National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX
Series Switch/Router 9.0.10
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11294-2022
Dated: July 5, 2022
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Linda Morrison
Clare Parran
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Allison Keenan
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 4
4 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 5
4.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 5
4.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 5
4.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 6
5 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
5.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 7
5.2 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
5.3 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
5.4 Security management.......................................................................................... 7
5.5 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
5.6 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
5.7 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 8
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
7 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
8 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 11
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 11
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 11
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 12
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 12
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 12
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 12
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 13
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)....................................................... 13
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 14
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 15
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 16
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 17
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 18
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 18
List of Tables
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers............................................................................................ 3
Table 2: Glossary.............................................................................................................. 18
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of CommScope Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router solution provided by Commscope Technologies LLC. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
(VR) is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S.
government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2022. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10.
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria
Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version
3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version
3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The
evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in
the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the CommScope
Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10 Security Target,
version 1.1, June 23, 2022 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE CommScope Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10
(Specific models identified in Section 7)
Protection Profile collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23
March 2020
ST CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 9.0.10 Security Target, version 1.1, June 23, 2022
Evaluation
Technical Report
CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 9.0.10, version 1.1, June 23, 2022
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Rev 5
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 Extended, CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Commscope Technologies LLC
Developer Commscope Technologies LLC
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Jenn Dotson, Sheldon Durrant, Linda Morrison, Clare Parran
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
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3 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Network Device models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore
should not be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
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4 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 09.0.10
family of products.
The TOE is composed of a hardware appliance with embedded software installed on a
management processor. The software controls the switching and routing network frames and
packets among the connections available on the hardware appliances.
All TOE appliances are configured at the factory with default parameters to allow immediate
use of the system’s basic features through its Command Line Interface (CLI). However, the
product should be configured in accordance with the evaluated configuration (using the
Ruckus FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide) prior to being placed into
operation. The CLI is a text based interface which is accessible from a directly connected
terminal or via a remote terminal using SSH. This remote management interface is protected
using encryption as explained later in this ST.
The hardware platforms that support the TOE have a number of common hardware
characteristics:
• Central processor that supports all system operations
• Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operations
• Flash memory, used to store the operating system image
• Non-volatile memory, which stores configuration parameters used to initialize the
system at system startup
• Multiple physical network interfaces either fixed in configuration or removable as
in a chassis based product
4.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 7 below.
4.2 TOE Architecture
The basic architecture of each TOE appliance begins with a hardware appliance with physical
network connections. Within the hardware appliance, the IOS is designed to control and
enable access to the available hardware functions (e.g., program execution, device access,
facilitate basic routing and switching functions). IOS enforces applicable security policies
on network information flowing through the hardware appliance.
During normal operation, IP packets are sent to the management IP address or through the
appliance over one or more of its physical network interfaces, which processes them
according to the system’s configuration and state information dynamically maintained by the
appliance. This processing typically results in the frames or packets being forwarded out of
the device over another interface.
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4.3 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance has physical network connections to its environment to facilitate
routing and switching of network traffic. The TOE appliance can also be the destination of
network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its own management.
The TOE may be accessed and managed through a PC or terminal in an environment which
can be remote from or directly connected to the TOE.
The TOE can be configured to forward its audit records to an external syslog server in the
network environment. This is generally advisable given the limited audit log storage space
on the evaluated appliances.
The use of a RADIUS authentication server is included the evaluated configuration with
communication occurring over a protected channel.
The TOE can be configured to use an NTP server for network time or it can use its own
hardware clock.
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5 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
5.1 Security audit
The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE
can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and
also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit
on the network.
5.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE contains a CAVP-tested cryptographic module that provides key management,
random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-
hashing features in support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including SSH and
TLS. The TOE supports SHA1 message digest authentication for NTP servers.
5.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions
mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its
configured switching/routing rules. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user
names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these attributes.
5.4 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands to access the wide range of
security management functions to manage its security policies. All administrative activity
and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users
(i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and
authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through
the use of privileges associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the
available privileges, only the Super User can actually manage the security policies provided
by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to facilitate effective
management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
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5.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and
integrity of its security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so
that they are not accessible even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing
mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log
accountability). The TOE can also be configured to work with an NTP server for reliable
time.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing.
It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so
that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce
malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
5.6 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator
establishes an interactive session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined
inactivity timeout value after which the inactive session (local or remote) will be
terminated.
5.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSH for CLI access
to ensure both integrity and disclosure protection. If the negotiation of an encrypted
session fails or if the user does not have authorization for remote administration, an
attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS
connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• RUCKUS FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 09.0.10, June 16, 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
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7 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluation consists of the following series and models:
a. ICX7150-C12P‐2X10GR‐A
b. ICX7150‐24‐4X10GR‐A
c. ICX7150‐24P‐4X10GR‐A
d. ICX7150‐48‐4X10GR‐A
e. ICX7150‐48P‐4X10GR‐A
f. ICX7150‐48PF‐4X10GR‐A
g. ICX7150‐48ZP‐8X10GR2‐A
h. ICX7250‐24G
i. ICX7250-48P
j. ICX7450-24P
k. ICX7450-48P
l. ICX7450-48F
All series have the following CPU: Dual-core ARM Cortex A9 1GHz (ARMv7-A
architecture). The TOE utilizes the Firmware crypto library referred to as the RUCKUS-IP-
CRYPTO-VER-5.0 running on this processor.
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8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for CommScope
Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10, Version 1.1, June 23,
2022 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e including the tests associated with
optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices, provides a list of
test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the
NDcPP22e.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the CommScope Ruckus FastIron ICX Series
Switch/Router 9.0.10 products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product
security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (AVA)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search), Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/), Rapid7 Vulnerability Database
(https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities), Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative
(http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories ), Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine
(http://www.exploitsearch.net), SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com),
Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search), Offensive
Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/) on 6/23/2022 with the following
search terms: "CommScope", "Ruckus", "FastIron", "ICX7150", "ICX7250", "ICX7450",
"ARM Cortex A9", "RUCKUS-IP-CRYPTO-VER-5.0 ".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the RUCKUS FastIron
FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 09.0.10, June 16, 2022. No versions of
the TOE and software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product
was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by devices in
the operational environment, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can
be drawn about their effectiveness.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX
Series Switch/Router 9.0.10 Security Target, Version 1.1, June 23, 2022.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
Term Definition
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) An IT security evaluation facility accredited by
the National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and approved
by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct
Common Criteria-based evaluations.
Conformance The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous
way that a given implementation is correct with
respect to the formal model.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product against the
Common Criteria using the Common Criteria
Evaluation Methodology to determine whether
or not the claims made are justified; or the
assessment of a protection profile against the
Common Criteria using the Common
Evaluation Methodology to determine if the
Profile is complete, consistent, technically
sound and hence suitable for use as a statement
of requirements for one or more TOEs that may
be evaluated.
Evaluation Evidence Any tangible resource (information) required
from the sponsor or developer by the evaluator
to perform one or more evaluation activities.
Feature Part of a product that is either included with the
product or can be ordered separately.
Target of Evaluation (TOE) A group of IT products configured as an IT
system, or an IT product, and associated
documentation that is the subject of a security
evaluation under the CC.
Validation The process carried out by the CCEVS
Validation Body leading to the issue of a
Common Criteria certificate.
Validation Body A governmental organization responsible for
carrying out validation and for overseeing the
day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme.
Table 2: Glossary
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
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[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020.
[5] CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10
Security Target, Version 1.1, June 23, 2022 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10, Version 1.1, June 23, 2022 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron ICX
Series Switch/Router 9.0.10, Version 1.1, June 23, 2022 (DTR).
[8] RUCKUS FastIron FIPS and Common Criteria Configuration Guide, 09.0.10, June
16, 2022 (AGD).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for CommScope Technologies LLC, Ruckus FastIron
ICX Series Switch/Router 9.0.10, Version 1.1, June 23, 2022 (ETR).