Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 Date 2022-05-10 HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD. Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. i Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 2020. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Trademarks and Permissions and other Huawei trademarks are trademarks of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. All other trademarks and trade names mentioned in this document are the property of their respective holders. Notice The purchased products, services and features are stipulated by the contract made between Huawei and the customer. All or part of the products, services and features described in this document may not be within the purchase scope or the usage scope. 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Address: Huawei Industrial Base Bantian, Longgang Shenzhen 518129 People's Republic of China Website: http://www.huawei.com Email: support@huawei.com Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. ii Contents 1 Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 9 1.1 ST reference....................................................................................................................................................................9 1.2 TOE reference.................................................................................................................................................................9 1.3 TOE overview...............................................................................................................................................................10 1.3.1 TOE Usage.................................................................................................................................................................10 1.3.2 TOE type....................................................................................................................................................................10 1.3.3 Non TOE Hardware and Software.............................................................................................................................10 1.3.4 Major Security Features.............................................................................................................................................12 1.4 TOE Description...........................................................................................................................................................13 1.4.1 Physical scope............................................................................................................................................................13 1.4.1.1 Evaluated Configuration.........................................................................................................................................15 1.4.2 Logical scope.............................................................................................................................................................16 1.5 Standalone TOE............................................................................................................................................................17 2 CPP_ND Conformance Claims.................................................................................................... 18 2.1 CPP_ND Conformance Claim......................................................................................................................................18 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance................................................................................................................................... 18 2.3 Conformance Rationale................................................................................................................................................ 18 2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness.................................................................................................................................................18 2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency.........................................................................................................18 2.3.3 Statement of Security Objectives Consistency..........................................................................................................19 2.3.4 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency.....................................................................................................19 3 Security Problem Definition......................................................................................................... 20 3.1 ASSET..........................................................................................................................................................................20 3.2 Threats.......................................................................................................................................................................... 21 3.2.1 T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS.............................................................................................21 3.2.2 T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................................. 21 3.2.3 T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS.............................................................................................22 3.2.4 T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS.......................................................................................................22 3.2.5 T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE.................................................................................................................................... 22 3.2.6 T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY.................................................................................................................................23 3.2.7 T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE..............................................................................................23 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. iii 3.2.8 T.PASSWORD_CRACKING....................................................................................................................................23 3.2.9 T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE........................................................................................................23 3.3 Assumptions................................................................................................................................................................. 24 3.3.1 A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION.................................................................................................................................24 3.3.2 A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY.............................................................................................................................24 3.3.3 A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION............................................................................................................... 24 3.3.4 A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR...........................................................................................................................24 3.3.5 A.REGULAR_UPDATES.........................................................................................................................................25 3.3.6 A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE................................................................................................................... 25 3.3.7 A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION..............................................................................................................................25 3.4 Organizational Security Policies...................................................................................................................................25 3.4.1 P.ACCESS_BANNER...............................................................................................................................................25 4 Security Objectives........................................................................................................................26 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..................................................................................................26 4.1.1 OE. PHYSICAL........................................................................................................................................................ 26 4.1.2 OE. NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE..............................................................................................................................26 4.1.3 OE. NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION............................................................................................................26 4.1.4 OE. TRUSTED_ADMIN.......................................................................................................................................... 26 4.1.5 OE. UPDATES.......................................................................................................................................................... 27 4.1.6 OE. ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE................................................................................................................27 4.1.7 OE. RESIDUAL_INFORMATION...........................................................................................................................27 5 Extended Components Definition................................................................................................ 28 6 Security Functional Requirements...............................................................................................29 6.1 Conventions..................................................................................................................................................................29 6.2 SFR Architecture.......................................................................................................................................................... 30 6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU).................................................................................................................................................30 6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation................................................................................................................30 6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association...........................................................................................................33 6.2.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage.........................................................................................33 6.2.1.4 FAU_STG.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss < O >...............................................................33 6.2.1.5 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage .......................................................................................................33 6.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)....................................................................................................................................34 6.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement) ......................................................................... 34 6.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)..................................................................... 34 6.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction................................................................................................34 6.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption) ......................35 6.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) ............................. 35 6.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) ....................................................................35 6.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) .............................................. 35 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. iv 6.2.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation................................................................................................... 36 6.2.2.9 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol .......................................................................................................36 6.2.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol with Authentication ..................................................................... 37 6.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA).................................................................................................................... 37 6.2.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management (Refinement).................................................................... 37 6.2.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management.................................................................................................... 37 6.2.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication .............................................................................38 6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism ...................................................................38 6.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback .......................................................................................... 38 6.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation .....................................................................................38 6.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication ..................................................................................... 39 6.2.4 Security Management (FMT).................................................................................................................................... 39 6.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour ................................................39 6.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour ............................................................39 6.2.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data ......................................................................................40 6.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data .................................................................................... 40 6.2.4.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions ................................................................................. 40 6.2.4.6 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles ..................................................................................................40 6.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)...................................................................................................................................... 41 6.2.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys) ......41 6.2.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords...........................................................................41 6.2.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing (Extended) ....................................................................................................41 6.2.5.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update ................................................................................................................ 41 6.2.5.5 FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps ..................................................................................................... 42 6.2.6 TOE Access (FTA).....................................................................................................................................................42 6.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking .........................................................................................42 6.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination (Refinement) ...................................................................................42 6.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination (Refinement)................................................................................... 42 6.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners (Refinement) ............................................................................. 42 6.2.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)......................................................................................................................................43 6.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (Refinement)......................................................................................43 6.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement) .............................................................................................43 6.3 Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................................................................ 43 6.4 SFR Rationale...............................................................................................................................................................44 7 TOE Summary Specification........................................................................................................48 7.1 Security Audit (FAU)....................................................................................................................................................48 7.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation...........................................................................................................................48 7.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association......................................................................................................................48 7.1.3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage..................................................................................................................49 7.1.4 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected audit event storage...................................................................................................... 49 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. v 7.1.5 FAU_STG.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss............................................................................ 50 7.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS).......................................................................................................................................50 7.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation............................................................................................................50 7.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment.......................................................................................................51 7.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction...........................................................................................................51 7.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption)..................................52 7.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)......................................... 53 7.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)................................................................................53 7.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm).......................................................... 53 7.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)................................................. 54 7.2.9 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server................................................................................................................................ 54 7.2.9.1 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1.............................................................................................................................................. 54 7.2.9.2 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2.............................................................................................................................................. 54 7.2.9.3 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3.............................................................................................................................................. 55 7.2.9.4 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4.............................................................................................................................................. 55 7.2.9.5 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5.............................................................................................................................................. 55 7.2.9.6 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6.............................................................................................................................................. 55 7.2.9.7 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7.............................................................................................................................................. 56 7.2.9.8 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8.............................................................................................................................................. 56 7.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol with Authentication................................................................................56 7.2.10.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1............................................................................................................................................56 7.2.10.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.2............................................................................................................................................56 7.2.10.3 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3............................................................................................................................................56 7.2.10.4 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.4............................................................................................................................................56 7.2.10.5 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.5............................................................................................................................................57 7.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)....................................................................................................................... 57 7.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management......................................................................................................57 7.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management............................................................................................................... 57 7.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication.........................................................................................58 7.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism...............................................................................58 7.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback...................................................................................................... 58 7.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation................................................................................................59 7.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication................................................................................................ 59 7.4 Security management (FMT)........................................................................................................................................60 7.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour............................................................60 7.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour...................................................................... 60 7.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data.................................................................................................. 60 7.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data...............................................................................................61 7.4.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions............................................................................................. 61 7.4.6 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles..............................................................................................................61 7.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)......................................................................................................................................... 62 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. vi 7.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)........................................................62 7.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords...................................................................................... 62 7.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing................................................................................................................................... 62 7.5.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update............................................................................................................................ 62 7.5.5 FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps................................................................................................................. 63 7.6 TOE Access (FTA)........................................................................................................................................................63 7.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking.....................................................................................................63 7.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination..................................................................................................................... 64 7.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination.....................................................................................................................64 7.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners................................................................................................................64 7.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP).........................................................................................................................................64 7.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel.......................................................................................................................64 7.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path............................................................................................................................... 65 8 Crypto Disclaimer........................................................................................................................66 9 Abbreviations Terminology and References..........................................................................69 9.1 Abbreviations................................................................................................................................................................69 9.2 Terminology..................................................................................................................................................................70 9.3 References.....................................................................................................................................................................71 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. vii Tables Table 1 Environment Components required.......................................................................................................11 Table 2 Cryptography provided by TOE............................................................................................................ 16 Table 3 TOE Assets.............................................................................................................................................21 Table 4 Definition of Extended Components - references to [CPP_ND].......................................................... 28 Table 5 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events.....................................................................30 Table 6 Security Assurance Requirements......................................................................................................... 43 Table 7 Dependency rationale for SFRs.............................................................................................................44 Table 8 Key Destructions....................................................................................................................................51 Table 9 Usage of Hash Algorithm...................................................................................................................... 53 Table 10 Specification of Keyed Hash Algorithm..............................................................................................54 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. viii Figures Figure 1-1 IT Entities which connect with TOE.................................................................................................11 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 9 1 Introduction 1.1 ST reference ST Title Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target ST version 1.10 Date 2022-05-10 Vendor and ST author Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd 1.2 TOE reference TOE Name Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software TOE software version V200R019C10SPC800 Patch V200R019SPH008T TOE Hardware Models CE16804, CE16808, CE16816, CE12804, CE12808, CE12816, CE8861-4C-EI,CE8850-64CQ-EI ,CE6863-48S6CQ, CE6881-48S6CQ and CE6820-48S6CQ Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 10 1.3 TOE overview 1.3.1 TOE Usage Huawei CloudEngine 16800 (CE16800 for short) series switches deliver stable, reliable, and high-performance Layer 2 and Layer 3 switching services, and provide customers with an intelligent, simple, secure, and open data center cloud network platform. Huawei CloudEngine 12800 (CE12800 for short) series switches are next-generation, high-performance core switches designed for data center networks and high-end campus networks. Using Huawei's next-generation VRP8 operating system, CE12800 series switches provide stable, reliable, and secure high-performance Layer 2/Layer 3 switching capabilities to help build an elastic, virtualized, and high-quality network. Huawei CloudEngine 8800 (CE8800 for short) series switches are next-generation Ethernet switches designed for data centers and high-end campus networks, providing high-performance, high port density, and low latency. The CE8850EI/CE8861EI support flexible cards. CE8800 series switches have an advanced hardware architecture design and provide high-density ports. Using the Huawei VRP8 software platform, CE8800 switches provide extensive data center service features and high stacking capability. In addition, the airflow direction (front-to-back or back-to-front) can be changed. Huawei CloudEngine 6800 (CE6800 for short) series switches are next-generation 10G/25G Ethernet switches designed for data centers and high-end campus networks, providing high-performance, high port density, low latency, and large buffer. The CE6800 series switches are Top of Rack (TOR) and the types of boards on the CE16800 are Main Processing Units (MPU), Line Processing Units (LPU) and Switch Fabric Units (SFU). The MPU integrate the main control unit and the system maintenance unit. The MPU controls and manages the system in a centralized way and is responsible for data exchange. The LPU and SFU are the actual hardware providing network traffic processing capacity. Besides the MPUs, LPUs and SFUs, there are other type of boards on TOE, such as Power Boards and FAN Boards. Only MPU is security relevant. 1.3.2 TOE type The TOE type is a switches product series (network devices) that provide stable, reliable, and high-performance layer 2 and layer 3 switching services. 1.3.3 Non TOE Hardware and Software The TOE supports the following hardware, software, and firmware components in its operational environment. All of the following environment components are supported by all TOE evaluated configuration. Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance Network Management Server YES This includes any Management workstation with a SSH client installed that is used to establish a protected channel with the TOE. Local Console YES This includes any Console that is directly connected to the TOE via the Serial Console Port and is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 11 Component Required Usage/Purpose Description for TOE performance Syslog Server YES This includes any syslog server to which the TOE would transmit syslog messages. NTP server NO The TOE supports secure communications with an NTP server in order to synchronize the date and time on the TOE with the NTP server’s date and time. When the TOE acts as NTP server, it receives NTP request from client and send timestamps to the client. *Note: The TOE supports NTP server configuration, however, the evaluated configuration establishes that the Security Administrator is the one in charge of setting the reliable timestamps Table 1 Environment Components required Therefore, the following figure shows the IT entities which are connected to the TOE: Figure 1-1 IT Entities which connect with TOE The HARDWARE that is necessary for the TOE to work is the following: o There are three types of chassis of CE16800 (CE16804, CE16808 and CE16816) as shown in the following table: Model Description CE16804 CE16808 CE16816 CE-MPUD-HALF Main Processing Unit D (half-width) ● ● CE-MPUE-HALF Main Processing Unit E (half-width) ● ● CE-MPUD-FULL Main Processing Unit D (full-width) ● CE-MPUE-FULL Main Processing Unit E (full-width) ● Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 12 o There are three types of chassis of CE12800 (CE12804, CE12808 and CE12816) as shown in the following table: Model Description CE12804 CE12808 CE12816 CE-MPUA Main Processing Unit ● ● ● CE-MPUB Main Processing Unit ● ● ● o There are two types of CE8800 (CE8861-4C-EI and CE8850-64CQ-EI) as shown in the following table: Model Description CE8861-4C-EI With 4 Subcard Slots, Without FAN Box and Power Module CE8850-64CQ-EI 64-Port 10GE QSFP28, 2-Port 10GE QSFP+, Without Fan and Power Module o There are three types of CE6800 (CE6863-48S6CQ, CE6881-48S6CQ and CE6820-48S6CQ) as shown in the following table: Model Description CE6863-48S6CQ 48-port 25G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR CE6881-48S6CQ 48-port 10G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR CE6820-48S6CQ 48-port 10G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR Huawei relies on 3rd party shipping world class logistics service providers such as DHL, KN, Schenker, Panalpina and so on to ensure the security of product in international transportation and regional warehousing, so as to deliver products to customers efficiently and securely. Huawei has a contractual agreement on Logistics Security that they have signed with all of these companies. Staff of the production facility shall notify the user of the shipping company that will ship the TOE in advance. Additionally, Huawei will send an email with the delivery note in order to check the TOE hardware integrity 1.3.4 Major Security Features (1) Security Audit - The TOE generates audit records to provide basis for system diagnosis and maintenance. Audit records reflect the operating status of a device and are used to analyze the conditions of a network and to find out the causes of network failure or faults. Audit records are stored locally and may be backed up to a remote syslog server. (2) Cryptographic support - The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote administrative management. (3) Identification and authentication - The TOE ensures that all Authorized Administrator are successfully identified and authenticated prior to gaining access to the TOE. (4) Secure Management - The TOE restricts the ability to determine the behavior of and modify the behavior of the functions transmission of audit data to the security administrator. Only the security administrator can manage the cryptographic keys. Only the security administrator has the right of opening/closing the security services and creation/deletion/modification of the user accounts. (5) Protection of the TSF - The TOE protects the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from reading them by an unauthorized entity. The TOE stores the users or administrator passwords in non-plaintext form preventing them from reading. The TOE verifies the packet before their installation and uses the digital signature. (6) TOE access through user authentication - The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol. (7) Trusted path and channels for device authentication - The TOE supports the trusted connections using TLS for the communication with the audit server. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 13 1.4 TOE Description The TOE is HUAWEI CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches is comprised of software. The software is comprised of Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) software, VRP is a network OS incorporating Huawei's proprietary intellectual properties and capable of supporting various network systems of Huawei. The hardware is comprise of the following: CE16804, CE16808, CE16816, CE12804, CE12808, CE12816, CE8861-4C-EI, CE8850-64CQ-EI, CE6863-48S6CQ, CE6881-48S6CQ and CE6820-48S6CQ. The HUAWEI CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches use the same VRP version. TSF relevant functions depend on software implementation. Hardware Configuration Processor Interface CE16804 CE16804 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 9 slots for SFU,4 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE16808 CE16808 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 9 slots for SFU,8 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE16816 CE16816 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 9 slots for SFU,16 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE12804 CE12804 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 6 slots for SFU,4 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE12808 CE12808 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 6 slots for SFU,8 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE12816 CE12816 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 6 slots for SFU,16 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE8861-4C-EI With 4 Subcard Slots, Without FAN Box and Power Module ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE8850-64CQ- EI 64-Port 10GE QSFP28, 2-Port 10GE QSFP+, Without Fan and Power Module ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE6863-48S6C Q 48-port 25G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE6881-48S6C Q 48-port 10G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules CE6820-48S6C Q 48-port 10G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR ARM Based on TOE's I/O modules Table 2 The models that have been claimed within this evaluation. 1.4.1 Physical scope This section will define the physical scope of CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 series switch to be evaluated. The SOFTWARE part of the TOE is the following: Hardware Delivery Item Version Signature File Sha256sum hash CE16800 series CE16800-V200R V200R019C10SPC800 CE16800-V200R019C 4bea0f7cf2dc829bda656fbd2c7a3f17 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 14 019C10SPC800. cc 10SPC800.cc.asc 82fbf2fccc4a1e4c9366a3a8828357b 2 CE12800 series CE12800-V200R 019C10SPC800. cc V200R019C10SPC800 CE12800-V200R019C 10SPC800.cc.asc 4cd4d03669049501460ea6febf849a1 ed78d6132db3a8d991456aa114478a d23 CE8800 series CE8850EI-V200 R019C10SPC80 0.cc V200R019C10SPC800 CE8850EI-V200R019C 10SPC800.cc.asc 8fe12b346dca98368f4e65b569bbbb4 9915ddd8167d21bba96bed08f69aad efe CE8861EI-V200 R019C10SPC80 0.cc CE8861EI-V200R019C 10SPC800.cc.asc 8fe12b346dca98368f4e65b569bbbb4 9915ddd8167d21bba96bed08f69aad efe CE6800 series CE6881- V200R019C10S PC800.cc V200R019C10SPC800 CE6881- V200R019C10SPC800. cc.asc 6332f6f0389c6ad96523978c79e06d6 87c46ddf773300e63e34b3e960b9e5 6bb CE6820- V200R019C10S PC800.cc CE6820- V200R019C10SPC800. cc.asc 6332f6f0389c6ad96523978c79e06d6 87c46ddf773300e63e34b3e960b9e5 6bb CE6863- V200R019C10S PC800.cc CE6863- V200R019C10SPC800. cc.asc 6332f6f0389c6ad96523978c79e06d6 87c46ddf773300e63e34b3e960b9e5 6bb o Huawei will provide an account to the customer via email with sufficient privilege that allows a user to log in the official website and download the corresponding software package. The software is available in: https://support.huawei.com/enterprise/ under the path “Support >> Software Download >> Switches >> Data Center Switch”. The SOFTWARE PATCH part of the TOE is the following: Hardware Delivery Item Version Signature File Sha256sum hash CE16800 series CE16800-V200 R019SPH008T.P AT V200R019SPH008T CE16800-V200R019S PH008T.PAT.asc 38484cdd7a276f9c7195e2e2f2a75ab 09ea136aacee02add7ed207b27f1940 db CE12800 series CE12800-V200 R019SPH008T.P AT V200R019SPH008T CE12800-V200R019S PH008T.PAT.asc 3db0205b71ebdd87c886fb9e258709 46819b5c2dc8d764f00937151a4c9c b7d5 CE8800 series CE8850EI-V200 R019SPH008T.P AT V200R019SPH008T CE8850EI-V200R019S PH008T.PAT.asc 6bc5e8aa326287c050775908c074fe4 c92b7987837539bf27265b5435c57b 90a CE8861EI-V200 R019SPH008T.P AT CE8861EI-V200R019S PH008T.PAT.asc 8e4c71e174ff3d1bc66d55d462fea4b 21f2f06e19636a4f7cf72a8494d5421 a6 CE6800 series CE6881-V200R 019SPH008T.P AT V200R019SPH008T CE6881-V200R019SP H008T.PAT.asc 77e12171e23fbf70b2648f85f6bf042 880eebb45aae737efec51e2178586cc 11 CE6820-V200R 019SPH008T.P AT CE6820-V200R019SP H008T.PAT.asc 536cbd099b318367b9bcf42bb468fd 8e5a88c29709fdfaad4b411858c4a60 a76 CE6863- V200R019SPH0 08T.PAT CE6863- V200R019SPH008T.P AT.asc 85622b686e2b244e692b994daa8364 071c3331b63cb5f5e61f80041b9b39b 2c7 o Huawei will provide an account to the customer via email with sufficient privilege that allows a user to log in the official website and download the corresponding Patch. The patches are available in the following links: ● For Cloud Engine 16800 and 12800 Series: “https://support.huawei.com/enterprise/en/switches/cloudengine-12800-16800-pid-2 52837173/software/252928347?idAbsPath=fixnode01%7C24030814%7C21782165 %7C21782236%7C252837173” Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 15 ● For Cloud Engine 8800 and 6800 Series: “https://support.huawei.com/enterprise/en/switches/cloudengine-58-68-78-88-98-pi d-252837181/software/253457897?idAbsPath=fixnode01%7C24030814%7C21782 165%7C21782239%7C252837181” The GUIDANCE part of the TOE is the following: Name of the document Version/ Issue Sha256sum hash Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Operational user Guidance.pdf 1.5 e0974fc533799652853f7cbabaaa94 428e4a10ed61b16734a64b17b65ef 5c1f1 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Preparative Procedures.pdf 1.5 13945d62823224716c69c4da262e6 264c37a6562493cd675431164b062 8f1e71 CloudEngine 16800 Series Switches V200R019C10 Product Documentation.chm 05 35fe01d3d5dfe9773fb31a656e1da7 04d3a4dfa84577c2b998a518f27a63 c821 CloudEngine 12800 and 12800E Series Switches V200R019C10 Product Documentation.chm 06 03cae48d2d63de21c05f58ef414ed6 6a6af53043cfe659f132dee95ce6ae8 a55 CloudEngine 8800, 7800, 6800, and 5800 Series Switches V200R019C10 Product Documentation.chm 06 24a4972e77af9001afcebfae892f63f 3b7783ffa9d2a0507e56f218bf5470 d1b o Huawei sends the previous documentation via an email generated automatically by Huawei File Transfer System (etrans). Note: Huawei send the Product Guidance depending on which specific series of the CloudEngine switches that the customer has purchased. 1.4.1.1 Evaluated Configuration Model HW Software CE16804 CE16804 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 9 slots for SFU,4 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). V200R019C10SPC800 Patch V200R019SPH008T CE16808 CE16808 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 9 slots for SFU,8 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). CE16816 CE16816 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 9 slots for SFU,16 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). CE12804 CE12804 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 6 slots for SFU,4 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). CE12808 CE12808 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 6 slots for SFU,8 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). CE12816 CE12816 Integrated Chassis,2 slots for MPU（Main Processing Unit), 6 slots for SFU,16 slots for LPU(Line Processing Unit). CE8861-4C-EI With 4 Subcard Slots, Without FAN Box and Power Module CE8850-64CQ-EI 64-Port 10GE QSFP28, 2-Port 10GE QSFP+, Without Fan and Power Module CE6863-48S6CQ 48-port 25G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 16 CE6881-48S6CQ 48-port 10G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR CE6820-48S6CQ 48-port 10G interface and 6-port 100G interface TOR Other software: ● SSH Client v2.0 ● OpenSSL v1.1.1g 1.4.2 Logical scope The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below. (1)Security audit ● The log module of the host software records operations on a device and events that occur to a device. The recorded operations and events are log messages. Log messages provide evidence for diagnosing and maintaining a system. Log messages reflect the operating status of a device and are used to analyze the conditions of a network and to find out the causes of network failure or faults. ● Key elements of log messages include timestamp, host name, Huawei identity, version, module name, severity, brief description, etc. ● IC component are the module processing, outputting log records. Information hierarchy is designed to help the user roughly differentiate between information about normal operation and information about faults. Since the information center needs to output information to the terminal, console, log buffer, and log file. (2)Cryptographic support ● The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote administrative management. ● The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table below. Cryptography Function Use in the TOE DRBG Used in session establishment of TLS and SSH RSA Used in session establishment of TLS and SSH SHA Used to provide cryptographic hashing services HMAC-SHA Used to provide integrity and authentication verification AES Used to encrypt traffic transmitted through TLS and SSH Table 2 Cryptography provided by TOE (3)Identification and authentication ● The authentication functionality provides validation by user’s account name and password. Public key authentication is supported for SSH users. Detailed functionalities, for example max idle-timeout period, max log-in attempts, UI lock, user kick out, can be applies by administrator according to networking environment, customized security considerations, differential user role on TOE, and/or other operational concerns. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 17 (4)Secure Management ● The TOE restricts the ability to determine the behavior of and modify the behavior of the functions transmission of audit data to the security administrator. Only the security administrator can manage the cryptographic keys. Only the security administrator has the right of opening/closing the security services and creation/deletion/modification of the user accounts. (5)Protection of the TSF ● The TOE protects the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from reading them by an unauthorized entity. The TOE stores the users or administrator passwords in non-plaintext form preventing them from reading. The TOE verifies the packet before their installation and uses the digital signature. (6)TOE access through user authentication ● The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol. ● To protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to ensure data transmission security and confidentiality, SSH implements: - authentication by password or by public-key; - AES encryption algorithms; - secure cryptographic key exchange; - Besides default TCP port 22, manually specifying a listening port is also implemented since it can effectively reduce attack. (7)Trusted path and channels for device authentication ● The TOE supports the trusted connections using TLS for the communication with the audit server. 1.5 Standalone TOE [CPP_ND], chapter 3 introduces distributed TOEs, i.e. TOEs that consist of more than one component. This does not refer to different software components running on one hardware component but same version software components running on each hardware components. This ST refers to a standalone TOE which is not a distributed TOE in the sense of [CPP_ND], chapter 3. All additional requirements that are defined for distributed TOEs within [CPP_ND] are therefore ignored in this ST. There are dedicated paragraphs in several Application Notes of [CPP_ND] which are only applicable to distributed TOEs. These dedicated paragraphs have not been integrated into the Application Notes in this ST since the TOE is not a distributed TOE. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 18 2 CPP_ND Conformance Claims 2.1 CPP_ND Conformance Claim As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3], this ST: • conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Revision 5 • is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant • does not claim conformance to any other PP than the one specified in chap 2.2 • does not claim conformance to any Evaluation Assurance Level as defined in [CC3], chap. 8. 2.2 Protection Profile Conformance This security target claims “Exact Conformance” to [CPP_ND]. Note that "Exact Conformance" is defined in [CPP_ND], chap. 2. The methodology applied for the cPP evaluation is defined in [CEM]. In addition to [CEM], the evaluation activities for [CPP_ND] are completed in [SD_ND]. 2.3 Conformance Rationale 2.3.1 TOE Appropriateness The TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the [CPP_ND]. 2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency The Threats, Assumptions, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Threats, Assumptions, and Organization Security Policies specified in [CPP_ND] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the collaborative Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 19 2.3.3 Statement of Security Objectives Consistency The security objectives included in the security target represent the security objectives specified in [CPP_ND] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in Protection Profile`s Statement of security objectives are included in the Security Target. 2.3.4 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in the [CPP_ND] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Requirements are included in the Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in the Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in section 6 of the [CPP_ND]. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 20 3 Security Problem Definition 3.1 ASSET The owner of the TOE presumably places value upon the following entities as long as they are in the scope of the TOE. Asset Name Description Audit data The data which is provided during security audit logging. TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity. Authentication data The data which is used to identify and authenticate the external entities such as account, password, certificate, etc. TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity. Cryptography data The data which is used for digital signature and encryption/decryption such as key. TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity. Management data The data which is used for software updates, and software integrity checking. TOE Security characteristic: integrity. Configuration data TOE Security characteristic: integrity. Software &firmware device firmware; software; TOE Security characteristic: integrity. Critical network traffic Administration traffic; Authentication traffic containing Authentication data; Audit traffic; traffic containing cryptography data; traffic containing Management data TOE Security characteristic: confidentiality, integrity. Security Functionality of the Device The TOE Security Functions (TSF) (Remark: In the context of this ST the Security Functionality of the device refers to the security functions of the TOE). TOE Security characteristic: integrity. Network on which the device resides The network on which the device resides. TOE Security characteristic: integrity. Network device The network device itself. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 21 TOE Security characteristic: integrity. Trust relations with other network devices Trust relations of the TOE with other network devices. TOE Security characteristic: integrity, authenticity. Table 3 TOE Assets 3.2 Threats The threats for the Network Device are grouped according to functional areas of the device in the sections below. 3.2.1 T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides. SFR Rationale: The Administrator role is defined in FMT_SMR.2 and the relevant administration capabilities are defined in FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_MTD.1/CoreData, with additional capabilities in FMT_MOF.1/Services. The actions allowed before authentication of an Administrator are constrained by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, and include the advisory notice and consent warning message displayed according to FTA_TAB.1 The requirement for the Administrator authentication process is described in FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Locking of Administrator sessions is ensured by FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (for local sessions), FTA_SSL.3 (for remote sessions), and FTA_SSL.4 (for all interactive sessions) The secure channel used for remote Administrator connections is specified in FTP_TRP.1/Admin (Malicious actions carried out from an Administrator session are separately addressed by T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY) (Protection of the Administrator credentials is separately addressed by T.PASSWORD_CRACKING). 3.2.2 T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort. SFR Rationale: Requirements for key generation and key distribution are set in FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.2 respectively Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 22 Requirements for use of cryptographic schemes are set in FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS_COP.1/SigGen, FCS_COP.1/Hash, and FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Requirements for random bit generation to support key generation and secure protocols (see SFRs resulting from T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) are set in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Management of cryptographic functions is specified in FMT_SMF.1 3.2.3 T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself. SFR Rationale: The general use of secure protocols for identified communication channels is described at the top level in FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Admin Requirements for the use of secure communication protocols are set for all the allowed protocols in FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 Requirements for use of public key certificates to support secure protocols are defined in FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, FIA_X509_EXT.2 3.2.4 T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compromised. SFR Rationale: The use of appropriate secure protocols to provide authentication of endpoints (as in the SFRs addressing T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS) are ensured by the requirements in FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1/Admin 3.2.5 T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration. SFR Rationale: Requirements for protection of updates are set in FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Certificate-based protection of signatures is supported by the X.509 certificate processing requirements in FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev and FIA_X509_EXT.2 Requirements for management of updates are defined in FMT_SMF.1 and (for manual updates) in FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 23 3.2.6 T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the network device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised. SFR Rationale: Requirements for basic auditing capabilities are specified in FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2, with timestamps provided according to FPT_STM_EXT.1 Requirements for protecting audit records stored on the TOE are specified in FAU_STG.1 Requirements for secure transmission of local audit records to an external IT entity via a secure channel are specified in FAU_STG_EXT.1 Additional requirements for dealing with potential loss of locally stored audit records are specified in FAU_STG.3/LocSpace Configuration of the audit functionality is specified in FMT_SMF.1. 3.2.7 T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker. SFR Rationale: Protection of secret/private keys against compromise is specified in FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Secure destruction of keys is specified in FCS_CKM.4 Management of keys is specified in FMT_SMF.1, and confining this functionality to Security Administrators is required by FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys (Protection of passwords is separately covered under T.PASSWORD_CRACKING), 3.2.8 T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other network devices. SFR Rationale: Requirements for password lengths and available characters are set in FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Protection of password entry by providing only obscured feedback is specified in FIA_UAU.7 Actions on reaching a threshold number of consecutive password failures are specified in FIA_AFL.1 Requirements for secure storage of passwords are set in FPT_APW_EXT.1. 3.2.9 T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE A component of the network device may fail during start-up or during operations causing a compromise or failure in the security functionality of the network device, leaving the device susceptible to attackers. SFR Rationale: Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 24 Requirements for running self-test(s) are defined in FPT_TST_EXT.1 3.3 Assumptions This section describes the assumptions made in identification of the threats and security requirements for network devices. The network device is not expected to provide assurance in any of these areas, and as a result, requirements are not included to mitigate the threats associated. 3.3.1 A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the ST will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The ST will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. [OE.PHYSICAL] 3.3.2 A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality). [OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE] 3.3.3 A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION A standard/generic network device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the network device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the network device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by this ST. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs for particular types of network devices (e.g., firewall). [OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION] 3.3.4 A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device. The TOE supports X.509v3 certificate-based authentication. The Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification). Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 25 [OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN] 3.3.5 A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities. [OE.UPDATES] 3.3.6 A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside. [OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE] 3.3.7 A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. [OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION] 3.4 Organizational Security Policies An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an organization to address its security needs. 3.4.1 P.ACCESS_BANNER The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE. SFR Rationale: An advisory notice and consent warning message is required to be displayed by FTA_TAB.1 [FTA_TAB.1] Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 26 4 Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment The following subsections describe objectives for the Operational Environment. 4.1.1 OE. PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment. 4.1.2 OE. NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g. compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE. 4.1.3 OE. NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment. 4.1.4 OE. TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. The TOE supports x.509v3 certificated-based authentication. The Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 27 4.1.5 OE. UPDATES The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities. 4.1.6 OE. ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside. 4.1.7 OE. RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 28 5 Extended Components Definition The extended components used in this ST are defined in [CPP_ND]. The following table provide a chapter specific reference in which chapter of [CPP_ND] each of the extended components is defined. Table 4 Definition of Extended Components - references to [CPP_ND] Extended Component Defined in [CPP_ND] chap. Mandatory Requirements () FAU_STG_EXT.1 C.1.2.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 C.2.1.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 C.3.1.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 C.3.2.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 C.3.3.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 C.4.1.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1 C.4.2.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1 C.4.3.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 C.4.4.1 FPT_STM_EXT.1 C.4.5.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 C.5.1.1 Optional Requirements () None None. Selection-Based Requirements () FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 C.2.2.7 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 C2.2.8 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev C.3.4.1 FIA_X509_EXT.2 C.3.4.2 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 29 6 Security Functional Requirements 6.1 Conventions The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows: Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD); Refinement made in the cPP: the refinement text is indicated with bold text and strikethroughs; Selection wholly or partially completed in the cPP: the selection values (i.e. the selection values adopted in the cPP or the remaining selection values available for the ST) are indicated with underlined text e.g. “[selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “disclosure” (completion) or “[selection: disclosure, modification]” (partial completion) in the PP; Assignment wholly or partially completed in the cPP: indicated with italicized text; Assignment completed within a selection in the cPP: the completed assignment text is indicated with italicized and underlined text e.g. “[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “change_default, select_tag” (completion of both selection and assignment) or “[selection: change_default, select_tag, select_value]” (partial completion of selection, and completion of assignment) in the PP; Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS_COP.1/Hash”) Application Notes added by the ST author are called 'Additional Application Note' which are enumerated as 'a', 'b', ... and are formatted with underline such as “Additional Application Note a”; [CPP_ND] distinguishes mandatory requirements from optional requirements and selection-based requirements. This ST will mark mandatory requirements by , optional requirements by and selection-based requirements by . Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 30 6.2 SFR Architecture 6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU) 6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and c) All administrative actions comprising: Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators). Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed). Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged). Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged). Starting and stopping services. d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 5. Additional Application Note: Audit functionality is enabled by default. The auditing functionality cannot be disabled. FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 5. Table 5 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents Mandatory Requirements () FAU_GEN.1 None. None. FAU_GEN.2 None. None. FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None. FCS_CKM.1 None. None. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 31 Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents FCS_CKM.2 None. None. FCS_CKM.4 None. None. FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None. FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None. FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None. FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None. FIA_AFL.1 Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address). FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None. FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the identification and authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address). FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the identification and authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g. IP address). FIA_UAU.7 None. None. FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual update None. FMT_MTD.1/CoreData All management activities of TSF data. None. FMT_SMF.1 None. None. FMT_SMR.2 None. None. FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None. FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None. FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure). None FPT_STM_EXT.1 Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged.) For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for success and failure (e.g. IP address). FTA_SSL_EXT.1 The termination of a local None. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 32 Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents session by the session locking mechanism. FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism. None. FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. None FTA_TAB.1 None. None. FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions. Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt. FTP_TRP.1/Admin Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failures of the trusted path functions. None Optional Requirements () FAU_STG.1 None. None. FAU_STG.3/LocSpace Low storage space for audit events. None. Selection-Based Requirements () FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH session. Reason for failure. FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 Failure to establish a TLS Session. Reason for failure. FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate. Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE’s trust store Reason for failure of certification validation. Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE’s trust store. FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None. FMT_MOF.1/Services Starting and stopping of services. None. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 33 Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of cryptographic keys. None. 6.2.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. 6.2.1.3 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP_ITC.1. FAU_STG_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally. FAU_STG_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: overwrite the oldest log information always when the local storage space for audit data is full. 6.2.1.4 FAU_STG.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss < O > FAU_STG.3.1/LocSpace The TSF shall generate a warning to inform the Administrator if the audit trail exceeds the local audit trail storage capacity. Additional Application Note: The local storage that store audit data is Internal flash. 6.2.1.5 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 34 6.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) 6.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement) FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3; and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. 6.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement) FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method: Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets the following: RFC 3526, Section 3; ] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. 6.2.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection; For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that that meets the following: No Standard. Additional Application Note: The TOE do not store plaintext keys in non-volatile memory. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 35 6.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption) FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in GCM mode and cryptographic key sizes: 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, GCM as specified in ISO 19772. 6.2.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus): 3072 bits and 4096 bits, that meet the following: For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3, 6.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-256, SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes 256, 384 bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. 6.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: HMAC-SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes: 256 bits for HMAC-SHA-256 and message digest sizes: 256 bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 36 6.2.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using Hash_DRBG (any). FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from 1 hardware-based noise source with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”,of the keys and CSPs that it will generate. 6.2.2.9 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFC(s) 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 6668. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than 262144 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses ssh-rsa as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses hmac-sha2-256, AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s). FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that ecdh-sha2-nistp256, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and no other methods are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol. FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data. After either of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 37 6.2.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol with Authentication FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will supporting the following ciphersuites: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.2 The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier per RFC 6125 section 6. FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also Not implement any administrator override mechanism. FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.4 The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension with the following NIST curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1 and no other curves in the Client Hello. FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.5 The TSF shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates. 6.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) 6.2.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management (Refinement) FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within 3 to 5 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely. FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating until unlock is taken by a local Administrator; prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed. 6.2.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords: a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”, “@”, Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 38 “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, “-“, “+”, “=”, “[“, “]”, “{“, “}”, “|”, “\”, “,”, “.”, “/”, “<”, “>”, “;”, “’”, “:”, “””; b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between 8 and 128 characters. 6.2.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process: Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1; no other actions. FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user. 6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, no other authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication. 6.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console. 6.2.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules: RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates. ● The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor. ● The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 39 ● The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3. The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules: ● Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ● Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ● Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field. ● OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field. FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE. 6.2.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS and no additional uses. FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate; the TSF shall not accept the certificate. 6.2.4 Security Management (FMT) 6.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators. 6.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour FMT_MOF.1.1/Services The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable start and stop the functions services to Security Administrators. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 40 6.2.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators. 6.2.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data FMT_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators. 6.2.4.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely; Ability to configure the access banner; Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking; Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates; Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1; Ability to start and stop services. Ability to configure audit behavior; Ability to manage the cryptographic keys; Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying; 6.2.4.6 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles: Security Administrator. FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions: The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally; The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely; are satisfied. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 41 6.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 6.2.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys) FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys. 6.2.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form. FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords. 6.2.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing (Extended) FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (on power on), to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: integrity of the firmware and software (software integrity check), the correct operation of cryptographic functions. Additional Application Note: Certificates are not used by the self-test mechanism, therefore FPT_TST_EXT.2 is not included in the ST. 6.2.5.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software. FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and no other update mechanism. FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism prior to installing those updates. Additional Application Note: Certificates are not used by the update verification mechanism, therefore, FPT_TUD_EXT.2 is not included in the ST. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 42 6.2.5.5 FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps FPT_STM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use. FPT_STM_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall allow the Security Administrator to set the time. 6.2.6 TOE Access (FTA) 6.2.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, terminate the session after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity. 6.2.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination (Refinement) FTA_SSL.3.1: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity. 6.2.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination (Refinement) FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own interactive session. 6.2.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners (Refinement) FTA_TAB.1.1: Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 43 6.2.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) 6.2.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (Refinement) FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of using TLS to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, no other capabilities that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data. FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for audit service. 6.2.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement) FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin The TSF shall be capable of using SSH to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data. FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path. FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication and all remote administration actions. 6.3 Security Assurance Requirements The development and the evaluation of the TOE shall be done in accordance to the following security assurance requirements: Table 6 Security Assurance Requirements Assurance Class Assurance Components Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1) Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1) ST introduction (ASE_INT.1) Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1) Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 44 Assurance Class Assurance Components Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1) Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1) TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1) Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1) Guidance documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1) Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1) Life cycle support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1) TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1) Tests (ATE) Independent testing – sample (ATE_IND.1) Vulnerability assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1) This security target claims conformance with [CPP_ND]. In addition to [CEM], the evaluation activities for [CPP_ND] are completed in [SD_ND]. 6.4 SFR Rationale The following table lists all SFRs contained in [CPP_ND] together with the classification whether they are mandatory, optional or selection-based, indicates which are included in this ST and provides a dependency rationale. Justifications for any unsupported dependencies will be given in the table as well. Table 7 Dependency rationale for SFRs Requirement from [CPP_ND] Dependencies Satisfied by Mandatory Requirements () FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM_EXT.1 included (which is hierarchic to FPT_STM.1) FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1; FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1; Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification timing FAU_STG_EXT.1 FAU_GEN.1; FTP_ITC.1 FAU_GEN.1; FTP_ITC.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_CKM.4 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 45 Requirement from [CPP_ND] Dependencies Satisfied by FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.2 FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/SigGen FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/Hash FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 Unsupported Dependencies: This SFR specifies keyless hashing operations, so initialisation and destruction of keys are not relevant FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None N/A FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None N/A FIA_UIA_EXT.1 FTA_TAB.1 FTA_TAB.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 None N/A FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 None N/A FMT_SMR.2 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None N/A Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 46 Requirement from [CPP_ND] Dependencies Satisfied by FPT_APW_EXT.1 None N/A FPT_TST_EXT.1 None N/A FPT_TUD_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1/SigGen or FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/SigGen and FCS_COP.1/Hash FPT_STM_EXT.1 None N/A FTA_SSL_EXT.1 FIA_UAU.1 Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification FTA_SSL.3 None N/A FTA_SSL.4 None N/A FTA_TAB.1 None N/A FTP_ITC.1 None N/A FTP_TRP.1/Admin None N/A Optional Requirements () FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.3/LocSpace FAU_STG.3/LocSpace FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 Selection-Based Requirements () FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1: FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1: FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1: FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.2; FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption; FCS_COP.1/SigGen; FCS_COP.1/Hash; FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash; FCS_RBG_EXT.1: FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev FIA_X509_EXT.2; FIA_X509_EXT.2; FIA_X509_EXT.2 FIA_X509_EXT.1; FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev; FMT_MOF.1/Services FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.2; FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys FMT_SMR.1; FMT_SMR.2; Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 47 Requirement from [CPP_ND] Dependencies Satisfied by FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 48 7 TOE Summary Specification 7.1 Security Audit (FAU) 7.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation The TOE generates an audit record whenever an audited event occurs. The types of events that cause audit records to be generated include identification and authentication related events, and administrative events (the specific events and the contents of each audit record are listed in the table within the FAU_GEN.1 SFR, “Table 5Auditable Events”). Each of the events specified in the audit record is in enough detail to identify the user for which the event is associated (e.g. user identity, MAC address, IP address), when the event occurred, where the event occurred, the outcome of the event (if the operation has been carried out successfully, the log records the audit associated to the operation, otherwise there is no audit) and the type of event that occurred. The audit trail consists of the individual audit records; one audit record for each event that occurred. The audit record contains a lot of information, such as the type of event that occurred, and two percent sign (%%), which follows the device name. As noted above, the information includes at least all of the required information. Additional information can be configured and included if desired. For the administrative task of generating/import, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys the TOE logs the key name and the specified DER/OPENSSH/PEM format for an RSA public key through the execution of CLI commands. 7.1.2 FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Each auditable event is associated with the user that triggered the event and as a result, Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 49 they are traceable to a specific user. For example, a human user, user identity or related session ID would be included in the audit record. For an IT entity or device, the IP address, MAC address, host name, or other configured identification is presented. The security log of user account management should include user name. Other types of security log have other rules about the information. 7.1.3 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Only the authorized administrators can monitor the logfile record, and operate the log files. The unauthorized users have no access to do those actions and therefore, records are protected against unauthorized modification or deletion. And the actions of the authorized administrators will be logged. The amount of audit data that are stored locally and how these records are protected against unauthorized modification or deletion are described in the following section. 7.1.4 FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected audit event storage The TOE supports to export syslog records to a specified, external syslog server. The TOE protects communications with an external syslog server via TLS v1.2. The TOE stores audit records on Internal flash whenever it is connected with syslog server or not. The size of an information file is configurable by the administrator with value 4M/8M/16M/32M bytes. The default maximum size of each information file is 8 MB. When the size of an information file exceeds the configured maximum size, the information file is compressed into a smaller file in standard log_slot ID_time.log.zip format. The maximum quantity of compressed files is configurable by the administrator with a value ranging from 3 to 500. A maximum of 200 files can be stored on a device by default. The unauthorized users are disallowed to handle the audit records. The logs are saved to flash memory (Internal flash) so records can’t be lost in case of failures or restarts. The log buffer is circular, so newer messages overwrite older messages after the buffer is full. Administrators are instructed to monitor the log buffer using the show logging privileged CLI command to view the audit records. The first message displayed is the oldest message in the buffer. There are other associated commands to clear the buffer, to reset log buffer, etc. The size of the log buffer can be configured by users with sufficient privileges. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 50 When the local audit data store in Internal flash exceeds the maximum allowed size of log file storage, the system deletes oldest compressed files to save the latest log file. An administrator cannot alter audit records but can delete audit records as a whole. 7.1.5 FAU_STG.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss If the log files have already occupied more than 80% of the total audit storage in Internal flash, or delete the old log files after saving them to the other storage device, an event will be generated and sent to management server to notice the clients of the warning information. If the number of compressed log files generated in the system exceeded 80% of the maximum number of compressed files, an event will also be generated to notice net-manager the warning information. If the number of recorded compressed files reach the maximum number that the security administrator has configured, or the storage with audit events reach the configured storage size, another event will be generated to notice net-manager. 7.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS) 7.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation The TOE generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with (FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3) using the following keys: Cipher Suites for TLS provided by TOE: Cipher Suite Protocol version Key Exchange Authentication Encrypti on Hash TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_A ES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLS 1.2 DHE RSA AES-128 -GCM SHA256 TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_A ES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLS 1.2 DHE RSA AES-256 -GCM SHA384 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 51 SSH client supports the data integrity algorithms of hmac-sha2-256, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM. 7.2.2 FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman group 14 key establishment. The Hash DRBG is used for every random bits generation from the TOE in the key establishment process. DH Keys are generated using DH group14 parameters from RFC3526, Section.3. [RFC3526, Section.3] 3. 2048-bit MODP Group This group is assigned id 14. This prime is: 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 } Its hexadecimal value is: FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF The generator is: 2. 7.2.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction Table 8 Key Destructions Name Description of Key Method of storage Storage SSH/TLS The key is used for plaintext Memory Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 52 Name Description of Key Method of storage Storage session key encrypting/decrypting the traffic in a secure connection. Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret This is the private exponent used as part of the DiffieHellman key exchange. plaintext Memory Diffie-Hellman private exponent The key is used for encrypting/decrypting the traffic in a secure connection. plaintext Memory TLS private key The key is used for signature and authentication. (AES256 cipher) Memory RSA key pair The key pair is used for digital signature and key establishment. plaintext Memory Destruction method: Allocating blocks of pages tends to fragment memory with larger blocks of free pages being broken down into smaller ones. The page deallocation code recombines pages into larger blocks of free pages whenever it can. In fact the page block size is important as it allows for easy combination of blocks into larger blocks. Whenever a block of pages is freed, the adjacent or buddy block of the same size is checked to see if it is free. If it is, then it is combined with the newly freed block of pages to form a new free block of pages for the next size block of pages. Each time two blocks of pages are recombined into a bigger block of free pages the page deallocation code attempts to recombine that block into a yet larger one. In this way the blocks of free pages are as large as memory usage will allow. 7.2.4 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/ Decryption) The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES algorithm with key size 128 bits, 256 bits in GCM mode as specified in ISO 19772. ● AES128 GCM, AES256 GCM are supported by TLS. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 53 ● AES128 GCM, AES256 GCM are supported by SSH. 7.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using RSA with key sizes between 3072 and 4096 bits as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”. ● The RSA with key size 3072 is used for signature generation and verification of SSH. ● The RSA with key size of 3072 to 4096 is used for signature generation and verification of TLS. 7.2.6 FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-256, and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-3 “Secure Hash Standard.”, it also meet the ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004. The association of the hash function with other TSF cryptographic functions: Table 9 Usage of Hash Algorithm Cryptographic Functions Hash Function HMAC-SHA-256 SHA-256 TLS Digital signature verification SHA-256 & SHA-384 SSH Digital signature verification SHA-256 Hash_DRBG SHA-256 7.2.7 FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) The TOE provides cryptographic keyed hash services using HMAC-SHA-256 according Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 54 to RFC2104: HMAC, it also complies with the ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”. Table 10 Specification of Keyed Hash Algorithm HMAC function Key length (bits) Hash function Block size (bits) Output MAC length (bits) HMAC-SHA-256 256 SHA-256 512 256 7.2.8 FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) The TOE implements a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) which is conformant to [ISO18031] using the DRBG mechanism Hash_DRBG as specified in [SP800-90A], chap. 10.1.1. The entropy source is based on hardware (internal noise source). Random numbers from the internal noise source are only used for seeding the DRBG. The TOE set new seed using at least 256 bits entropy before generate random bits as cryptographic key. The calculated min-entropy of the TOE is “0.924912”. 7.2.9 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server 7.2.9.1 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1 The TOE implements the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 and 6668. 7.2.9.2 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2 Both public key and password authentication modes are supported by SSH server function. The TOE implements the public key algorithms of ssh-rsa. SSH users can be authenticated in eight modes: RSA, password, password-RSA, and All (any authentication mode of RSA or password is allowed with “ALL” mode). The SSH user that created by administrators shall configured one of mode. Then the external SSH client can login SSH server successfully via the configured SSH user and authentication mode. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 55 7.2.9.3 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3 The max packet length that SSH client can process is 262144 bytes, as defined in RFC 4253. If the packet is larger than 262144 bytes, SSH server function will drop this packet and close the current session. 7.2.9.4 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4 SSH server function supports the encryption algorithms of aes128-gcm and aes256-gcm. When SSH Client establishes a connection, it will send a list of encryption algorithms to SSH server. SSH Server will check each algorithm in the list one by one. If it finds one algorithm in the list that is also supported by it, this algorithm will be chosen as the encryption algorithm between client and server. If no algorithm in the list is supported by SSH server, the connection will be terminated. After the encryption algorithm is selected, Server and Client will create a random number and exchange. Client and Server will use own random number to create an encryption key. Then SSH server will use its own encryption key to encrypt packet, and use SSH client’s encryption key to decrypt packet. 7.2.9.5 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5 SSH server function supports the public key algorithm of ssh-rsa. Before SSH Client and SSH Server build a connection, they both need to configure a Local Key-pair what is used for authentication. In Huawei device, this local key-pair is used for SSH server and SSH client. When Client authenticates Server, first step is to consult public key algorithms. Client will send a list of public key algorithms to SSH server. SSH Server will check each algorithm in the list one by one. If it finds one algorithm in the list that is also supported by it, this algorithm will be chosen as the public key algorithm between client and server. If no algorithm in the list is supported by SSH server, the connection will be terminated. 7.2.9.6 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6 SSH server function supports the data integrity algorithms of hmac-sha2-256 , Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 56 AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM. 7.2.9.7 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7 SSH server supports the following key exchange algorithm: ecdh-sha2-nistp256. 7.2.9.8 FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8 The SSH connection will be rekeyed after one hour of session time or one gigabyte of transmitted data using that key which ever goes first. The SSH allows either side to force another run of the key-exchange phase, changing the encryption and integrity keys for the session. The idea is to do this periodically, after one hour of session time or one gigabyte of transmitted data using that key which ever goes first. 7.2.10 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Protocol with Authentication 7.2.10.1 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1 The TLS client supports the following ciphersuites: ● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288 ● TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288 7.2.10.2 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.2 The TOE supports configuring reference identifier and matching this identifier with server certificate. 7.2.10.3 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3 When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also not implement any administrator override mechanism. 7.2.10.4 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.4 The syslog TLS client will transmit the Supported Elliptic Curves extension in the Client Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 57 Hello message by default with support for the following NIST curves: secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1. The non-TOE server can choose to negotiate the elliptic curve from this set for any of the mutually negotiable elliptic curve ciphersuites no additional configuration is required. The TOE also supports key agreement using the server’s RSA public key or DHG14 (2048 bits). 7.2.10.5 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.5 The TOE uses client-side certificates for TLS mutual authentication. 7.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) 7.3.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management The TOE can be configured within 3 to 5 unsuccessful authentication attempts by Administrators. When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TOE will prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating until unlock is taken by a local Administrator or prevent the offending remote Administrator from successfully authenticating until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed. 7.3.2 FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management The TOE supports the local definition of users with corresponding passwords which are used for security administrators’ authentication of local or remote administration connections. The passwords can be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”, “-“, “+”, “=”, “[“, “]”, “{“, “}”, “|”, “\”, “,”, “.”, “/”, “<”, “>”, “;”, “’”, “:”, “””;)”. Minimum password length is settable by the Administrator, and support passwords from 8 characters to 128. Password composition rules specifying the types and number of required characters: that comprise the password are settable by the Administrator. Passwords have a maximum lifetime, configurable by the Administrator. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 58 7.3.3 FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication The TOE requires all users to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing execution of any TSF mediated action except display of the banner. The TOE supports user login over console or remote interface. Any login method need authentication before successfully logon. ● Local access is achieved by console port. Local authentication supports password-based authentication. ● Remote access is achieved by SSH. It also supports associated identity authentication of password and public-key. Users can also login with any of the identity authentication modes of password, and RSA when their login mode are configured to be ‘ALL’. 7.3.4 FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism The TOE can be configured to require local authentication or remote authentication as defined in the authentication policy for interactive (human) users. The policy for interactive (human) users (Administrators) can be authenticated to the local user database, or have redirection to a remote authentication server. Interfaces can be configured to try one or more remote authentication servers, and then fail back to the local user database if the remote authentication servers are inaccessible. If the interactive (human) users (Administrators) password is expired, the user is required to create a new password after correctly entering the expired password. 7.3.5 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback When a user inputs their password at the local console, the console will not display the input so that the user password is obscured. For remote session authentication, the TOE does not echo any characters as they are entered. The TOE does not provide any additional information to the user that would give any indication about the authentication data. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 59 7.3.6 FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation The TOE supports to verify the certificate and the certificate path by the rules specified in RFC 5280, using algorithm RSA. The TOE supports to verify the revocation status by CRLs as specified in [RFC 5280]. The TOE validate the certificate by steps as below: 1. Validate basic certificate fields and the extendedKeyUsage field. 2. Validate the revocation status using CRL as specified in [RFC 5759]. 3. Validate certificate path as specified in [RFC 5280], do step 1 and 2 for every certificate in the certificate chain. 4. Validate the end of the certificate chain, it should be trusted root certificate. 7.3.7 FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication The certificate used by TLS authentication is sent by TLS server. The CRL should be loaded for certificate validation. The TOE will send a security log when a connection cannot be established during the validity check of a certificate used in establishing a trusted channel. TLS only supports RSA certificate. The check of validity of the certificates takes place at authentication of TLS connection and verification of code signing for system software updates. When the certificate is valid, we can trust the peer identity and use the certificate to verify the integrity of the message. The TOE uses client-side certificates for TLS mutual authentication. TOE chooses certificate which was configured by CLI for services (such as Syslog). When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate; the TSF shall not accept the certificate. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 60 7.4 Security management (FMT) 7.4.1 FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators. Only administrators have the right to create or delete local user. While changing the local user privilege level, the configured new level of the local user cannot be higher than that of the login-in user. In this way no user except administrators can change another user to be at the privilege level of administrator. And only administrators have the ability to perform manual update. So the manual update is restricted to administrators. The TOE uses groups to organize users. Different kinds of users are in different group and every group has a specific level that identity its roles and scope of rights. 7.4.2 FMT_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour Only administrators have ability to enable and disable the functions and services, the other users are disallowed to do it. 7.4.3 FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data Only administrators have privilege to manage the TSF data, the other users are disallowed to do it. The TOE provides the ability for authorized administrators to access TOE data, such as audit data, configuration data. Each of the predefined and administratively configured user has different right to access the TOE data. The access control mechanisms of the TOE are based on hierarchical access levels where a user level is associated with every user and terminal on the one hand and a command level is associated with every command. Only if the user level is equal or higher to a specific command, the user is authorized to execute this command. Management of security function is realized through commands. So for every management function sufficient user level is required for the user to be able to execute the corresponding command. The administrative functions are described in section 7.4.6 of the present document. In Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 61 order to perform these administrative functions, the administrator shall be log-in. The TOE stores X.509v3 certificates in Flash ,and all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys in the file system in Flash that can’t be read, copy or extract by administrators; hence no interface access is available. 7.4.4 FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data Only administrators have the right to manage the cryptographic keys, the other users are disallowed to do this. 7.4.5 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions The TOE provides all the capabilities necessary to securely manage the TOE. The administrative user can connect to the TOE using the CLI to perform these functions via SSH encrypted session. The management functionality provided by the TOE includes the following administrative functions: ● Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely; ● Ability to configure the access banner; ● Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking; ● Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates; ● Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1; ● Ability to start and stop services. ● Ability to configure audit behavior; ● Ability to manage the cryptographic keys; ● Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying; 7.4.6 FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles A Security Administrator is able to administer the TOE through the local console or through a remote SSH mechanism. An administrator can create, delete and modify the other users and endow them with a proper right according to the users’ roles. The TOE uses groups to organize users. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 62 Different kinds of users are in different group and every group has a specific level that identity its roles and scope of rights. Every user in one group has the same scope of rights that the group owns. The TOE has 4 default user groups: manage-ug, system-ug, monitor-ug, and visitor-ug. 7.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) 7.5.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) The TOE stores all symmetric keys, and private keys in the file system in Flash that can’t be read, copy or extract by administrators; hence no interface access. 7.5.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords The administrator passwords are stored to configuration file in cryptographic form hashed with salt by SHA-256, including username passwords, authentication passwords, console and virtual terminal line access passwords. In this manner, the TOE ensures that plaintext user passwords will not be disclosed to anyone through normal interfaces including administrators. 7.5.3 FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF testing The TSF run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF, including software integration verification by integrity check and the correct operation of cryptographic functions. During initial power on start-up, software integrity is checked at first. If integrity check is failed the start-up procedure will stop. After VRP gain control, it test the correct operation of cryptographic functions with known-answer test. If this testing fail the start-up procedure will also stop. 7.5.4 FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update Only authenticated administrators have the ability to manually initiate an update to TOE Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 63 firmware/software. During the updating procedure, digital signature as defined at FCS_COP.1/SigGen will be verified by the TOE at first. The administrators can query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software as well as the most recently installed version by the “display startup” command. The currently executing patches and most recently installed patches can also be checked out. The validation of the firmware/software integrity is always performed before the process of replacing a non-volatile, system resident software component with another is started. All discrete software components (e.g. applications, drivers, kernel, and firmware) of the TSF are archived together into a whole package and the single package is digitally signed. RSA as specified in FCS COP.1/SigGen can be used for firmware/software digital signature mechanism to authenticate it prior to installation and that installation fails if the verification fails. When digital signature is verified correct, the new software will be installed successfully and become active when the TOE reboot. 7.5.5 FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps Only administrators have the ability to modify the time of TOE, and all modification about time will be recorded. The security functions that make use of time include: 1) With this information the real time for all audit data can be calculated. 2) The validation period of the certificate can be calculated. 7.6 TOE Access (FTA) 7.6.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking An administrator can configure maximum inactivity times for both local and remote administrative sessions. When a session is inactive (i.e., not session input) for the configured period of time the TOE will terminate the session, flush the screen, and no further activity is allowed requiring the administrator to log in (be successfully identified and authenticated) again to establish a new session. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 64 The allowable range is from 0 minute 0 second to 35791 minutes 59 seconds. 7.6.2 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination When the remote session is inactive (i.e., not session input) for the configured period of time the TOE will terminate the session. 7.6.3 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination The administrator can use the command “quit” in order to finish the administrator’s own interactive session. 7.6.4 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners To provide some prompts or alarms to users, Administrator can use the header command to configure a title on the switch. If a user logs in to the switch, the title is displayed. Administrator can specify the title information, or specify the title information by using the contents of a file. The title displayed same for both local and remote users. When a terminal (remote or local) connection is activated and attempt to log in, the terminal displays the contents of the title that is set by using the header login command. After the successful login, the terminal displays the contents of the title that is configured by using the header shell command. The local Console port and the remote Secure Telnet interface are used for an administrator to communicate with the switch. 7.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) 7.7.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel The TOE protects communications between a TOE and its connected Audit server with TLS v1.2. TLS/SSH protects the data from disclosure by encryption defined at 6.2.2.6 and ensure that the data has not been modified by MAC defined by 6.2.2.7. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 65 7.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path All remote administrative communications take place over a secure encrypted SSH session. The remote users are able to initiate SSH communications with the TOE. The TOE protects communications between a TOE and authorized remote administrator with SSH. Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 66 8 Crypto Disclaimer The following cryptographic algorithms are used by CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series to enforce its security policy: # Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of Implementation Key Size in Bits Standard of Application Comments 1 Key Generation Elliptic curve- Diffie Hellman FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3 2048-bit or greater NIST Special Publication 800-56B FCS_CKM.1 2 Key Establishment Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography 2048-bit or greater NIST Special Publication 800-56B FCS_CKM.2 3 Confidentiality AES in GCM mode 128 bits or 256 bits AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, GCM as specified in ISO 19772 FCS_COP.1/ DataEncryption 4 Authentication RSA signature RSA: PKCS#1_V2.1, RSASSA-PKCS2v 1_5 3072 bits FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5 FCS_COP.1/ SigGen Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3 3072 bits ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3 FCS_COP.1/ SigGen Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 67 # Purpose Cryptographic Mechanism Standard of Implementation Key Size in Bits Standard of Application Comments Integrity SHA-256 and SHA-384 - 256 bits,384 bits ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 FCS_COP.1/Hash 5 Cryptographic Primitive HMAC-SHA-25 6 - 256 bits ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2” FCS_COP.1/Keye dHash 6 Random Bit Generation Hash_DRBG (any); DRG.2 acc. to SP800-90A - 256 bits SP800-90A ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions” FCS_RBG_EXT. 1 7 Trusted Channel SSH V2.0 RFC 4251 RFC 4252 RFC 4253 RFC 4254 RFC 6668 - - FTP_TRP.1/ Admin TLS1.1 RFC 3268 RFC 4346 RFC 5246 RFC 6125 - - FTP_ITC.1 TLS1.2 RFC 3268 RFC 5246 RFC 6125 - - FTP_ITC.1 Referenced Documents [FIPS 186-4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013 [PKCS#1] RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1(RFC3447) [PKCS#3] A cryptographic protocol that allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel. [FIPS 198-1]The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)--2008 July [RFC 4251]The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, January 2006 [RFC 4252]The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, January 2006 [RFC 4253]The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, January 2006 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 68 [RFC 4254]The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, January 2006 [RFC 6668]SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol [RFC 3268]Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC 4346]The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1 [RFC 5246]The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 [RFC 8446]The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 [RFC 6125]Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [NIST SP 800-56A]National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, May 2013 [NIST SP 800-56B]National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography August 2009 [ISO/IEC 18031:2011] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Random bit generation [ISO 18033-3] Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms [ISO/IEC 9796-2]Information technology -- Security techniques -- Digital signature schemes giving message recovery [ISO/IEC 9797-2]Information technology -- Security techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs) [ISO/IEC 10118-3]Information technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-functions [ISO/IEC 14888-3] Information technology -- Security techniques -- Digital signatures with appendix Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 69 9 Abbreviations Terminology and References 9.1 Abbreviations Name Explanation AAA Authentication Authorization Accounting CA Certificate Authority CC Common Criteria CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security CLI Command Line Interface EAL Evaluation Assurance Level EXEC Execute Command GUI Graphical User Interface IC Information Center IP Internet Protocol LMT Local Maintenance Terminal MAN Metropolitan Area Network NDcPP collaborative Protection Profile for Network Device NMS Network Management Server NTP Network Tiem Protocal Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 70 Name Explanation PP Protection Profile RMT Remote Maintenance Terminal SFR Security Functional Requirement SSH Secure Shell SSL Secure Sockets Layer ST Security Target STP Spanning-Tree Protocol TLS Transport Layer Security TOE Target of Evaluation TSF TOE Security Functions VRP Versatile Routing Platform AC Alternating Current DC Direct Current 9.2 Terminology This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the [CC] are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise. Terminology Explanation Administrator: An administrator is a user of the TOE who may have been assigned specific administrative privileges within the TOE. This ST may use the term administrator occasionally in an informal context, and not in order to refer to a specific role definition – from the TOE’s point of view, an administrator is simply a user who is authorized to perform certain administrative actions on the TOE and the objects managed by the TOE. Since all Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 71 Terminology Explanation user levels are assigned to commands and users and users can only execute a command if their associated level is equal or higher compared to the level assigned to a command, a user might have certain administrative privileges but lacking some other administrative privileges. So the decision whether a user is also an administrator or not might change with the context (e.g. might be able to change audit settings but cannot perform user management). User: A user is a human or a product/application using the TOE which is able to authenticate successfully to the TOE. A user is therefore different to a subject which is just sending traffic through the device without any authentication. 9.3 References Name Description [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Part 1-3 April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC1] Common Criteria (CC) Part 1: Introduction and general model April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC2] Part 2: Security functional components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC3] Part 3: Security assurance components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 72 Name Description Evaluation methodology April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CPP_ND] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1，24-Sep-2018 cPP collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1，24-Sep-2018 [ISO18031] Information technology — Security techniques — Random bit generation Second edition 2011-11-15 [RFC 3526] This document defines new Modular Exponential (MODP) Groups for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. It documents the well known and used 1536 bit group 5, and also defines new 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, and 8192 bit Diffie-Hellman groups numbered starting at 14. Please refer to the following link: http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3526 [RFC 4251] This document describes the architecture of the SSH protocol, as well as the notation and terminology used in SSH protocol documents. It also discusses the SSH algorithm naming system that allows local extensions. Please refer to the following link: http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251 [RFC 5280] This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. Please refer to the following link: http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280 [RFC 5759] This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography. Please refer to the following link: http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5759 [SD_ND] Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP September-2018 Version 2.1 Huawei CE16800&CE12800&CE8800&CE6800 Series Switches running VRP software V200R019C10SPC800 Security Target Issue 1.10 (2022-05-10) Copyright © Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. 73 Name Description [SP800-56A] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography Revision 2 May 2013 [SP800-56B] Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography Revision 1 September 2014 [SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators Revision 1 June 2015