SERTIT, P.O. Box 14, N-1306 Bærum postterminal, NORWAY
Phone: +47 67 86 40 00 Fax: +47 67 86 40 09 E-mail: post@sertit.no Internet: www.sertit.no
Sertifiseringsmyndigheten for IT-sikkerhet Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SERTIT-056 CR Certification Report
Issue 1.0 22 August 2014
TNP ECC2 CPU Card version 1.0
CERTIFICATION REPORT - SERTIT STANDARD REPORT TEMPLATE SD 009 VERSION 2.1 11.11.2011
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ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES IN
THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY
SERTIT, the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security, is a member of the
above Arrangement and as such this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate
has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this Arrangement and is the
Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of
this Arrangement
The judgements contained in the certificate and Certification Report are those of
SERTIT which issued it and the Norwegian evaluation facility (EVIT) which carried
out the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Agreement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as
a result of reliance placed upon those judgements by a third party. *
* Mutual Recognition under the CC recognition arrangement applies to EAL4.
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Contents
1 Certification Statement 5
2 Abbreviations 6
3 References 8
4 Executive Summary 9
4.1 Introduction 9
4.2 Evaluated Product 9
4.3 TOE scope 9
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance 9
4.5 Assurance Level 9
4.6 Security Policy 9
4.7 Security Claims 9
4.8 Threats Countered 10
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment 11
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered 11
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies 11
4.12 IT Security Objectives 11
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives 12
4.14 Security Functional Requirements 12
4.15 Security Function Policy 13
4.16 Evaluation Conduct 13
4.17 General Points 13
5 Evaluation Findings 15
5.1 Introduction 16
5.2 Delivery 16
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation 16
5.4 Misuse 16
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis 16
5.6 Developer’s Tests 17
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests 17
6 Evaluation Outcome 18
6.1 Certification Result 18
6.2 Recommendations 18
Annex A: Evaluated Configuration 19
TOE Identification 19
TOE Documentation 20
TOE Configuration 20
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TNP ECC2 CPLJ Card Versjon 1.0 EAL4+ ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
i Certification Statement
Taiwan Name Plate Co. Ltd. TNP ECC2 CPU Card is a a dual interface CPU smartcard
that implements electronic purse functionality for online or offline Iow value
transaction in Easy Card Corporation payment system. It is mainly used for the Taipei
Metro System and in convenience stores.
TNP ECC2 CPU Card version 1.0 has been evaluated under the terms of the Norwegian
Certification Scheme for il Security and has met the Common Criteria Part 3 (ISO/IEC
i 5408) conformant requirements of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 for the specified Common Criteria Part 2 (lSO/IEC 15408)
conformant functionality when running on the platforms specified in Annex A.
Author Kjartan
Quality Assurance Lars Borg::
Approved Øystein Hole ,../ ,
Head of SERTIT
Date approved 22 August 2014
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2 Abbreviations
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
ATR Answer to reset
ATS Answer to select
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(ISO/IEC 15408)
CCRA Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the
Field of Information Technology Security
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CM Configuration Management
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
DEMA Differential Electro Magnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Easy Card Corporation
ECC2 2nd Generation ECC card / the TOE
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EOR Evaluation Observation Report
EP Electronic purse
EM Electronic Money
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EVIT Evaluation Facility under the Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT
Security
EWP Evaluation Work Plan
HO-DEMA High-Order Differential Electro Magnetic Analysis
HO-DPA High-Order Differential Power Analysis
IFX A security level named by Infineon (highest security level)
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OS1 A security level named by Infineon (medium-high security level)
OS2 A security level named by Infineon (low security level)
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OTP One Time Programmable
POC Point of Contact
QP Qualified Participant
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman Public Key Encryption
SEMA Simple Electro Magnetic Analysis
SERTIT Norwegian Certification Authority for IT Security
SPA Simple Power Analysis
SPM Security Policy Model
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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3 References
[1] Taiwan Name Plate Co., Ltd. (TNP) TNP ECC2 CPU Card Security Target,
version 1.0.1.
[2] Common Criteria Part 1, CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[3] Common Criteria Part 2, CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[4] Common Criteria Part 3, CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[5] The Norwegian Certification Scheme, SD001E, Version 9.0, 02 April 2013.
[6] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology, CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September
2012.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report Common Criteria EAL4+ Evaluation of TNP
ECC2 CPU Card v1.0, version 1.1, 28 March 2014.
[8] TNP ECC2 CPU Card Security Guidance version 1.0.
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4 Executive Summary
4.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security
evaluation of TNP ECC2 CPU Card version 1.0 to the Sponsor, Taiwan Name Plate Co.
Ltd., and is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of
the IT security of the product for their particular requirements.
Prospective consumers are advised to read this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1] which specifies the functional, environmental and assurance
evaluation requirements.
4.2 Evaluated Product
The version of the product evaluated was TNP ECC2 CPU Card version 1.0.
This product is also described in this report as the Target of Evaluation (TOE). T he
developer was Taiwan Name Plate Co. Ltd.
The TOE is an anonymous Electronic Purse (EP) smartcard application running on the
Infineon M7794 A12 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0883-2013) IC to the implementation of ECC EP
functionalities. The Infineon M7794 A12 smartcard was certified conformant to
PP0035. The firmware is installed on the NVM of the chip
Details of the evaluated configuration, including the TOE’s supporting guidance
documentation, are given in Annex A.
4.3 TOE scope
The TOE scope is described in the ST[1], chapter 1.4.
4.4 Protection Profile Conformance
The Security Target[1] did not claim conformance to any protection profile.
4.5 Assurance Level
The assurance incorporated predefined evaluation assurance level EAL4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. Common Criteria Part 3[4] describes the scale of
assurance given by predefined assurance levels EAL1 to EAL7. An overview of CC is
given in CC Part 1[2].
4.6 Security Policy
The TOE security policies are detailed in the ST[1], chapter 3.6.
4.7 Security Claims
The Security Target[1] fully specifies the TOE’s security objectives, the threats which
these objectives meet and security functional requirements and security fun ctions to
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elaborate the objectives. All of the SFR’s are taken from CC Part 2[3]; use of this
standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated pr oducts.
4.8 Threats Countered
 T.COUNTERFEITING_DEBIT
Counterfeiting of a debit operation in order to debit the EP with an EM
greater or lesser than the actual transaction that leads to unauthorized EM
creation or loss.
 T.COUNTERFEITING_CREDIT
Counterfeiting of a credit transaction in order to credit the EP without any
financial counterpart that leads to unauthorized EM creation or loss.
 T.COUNTERFEITING_UPDATE
Counterfeiting of a parameters update transaction in order to change the keys
values or the static counters values.
 T.DISCLOSURE_KEYS
Unauthorized access to the secret keys.
 T.INTEG_CODE
Unauthorized modification of the TOE code: an attacker modifies the code in
order to bypass the security policy of the EP.
 T.INTEG_LOG
Unauthorized modification of transaction log: an attacker modifies the value
of the last transaction log stored in the EP in order to input a known key.
 T.INTEG_KEYS
Unauthorized modification of stored keys: an attacker modifies the value of
the secret keys and associated attributes stored in the EP that leads to
unauthorized EM modification.
 T.INTEG_EM
Unauthorized modification of stored EM: An attacker modifies the amount of
EM stored in the EP in order to increase or decrease the amount.
 T.INTEG_IV_DATA
Unauthorized modification of stored EP identification and validity data: an
attacker modifies the value of the EP identification and validity data stored in
the EP in order to input another one.
 T.INTEG_COUNTER
Unauthorized modification of stored static counter: an attacker modifi es the
value of sequence counters in order to force the EP accepting counterfeited or
replayed transactions.
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 T.INTEG_EP_STAT
Unauthorized modification of the State Machine: an attacker modifies or
deletes information that defines the current state of the EP in order, for
instance, to bypass a secure state.
 T.REPLAY_DEBIT
Replay of a debit: an EP is debited several times via a previous complete
sequence of debit operations; it leads to unauthorized EM loss.
 T.REPLAY_CREDIT
Replay of a credit transaction: an EP is loaded several times via a previous
complete sequence of credit operations; it leads to unauthorized EM creation.
 T.REPLAY_UPDATE
Replay of a parameters update transaction: an EP is updated several times via
a previous complete sequence of parameters update operations; it leads to
fraudulent changes of parameters stored in the EP (keys and static counters).
4.9 Threats Countered by the TOE’s environment
There are no threats countered by the TOE’s environment.
4.10 Threats and Attacks not Countered
No threats or attacks that are not countered are described.
4.11 Environmental Assumptions and Dependencies
It is assumed that the persons manipulating the TOE in the operational environment
follow the TOE guides. And he is responsible for the application of the p rocedures
contained in the guides, and the persons involved in delivery and protection of the
product have the required skills and are aware of the security issues.
4.12 IT Security Objectives
 O.AUTH
The EP shall enforce mutual authentication with external devi ces prior any
transaction.
 O.EM
The EP shall prevent unauthorized creation or loss of EM.
 O.CONF_DATA
The EP shall prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential the Keys.
 O.INTEG_DATA
The EP shall prevent unauthorized modification of user and TSF data.
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 O.LIMIT
The EP behavior shall be limited by maximum values defined in the static
counters.
 O.OPERATE
The EP shall ensure the continued correct operation of its security functions
especially in case of abnormal transactions and unexpected interruption.
 O.RECORD
The EP shall record the last transactions to support effective security
management.
 O.REPLAY
The EP shall detect and reject replayed transactions.
 O.TAMPER
The EP shall prevent physical tampering of its security critical parts.
4.13 Non-IT Security Objectives
 OE.DEBIT_BEFORE_CREDIT
Debit must always precede credit during EM payment transaction.
 OE.MANAGEMENT_OF_SECRETS
The secret User or TSF data managed outside the TOE shall be protected
against unauthorized disclosure and modification.
 OE.PROTECTION_AFTER_TOE_DELIVERY
Procedures and controlled environment shall ensure protection of the TOE and
related information after delivery. Procedures shall ensure that people
involved in TOE delivery and protection have the required skills. The pers ons
using the TOE in the operational environment shall apply the product guides
(user and administrator guidance of the product, installation documentation
and personalization guide).
 OE.TOE_USAGE
The EM issuer shall communicate to the Purse holder the ru les dealing with
the use of the EP. Especially it must inform the user that he must keep EP the
same way he does for a real purse,
The Purse holder shall enforce these rules.
 OE.TIME
The terminal shall provide reliable time stamp to the TOE
4.14 Security Functional Requirements
The TOE security functional requirements are described in the ST[1], chapter 5.1.
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4.15 Security Function Policy
The TOE is a dual interface CPU smartcard that implements EP (electronic purse)
functionality for online or offline low value transaction in Easy Card Corporation
(ECC) payment system. It is mainly used for the Taipei Metro System and in
convenience stores.
The usage scenario of the EP is as below:
 Credit Purse transaction: the purse holder gives funds to the ECC Company
(online transaction) or the merchant (offline transaction) who loads the EP
with an equivalent amount of Electronic Money (EM),
 Debit Purse transaction: the purse holder asks the merchant for a service and
transfers (offline) EM from his EP to the merchant.
The TOE is able to:
 Store its amount of EM which defines the balance of the EP,
 Indicate the available amount of EM,
 Debit EM via Debit Purse operations,
 Credit EM via Credit Purse transactions,
 Update parameters.
4.16 Evaluation Conduct
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the
Norwegian Certification Scheme for IT Security as described in SERTIT Document
SD001E[5]. The Scheme is managed by the Norwegian Certification Authority for IT
Security (SERTIT). As stated on page 2 of this Certification Report, SERTIT is a
member of the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in
the Field of Information Technology Security (CCRA), and the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of
the TOE in meeting its Security Target[1], which prospective consumers are advised to
read. To ensure that the Security Target[1] gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against this
baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed in accordance with CC Part
3[4] and the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM)[6].
SERTIT monitored the evaluation which was carried out by the Brightsight B.V.
Commercial Evaluation Facility (CLEF/EVIT). The evaluation was completed when the
EVIT submitted the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)[7] to SERTIT in 28 March 2014.
SERTIT then produced this Certification Report.
4.17 General Points
The evaluation addressed the security functionality claimed in the Security Target [1]
with reference to the assumed operating environment specified by the Security
Target[1]. The evaluated configuration was that specified in Annex A . Prospective
consumers are advised to check that this matches their identified requirements and
give due consideration to the recommendations and caveats of this report.
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Certification does not guarantee that the IT product is free from security
vulnerabilities. This Certification Report and the belonging Certificate only reflect
the view of SERTIT at the time of certification. It is furthermore the responsibility of
users (both existing and prospective) to check whether any security vulnerabilities
have been discovered since the date shown in this report. This Certification Report is
not an endorsement of the IT product by SERTIT or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this Certification Report, and no warranty of the IT
product by SERTIT or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
Certification Report is either expressed or implied.
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5 Evaluation Findings
The evaluators examined the following assurance classes and components taken from
CC Part 3[4]. These classes comprise the EAL 4 assurance package augmented with
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
Assurance class Assurance components
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
All assurance classes were found to be satisfactory and were awarded an overall
“pass” verdict.
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5.1 Introduction
The evaluation addressed the requirements specified in the Security Target [1]. The
results of this work were reported in the ETR[7] under the CC Part 3[4] headings. The
following sections note considerations that are of particular relevance to either
consumers or those involved with subsequent assurance maintenance and re -
evaluation of the TOE.
5.2 Delivery
On receipt of the TOE, the consumer is recommended to check that the evaluated
version has been supplied, and to check that the security of the TOE has not been
compromised in delivery.
5.3 Installation and Guidance Documentation
Installation procedures are described in detail in the supporting documents[8].
5.4 Misuse
There is always a risk of intentional and unintentional misconfigurations that could
possibly compromise confidential information. Developers should follow the
guidance[8] for the TOE in order to ensure that the TOE operates in a secure manner.
The guidance documents adequately describe the mode of operation of the TOE, all
assumptions about the intended environment and all requirements for external
security. Sufficient guidance is provided for the consumer to effectively use the TOE’s
security functions.
5.5 Vulnerability Analysis
An independent vulnerability analysis has been performed. The vulnerability analysis
presented comprises of the following steps:
 A design and implementation review on the TOE was performed to identify
weaknesses in the TOE that could potentially be exploited by attackers.
 Validation tests of security features performed in ATE are taken into account
for the following vulnerability analysis.
 A vulnerability analysis based on the design and implementation review results
and the validation test results of security features, was performed considering
the well-known attacks from the “JIL Attack Methods for Smartcards and
Similar Devices”.
 The ETR report [ETR_COMP] and chip security guidance [ADV SG] of the
certified chip M7794 A12 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0883-2013) from the chip vendor is
taking into consideration while analysing potential vulnerabilities.
 A penetration test plan is established based on the results of the vulnerability
analysis.
 Practical penetration tests are performed according the penetration test plan.
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The evaluators first performed general vulnerability analysis by reviewing the source
code (version V170) and then identified verification test cases for AVA_VAN
penetration test to check the effectiveness of the countermeasures implemented
according to the hardware security guidelines.
Next, a thorough vulnerability analysis was done and identified 4 vulnerabilities
which are reported to the certifier. The developer, later on, patched the TOE ECC2
firmware to fix the identified vulnerabilities and provided an updated TOE with ECC2
firmware version v0.8.0 (next version of V170). Also a potential replay attack
vulnerability was identified during ATE testing. It was later on covered by [AGD] v0.9.
After reviewing the code again, the evaluator confirmed that no additional
vulnerability was introduced by these changes, so the test cases already performed
remain valid. The evaluators confirmed that the patch fixed the identified
vulnerability, and additional verification tests were conducted.
5.6 Developer’s Tests
The developer tests are performed on TOE samples that have the ECC2 firmware in
NVM. The ECC2 firmware version is v0.8.0. The developer test s are performed on TOE
non-personalized samples with test scripts running on the developer’s test tool .
5.7 Evaluators’ Tests
The evaluator approaches ATE independent testing as follows: a distinction is made
between reproduction of (a sample of) developer functional tests and tests additional
to the developer functional tests.
The evaluator’s responsibility for performing independent testing is required by the
ATE_IND class. The evaluators repeated the developer’s tests with the developer’s test
tool and scripts by using contact smartcard reader. Then, the evaluator defined
additional test cases, prompted by study of the developer documentation and test
scripts. The test strategy is as shown below.
 Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces by varying pa rameters to
more rigorously test the interface
 Performing positive and negative tests on selected Security Function or
Security Mechanism
 Change the execution sequence and perform replay test
 Enumerate all possible commands (INS)
The evaluators performed the evaluator’s independent tests with the developer’s test
tool and scripts by using contact smartcard reader. According to code review result,
the evaluator confirmed that the code for processing the APDU commands from
contact and contactless smartcard reader is the same. Therefore the evaluators
requested the developer to perform these same logical tests (both repeating part and
independent part) on the contactless smartcard reader. The evaluators witn essed the
execution of the same test cases performed by the developer by using contactless
smartcard reader.
The last independent test was done by Brightsight’s proprietary software.
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6 Evaluation Outcome
6.1 Certification Result
After due consideration of the ETR[7], produced by the Evaluators, and the conduct
of the evaluation, as witnessed by the Certifier, SERTIT has determined that TNP ECC2
CPU Card version 1.0 meet the Common Criteria Part 3 conformant requirements of
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 for the
specified Common Criteria Part 2 conformant functionality, in the specified
environment, when running on platforms specified in Annex A.
6.2 Recommendations
Prospective consumers of TNP ECC2 CPU Card version 1.0 should understand the
specific scope of the certification by reading this report in conjunction with the
Security Target[1]. The TOE should be used in accordance with a number of
environmental considerations as specified in the Security Target.
The above “Evaluation Findings” include a number of recommendations relating to the
secure receipt, installation, configuration and operation of the TOE.
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Annex A: Evaluated Configuration
TOE Identification
The TOE is an anonymous Electronic Purse (EP) smartcard application running on the
Infineon M7794 A12 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0883-2013) IC to the implementation of ECC EP
functionalities. The Infineon M7794 A12 smartcard was certified conformant to
[PP0035]. The firmware is installed on the NVM of the chip.
The TOE is a dual interface CPU smartcard that implements EP (electronic purse)
functionality for online or offline low value transaction in Easy Card Corporation
(ECC) payment system. It is mainly used for the Taipei Metro System and in
convenience stores.
Hardware components
The basic configuration elements of the TOE are the CPU, the various memory
elements (EEPOM, ROM, and RAM), security function circuits SCP (symmetric
coprocessor), various types of control circuits (including various types of detect ion
circuits).
Software components
The software component of the TOE is the ECC2 firmware. The software is organized
into three security levels: IFX level, OS1 level and OS2 level. The invocation of APIs
between different security level can only be done through so called Branch Table.
Only APIs in higher security level that registered in the Branch Table can be invoked
by code in lower security level.
OS2 is the lowest security level that includes functions to process I/O data. No
sensitive information is kept in this level. During system boot up, Main Subsystem
invoked InitMem function of System Service Subsystem to initialize the chip and
check system integrity. The Main Subsystem also implements the main execution loop
that receives and sends APDU commands through I/O Subsystem and then the
Hardware Subsystem to communicate with the card reader. It then dispatches APDU
commands to Command Interpreter, in OS1 security level, for command processing.
The major functionality of the TOE is implemented by ECC2 and Card Manager
Subsystems in OS1 security level. When an APDU command is sent from Main
Subsystem, the Command Interpreter in System Service Subsystem checks the security
status and interprets the APDU command and dispatch the command to corresponding
ECC2 or Card Manager Subsystem. These two subsystems implemented all APDU
commands of the TOE. Tool subsystem implements security mechanisms, required by
the chip vendor’s security guideline, to interact with hardware and Infineon Tool
Subsystem. Life Cycle subsystem is used by other subsystems to maintain the
lifecycle status. Mifare subsystem is only used in the ECC metro system migration
phase which is not in the TOE evaluation scope.
Infineon Tool Subsystem, in IFX security level, is the software part of the certified
platform (BSI-DSZ-CC-0883-2013) that provides chip identification information and
security services to manage the NVM.
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The Hardware Subsystem is the certified IC (BSI-DSZ-CC-0883-2013) that provides
the major security functions and mechanisms to protect the TOE.
TOE Documentation
The supporting guidance documents evaluated were:
[a] TNP ECC2 CPU Card Security Guidance version 1.0.
Further discussion of the supporting guidance material is given in Section 5.3
“Installation and Guidance Documentation”.
TOE Configuration
The following configuration was used for testing:
Item Identifier Versions
Hardware Infineon M7794 Integrated Circuit A12
Software ECC2 1.0
Manuals TNP ECC2 CPU Card Security Guidance 1.0
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M7794 A12. Another characteristic of
the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification data is accessible
via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM). The Generic Chip Identification
Mode (GCIM) can be activated on the ISO/IEC 7816-3 and ISO/IEC 14443-3 interfaces
after power-on with a dedicated signalling sequence as specified in [ADV SG].
The software (ECC2 v1.0) is identified by the return values of the following ATR or
ATS commands. In the developer’s CM system, ECC2 firmware is tagged as v0.8.0.
After this CC certification, it will be tagged as v1.0 according to [ALC, 5.4.2] without
any change in the source code. Hereafter, ECC2 firmware version 0.8.0 and version
1.0 both refer to the same TOE in this report. Both of these two tagged versions are
identified by the same return values of ATR and ATS commands.
ATS: 78 80 E4 02 54 4E 05 19 00 00 00 02 20
ATR: 3B F8 11 00 00 81 71 FE 42 00 54 4E 05 19 00 00 00 02 A1
y.
Lars Borgos
Quaiity Assurance
Certificate
The ITproduct identified in this certificote hos been
evoluated at the Norwegian evaluation facility described
on this certitïcote using Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, according to the versjon I7umber
described on this certificate, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for ITSecurity Evaluation occording to
the versjon nurnber described on this certificate.
This certificote applies only to the specific versjon and
release ofthe product in its evalucited configuration ondin
conjunctionwith the complete Certification repart.
The evaluotion hos been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of The Norwegian Certiflcation Authority for
ITSecurity [SERTITJ and the conc(usions ofthe evaluation
technicol report are consistent with the evidence odduced.
Certiffeation does not guarontee thatthe ITproduct is free
from security vulnerabilities. This certificate only reflects
the view ofSERTlTatthe time ofcertification.
It is furthermore the responsibility of users (both eisting
ond prospective) to check whether any security
vulnerabilities have been discovered since the date shown of
this certificate. This certificate is not an endorsement ofthe
ITproduct by SERTIT ar by any other organizotion that
recognizes orgives effect to this certificate, and no
worranty of the ITproduct by SERTIT ar by any other
organization thotrecognizes orgives effect to this
certificote, is either expressed or implied.
Produet Manufacturer: Taiwan Name Plate Co. Ltd.
Product Name: TNP ECC2 CPU Card
Type ofProduct: Electronic Purse (EP) smartcard application
Versjon and Release Numbers: Versjon 1.0
Assurance Package: EAL 4 augmented with ALC...DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Evaluation Criteria: Com mon Criteria versjon 3.1 R4 (ISO/IEC 15408)
Name of IT Security Evaluation Facility: Brightsight B.V.
Name ofCertification Body: SERTIT
Certification Reportidentifier: SERTIT-056 CR, issue 1.0, 22August2014
Certificate Identifier: SERTIT—056 C
Date Issued: 22 August 201 4
///
Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Certifier
ystein Hole
Head of SERTIT
:::( SERTIl
Norwegian Certificotion Authority for ITSecurity