BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
for
Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs
SLE88CNFX6600PM/P, SLE88CNFX6602PM/P,
SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P,
SLE88CFX6600P, SLE88CFX6602P,
SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P,
SLE88CF5400P all with PSL 3.22.11
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V4.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs SLE88CNFX6600PM/P,
SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P,
SLE88CFX6602P, SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P,
SLE88CF5400P all with PSL 3.22.11, Version: A13
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 June 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.1 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs SLE88CNFX6600PM/P,
SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P, SLE88CFX6602P,
SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P, SLE88CF5400P all with PSL 3.22.11
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs
SLE88CNFX6600PM/P, SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
SLE88CNF6600PM/P, SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P,
SLE88CFX6602P, SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P, SLE88CF5400P
all with PSL 3.22.11 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 20 June 2011. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs SLE88CNFX6600PM/P,
SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P, SLE88CFX6602P,
SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P, SLE88CF5400P all with PSL 3.22.11
has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs
SLE88CNFX6600PM/P, SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P, SLE88CFX6602P,
SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P, SLE88CF5400P all with PSL 3.22.11 (in the
following named SLE88CNFX6600PM), is a smart card IC (Security Controller) with
specific IC dedicated software, which is manufactured in a 0,13 μm CMOS technology.
The IC is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security-relevant applications.
The term “User Software” is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the user
software. The user software itself is not part of the TOE. The SLE88CNFX6600PM, whose
block diagram is shown in Figure 2-1 of [6], consists of a dedicated microprocessor (CPU)
with a virtual memory system (VMS), several different memories, security logic, a timer
and an interrupt-controlled I/O interface, an interface management module, a Single Wire
Protocol slave module (SWP) and two co-processors. The firmware, called platform
support layer (PSL), provides a high level interface to the hardware devices like timers,
UART (Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter), Crypto@1408Bit, TRNG (Random
Number Generator), NVM (Non Volatile Memory), DES (Data Encryption Standard) and to
the cryptographic functions AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), MD5, CRC (Cyclic
Redundancy Check) and SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm). The AES Encryption/Decryption,
the MD5 Generator and the CRC Generator are not in the scope of the certification and
not part of the security features of the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 7.1 They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF1 Operating state checking
SF2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3 Protection against snooping
SF4 TSF self test
SF5 Virtual Memory System (VMS)
SF6 Cryptographic support
SF7 NVM tearing save write
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.2.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.3, 4.1.1, 4.2.
The TOE has various configurations. The entire configuration is done during the
manufacturing process of the TOE according to the choice of the user. All differences
between the products of this TOE are realized by means of blocking without changing the
hardware. Therefore, all products of this TOE are equal from the hardware perspective.
Please refer to chapter 8 for more details about the configurations.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs SLE88CNFX6600PM/P,
SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P, SLE88CFX6602P,
SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P, SLE88CF5400P all with PSL
3.22.11
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW SLE88 CNFX 6600PM / M8864XXX or
SLE88 CNFX 6602PM / M8867XXX or
SLE88 CNFX 5400PM / M8960XXX or
SLE88 CNF 6600PM / M8954XXX or
SLE88 CNF 6602PM / M8957XXX or
SLE88 CNF 5400PM / M8970XXX or
SLE88 CNFX 6600P / M8865XXX or
SLE88 CNFX 6602P / M8868XXX or
SLE88 CNFX 5400P/ M8961XXX or
SLE88 CNF 6600P / M8955XXX or
SLE88 CNF 6602P / M8958XXX or
SLE88 CNF 5400P / M8971XXX or
SLE88 CFX 6600P / M8866XXX or
SLE88 CFX 6602P / M8869XXX or
SLE88 CFX 5400P / M8962XXX or
SLE88 CF 6600P / M8956XXX or
SLE88 CF 6602P / M8959XXX or
SLE88 CF 5400P / M8972XXX
a13 Complete modules, in form of
plain wafers or in an IC case
(e.g. DSO20)
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
2 SW IC Dedicated Test Software STS 06.03.03.03
build 0016
Included in ROM of the HW
3 SW IC Dedicated Test Software TNVM 0e.31 Included in ROM of the HW
4 SW IC Dedicated Support Software PSL
(Platform Support Layer)
3.22.11 Included in ROM of the HW or
Electronic Data.
5 DOC SLE88CNFX Family Hardware
Reference User’s Manual, Infineon
Technologies AG
Edition
19-12-2009
Electronic Data/Hardcopy
6 DOC SLE88CNFXxxxxPM PSL & Security
Reference Manual, Infineon
Technologies AG
Edition
May 2011
Electronic Data/Hardcopy
7 DOC SLE88CNFX Family Errata Sheet,
Infineon Technologies AG
02-07-2010 Electronic Data/Hardcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The deliverables and the form of the delivery is outlined in ST [6], section 2.2.5. All parts of
the PSL needed for tailoring the TOEs variant of the PSL at the user’s (i.e. application
software developer) site are delivered to the user. These parts of the TOE are identified by
a name of the data file and by a hash value ([6]). The SLE88CNFXxxxxPM PSL & Security
Reference Manual [11] guides how to tailor the PSL to evaluated variants. A guidance on
delivery procedures is also given in [11], A5.2. Therein the delivery of user guidance is
explained as follows. Infineon Technologies AG provides the user guidance in electronic
form encrypted with the PGP tool within an already established PKI. The customer has to:
● decrypt the received documents
● check whether the received documents match the document versions referenced in the
accompanying certification report (available at www.bsi.bund.de of the “Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik”.
● optionally, Infineon Technologies AG sends the user guidance in personalized paper
form to the customer.
The non-ISO Reset of the chip allows the user to get the chip identification information.
The hardware version can be identified by the nameplate on the surface of the die. Details
can be found in the SLE88CFXxxxxP PSL & Security Reference Manual [11] and the
“SLE88CNFX Family Hardware Reference User’s Manual” [10].
The new workspace based on one of the certified PSLs can be downloaded to the target
chip via the Flash or the Patch Loader. In order to start the Loader driver on the target
chip, a ’mini-operating system’ is stored by Infineon’s factory, which becomes active after
each reset. The ’mini-operating system’ is not part of the PSL and not certified. If the
download of the new workspace is executed, the user has to ensure that the 'mini-
operating system' is overwritten or disabled as described in [11].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an
overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement symmetric
cryptographic block cipher algorithms (DES, Triple-DES) to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will
provide a Random Number Generator. Additionally the TOE implements SHA-1and SHA-
256 functionality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the Security Policy of the TOE is also defined
to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during DES and Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), protection against physical probing, malfunctions, physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● Usage of Hardware Platform
● Treatment of User Data
● Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
● Usage of Key-dependent Functions
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 4.3.
5 Architectural Information
The Infineon SLE800CNFX6600PM smart card IC (Security Controller) is an integrated
circuit (IC) providing a hardware and software platform (Platform Support Layer PSL) to a
Smartcard Embedded Software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be
found within the TOE description of the “SLE88CNFX6600PM/m8864 Security Target”. The
complete hardware description, the complete instruction set and the programmers
interfaces to the PSL of the Infineon SLE800CNFX6600PM smart card controller can be
found in the “SLE88CNFX Family Hardware Reference User’s Manual” [10] and
“SLE88CNFXxxxxPM PSL & Security Reference Manual” [11].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components 32-bit
proprietary CPU, (Triple-) DES Co-Processor, numeric coprocessor, Random Number
Generator (RNG), Virtual Memory System, Security Sensors and Filters, Memory
Encryption and software drivers within the Platform Support Layer software (PSL) are
used. Security measures for physical protection are realized within the layout of the whole
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
circuitry. Logical security measures are implemented in both the circuitry of the hardware
and in the software of the PSL.
The API of the Platform Support Layer software (PSL) provide the user interface to all
security functions of the TOE where they can be configured or used by the user (i.e.
Smartcard Operating System and/or the Smartcard Embedded Software).
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into following categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and for digital
simulations;
3. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software (PSL) and
for the IC Dedicated Support Software (STS) on emulator versions of the TOE or
within the simulation of chip in special hardware;
4. qualification tests to release the TOE to production:
• used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as
characterisation tests)
• special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with samples of
the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also
layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements
concerning the layout;
5. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3 or phase 4 depending
on the TOE delivery form).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
sites. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling or by complete repetition of regression tests
especially for the software. Besides repeating exactly the developer’s tests, test
parameters and test equipment are varied and additional analysis was done. Security
features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the
evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
The developer has tested the TOE. In cases that different configurations were tested, the
evaluators assessed the validity of test results for the TOE.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security
Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated derivative of the TOE is SLE88CNFX6600PM/M8864XXX a13 with PSL
Version 3.22.11, STS Version 06.03.03.03 build 0016 and TNVM software rev. 0e.31.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the semiconductor factory in
Dresden, each labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
The evaluation results including also results of tests performed by the developer are valid
for all hardware derivatives of the TOE containing the same software (PSL, STS and
NVM), as the only differences are the configured (by software means) size of the available
NVM to the user and the size of ROM made available to the user during mask
manufacturing. All those configuration options have no impact on evaluation results.
The evaluation results including also results of tests performed by the developer are valid
for all tailoring options (see [11], section 7.1) for PSL variants on all derivatives. This
statement must be understood as follows. A PSL driver provides a tested functionality on
its interfaces only when it is enabled and included. There are no security flaws related to
disabling or not including PSL drivers. There is no difference in terms of the rating the
overall security to the situation when the user decides not to use a specified PSL driver at
all.
In order to start the Loader driver on the target chip, a ’mini-operating system’ is stored by
Infineon’s factory, which becomes active after each reset. The ’mini-operating system’ is
not part of the PSL and not certified. If the download of the new workspace is executed,
the user has to ensure that the 'mini-operating system' is overwritten or disabled as
described in [11].
The evaluation results cannot be extended to further versions/derivatives of the TOE
and/or another production sites without any extra investigations.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, The Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits
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● Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack Potential
to Smartcards
● Supporting Document - Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [9] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform
evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria
Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for the TOE Security
functionality SF6 (Cryptographic Support).
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Algorithm Bit
Length
Application Portion
of the
TSF
Standard of
Implementation
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
DES 56 General service for the
user, encryption and
decryption
SF6 NIST Special
Publication 800-67,
Version 1.1 , NIST
Special Publication
800-38A, Edition
2001
- -
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
Algorithm Bit
Length
Application Portion
of the
TSF
Standard of
Implementation
Standard of
Application
Validity
Period
3DES 112,
168
General service for the
user, encryption and
decryption
SF6 NIST Special
Publication 800-67,
Version 1.1, NIST
Special Publication
800-38A, Edition
2001
- -
SHA 160,
256
General service for the
user. The secure hash
algorithm SHA is intended
to be used for signature
generation, verification and
generic data integrity
checks. The use for keyed
hash operations like HMAC
or similar, is not subject of
the TOE
SF6 FIPS PUB 180-3 - -
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality DES, 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), SHA1 (used as collision-
resistant hash function) provided by the TOE achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits
(in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
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In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [9].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HW Hardware
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM Non Volatile Memory
PP Protection Profile
PSL Platform Support Layer
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read-Only Memory
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
SWP Single Wire Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
TSF TOE Security Functionalities
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
VMS Virtual Memory System
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011, Version 0.3, 30.05.2011,
SLE88CNFX6600PM/m8864 Security Target, Infineon Technologies AG
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.02, 09.06.2011, T-Systems GEI GmbH,
(confidential document)
[9] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product Infineon Smart
Card IC SLE88CNFX6600PM/m8864, Version 1.02, 09.06.2011, T-Systems GEI
GmbH (confidential document)
[10] SLE88CNFX Family Hardware Reference User’s Manual, Edition 19-12-2009,
Infineon Technologies AG
[11] SLE88CNFXxxxxPM PSL & Security Reference Manual, Edition May 2011, Infineon
Technologies AG
[12] SLE88CNFX Family Errata Sheet, Infineon Technologies AG, 02-07-2010
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, 17.05.2010, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (Release 3 = chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
level design presentation
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) -
functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
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“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0706-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Technologies AG Smartcard ICs SLE88CNFX6600PM/P,
SLE88CNFX6602PM/P, SLE88CNFX5400PM/P, SLE88CNF6600PM/P,
SLE88CNF6602PM/P, SLE88CNF5400PM/P, SLE88CFX6600P, SLE88CFX6602P,
SLE88CFX5400P, SLE88CF6600P, SLE88CF6602P, SLE88CF5400P all with PSL 3.22.11
(Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for
the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 29 June 2011, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Address Function
Amkor
Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
Module Mounting
Augsburg
Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Dresden
Infineon Technologies Dresden
GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production, Initialisation Pre-
personalisation
Dresden-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc.
Rähnitzer Allee 9
Mask Center
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Site Address Function
01109 Dresden
Germany
Graz / Villach /
Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Development
Großostheim
Infineon Technology AG
DCE Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 - Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward
Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
Distribution Center
Kulim
Infineon Technologies (Kulim)
Sdn. Bhd
Lot 10 &11, Julan Hi-Tech 7
Industrial Zone Phase II
Kulim Hi-Tech Park
09000 Kulim, Kedah Darul Aman
Malaysia
Initialisation and Pre-
personalisation
Munich
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Germany
Development
Regensburg-
West
Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Module Mounting, inlay
antenna mounting, Distribution
Center
Singapore
Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Distribution Center
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Site Address Function
Singapore
Kallang
Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting
Wuxi
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting, Distribution
Center
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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