Document Version 1.2
Xerox Multi-Function Device
Security Target
WorkCentre® 7845/7855 Xerox®
ConnectKey® Technology with SIPRNet
Support
Prepared by:
Xerox Corporation Computer Sciences Corporation
800 Phillips Road 7231 Parkway Drive
Webster, New York 14580 Hanover, Maryland 21076
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Copyright
2016 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved.
©2016 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved. Xerox and the sphere of connectivity design are
trademarks of Xerox Corporation in the United States and/or other counties.
All copyrights referenced herein are the property of their respective owners. Other company trademarks
are also acknowledged.
Document Version: 1.2 (June 2016).
Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target
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Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................6
1.1. ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION.....................................................................................................................6
1.2. TOE OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................7
1.2.1. Usage and Security Features..........................................................................................................7
1.2.2. TOE Type ........................................................................................................................................9
1.2.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware .................................................................9
1.3. TOE DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................................................9
1.3.1. Physical Scope of the TOE ..............................................................................................................9
1.3.2. Logical Scope of the TOE ..............................................................................................................10
1.4. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION...................................................................................................................13
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS......................................................................................14
2.1. COMMON CRITERIA................................................................................................................................14
2.2. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................................14
2.3. PACKAGE CLAIMS...................................................................................................................................14
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.......................................................................15
3.1. DEFINITIONS .........................................................................................................................................15
3.1.1. Users ............................................................................................................................................15
3.1.2. Objects (Assets)............................................................................................................................15
3.1.3. Operations....................................................................................................................................17
3.1.4. Channels.......................................................................................................................................18
3.2. ASSUMPTIONS.......................................................................................................................................18
3.3. THREATS ..............................................................................................................................................19
3.3.1. Threats Addressed by the TOE .....................................................................................................19
3.3.2. Threats Addressed by the IT Environment....................................................................................19
3.4. ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ........................................................................................................20
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................21
4.1. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..........................................................................................................21
4.2. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................22
4.3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT.................................................................................23
4.4. RATIONALE FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES.......................................................................................................23
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION .............................................................29
5.1. FPT_FDI_EXP RESTRICTED FORWARDING OF DATA TO EXTERNAL INTERFACES ..................................................29
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................31
6.1. CONVENTIONS.......................................................................................................................................31
6.2. TOE SECURITY POLICIES..........................................................................................................................31
6.2.1. IP Filter SFP...................................................................................................................................31
6.2.2. User Access Control SFP ...............................................................................................................32
6.2.3. TOE Function Access Control SFP .................................................................................................34
6.3. SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .....................................................................................................34
6.3.1. Class FAU: Security audit..............................................................................................................35
6.3.2. Class FCO: Communication...........................................................................................................37
6.3.3. Class FCS: Cryptographic support.................................................................................................37
6.3.4. Class FDP: User data protection...................................................................................................40
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6.3.5. Class FIA: Identification and authentication ................................................................................43
6.3.6. Class FMT: Security management................................................................................................44
6.3.7. Class FPR: Privacy.........................................................................................................................48
6.3.8. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................48
6.3.9. Class FTA: TOE access...................................................................................................................48
6.3.10. Class FTP: Trusted paths/channels ..........................................................................................48
6.4. EXPLICITLY STATED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE........................................................................................49
6.4.1. FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces..........................................49
6.5. TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ...............................................................................................49
6.6. RATIONALE FOR SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................................50
FMT_SMF.1.................................................................................................................................................57
Supports purge function by enabling administrator to invoke purge.........................................................57
6.7. RATIONALE FOR SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................57
6.8. RATIONALE FOR DEPENDENCIES................................................................................................................57
6.8.1. Security Functional Requirement Dependencies ..........................................................................57
6.8.2. Security Assurance Requirement Dependencies...........................................................................60
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..........................................................................62
7.1. TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS......................................................................................................................62
7.1.1. Image Overwrite & Purge (TSF_IOW_PURGE) .............................................................................62
7.1.2. Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)........................................................................................63
7.1.3. Authentication (TSF_ AUT)...........................................................................................................64
7.1.4. Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)...........................................................................................65
7.1.5. Security Audit (TSF_FAU)..............................................................................................................65
7.1.6. Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS) ...........................................................................................66
7.1.7. User Data Protection – Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE) .............................................................66
7.1.8. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER) .................................................................67
7.1.9. Network Security (TSF_NET_SEC).................................................................................................67
7.1.10. Security Management (TSF_FMT) ...........................................................................................67
8. GLOSSARY .............................................................................................................70
9. ACRONYMS.............................................................................................................74
10. BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................76
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List of Figures
FIGURE 1: WORKCENTRE® 7845/7855 XEROX® CONNECTKEY® TECHNOLOGY WITH SIPRNET SUPPORT..................................7
List of Tables
TABLE 1: ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ...........................................................................................................................6
TABLE 2: SYSTEM USER AND ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE................................................................................................10
TABLE 3: USERS.......................................................................................................................................................15
TABLE 4: USER DATA ................................................................................................................................................16
TABLE 5: TSF DATA ..................................................................................................................................................16
TABLE 6: TSF DATA CATEGORIZATION ..........................................................................................................................16
TABLE 7: HCD FUNCTIONS.........................................................................................................................................17
TABLE 8: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE TOE.........................................................................................................................18
TABLE 9: THREATS TO USER DATA................................................................................................................................19
TABLE 10: THREATS TO TSF DATA...............................................................................................................................19
TABLE 11: ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES............................................................................................................20
TABLE 12: SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................................................21
TABLE 13: SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE IT ENVIRONMENT.............................................................................................22
TABLE 14: SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE NON-IT ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................................23
TABLE 15: COMPLETENESS OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES .......................................................................................................24
TABLE 16: SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...........................................................................................................25
TABLE 17: USER ACCESS CONTROL SFP........................................................................................................................32
TABLE 18: ATTRIBUTES DEFINITION..............................................................................................................................33
TABLE 19: TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS....................................................................................................34
TABLE 20: AUDIT DATA REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................................36
TABLE 21: CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS ......................................................................................................................38
TABLE 22: CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION.................................................................................................................39
TABLE 23: CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DISTRIBUTION ...............................................................................................................39
TABLE 24: EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.3).................................................................................................................................49
TABLE 25: COMPLETENESS OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................51
TABLE 26: SUFFICIENCY OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.....................................................................................52
TABLE 27: SFR DEPENDENCIES SATISFIED ......................................................................................................................57
TABLE 28: EAL2 (AUGMENTED WITH ALC_FLR.3) SAR DEPENDENCIES SATISFIED................................................................60
TABLE 29: ACRONYMS...............................................................................................................................................74
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2016 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This Security Target (ST) specifies the security claims of the WorkCentre®
7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with SIPRNet Support in accordance
with the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC).
1.1. ST and TOE Identification
Table 1 below presents key identification details relevant to the CC evaluation of the
WorkCentre® 7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with SIPRNet Support.
Table 1: ST and TOE identification
ST Title: Xerox Multi-Function Device Security Target, WorkCentre®
7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with SIPRNet
Support
ST Version: 1.2
Publication Date: 14 June 2016
Authors: CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories, Xerox
Corporation
TOE Identification: WorkCentre® 7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with
SIPRNet Support
System Software: 073.040.035.28000 with SNMPV3_V2.dlm
and 876840v5.dlm patches
EAL: EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.3)
ST Evaluator: CSC Security Testing/Certification Laboratories
Keywords: Xerox, Multi-Function Device, Image Overwrite, WorkCentre,
Printer, Scanner, Copier, Facsimile, Fax, Document Server,
Document Storage and Retrieval, Disk overwrite, All-In-One,
MFD, MFP, ISO/IEC 15408, Common Criteria, FIPS, Protection
Profile, Security Target
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2016 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved.
1.2. TOE Overview
1.2.1. Usage and Security Features
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Xerox multi-function device (MFD)
WorkCentre® 7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with SIPRNet Support.
The TOE copies and prints with scan and fax capabilities. The Xerox Embedded
Fax Accessory provides local analog fax capability over Public Switched Telephone
Network (PSTN) connections and also enables LanFax1.
Xerox’s Workflow Scanning Accessory is part of the TOE configuration. This
accessory allows documents to be scanned at the device with the resulting image
being sent via email, transferred to a remote file repository, kept in a private (scan)
mailbox or placed on a personal USB storage device.
The TOE can integrate with an IPv4 network with native support for DHCP. The
hardware included in the TOE is shown in the figure below.
Figure 1: WorkCentre® 7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with SIPRNet Support
The TOE provides the following security features:
 Image overwrite and data purge. The image overwrite feature overwrites
temporary image files created during a copy, print, scan or fax job when those
files are no longer needed. Overwrite is also invoked at the instruction of a job
owner or administrator and at start-up. The purge feature allows an
1
LanFax enables fax jobs to be submitted from the desktop via printing protocols.
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authorized administrator to permanently delete all customer-supplied data on
the TOE. This addresses residual data concerns when the TOE is
decommissioned from service or redeployed to a different environment.
 Hard disk encryption. The TOE stores temporary image data created during
a copy, print, scan and fax job on the single shared hard disk drive (HDD).
This temporary image data consists of the original data submitted and
additional files created during a job. All partitions of the HDD used for
spooling temporary files are encrypted. The encryption key is created on
each power-up.
 Audit. The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g.,
print/scan/fax job submission) to identified users. The audit logs, which are
stored locally in a 15000 entry circular log, are available to TOE
administrators and can be exported in comma separated format for viewing
and analysis.
 Network filtering. The TOE allows filtering rules to be specified for IPv4
network connections based on IP address and port number.
 Secure communication. The TOE provides support for a number of secure
communication protocols:
o Transport Layer Security (TLS) support is available for protecting
communication over the Web User Interface (Web UI) and SMTP
email communications.
o Secure Shell (SSH) File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) and TLS are
available for protecting document transfers to a remote file depository.
o Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) support is available for protecting
communication over IPv4 networks.
o Kerberos and TLS support are available for protecting communication
with a remote authentication server.
o SNMPv3 with AES for protecting SNMP messages.
 Authentication & access control. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE
requires users and system administrators to authenticate before granting
access to user (copy, print, fax etc) or system administration functions via the
Web User Interface (Web UI) or the Local User Interface (LUI). The user or
system administrator must enter a username and password at either the Web
UI or the LUI. The password is obscured as it is being entered. The TOE
provides role based access control as configured by the system
administrator.
 Network authentication. The TOE supports smart card, Kerberos and
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) for network authentication.
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1.2.2. TOE Type
The TOE is an MFD that provides copy and print, document scanning and fax
services.
1.2.3. Required Non-TOE Hardware, Software and Firmware
The TOE does not require any additional hardware, software or firmware in order to
function as a multi-function device. Additional features require non-TOE support as
follows:
 Network security and fax flow features are only useful in environments where
the TOE is connected to a network or PSTN.
 Network identification is only available when LDAP or Kerberos remote
authentication services are present in the environment.
 Smart card authentication requires Federal Information Processing Standard
(FIPS) 201 Personal Identity Verification Common Access Card (PIV-CAC)
compliant smart cards and readers or equivalent. In support of smart card
authentication, a Windows Domain Controller must also be present in the
environment.
 The TOE may be configured to reference an NTP server for time.
1.3. TOE Description
1.3.1. Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is an MFD (WorkCentre® 7845/7855 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology
with SIPRNet Support) that consists of a printer, copier, scanner, fax and associated
administrator and user guidance. The TOE comprises all software and firmware
within the MFD enclosure.
Users can determine version numbers and whether the Xerox Embedded Fax
Accessory, Xerox Workflow Scan Accessory and Image Overwrite Security Package
are installed by reviewing the TOE configuration report.
The administrator and user guidance included in the TOE are listed in Table 2.
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Table 2: System User and Administrator Guidance
Title Version Date
Xerox® WorkCentre® 7800/7800i Series
Color Multifunction Printer
2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology
System Administrator Guide
1.3 February 2016
Xerox® WorkCentre® 7800/7800i Series
Color Multifunction Printer
2016 Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology
User Guide
1.3 February 2016
Secure Installation and Operation of
Your WorkCentre® 3655
WorkCentre®
5845/5855/5865/5875/5890
WorkCentre® 5945/5955
WorkCentre® 6655
WorkCentre® 7220/7225
WorkCentre® 7830/7835/7845/7855
WorkCentre® 7970
Xerox® ConnectKey® Technology with
SIPRNet Support
1.1 May 2016
The TOE’s physical interfaces include a power port, an ethernet port, USB ports,
serial port, fax ports, LUI with keypad, a document scanner, a document feeder and
a document output.
1.3.2. Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE logical boundary is the operating system software that provides the
following security functions:
 Image Overwrite & Purge (TSF_IOW_PURGE)
 Authentication (TSF_ AUT)
 Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
 Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
 Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
 User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
 Network Security (TSF_NET_SEC)
 Information Flow Security (TSF_ FLOW)
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 Security Management (TSF_FMT)
 User Data Protection – Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE)
1.3.2.1. Image Overwrite (TSF_IOW_PURGE)
The Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO) function overwrites files created during job
processing. The IIO function automatically starts for all abnormally terminated copy,
print, scan and fax jobs stored on the HDD prior to coming on-line at reboot or after
a power failure/disorderly shutdown.
The On-Demand Image Overwrite (ODIO) function overwrites the hard drive(s) on-
demand of the system administrator. The ODIO function operates in two modes:
full ODIO and standard ODIO. A standard ODIO overwrites all files written to
temporary storage areas of the HDD. A full ODIO overwrites those files as well as
the fax mailbox/dial directory and scan-to-mailbox data.
The Data Purge function at the command of the system administrator overwrites all
jobs that are actively being processed by the TOE or are being held on the TOE for
later processing; overwrites all jobs and log files that are stored on the hard drive(s);
overwrites all local authentication data stored on the internal database; overwrites all
customer data stored in address books and accounting databases and resets the fax
and copy controller Nonvolatile Memory (NVM) on the TOE to their factory default
values.
1.3.2.2. Authentication (TSF_AUT)
A user must authenticate by entering a username and password prior to being
granted access to the LUI or the Web UI. While the user is typing the password, the
TOE obscures each character entered.
Upon successful authentication, users are granted access to functions based on
their role. The system administrator defines the privileges associated to each role.
If configured for local authentication the system requires the system administrator to
create each user and assign associated credentials. The system will authenticate
the user against an internal database. The TOE may alternatively be configured to
use an external authentication store as described by section 1.3.2.3.
The TOE enforces administrator defined session timeout periods for the LUI and
Web UI.
1.3.2.3. Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
As an alternative to local authentication, the TOE may be configured to refer to an
external identity server (a trusted remote IT entity). User credentials entered at the
LUI or Web UI are authenticated at the server instead of the TOE. The network
authentication services supported by the TOE include: smart card authentication,
LDAP v4, Kerberos v5 (Solaris) and Kerberos v5 (Windows 2000/2003/2008).
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1.3.2.4. Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
The TOE generates audit logs that record events (e.g. copy/print/scan/fax job
completion) and associated users. The audit logs, which are stored locally in a
15000 entry circular log, are available to TOE administrators and can be exported
for viewing and analysis. The downloaded audit records are in comma separated
format.
1.3.2.5. Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
The TOE utilizes digital signature generation and verification (RSA), data encryption
(TDES, AES), key establishment (RSA) and cryptographic checksum generation and
secure hash computation (HMAC, SHA-1) in support of disk encryption, SFTP, TLS,
TLS/HTTPS, TLS/SMTP, IPsec and SNMPv3. The TOE also provides random
number generation in support of cryptographic operations.
1.3.2.6. User Data Protection – Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE)
The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES) to support encryption and decryption of
designated portions of the hard disk where user image data files may be temporarily
stored.
1.3.2.7. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
The TOE enforces administrator defined IPv4 filtering rules.
1.3.2.8. Network Security (TSF_NET_SEC)
The TOE supports the following secure communication protocols: TLS for Web UI;
SFTP and TLS for document transfers to the remote file depository; IPsec for
communication over IPv4; SMTP over TLS for email; SNMPv3 with AES for SNMP
messages and Kerberos and LDAP over TLS for remote authentication.
1.3.2.9. Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
The TOE prevents unintentional transmission of data between its interfaces and the
network and/or PSTN to which the TOE is connected.
1.3.2.10. Security Management (TSF_FMT)
The security functions of the TOE are managed by the system administrator from
the LUI and WebUI client. User and role management is only accessible via the Web
UI.
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1.4. Evaluated Configuration
To implement the security features identified in section 1.2.1 of this Security Target,
the TOE must be configured in accordance with the Secure Installation and
Operation guidance document (see
Table 2).
The following components are included in the evaluated configuration:
 Xerox Embedded Fax Accessory
 Smart card authentication
No claims are made regarding security features that are not explicitly identified in
this Security Target.
Please see http://www.xerox.com/information-security/product/enus.html for the
latest Xerox security information, bulletins and advisory responses.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1. Common Criteria
The ST is based upon the following, referenced hereafter as [CC]:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 4
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; Version 3.1, Revision 4
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components; Version 3.1, Revision 4
This ST claims the following CC conformance:
 Part 2 extended
 Part 3 conformant
2.2. Protection Profile Claims
None.
2.3. Package Claims
EAL2-augmented (ALC_FLR.3).
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3. Security Problem
Definition
3.1. Definitions
3.1.1. Users
Users are entities that are external to the TOE and which interact with the TOE.
There may be two types of Users: Normal and Administrator, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Users
Designation Definition
U.USER Any authorized User.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data
processing functions of the TOE
U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to
manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions
may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). Administrators may
possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override
portions of the TSP.
This ST specifies:
 U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)
 U.ADMINISTRATOR (Accounting Administrator)
If U.ADMINISTRATOR is specified without identifying the
above, then it refers to both roles.
3.1.2. Objects (Assets)
Objects are passive entities in the TOE, that contain or receive information, and
upon which Subjects perform Operations. In this Security Target, Objects are
equivalent to TOE Assets. There are three types of Objects: User Data, TSF Data,
and Functions.
3.1.2.1. User Data
User Data are data created by and for Users and do not affect the operation of the
TOE Security Functionality (TSF). This type of data is composed of two objects:
User Document Data, and User Function Data, as shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: User data
Designation Definition
D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user’s
document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or
electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the
hardcopy device while processing an original document and printed
hardcopy output.
D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user’s document or job to
be processed by the TOE.
3.1.2.2. TSF Data
TSF Data is data created by and for the TOE and might affect the operation of the
TOE. This type of data is composed of two objects: TSF Protected Data and TSF
Confidential Data. The TSF Data assets for this TOE has been categorized
according to whether they require protection from unauthorized alteration (TSF
Protected Data) or protection from both unauthorized disclosure and unauthorized
alteration (TSF Confidential Data). The data assets have been identified and
categorized in Table 5 and Table 6 below.
Table 5: TSF data
Designation Definition
D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is
neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect
on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is
acceptable.
D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or
alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of
the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE.
Table 6: TSF data categorization
TSF Protected Data TSF Confidential Data
Configuration data Audit Log
Device and network status information and
configuration settings
Cryptographic keys
Device service and diagnostic data X.509 Certificate (TLS)
User IDs and Passwords
User Access Permissions
802.1x Credentials and Configuration
IP filter table (rules)
Email Addresses for fax forwarding
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TSF Protected Data TSF Confidential Data
SNMPv3 authentication key
Note: TSF data is categorized as:
1. TSF Protected Data. Data that should be protected, but does not affect the
operational security of the TOE if it is disclosed (D.PROT).
2. TSF Confidential Data. Data that does affect the operational security of the
TOE if it is disclosed (D.CONF).
3.1.2.3. HCD Functions
Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be
present in Hardcopy Device (HCD) products (HCD is an IEEE term for MFD). The
HCD functions relevant to the TOE are defined in Table 7 below.
Table 7: HCD functions
Designation Definition
F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to
physical document output
F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to
electronic document output
F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to
physical document output
F.FAX Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a
telephone-based document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in
which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted
to physical document output
F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored
during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs
F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data
or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional
practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as
wired network media and most radio-frequency wireless media
3.1.3. Operations
Operations are a specific type of action performed by a Subject on an Object. In this
Security Target, five types of operations are considered: those that result in
disclosure of information (Read), those that result in alteration of information
(Create, Modify, Delete), and those that invoke a function (Execute).
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3.1.4. Channels
Channels are the mechanisms through which data can be transferred into and out of
the TOE. In this Security Target, four types of Channels are allowed:
1. Private Medium Interface. Mechanisms for exchanging information that use
(1) wired or wireless electronic methods over a communications medium
which, in conventional practice, is not accessed by multiple simultaneous
Users; or, (2) Operator Panel and displays that are part of the TOE. It is an
input-output channel.
2. Shared-medium Interface. Mechanisms for exchanging information that use
wired or wireless network or non-network electronic methods over a
communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be
simultaneously accessed by multiple Users. It is an input-output channel.
3. Original Document Handler. Mechanisms for transferring User Document
Data into the TOE in hardcopy form. It is an input channel.
4. Hardcopy Output Handler. Mechanisms for transferring User Document
Data out of the TOE in hardcopy form. It is an output channel.
In practice, at least one input channel and one output channel would be present in
any HCD configuration, and at least one of those channels would be either an
Original Document Handler or a Hardcopy Output Handler.
3.2. Assumptions
The Security Objectives and SFRs defined in subsequent sections of this ST are
based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this section are
satisfied.
Table 8: Assumptions for the TOE
Assumption Definition
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that
provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical
components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of
their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those
policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures
of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the
manufacturer’s guidance and documentation, and correctly
configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those
policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for
malicious purposes.
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3.3. Threats
3.3.1. Threats Addressed by the TOE
This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat
agents:
1. Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the
TOE
2. Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE
functions for which they are not authorized.
3. Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data
in ways for which they not authorized.
4. Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose
the TOE to unanticipated threats.
The threats and policies defined in this ST address the threats posed by these threat
agents. This section describes threats to assets described in section 3.1.2.
Table 9: Threats to user data
Threat Affected Asset Description
T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to
unauthorized persons
T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized
persons
T.FUNC.ALT D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized
persons
Table 10: Threats to TSF data
Threat Affected Asset Description
T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized
persons
T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to
unauthorized persons
T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by
unauthorized persons
3.3.2. Threats Addressed by the IT Environment
There are no threats addressed by the IT Environment.
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3.4. Organizational Security Policies
This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the
TOE. OSPs are used to provide a basis for security objectives that are commonly
desired by TOE Owners in this operational environment, but for which it is not
practical to universally define the assets being protected or the threats to those
assets.
Table 11: Organizational Security Policies
Name Definition
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security,
Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as
permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security,
records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and
security-relevant events will be created, maintained,
and protected from unauthorized disclosure or
alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized
personnel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external
interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces
will be controlled by the TOE and its IT
environment.
P.PURGE.DATA To prevent unauthorized disclosure of customer
data stored on the TOE during decommissioning, a
function will be provided that makes all customer-
supplied User Data and TSF Data permanently
irretrievable from Nonvolatile Storage Devices .
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4. Security Objectives
The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security
problem or threat. Threats can be directed against the TOE or the security
environment or both, therefore, the CC identifies two categories of security
objectives:
1. Security objectives for the TOE, and
2. Security objectives for the environment.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives that the TOE shall fulfill.
Table 12: Security objectives for the TOE
Objective Definition
O.DOC.NO.DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from
unauthorized disclosure.
O.DOC.NO.ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from
unauthorized alteration.
O.FUNC.NO.ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from
unauthorized alteration.
O.PROT.NO.ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from
unauthorized alteration.
O.CONF.NO.DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from
unauthorized disclosure.
O.CONF.NO.ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from
unauthorized alteration.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of
Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in
accordance with security policies before allowing them to
use the TOE.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces
in accordance with security policies.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and
security-relevant events, and prevent its unauthorized
disclosure or alteration.
O.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROT
ECTED
The TOE shall ensure that internal audit records are
protected from unauthorized access, deletion and
modifications.
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Objective Definition
O.PURGE.DATA The TOE shall provide a function that makes all User Data
and TSF Data permanently irretrievable from Nonvolatile
Storage Devices when invoked by an authorized
administrator.
4.2. Security Objectives for the
Operational Environment
This section describes the security objectives that must be fulfilled by IT methods in
the IT environment of the TOE.
Table 13: Security objectives for the IT environment
Objective Definition
OE.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to
another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall
ensure that those records are protected from
unauthorized access, deletion and modifications.
OE.AUDIT.ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are
exported from the TOE to another trusted IT
product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those
records can be accessed in order to detect
potential security violations, and only by
authorized persons
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from
unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces.
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED The IT environment shall provide support for user
identification and authentication and protect the
user credentials in transit when TOE operates in
remote identification and authentication mode.
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4.3. Security Objectives for the Non-IT
Environment
This section describes the security objectives that must be fulfilled by non-IT
methods in the non-IT environment of the TOE.
Table 14: Security objectives for the non-IT environment
Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that
provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the
TOE.
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be
authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies
and procedures of their organization.
OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organization, and
have the training and competence to follow those policies and
procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are
aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, have the training, competence, and time to
follow the manufacturer’s guidance and documentation, and
correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with
those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators
will not use their privileged access rights for malicious
purposes.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at
appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual
patterns of activity.
4.4. Rationale for Security Objectives
This section demonstrates that each threat, organizational security policy, and
assumption are mitigated by at least one security objective for the TOE, and that
those security objectives counter the threats, enforce the policies, and uphold the
assumptions.
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Table 15: Completeness of security objectives
T.DOC.DIS
T.DOC.ALT
T.DOC.ALT
T.PROT.ALT
T.CONF.DIS
T.CONF.ALT
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
P.PURGE.DATA
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
A.USER.TRAINING
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
A.ADMIN.TRUST
O.DOC.NO.DIS X
O.DOC.NO.ALT X
O.FUNC.NO.ALT X
O.PROT.NO.ALT X
O.CONF.NO.DIS X
O.CONF.NO.ALT X
O.USER.AUTHORIZED X X X X X X X
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED X
O.AUDIT.LOGGED X
O.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTED X
O.PURGE.DATA X
OE.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTED X
OE.AUDIT.ACCESS.AUTHORIZED X
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED X
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED X X X X X X X
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED X
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED X X X X X X X
OE.USER.TRAINED X
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED X
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED X
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED X
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Table 16: Sufficiency of security objectives
Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
T.DOC.DIS User Document Data
may be disclosed to
unauthorized persons
O.DOC.NO.DIS protects D.DOC
from unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
T.DOC.ALT User Document Data
may be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.DOC.NO.ALT protects D.DOC
from unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data
may be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.FUNC.NO.ALT protects D.FUNC
from unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
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Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data
may be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.PROT.NO.ALT protects D.PROT
from unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data
may be disclosed to
unauthorized persons
O.CONF.NO.DIS protects D.CONF
from unauthorized disclosure
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data
may be altered by
unauthorized persons
O.CONF.NO.ALT protects D.CONF
from unauthorized alteration
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
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Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION Users will be
authorized to use the
TOE
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization to use the TOE
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
establishes responsibility of the
TOE Owner to appropriately grant
authorization
OE.USER.AUTHENTICATED
establishes alternative (remote)
means for user identification and
authentication as the basis for
authorization to use the TOE
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION Procedures will exist to
self-verify executable
code in the TSF
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides
procedures to self-verify executable
code in the TSF
P.AUDIT.LOGGING An audit trail of TOE
use and security-
relevant events will be
created, maintained,
protected, and
reviewed.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and
maintains a log of TOE use and
security-relevant events, and
prevents unauthorized disclosure
or alteration
O.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTED
protects internal audit records from
unauthorized access, deletion and
modifications
OE.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTE
D protects exported audit records
from unauthorized access, deletion
and modifications
OE.AUDIT.ACCESS.AUTHORIZE
D establishes responsibility of, the
TOE Owner to provide appropriate
access to exported audit records
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
ensure that audit logs are
appropriately reviewed
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT Operation of external
interfaces will be
controlled by the TOE
and its IT environment.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
manages the operation of external
interfaces in accordance with
security policies
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Threats. Policies, and
Assumptions
Summary Objectives and rationale
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
establishes a protected
environment for TOE external
interfaces
P.PURGE.DATA Administrators are able
to purge all user
supllied information.
O.PURGE.DATA provides purge
function to remove all user supplied
information.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE environment
provides protection
from unmanaged
access to the physical
components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED
establishes a protected physical
environment for the TOE
A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are
aware of and trained to
follow security policies
and procedures
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
provide appropriate Administrator
training.
A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not
use their privileged
access rights for
malicious purposes.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
have a trusted relationship with
Administrators.
A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware
of and trained to follow
security policies and
procedures
OE.USER.TRAINED establishes
responsibility of the TOE Owner to
provide appropriate User training.
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5. Extended Components
Definition
This Security Target defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria
3.1 Release 4, Part 2.
5.1. FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted
forwarding of data to external
interfaces
Family behaviour:
This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of
information from one external interface to another external interface.
Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended
to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external
interface. However, some products may provide the capability for attackers to
misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are
connected to the TOE’s external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of
unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly
allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been
defined to specify this kind of functionality.
Component leveling:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces, provides for
the functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined
external interfaces before this data is sent out on another external interface. Direct
forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit
allowance by an authorized administrative role.
Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities;
b) management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed
by an administrative role;
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external
interfaces
1
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c) revocation of such an allowance.
Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data
Generation is included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
Rationale:
Quite often a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data
received on one external interface before such (processed) data is allowed to be
transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall systems but also
other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be
transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e. without processing the data first)
between different external interfaces is therefore a function that – if allowed at all –
can only be allowed by an authorized role.
It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that
allows specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an
authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a
number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component.
The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP
class. However, in this Security Target, the authors needed to express the control of
both user data and TSF data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-
based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose
resulted in SFRs that were too unwieldy for refinement in a Security Target.
Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this
functionality.
This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and could
therefore be placed in either the FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect
the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in
the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this
lead the authors to define a new family with just one member.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on
[assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded
without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of
external interfaces].
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6. Security Requirements
This section defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE
or its environment:
The CC divides TOE security requirements into two categories:
1. Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and
authentication, security management, and user data protection) that the TOE
and the supporting evidence need to satisfy to meet the security objectives of
the TOE.
2. Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence
that the TOE and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives
(e.g., configuration management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).
These requirements are discussed separately within the following subsections.
6.1. Conventions
All operations performed on the SFRs or the SARs need to be identified. For this
purpose the following conventions shall be used.
 Assignments will be written in [normal text with brackets]
 Selections will be written in underlined and italic text.
 Refinements will be written bold
 Iterations will be performed on components and functional elements. The
component ID defined by the Common Criteria (e.g. FDP_IFC.1) will be
extended by an ID for the iteration (e.g. “(FILTER)”). The resulting component
ID would be “FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER)”.
 Where an iteration is identified in rationale discussion as “all”, the statement
applies to all iterations of the requirement (e.g. “FMT_MTD.1 (all)”)
6.2. TOE Security Policies
This chapter contains the definition of security policies which must be enforced by
the TSF.
6.2.1. IP Filter SFP
The security function “User Data Protection – IP Filtering” (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
requires that network traffic to and from the TOE will be filtered in accordance with
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the rules defined by the system administrator at the Web User Interface
configuration editor for IP Filtering. This policy will be enforced on:
 Subjects. External entities that send network traffic to the TOE.
 Information. All IP-based traffic to and from that destination.
Operations. Pass network traffic.
6.2.2. User Access Control SFP
The Security Function Policy (SFP) described in Table 17 and Table 18 below is
referenced by the FDP class SFRs.
Table 17: User Access Control SFP
Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access Control Rule
D.DOC
+PRT
Read
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(Accounting
Administrator)
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(System Administrator)
Allowed, except for
documents protected
by an optional
passcode
Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except when
the associated
D.FUNC is deleted.
+SCN Read, Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
+CPY Read, Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
+faxIN
Read, Delete
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(System Administrator)
Allowed
Read, Delete
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(Accounting
Administrator)
Denied
+faxOUT Read, Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
+DSR and
+SCN
Read, Delete
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(Accounting
Administrator)
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
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Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access Control Rule
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(System Administrator)
Allowed
D.FUNC Any
Attribute,
except
+CPY
Modify
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied
+PRT Delete
U.NORMAL
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
U.ADMINISTRATOR Allowed
+SCN Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied
+CPY
Delete,
Modify
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied, except for
his/her own
documents
+faxIN Delete
U.NORMAL,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
Denied
+faxOUT Delete
U.NORMAL
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(Accounting
Administrator)
Denied
+faxOUT Delete
U.ADMINISTRATOR
(System Administrator)
Allowed
Table 18: Attributes Definition
Designation Definition
+PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job.
+SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job.
+CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job.
+faxIN Indicates data that are associated with an inbound (received) fax job.
+faxOUT Indicates data that are associated with an outbound (sent) fax job.
+DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval
job.
+SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a shared-medium
interface.
Application Note: A document (D.DOC) is “owned” by a User (U.User) if that
document was created or submitted to the TOE by that User. The only exception are
documents received as fax (D.DOC +faxIN), for which the system administrators are
considered as the owner.
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Application Note: Access control rules for the “Create” Operation are not specified
because typically, any authorized U.User can create his/her own documents and
cannot create documents that are owned by another User.
6.2.3. TOE Function Access Control SFP
Users (U.NORMAL) require explicit authorization from system administrators
(U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)) for them to be allowed to perform the
following TOE Functions via the Web UI or the LUI:
 Print (PRT)
 Scan (SCN)
 Fax (faxIN / faxOUT)
 Copy (CPY)
 Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR)
Any User who is authorized to establish a connection with the TOE through the
ethernet port is able to perform the following TOE functions:
 Print (PRT). Any host / authorized user on the network can submit print jobs,
however, release of print jobs submitted by unknown/unauthenticated users
to the hardcopy output handler is dependent on the system administrator
defined policy.
 Fax (faxOUT). Any host / authorized user on the network can submit LanFax
jobs.
6.3. Security Functional Requirements
The TOE satisfies the SFRs identified in Table 19. The rest of this section contains a
description of each component and any related dependencies.
Table 19: TOE security functional requirements
Functional Component ID Functional Component Name
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
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Functional Component ID Functional Component Name
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
6.3.1. Class FAU: Security audit
6.3.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the
following auditable events:
- Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- [all Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if
one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 20].
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FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the
following information:
- Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the
event; and
- For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
definitions of the functional components included in the
PP/ST, [for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 20: (1)
information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified),
and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required),
- And the following audit attribute:
o Entry number (an integer value from 1 to the number
of entries in the audit log) ]
Table 20: Audit data requirements
Auditable Event Relevant
SFR
Audit Level Additional
Information
Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job
Both successful and unsuccessful
use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.1 Basic None required
Both successful and unsuccessful
use of the identification mechanism
FIA_UID.1 Basic Attempted user
identity, if
available
Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required
Modifications to the group of users
that are part of a role
FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required
Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required
Failure of the trusted channel
functions
FTP_ITC.1 Minimum Non required
6.3.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the
TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the
identity of the user that caused the event.
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6.3.1.3. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: None.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1: The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail
from unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2: The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to
the stored audit records in the audit trail.
6.3.1.4. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3.
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1: The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and
[generate an email warning at 90%] if the audit trail is full.
6.3.2. Class FCO: Communication
There are no Class FCO security functional requirements for this ST.
6.3.3. Class FCS: Cryptographic support
6.3.3.1. FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [the cryptographic operations listed in the
Cryptographic Operations column of
Table 21] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [the cryptographic
algorithms listed in the Cryptographic Algorithm column of
Table 21] and cryptographic key sizes [the cryptographic key sizes listed in the Key
Sizes (bits) column of
Table 21] that meet the following: [the list of standards in the Standards column of
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Table 21].
Table 21: Cryptographic operations
Cryptographic
Operations
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key Sizes
(bits)
Standards & Certs.*
Symmetric encryption and
decryption
Triple DES (CBC) 168
SP 800-67
OpenSSL: cert #1223
Mocana: cert #1006
AES (CBC)
128
256
FIPS 197
OpenSSL: cert #1884
Mocana: cert #1505
Digital signature generation
and verification
RSA 2048
FIPS 186-3
OpenSSL: cert #960
Mocana: cert #738
Message digest
SHA-1 N/A
FIPS 180-3
OpenSSL: cert #1655
Mocana: cert #1353
SHA-256 N/A
FIPS 180-3
OpenSSL: cert #1655
Mocana: cert #1353
Message authentication HMAC
96
160
FIPS 198
OpenSSL: cert #1126
Mocana: cert #885
Random number
generation
DRBG N/A
SP800-90A
OpenSSL: cert #157
Mocana: cert #64
*Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) certificates
6.3.3.2. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [the
cryptographic algorithms listed in the Cryptographic Algorithm
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column of Table 22] and specified cryptographic key sizes [the
cryptographic key sizes listed in the Key Sizes (bits) column of
Table 22] that meet the following: [the standards in the
Standards column of Table 22].
Table 22: Cryptographic key generation
Cryptographic Algorithm Key Sizes (bits) Standards
Triple DES (OpenSSL) 168 DRBG: SP800-90A
AES (OpenSSL) 128, 256 DRBG: SP800-90A
RSA (OpenSSL) 2048 DRBG: SP800-90A
Triple DES (Mocana) 168 DRBG: SP800-90A
AES (Mocana) 128, 256 DRBG: SP800-90A
6.3.3.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key distribution method [the method
shown for each related protocol in Table 23] that meet the
following: [standards shown in Table 23].
Table 23: Cryptographic key distribution
Related Protocol Key Distribution Method Standards
TLS (client server
authentication)
RSA encrypted exchange of
session keys for TLS handshake
RFC 4366
TLS (public keys) Digital certificates for public keys
RFC 5280
(certificate format)
IPsec Diffie-Hellman key exchange RFC 2631
SFTP Diffie-Hellman key exchange RFC 2631
SNMPv3 Pre-shared key RFC 3826
6.3.3.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
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FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [zeroizationthat
meets the following: [FIPS 140-2 zeroization requirements].
6.3.4. Class FDP: User data protection
6.3.4.1. FDP_ACC.1 (USER) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 17] on [the list of users as subjects, objects, and
operations among subjects and objects covered by the User
Access Control SFP in Table 17].
6.3.4.2. FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC) Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
SFP] on [users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the
right to use the functions as operations].
6.3.4.3. FDP_ACF.1 (USER) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 17] to objects based on the following: [the list of users as
subjects and objects controlled under the User Access Control
SFP in Table 17, and for each, the indicated security attributes
in Table 17].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if
an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [rules specified in the User Access Control SFP in
Table 17 governing access among controlled users as subjects
and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled
objects].
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FDP_ACF.1.3 (USER) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (USER) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects based on the [none].
6.3.4.4. FDP_ACF.1 (FUNC) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
SFP] to objects based on the following: [Users and their role
based permissions to perform any or all of the following
functions: print, scan, copy, fax, document storage and retrieval,
access to shared-medium interface].
FDP_ACF.1.2 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if
an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [users assigned to a role that is explicitly authorized by
U.ADMINISTATOR (System Administrator) to use a function is
allowed to access the function].
FDP_ACF.1.3 (FUNC) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects based on the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 (FUNC) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects based on the [none].
6.3.4.5. FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) Subset information flow control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 (FILTER) The TSF shall enforce the [IPFilter SFP] on [
- Subjects: External entities that send traffic to the TOE;
- Information: All IP-based traffic to/from that
source/destination;
- Operations: send or receive network traffic].
6.3.4.6. FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization.
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FDP_IFF.1.1 (FILTER) The TSF shall enforce the [IPFilter SFP] based on the
following types of subject and information security attributes: [
- Subjects: External entities that send traffic to the TOE
o IP address,
- Information: IP Packet
o Source IP address, protocol used (TCP or UDP),
destination TCP or UDP port].
FDP_IFF.1.2 (FILTER) The TSF shall permit an information flow between a
controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold: [
- The source IP address matches a rule in the TOE’s rule
base
- If configured, the destination transport layer port matches a
rule in the TOE’s rule base.]
FDP_IFF.1.3 (FILTER) The TSF shall enforce the [implicit allow if no rules have
been defined].
FDP_IFF.1.4 (FILTER) The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow
based on the following rules: [if the rule is the default all].
FDP_IFF.1.5 (FILTER) The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based
on the following rules: [if there are no rules with matching
security attributes or if a rule explicitly denies an information
flow].
Application Note: When custom rules have not been defined by the system
administrator, the default rule (allow all traffic) will apply. Because it is a wildcard
rule, all IP addresses, ports and protocols (either TCP or UDP) will be a match for
allowed traffic.
6.3.4.7. FDP_RIP.1(IMAGE) Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1(IMAGE) The TSF shall ensure that any previous information
content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation
of the resource from the following objects: [D.DOC].
6.3.4.8. FDP_RIP.1(PURGE) Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1(PURGE) The TSF shall ensure that any previous customer-
supplied information content of a resource is made unavailable
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upon the request of an administrator for the following objects:
[all TSF and User data].
6.3.5. Class FIA: Identification and authentication
6.3.5.1. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: [username, password, role].
6.3.5.2. FIA_UAU.1Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [job requests to be received via printing
protocols] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user
is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
6.3.5.3. FIA_UAU.7Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback] to the user
while the authentication is in progress.
6.3.5.4. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [job requests to be received via printing
protocols] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user
is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
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6.3.5.5. FIA_USB.1User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes
with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [username and
role].
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial
association of user security attributes with the subjects acting on
behalf of users: [subjects will be assigned the security attributes
of the user that they are acting on behalf of].
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to
the user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of
users: [security attributes of subjects acting on behalf of a user
will not be changed while an action is in progress and cannot be
changed by anyone but U.ADMINISTRATOR (System
Administrator)].
6.3.6. Class FMT: Security management
6.3.6.1. FMT_MSA.1 (USER) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 17] to restrict the ability to change_default, modify, delete,
[read] the security attributes [all] to [U.ADMINISTRATOR
(System Administrator)].
6.3.6.2. FMT_MSA.1 (FUNC) Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
SFP] to restrict the ability to change_default, modify, delete,
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[read] the security attributes [role and associated access
permissions] to [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)].
6.3.6.3. FMT_MSA.3 (USER) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (USER) The TSF shall enforce the [User Access Control SFP in
Table 17] to provide permissive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (USER) The TSF shall allow the [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System
Administrator)] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
6.3.6.4. FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC) Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 (FUNC) The TSF shall enforce the [TOE Function Access Control
Policy] to provide permissive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 (FUNC) The TSF shall allow the [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System
Administrator)] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
6.3.6.5. FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 (MGMT1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [download] the [audit
log] to [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)].
6.3.6.6. FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT2) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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FMT_MTD.1.1 (MGMT2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to change_default,
modify, delete, [read] the [role and associated permissions] to
[U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)].
6.3.6.7. FMT_MTD.1 (KEY) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 (KEY) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, delete,
[create] the [
- IPsec Secret Key,
- X.509 Server certificate
- SNMPv3 Keys]
to [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)].
6.3.6.8. FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 (FILTER) The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify, delete,
[create, read] the [
- IP filter rules
- Fax Forwarding Email Addresses]
to [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator)].
6.3.6.9. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [
- Enable/disable Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO);
- Enable/disable and configure smart card use;
- Enable/disable USB ports;
- Invoke ODIO;
- Invoke data purge function;
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- Create a recurrence schedule for ODIO;
- Enable/disable audit function;
- Configure SFTP;
- Transfer the audit records (if audit is enabled) to a remote
trusted IT product;
- Configure email addresses for audit exhaustion warnings;
- Enable/disable TLS;
- Create/upload/download X.509 certificates;
- Enable/disable and configure 802.1x;
- Enable/disable and configure IPsec;
- Configure (specify the IP address and/or IP address range,
port and port range for remote trusted IT products
(presumed) allowed to connect to the TOE via the network
interface) IP filtering;
- Enable/disable Disk Encryption;
- Configure network authentication;
- Configure users, roles, privileges and passwords;
- Configure WebUI and LUI session timeout;
- Manage receive fax (job) passcodes;
- Configure the Workflow Scanning Repository;
- Enable/disable and configure fax forwarding to email;
- Configure NTP;
- Configure SMTP over TLS;
- Configure SNMPv3; and,
- Enable/disable and configure Enhanced Device Security].
6.3.6.10. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [U.ADMINISTRATOR (System
Administrator), U.ADMINISTRATOR (Accounting Administrator),
U.NORMAL (Authenticated User / system administrator defined
roles containing no administrative privileges), Nobody].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for
the role “Nobody” to which no user shall be associated.
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Application Note: The TOE implements role based access control that allows the
system administrator to define custom roles. The system administrator assigns
privileges to roles.
Application Note: The role “Nobody” cannot be assigned to any user. It is included
in FMT_SMR.1.1 only because it has been used as a role in other SFRs.
6.3.7. Class FPR: Privacy
There are no Class FPR security functional requirements for this Security Target.
6.3.8. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
6.3.8.1. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
6.3.8.2. Class FRU: Resource utilization
There are no Class FRU security functional requirements for this ST.
6.3.9. Class FTA: TOE access
6.3.9.1. FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a
[U.ADMINISTRATOR (System Administrator) configurable
amount of time in the LUI or on the WebUI].
6.3.10. Class FTP: Trusted paths/channels
6.3.10.1. FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of
its end points and protection of the communicated data from
modification or disclosure.
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FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to
initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF
over any Shared-medium interface].
6.4. Explicitly Stated Requirements for
the TOE
6.4.1. FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to
external interfaces
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on
[any external Interface] from being forwarded without further
processing by the TSF to [any Shared-medium Interface].
6.5. TOE Security Assurance
Requirements
Table 24 lists the security assurance requirements for EAL2+ augmented with
ALC_FLR.3.
Table 24: EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.3)
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation (augmentation of
EAL2)
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.6. Rationale for Security Functional
Requirements
Table 25 and Table 26 below demonstrate the completeness and sufficiency of
SFRs that fulfill the objectives of the TOE. Bold typeface items provide principal
(P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide supporting (S)
fulfillment.
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Table 25: Completeness of security functional requirements
SFRs Objectives
O.DOC.NO.DIS
O.DOC.NO.ALT
O.FUNC.NO.ALT
O.PROT.NO.ALT
O.CONF.NO.DIS
O.CONF.NO.ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTED
O.PURGE.DATA
SFRs
FAU_GEN.1 P P
FAU_GEN.2 P P
FAU_STG.1 P
FAU_STG.4 P
FCS_COP.1 S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.1 S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.2 S S S S S S
FCS_CKM.4 S S S S S S
FDP_ACC.1 (USER) P P P
FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC) P
FDP_ACF.1 (USER) S S S
FDP_ACF.1 (FUNC) S
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) P
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) S
FDP_RIP.1 (IMAGE) P
FDP_RIP.1 (PURGE) P
FIA_ATD.1 S
FIA_UAU.1 P P
FIA_UAU.7 S
FIA_UID.1 S S S S S S P P S S
FIA_USB.1 P
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SFRs Objectives
O.DOC.NO.DIS
O.DOC.NO.ALT
O.FUNC.NO.ALT
O.PROT.NO.ALT
O.CONF.NO.DIS
O.CONF.NO.ALT
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.AUDIT.STORAGE.PROTECTED
O.PURGE.DATA
SFRs
FMT_MSA.1 (USER) S S S
FMT_MSA.1 (FUNC) S
FMT_MSA.3 (USER) S S S
FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC) S
FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1) P P P
FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT2) P P P
FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER) P P P
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY) P P P
FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S S S
FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S S
FPT_STM.1 S S
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 P
FTA_SSL.3 P P
FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P
Table 26: Sufficiency of security functional requirements
Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
O.DOC.NO.DIS,
O.DOC.NO.ALT,
O.FUNC.NO.ALT
Protection of User
Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FDP_ACC.1(USER) Enforces protection
by establishing an
access control policy.
FDP_ACF.1(USER) Supports access
control policy by
providing access
control function.
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Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FIA_UID.1 Supports access
control and security
roles by requiring user
identification.
FMT_MSA.1(USER) Supports access
control function by
enforcing control of
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(USER) Supports access
control function by
enforcing control of
security attribute
defaults.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports control of
security attributes by
requiring functions to
control attributes.
FMT_SMR.1 Supports control of
security attributes by
requiring security roles.
O.DOC.NO_DIS Protection of User
Document Data from
unauthorized
disclosure
FDP_RIP.1(IMAGE) Enforces protection
by making residual
data unavailable.
O.CONF.NO.DIS
O.PROT.NO.ALT
O.CONF.NO.ALT
Protection of TSF
Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FIA_UID.1 Supports access
control and security
roles by requiring user
identification.
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT1)
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT2)
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY)
FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)
Enforces protection
by restricting access.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports control of
security attributes by
requiring functions to
control attributes.
FMT_SMR.1 Supports control of
security attributes by
requiring security roles.
O.USER.AUTHORI
ZED
Authorization of
Normal Users and
Administrators to use
the TOE
FDP_ACC.1(FUNC) Enforces
authorization by
establishing an
access control policy.
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Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FDP_ACF.1(FUNC) Supports access
control policy by
providing access
control function.
FIA_ATD.1 Supports authorization
by associating security
attributes with users.
FIA_UAU.1 Enforces
authorization by
requiring user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.7 Supports authorization
by protecting
passwords.
FIA_UID.1 Enforces
authorization by
requiring user
identification.
FIA_USB.1 Enforces
authorization by
distinguishing
subject security
attributes associated
with user roles.
FMT_MSA.1(FUNC) Supports access
control function by
enforcing control of
security attributes.
FMT_MSA.3(FUNC) Supports access
control function by
enforcing control of
security attribute
defaults.
FMT_SMR 1 Supports authorization
by requiring security
roles.
FTA_SSL.3 Enforces
authorization by
terminating inactive
sessions.
O.INTERFACE.MA
NAGED
Management of
external interfaces
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) Enforces
management of
external interfaces by
establishing an
information flow
policy for the network
and fax interfaces
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Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) Supports management
of external interfaces
by enforcing
information flow rules
on the network and fax
interfaces
FIA_UAU.1 Enforces
management of
external interfaces by
requiring user
authentication.
FIA_UID.1 Enforces
management of
external interfaces by
requiring user
identification.
FTA_SSL.3 Enforces
management of
external interfaces by
terminating inactive
sessions.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Enforces
management of
external interfaces by
requiring (as needed)
administrator control
of data transmission
from external
Interfaces to Shared-
medium Interfaces.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED Logging and
authorized access to
audit events
FAU_GEN.1 Enforces audit
policies by requiring
logging of relevant
events.
FAU_GEN.2 Enforces audit
policies by requiring
logging of
information
associated with
audited events.
FIA_UID.1 Supports audit policies
by associating user
identity with events.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports audit policies
by requiring functions
to enable logging of
relevant events.
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Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
FPT_STM.1 Supports audit policies
by
requiring time stamps
associated with events.
O.AUDIT.STORAG
E.PROTECTED
Logging and
authorized access to
audit events
FAU_GEN.1 Enforces audit
policies by requiring
logging of relevant
events.
FAU_GEN.2 Enforces audit
policies by requiring
logging of
information
associated with
audited events.
FAU_STG.1 Enforces the audit
policies by
preventing
unauthorized
modification or
deletion.
FAU_STG.4 Enforces the audit
policies by
preventing loss of
newer audit trail data.
FIA_UID.1 Supports audit policies
by requiring user
identification
FPT_STM.1 Supports audit policies
by requiring time
stamps associated with
events.
O.DOC.NO.DIS
O.DOC.NO.ALT
O.FUNC.NO.ALT
O.PROT.NO.ALT
O.CONF.NO.DIS
O.CONF.NO.ALT
Protection of User
and TSF Data from
unauthorized
disclosure or
alteration
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.4
Supports protection by
providing cryptographic
operations for secure
communication and
enforces disk
encryption.
FTP_ITC.1 Enforces protection
by requiring the use
of trusted channels
for communication of
data over Shared-
medium Interfaces.
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Objectives Description SFRs Purpose
O.PURGE.DATA Proteciton of residual
user supplied
information.
FDP_RIP.1(PURGE) Enforace protection
by enabling
administrator to
purge all user
supplied data.
FMT_SMF.1 Supports purge
function by enabling
administrator to invoke
purge.
6.7. Rationale for Security Assurance
Requirements
The TOE environment will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is
assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or monitored environment that
provides almost constant protection from unauthorized and unmanaged access to
the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile
storage without disassembling the TOE. Agents have limited or no means of
infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change and the TOE self-verifies its
executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation
Assurance Level 2 is appropriate.
This ST augments EAL2 with ALC_FLR.3, Systematic flaw remediation.
ALC_FLR.3 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and
remediation of identified security flaws are in place and their inclusion is expected by
the consumers of this TOE, and that consumers of this TOE are automatically
notified of flaws and changes to the TOE.
6.8. Rationale for Dependencies
6.8.1. Security Functional Requirement Dependencies
Table 27: SFR dependencies satisfied is a cross-reference of the functional
components, their related dependencies, and whether the dependency was
satisfied.
Table 27: SFR dependencies satisfied
Functional Component Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 Yes
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 Yes
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Functional Component Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FIA_UID.1 Yes
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 Yes
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 Yes
FCS_COP.1
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1
Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.2
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Yes
FCS_CKM.4 Yes
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2
Yes
FCS_CKM.1 Yes
FDP_ACC.1(USER) FDP_ACF.1 Yes, FDP_ACF.1(USER)
FDP_ACC.1(FUNC) FDP_ACF.1 Yes, FDP_ACF.1(FUNC)
FDP_ACF.1(USER)
FDP_ACC.1 Yes, FDP_ACC.1(USER)
FMT_MSA.3 Yes, FMT_MSA.3(USER)
FDP_ACF.1(FUNC)
FDP_ACC.1 Yes, FDP_ACC.1(FUNC)
FMT_MSA.3 Yes, FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC)
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER) FDP_IFF.1 Yes, FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)
FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER)
FDP_IFC.1 Yes, FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER)
FMT_MSA.3 No2
FDP_RIP.1 (IMAGE) None
2
The dependency of FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER) on FMT_MSA.3 is not met because none of these functions support “a) managing
the group of roles that can specify initial values; b) managing the permissive or restrictive setting of default values for a given
access control SFP; c) management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values.” (CC Part 2). The TOE does
not give system administrators the option of specifying default values, permissive or otherwise. In fact, these features are
configured and, with the exception of IP Filter rules, cannot be modified by the system administrator other than to enable or
disable them. It is for these reasons that the dependency on FMT_MSA.3 is not and cannot be expected to be met.
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Functional Component Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FDP_RIP.1 (PURGE) None
FIA_ATD.1 None
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Yes
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 Yes
FIA_UID.1 None
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.1(USER)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 (USER)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.1(FUNC)
FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.3(USER)
FMT_MSA.1 Yes, FMT_MSA.1(USER)
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MSA.3(FUNC)
FMT_MSA.1 Yes, FMT_MSA.1(FUNC)
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT1)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1(MGMT2)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_MTD.1 (KEY)
FMT_SMF.1 Yes
FMT_SMR.1 Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Yes
FPT_STM.1 None
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Functional Component Dependency (ies) Satisfied
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
FMT_SMF.1 No3
FMT_SMR.1 No4
FTA_SSL.3 None
FTP_ITC.1 None
6.8.2. Security Assurance Requirement Dependencies
SAR dependencies identified in the CC have been met by this ST as shown in Table
28.
Table 28: EAL2 (augmented with ALC_FLR.3) SAR dependencies satisfied
Assurance Component ID Dependencies Satisfied
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1 Yes, hierarchically
Yes
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_TDS.1 Yes
ADV_TDS.1 ADV_FSP.2 Yes
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 Yes, hierarchically
AGD_PRE.1 None
ALC_CMC.2 ALC_CMS.1 Yes, hierarchically
ALC_CMS.2 None
ALC_DEL.1 None
ALC_FLR.3 None
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.1
Yes
Yes
Yes, hierarchically
ASE_ECD.1 None
ASE_INT.1 None
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 Yes
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
Yes
Yes
3
For this TOE, the restricted forwarding from the external interfaces to the network controller are architectural design features
which cannot be configured, hence the dependencies on FMT_SMF.1 is not met.
4
For this TOE, the restricted forwarding from the external interfaces to the network controller are architectural design features
which cannot be configured; hence the dependencies on FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 are not met.
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Assurance Component ID Dependencies Satisfied
ASE_SPD.1 None
ASE_TSS.1 ADV_FSP.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_REQ.1
Yes, hierarchically
Yes
Yes, hierarchically
ATE_COV.1 ADV_FSP.2
ATE_FUN.1
Yes
Yes
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 Yes
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
AVA_VAN.2 ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_TDS.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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7. TOE Summary
Specification
This section presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the
TOE.
7.1. TOE Security Functions
This section presents the security functions performed by the TOE to satisfy the
identified SFRs in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
 Image Overwrite & Purge (TSF_IOW_PURGE)
 Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
 System Authentication (TSF_AUT)
 Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
 Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
 Cryptographic Support (TSF_FCS)
 User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
 Network Security (TSF_NET_SEC)
 Security Management (TSF_FMT)
 User Data Protection – Disk Encryption (TSF_FDP_UDE)
7.1.1. Image Overwrite & Purge (TSF_IOW_PURGE)
FDP_RIP.1(IMAGE), FDP_RIP.1(PURGE)
The TOE implements an image overwrite security function (using a three pass
overwrite procedure consistent with U.S. Deparment of Defense National Industrial
Security Program Operating Manual – DoD 5220.22-M – requirements) to overwrite
all temporary files created during processing of jobs, files (images) of completed or
deleted jobs or any files that are deleted5.
The TOE spools and processes documents to be printed or scanned. Temporary
files are created as a result of this processing on a reserved section of the hard disk
drive. The definition of this reserved section is statically stored within the TOE and
5
Files are stored inside mailboxes. They may be deleted by their owner through individual file deletions or deletion of the
mailbox.
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cannot be manipulated. Immediately after the job has completed, the files are
overwritten, and this is called Immediate Image Overwrite (IIO).
The TOE automatically starts an IIO procedure for all abnormally terminated copy,
print, scan or fax jobs stored on the HDD prior to coming “on line” when any of the
following occurs: a reboot or once the MFD is turned back on after a power
failure/disorderly shutdown.
The image overwrite security function can also be invoked manually (on demand) by
the system administrator (ODIO). Once invoked, the ODIO cancels all jobs, halts
the printer interface (network), performs the overwrites, and then the network
controller reboots. A scheduling function allows ODIO to be executed on a recurring
basis as set up by the System Administrator.
A standard ODIO overwrites all files written to temporary storage areas of the HDD.
A full ODIO overwrites those files as well as the Fax mailbox/dial directory and Scan
to mailbox data.
An ODIO cannot be aborted from either the WebUI or LUI.
The image overwrite function overwrites the contents of the reserved section on the
hard disk using a three pass overwrite procedure.
The purge function is invoked manually by the system administrator. Once invoked,
the purge function overwrites all jobs that are actively being processed by the TOE
or are being held on the TOE for later processing; overwrites all jobs and log files
that are stored on the hard drive(s); overwrites all local authentication data stored on
the internal database; overwrites all customer data stored in address books and
accounting databases and resets the fax and copy controller NVM on the TOE to
their factory default values. At the completion of the purge function the TOE will
reformat the hard drive(s), print a confirmation page, reboots the TOE and re-install
the system software release that was installed on the TOE when the purge function
was invoked.
7.1.2. Information Flow Security (TSF_FLOW)
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The only physical shared-medium interface of the TOE is the network interface.
The TOE controls and restricts the data/information flow from the LUI, document
scanner and document feeder to the network interface by brokering all data through
an intermidary subsystem. A connectivity subsystem further processes the data
before sending it to the network interface.
The TOE provides separation between the fax processing board and the network
interface and therefore prevents an interconnection between the PSTN and the
internal network. This separation is realized in software, as by design, these
interfaces may only communicate via an intermediary. All internal command calls
(API) and response messages for both the network and fax interfaces are statically
defined within the TOE. No user or system administrator is able to change their
formats or functionalities.
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The fax software runs two independent processes, for sending and receiving job
data through the fax card respectively. There is no internal communication between
these two processes.
The same job data will never be active on both the fax interface and network
interface at the same time. For network interface to fax interface (LanFax) jobs, the
entire job must be received as an image and buffered in memory before it is sent out
through the fax interface. Likewise, for fax interface to network interface (fax
forwarding to email) jobs, the entire job must be received from the fax interface and
buffered in memory before it is transformed by an intermediary subsystem into an
email attachment and sent out through the network interface.
7.1.3. Authentication (TSF_ AUT)
FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.1, FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FTA_SSL.3
The TOE implements a role based access control system. The TOE ships with three
pre-configured roles:
 System Administrator. Has access to all pathways, services and features
including all management functions on the TOE.
 Logged-in User. Non-administrative users who have authenticated to the
TOE. The System Administrator may create custom roles for Logged-In Users
and assign MFD function privileges.
 Accounting Administrator. Has access to all device services and pathways
except for the tools pathway (which is used for system administrator
functions).
The TOE also maintains a fourth category for Non-Logged-In (unauthenticated)
users, enabling the system administrator to specify what functions if any are
available to unauthenticated users.
A user must authenticate by entering a username and password prior to being
granted access to the LUI or the Web UI. While the user is typing the password, the
TOE obscures each character entered.
Upon successful authentication, users are granted access based on their role. Only
a system administrator is allowed full access to the TOE including all the system
administration functions.
If configured for local authentication the system requires the system administrator to
enter a username and password for each user. The system will authenticate the
user against an internal database.
By default, the LUI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 1 minute.
By default, the Web UI will terminate any session that has been inactive for 60
minutes. The system administrator can configure both the LUI and Web UI session
timeouts to terminate an inactive session after some other period of time.
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7.1.4. Network Identification (TSF_NET_ID)
FIA_UAU.7, FIA_UID.1, FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMR.1, FTA_SSL.3
As an alternative to local authentication, the TOE may be configured to refer to an
external identity server (a trusted remote IT entity). User credentials entered at the
LUI or Web UI are authenticated at the server instead of the TOE. The network
authentication services supported by the TOE are: smart card authentication, LDAP
v4, Kerberos v5 (Solaris) and Kerberos v5 (Windows 2000/2003/2008).
When a user authenticates using the smart card method a PIN number is used
instead of a password. The PIN is authenticated by the smart card. If a smart card is
used for authentication, by default the LUI will terminate a session that has been
inactive for 6 minutes.
The TOE maintains the username from a successful authentication during the
context of the job, and this value is entered into the audit log as the username.
Role based access control is implemented as per section 7.1.3 with access policies
either stored locally or on an LDAP repository depending on the chosen
configuration.
7.1.5. Security Audit (TSF_FAU)
FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1),
FPT_STM.1
The TOE generates audit logs that track events/actions (e.g., print/scan/fax job
submission) to logged-in users, and each log entry contains a timestamp. The audit
logs are only available to TOE administrators and can be downloaded via the web
interface for viewing and analysis.
The TOE implements an internal time reference with which to timestamp auditable
events. The internal time reference is a hardware based (CPU clock). The system
administrator may set the time or configure the TOE to reference an NTP server.
The audit log tracks user identification and authentication, system administrator
actions, and failure of trusted channels. By adopting a policy of regularly
downloading and saving the audit logs, users can satisfy the tracking requirements
for transmission of data outside of the local environment, as required by such
legislation as HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, etc.
The audit log may be downloaded from the Web UI or the LUI. The system
administrator must be logged in to download the audit log.
The TOE can store a maximum of 15,000 audit log entries. The TOE overwrites
oldest events first if the maximum is reached. When the TOE reaches 13,500 entries
(90% full) an email warning is sent to a set of administrator defined email addresses.
Subsequent warnings will be emailed after every 15,000 entries if the audit log has
not been cleared.
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Application Note: For print and LanFax jobs not submitted from the Web UI, the
network username associated with the logged in user at the client workstation will be
recorded in the audit log.
7.1.6. Cryptographic Operations (TSF_FCS)
FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4
The TOE utilizes digital signature generation and verification (RSA), data encryption
(TDES, AES), key establishment (RSA) and cryptographic checksum generation and
secure hash computation (HMAC, SHA) in support of disk encryption, SFTP,
TLS/HTTPS, TLS/SMTP, SNMPv3 and IPsec.
The TOE employs two validated cryptographic modules:
 Mocana v5.4f (CMVP Cert #1614) provides cryptographic functions for
IPSec and AES used in disk encryption. It implements the AES/CTR DRBG
from NIST SP800-90A. When cryptographic keys are no longer required, an
API call is made to destroy the key via zeroization as described in Table 4
and Section 11 of the Mocana cryptographic module Security Policy
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-
1/140sp/140sp1614.pdf).
 OpenSSL v1.0.1p-fips using OpenSSL FIPS Object Module 2.0 (CMVP
Cert #1747) provides all other cryptographic functions. It implements the
AES/CTR DRBG from NIST SP800-90A. When cryptographic keys are no
longer required, an API call is made to destroy the key via zeroization as
described in Section 4.1 of the OpenSSL cryptographic module Security
Policy (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-
1/140sp/140sp1747.pdf).
In addition to explicit key destruction when keys are no longer required, the TOE
also ensure that keys are destroyed at power down. Cryptographic keys are stored
in volotile memory which requires power to maintain state. When the TOE is
shutdown (or power is suddenly interrupted) power is removed from the volatile
memory and all data in the memory along with non-persistant cryptographic keys are
destroyed.
7.1.7. User Data Protection – Disk Encryption
(TSF_FDP_UDE)
FCS_COP.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
The TOE utilizes data encryption (AES) to support encryption and decryption of
designated portions of the hard disk where user files may be temporarily stored.
The algorithm deployed meets the following standard: AES-CBC-256-FIPS-197.
Additional detail on cryptographic functions is provided in section 7.1.6.
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7.1.8. User Data Protection – IP Filtering (TSF_FDP_FILTER)
FDP_IFC.1 (FILTER), FDP_IFF.1 (FILTER), FMT_MTD.1 (FILTER)
The TOE provides the ability for the system administrator to configure a network
information flow control policy based on a configurable rule set. The information flow
control policy (IPFilter SFP) is defined by the system administrator through
specifying a series of rules to “accept,” “deny,” or “drop” packets. These rules
include a listing of IP addresses that will be allowed to communicate with the TOE.
Additionally rules can be generated specifying filtering options based on port number
given in the received packet.
7.1.9. Network Security (TSF_NET_SEC)
FTP_ITC.1
The TOE supports the following secure communication protocols: TLS for Web UI;
SFTP and TLS for document transfers to the remote file depository; IPsec for
communication over IPv4; SMTP over TLS for email; SNMPv3 for SNMP messages
and Kerberos and LDAP over TLS for remote authentication.
SNMPv3 is implemented using the User Security Model with ciphersuite CFB 128-
AES-128 and authentication protocol HMAC-SHA-96. The SNMPv3 protocol is used
to authenticate each SNMP message, as well as provide encryption of the data – the
TOE requires that authPriv (authentication and privacy) be enabled for all SNMPv3
messages. The TOE uses the OpenSSL cryptographic module identified in section
7.1.6 for SNMPv3 cryptographic operations.
7.1.10. Security Management (TSF_FMT)
FDP_ACC.1 (USER), FDP_ACC.1 (FUNC), FDP_ACF.1 (USER), FDP_ACF.1
(FUNC), FIA_ATD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1 (USER), FMT_MSA.1 (FUNC),
FMT_MSA.3 (USER), FMT_MSA.3 (FUNC), FMT_MTD.1 (MGMT1), FMT_MTD.1
(MGMT2), FMT_MTD.1 (KEY)
7.1.10.1. Management Security Functions
Section 6.3.6.9 of the ST (FMT_SMF.1.1) provides a list of the security management
functions provided by the TOE. Management of the security functions and attributes
is restricted to system administrators.
7.1.10.2. Controlling Access to MFD Functions
The TOE enforces a system administrator defined role based access control policy.
Only authenticated users assigned to roles with the necessary privileges are allowed
to perform copy, print, scan or fax on the TOE via the Web UI or the LUI.
Unauthenticated users can submit print or LanFax jobs to the TOE via printing
protocols. Release of unauthenticated print jobs to the hardcopy output handler is
dependent on the system administrator defined policy.
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7.1.10.3. Copy
Copy has to be performed at the local user interface. A user can only read physical
copies of the documents (D.DOC +CPY Read). During job setup, a copy job
(D.FUNC +CPY Delete, Modify) or image (D.DOC +CPY Read, Delete) can be read,
modified or deleted. Once a job is committed, the job (D.FUNC +CPY Delete,
Modify) can only be canceled (deleted) during its execution. Once completed, the
job is removed.
7.1.10.4. Print
Print jobs can be submitted remotely via printing protocols (e.g. lpr, port 9100) or
from the WebUI. Print jobs may also be submitted at the LUI from a USB storage
device. Once submitted to the TOE, there is no way for anyone to modify the job
(D.FUNC +PRT Modify) or the document (D.DOC +PRT Delete). None of the jobs
will be processed until the job owner starts a user session at the local user interface.
The authenticated job owner can release printing of the document (D.DOC +PRT
Read) or delete the print job (D.FUNC +PTR Delete) at the local user interface. The
owner may also choose to delete a job (submitted from the Web UI) through the
Web UI before it is released.
Users have the option to assign a passcode to a print job during its submission
(known as Secure Print). When required to enter the passcode, the user will need to
be authenticated at the LUI in order to do so. The TOE can be configured to release
Secure Print jobs with or without the associated passcode for the job owner who is
authenticated at the LUI. User deletion of a Secure Print job requires knowledge of
the associated passcode.
A system administrator has the capability to delete (D.FUNC +PRT Delete) print jobs
at the LUI or Web UI. The Web UI only allows deletion of jobs submitted via the Web
UI.
7.1.10.5. Scan
Documents can only be scanned at the Local User Interface. During job setup,
document image (D.DOC +SCN Read, Delete) may be read or deleted. Once the
job is committed, the owner may send the image via email, transfer the image to a
remote (TLS scan) repository, keep the image in their private mailbox, print the
image or transfer the image to his/her personal USB storage device.
(Scan to) Mailboxes are created and owned by individual users. Only the owner is
allowed to locate and access the mailbox, and this access to mailboxes is further
restricted with a passcode which the owner creates and owns. System
Administrators have access to all the (scan) mailboxes. (Scan) Images saved in a
mailbox (D.DOC +DSR and +SCN Read, Delete) may only be downloaded via the
Web UI or deleted. A user with proper access may choose to delete the mailbox
together with all images stored inside the mailbox.
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7.1.10.6. Fax
Faxes can be submitted at the Local User Interface or remotely as LanFax (through
the same interfaces as for printing). During job setup, created document images
may be read or deleted (D.DOC +faxOUT Read, Delete). Once a job is submitted,
only a system administrator can delete the job before it is fully completed, in the
case of delayed send for example (D.FUNC +faxOUT Delete).
Access to receive faxes is restricted to the system administrators (D.DOC +faxIN
Read, Delete). All received faxes will be stored locally and assigned a system
administrator predefined passcode. The system administrator can print or delete
secure received faxes by entering the appropriate passcode. Once printed, the
faxes are automatically deleted. Alternatively, the system administrator may also
choose to designate email addresses for receiving fax images. Once the fax job is
forwarded as an attachment to an email, the job is automatically deleted.
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8. Glossary
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. IEEE
Std. 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards, Seventh Edition, should
be referenced for terms not defined in this annex.
Access: Interaction between an entity and an object that results in the flow or
modification of data.
Access Control: Security service that controls the use of hardware and software
resources and the disclosure and modification of stored or communicated data.
Accountability: Property that allows activities in an IT system to be traced to the
entity responsible for the activity.
Administrator: A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage
some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TSP.
Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override
portions of the TSP.
Asset: An entity upon which the TOE Owner, User, or manager of the TOE places
value.
Authentication: Security measure that verifies a claimed identity.
Authentication data: Information used to verify a claimed identity.
Authorization: Permission, granted by an entity authorized to do so, to perform
functions and access data.
Authorized User: An authenticated User who may, in accordance with the TSP,
perform an operation, This includes Users who are permitted to perform some
operations but may be able to attempt or perform operations that are beyond those
permissions.
Availability: (A) A condition in which Authorized Users have access to information,
functionality and associated assets when requested. (B) Timely (according to a
defined metric), reliable access to IT resources.
Channel: Mechanisms through which data can be transferred into and out of the
TOE.
Confidentiality: (A) A condition in which information is accessible only to those
authorized to have access. (B) A security policy pertaining to disclosure of data.
Enterprise: An operational context typically consisting of centrally-managed
networks of IT products protected from direct Internet access by firewalls. Enterprise
environments generally include medium to large businesses, certain governmental
agencies, and organizations requiring managed telecommuting systems and remote
offices
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Evaluation Assurance Level: An assurance package, consisting of assurance
requirements drawn from CC Part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined
assurance scale.
External Interface: A non-hardcopy interface where either the input is being
received from outside the TOE or the output is delivered to a destination outside the
TOE.
Function: an entity in the TOE that performs processing, storage, or transmission of
data that may be present in the TOE.
Hardcopy Device (HCD): A system producing or utilizing a physical embodiment of
an electronic document or image. These systems include printers, scanners, fax
machines, digital copiers, MFPs (multifunction peripherals), MFDs (multifunction
devices), “all-in-ones”, and other similar products. See also: multifunction device.
Hardcopy Output Handler: Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data in
hardcopy form out of the HCD.
Identity: A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an Authorized User,
which can either be the full or abbreviated name of that User or a pseudonym.
Information assurance: Information operations that protect and defend information
and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication,
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
Information Technology (IT): The hardware, firmware and software used as part of
a system to collect, create, communicate, compute, disseminate, process, store or
control data or information.
Integrity: (A) A condition in which data has not been changed or destroyed in an
unauthorized way. (B) A security policy pertaining to the corruption of data and
security function mechanisms.
Job: A document processing task submitted to the hardcopy device. A single
processing task may process one or more documents.
Multifunction Device (MFD) and Multifunction Product (MFP): A hardcopy device
that fulfills multiple purposes by using multiple functions in different combinations to
replace several, single function devices.
Nobody: A pseudo-role that cannot be assigned to any User.
Nonvolatile storage: Computer storage that is not cleared when the power is
turned off.
Normal User: A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing
functions of the TOE.
Object: A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Operation: A specific type of action performed by a subject on an object.
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Operational Environment: The total environment in which a TOE operates,
including the consideration of the value of assets and controls for operational
accountability, physical security and personnel.
Operator Panel: A local human interface used to operate the HCD. It typically
consists of a keypad, keyboard, or other controls, and a display device.
Organizational Security Policy (OSP): A set of security rules, procedures, or
guidelines imposed (or presumed to be imposed) now and/or in the future by an
actual or hypothetical organization in the operational environment.
Original Document Handler: Mechanisms for transferring User Document Data in
hardcopy form into the HCD.
Own or Ownership: May refer to a User Document or to User Function Data
associated with .processing a User Document. Depending upon the implementation
of conforming TOE applications, the Owner of a User Function Data associated with
a User Document may be different or may have different access control rules. These
should be specified in a conforming Security Target.
Private-medium interface: Mechanism for exchanging data that (1) use wired or
wireless electronic methods over a communications medium which, in conventional
practice, is not accessed by multiple simultaneous users; or, (2) use Operator Panel
and displays that are part of the TOE.
Protected: A condition in which data has not been changed or destroyed in an
unauthorized way.
Removable nonvolatile storage: nonvolatile storage that is part of an evaluated
TOE but is designed to be removed from the TOE by authorized personnel. See also
Nonvolatile storage.
Security attribute: A property of subjects, users (including external IT products),
objects, information, sessions and/or resources that is used in defining the SFRs
and whose values are used in enforcing the SFRs.
Security Function Policy (SFP): A set of rules describing specific security behavior
enforced by the TSF and expressible as a set of SFRs.
Security Functional Requirement (SFR): A functional requirement which is taken
from Part 2 of the Common Criteria and provide the mechanisms to enforce the
security policy.
Security Target (ST): An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for
a specific identified TOE.
SFR package: A named set of security functional requirements.
Shared-medium interface: Mechanism for transmitting or receiving data that uses
wired or wireless network or non-network electronic methods over a communications
medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by
multiple users.
Subject: An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation (TOE): A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly
accompanied by guidance.
Telephone line: An electrical interface used to connect the TOE to the public switch
telephone network for transmitting and receiving facsimiles.
Threat: Capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any
circumstance or event, with the potential to violate the TOE security policy.
TSF Data: Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE.
TSF Confidential Data: Assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User
who is not an Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the
operational security of the TOE.
TSF Protected Data: Assets for which alteration by a User who is not an
Administrator or the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational
security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable.
TOE Owner: A person or organizational entity responsible for protecting TOE assets
and establishing related security policies.
TOE security functionality (TSF): A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
SFRs.
User: An entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with
the TOE.
User Data: Data created by and for the User, that do not affect the operation of the
TOE security functionality.
User Document Data: The asset that consists of the information contained in a
user’s document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or
electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy
device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output.
User Function Data: The asset that consists of the information about a user’s
document or job to be processed by the HCD.
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9. Acronyms
For the purposes of this document, the following acronyms and definitions apply.
IEEE Std. 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards, Seventh Edition,
should be referenced for terms not defined in this annex.
Table 29: Acronyms
Acronym Definition
ALT Alteration
CAC Common Access Card
CC Common Criteria
CPY Copy
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DIS Disclosure
DSR Document Storage And Retrieval
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EIP Extensible Interface Platform
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HCD Hardcopy Device
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IEEE Institute Of Electrical And Electronics Engineers
IIO Immediate Image
IOT Image Output Terminal
IPP Internet Printing Protocol
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
LPR Line Printer Remote
LUI Local User Interface
MFD Multifunctional Device
MFP Multifunctional Product / Peripheral / Printer
NVM Nonvolatile Memory
ODIO On-Demand Image Overwrite
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Acronym Definition
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PIV Personal Identity Verification
PPM Page Per Minute
PP Protection Profile
PRT Print
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
SCN Scan
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMI Shared-Medium Interface
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
Std Standard
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSP TOE Security Policy
USB Universal Serial Bus
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10. Bibliography
[B1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1
Release 4 - Part 1: Introduction and General Model
[B2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 3.1 Release 4 - Evaluation Methodology
[B3] IEEE Std. 100, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms,
Seventh Edition, New York, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
Inc.6
6
IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ
08854, USA (http://standards.ieee.org)