BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017
for
DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3,
Version 1.0
from
DIGITTRADE GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 (*)
Portable Storage Media
DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3
Version 1.0
from DIGITTRADE GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for Portable Storage Media
(PSMPP), Version 1.0, 31 July 2012, BSI-CC-PP-
0081-2012
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 6 October 2017
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................9
4. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................9
5. Publication...................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................16
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................16
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6. Documentation............................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................20
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 Certification Report
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3, Version 1.0 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3, Version 1.0 was
conducted by DFKI. The evaluation was completed on 22 September 2017. DFKI is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: DIGITTRADE GmbH.
The product was developed by: DIGITTRADE GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 6 October
2017 is valid until 5 October 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3, Version 1.0 has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
DIGITTRADE GmbH
Ernst-Thälmann-Str. 39
06179 Holleben
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3 (external
encrypted HDD/SSD), Version 1.0. The TOE is a portable, self-contained storage device
with a physical host connection providing encrypted storage of user data and strong
authentication to unlock access to the encrypted user data.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for Portable Storage Media (PSMPP), Version 1.0, 31 July 2012, BSI-
CC-PP-0081-2012 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and one of
them is newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
SF1 „Access control“ Access to the encrypted storage area via the USB 2.0/3.0 connection to the
host PC is granted after successfully verifying the smart card PIN (knowledge
factor) and transferring the encryption key (possession factor) from the smart
card to the storage device.
It is ensured that the smart card PIN consists of 8 decimal digits and no
compromising feedback is given during any authentication attempt. Therefore
the probability for a random authentication attempt to be successful is 1 out of
108
.
If the smart card PIN had been entered 8 times incorrectly, the smart card PIN
and the encryption key on the smart card will be destroyed and the smart card
will be terminated.
The smart card PIN and the encryption key are securely stored on the
individual smart card.
SF2 „Change PIN“ Changing the smart card PIN is supported after successful (re-)authentication
by verifying the current smart card PIN.
It is ensured that both the old and new smart card PIN consist of 8 decimal
digits and no compromising feedback is given during any authentication
attempt.
After successfully changing the smart card PIN (knowledge factor), access to
the encrypted storage area via the USB 2.0/3.0 connection to the host PC is
immediately granted by transferring the encryption key (possession factor)
from the smart card to the storage device.
SF3 „Key generation and
key destruction"
Changing the encryption key on the smart card is supported after successful
(re-)authentication by verifying the current smart card PIN.
If the smart card PIN had been entered 8 times incorrectly, the smart card PIN
and the encryption key on the smart card will be destroyed and the smart card
will be terminated.
Changing the encryption key is realised by either generating a new key using
the secure random number generator of the smart card, or copying the
encryption key from another smart card (requiring successful PIN verification
on both the source and target smart card).
The smart card generates two AES-256 keys (FIPS-197 [12]) using the built-in
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 Certification Report
TOE Security Functions Addressed issue
random number generator.
The smart card PIN and the encryption key are securely stored on the
individual smart card. The preceding encryption key (if any) is destroyed by
overwriting it with the changed encryption key.
When removing the smart card in activated lock-out mode, the storage device
is logically disconnected from the host PC. When removing the USB cable
(also in case of power failure or other disruptions), the storage device is
physically disconnected from the host PC. Upon logical or physical
disconnection from the host PC, the encryption key will be deleted on the
storage device. In order to regain access to the encrypted storage area, a
successful re-authentication is necessary (see SF1 or SF2).
SF4 „Encryption and
decryption“
The storage device uses the encryption key received from the smart card (see
SF1 and SF2) for encryption and decryption of the protected storage area. It
implements the cryptographic operation XTS-AES-256, i.e. AES in XTS mode
with two 256 Bit AES keys (FIPS-197 [12], SP 800-38E [13], IEEE 1619-2007
[14]). The Logical Block Address (LBA) of the HDD / SSD is used as the data
unit number for the XTS tweak generation.
SF5 „Secure state“ The TSF preserves a secure state and provides re-authentication (see SF1 or
SF2) when the following types of failures occur:
● abnormal abort of the TSF,
● system crash in the host,
● power failure,
● unintentional physical disconnection, or
● other disruption to the connection.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, and
Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapters 3.3 and 3.5.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3, Version 1.0
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/FW DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3 (external
encrypted HDD/SSD)
Portable storage device with internal 2.5” SATA
HDD or SSD drive (with 512 byte external sector
size) from Samsung (preferred), Seagate,
Western Digital, Toshiba or Hitachi.
The following capacities are available: 120GB
SSD, 160GB HDD, 250GB SSD, 320GB HDD,
500GB HDD/SSD, 640GB HDD, 750GB
HDD/SSD, 1TB HDD/SSD, 1,5TB HDD/SSD,
2TB HDD/SSD, 4TB HDD/SSD.
TOE device
Version 1.0
Delivered inside the
security bag and
packaging box
2 HW/SW Two smart cards NXP J2E081_M64 R3 with
JCOP v2.4.2 R3 (Java Card) certified by NSCIB-
CC-13-37761-CR2 [15]
loaded with DIGITTRADE HS256 S3 Java Card
Applet
TOE smart
card Version
1.0
Version 1.1.0
Delivered inside the
security bag and
packaging box
3 DOC DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3
Benutzerhandbuch / User Manual [10]
Note: Printed version is inside the packaging box,
but not part of the evaluated configuration.
Version 1.8 for
TOE Version
1.0
Download
3 DOC Benutzerhandbuch / User Manual -
Wichtiger Hinweis / Important notice [11]
Version 1.8 for
TOE Version
1.0
Delivered inside the
security bag and
packaging box
4 Accessory USB cable non-TOE Delivered inside the
packaging box
6 Accessory Hard case non-TOE Delivered inside the
packaging box
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Additional smart cards:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/SW Some smart cards (variable amount) NXP
J2E081_M64 R3 with JCOP v2.4.2 R3 (Java
Card) certified by NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2 [15]
loaded with DIGITTRADE HS256 S3 Java Card
Applet
TOE smart
card Version
1.0
Version 1.1.0
Delivered inside the
security bag and
packaging box
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
The physical delivery items of the complete product resp. additional smart cards, as listed
in the above tables, are shipped using standard packaging boxes.
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Only the electronic edition of the "Benutzerhandbuch / User Manual” is part of the
evaluated configuration of the TOE. It can be downloaded from:
http://www.digittrade.de/cms/support-center/download-center/?did=83
The SHA-512 hash of the electronic edition of the “Benutzerhandbuch / User Manual” is:
5AFF4CA83276CDB572842EC131DE0FB7A0F7A2BDB192E858A800238C1075C2D3
233A90CFB537AFCBCDBB2F36D9EB21F8E3707781E06696E2711CD9EE25F8A3E0
There are three different delivery procedures:
● physical delivery of the complete TOE
● physical delivery of additional smart cards
● electronic delivery of the user guidance (download)
The procedure for physical delivery of the complete TOE (storage device and smart cards)
and accessories are separated in two stages.
In the first stage of physical delivery, the complete TOE (storage device and smart cards)
resp. additional smart cards are packed into a security bag that is labelled with
name/version of the TOE. The second stage of physical delivery requires that the security
bag remains in place, undamaged and closed until the TOE is received by the end user.
The security bag ensures detection of any tampering or masquerading attempts during
physical delivery. Moreover, the security bag contains a download notice indicating the
SHA-256 hash value of the electronic edition of the user guidance, ensuring detection of
any tampering or masquerading during electronic delivery (download) of the user
guidance.
Overall, the developer uses two mechanism, i.e. a tamper-evident/-proof packaging
(security bag) and a strong cryptographic checksum, to ensure that the TOE is protected
against tampering and masquerading attacks during physical and electronic delivery.
In case of physical delivery of the complete TOE resp. additional smart cards, the user
shall verify the correct packaging of the TOE (see electronic user manual), i.e. check
whether the security bag is in place and closed and its security indicators are neither
damaged nor removed.
After electronic delivery of the user manual the user shall verify its SHA-512 hash value
after download (see [11]).
The print edition of the user guidance is not sufficiently protected since it is not packed into
the security bag. Therefore, only the digital version of the user manual is part of the
evaluation.
Although the user manual also describes the presence of a hologram sticker and epoxy
glue, these sealings are indicated as not being evaluated. They do not make any
contribution to the secure delivery and acceptance procedures.
The TOE parts can be identified via the labels of the
● portable storage device, printed on a sticker at the back side of its housing;
● smart card (JCOP v2.4.2 R3 from NXP), printed on its back side;
● user guidance [10], printed at the bottom of the inside front cover of its German (p. 2)
resp. English (p. 53) section.
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3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Protection of TSF data, i.e. authentication data and the cryptographic key material
(smart card PIN and encryption key)
● Provision of a two-factor authentication mechanism
• Possession factor: encryption key
• Knowledge factor: smart card PIN
● Encryption of all data stored in the protected storage area of the TOE
● Allowing only authenticated users to change the authentication data
● Reverting to a secure, stable and consistent state following a disruption
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.TrustedWS: The responsibility of the user is to ensure that all data retrieved from the
protected storage area of the TOE is properly protected resp. and no malware is
transferred to the TOE. This is explicitly reflected and supplemented by additional
instructions to monitor the activation of the lock-out mode and locking the TOE when it is
unattended.
● OE.AuthConf: The responsibility of the user for protecting confidentiality of the
authentication data is explicitly reflected and supplemented by additional instructions for
the destruction of encryption key, periodical resp. event-driven change of the smart card
PIN and individual and secure choice of the smart card PIN.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE consists of three subsystems:
● Storage device
● Java card applet
● Smart card
The storage device provides the host connection and contains the encrypted storage. It is
composed of the controller, USB-to-SATA bridge, protected storage and authentication
interfaces (smart card, keypad) as parts of the subsystem. It implements the data and
control relationships within the functionality for access control, user authentication,
encryption and administration of the encryption key.
While the Java card applet provides the storage, handling and management of the match
ID (for pairing with the storage device), the encryption key and the smart card PIN, it uses
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0825-2017 Certification Report
basic functionality of the smart card platform including secure cryptographic primitives
(random number generator), secure storage of sensitive data (smart card PIN, encryption
key) and relies on the management of an authenticated state.
The interfaces of the storage device and the Java card applet correspond to the TSF
interfaces. The interaction between the Java card applet and the smart card platform is not
visible to the user.
The architecture of the TOE ensures that the data encryption key is strictly separated from
the encrypted data, unless the storage device is in its authenticated state. The separation
provides the possession factor (encryption key) in addition to the knowledge factor (smart
card PIN) for 2-factor authentication. With the help of the storage device and the Java card
applet, the encryption key and the smart card PIN can be changed.
Further, with the help of the storage device and the Java card applet, the encryption key
can be copied to several smart cards. Each of these smart cards can be used in the
authentication process. Destruction of the encryption key requires either deletion on all
smart cards that store a copy of the encryption key, or generation of a new encryption key
and wiping the storage media using the new encryption key.
Physical disconnection of the storage device from the host PC locks the encrypted user
data by making the encryption key unavailable. Removing the smart card from the storage
device leads to a logical disconnection of the storage device from the host PC, which also
locks the encrypted user data by making the encryption key unavailable8
.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
In addition to the evaluated configuration, several test configurations of the TOE are used
for the functional and penetration testing as described below.
The developer designed seven classes of tests:
● Functional external interface tests use the evaluated configuration and some specifically
prepared smart cards for testing the functionalities:
• Automatic power on tests
• Access control only after successful user authentication
• Management functions
● Encryption specific tests examine the storage media for testing whether the proper
cryptographic algorithm (XTS-AES-256) is used.
8
This so called lock-out mode can be deactivated by the user, but must remain activated in order to use the
TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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● Java Card applet tests use a standard smart card reader for testing all relevant APDU
opcodes of the applet interface
● Smart card integrity tests use a standard smart card reader for testing the protection
against manipulating the smart card applet by using the smart card platform functionality
to install and configure applications.
● USB-to-SATA Bridge integrity tests use equipment on the host PC for testing the
protection of the TOE against manipulating the firmware on the USB bridge by
attempting to use the update mechanism.
● RAM tracking tests use an appropriate debugging tool for tracking the deletion of
sensitive information in the internal RAM.
● Data transmission integrity tests use an appropriate debugging tool and an adapted test
configuration for testing the detection and handling of integrity errors during internal
transmission of the data encryption key.
In addition to repeating an appropriate sample of the developer tests, the evaluator has
conducted independent tests which complement
● The tests of the behaviour of the security functionality,
● The tests of the interface actions in additional ways and combinations,
● The standard IEEE Std 1619-2007 test vectors, and
● The choice of encrypted sectors on storage media.
Moreover, the evaluator has conducted penetration tests for three identified potential
vulnerabilities:
● Sensitive information stored on storage media;
● Access to the internal memory of the device;
● Improper handling of unused APDU opcodes.
The test results do not indicate any unexpected behaviour. The potential vulnerabilities
being tested actually do not exist.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE shall be
operated in a single configuration. It consists of all delivered parts that comprise the TOE
as described in the scope of delivery. Further, the TOE shall be operated with activated
lock-out mode.
The single configuration of hardware, firmware, software and user guidance is:
● The TOE device as composed of its hardware/firmware components
● Contact-based smart card NXP J2E081_M64 R3 with JCOP v2.4.2 R3 (Java Card),
certified by NSCIB-CC-13-37761-CR2 (NXP)
● DIGITTRADE HS256 S3 V1.0 Java Card Applet V1.1.0 (DIGITTRADE)
● The TOE user guidance: DIGITTRADE HS256 S3 V1.0 Benutzerhandbuch / User
Manual
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for Portable Storage Media (PSMPP), Version
1.0, 31 July 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0081-2012 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Key Generation
(FCS_CKM.1)
AES (DRG.3) FIPS PUB 197 [12] 512 Bit Yes -
2 En-/decryption
of stored data
(FCS_COP.1 )
XTS-AES-256 NIST SP 800-38E [13]
IEEE Std 1619-2007 [14]
2 × 256
Bit
Yes -
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● The originality and integrity of the printed edition of the user manual is not sufficiently
protected during physical delivery of the TOE. Therefore, the authorized user shall only
use the electronic edition of the user manual. It is provided for download as indicated by
the accompanying important notice. Before first usage of the user manual the authorized
user shall verify the checksum (see chapter 2).
● The TOE shall be operated in activated lock-out mode. In order to ensure that the lock-
out mode is activated, the authorized user shall monitor the corresponding status LED.
● The authorized user is responsible for the individual preparation of the TOE. Before first
usage of the TOE he shall (a) change the initial smart card PIN, (b) generate the initial
encryption key on the smart card, and (c) initialize the smart card on the storage device.
Otherwise, the TOE shall not be used since it may not be in a secure state.
● In order to terminate the life-cycle of the encryption key and ensure that the encrypted
user data definitely cannot be decrypted anymore, even when the encryption key has
been copied onto several smart cards, the authorized user shall either destroy each
copy of the encryption key or overwrite the entire storage area using a newly generated
encryption key.
The cryptographic keys can be deleted by either deleting the cryptographic keys by
creating a new one or by entering the 8-digit PIN incorrectly 8 times.
Obligations and advices for the developer
● The security bag is apparently intended for use with different products. In order to avoid
delivery of a false version of the TOE due to mistakes in the supply chain, the developer
shall label the security bag with the complete TOE reference (name and version).
● When integrating further functions into the smart card, the developer shall inform its
customers that any such configuration is not covered by the certificate for the TOE.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES-XTS Advanced Encryption Standard in XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with
ciphertext stealing
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HDD Hard Disk Drive
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LBA Logical Block Address
LED Light Emitting Diode
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SATA Serial Advanced Technology Attachment
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSD Solid State Disk
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
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TSF TOE Security Functionality
USB Universal Serial Bus
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target, Version 1.10, 2017-09-18, DIGITTRADE High Security HS256 S3,
(external encrypted HDD/SSD), Version 1.0, DIGITTRADE GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 2017-09-19, Evaluation DIGITTRADE
HS256 S3 V1.0, DFKI GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for Portable Storage Media (PSMPP), Version 1.0, 31 July 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0081-2012
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.4, 2017-04-03, CM scope (ALC_CMS.2),
(confidential document)
[10] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.07, 2017-04-03,
Benutzerhandbuch / User Manual
[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.07, 2017-04-03,
Benutzerhandbuch / User Manual - Wichtiger Hinweis / Important Notice
[12] [U.S.] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 197 – Announcing the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), November 26, 2001.
[13] [U.S.] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): Special Publication
(SP) 800-38E – Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation – The XTS-
AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010.
[14] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Inc.: IEEE Std 1619-2007 –
The XTS-AES Tweakable Block Cipher, 04/18/2008.
[15] TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.: NXP J3E081_M64, J3E081_M66, J2E081_M64,
J3E041_M66, J3E016_M66, J3E016_M64, J3E041_M64 Secure Smart Card
Controller Revision 3 [also named JCOP 2.4.2 R3] – Certification Report, NSCIB-
CC-13-37761-CR2, Version 1, 25/08/2014.
9
specifically
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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