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Reference: 2021-22-INF-4236- v1
Target: Limitada al expediente
Date: 15.01.2024
Created by: I003
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2021-22
TOE Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated
Software revision 1.0
Applicant 124-81-00998 - SAMSUNG Electronics Co. Ltd
References
[EXT-6771] Certification Request
[EXT-8801] Evaluation Technical Report
Certification report of the product Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC
Dedicated Software revision 1.0, as requested in [EXT-6771] dated 08/04/2021, and evaluated by
Applus Laboratories, as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-6771] received on
09/11/2023.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 5
IDENTIFICATION.................................................................................................................................. 6
SECURITY POLICIES.............................................................................................................................. 6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 7
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS................................................................................ 7
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ............................................................................. 7
ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................................... 7
LOGICAL SCOPE ............................................................................................................................... 7
PHYSICAL SCOPE.............................................................................................................................. 8
DOCUMENTS....................................................................................................................................... 9
PRODUCT TESTING............................................................................................................................ 10
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .......................................................................................................... 10
EVALUATION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 11
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ............................................. 12
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 12
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 12
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 12
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)............................................................ 13
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS............................................................................................................ 14
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).................................................... 14
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)................................................................... 14
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Samsung
STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software revision 1.0.
The TOE is a Secure Sub-Systems implemented in a SoC, which is designed and packaged specially
for mobile applications.
Developer/manufacturer: SAMSUNG Electronics Co. Ltd
Sponsor: SAMSUNG Electronics Co. Ltd.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus Laboratories.
Protection Profile: Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages,
version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL5+AVA_VAN.5+ALC_CMC.5+ALC_DVS.2+ALC_TAT.3.
Evaluation end date: 27/11/2023.
Expiration Date1
: 06/01/2029.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 (augmented with AVA_VAN.5 +
ALC_CMC.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.3) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the
laboratory Applus Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the
evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_CMC.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.3,
as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software
revision 1.0, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE secure subsystem featuring the
TORNADO-H cryptographic coprocessor, is a Hard macro instantiated within an SOC which is
composed of a processing unit, security components, hardware circuit for testing purpose during
the manufacturing process and volatile and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically
exists in an STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such software
(also known as IC bootloader/firmware) is used for providing additional services to facilitate the
usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services, a random number generation library
and a random number generator. All other software is called Security IC Embedded Software and is
not part of the TOE. The SoC S5E9925 is necessary to operate the STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE but it is
not TOE hardware. The Security IC Embedded Software is initially stored in encrypted form in
external NVM (Flash).
Regarding the public key cryptographic libraries, the user has the possibility to tailor this IC
Dedicated Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the public key
cryptographic libraries. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the
public key cryptographic libraries what is resulting in two TOE configurations. This is considered in
this Security Target and corresponding notes (indicated by “optional”) are added where required. If
the user decides not to use the public key cryptographic libraries, the library is not delivered to the
user and the accompanying RSA and Elliptic Curve cryptographic mechanisms are not provided by
the TOE.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level EAL5 and the
evidences required by the additional components AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_CMC.5 + ALC_DVS.2 +
ALC_TAT.3 to the table, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
ADV ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_INT.2
ADV_TDS.4
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.5
ALC_CMS.5
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ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.3
ATE ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA AVA_VAN.5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/ECDSA
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.5
FCS_COP.1/AES
FCS_COP.1/ECDH
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
FCS_COP.1/HMAC
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/SHA_HW
FCS_COP.1/TDES
FCS_COP.1/X25519
FCS_RNG.1/DRG.3
FCS_RNG.1/PTG.2
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1/Loader
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1/Loader
FDP_DAU.2/PM
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IRA.1/PM
FDP_ITT.1
FDP_SDC.1
FDP_SDC.1/PM
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FDP_SDI.2
FDP_SDI.2/PM
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_URC.1/PM
FIA_API.1
FIA_UID.1/PM
FMT_LIM.1/Debug
FMT_LIM.1/Test
FMT_LIM.2/Debug
FMT_LIM.2/Test
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_ITT.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_RPL.1/PM
FRU_FLT.2
FTP_ITC.1
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software
revision 1.0
Security Target: STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software, version
2.7 (04/09/2023).
Protection Profile: Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages,
version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 EAL5+AVA_VAN.5+ALC_CMC.5+ALC_DVS.2+ALC_TAT.3.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated
Software revision 1.0 shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different
standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
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ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the Security Target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.4 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of
S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software revision 1.0, although the agents implementing
attacks have the attack potential according to the High of EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_CMC.5 +
ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.3. and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security
policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 3.2 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.3 (“Security Objectives
for the Operational Environment”).
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL SCOPE
The CORTEX-M35P CPU architecture of STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE follows the Harvard architecture,
that is, it has separate program and data memories. Using those separate memory access paths,
both instruction and data can be fetched simultaneously without causing a stall.
The main security features of the TOE are:
• Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High and Low
Supply Voltage detectors, Supply Voltage Glitch detector and Laser detector.
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• Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks.
• Life time detector for detecting if detector signals are modified or not.
• Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure topology.
• Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Random Branch
insertion and ROM and SRAM encryption mechanisms.
• Secure TDES, AES (AES in CRYPTO block and AES in Security Controller block) Symmetric
Cryptography support.
• Key Manager (KDF).
• ECC/ Parity / CRC-32 calculators.
• One Hardware True Random Number Generator (TRNG) that meet PTG.2 class of BSI AIS31
(German scheme).
• SHA256/384/512 based on HASH standard-NIST FIPS 180-4 in Securiy Controller block.
• SHA2-based HMAC in Securiy Controller block.
• Direct Memory Access (SC_DMA).
• Secure AHB Bridge(XIP).
• The IC Dedicated Software includes:
- The optional modular arithmetic libraries for the support of RSA and ECC (with SHA)
cryptographic operations (optional)
- TRNG library built around Hardware TRNG together with corresponding TRNG
application notes. This library meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German scheme).
- DRBG library is for deterministic random bit generator as specified in NIST SP 800-
90A and FIPS 197 using seed from TRNG. This library meets DRG.3 class of BSI-AIS31
(German scheme).
- Boot Loader includes the loader for the SoC and for TOE booting (Secure Bootloader)
and it copies the embedded software from external FLASH storage into the internal
SRAM
PHYSICAL SCOPE
The physical architecture is depicted in the following figure. The TOE is delimited by the green area.
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DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
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PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed test for all the security functions. All the tests have been performed by
the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the security
functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is appropriate to the
function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the established
architecture in the Security Target. It has also been checked that the obtained results during the
tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has applied sampling strategy and has
concluded that the information is complete and coherent enough to reproduce tests and identify
the functionality tested. Through the tests performed by the Laboratory, it is concluded that
42,42% of the developer tests were covered.
In addition, the lab has devised a test for each of the security function of the product verifying that
the obtained results are consistent with the results obtained by the developer.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in the cases
where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the evaluator has confirmed that
this variation neither represents any security problem nor a decrease in the functional capacity of
the product. Through the tests performed by the Laboratory it is concluded that 77,77% of the SFRs
and 87,5% of the TSFI groups defined in the Functional Specification.
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in is operational environment
[JILAAPS], the evaluation team has devised vulnerability analysis and attack scenarios for
penetration testing according to JIL supporting documents [JILAAPS] and [JILADVARCS]. Within
these activities all aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional testing
have been considered.
No attack scenario with the attack potential High according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5 has been
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the Security Target when all security
measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its commercial name and version STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with
Specific IC Dedicated Software revision 1.0.
The TOE hardware components are:
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The TOE software comprises the following components:
• The optional modular arithmetic libraries for the support of RSA and ECC (with SHA)
cryptographic operations (optional)
• TRNG library built around Hardware TRNG together with corresponding TRNG application
notes. This library meets PTG.2 class of BSI-AIS31 (German scheme).
• DRBG library is for deterministic random bit generator as specified in NIST SP 800-90A and
FIPS 197 using seed from TRNG. This library meets DRG.3 class of BSI-AIS31 (German
scheme).
• Boot Loader includes the loader for the SoC and for TOE booting (Secure Bootloader) and it
copies the embedded software from external FLASH storage into the internal SRAM
The acceptance procedure for the evaluated configuration of the TOE is described in document
“Chip Delivery Specification”, version 0.5.
Here it is reminded that to fulfil the requirements defined in the Security Target, the TOE consumer
must strictly follow the security recommendations that can be found on documents Security
Application Note For STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 (version 0.5), STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE
HW TRNG HS_MRO9 and TRNG HS_MRO9 Library Application Note (revision 1.1),
STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE DRBG library Application Note (revision 1.6) and PKA Library API Manual
(AH2 RSA/ECC/SHA Library API Manual v1.14) as well as to observe the operational environment
requirements and assumptions defined in the applicable Security Target.
The TOE also includes the documents identified in section “DOCUMENTS” of this certification report
that shall be distributed and made available together to the users of the evaluated version.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software
revision 1.0 has been evaluated against the Security Target STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925
with Specific IC Dedicated Software, version 2.7 (04/09/2023).
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All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_CMC.5 +
ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.3 have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus
Laboratories assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are
satisfied for the evaluation level EAL5 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_CMC.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ALC_TAT.3., as
defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5 and the CEM v3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
The evaluation team makes the following security recommendations:
• To follow the security guidance’s of the TOE strictly.
• To keep the TOE under personal control and set all other security measures available from
the environment.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Samsung STRONG_V2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software
revision 1.0, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
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[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[JILAAPS] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards. Joint Interpretation Library. Version 3.1.
June 2020. Joint Interpretation Library.
[JILADVARCS] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for Smart Cards and similar devices,
version 2.0. January 2012. Joint Interpretation Library.
[ST] Security Target of STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software,
version 2.7 (04/09/2023).
[ST Lite] Security Target Lite of STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated
Software, version 0.0 (06/09/2023).
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is stored and
protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified as:
• Security Target of STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated Software,
version 2.7 (04/09/2023).
The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also been reviewed for
the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it is published along with this
certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
• Security Target Lite of STRONGV2P10_LN04LPE of S5E9925 with Specific IC Dedicated
Software, version 0.0 (06/09/2023).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014, the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components up to EAL2 and
ALC_FLR.