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ASE\_ST – Security Target Lite

TESIC-SC500 V2

D-SPD-401-511-1.2

Security Level 1: Public

Revision: 1.2

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## Version

Version	Date	Description
1.0	23/03/2016	Initial version
1.1	24/03/2016	Update after evaluator comments
1.2	30/03/2016	Public release

Public Release

## 1 ST Introduction

- 1 This chapter introduces the security target and the TOE reference (1.1), the TOE overview and the TOE description (1.2), the interface of the TOE (1.3) and the TOE intended usage (1.4).

### 1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference

- 2 The version and the date of the **Security Target Lite** are respectively version 1.2 and 30/03/2016. The Security Target is strictly compliant to Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] and built on *Common criteria* version 3.1 [2-5].

Title:	TESIC-SC-Security Target Lite
TOE reference:	TESIC-SC-500-HW02.0-BL02.0
Provided by:	TIEMPO-IC
Evaluation schema:	France (ANSSI)
Evaluator:	LETI CEA France
Common Criteria version:	[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001. [3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements; September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002. [4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-003. [5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology; September 2012, Version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004.



## 1.2 TOE Overview and TOE Description

### 1.2.1 Introduction

- 3 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the TESIC-SC-500-02. It is a chip with a dual interface (contact ISO7816 and contactless ISO14443) and a Flash memory of 504 Kbytes supporting various secured transactions – payments, ticketing and identification – with high performance and enforced security.

### 1.2.2 TOE Definition

- 4 The TESIC-SC-500-02 is a Security IC based on Tiempo TESIC-SC platform, built around TAM16EXV2S asynchronous microcontroller with coprocessors for hardware acceleration of standard cryptographic operations, peripherals, communication interfaces, embedded memories and security features. The overview of the architecture is presented on Figure 1-1.




Figure 1-1: Block diagram of the TOE

- 5 The main security features associated to security services integrated in TESIC-SC-500-02 are listed below:
- Security sensors.
  - Active shield.
  - Secure DES/Triple DES crypto processor.
  - Secure AES crypto processor.
  - Secure accelerator for RSA and ECC.

- Physical True Random Number Generator (PTRNG) that meets some of ANSSI requirements (RGS\_B1).
- Secure processor TAM16EXV2S.
- Secure CRC co-processor.

Several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as well as integrity and confidentiality of stored data.

#### Operating Temperature

- -25°C to +85°C

#### Operating Voltage range

- Support class A operations: 4.5 V – 5.5 V
- Support class B operations: 2.7 V – 3.3 V

### 1.2.3 TOE Hardware

6 The main hardware blocks integrated in the TOE are listed below:

- Low power 8/16-bit microcontroller TAM16EXV2S. It provides 32-bit operations.
- Timers: 3 timers providing periodic timestamp, watchdog, application timeout, profiling function, and CPU power saving mode features.
- Interrupt controller with 2 types of interrupts: Maskable interrupts (MI) and non-maskable interrupts (NMI).
- Hardware contact interface compliant with ISO7816-3 [6] providing the following features:
  - Support of T=0 and T=1 protocols.
  - Support class A and B of operating conditions.
- Hardware contactless interface compliant with ISO14443-3 [7] providing the following features:
  - Type A modulation/demodulation.
- Hardware AES cryptographic coprocessor compliant with the AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 standards [8].
- Hardware DES/Triple DES cryptographic coprocessor with 56 bits, 112 bits and 168 bits key sizes [9].
- Hardware PKA public key cryptographic accelerator to support RSA and ECC over GF(p) with operand sizes up to 4096 bits. It integrates modular multiplication function, addition and subtraction functions, shift functions and logical operation functions [12].
- CRC-16 block compliant with ISO/IEC 13239 with additional recommendation in CCITTv41 [13].
- External supply glitch detector.
- Temperature sensor.
- Physical True Random Number Generator (PTRNG).
- Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG).

- Active shield.
- 504 Kbytes of Flash memory
- 8 Kbytes of RAM memory
- 16 Kbytes of ROM memory
- Power on reset.
- Memory protection unit (MPU).

#### 1.2.4 TOE Software

7 The software component contained in the TOE is listed below:

- Secure boot loader (ROM).

#### 1.2.5 TOE Guidance

8 Guidances related to the TOE are listed below:

- TESIC-SC-500-02 Hardware User Manual, version 2.5 from March 2016. This guidance describes the hardware functions and electrical characteristics for users.
- TESIC-SC-500-SDK User Manual, version 5.0. This document contains all information required to develop applications on TESIC-SC platform.
- TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD\_OPE revision 1.2, from March 2016. This document describes Operational User Guidance
- TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD\_OPE - Loader role revision 1.0, from July 2015. This document describes Operational User LOADER role specific description
- TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD\_OPE - Developer role revision 2.2, from March 2016. This document describes Operational User DEVELOPER role specific description
- TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD\_PRE- Loader role revision 1.2, from December 2015. This document describes preparative procedures for Loader role
- TESIC-SC500 V2 ADMIN Loader specification revision 1.0 from March 2016

9 Table 1-1 summarizes the hardware, software and guidance documents of the TOE.

Type	Component	Version	Delivery form
Hardware	TESIC-SC-500-02	2.0.1	Wafer, die, smartcard packaging.
Software	Secure Boot Loader	2.0	Integrated in ROM

Guidance	TESIC-SC500 V2 Hardware User Manual	2.5	Electronic document
Guidance	TESIC-SC-500-02 secure platform SDK User Manual	5.0	Electronic document
Guidance	TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD_OPE	1.2	Electronic document
Guidance	TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD_OPE - Loader role	1.0	Electronic document
Guidance	TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD_OPE - Developer role	2.2	Electronic document
Guidance	TESIC-SC500 V2 AGD_PRE- Loader role	1.2	Electronic document
Guidance	TESIC-SC500 V2 ADMIN Loader specification	1.0	Electronic document

Table 1-1: Summary of TOE hardware, software and guidance documents

### 1.2.6 TOE life cycle

10 The complex development and manufacturing processes of a Composite Product can be separated into seven distinct phases. The phases 2 and 3 of the Composite Product life cycle cover the IC development and production:

- IC Development (Phase 2):
  - IC design,
  - IC Dedicated Software development,
- the IC Manufacturing (Phase 3):
  - integration and photomask fabrication,
  - IC production,
  - IC testing,
  - Initialisation, and
  - Pre-personalisation if necessary

The Composite Product life cycle phase 4 can be included in the evaluation of the IC as an option:

- the IC Packaging (Phase 4):
  - Security IC packaging (and testing),

- Pre-personalisation if necessary.
- 11 In addition, four important stages have to be considered in the Composite Product life cycle:
- Security IC Embedded Software Development (Phase 1),
  - the Composite Product finishing process, preparation and shipping to the personalisation line for the Composite Product (Composite Product Integration Phase 5),
  - the Composite Product personalisation and testing stage where the user data of the Composite TOE is loaded into the Security IC's memory (Personalisation Phase 6),
  - the Composite Product usage by its issuers and consumers (Operational Usage Phase 7) which may include loading and other management of applications in the field.
- 12 The definition of “TOE Delivery” and the responsible parties are presented in Figure 1-2. It also includes for each life cycle phase the state (mode) of the TOE.




Figure 1-2: Definition of “TOE Delivery” and responsible Parties

- 13 The Security IC Embedded Software is developed outside the TOE development in Phase 1. The TOE is developed in Phase 2 and produced in Phase 3. Then the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice). The TOE can also be delivered in form of packaged products. In this case the corresponding assurance requirements for the development and production of the TOE not only pertain to Phase 2 and 3 but to Phase 4 in addition.

- 14 In the following the term “TOE Delivery” (refer to Figure 1-2) is uniquely used to indicate:
- after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or
  - after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.

- 15 The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “TOE Manufacturer” (refer to Figure 1-2) which includes the following roles:
- the IC Developer (Phase 2) and  
the IC Manufacturer (Phase 3)

if the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or

- the IC Developer (Phase 2),  
the IC Manufacturer (Phase 3) and  
the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4)

if the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of packaged products.

- 16 Hence the “TOE Manufacturer” comprises all roles beginning with Phase 2 and before “TOE Delivery”. Starting with “TOE Delivery” another party takes over the control of the TOE.

- 17 The Protection Profile uniquely uses the term “Composite Product Manufacturer” which includes all roles (outside TOE development and manufacturing) except the End-consumer as user of the Composite Product (refer to Figure 1-2) which are the following:
- Security IC Embedded Software development (Phase 1).
  - the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice).
  - the Composite Product Manufacturer (Phase 5) and the Personaliser (Phase 6).

- 18 The loader is intended to be used in phases 3 to 6.

### 1.2.7 TOE domain (Mode)

- 19 The TOE integrates two separated domains:

- Test domain: It is the default domain after manufacturing
- Admin domain: this domain comes after the test domain. The TOE is delivered in administration domain either at the end of phase 3 or at the end of phase 4.

### 1.3 Interfaces of the TOE

- 20 The TOE includes a contact interface, a contactless interface and software interfaces.

#### 1.3.1 Software Interfaces

- 21 The software interfaces consist of interfaces between hardware and software. It is made of interface registers. All TESIC-SC blocks integrate such registers which enable together with software drivers to access into TESIC-SC hardware functions.

#### 1.3.2 Contact Interface

- 22 The contact interface is a receiver transmitter serial interface compliant to the ISO-7816-3 standard. The TOE physically communicates with the external environment through chip's pads including the Vcc, Reset, Clock, Ground and IO1 (Input/Output).

#### 1.3.3 Contactless Interface

- 23 The contactless interface is compliant to the ISO 14443-2 and ISO 14443-3 type "A" standard.

### 1.4 TOE intended Usage

- 24 The TESIC-SC-500-02 is intended to support the following applications:
- Banking and payment applications.
  - NFC/Mobile transactions.
  - Transport and ticketing services.
  - Identification and health applications.
  - Digital rights management (DRM) applications.

## 2 Conformance Claims

- 25 This chapter details the conformance claims of the TOE. It includes the CC conformance claim (2.1), the PP claim (2.2), the PP Additions (2.3), the Package Claim (2.4) and the Conformance Claim Rationale (2.5).

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

- 26 The ST claims to be conformant to the CC v3.1R4 [2], [3], [4], and [5].
- 27 Furthermore it claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant. The extended Security Functional Requirements are defined in chapter 5.

### 2.2 PP Claim

- 28 This Security Target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 “Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages” [1].
- 29 All refinements described in the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] are taken into consideration. In particular the refinements of Security Assurance Requirements ADV\_FSP.5 and ALC\_CMS.5.
- 30 The conformance to the following additional packages from BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] is also claimed:
- Package “Authentication of the Security IC”
  - Package 1+ for Loader: this package corresponds to the Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only, augmented with the SFRs FDP\_ACC.1/Loader and FDP\_ACF.1/Loader of the Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized user.

The details of this augmentation will be defined in an upcoming note written by the ANSSI.

- 31 This ST does not claim conformance to any other PP.

### 2.3 PP Additions

- 32 The following security problems, security objectives and security functional requirements have been added:
- T.Mem-Access
  - T.Open\_Samples\_Diffusion
  - A.Key-Function
  - O.Mem-Access



- O.PKA
- O.Prot\_TSF\_Confidentiality
- O.Ctrl\_Auth\_Loader/Package1+
- FDP\_ACC.1
- FDP\_ACF.1
- FMT\_MSA.1
- FMT\_MSA.3
- FMT\_SMF.1

## 2.4 Package Claim

- 33 The assurance level for this Security Target is EAL5+. It includes the assurance level EAL5 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2.

## 2.5 Conformance Claim Rationale

- 34 This Security Target claims strict conformance to Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 [1] which has an assurance level EAL4 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2. The assurance level of the TOE is EAL5 augmented with AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2.
- 35 The differences between this Security Target and the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP0084 [1] focused on security problems, security objectives and security functional requirements do not affect the conformance claims of this Security Target. This is also true for all additional security problems, objectives and requirements added in this Security Target.
- 36 The PP enables the TOE to be evaluated above the EAL4+, therefore the fact that this Security Target addresses the EAL5+ level, it still maintains the conformance claims to PP. The rationale is given in section 4.4 and section 6.3.

### 3 Security Problem Definition

- 37 The chapter 3 contains the description of assets (3.1), threats (3.2), organizational security policies (3.3) and assumptions (3.4).

#### 3.1 Description of Assets

- 38 Assets (related to standard functionality) to be protected are:
- The User Data of the composite TOE.
  - The Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation.
  - The security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
- 39 The user (consumer) of the TOE places value upon the assets related to high-level security concerns :
- SC1 integrity of User Data of the Composite TOE,
  - SC2 confidentiality of User Data of the Composite TOE being stored in the TOE's protected memory areas.
  - SC3 correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.
- 40 The Security IC may not distinguish between user data which is public knowledge or kept confidential. Therefore the Security IC shall protect the user data of the Composite TOE in integrity and in confidentiality if stored in protected memory areas, unless the Security IC Embedded Software chooses to disclose or modify it.
- 41 In particular integrity of the Security IC Embedded Software means that it is correctly being executed which includes the correct operation of the TOE's functionality. Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software which do not contain secret data or security critical source code, may not require protection from being disclosed. Other parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may need to be kept confidential since specific implementation details may assist an attacker.
- 42 The Protection Profile requires the TOE to provide at least one security service: the generation of random numbers by means of a physical Random Number Generator. The annex 7 of Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 provides packages for typical additional security services. The Security Target may require additional security services as described in these packages or define TOE specific security services. It is essential that the TOE ensures the correct operation of all security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.

- 43 According to the Protection Profile there is the following high-level security concern related to security service:

SC4 deficiency of random numbers.

- 44 To be able to protect these assets (SC1 to SC4) the TOE shall self-protect its TSF. Critical information about the TSF shall be protected by the development environment and the operational environment. Critical information may include:

- Logical design data, physical design data, IC Dedicated Software, and configuration data.
- Initialization data and Pre-personalization data, specific development aids, test and characterization related data, material for software development support, and photo masks.

- 45 Such information and the ability to perform manipulations assist in threatening the above assets.

- 46 Note that there are many ways to manipulate or disclose the User Data: (i) An attacker may manipulate the Security IC Embedded Software or the TOE. (ii) An attacker may cause malfunctions of the TOE or abuse Test Features provided by the TOE. Such attacks usually require design information of the TOE to be obtained. They pertain to all information about (i) the circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories), (ii) the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software (if any) and IC Dedicated Support Software (if any), and (iii) the configuration data for the security functionality. The knowledge of this information enables or supports attacks on the assets. Therefore the TOE Manufacturer must ensure that the development and production of the TOE is secure so that no restricted, sensitive, critical or very critical information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE.

- 47 The TOE Manufacturer must apply protection to support the security of the TOE. This not only pertains to the TOE but also to all information and material exchanged with the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software. This covers the Security IC Embedded Software itself if provided by the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software or any authentication data required to enable the download of software. This includes the delivery (exchange) procedures for Phase 1 and the Phases after TOE Delivery as far as they can be controlled by the TOE Manufacturer. These aspects enforce the usage of the supporting documents and the refinements of SAR defined in the protection profile.

48 The information and material produced and/or processed by the TOE Manufacturer in the TOE development and production environment (Phases 2 up to TOE Delivery) can be grouped as follows :

- logical design data,
- physical design data,
- IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data,
- specific development aids,
- test and characterisation related data,
- material for software development support,
- photo masks and products in any form,

as long as they are generated, stored or processed by the TOE manufacturer.

### 3.2 Threats

49 The following explanations help to understand the focus of the threats and objectives defined below. For example, certain attacks are only one step towards a disclosure of assets, others may directly lead to a compromise of the application security.

- Manipulation of user data (which includes user data and code of the Composite TOE, stored in or processed by the Security IC) means that an attacker is able to alter a meaningful block of data. This should be considered for the threats T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation and T.Abuse-Func.
- Disclosure of user data (which may include user data and code of the Composite TOE, stored in protected memory areas or processed by the Security IC) or TSF data means that an attacker is realistically able to determine a meaningful block of data. This should be considered for the threats T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys-Probing, T.Leak-Forced and T.Abuse-Func.
- Manipulation of the TSF or TSF data means that an attacker is able to deliberately deactivate or otherwise change the behaviour of a specific security functionality in a manner which enables exploitation. This should be considered for the threat T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation and T.Abuse-Func.

50 The cloning of the functional behavior of the Security IC on its physical and command interface is the highest level security concern in the application context.

- 51 The cloning of that functional behavior requires to (i) develop a functional equivalent of the Security IC Embedded Software, (ii) disclose, interpret and employ the user data of the Composite TOE stored in the TOE, and (iii) develop and build a functional equivalent of the Security IC using the input from the previous steps.
- 52 The Security IC is a platform for the Security IC Embedded Software which ensures that especially the critical user data of the Composite TOE are stored and processed in a secure way (refer to below). The Security IC Embedded Software must also ensure that critical user data of the Composite TOE are treated as required in the application context (refer to Section 3.4). In addition, the personalization process supported by the Security IC Embedded Software (and perhaps by the Security IC in addition) must be secure (refer to Section 3.4). This last step is beyond the scope of the Protection Profile (Security IC) and those being subject to the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software or Security IC and the corresponding personalization process. Therefore, functional cloning is indirectly covered by the security concerns and threats described below.
- 53 The high-level security concerns are refined below by defining threats as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 3-1). Note that manipulation of the TOE is only a means to threaten user data is not a success for the attacker in itself.




Figure 3-1: Standard Threats

- 54 The high-level security concern related to specific security service is refined below by defining threats as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 3-2).



Figure 3-2: Threats related to security service

- 55 The Security IC Embedded Software may be required to contribute to averting the threats. At least it must not undermine the security provided by the TOE. For detail refer to the assumptions regarding the Security IC Embedded Software specified in Section 3.4.
- 56 The above security concerns are derived from considering the operational usage by the end-consumer (Phase 7) since
- Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by assumptions and
  - the development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery are covered by an organizational security policy.
- 57 The TOE's countermeasures are designed to avert the threats described below. Nevertheless, they may be effective in earlier phases (Phases 4 to 6).
- 58 The TOE is exposed to different types of influences or interactions with its outer world. Some of them may result from using the TOE only but others may also indicate an attack. The different types of influences or interactions are visualized in Figure 3-3. Due to the intended usage of the TOE all interactions are considered as possible.




Figure 3-3: Interactions between the TOE and its outer world

- 59 An interaction with the TOE can be done through the physical interfaces (Number 7–9 in Figure 3-3) which are realized using contacts and/or a contactless interface. Influences or interactions with the TOE also occur through the chip surface (Number 1–6 in Figure 3-3). In Number 1 and 6 galvanic contacts are used. In Number 2 and 5 the influence (arrow directed to the chip) or the measurement (arrow starts from the chip) does not require a contact. Number 3 and 4 refer to specific situations where the TOE and its functional behavior is not only influenced but definite changes are made by applying mechanical, chemical and other methods (such as 1, 2). Many attacks require a prior inspection and some reverse-engineering (Number 3). This demonstrates the basic building blocks of attacks. A practical attack will use a combination of these elements.

### 3.2.1 Standard Threats

- 60 The TOE shall avert the threat “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” as specified below.

T.Leak-Inherent                      Inherent Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the

TOE during usage of the Security IC in order to disclose confidential user data as part of the assets.

No direct contact with the Security IC internals is required here. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. One example is Differential Power Analysis (DPA). This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from direct (contact) measurements (Numbers 6 and 7 in Figure 3-3) or measurement of emanations (Number 5 in Figure 3-3) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.

- 61 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)” as specified below.

T.Phys-Probing

Physical Probing

An attacker may perform physical probing of the TOE in order (i) to disclose user data while stored in protected memory areas, (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the user data while processed or (iii) to disclose other critical information about the operation of the TOE to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.

Physical probing requires direct interaction with the Security IC internals (Numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 3-3). Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified (Number 3 in Figure 3-3). Determination of software design including treatment of user data of the Composite TOE may also be a pre- requisite.

This pertains to “measurements” using galvanic contacts or any type of charge interaction whereas manipulations are considered under the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”. The threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)” and “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)” may use physical probing but require complex signal processing in addition.

- 62 The TOE shall avert the threat “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)” as specified below.

T.Malfunction

Malfunction due to Environmental Stress

An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the Security IC Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) modify security services of the TOE or (ii) modify functions of the Security IC Embedded Software (iii) deactivate or affect security mechanisms of the TOE to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE



or the Security IC Embedded Software. This may be achieved by operating the Security IC outside the normal operating conditions (Numbers 1, 2 and 9 in Figure 3-3).

The modification of security services of the TOE may e.g. affect the quality of random numbers provided by the random number generator up to undetected deactivation when the random number generator does not produce random numbers and the Security IC Embedded Software gets constant values. In another case errors are introduced in executing the Security IC Embedded Software. To exploit this, an attacker needs information about the functional operation, e.g. to introduce a temporary failure within a register used by the Security IC Embedded Software with light or a power glitch.

- 63 The TOE shall avert the threat “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified below.

T.Phys-Manipulation      Physical Manipulation

An attacker may physically modify the Security IC in order to (i) modify user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) modify the Security IC Embedded Software, (iii) modify or deactivate security services of the TOE, or (iv) modify security mechanisms of the TOE to enable attacks disclosing or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.

The modification may be achieved through techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis (Numbers 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 3-3) and IC reverse engineering efforts (Number 3 in Figure 3-3). The modification may result in the deactivation of a security feature. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including treatment of user data of the Composite TOE may also be a pre-requisite. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.

In contrast to malfunctions (refer to T.Malfunction) the attacker requires gathering significant knowledge about the TOE’s internal construction here (Number 3 in Figure 3-3).

- 64 The TOE shall avert the threat “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)” as specified below:

T.Leak-Forced      Forced Information Leakage

An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during usage of the Security IC in order to disclose confidential user data of the Composite TOE as part of the assets even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the

attacker.

This threat pertains to attacks where methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals (Numbers 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Figure 3-3) which normally do not contain significant information about secrets.

- 65 The TOE shall avert the threat “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” as specified below.

T.Abuse-Func

Abuse of Functionality

An attacker may use functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery in order to (i) disclose or manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security services of the TOE or (iii) manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) functions of the Security IC Embedded Software or (iv) enable an attack disclosing or manipulating the user data of the Composite TOE or the Security IC Embedded Software.

### 3.2.2 Threats related to security services

- 66 The TOE shall avert the threat “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” as specified below.

T.RND

Deficiency of Random Numbers

An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers generated by the TOE security service for instance because of a lack of entropy of the random numbers provided.

An attacker may gather information about the random numbers produced by the TOE security service. Because unpredictability is the main property of random numbers this may be a problem in case they are used to generate cryptographic keys. The entropy provided by the random numbers must be appropriate for the strength of the cryptographic algorithm, the key or the cryptographic variable is used for. Here the attacker is expected to take advantage of statistical properties of the random numbers generated by the TOE. Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered which may assist in getting information about random numbers.

### 3.2.3 Threats related to additional TOE Specific Functionality

- 67 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” as specified below.

T.Mem-Access                      Memory Access Violation

Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may cause security violations by accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code). Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific application context and must be implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software.

**Clarification:** This threat does not address the proper definition and management of the security rules implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software, this being software design and correctness issue. This threat addresses the reliability of the abstract machine targeted by the software implementation. To avert the threat, the set of access rules provided by this TOE should be undefeated if operated according to the provided guidance. The threat is not realized if the Security IC Embedded Software is designed or implemented to grant access to restricted information. It is realized if an implemented access denial is granted under unexpected conditions or if the execution machinery does not effectively control a controlled access. Here the attacker is expected to (i) take advantage of flaws in the design and/or the implementation of the TOE memory access rules (refer to T.Abuse-Func but for functions available after TOE delivery), (ii) introduce flaws by forcing operational conditions (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or by physical manipulation (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation). This attacker is expected to have a high level potential of attack.

### 3.2.4 Threats related to Authentication of the Security IC

- 68 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Masquerade the TOE (T.Masquerade-TOE)” as specified below.

T.Masquerade-TOE                      Masquerade the TOE

An attacker may threaten the property being a genuine TOE by producing a chip which is not a genuine TOE but wrongly identifying itself as genuine TOE sample.

The threat T.Masquerade\_TOE may threaten the unique identity of the TOE as described in the P.Process-TOE or the property as being a genuine TOE without unique identity. Mitigation of masquerade requires tightening up the identification by authentication.

### 3.2.5 Threats related to Package 1+ for Loader

- 69 The TOE shall avert the additional threat “Diffusion of Open Samples (T.Open\_Samples\_Diffusion)” as specified below.

## T.Open\_Samples\_Diffusion Diffusion of Open Samples

An attacker may get access to open samples of the TOE and use them to gain information about the TSF (loader, memory management unit, ROM code...). He may also use the open samples to characterize the behavior of the IC and its security functionalities (for example: characterization of side channel profiles, perturbation cartography...). The execution of dedicated security features (for example: execution of a DES computation without countermeasures or by de-activating countermeasures) through the loading of an adequate code would allow this kind of characterization and the execution of enhanced attacks on the IC.

### 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

70 The following Figure 3-4 shows the policies applied in this Security Target.




Figure 3-4: Policies

71 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” as specified below.

P.Process-TOE                      Protection during TOE Development and Production

An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires that each instantiation of the TOE carries this unique identification.

72 The accurate identification is introduced at the end of the production test in phase 3. Therefore the production environment must support this unique identification.

73 The groups of information and material processed and/or produced by the TOE manufacturer in the TOE development and production environment (Phase 2 to TOE Delivery) are listed below:

- logical design data,
- physical design data,
- IC Dedicated Software, Security IC Embedded Software, Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data,
- specific development aids,
- test and characterisation related data,
- material for software development support,
- photo masks and products in any form,

while they are processed by the TOE Manufacturer.

74 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Cryptographic services of the TOE (P.Crypto-Service)” as specified below.

P.Crypto-Service

Cryptographic services of the TOE

The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services for the IC Embedded Software.

**Application note:** The TOE shall provide the following security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

- Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES)
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- Public Key Accelerator (PKA) supporting Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in GF(p).

**Note:** The TOE can be delivered without the RSA/ECC cryptographic library. In this case the TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).

75 The IC Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality (P.Lim-Block-Loader)” as specified below.

P.Lim-Block-Loader

Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality

The composite manufacturer uses the Loader for loading of Security IC Embedded Software, user data of the Composite Product or IC Dedicated Support Software in charge of the IC Manufacturer. He limits the capability and blocks the availability of the Loader in order to protect stored data from disclosure and manipulation.

- 76 The organisational security policy “Controlled usage to Loader Functionality (P.Ctrl\_Loader)” applies to Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only.

P.Ctrl_Loader	Controlled usage to Loader Functionality
	Authorized user controls the usage of the Loader functionality in order to protect stored and loaded user data from disclosure and manipulation.

### 3.4 Assumptions

- 77 The following Figure 3-5 shows the assumptions applied in this Security Target.




Figure 3-5: Assumptions

- 78 The intended usage of the TOE is twofold, depending on the Life Cycle Phase: (i) The Security IC Embedded Software developer uses it as a platform for the Security IC software being developed (ii) The Composite Product Manufacturer (and the consumer) uses it as a part of the Security IC. The Composite Product is used in a terminal which supplies the Security IC (with power and clock) and (at least) mediates the communication with the Security IC Embedded Software.
- 79 Before being delivered to the consumer the TOE is packaged. Many attacks require the TOE to be removed from the carrier. Though this extra step adds difficulties for the attacker no specific assumptions are made here regarding the package.
- 80 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (A.Process-Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.

A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
------------------	------------------------------------------------------------

It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected appropriately.

81 The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:

- the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications, implementation and related documentation,
- pre-personalization Data and personalization data including specifications of formats and memory areas, test related data,
- the user data of the Composite TOE and related documentation, and
- material for software development support

as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer. Details must be defined in the Security Target for the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software and/or Security IC.

82 The developer of the Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate usage of Security IC while developing this software in Phase 1 as described in the (i) TOE guidance documents (refer to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as documented in the certification report.

83 Note that particular requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software are often not clear before considering a specific attack scenario during vulnerability analysis of the Security IC (AVA\_VAN). A summary of such results is provided in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" (ETR-COMP). This document can be provided for the evaluation of the composite product. The ETR-COMP may also include guidance for additional tests being required for the combination of hardware and software. The TOE evaluation must be completed before evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software can be completed. The TOE evaluation can be conducted before and independent from the evaluation of the Security IC Embedded Software.

- 84 The Security IC Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE (A.Resp-AppI)” as specified below.

A.Resp-AppI

Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE

All user data of the Composite TOE are owned by Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, it must be assumed that security relevant user data of the Composite TOE (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as defined for its specific application context.

- 85 The application context specifies how the user data of the Composite TOE shall be handled and protected. The evaluation of the Security IC according to this Security Target is conducted on generalized application context. The concrete requirements for the Security IC Embedded Software shall be defined in the Protection Profile respective Security Target for the Security IC Embedded Software. The Security IC cannot prevent any compromise or modification of user data of the Composite TOE by malicious Security IC Embedded Software.

- 86 The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate “Usage of Key-dependent Functions (A.Key-Function)” while developing this software in Phase 1 as specified below.

A.Key-Function

Usage of Key-dependent Functions

Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks (as described under T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced).

- 87 Note that here the routines which may compromise keys when being executed are part of the Smartcard Embedded Software. In contrast to this the threats T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced address (i) the cryptographic routines which are part of the TOE and (ii) the processing of User Data including cryptographic keys



## 4 Security Objectives

- 88 This chapter presents the security objectives for the TOE (4.1), the security objectives for the security IC embedded software development environment (4.2), the security objectives for the operational environment (4.3) and the security objectives rationale (4.4).

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

- 89 The standard high-level security goals related to the assets are described as followed for the user:


SG1 maintain the integrity of user data (when being executed/processed and when being stored in the TOE's memories) as well as

SG2 maintain the confidentiality of user data (when being processed and when being stored in the TOE's protected memories).

SG3 maintain the correct operation of the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software.

Note, the Security IC may not distinguish between user data which are public known or kept confidential. Therefore the security IC shall protect the user data in integrity and in confidentiality if stored in protected memory areas, unless the Security IC Embedded Software chooses to disclose or modify it. Parts of the Security IC Embedded Software which do not contain secret data or security critical source code, may not require protection from being disclosed. Other parts of the Security IC Embedded Software may need kept confidential since specific implementation details may assist an attacker.

- 90 These standard high-level security goals in the context of the security problem definition build the starting point for the definition of security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 4-1). Note that the integrity of the TOE is a means to reach these objectives.



From BSI-CC-PP-0084

Figure 4-1: Standard Security Objectives

91 According to this Security Target there is the following high-level security goal related to specific functionality:

SG4 Provide true random numbers.

92 The additional high-level security consideration are refined below by defining security objectives as required by the Common Criteria (refer to Figure 4-2).



From BSI-CC-PP-0084

Addition

Figure 4-2: Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality

## Standard Security Objectives

93 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)” as specified below:

O.Leak-Inherent      Protection against Inherent Information Leakage

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential data stored and/or processed in the Security IC

- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals (for example on the power, clock, or I/O lines) and
- by measurement and analysis of the time between events found by measuring signals (for instance on the power, clock, or I/O lines).

This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing whereas O.Phys-Probing is about direct measurements on elements on the chip surface. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.

94 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)” as specified below:

O.Phys-Probing      Protection against Physical Probing

The TOE must provide protection against disclosure/reconstruction of user data while stored in protected memory areas and processed or against the disclosure of other critical information about the operation of the TOE.

This includes protection against:

- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)

with a prior

- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

- 95 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” as specified below:

O.Malfunction                      Protection against Malfunctions

The TOE must ensure its correct operation.

The TOE must indicate or prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent malfunctions. Examples of environmental conditions are voltage, clock frequency, temperature, or external energy fields.

**Remark:** A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective O.Phys-Manipulation) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE’s internal construction is required and the attack is performed in a controlled manner.

- 96 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)” as specified below:

O.Phys-Manipulation                      Protection against Physical Manipulation

The TOE must provide protection against manipulation of the TOE (including its software and TSF data), the Security IC Embedded Software and the user data of the Composite TOE. This includes protection against:

- reverse-engineering (understanding the design and its properties and functions),
- manipulation of the hardware and any data, as well as
- undetected manipulation of memory contents.

The TOE must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack.

- 97 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)” as specified below:

O.Leak-Forced                      Protection against Forced Information Leakage

The Security IC must be protected against disclosure of confidential data processed in the Security IC (using methods as described under O.Leak-Inherent) even if the information leakage is not inherent but caused by the attacker

- by forcing a malfunction (refer to “Protection against Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (O.Malfunction)” and/or
- by a physical manipulation (refer to “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)”).

If this is not the case, signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets could become an information channel for a leakage attack.

- 98 The TOE shall provide “Protection against Abuse of Functionality (O.Abuse-Func)” as specified below:

O.Abuse-Func                      Protection against Abuse of Functionality

The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can be abused in order to (i) disclose critical user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) manipulate critical user data of the Composite TOE, (iii) manipulate Security IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or security services of the TOE. Details depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.

- 99 The TOE shall provide “TOE Identification (O.Identification)” as specified below:

O.Identification                      TOE Identification

The TOE must provide means to store Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialization Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification.

### Security Objectives related to Specific Functionality (referring to SG4)

- 100 The TOE shall provide “Random Numbers (O.RND)” as specified below:

O.RND Random Numbers

The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and shall have sufficient entropy.

The TOE will ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker since they might be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.

## Security Objectives for Cryptographic Services

101 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service Triple-DES (O.TDES)” as specified below.

O.TDES Cryptographic service Triple-DES

The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services implementing the Triple-DES for encryption and decryption.

102 The security objective “Cryptographic service Triple-DES (O.TDES)” enforces the organizational security policy P.Crypto-Service.

103 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)” as specified below.

O.AES Cryptographic service AES

The TOE provides secure hardware based cryptographic services for the AES for encryption and decryption.

104 The security objective “Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)” enforces the organizational security policy P.Crypto-Service.

105 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)” as specified below.

O.PKA Cryptographic service PKA

The TOE shall provide the following specific security functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:

Public Key Accelerator (PKA) supporting Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in GF(p).

**Note:** The TOE can be delivered without the RSA/ECC cryptographic library. In this case the TOE does not provide the Additional Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Cryptography and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).

- 106 The security objective “Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)” enforces the organizational security policy P.Crypto-Service.

### Security Objectives for Added Function

- 107 The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified below.

O.Mem-Access      Area based Memory Access Control

The TOE must provide the smartcard Embedded Software with the capability to define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the partitioning of such memory areas so that access of software to memory areas is controlled as required, for example in a multi-application environment.

- 108 The TOE shall provide “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap-Avail-Loader)” as specified below.

O.Cap-Avail-Loader      Capability and availability of the Loader

The TSF provides limited capability of the Loader functionality and irreversible termination of the Loader in order to protect stored user data from disclosure and manipulation.

- 109 The TOE shall provide “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)” as specified below:

O.Authentication      Authentication to external entities

The TOE shall be able to authenticate itself to external entities. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE authentication verification data.

- 110 The TOE shall provide “Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl\_Auth\_Loader/Package1+)” as specified below:

O.Ctrl\_Auth\_Loader/Package1+      Access control and authenticity for the Loader

The TSF provides communication channel with authorized user, supports authentication of the user data to be loaded and access control for usage of the Loader functionality.

- 111 The TOE shall provide “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot\_TSF\_Confidentiality)” as specified below.

O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality	Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF  The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential operations of the Security IC (loader, memory management unit...) through the use of a dedicated code loaded on open samples.
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## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment

- 112 The development of the Security IC Embedded Software is outside the development and manufacturing of the TOE (cf. 1.2.6). The Security IC Embedded Software development defines the operational use of the TOE. This section describes the security objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development.
- 113 Note, in order to ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the Security IC Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) hardware data sheet for the TOE, (ii) data sheet of the IC Dedicated Software of the TOE, (iii) TOE application notes, other guidance documents, and (iv) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC Embedded Software as referenced in the certification report.

### Phase 1



Figure 4-3: Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded Software development environment

- 114 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-AppI)” as specified below.

OE.Resp-AppI	Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE  Security relevant user data of the Composite TOE (especially cryptographic keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as required by the security needs of the specific application context.
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For example the Security IC Embedded Software will not disclose security relevant user data of the Composite TOE to unauthorized users or processes when communicating with a terminal.

#### 4.2.1 Clarification of “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-App)”

- 115 User Data are defined but not limited to cipher or plain text data and cryptographic keys. These data shall be manipulated appropriately by the Smartcard Embedded Software. Secret keys used as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE shall be chosen carefully in order to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
- 116 Keys are defined and must be treated as confidential data which must be unique with high entropy. The environment shall integrate appropriate key management for manipulating keys (for example the importation of keys into TOE and/or the derivation from other keys).
- 117 If the Embedded Software of the TOE integrates multi-application operating systems, user data shall be treated carefully. The Multi-application operating system should not disclose security relevant user data of one application to another application.

### 4.3 Security Objectives for the operational Environment

#### TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6



Figure 4-4: Security Objectives for the operational Environment

#### 4.3.1 “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”

- 118 Appropriate “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” must be ensured after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phases 6, as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 as specified below.

OE.Process-Sec-IC      Protection during composite product manufacturing

Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).

This means that Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 (refer to Section 1.2.6) must be protected appropriately. For a preliminary list of assets to be protected refer to Section 3.4.

#### 4.3.2 Clarification of “Protection during Composite Product Manufacturing (OE.Process-Sec-IC)”

- 119 The personalization process and the personalization of data happening during phase 4, 5 and 6 of life cycle, shall be protected as the packaging, finishing and personalization phases are protected.
- 120 Measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC should be implemented by the Composite Product Manufacturer according to requirement of OE.Process-Sec-IC. This objective covers this assumption.

#### 4.3.3 “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim-Block-Loader)”

- 121 The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim-Block-Loader)” as specified below.

OE.Lim-Block-Loader      Limitation of capability and blocking the loader

The Composite Product Manufacturer will protect the Loader functionality against misuse, limit the capability of the Loader and terminate irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.

- 122 Note: The Loader is intended to be used from phase 3 to 6 of the life cycle.

#### 4.3.4 Clarification of “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim-Block-Loader)”

- 123 The Loader functionality during phases 3 to 6 shall be protected against misuse. Measures assumed in P.Lim-Block-Loader should be implemented by the

Composite Product Manufacturer according to requirement of OE.Lim-Block-Loader and O.Cap-Avail-Loader.

- 124 Note: To maintain the confidentiality of the data of the Composite TOE, the intended usage of the Loader is limited to the phases 3 to 6 of the life cycle.

#### 4.3.5 “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE\_Auth)”

- 125 The operational environment shall provide “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE\_Auth)”.

OE.TOE\_Auth                      External entities authenticating of the TOE

The operational environment shall support the authentication verification mechanism and know authentication reference data of the TOE.

- 126 The threat “Masquerade the TOE (T.Masquerade\_TOE)” is directly covered by the TOE security objective “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)” describing the proving part of the authentication and the security objective for the operational environment of the TOE “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE\_Auth)” the verifying part of the authentication.

- 127 The justification of the additional policy and the additional assumption show that they do not contradict to the rationale already given in the Protection Profile for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.

#### 4.3.6 “Secure usage of the Loader (OE.Loader\_Usage/Package1+)”

- 128 The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Secure usage of the Loader (OE.Loader\_Usage/Package1+)” as specified below.

OE.Loader\_Usage/Package1+      Secure usage of the Loader

The authorized user must fulfil the access conditions required by the Loader.

### 4.4 Security Objectives Rationale

- 129 Table 4-1 below gives an overview, how the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policies are addressed by the objectives. The text following after the table justifies this in details.

Assumption, Threat or Organizational Security Policy	Security Objective	Notes
A.Resp-AppI	OE.Resp-AppI	Phase 1
P.Process-TOE	O.Identification	Phase 2 - 3 optional phase 4
A.Process-Sec-IC	OE.Process-Sec-IC	Phase 5 – 6 optional Phase 4
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent	
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing	
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	
T.Abuse-Func	O.Leak-Forced	
T.RND	O.RND	
T.Mem-Access	O.Mem-Access	
P.Crypto-Service	O.TDES O.AES O.PKA	
A.Key-Function	OE.Resp-AppI	
P.Lim-Block-Loader	O.Cap-Avail-Loader OE.Lim-Block-Loader	Phase 3 to phase 6
T.Masquerade_TOE	O.Authentication OE.TOE_Auth	
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion	O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality O.Leak-Inherent O.Leak-Forced	
P.Ctrl_Loader	O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader/Package1+ OE.Loader_Usage/Package1+	Phase 3 to phase 6

*Table 4-1: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies*

130 The justification related to the assumption “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-AppI)” is as follows:

131 Since OE.Resp-AppI requires the Security IC Embedded Software to implement measures as assumed in A.Resp-AppI, the assumption is covered by the objective.

- 132 The justification related to the organizational security policy “Protection during TOE Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” is as follows:
- 133 O.Identification requires that the TOE has to support the possibility of a unique identification. The unique identification can be stored on the TOE. Since the unique identification is generated by the production environment the production environment must support the integrity of the generated unique identification. The technical and organizational security measures that ensure the security of the development environment and production environment are evaluated based on the assurance measures that are part of the evaluation. For a list of material produced and processed by the TOE Manufacturer refer to Section 3.1. All listed items and the associated development and production environments are subject of the evaluation. Therefore, the organizational security policy P.Process-TOE is covered by this objective, as far as organizational measures are concerned.
- 134 The justification related to the assumption “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (A.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
- 135 Since OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the Composite Product Manufacturer to implement those measures assumed in A.Process-Sec-IC, the assumption is covered by this objective.
- 136 The justification related to the threats “Inherent Information Leakage (T.Leak-Inherent)”, “Physical Probing (T.Phys-Probing)”, “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress (T.Malfunction)”, “Physical Manipulation (T.Phys-Manipulation)”, “Forced Information Leakage (T.Leak-Forced)”, “Abuse of Functionality (T.Abuse-Func)” and “Deficiency of Random Numbers (T.RND)” is as follows:
- 137 For all threats the corresponding objectives (refer to Table 4-1) are stated in a way, which directly corresponds to the description of the threat (refer to Section 3.2). It is clear from the description of each objective (refer to Section 4.1), that the corresponding threat is removed if the objective is valid. More specifically, in every case the ability to use the attack method successfully is countered, if the objective holds.
- 138 The threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” is justified as follows: the TOE must enforce the partitioning of the memory areas and must control its accesses. The Smartcard Embedded Software must define restrictions so that accidental or deliberate security violation access to restricted memory area shall be prevented (T.Mem-Access). Therefore, the threat T.Mem-Access is eliminated when the objective O.Mem-Access is achieved.

- 139 The Smartcard Embedded Software should implement the memory management mechanism exploiting appropriately TSF. This assertion is clarified in T.Mem-Access and O.Mem-Access. The TOE makes available to Smartcard Embedded Software access control functions. Clarification "Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)" emphasizes this point by reminding that the Smartcard Embedded Software must not bypass access memory restrictions. This clarification allows covering the threat T.Mem-Access.
- 140 The justification related to the security objectives "Cryptographic service TDES (O.TDES)", "Cryptographic service AES (O.AES)" and "Cryptographic service PKA (O.PKA)" is as follows:
- 141 Since the objectives O.TDES, O.AES and O.PKA require the TOE to implement exactly the same specific security functionality as required by P.Crypto-Service, the organizational security policy is covered by these objectives.
- 142 The implementation of the specific security functionality required by P.Crypto-Service is defined by the following security objectives: O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced. As expected from P.Crypto-Service and described in these objectives, the specific security functionality is provided in a secure way. In general, the protection of confidential data (User data or TSF data) is referred in O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced. P.Crypto-Service require specific security functions which enable to process User data.
- 143 The clarification has been made for the security objective "Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-Appl)". The Smartcard Embedded Software will protect User data such as cipher, plain text and cryptographic keys if required by using secured functions for ensuring the security of cryptographic operations. Secure mechanism in the environment must be used for the management of keys or derived keys. This is supported by the assumption A.Key-Function covered by OE.Resp-Appl. Therefore, the assumption A.Key-Function is covered by the objective OE.Resp-Appl.
- 144 The organizational security policy "Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (P.Lim-Block-Loader)" is directly implemented by the security objective for the TOE "Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap-Avail-Loader)" and the security objective for the TOE environment "Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim-Block-Loader)". The TOE security objective "Capability and availability of the Loader" (O.Cap-Avail-Loader)" mitigates also the threat "Abuse of Functionality "(T.Abuse-Func) if attacker tries to misuse the Loader functionality in order to manipulate security services of the TOE provided or depending on IC Dedicated Support Software or user data of the TOE as IC Embedded Software, TSF data or user data of the smartcard product.

- 145 The threat “Masquerade the TOE (T.Masquerade\_TOE)” is directly covered by the TOE security objective “Authentication to external entities (O.Authentication)” describing the proving part of the authentication and the security objective for the operational environment of the TOE “External entities authenticating of the TOE (OE.TOE\_Auth)” the verifying part of the authentication.
- 146 The justification related to the threat “Diffusion of Open Samples (T.Open\_Samples\_Diffusion)” is as follows:
- 147 The authentication required before having access to the Loader ensures the TOE is self-protected at delivery point. The threat “Diffusion of Open Samples is then removed if the following objectives are valid: “Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot\_TSF\_Confidentiality)”, “Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)” and “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)”.
- 148 The organisational security policy “Controlled usage to Loader Functionality (P.Ctrl\_Loader) is directly implemented by the security objective for the TOE “Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl\_Auth\_Loader/Package1+)” and the security objective for the TOE environment “Secure usage of the Loader (OE.Loader\_Usage/Package1+)”.

## 5 Extended Components Definition

149 This chapter presents the extended component definition. The extended components are listed as follows:

- FCS\_RNG.1
- FMT\_LIM.1
- FMT\_LIM.2
- FAU\_SAS.1
- FDP\_SDC.1
- FIA\_API.1

### 5.1 Definition of the Family FCS\_RNG

150 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS\_RNG) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes.

#### **FCS\_RNG Generation of random numbers**

Family behavior

This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.

Component levelling:

FCS\_RNG Generation of random numbers

1

FCS\_RNG.1      Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.

Management:      FCS\_RNG.1  
There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit:      FCS\_RNG.1  
There are no actions defined to be auditable.

**FCS\_RNG.1      Random number generation**

Hierarchical to:      No other components.



Dependencies:	No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1	The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic] random number generator that implements: [assignment: list of security capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2	The TSF shall provide [selection: bits, octets of bits, numbers] [assignment: format of the numbers]] that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].

## 5.2 Definition of the Family FMT\_LIM


- 151 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FMT\_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements are defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE (refer to Section 6.1) appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
- 152 The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT\_LIM)” is specified as follows.

### FMT\_LIM Limited capabilities and availability

#### Family behavior

This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP\_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the component Limited Capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.

#### Component levelling:



FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability requires that the TSF restricts the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be

achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE's life-cycle.

Management:	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:	FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2 There are no actions defined to be auditable.

153 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.

<b>FMT_LIM.1</b>	<b>Limited capabilities</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1	The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability policy].

154 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.

<b>FMT_LIM.2</b>	<b>Limited capabilities</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
Dependencies:	FMT_LIM.1 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.2.1	The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited availability policy].

### 5.3 Definition of the Family FAU\_SAS

155 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FAU\_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU\_GEN, because it does not

necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.

156 The family “Audit data storage (FAU\_SAS)” is specified as follows.

### FAU\_SAS Audit data storage

Family behavior

This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.

Component levelling:

FAU\_SAS Audit data storage

1

FAU\_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.

Management: FAU\_SAS.1  
There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FAU\_SAS.1  
There are no actions defined to be auditable.

#### FAU\_SAS.1 Audit storage

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FAU\_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the [assignment: type of persistent memory].

## 5.4 Definition of the Family FDP\_SDC

157 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FDP\_SDC.1) of the Class FDP (User data protection) is defined here.

158 The family “Stored data confidentiality (FDP\_SDC)” is specified as follows.

### FDP\_SDC Stored data confidentiality

Family behavior

This family provides requirements that address protection of user data confidentiality while these data are stored within memory areas protected by the TSF. The TSF provides access to the data in the memory through the

specified interfaces only and prevents compromising of this information by bypassing these interfaces. It complements the family Stored data integrity (FDP\_SDI) which protects the user data from integrity errors while being stored in the memory.

Component levelling:



FDP\_SDC.1 Requires the TOE to protect the confidentiality of information of the user data in specified memory areas.

Management: FDP\_SDC.1  
There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FDP\_SDC.1  
There are no actions defined to be auditable.

**FDP\_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FDP\_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in the [assignment: memory area].

## 5.5 Definition of the Family FIA\_API

159 To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a functional family FIA\_API (Authentication Proof of Identity) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity by the TOE and enables the authentication verification by an external entity. The other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity by the TOE.

160 To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a functional family FIA\_API (Authentication Proof of Identity) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity by the TOE and enables the authentication verification by an external entity. The other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity by the TOE.


161 The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of users' identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA\_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter "Extended components definition (APE\_ECD)") from a TOE point of view.

### **FIA\_API Authentication Proof of Identity**

Family behavior

This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its identity and to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment

Component levelling:



FIA\_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity, provides proof of the identity of the TOE, an object or an authorized user or role to an external entity.

Management: FIA\_API.1  
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.

Audit: FIA\_API.1  
There are no actions defined to be auditable.

**FIA\_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

FIA\_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: *authentication mechanism*] to prove the identity of the [selection: *TOE*, [assignment: *object, authorized user or role*]] to an external entity.

## 6 IT Security Requirements

162 The chapter IT Security Requirements describes the security functional requirements for the TOE (6.1), the TOE assurance requirements (6.2) and the security requirement rationale (6.3) as required in [1].

### 6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

163 A summary of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE is given in Table 6-1.

#	Security Functional Requirements	Origin of the SFR	Threats or policies
1	FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Malfunction T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND
2	FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Malfunction T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND
3	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (extended component)	T.Abuse-Func
4	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (extended component)	T.Abuse-Func
5	FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (extended component)	P.Process-TOE
6	FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (extended component)	T.Phys-Probing T.Phys-Manipulation
7	FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Phys-Probing T.Phys-Manipulation
8	FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Phys-Probing T.Phys-Manipulation T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND
9	FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Leak-Inherent T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND
10	FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Leak-Inherent T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND
11	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	BSI-CC-PP-0084	T.Leak-Inherent T.Leak-Forced T.Abuse-Func T.RND

12	FCS_RNG.1/ RGS-IC	Random number generation – RGS-IC	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (extended component)	T.RND
13	FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control	CC 3.1 - Part 2	T.Mem-Access
14	FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control	CC 3.1 - Part 2	T.Mem-Access
15	FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialization	CC 3.1 - Part 2	T.Mem-Access
16	FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes	CC 3.1 - Part 2	T.Mem-Access
17	FMT_SMF.1	Specification of management functions	CC 3.1 - Part 2	T.Mem-Access
18.1	FCS_COP.1/ TDES	Triple DES Operation	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (Packages for Cryptographic Services)	P.Crypto-Service
18.2	FCS_COP.1/ AES	AES Operation	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (Packages for Cryptographic Services)	P.Crypto-Service
18.3	FCS_COP.1/ RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Operation	CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived from the component FCS_COP.1)	P.Crypto-Service
18.4	FCS_COP.1/ SW-RSA	Sliding Windows RSA (SW-RSA) Operation	CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived from the component FCS_COP.1)	P.Crypto-Service
18.5	FCS_COP.1/ LA-RSA	Ladder RSA (LA-RSA) Operation	CC 3.1 - Part 2 (derived from the component FCS_COP.1)	P.Crypto-Service
19	FMT_LIM.1/L oader	Limited capabilities - Loader	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only)	P.Lim-Block-Loader
20	FMT_LIM.2/L oader	Limited availability - Loader	BSI-CC-PP-0084 (Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only)	P.Lim-Block-Loader
21	FIA_API.1	Authentication Proof of Identity	BSI-CC-PP0084 (Package “Authentication of the Security IC”)	T.Masquerade_TOE
22	FDP_ACC.1/ Loader	Subset access control – Loader	BSI-CC-PP0084 (Package 2 for Loader)	P.Ctrl_Loader

23	FDP_ACF.1/ Loader	Security attribute based access control – Loader	BSI-CC-PP0084 (Package 2 for Loader)	P.Ctrl_Loader
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Table 6-1: Summary of the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE

164 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements the Part 2 of the Common Criteria was used. However, some Security Functional Requirements have been refined. These refinements are described below along with the associated SFR. The refinements appear in bold font whereas the assignments and selections appear in italic bold font.

## Malfunctions

165 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)” as specified below.

<b>FRU_FLT.2</b>	<b>Limited fault tolerance</b>
Hierarchical to:	FRU_FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerance
FRU_FLT.2.1	The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE’s capabilities when the following failures occur: <b><i>exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1).</i></b>
Dependencies:	FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.
<b>Refinement:</b>	<b>The term “failure” above means “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.</b>

166 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)” as specified below.

<b>FPT_FLS.1</b>	<b>Failure with preservation of secure state</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1	The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: <b><i>exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.</i></b>
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
<b>Refinement:</b>	<b>The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances”. The TOE prevents failures for the “circumstances” defined above.</b>



Application note: Failures are due to abnormal working environment. These environment conditions include but are not limited to abnormal frequency, abnormal voltage, abnormal temperature, glitch on power and glitch on reset signal.

## Abuse of Functionality

167 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FMT\_LIM.1**                      **Limited capabilities**

Hierarchical to:                No other components.

FMT\_LIM.1.1                    The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: ***Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.***

Dependencies:                 FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability.

168 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities – Loader (FMT\_LIM.1/Loader)” as specified below.

**FMT\_LIM.1/Loader**            **Limited capabilities - Loader**

Hierarchical to:                No other components.

Dependencies:                 FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability.

FMT\_LIM.1.1/Loader         The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: ***Deploying Loader functionality after the locking of the Loader does not allow stored user data to be disclosed or manipulated by unauthorized user***

Application Note                FMT\_LIM.1 supplements FMT\_LIM.2 allowing for non-overlapping loading of user data and protecting the TSF against misuse of the Loader for attacks against the TSF. The TOE Loader may allow for correction of already loaded user data before the assigned action e.g. before blocking the TOE Loader for TOE Delivery to the end customer or any intermediate step in the life cycle of the Security IC or the smartcard.

169 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FMT\_LIM.2**                      **Limited availability**

Hierarchical to:                No other components.

FMT\_LIM.2.1                    The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: ***Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.***

Dependencies:                 FMT\_LIM.1 capabilities.

170 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FMT\_LIM.2/Loader)” as specified as follows.

**FMT\_LIM.2/Loader**            **Limited availability - Loader**

Hierarchical to:                No other components.

Dependencies:                 FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.

FMT\_LIM.2.1/Loader         The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced: ***The TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality after the locking of the Loader.***

171 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU\_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

**FAU\_SAS.1**                      **Audit storage**

Hierarchical to:                No other components.

FAU\_SAS.1.1                    The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store ***the initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software in the Non-volatile Memory.***

Application note:              The development, production and the testing phases require the TOE to support unique identification number.

## Physical Manipulation and Probing

172 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality (FDP\_SDC.1)” as specified below.

<b>FDP_SDC.1</b>	<b>Stored data confidentiality</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FDP_SDC.1.1	The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is stored in <b>the ROM, CRAM, RAM or FLASH memories</b> .
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

173 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP\_SDI.2)” as specified below.

<b>FDP_SDI.2</b>	<b>Stored data integrity monitoring and action</b>
Hierarchical to:	FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
FDP_SDI.2.1	The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for <b>integrity errors using the CRC coprocessor and the CRC modules integrated in both RAM and CRAM</b> on all objects, based on <b>the content of the Flash, RAM and CRAM memories</b> .
FDP_SDI.2.2	Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF <b>shall reset the TOE or generates a maskable interrupt signal</b> .
Dependencies:	No dependencies.
Refinement:	<b>The TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software to check data integrity on Flash memory with the help of CRC coprocessor.</b>

174 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT\_PHP.3)” as specified below.

<b>FPT_PHP.3</b>	<b>Resistance to physical attack</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1	The TSF shall resist <b>physical manipulation and physical probing</b> to the <b>TSF</b> by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Dependencies:	No dependencies.

**Refinement:** The TSF implements appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

Application note: Security features enable to meet the security functional requirement of FPT\_PHP.3.

## Leakage

175 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal transfer protection (FDP\_ITT.1)” as specified below.

**FDP\_ITT.1**                      **Basic internal transfer protection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FDP\_ITT.1.1                      The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** to prevent the **disclosure** of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

Dependencies: [FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control].

**Refinement:** The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.

176 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection (FPT\_ITT.1)” as specified below.

**FPT\_ITT.1**                      **Basic internal TSF data transfer protection**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FPT\_ITT.1.1                      The TSF shall protect TSF data from **disclosure** when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

**Refinement:** The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.

177 This requirement is equivalent to FDP\_ITT.1 above but refers to TSF data instead of user data. Therefore, it should be understood as to refer to the same Data Processing Policy defined under FDP\_IFC.1 below.

178 The TOE shall meet the requirement “ Subset information flow control (FDP\_IFC.1)” as specified below:

<b>FDP_IFC.1</b>	<b>Subset information flow control</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FDP_IFC.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <b>Data Processing Policy</b> on <b>all confidential data when they are processed or transferred by the TOE or by the Security IC Embedded Software.</b>
Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.

179 The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Data Processing Policy is defined for the requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP\_IFC.1)”:

User data of the Composite TOE and TSF data shall not be accessible from the TOE except when the Security IC Embedded Software decides to communicate the user data of the Composite TOE via an external interface. The protection shall be applied to confidential data only but without the distinction of attributes controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software.

## Random Numbers

180 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS\_RNG.1/RGS-IC)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).

<b>FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC</b>	<b>Random number generation – RGS-IC</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_RNG.1.1/RGS-IC	The TSF shall provide a <b>physical</b> random number generator that implements: <b>the rule RègleArchiGVA-1 of [16] and the recommendation RecomArchiGVA-1 of [16], total failure tests and online tests.</b>
FCS_RNG.1.2/RGS-IC	The TSF shall provide <b>random numbers</b> that meet <b>the rule RègleArchiGVA-2 of [16].</b>
Dependencies:	No dependencies.



**evaluate the permission access rights before granting access to controlled subjects and objects.**

FDP_ACF.1.3	The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>none</b> .
FDP_ACF.1.4	The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: <b>none</b> .
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization

184 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialization (FMT\_MSA.3)” as specified below.

<b>FMT_MSA.3</b>	<b>Static attribute initialization</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1	The TSF shall enforce the <b>Memory Access Control Policy</b> to provide <b>initialization</b> default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2	The TSF shall allow any <b>subjects</b> to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
Dependencies:	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

185 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT\_MSA.1)” as specified below:

<b>FMT_MSA.1</b>	<b>Management of security attributes</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1	The TSF shall enforce the <b>Memory Access Control Policy</b> to restrict the ability to <b>change initial values, modify or delete the security access rights of control information to running at privilege mode</b> .
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles

186 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT\_SMF.1)” as specified below:

<b>FMT_SMF.1</b>	<b>Specification of management functions</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1	The TSF shall make available the <b>access of control registers of the MPU</b> for allowing security management functions.
Dependencies:	No dependencies

### Cryptographic Support

187 The Cryptographic Operation component FCS\_COP.1 requires the cryptographic algorithm and key size used to perform specified cryptographic operations which can be based on assigned standard.

188 The TOE shall meet the Cryptographic Operation (FCS\_COP.1) requirements as specified below:

#### Triple DES operation

<b>FCS_COP.1/TDES</b>	<b>Cryptographic Operation</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES	The TSF shall perform <b>encryption and decryption</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: <b>TDES in ECB and CBC modes</b> and cryptographic key sizes: <b>112 bit, 168 bit</b> that meet the following: <b>NIST SP 800-67 [10], NIST SP 800-38A [11]</b> .
Dependencies:	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction



## AES Operation

<b>FCS_COP.1/AES</b>	<b>Cryptographic Operation</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/AES	The TSF shall perform <b>decryption and encryption</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: <b>AES in ECB mode</b> and cryptographic key sizes: <b>128 bit, 192 bit and 256 bit</b> that meet the following standard: <b>FIPS 197 [8], NIST SP 800-38A [11]</b> .
Dependencies:	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

## Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Operation

<b>FCS_COP.1/RSA</b>	<b>Cryptographic Operation</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/RSA	The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: <b>RSA Cryptography Standard with Montgomery</b> and cryptographic key sizes: <b>between 128-bit and 4096-bit</b> that meet the following: <b>PKCS#1 v2.1 June, 14, 2002</b> .
Dependencies:	FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

## Sliding Windows RSA (SW-RSA) Operation

<b>FCS_COP.1/SW-RSA</b>	<b>Cryptographic Operation</b>
Hierarchical to:	No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/SW-RSA	The TSF shall perform <b>encryption and decryption</b> in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: <b>RSA with Montgomery Sliding Windows</b> and cryptographic key sizes: <b>between 128-bit and 4096-bit</b> that meet the following: <b>PKCS#1 v2.1 June, 14, 2002</b> .

Dependencies: FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

## Ladder RSA (LA-RSA) Operation

### **FCS\_COP.1/LA-RSA Cryptographic Operation**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FCS\_COP.1.1/LA-RSA The TSF shall perform **encryption and decryption** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: **RSA with Montgomery Ladder** and cryptographic key sizes: **between 128-bit and 4096-bit** that meet the following: **PKCS#1 v2.1 June, 14, 2002**.

Dependencies: FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes or  
FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or  
FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation  
FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction

## Authentication of the TOE

189 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA\_API.1)” as specified below.

### **FIA\_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

FIA\_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide an **authentication mechanism** to prove the identity of the **TOE** to an external entity.

Dependencies: No dependencies

## Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only

190 The TOE Functional Requirement “Subset access control - Loader (FDP\_ACC.1/Loader)” is specified as follows.

### **FDP\_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control - Loader**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.

FDP\_ACC.1.1/  
Loader The TSF shall enforce the **Loader SFP** on  
(1) the subjects : **Loader role**,  
(2) the objects user data in **Flash**,  
(3) the operation deployment of Loader

191 The TOE Functional Requirement “Security attribute based access control - Loader (FDP\_ACF.1/Loader)” is specified as follows.

**FDP\_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader**

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies No dependencies

FDP\_ACF.1.1/  
Loader FDP\_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Loader SFP** to objects based on the following:

(1) the subjects : **Loader role** with security attributes : **writing access rights**.

(2) the objects user data in **Flash** with security attributes : **data are located in Flash main arrays**.

FDP\_ACF.1.2/  
Loader FDP\_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: **evaluate the writing access rights before granting access to the controlled subjects or objects**.

FDP\_ACF.1.3/  
Loader FDP\_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **the Loader role shall be authenticated before access is granted**.

FDP\_ACF.1.4/  
Loader The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **the TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality after the locking of the Loader, the TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality if the Loader role has not been authenticated**.

**Note** The SFR FMT\_MSA.3 as a dependency is not necessary as the security attributes used to enforce the Loader SFP are fixed by the IC manufacturer and no new objects under control of the Loader SFP are created.

## 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

192 The Security Target will be evaluated according to  
Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)

193 The Security Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken from the

Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5)

and augmented by taking the following components:

ALC\_DVS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5.

this corresponds to level “EAL5+”

Public Release

194 The assurance requirements are (augmented components are highlighted):

Title	Label	Origin
<b>Class ADV: Development</b>		
Architectural design	(ADV_ARC.1)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Functional specification	(ADV_FSP.5)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Implementation representation	(ADV_IMP.1)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Well-structured internals	(ADV_INT.2)	CC
TOE design	(ADV_TDS.4)	CC
<b>Class AGD: Guidance documents</b>		
Operational user guidance	(AGD_OPE.1)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Preparative user guidance	(AGD_PRE.1)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
<b>Class ALC: Life-cycle support</b>		
CM capabilities	(ALC_CMC.4)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
CM scope	(ALC_CMS.5)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Delivery	(ALC_DEL.1)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Development security	(ALC_DVS.2)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Life-cycle definition	(ALC_LCD.1)	CC
Tools and techniques	(ALC_TAT.2)	CC
<b>Class ASE: Security Target evaluation</b>		
Conformance claims	(ASE_CCL.1)	CC
Extended components definition	(ASE_ECD.1)	CC
ST introduction	(ASE_INT.1)	CC
Security objectives	(ASE_OBJ.2)	CC
Derived security requirements	(ASE_REQ.2)	CC
Security problem definition	(ASE_SPD.1)	CC
TOE summary specification	(ASE_TSS.1)	CC
<b>Class ATE: Tests</b>		
Coverage	(ATE_COV.2)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084
Depth	(ATE_DPT.3)	CC
Functional tests	(ATE_FUN.1)	CC
Independent	(ATE_IND.2)	CC
<b>Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment</b>		
Vulnerability analysis	(AVA_VAN.5)	CC & BSI-CC-PP-0084

195 All refinements of Security Assurances requirements (CC V3.1 Part 3) defined in the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0084 are considered (claimed) in this Security Target. They also include refinement for the augmented components ALC\_DVS.2 and AVA\_VAN.5.

## 6.3 Security Requirements Rationale

### 6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements

196 Table 6-2 below gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the security objectives. The detailed justification follows after the table.

Objective	TOE Security Functional and Assurance Requirements
O.Leak-Inherent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”</li> <li>- FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection”</li> <li>- FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”</li> </ul>
O.Phys-Probing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality”</li> <li>- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”</li> </ul>
O.Malfunction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance”</li> <li>- FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”</li> </ul>
O.Phys-Manipulation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action”</li> <li>- FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”</li> </ul>
O.Leak-Forced	<p>All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1</li> </ul> <p>plus those listed for O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3</li> </ul>
O.Abuse-Func	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”</li> <li>- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”</li> </ul> <p>plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1</li> </ul>
O.Identification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”</li> </ul>
O.RND	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC “Quality metric for random numbers”</li> </ul> <p>plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1</li> </ul>
O.TDES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FCS_COP.1/TDES “Triple DES Operation”</li> </ul>
O.AES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FCS_COP.1/AES “AES Operation”</li> </ul>
O.PKA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FCS_COP.1/RSA “Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Operation”</li> <li>- FCS_COP.1/SW-RSA “Sliding Windows RSA (SW-RSA)”</li> </ul>

	Operation" - FCS_COP.1/LA-RSA "Ladder RSA (LA-RSA) Operation"
OE.Resp-Appl	not applicable
OE.Process-Sec-IC	not applicable
O.Mem-Access	- FDP_ACC.1 "Subset access control" - FDP_ACF.1 "Security attribute based access control" - FMT_MSA.3 "Static attribute initialisation" - FMT_MSA.1 "Management of security attributes" - FMT_SMF.1 "Specification of Management Functions"
O. Cap-Avail-Loader	- FMT_LIM.1/Loader "Limited capabilities - loader" - FMT_LIM.2/Loader "Limited availability - loader"
OE.Lim-Block-Loader	not applicable
O.Authentication	- FIA_API.1 "Authentication Proof of Identity"
OE.TOE_Auth	- FIA_API.1 "Authentication Proof of Identity"
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality	- FDP_ACC.1/Loader "Subset access control - Loader" - FDP_ACF.1/Loader "Security attribute based access control - Loader"
O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader/ Package1+	- FDP_ACC.1/Loader "Subset access control - Loader" - FDP_ACF.1/Loader "Security attribute based access control - Loader"
OE.Loader_Usage/ Package1+	not applicable

*Table 6-2: Security Requirements versus Security Objectives*

- 197 The justification related to the security objective "Protection against Inherent Information Leakage (O.Leak-Inherent)" is as follows:
- 198 The refinements of the security functional requirements FPT\_ITT.1 and FDP\_ITT.1 together with the policy statement in FDP\_IFC.1 explicitly require the prevention of disclosure of secret data (TSF data as well as user data) when transmitted between separate parts of the TOE or while being processed. This includes that attackers cannot reveal such data by measurements of emanations, power consumption or other behaviour of the TOE while data are transmitted between or processed by TOE parts.
- 199 The Security IC Embedded Software has to support this objective. For example timing attacks were possible if the processing time of algorithms implemented in the software would depend on the content of secret data.
- 200 The justification related to the security objective "Protection against Physical Probing (O.Phys-Probing)" is as follows:

- 201 The SFR FDP\_SDC.1 requires the TSF to protect the confidentiality of the information of the user data stored in specified memory areas and prevent its compromise by physical attacks bypassing the specified interfaces for memory access. The scenario of physical probing as described for this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT\_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.
- 202 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Security IC Embedded Software (e. g. to send data over certain buses only with appropriate precautions). This support must be addressed in the Guidance Documentation. In this case the combination of the Security IC Embedded Software together with this FPT\_PHP.3 is suitable to meet the objective.
- 203 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Malfunctions (O.Malfunction)” is as follows:
- 204 The definition of this objective shows that it covers a situation, where malfunction of the TOE might be caused by the operating conditions of the TOE (while direct manipulation of the TOE is covered O.Phys-Manipulation). There are two possibilities in this situation: Either the operating conditions are inside the tolerated range or at least one of them is outside of this range. The second case is covered by FPT\_FLS.1, because it states that a secure state is preserved in this case. The first case is covered by FRU\_FLT.2 because it states that the TOE operates correctly under normal (tolerated) conditions. The functions implementing FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1 must work independently so that their operation cannot be affected by the Security IC Embedded Software (refer to the refinement). Therefore, there is no possible instance of conditions under O.Malfunction, which is not covered.
- 205 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Physical Manipulation (O.Phys-Manipulation)” is as follows:
- 206 The SFR FDP\_SDI.2 requires the TSF to detect the integrity errors of the stored user data and react in case of detected errors. The scenario of physical manipulation as described for this objective is explicitly included in the assignment chosen for the physical tampering scenarios in FPT\_PHP.3. Therefore, it is clear that this security functional requirement supports the objective.
- 207 It is possible that the TOE needs additional support by the Embedded Software (for instance by implementing FDP\_SDI.1 to check data integrity with the help of appropriate checksums, refer to section 6.1). This support must be



addressed in the Guidance Documentation. The combination of the Embedded Software together with this FPT\_PHP.3 is suitable to meet the objective.

- 208 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Forced Information Leakage (O.Leak-Forced)” is as follows:
- 209 This objective is directed against attacks, where an attacker wants to force an information leakage, which would not occur under normal conditions. In order to achieve this the attacker has to combine a first attack step, which modifies the behaviour of the TOE (either by exposing it to extreme operating conditions or by directly manipulating it) with a second attack step measuring and analysing some output produced by the TOE. The first step is prevented by the same mechanisms which support O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation, respectively. The requirements covering O.Leak-Inherent also support O.Leak-Forced because they prevent the attacker from being successful if he tries the second step directly.
- 210 The justification related to the security objective “Protection against Abuse of Functionality (O.Abuse-Func)” is as follows:
- 211 This objective states that abuse of functions (especially provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software, for instance in order to read secret data) must not be possible in Phase 7 of the life-cycle. There are two possibilities to achieve this: (i) They cannot be used by an attacker (i. e. its availability is limited) or (ii) using them would not be of relevant use for an attacker (i. e. its capabilities are limited) since the functions are designed in a specific way. The first possibility is specified by FMT\_LIM.2 and the second one by FMT\_LIM.1. Since these requirements are combined to support the policy, which is suitable to fulfil O.Abuse-Func, both security functional requirements together are suitable to meet the objective.
- 212 Other security functional requirements which prevent attackers from circumventing the functions implementing these two security functional requirements (for instance by manipulating the hardware) also support the objective. The relevant objectives are also listed in Table 6-1.
- 213 It was chosen to define FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 explicitly (not using Part 2 of the Common Criteria) for the following reason: Though taking components from the Common Criteria catalogue makes it easier to recognise functions, any selection from Part 2 of the Common Criteria would have made it harder for the reader to understand the special situation meant here. As a consequence, the statement of explicit security functional requirements was chosen to provide more clarity.

- 214 The justification related to the security objective “TOE Identification (O.Identification)” is as follows:
- 215 Obviously the operations for FAU\_SAS.1 are chosen in a way that they require the TOE to provide the functionality needed for O.Identification. The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used for TOE identification. The technical capability of the TOE to store Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data is provided according to FAU\_SAS.1.
- 216 It was chosen to define FAU\_SAS.1 explicitly (not using a given security functional requirement from Part 2 of the Common Criteria) for the following reason: the security functional requirement FAU\_GEN.1 in Part 2 of the CC requires the TOE to generate the audit data and gives details on the content of the audit records (for instance date and time). The possibility to use the functions in order to store security relevant data which are generated outside of the TOE, is not covered by the family FAU\_GEN or by other families in Part 2. Moreover, the TOE cannot add time information to the records, because it has no real time clock. Therefore, the new family FAU\_SAS was defined for this situation.
- 217 The Manufacturer has to support this objective which is examined during the evaluation of the assurance requirements of the classes AGD and ALC.
- 218 The justification related to the security objective “Random Numbers (O.RND)” is as follows:
- 219 FCS\_RNG.1/RGS-IC requires the TOE to provide random numbers of good quality. To specify the exact metric is left to the individual Security Target for a specific TOE.
- 220 Other security functional requirements, which prevent physical manipulation and malfunction of the TOE (see the corresponding objectives listed in the Table 6-2) support this objective because they prevent attackers from manipulating or otherwise affecting the random number generator.
- 221 Random numbers are often used by the Security IC Embedded Software to generate cryptographic keys for internal use. Therefore, the TOE must prevent the unauthorized disclosure of random numbers. Other security functional requirements which prevent inherent leakage attacks, probing and forced leakage attacks ensure the confidentiality of the random numbers provided by the TOE.

- 222 Depending on the functionality of specific TOEs the Security IC Embedded Software will have to support the objective by providing runtime-tests of the random number generator. Together, these requirements allow the TOE to provide cryptographically good random numbers and to ensure that no information about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker.
- 223 It was chosen to define FCS\_RNG.1/RGS-IC explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not contain generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation. (Note, that there are security functional requirements in Part 2 of the Common Criteria, which refer to random numbers. However, they define requirements only for the authentication context, which is only one of the possible applications of random numbers.).
- 224 The justification related to the security objective “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” is as follows:
- 225 The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP\_ACC.1)” with the related Security Function Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require the implementation of an area based memory access control, which is a requirement from O.Mem-Access. Therefore, FDP\_ACC.1 with its SFP is suitable to meet the security objective.
- 226 The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialization (FMT\_MSA.3)” requires that the TOE provides default values for the security attributes. Since the TOE is a hardware platform these default values are generated by the reset procedure. Therefore FMT\_MSA.3 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Mem-Access.
- 227 The security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT\_MSA.1)” requires that the ability to change the security attributes is restricted to privileged subject(s). It ensures that the access control required by O.Mem-Access can be realized using the functions provided by the TOE. Therefore FMT\_MSA.1 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Mem-Access.
- 228 Finally, the security functional requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF.1)” is used for the specification of the management functions to be provided by the TOE as required by O.MEM\_ACCESS. Therefore, FMT\_SMF.1 is suitable to meet the security objective O.Mem-Access.
- 229 The justification related to the security objective “Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization (OE.Process-Sec-IC)” is as follows:
- 230 The Composite Product Manufacturer has to use adequate measures to fulfil OE.Process-Sec-IC. Depending on the security needs of the application, the

Security IC Embedded Software may have to support this for instance by using appropriate authentication mechanisms for personalization functions.

- 231 The justification related to the security objective “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap-Avail-Loader)” is as follows:
- 232 The security functional requirement “Limited capabilities – loader (FMT\_LIM.1/Loader)” with the security functional requirement “Limited availability - Loader (FMT\_LIM.2/Loader)” require the implementation that enable to limit the availability and capabilities of Loader. Therefore, the security objective “Capability and availability of the Loader (O.Cap\_Avail\_Loader) is directly covered by the SFR FMT\_LIM.1/Loader and FMT\_LIM.2/Loader.
- 233 The justification related to the security objective “Limitation of capability and blocking the Loader (OE.Lim-Block-Loader)” is as follows:
- 234 The Composite Product Manufacturer has to use adequate measures to protect the Loader functionality against misuse in order to fulfil (OE.Lim-Block-Loader). The Security IC Embedded Software may have to support this for instance by limiting the capability of the Loader and terminate irreversibly the Loader after intended usage of the Loader.
- 235 The security objective Protection of the confidentiality of the TSF (O.Prot\_TSF\_Confidentiality) is covered by the SFR as follows:
- The SFR FDP\_ACC.1/Loader defines the subjects, objects and operations of the Loader SFP enforced by the SFR FDP\_ACF.1/Loader.
  - The SFR FDP\_ACF.1/Loader requires the TSF to implement access control for the Loader functionality.
- 236 The security objective Access control and authenticity for the Loader (O.Ctrl\_Auth\_Loader/Package1+) is covered by the SFR as follows:
- The SFR FDP\_ACC.1/Loader defines the subjects, objects and operations of the Loader SFP enforced by the SFR FDP\_ACF.1/Loader.
  - The SFR FDP\_ACF.1/Loader requires the TSF to implement access control for the Loader functionality.

#### Dependencies of security functional requirements

- 237 Table 6-3 below lists the security functional requirements defined in this security target, their dependencies and whether they are satisfied by other security requirements defined in this security target.

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements
FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1	Yes
FPT_FLS.1	None	No dependency
FMT_LIM.1	FMT_LIM.2	Yes
FMT_LIM.2	FMT_LIM.1	Yes
FAU_SAS.1	None	No dependency
FPT_PHP.3	None	No dependency
FDP_ITT.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Yes
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	See discussion below
FPT_ITT.1	None	No dependency
FDP_SDC.1	None	No dependency
FDP_SDI.2	None	No dependency
FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC	None	No dependency
FCS_COP.1/TDES	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	Yes
FCS_COP.1/AES	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	Yes
FCS_COP.1/RSA	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	Yes
FCS_COP.1/SW-RSA	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	Yes
FCS_COP.1/LA-RSA	FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4	Yes
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3	Yes
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1	Yes See discussion below
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	Yes See discussion below Yes
FMT_SMF.1	None	No dependency
FMT_LIM.1/Loader	FMT_LIM.2/Loader	Yes
FMT_LIM.2/Loader	FMT_LIM.1/Loader	Yes
FIA_API.1	None	Yes

Security Functional Requirement	Dependencies	Fulfilled by security requirements
FDP_ACC.1/Loader	FDP_ACF.1	Yes
FDP_ACF.1/Loader	None	Yes

*Table 6-3 : Dependencies of the Security Functional Requirements*

- 238 Part 2 of the Common Criteria defines the dependency of FDP\_IFC.1 (information flow control policy statement) on FDP\_IFF.1 (Simple security attributes). The specification of FDP\_IFF.1 would not capture the nature of the security functional requirement nor add any detail. As stated in the Data Processing Policy referred to in FDP\_IFC.1 there are no attributes necessary. The security functional requirement for the TOE is sufficiently described using FDP\_ITT.1 and its Data Processing Policy (FDP\_IFC.1).
- 239 Section 6.3.1 has shown how the security functional requirements support each other in meeting the security objectives of this Security Target. In particular the security functional requirements providing resistance of the hardware against manipulations (e. g. FPT\_PHP.3) support all other more specific security functional requirements (e. g. FCS\_RNG.1/RGS-IC) because they prevent an attacker from disabling or circumventing the latter.
- 240 Components FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_MSA.3 introduce FMT\_SMR.1 requirement for security management roles. This requirement, defined on Part 2 of the Common Criteria, is considered to be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is not based on roles but enforced for each subject. Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security functional requirement FMT\_SMR.1.

### 6.3.2 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements

- 241 The assurance level EAL5 and the augmentation with the requirements ALC\_DVS.2, and AVA\_VAN.5 were chosen in order to meet assurance expectations explained in the following paragraphs.
- 242 An assurance level of EAL5 with the augmentations AVA\_VAN.5 and ALC\_DVS.2 are required for this type of TOE since it is intended to defend against sophisticated attacks. This evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a meaningful level of assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defence against such attacks, the evaluators should have access to the low level design and source code.

## **ALC\_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures**

- 243 Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE.
- 244 In the particular case of a Security IC the TOE is developed and produced within a complex and distributed industrial process which must especially be protected. Details about the implementation, (e.g. from design, test and development tools as well as Initialization Data) may make such attacks easier. Therefore, in the case of a Security IC, maintaining the confidentiality of the design is very important.
- 245 This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (which only requires ALC\_DVS.1). ALC\_DVS.2 has no dependencies.

## **AVA\_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis**

- 246 Due to the intended use of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA\_VAN.5 component.
- 247 Independent vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing high attack potential.
- 248 AVA\_VAN.5 has dependencies to ADV\_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”, ADV\_FSP.4 “Complete functional specification”, ADV\_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”, ADV\_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of the TSF”, AGD\_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”, and AGD\_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures” and ATE\_DPT.1 “Testing: basic design”.
- 249 All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
- 250 It has to be assumed that attackers with high attack potential try to attack Security ICs like smart cards used for digital signature applications or payment systems. Therefore, specifically AVA\_VAN.5 was chosen in order to assure that even these attackers cannot successfully attack the TOE.

### 6.3.3 Security Requirements are Internally Consistent

- 251 The discussion in the preceding sections on security functional requirements and assurance components has shown consistency for both groups of requirements. The arguments given for the fact that the assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE also shows that the security functional requirements and assurance requirements support each other and that there are no inconsistencies between these groups.
- 252 It is hard to manipulate data with the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3. It protects the primary assets and other security features or functionalities which use these data.
- 253 The security functional requirements FDP\_SDC.1 and FDP\_SDI.2 address the protection of user data in the specified memory areas against compromise and manipulation. The security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 makes it harder to manipulate data. This protects the primary assets identified in Section 3.1 and other security features or functionality which use these data.
- 254 Though a manipulation of the TOE (refer to FPT\_PHP.3) is not of great value for an attacker in itself, it can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets. Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 is not only required to meet the security objective O.Phys-Manipulation. Instead it protects other security features or functions of TOE from being bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this may pertain to the security features or functions being specified using FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FPT\_FLS.1, FMT\_LIM.2 and FCS\_RNG.1/RGS-IC.
- 255 A malfunction of TSF (refer to FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1) can be an important step in order to threaten the primary assets. Therefore, the security functional requirements FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1 are not only required to meet the security objective O.Malfunction. Instead they protect other security features or functions of TOE from being bypassed, deactivated or changed. In particular this pertains to the security features or functions being specified using FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1, FMT\_LIM.1, FMT\_LIM.2 and FCS\_RNG.1/RGS-IC.
- 256 In a forced leakage attack the methods described in “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” (refer to T.Malfunction) and/or “Physical Manipulation” (refer to T.Phys-Manipulation) are used to cause leakage from signals which normally do not contain significant information about secrets. Therefore, in order to avert the disclosure of primary assets; it is important that the security functional requirements averting leakage (FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1) and those against malfunction (FRU\_FLT.2 and FPT\_FLS.1) and physical manipulation (FPT\_PHP.3) are effective and bind well. The security features and functions against malfunction ensure correct operation of other security functions (refer



- to above) and help to avert forced leakage themselves in other attack scenarios. The security features and functions against physical manipulation make it harder to manipulate the other security functions (refer to above).
- 257 Physical probing (refer to FPT\_PHP.3) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets. In addition, physical probing can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT\_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirement FPT\_PHP.3 (against probing) helps to protect other security features or functions. Details depend on the implementation.
- 258 Leakage (refer to FDP\_ITT.1, FPT\_ITT.1) shall directly avert the disclosure of primary assets. In addition, inherent leakage and forced leakage (refer to above) can be an important step in other attack scenarios if the corresponding security features or functions use secret data. For instance the security functional requirement FMT\_LIM.2 may use passwords. Therefore, the security functional requirements FDP\_ITT.1 and FPT\_ITT.1 help to protect other security features or functions implemented or provided by the TOE (FPT\_ITT.1). Details depend on the implementation.
- 259 The user data of the Composite TOE are treated as required to meet the requirements defined for the specific application context (refer to Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE (A.Resp-App)). However, the TOE may implement additional functions. This can be a risk if their interface cannot completely be controlled by the Security IC Embedded Software. Therefore, the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 are very important. They ensure that appropriate control is applied to the interface of these functions (limited availability) and that these functions, if being usable, provide limited capabilities only.
- 260 The combination of the security functional requirements FMT\_LIM.1 and FMT\_LIM.2 ensures that (especially after TOE Delivery) these additional functions cannot be abused by an attacker (i) to disclose or manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded Software or (iii) to enable other attacks on the assets. Hereby the binding between these two security functional requirements is very important.
- 261 The security functional requirement Limited Capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) must close gaps which could be left by the control being applied to the function's interface (Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2)). Note that the security feature or services which limit the availability can be bypassed, deactivated or changed by physical manipulation or a malfunction caused by an attacker. Therefore, if Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2) is vulnerable, it is important to limit the capabilities of the functions in order to limit the possible benefit for an attacker.

- 262 The security functional requirement Limited Availability (FMT\_LIM.2) must close gaps which could result from the fact that the function's kernel in principle would allow to perform attacks. The TOE must limit the availability of functions which potentially provide the capability to disclose or manipulate user data of the Composite TOE, to manipulate security features or services of the TOE or of the Security IC Embedded Software or to enable other attacks on the assets. Therefore, if an attacker could benefit from using such functions, it is important to limit their availability so that an attacker is not able to use them.
- 263 No perfect solution to limit the capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) is required if the limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. No perfect solution to limit the availability (FMT\_LIM.2) is required if the limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1) alone can prevent the abuse of functions. Therefore, it is correct that both requirements are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security.
- 264 It is important to avert malfunctions of TSF and of security functions implemented in the Security IC Embedded Software (refer to above). There are two security functional requirements which ensure that malfunctions cannot be caused by exposing the TOE to environmental stress. First it must be ensured that the TOE operates correctly within some limits (Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2)). Second the TOE must prevent its operation outside these limits (Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1)). Both security functional requirements together prevent malfunctions. The two functional requirements must define the "limits". Otherwise there could be some range of operating conditions which is not covered so that malfunctions may occur. Consequently, the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1) are defined in a way that they together provide sufficient security

## 7 TOE Summary Specification

265 This chapter lists all the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) and all security features which meet Security Functional Requirements.

### 7.1 List of Security Functional Requirements

SFR	SFR description	TOE security features meeting SFR
1	FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance	This SFR is ensured by a TOE functional design stable within the limits of the operational conditions. The asynchronous logic contributes to fault tolerance therefore ensuring a correct behavior of the TOE.
2	FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.	The TOE integrates mechanisms that enable to detect abnormal/failure events before the secure state is compromised. Secure state is maintained by the TOE which monitors all abnormal and failure events. These events can be abnormal (out of the recommended functional range), voltage, temperature and power glitches
3	FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities	The limited capabilities are used to control the access in test mode.
4	FMT_LIM.2 Limited availabilities	Different modes of the TOE restricts the use of functions integrated in the TOE.
5	FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage	Audit Storage requirement is notably covered by identification/authentication values are written in order to ensure the traceability of the TOE.
6	FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality	This requirement is covered by the security features integrated in TOE
7	FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action	This requirement is covered by the checksum modules
8	FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attacks	The integration inside the TOE of the active shield module enables to meet this requirement. The physical manipulation or the physical probing is detected or made very difficult by using techniques that enhanced the security of the TOE by making the reverse-engineering unpredictable or very difficult to realize.
9	FDP_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection	The security features integrated in the TOE enable to achieve this requirement
10	FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection	This requirement is achieved by security features used for covering requirement FDP_ITT.1.
11	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	This requirement is covered by the memory encryption units for protecting all confidential data

			processing or transferring by the TOE or by the security IC embedded software.
12	FCS_RNG.1/RGS-IC number generation	Random	The PTRNG module integrated in the TOE covers this requirement. The PTRNG follows some of the ANSSI RGS_B1 requirements (French scheme).
13	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control		The Subset access control is met by secure features inside the TOE to control access to memories and to different modes.
14	FDP_ACF.1 Security attributes based access control		The Memory Access Control Policy is enforced by features which implement different access rights.
15	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization		When the TOE is reset, all sensitive register functions are initialized with default value.
16	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes		Management of security attributes is covered by the security features integrated in TOE's memory protection unit (MPU).
17	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions		This requirement is achieved by the possibilities offered by the TOE to access to control registers of TOE's MPU.
18	FCS_COP.1 Cryptography operation		<p>This requirement is fulfilled by the following cryptography operation functions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) with 112 bits or 168 bits of key.</li> <li>• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128, 192 and 256 bits of key.</li> <li>• Public Key Accelerator (PKA) to support RSA and ECC in GF(p) with key size from 128 up to 4092 bits.</li> </ul>
19	FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited capabilities		The limited capabilities of Loader are met by the secure authentication system.
20	FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availabilities		The limited availabilities of Loader are met by implementing a secure blocking system.
21	FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity		The authentication proof of identity is implemented by the IC Embedded Software
22	FDP_ACC.1/Loader		The subset access control is defined for the TOE.
23	FDP_ACF.1/Loader		Access control for the Loader functionality is implemented by the TOE.

## 8 ANNEX

### 8.1 Glossary

<b>Application Data</b>	All data managed by the Security IC Embedded Software in the application context. Application data comprise all data in the final Security IC.
<b>Composite Product Integrator</b>	<p>Role installing or finalizing the IC Embedded Software and the applications on platform transforming the TOE into the unpersonalized Composite Product after TOE delivery.</p> <p>The TOE Manufacturer may implement IC Embedded Software delivered by the Security IC Embedded Software Developer before TOE delivery (e.g. if the IC Embedded Software is implemented in ROM or is stored in the non-volatile memory as service provided by the IC Manufacturer or IC Packaging Manufacturer).</p>
<b>Composite Product Manufacturer</b>	<p>The Composite Product Manufacturer has the following roles (i) the Security IC Embedded Software Developer (Phase 1), (ii) the Composite Product Integrator (Phase 5) and (iii) the Personaliser (Phase 6). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 3 in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) he has the role of the IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.</p> <p>The customer of the TOE Manufacturer who receives the TOE during TOE Delivery. The Composite Product Manufacturer includes the Security IC Embedded Software developer and all roles after TOE Delivery up to Phase 6 (refer to Figure 2 on page 10 and Section 7.1.1).</p>
<b>End-consumer</b>	User of the Composite Product in Phase 7.
<b>IC Dedicated Software</b>	IC proprietary software embedded in a Security IC (also known as IC firmware) and developed by the IC Developer. Such software is required for testing purpose (IC Dedicated Test Software) but may provide additional services to facilitate usage of the hardware and/or to provide additional services (IC Dedicated Support Software).
<b>IC Dedicated Test Software</b>	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
<b>IC Dedicated Support Software</b>	That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
<b>Initialization Data</b>	Initialization Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the TOE and to keep track of the Security IC's production and further life-cycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data. These data are for instance used for traceability and for TOE identification (identification data).

<b>Integrated Circuit (IC)</b>	Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions.
<b>Pre-personalization Data</b>	Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 3). These data are for instance used for traceability and/or to secure shipment between phases.
<b>Security IC</b>	(as used in the Protection Profile) Composition of the TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software, User Data and the package (the Security IC carrier).
<b>Security IC Embedded Software</b>	<p>Software embedded in a Security IC and normally not being developed by the IC Designer. The Security IC Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the Security IC in Phase 3 or in later phases of the Security IC product life-cycle.</p> <p>Some part of that software may actually implement a Security IC application others may provide standard services. Nevertheless, this distinction doesn't matter here so that the Security IC Embedded Software can be considered as being application dependent whereas the IC Dedicated Software is definitely not.</p>
<b>Security IC Product</b>	Composite product which includes the Security Integrated Circuit (i.e. the TOE) and the Embedded Software and is evaluated as composite target of evaluation in the sense of the Supporting Document
<b>Test Features</b>	All features and functions (implemented by the IC Dedicated Test Software and/or hardware) which are designed to be used before TOE Delivery only and delivered as part of the TOE.
<b>TOE Delivery</b>	The period when the TOE is delivered which is (refer to Figure 2 on page 10) either (i) after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers (dice) or (ii) after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
<b>TOE Manufacturer</b>	<p>The TOE Manufacturer must ensure that all requirements for the TOE and its development and production environment are fulfilled.</p> <p>The TOE Manufacturer has the following roles: (i) IC Developer (Phase 2) and (ii) IC Manufacturer (Phase 3). If the TOE is delivered after Phase 4 in form of packaged products, he has the role of the (iii) IC Packaging Manufacturer (Phase 4) in addition.</p>
<b>TSF data</b>	Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE. This includes information about the TOE's configuration, if any is coded in non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM), in specific circuitry, in non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) or a combination thereof.

<b>User data of the Composite TOE</b>	All data managed by the Smartcard Embedded Software in the application context.
<b>User data of the TOE</b>	Data for the user of the TOE, that does not affect the operation of the TSF. From the point of view of TOE defined in this PP the user data comprises the Security IC Embedded Software and the user data of the Composite TOE.

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### 8.3 List of Abbreviations

CC	Common Criteria
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
IC	Integrated Circuit
IT	Information Technology
PP	Protection Profile
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope OF Control
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFR	Security Functional Requirements