identifier
that is bound to the key exchange process in the
transport protocol. The temporary session keys
are destroyed by overwriting them with zeroes
when the session is closed.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4.
The TOE requires the appropriate hardware to operate on, i.e. a LANCOM CC series
router. The router hardware is outside the scope of the TOE. The list of supported
hardware of the certified TOE can be found in chapter 1.5 of the ST [6]. Chapter 1.4.4 of
the ST [6] gives information of product features that are explicitly excluded from the
evaluated configuration and must be disabled in the configuration. Therefore, the TOE also
includes two guidance documents, the preparative procedures [8] and the operational
guidance [9]. The TOE must be operated in compliance with both guidance documents.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Form of Delivery
1a SW Router Model: 1781-4G (CC)
Identification: LC-1781-4G-8.70.0095-Rel.upx
Secure Download
13 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
No Type Identifier Form of Delivery
SHA-256 value:
95d8eed735be352de69366c688802eea33e576369b0a96bf9
549b877b03c3d3e
1b SW Router Model: 1781A-3G (CC)
Identification: LC-1781A-3G-8.70.0095-Rel.upx
SHA-256 value:
d73a6536a07a0a504741443788adb7ddfbf91ae0aa1118bcc2
61e82961f86258
Secure Download
1c SW Router Model: 1781A-4G (CC)
Identification: LC-1781A-4G-8.70.0096-Rel.upx
SHA-256 value:
e27be5f81261b0ac8b58d23aee65e33b6e9cf8a94361ffc799
5164a0f1dc5c72
Secure Download
1d SW Router Model: 1781A (CC)
Identification: LC-1781A-8.70.0095-Rel.upx
SHA-256 value:
5cc9c34a058336e60bb91d77b0503e558b6d1dbdbc66921aa
47146607f1eab39
Secure Download
1e SW Router Model: 1781EF (CC)
Identification: LC-1781EF-8.70.0095-Rel.upx
SHA-256 value:
888075304feb3d29b284bb9e35ba31efabfa730833a57284ffd
6cd41d421da90
Secure Download
1f SW Router Model: 7100+ VPN (CC)
Identification: LC-7100plus-8.70.0095-Rel.upx
SHA-256 value:
dbfd7c4c7045aaa14e572dfb500d19aa1aac67793435612ad
59c662c702b1ce5
Secure Download
1g SW Router Model: 9100+ VPN (CC)
Identification: LC-9100plus-8.70.0095-Rel.upx
SHA-256 value:
dcb20236335a789abbacef93203f9244568a7c7ab002c6c0e7
e8ebf47cf80ff5
Secure Download
2 DOC Preparative Procedures [8]
Identification: LCOS 8.70 – Preparative Procedures.pdf
SHA-256 value:
1b82f43ad013ee1475479ae74db9cb6a14f72f19dfb2cfd3f99
8b603096bd5fa
Secure Download
3 DOC Operational User Guidance [9]
Identification: LCOS 8.70 – Operational User Guidance.pdf
SHA-256 value:
96de218b8f3f09535e9cfecd109b41e3634cf7b57358a8cc4f2
7387eb9320a99
Secure Download
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
14 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
The TOE consists of the Firmware for LANCOM CC series routers. There are seven
different configurations of the TOE for different router models which can be uniquely
identified by their file names and hash values given in the table above.
After installation and start-up, during normal operation, the user (i.e. the administrator) can
identify the hardware platform and running firmware release (i.e. the TOE) using the
command line ‘sysinfo’ command.
The firmware images and the accompanying guidance documents are downloadable after
registration on the LANCOM Systems website https://www.lancom-systems.de/cc.
The TOE user/administrator can download the applicable firmware for his LANCOM CC
series router and the guidance documents from the website. He has to calculate a
SHA-256 checksum and compare the results with the checksums stated in this certification
report.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers IPsec for network data encryption at the IP packet level
to guarantee the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of IP packets, namely for
authentication between TOE and VPN peer, confidentiality of packets, and integrity and
authenticity of packets. Also, it covers packet filtering for controlled communications
between two networks that are physically separated, configuration management and
operation performed directly from a command line interface, including the generation of
system message logs, and key management for IPsec connections as part of the IPsec
implementation. Finally it also covers remote management via SSH to enable access to
the command line interface functions.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Policy, OE.Secure-Management, OE.VPN, OE.Hardware. Details can be
found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5 Architectural Information
The LANCOM Systems Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN consists of
software that is used to construct virtual private networks (VPNs) between networks or the
TOE and a remote access client. The TOE design implements its security functions by the
following subsystems:
● Sub.VPN
● Sub.Cryptography
● Sub.Router/Firewall
● Sub.Management
● Sub.Log
● Sub.TCP/IP
15 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
● Sub.OS
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Description of the Functional Developer Tests
The test configuration consists of a test PC, two switches for selecting the actual TOE
configuration (1781-4G (CC), 1781A (CC), 1781A-3G (CC), 1781A-4G (CC), 1781EF (CC),
7100+ VPN (CC), and 9100+ VPN (CC), via WAN and LAN), the TOE itself and an IPsec
gateway. The TOE configurations are installed on corresponding LANCOM CC series
routers, as required in OE.Hardware of the ST [6].
The tests for the TSFIs were performed using the TOE firmware 8.70.0095 and 8.70.0096
and for some tests with a specially modified firmware.
For some of the TSFI tests an external test tool (Codenomicon Defensics) was used to
run a variety of tests for each action to be tested. All other tests were implemented by the
developer.
The tests of the TOE were carried out by a test tool provided by the developers. The entire
developer test configuration and the test protocols were later also provided to the
evaluator.
The developer used several testing approaches and several different test configurations.
Many tests were performed automatically by the CC-BatchTester tool developed by
LANCOM Systems. This tool starts the actual tests, which are implemented either using
Python or using the Codenomicon Defensics test tool. The CC-BatchTester also shows the
ordering dependencies, since the tests are organized in a tree that defines the correct
execution order. When performing a test for a specific TOE configuration the tool first sets
up the hardware. This makes sure, that only the actual TOE can be access by the test PC.
Then, the TOEs firmware is uploaded. Third, the tests selected in the tool are executed.
Unit tests run after the firmware was built. The developer used scripts to run all or a subset
of these unit tests. In order to run these tests, a development environment is needed that
was set up on a virtual machine with help of the developers. The evaluator tests also
included a rerun of these tests.
The communication via serial interface was tested manually. The developer specified and
implemented test cases for each defined TSFI and each subsystem. Thus all subsystems
are covered by several test cases and each SFR-enforcing module is covered by at least
one test case.
The results of the TOE tests prove the correct implementation. All test cases were
executed successfully and showed the expected result.
16 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
Description of the Independent Evaluator Tests
For the independent tests the test setup and configuration was similar to the developer
tests. The developer tests were redone using the test setup provided by the developer.
These tests were performed on all hardware platforms. The test execution of the developer
tests is controlled by the test tool CC-BatchTester that was provided by LANCOM
Systems.
The evaluators tested all TOE Security Functions. All TSFIs were tested during the
independent evaluator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases were
specified in order to demonstrate the TOE's expected behaviour including error cases.
Tests included
● Remote administration login, serial console interface and CLI,
● Routing, firewall, and application dispatcher related tests,
● SSH connection establishment, validation of authentication schemes, and file exchange,
● ISAKMP connection establishment for both signature based and PSK authentication,
including manual connection triggering,
● ESP packet related tests including SPI and padding,
● Internal data structures and file tests,
● Internal packet handling on IP, TCP, UDP and logging functionality via unit tests,
● Cryptographic functions in software and hardware,
● Checks for valid configuration,
● Port scans, fuzzing, stress test,
● Password brute force.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced-basic attack
potential during their penetration testing. The achieved test results correspond to the
expected test results. The results of the TOE tests prove the correct implementation. All
test cases were executed successfully and showed the expected result.
Description of the Penetration Tests
Publicly known vulnerabilities have been collected from CVE, textbooks and scientific
publications. The applicability of each attack path has been considered for the configured
TOE in its intended environment. All interfaces that the TOE configuration allows have
been considered, that is Ethernet and USB. After the setup of the test environment the
different attack scenarios were defined. These attack scenarios were mapped to test cases
and executed in the test environment.
For testing the TOE the evaluators used the same configuration as used in the developer
tests, including the hardware 1781-4G (CC), 1781A (CC), 1781A-3G (CC), 1781A-4G
(CC), 1781EF (CC), 7100+ VPN (CC), and 9100+ VPN (CC).
For some penetration tests the evaluators used an additional host computer and integrated
it in the trusted network of the test scenario.
The penetration tests included Timing Attack on RSA, Timing attack on AES, and Padding
Oracle. It was verified that the SFRs are implemented correctly and that they cannot be
bypassed, deactivated or manipulated. Direct attacks against the implementation of SFRs
17 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
including the corresponding TSFIs were considered. The TSFIs are implemented correctly.
The tested TSFIs are IKE (RSA signature during DH in IKE) and SSH (RSA signature
during DH in SSH, AES encryption) while independent tests covered the other TSFI.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. Tests were performed according to attack potential enhanced basic.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE includes only the operating system, not the hardware on which the operating
system is executed, i.e. the LANCOM CC series router. In particular, the cryptographic
acceleration engine in the CPU is not part of the TOE. The hardware the TOE is running
on comprise the models 1781-4G (CC), 1781A (CC), 1781A-3G (CC), 1781A-4G (CC),
1781EF (CC), 7100+ VPN (CC), 9100+ VPN (CC) as identified in the ST [6] chapter 1.5.
The TOE manages the hardware it is running on, in particular the various network
interfaces available, and uses them to distinguish untrusted networks and trusted
networks. When the TOE is in use, at least one of the network interfaces of the
internetworking device will be attached to a trusted network, and at least one other
interface will be attached to an untrusted network.
A set of features as described in the ST [6] chapter 1.4.4 is explicitly excluded from the
evaluated configuration and must be disabled. In particular it should be mentioned that the
TOE supports the PPP protocol to establish a connection to an Internet provider via, e.g.,
DSL. The PPP protocol is not used to provide additional security and, therefore, is not
within the scope of the security evaluation. Similarly, the TOE supports the use of
VLAN-Tags for Ethernet network interfaces. The use of VLAN-Tags is not used to provide
additional security and, therefore, is not within the scope of the security evaluation. The
evaluated configuration only supports IPv4, not IPv6. The firmware update mechanism
depends on the boot-loader, which is outside the TOE scope as well.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC Specific Results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
18 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of Cryptographic Assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Algorithm Bit
Length
Purpose Security Functionality Standard of
Implementation
Standard of
Usage
HMAC-
SHA-1
160 Digital signing
and signature
verification. Key
derivation
IPsec Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) (FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2(1)), Remote
Management (FCS_COP.1,
FCS_CKM.2(2))
FIPS-198-1 (198a) RFC 2409,
RFC 2104,
RFC 4253
HMAC-
SHA-256
256 Digital signing
and signature
verification. Key
derivation
IPsec Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) (FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2(1))
FIPS 198-1 (198a) RFC 2409,
RFC 4868
AES-CBC 128,
192,
256
Encryption and
decryption of
secured packets
IPsec Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) (FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2(1)), Remote
Management (FCS_COP.1)
AES: FIPS-197
CBC: NIST SP 800
- 38A, sec. 6.2
RFC 3602
Diffie-Hellma
n
2048 Diffie-Hellman
key agreement
IPsec Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) (FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.2(1)), Remote
Management
(FCS_CKM.2(2))
PKCS#3 RFC 3526
RSA 2048 Authentication
of the TOE.
Digital signing
and signature
verification.
IPsec Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) (FCS_CKM.2(1)),
Remote Management
(FCS_CKM.2(2))
PKCS#1 RFC 2409,
RFC 2313,
RFC 3447
Table 3: Cryptographic Algorithms used by the TOE
Please note: The HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm is implemented by the TOE because of the
standards the TOE shall conform to e.g. RFC 2104.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to [10] and BSI TR-02102
[11] the algorithms are suitable for their purpose as described in the table above. The
validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [10] and BSI
TR-02102 [11] and summarized the table above.
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
19 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
The TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains guidelines for
preparation and operation of the TOE which have to be followed. The Preparative
Procedures [8] and the Operational User Guidance [9] contain necessary information
about the secure administration, configuration, and usage of the TOE and all security hints
therein have to be considered. Namely, the use of the software random number generator
requires a unique random seed with a sufficiently high entropy which has to be obtained
and loaded into the TOE from a certified source of random numbers, for details see [8],
chapter 1.2.3, and the objective for the operational environment
"OE.Secure-Management", bullet point e) in chapter 4.2 of the ST [6].
The validity of the certificate is limited to a specific set of Hardware Routers on which the
TOE is running. For a list of the allowed hardware and for more details please refer to
chapter 8 of this report and to the ST [6], chapter 1.5.
The TOE will be downloadable as a firmware file at the LANCOM Systems website:
https://www.lancom-systems.de/cc
The link has to be present throughout the validity of this certificate.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
20 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
CPU Central Processing Unit
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSL Digital Subscriber Line
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IP Internet Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LAN Local Area Network
LCOS LANCOM Systems Operating System
OS Operating System
PC Personal Computer
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standards
PP Protection Profile
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
RFC Requests for Comments
RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, an asymmetric crypto algorithm
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPI Security Parameters Index
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
21 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UDP User Datagram Protocol
USB Universal Serial Bus
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
VPN Virtual Private Network
WAN Wide Area Network
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
22 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013, LANCOM Systems Operating System
LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN, LANCOM Systems GmbH, Version 1.15, Release,
08.05.2013
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) for BSI-DSZ-CC-0815, LANCOM Systems
Operating System LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN, Version 1.2, 10.05.2013, SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE) for LANCOM Systems Operating System
LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN, LANCOM Systems GmbH, Version 1.8, Release,
11.04.2013
[9] Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE) for LANCOM Systems Operating System
LCOS 8.70 CC with IPsec VPN, Version 1.10, Release, LANCOM Systems GmbH,
17.04.2013
[10] Algorithmenkatalog, Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem
Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung, Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität,
Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen, Übersicht vom 18.02.2013
[11] Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Technische
Richtline BSI TR-02102, version 2013.02, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, Stand 09.01.2013
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
23 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
This page is intentionally left blank.
24 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim chapter 10.4
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
25 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
26 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
27 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
28 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
29 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
30 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
31 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
32 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
33 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
This page is intentionally left blank
34 / 36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
35 / 36
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0815-2013
This page is intentionally left blank.
36 / 36