Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 22FMV4120-20
Dokument ID CSEC2022009
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2022-11-10
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
Issue: 1.0, 2022-nov-10
Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 7
3.1 Auditing 7
3.2 Data Encryption (a.k.a. cryptography) 7
3.3 Identification, Authentication, and Authorization to Use HCD Functions 8
3.4 Access Control 8
3.5 Image Overwrite 9
3.6 Trusted Communications 9
3.7 Administrative Roles 9
3.8 Trusted Operation 9
3.9 PSTN Fax-network Separation 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
4.1 Assumptions 11
4.2 Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
7.1 Developer Testing 16
7.2 Evaluator Testing 16
7.3 Penetration Testing 17
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 20
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 21
11 Glossary 22
12 Bibliography 24
Appendix A Scheme Versions 25
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 25
A.2 Scheme Notes 25
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
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1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the:
 Samsung Color MFP SL-X5230NR / SL-X5280NR
 Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-
X6350ZX
 Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-
X9700LX
 Samsung Color MFP SL-G306X / SL-G256X / SL-G409X / SL-G509X
 Samsung Mono MFP SL-K5250NR / SL-K5300NR
 Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX / SL-
K6400ZX
 Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX
 Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K / SL-G509K / SL-G609K
The TOE is a hardcopy device (HCD) also known as a multifunction printer (MFP).
The TOE is an HCD including internal firmware, but exclusive of non-security rele-
vant options such as finishers. The TOE also includes the English-language guidance
documentation.
The following firmware modules are included in the TOE:
 System firmware
 Jetdirect Inside firmware
The Security Target claims conformance to:
 Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices; IPA, NIAP, and the MFP Technical
Community. Version 1.0 as of 2015-09-10; exact conformance.
 Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0, Errata #1, Version 1.0 as of 2017-
06; exact conformance.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in Danderyd,
Sweden. The evaluation was completed on 2022-10-25. The evaluation was conducted
in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version 3.1 release 5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec in-
formation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according
to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm both to the evaluation activities in the HCDPP and to evaluation assurance
level EAL 1, augmented by ASE_SPD.1
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the
Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
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The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2022009
Name and version of the
certified IT product
 Samsung Color MFP
SL-X5230NR/ SL-X5280NR,
System firmware version: 2503252_000045,
Jetdirect Inside firmware version: JOL25030046
 Samsung Color MFP
SL-X6350ZX/ SL-G306X/ SL-G256X /
SL-X6350LX /SL-X6300LX /SL-X6250LX,
System firmware version: 2503252_000043,
Jetdirect Inside firmware version: JOL25030046
 Samsung Color MFP
SL-X9700LX/ SL-X9600LX/ SL-X9500LX/
SL-X9400LX/SL-G509X/SL-G409X,
System firmware version: 2503252_000046;
Jetdirect Inside firmware version: JOL25030046
 Samsung Mono MFP
SL- K9700LX/ SL-K9600LX/SL-K9500LX/
SL-G609K/SL-G509K,
System firmware version: 2503252_000042,
Jetdirect Inside firmware version: JOL25030046
 Samsung Mono MFP
SL-K5300NR /SL-K5250NR,
System firmware version: 2503252_000049,
Jetdirect Inside firmware version: JOL25030046
 Samsung Mono MFP
SL-K6400ZX/ SL-G356K/SL-G306K/
SL-K6400LX/SL-K6350LX/SL-K6300LX,
System firmware version: 2503252_000040,
Jetdirect Inside firmware version: JOL25030046
Security Target Identification Samsung Color MFP SL-X5230NR / SL-X5280NR,
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX /
SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX, Samsung Color MFP
SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-
X9700LX, Samsung Color MFP SL-G306X / SL-
G256X / SL-G409X / SL-G509X, Samsung Mono
MFP SL-K5250NR / SL-K5300NR, Samsung Mono
MFP SL-K6300LX /SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX /
SL-K6400ZX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX /
SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX, Samsung Mono MFP
SL-G306K / SL-G356K / SL-G509K / SL-G609K
Security Target, HP Inc., 2022-10-12, document
version 1.6
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
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22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
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EAL For CCRA and EA/MLA:
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices v1.0 as
modified by Errata #1 including ASE_INT.1,
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1,
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1, ASE_TSS.1,
ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1, ATE_IND.1, and
AVA_VAN.1
For SOGIS:
EAL 1 + ASE_SPD.1
Sponsor HP Inc.
Developer HP Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.2
Scheme Notes Release 19.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS and EA/MLA
Certification date 2022-11-10
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
 Auditing
 Data Encryption (a.k.a. cryptography)
 Identification, Authentication, and Authorization to Use HCD Functions
 Access Control
 Image Overwrite
 Trusted Communications
 Administrative Roles
 Trusted Operation
 PSTN Fax-network Separation
A brief description of each security policy is given below. A more detailed description
is given in the ST.
3.1 Auditing
The TOE supports both internal and external storage of audit records. The evaluated
configuration requires the use of an external syslog server for external audit record
storage. The connection between the TOE and the syslog server is protected using IP-
sec. No unauthorized access to the audit records is allowed by the TOE.
3.2 Data Encryption (a.k.a. cryptography)
3.2.1 IPsec
The TOE's IPsec supports both pre-shared keys (PSKs) and X.509v3 certificates for
authentication, the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), Internet Security Associa-
tion and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), Internet Key Exchange version 1
(IKEv1) protocol, and the following cryptographic algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (DH),
Elliptic Curve DH (ECDH), Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), Elliptic Curve DSA
(ECDSA), Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher
Block Chaining (AES-CBC), Advanced Encryption Standard-Electronic Code Book
(AES-ECB), Secure Hash Algorithm-based (SHA-based) Hashed Message Authenti-
cation Codes (HMACs), Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v1.5 signa-
ture generation and verification, and counter mode deterministic random bit generator
using AES (CTR_DRBG(AES)).
3.2.2 Drive-lock Password
For secure storage, all TOE models contain one field-replaceable, nonvolatile storage
device. This storage device is a disk-based, self-encrypting drive (SED).
The SED in the TOE uses the 256-bit "drive-lock password" as the border encryption
value (BEV), which is used to unlock the data on the drive. The BEV is generated by
the TOE using a CTR_DRBG(AES-256) algorithm and is stored as a key chain of one
in non-field replaceable nonvolatile storage (SPI flash and EEPROM) located inside
the TOE. The CTR_DRBG(AES-256) uses the Advanced Encryption Standard-
Counter (AES-CTR) algorithm.
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3.2.3 Digital Signatures for Trusted Update
The TOE uses digital signatures based on the RSA 2048-bit algorithm, SHA2-256 al-
gorithm, and PKCS#1 v1.5 to verify the authenticity of the signed update images. The
TOE's EWS interface allows an administrator to verify and install the signed update
images.
3.2.4 Digital Signatures for TSF Testing
The TOE uses digital signatures as part of its TSF testing functionality.
3.2.5 Cryptographic Implementations/Modules
The TOE uses multiple cryptographic implementations to accomplish its cryptograph-
ic functions. The table below provides the complete list of cryptographic implementa-
tions used to satisfy the [HCDPPv1.0] cryptographic requirements and maps the cryp-
tographic implementations to the firmware modules.
Cryptographic implementation Usage
HP FutureSmart Firmware OpenSSL
1.1.1
Drive-lock password (BEV) generation,
TSF Testing, Trusted Update
HP FutureSmart Firmware QuickSec 7.3
Cryptographic Module
IKE
HP FutureSmart Firmware Linux Kernel
Crypto API
IPsec
3.3 Identification, Authentication, and Authorization to Use
HCD Functions
The following table shows the Internal and External Authentication mechanisms sup-
ported by the TOE in the evaluated configuration and maps the mechanisms to the in-
terfaces that use them. The PJL interface does not appear in this table because the PJL
interface does not perform authentication of users.
Authentication type Mechanism name Supported interfaces
Internal Authentication Local Device Sign In Control Panel, EWS,
REST
External Authentication LDAP Sign In Control Panel, EWS
Windows Sign In Control Panel, EWS,
REST
3.4 Access Control
The TOE enforces access control on TSF data and User Data. Each piece of User Data
is assigned ownership and access to the data is limited by the access control mecha-
nism. The PSs used to define roles also affect the access control of each user. The ac-
cess control mechanism for User Data is explained in more detail in the TSS for
FDP_ACF.1.
The TOE contains one field-replaceable, nonvolatile storage device. This storage de-
vice is a disk-based SED whose cryptographic functions have been CC certified. To-
gether with the drive-lock password, the SED ensures that TSF Data and User Data on
the drive is not stored as plaintext.
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3.5 Image Overwrite
The TOE also supports the optional Image Overwrite function
(O.IMAGE_OVERWRITE) defined in [HCDPPv1.0]. [HCDPPv1.0] limits the scope
of this function to a field-replaceable nonvolatile storage device.
The TOE refers to the image overwrite feature as "Managing Temporary Job Files."
Although the TOE displays three options for image overwrite, in the evaluated config-
uration the administrator must select one of the following two options, both of which
completely overwrite the user document data (i.e., file).
 Secure Fast Erase (overwrite 1 time)
 Secure Sanitize Erase (overwrite 3 times)
3.6 Trusted Communications
The TOE uses IPsec to protect the communications between the TOE and trusted IT
entities as well as between the TOE and client computers. IPsec provides assured iden-
tification of the endpoints. It implements IKEv1 and transport mode. The TOE also
supports both X.509v3 certificates and pre-shared keys (PSKs) for endpoint authenti-
cation. For additional details on the TOE's IPsec features, see the TSS for
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.
3.7 Administrative Roles
The TOE supports administrative and non-administrative roles. Assignment to these
roles is controlled by the TOE's administrator. In the case of a user authenticated using
an External Authentication mechanism (Windows Sign In and LDAP Sign In), the
roles are implemented as permission sets. In the case of a user authenticated using an
Internal Authentication mechanism (Local Device Sign In), only an administrative ac-
count exists.
In addition, the TOE provides security management capabilities for TOE functions,
TSF data, and security attributes as defined by this ST.
3.8 Trusted Operation
TOE updates can be downloaded from the HP Inc. website. These updates are digitally
signed by the HCD manufacturer using the RSA 2048-bit algorithm, SHA2-256 algo-
rithm, and PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation. The TOE's EWS interface allows an
administrator to install the update images. When installing an update image, the TOE
validates the digital signature of the update image before installing the update image.
For additional details, see the TSS for FPT_TUD_EXT.1.
The TOE contains TSF testing functionality referred to as Whitelisting to help ensure
only authentic, known-good firmware files that have not been tampered with are load-
ed into memory. The TOE supports dm-verity to protect the integrity of the SquashFS
file system firmware images. On each boot, the TOE verifies the digital signature of
the dm-verity hash tree corresponding to a SquashFS file system firmware image.
During operation, dm-verity verifies the integrity of a file system block before loading
it into memory. The TOE uses digital signatures based on the RSA 2048-bit algorithm,
SHA2-256 algorithm, and PKCS#1 v1.5 to verify the integrity of a dm-verity hash
tree. For additional details, see the TSS for FPT_TST_EXT.1.
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3.9 PSTN Fax-network Separation
The PSTN fax capability is either included with or can be added to the TOE. In either
case, the TOE provides a distinct separation between the fax capabilities and the
Ethernet network connection of the TOE prohibiting communication via the fax inter-
face except when transmitting or receiving User Data using fax protocols. This is ex-
plained in more detail along with the fax capabilities in the TSS for
FDP_FXS_EXT.1.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes four assumptions on the usage and the operational
environment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL - Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it stores or processes, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN - TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE ac-
cording to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS - Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according to site
security policies
A.NETWORK - The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the TOE from di-
rect, public access to its LAN interface.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains five threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS - An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
User Document Data or change (modify or delete) User Job Data in the TOE through
one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE - An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF Data in
the TOE through one of the TOE’s interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE - A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security if the TOE is
permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE - An attacker may cause the installation of unauthor-
ized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE - An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise com-
promise the security of the TOE by monitoring or manipulating network communica-
tion.
The Security Target contains seven Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which
have been considered during the evaluation.
P.AUTHORIZATION - Users must be authorized before performing Document Pro-
cessing and administrative functions.
P.AUDIT - Security-relevant activities must be audited and the log of such actions
must be protected and transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION - The TOE must be able to identify itself to other devices
on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION - If the TOE stores User Document Data or Confiden-
tial TSF Data on Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL - Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or any other val-
ues that contribute to the creation of encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvola-
tile Storage of User Document Data or Confidential TSF Data must be protected from
unauthorized access and must not be stored on that storage device.
P.FAX_FLOW - If the TOE provides a PSTN fax function, it will ensure separation
between the PSTN fax line and the LAN.
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P.IMAGE_OVERWRITE - Upon completion or cancellation of a Document Pro-
cessing job, the TOE shall overwrite residual image data from its Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Device.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE is designed to be shared by many client computers and human users. It per-
forms the functions of printing, copying, scanning, faxing, and storing of documents.
It can be connected to a local network through the embedded Jetdirect Inside's built-in
Ethernet, to an analog telephone line using its internal analog fax modem, or to a USB
device using its USB port (but the use of which must be disabled in the evaluated con-
figuration except when the administrator performs trusted update via the USB).
The TOE's operating system is Linux 4.9.180 running on an ARM Cortex-A72 pro-
cessor.
The TOE supports Local Area Network (LAN) capabilities and protects all network
communications with IPsec, which is part of the Jetdirect Inside firmware. It imple-
ments Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1) and supports both pre-shared key
(PSK) authentication and X.509v3 certificate-based authentication. The TOE supports
both Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6).
The HTTP-based EWS administrative interface allows administrators to remotely
manage the features of the TOE using a web browser. This interface is protected using
IPsec.
The Web Services (WS) interfaces allow administrators to externally manage the
TOE. The evaluated configuration only supports the REST Web Services interface.
The REST Web Services interface is protected using IPsec.
For design reasons, only one computer can be used as the Administrative Computer
for the TOE in the evaluated configuration. This computer is used for administration
of the TOE. All other client computers connecting to the TOE to perform non-
administrative tasks are known as Network Client Computers.
Some models of the TOE contain a built-in PSTN connection for sending and receiv-
ing faxes. For models of the TOE that don't have built-in analog fax functionality, an
optional analog fax accessory can be installed to add analog fax functionality. The
Control Panel uses identification and authentication to control access for sending faxes
over PSTN.
The PJL interface is used by unauthenticated users via Network Client Computers to
submit print jobs and receive job status (e.g., view the print queue). The unauthenti-
cated users use PJL over an IPsec connection. It is also used in a non-administrative
capacity by the Administrative Computer to send print jobs to the TOE as well as to
receive job status. In general, PJL supports password-protected administrative com-
mands, but in the evaluated configuration these commands are disabled.
The TOE supports Microsoft SharePoint and remote file systems for the storing of
scanned documents. The TOE uses IPsec to protect the communication to SharePoint
and to the remote file systems. For remote file system connectivity, the TOE supports
the FTP and SMB protocols. (SharePoint is HTTP-based, but IPsec is used to protect
the HTTP-based communications.)
The TOE can be used to email scanned documents, email received faxes, or email sent
faxes. In addition, the TOE can send email alert messages to administrator-specified
email addresses, mobile devices, or to a website. The TOE supports protected com-
munications between itself and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) gateways. It
uses IPsec to protect the communication with the SMTP gateway. The TOE can only
send emails; it does not accept inbound emails.
The TOE supports the auditing of security-relevant functions by generating and for-
warding audit records to an external syslog server. It supports both internal and exter-
nal storage of audit records. The TOE uses IPsec to protect the communications be-
tween itself and the syslog server.
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The TOE requires a DNS server, an NTS server, and a WINS server in the Operational
Environment. The TOE connects to them over an IPsec connection.
Each HCD contains a user interface (UI) called the Control Panel. The Control Panel
consists of a touchscreen LCD, a physical home screen button, and a pull-out key-
board (“Flow” models only) as part of the Control Panel. The Control Panel is the
physical interface that a user uses to communicate with the TOE when physically us-
ing the HCD. The LCD screen displays information such as menus and status to the
user. It also provides virtual buttons to the user such as an alphanumeric keypad for
entering usernames and passwords. Both administrative and non-administrative users
can access the Control Panel.
The TOE supports both Internal Authentication mechanisms (Local Device Sign In)
and External Authentication mechanisms (LDAP Sign In and Windows Sign In i.e.,
Kerberos).
All TOE models contain one field-replaceable nonvolatile storage device. This storage
device is a disk-based self-encrypting drive (SED). It contains a section called Job
Storage which is a user-visible file system where user document data, such as stored
print, stored copy, and stored received faxes, are located.
The Jetdirect Inside firmware and System firmware components comprise the firm-
ware on the system. Both firmware components work together to provide the security
functionality of the TOE. They share the same operating system. The operating system
is part of the System firmware.
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6 Documentation
Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Samsung Multifunction Printers
Samsung Color MFP SL-X5230NR / SL-X5280NR
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX / SL-X9700LX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G306X / SL-G256X / SL-G409X / SL-G509X
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K5250NR / SL-K5300NR
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K / SL-G509K / SL-G609K
Edition 1, 6/2022
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
[HCDPPv1.0] does not requires the developer to perform any testing.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator performed testing remotely by connecting to the test environment using
Microsoft Remote Desktop (RDP). The developers set up the test environment with
the actual TOE models in Boise, Idaho, USA. The testing was performed between
2022-05-05 and 2022-07-15 and re-testing was performed between 2022-09-15 and
2022-09-21. The tests included both automated and manual tests which the evaluator
executed successfully.
The developer configured the TOE according to the [CCECG]. Before initiating the
testing the evaluator verified that TOE was configured correctly. He also verified that
the test environment was properly set up by the developer. The following models were
tested:
TOE Name (hardware mo-
dels)
Code
name
System
Firmware Vers-
ion
Jetdirect Inside
Firmware Vers-
ion
Samsung Color MFP SL-
X5230NR
Ammolite 2503238_000229 JOL25030046
HP Laserjet Managed Flow
MFP E82650
Moonstone 2503238_000228
Samsung Mono MFP SL-
K6300
Pearl 2503238_000225
Re-testing was performed on the same hardware models, but with the new System
Firmware version:
TOE Name (hardware mo-
dels)
Code
name
System
Firmware Vers-
ion
Jetdirect Inside
Firmware Vers-
ion
Samsung Color MFP SL-
X5230NR
Ammolite 2503251_000033 JOL25030046
HP Laserjet Managed Flow
MFP E82650
Moonstone 2503251_000035
Samsung Mono MFP SL-
K6300
Pearl 2503251_000029
The System Firmware Version was updated after testing, however no product code
was updated.
The evaluator executed all required tests in [HCDPPv1.0], [ERRATA] and Technical
Decisions listed in [ST] 2.1.1 "Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices; IPA, NIAP,
and the MFP Technical Community ([HCDPP])".
The evaluator also re-executed 93 tests on the updated TOE version to verify that the
updates to the TOE did not affect any functions of the TSF.
All test results were consistent to the expected test results.
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7.3 Penetration Testing
Port scans penetration tests were performed against the TOE interfaces that are acces-
sible to a potential attacker (IPv4 and IPv6 UDP and TCP ports of the TOE).
Since an attack requires an attack surface, the evaluator decided to start by examining
if the TOE exposes such interfaces, i.e., open ports.
The TOE and operational environment was configured according to [ST] and
[CCECG].
TOE Name (hardware mo-
dels)
Code
name
System
Firmware Vers-
ion
Jetdirect Inside
Firmware Vers-
ion
Samsung Color MFP SL-
X5230NR
Ammolite 2503238_000229 JOL25030046
Samsung Mono MFP SL-
K6300LX
Pearl 2503238_000225
HP LaserJet Managed MFP
E82650
Moonstone 2503238_000228
The evaluator notes that the developer updated the System firmware to fix an issue
with the seeding of OpenSSL DRBG (used for generating Drive-lock password) dur-
ing the evaluation. Since the Jetdirect Inside firmware which implements the network
functionality was not updated, the evaluator determined that there is no need to re-
execute the port scan penetration tests on the updated firmware.
The evaluator examined all potential interfaces, i.e., all IPv4 and IPv6 UDP and TCP
ports.
The evaluator examined the results from the penetration test. The evaluator deter-
mined that only UDP port 500 (ISAKMP) is available outside of IPsec which was the
expected outcome.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 18 (25)
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following items will need to be adhered to in the evaluated configuration.
 Only one Administrative Computer is used to manage the TOE.
 Third-party solutions must not be installed on the TOE.
 PC Fax Send must be disabled.
 Fax polling receive must be disabled.
 Device USB must be disabled.
 Host USB plug and play must be disabled.
 Firmware upgrades through any means other than the EWS (e.g., PJL) and USB
must be disabled.
 All non-fax stored jobs must be assigned a Job PIN or Job Encryption Password.
 Networking XML Services must be disabled.
 External file system access through PJL and PS must be disabled.
 Only X.509v3 certificates and pre-shared key are supported methods for IPsec au-
thentication (IPsec authentication using Kerberos is not supported).
 IPsec Authentication Headers (AH) must be disabled.
 Control Panel Mandatory Sign-in must be enabled (this disables the Guest role).
 SNMP must be disabled.
 The Service PIN, used by a customer support engineer to access functions availa-
ble to support personnel, must be disabled.
 Wireless functionality must be disabled:
 Near Field Communication (NFC) must be disabled.
 Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) must be disabled.
 Wireless Direct Print must be disabled.
 Wireless station must be disabled.
 PJL device access commands must be disabled.
 When using Windows Sign In, the Windows domain must reject Microsoft NT
LAN Manager (NTLM) connections.
 Remote Control-Panel use is disallowed.
 Local Device Sign In accounts must not be created (i.e., only the built-in Device
Administrator account is allowed as a Local Device Sign In account).
 Access must be blocked to the following Web Services (WS) using IPsec:
 Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services
 WS* Web Services
 Device Administrator Password must be set.
 Remote Configuration Password must not be set.
 OAUTH2 use is disallowed.
 SNMP over HTTP use is disallowed.
 HP Workpath Platform must be disabled.
 Licenses must not be installed to enable features beyond what is supported in the
evaluated configuration.
 All received faxes must be converted into stored faxes.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 19 (25)
 Fax Archive must be disabled.
 Fax Forwarding must be disabled.
 Internet Fax and LAN Fax must be disabled.
 Firmware updates through REST Web Services is disallowed.
 Scan+ must be disabled.
 Remote User Auto Capture must be disabled.
 PS privileged operators must be disabled.
 Cancel print jobs after unattended error must be enabled.
 Smart Cloud Print must be disabled.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 20 (25)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
PP assurance activities AGD_HCDPP.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
Labeling of the TOE ALC_CMC.1 PASS
TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.1 PASS
PP assurance activities ALC_HCDPP.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives for the ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Operational Environment
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Stated Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
PP assurance activities ASE_HCDPP.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing - ATE_IND.1 PASS
conformance
PP assurance activities ATE_HCDPP.1 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.1 PASS
PP assurance activities AVA_HCDPP.1 PASS
Entropy Description AEN
PP assurance activities AEN_HCDPP.1 PASS
Key Management Description AKM
PP assurance activities AKM_HCDPP.1 PASS
Note that the evaluators have used a notation similar to assurance classes for PP assur-
ance activities that does not belong to a particular assurance class in CC. For PP re-
quirements that are related to existing assurance classes, the evaluators have used a
notation similar to assurance components for the requirements.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 21 (25)
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 22 (25)
11 Glossary
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AH Authentication Header (IPsec)
Arm Advanced RISC Machine
BEV Border Encryption Value
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSEC The Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
CTR Counter mode
CTR_DRBG Counter mode DRBG
DH Diffie-Hellman
DNS Domain Name System
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAL Evaluated Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload (IPsec)
EWS Embedded Web Server
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
HCD Hardcopy Device
HCDPP Hardcopy Device Protection Profile
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
HP Hewlett-Packard
I&A Identification and Authentication
IKE Internet Key Exchange (IPsec)
IP Internet Protocol
IPv4 IP version 4
IPv6 IP version 6
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
ISAKMP Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (IPsec)
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
LAN Local Area Network
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MFP Multifunction Printer
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 23 (25)
NFC Near Field Communication
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NTLM Microsoft NT LAN Manager
NTS Network Time Service
OSP Organizational Security Policy
OXP Open Extensibility Platform
OXPd OXP device layer
PJL Printer Job Language
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PP Protection Profile
PS Permission Set
PSK Pre-Shared Key
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
REST Representational State Transfer
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB Server Message Block
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
EP External Publication
SPD Security Problem Definition (CC)
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface
SSC Security Subsystem Class
ST Security Target
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSS TOE Summary Specification
USB Universal Serial Bus
WINS Windows Internet Name Service
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 24 (25)
12 Bibliography
ST Samsung Color MFP SL-X5230NR / SL-X5280NR, Samsung Color
MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX,
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX /
SL-X9700LX, Samsung Color MFP SL-G306X / SL-G256X / SL-
G409X / SL-G509X, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K5250NR / SL-
K5300NR, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX /SL-K6350LX / SL-
K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-
K9600LX / SL-K9700LX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-
G356K / SL-G509K / SL-G609K Security Target, HP Inc., 2022-10-
12, document version 1.6
HCDPPv1.0 Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices; IPA, NIAP, and the MFP,
2015-09-10, Version 1.0
ERRATA Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0, Errata #1, June 2017
CCECG Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Samsung Mul-
tifunction Printers
Samsung Color MFP SL-X5230NR / SL-X5280NR, Samsung Color
MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX,
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX /
SL-X9700LX, Samsung Color MFP SL-G306X / SL-G256X / SL-
G409X / SL-G509X, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K5250NR / SL-
K5300NR, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-
K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-
K9600LX / SL-K9700LX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-
G356K / SL-G509K / SL-G609K, HP Inc., 6/2022, Edition 1
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCpart2 + CCpart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
EP-002 EP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2021-10-26, document
version 34.0
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report- HP G2 Samsung HCDPP
22FMV4120-20 1.0 2022-11-10
CSEC2022009 25 (25)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.2 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:
 Scheme Note 15 - Testing
 Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
 Scheme Note 21 - NIAP PP Certifications
 Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
 Scheme Note 23 - Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
 Scheme Note 25 - Use of CAVP-tests in CC evaluations
 Scheme Note 27 - ST requirements at the time of application for certification
 Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for aplication, evalua-tion and certification