BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009
for
SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption
Version 5.30
from
Utimaco Safeware AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009
PC-Sicherheit: Integritätsschutz
SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption
Version 5.30
from Utimaco Safeware AG
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2, ADO_DEL.2, ADV_FSP.2, ALC_LCD.1,
AVA_MSU.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 02. October 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● BSIG2
● BSI Certification Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN 45011 standard
● BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
● Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 12 June 2007. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Utimaco Safeware AG
The product was developed by: Utimaco Safeware AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30 has been included in
the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://
www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228
9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Utimaco Safeware AG
Elektrastrasse 6a
81925 München
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the software application SafeGuard Enterprise Device
Encryption, Version 5.30 provided by Utimaco Safeware AG. SafeGuard Enterprise Device
Encryption prevents unauthorized users from access to the clear text of data stored on
mobile or stationary block devices. This is achieved by encryption of the data, which is
completely transparent to users.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 3
augmented by ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2, ADO_DEL.2, ADV_FSP.2,
ALC_LCD.1, AVA_MSU.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
Power On Authentication (POA) Power On Authentication is a mechanism of the TOE to
check the user’s authenticity before the operating system on
a PC is booted from its boot device.
Protection of Data on Protected
Devices
After a successful authentication by security function POA,
the cryptographic keys needed to boot the PC are
determined out of the user’s key ring stored in TSF data. The
user’s key ring is compiled from one or more key tables after
a successful logon to Windows. An access to any encrypted
device is only possible if the cryptographic key used for
encryption of that specific device is known. Hence, this
security function ensures that data provided by authorised
users are protected when being stored on encrypted devices
and when the PC is not in operation or the device is
detached from the PC.
Secure Server-Based Administration The administration of the TOE is done in the administration
server. The TOE retrieves its administration data from the
administration server over a network connection.
Besides the TOE installation and uninstallation and user
password change, there is no administration function
available at the client side for the TOE.
The local administration data (TSF data) is secured by
symmetric encryption. Only a successful identification and
authentication grants access to the TSF data.
Note: The TOE and the administration server communicate
using a secure SSL connecting that is provided by the
environment. All data transmitted over this secure
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0462-2009 Certification Report
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
connection is encrypted and its integrity is protected. Thus,
sensitive administration data is protected by multiple
protection layers during transmission.
Random Number Generation and Key
Generation
During installation of the TOE and initial encryption of local
block devices a deterministic random number generator
(DRNG) is used for the generation of the cryptographic keys.
The DRNG fulfils the requirements of class K3 as described
in AIS20.
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 2.3 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of
Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as specified in chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Device Encryption client for
SafeGuard Enterprise
Version 5.30.1, English
program version
SafeGuard® Enterprise Client
Modules 5.30.1
CD-ROM
2 PDF Installation Manual SafeGuard® Enterprise
Version 5.30
CD-ROM
3 PDF Administrator’s Manual SafeGuard® Enterprise
Version 5.30
CD-ROM
4 PDF User Manual SafeGuard® Enterprise
Version 5.30
CD-ROM
5 PDF Manual for certification
compliant operation
SafeGuard® Enterprise
Version 5.30, August 2009
CD-ROM
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Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
No hardware is delivered as part of the product.
Packing and Shipping:
The product CD-R and a printed document containing the installation guide are packed
together into a plastic box at the production department of Utimaco at Oberursel.
The boxes containing the CD-R and the installation guide are delivered from the
production department of Utimaco at Oberursel to the customer.
There are no restrictions for the channel of distribution: direct distribution, purchase from
distributor or dealer. Different ways of shipping are offered. Usually shipping is done with
the German Parcel Service or UPS with online tracking. Special forms of delivery are also
possible like parcel service with certain hand-over procedures, direct pick-up at Utimaco
Oberursel or personal delivery by an Utimaco employee (only possible for larger amounts
of licenses).
Independent of the shipping method, the product contains ways for customers to check the
origin, integrity and authenticity of the software they received.
Product Identification:
The product can be identified by the product name and version number printed on the CD-
R media as well as on the documentation provided together with the media.
Integrity and Authentication:
The user may check the integrity and the authenticity of the received package by using a
built-in integrity check function:
The installation files (.msi) of the product are signed with a VeriSign class 3 Code Signing
Certificate. This enables customers to verify the origin, integrity and authenticity of the
TOE.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Access Control:
The TOE controls access to block devices. Each block device is treated as a whole, i.e.
there is no specific access control to any subset of data (directories, files) on a block
device. For each user known to the TOE and each block device under control of the
TOE, it can be defined, whether the user has access to the block device or not. Any
user not known to the TOE won’t have any access to controlled block devices. The
identity and authorization of a user are checked during the boot process of a PC with
the TOE installed.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
● The TOE runs on personal computer systems with following minimum requirements:
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● microprocessor Intel Pentium IV with 1.3 GHz or higher (or successor type) or
compatible device, with 32-bit internal operation, suitable for Windows XP,
● minimum system RAM of 512 MB (1.024 MB recommended for Windows Vista),
● 5 GB free hard disk memory (minimum)
● CD-ROM drive for installation,
● USB 2.0 port (if a USB Token device is used for authentication)
● USB Token (optional), e.g. Aladdin eToken or RSA SecurID Token
● Smart Card Reader (if smart cards are used for authentication)
● Smart Card (optional), several Java Card, MultOS and ISO 7816 cards are
supported
● Operating System
The version of SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption under this evaluation is
provided for the following operating systems:
● Microsoft Windows XP Professional Edition Service Pack 2
● Microsoft Windows Vista Enterprise Edition Service Pack 1
For all operating systems, the international versions for support of Western character
sets are applied.
SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption works with all available file systems under
Windows XP/Vista: FAT, FAT32, NTFS4, and NTFS5 (EFS).
● Application Software
The TOE is working together with all application software, which is released for the
mentioned operating system platform. However, application software, which is not
using the respective Application Programming Interface of the OS platform for disk
access, may write plain text data directly onto a protected device. Then this data is not
protected by the TOE against unauthorised disclosure. Using such software, while the
TOE is installed, is not recommended.
● Administration Network Connection
The data connection between SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption and SafeGuard
Enterprise Server has to be secured by a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) resp. Transport
Layer Security (TLS) connection provided by the IT environment.
● Further Connectivity Aspects
● The threats defined for the TOE are restricted to unauthorised accesses to plain
text data by unauthorised users to PCs not in an operational state.
● When the PC - with the TOE installed on it - is operated in connection to any
other computer system, it might be possible for unauthorised individuals to
manipulate the TOE in a way, that its security functionality can be circumvented
or deactivated (e.g. by installing “Trojan Horse”-type programs/scripts).
Therefore no partition-/drive-/volume-, directory- or file-shares shall be defined
on a PC secured by the TOE.
● When the TOE is operated in a network with connection to the Internet, a
correctly installed and maintained firewall system shall be established to prevent
access to the protected PC’s hard disk(s) and memory by unauthorised
individuals from outside.
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Details can be found in the Security Target [6] chapter 3.3.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE consists of the following main components:
[C1] “Power On Authentication” component, performing boot control and user
identification and authentication;
[C2] Real mode kernel for device encryption on BIOS level and TSF data management;
[C3] Windows 32-bit filter driver for device encryption;
[C4] Administration component including remote administration interface and local
administration tools;
During their examination the evaluators got the following overview showing the
decomposition of the TOE into subsystems:
● Subsystems of the main component [C1]: Power On Authentication component
[S1.1] Modified Master Boot Record
[S1.2] POA User Interface Application
[S1.3] POA Cryptographic Subsystem
● Subsystems of the main component [C2]: Real mode kernel for device encryption on
BIOS level and TSF data management
[S2.1] Real Mode Encryption Driver
● Subsystems of main component [C3]: Windows 32-bit filter driver for device encryption
[S3.1] Windows 32-bit Filter Driver Frame
[S3.2] Windows 32-bit Crypto Modules
● Subsystems of main component [C4]: Administration component including remote
administration interface and local administration tools
[S4.1] Initialization Subsystem
[S4.2] Administration Server Interface
[S4.3] User and Password Synchronisation Subsystem
[S4.4] Device Encryption Controller Subsystem
[S4.5] Event Subsystem
[S4.6] Status User Interface
[S4.7] Auditing Subsystem
Please note that the italic marked subsystems don’t provide any explicit security function.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
Description of the Test Configuration
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The TOE test configuration is indicated at the beginning of chapter 3 of the test document
ATE describing the test cases [10], and is defined as the TOE itself which is denoted as
SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30. The test configuration consists of a
TOE installed according to the installation guidance [13] as well as the user guidance
documents [14] and [15]. The tests are exercised twice by the developer: firstly for the
operating system "Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2" ("XP-SP2" in short) and
secondly using the operating system "Microsoft Windows Vista Service Pack 1" ("Vista-
SP1" in short). The configuration of the TOE is the same for both operating systems.
Since there are no different configurations of the TOE the evaluators’ testing addresses
the TOE as defined by the denotation SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version
5.30. Since the dedication of the TOE is intended for the two different operating systems
Microsoft Windows XP Professional Service Pack 2 (XP-SP2) and Microsoft Windows
Vista Enterprise Service Pack 1 (Vista-SP2) the tests were conducted twice, once for each
operating system.
In execution of the tests the following tools are specifically used for testing:
● KeytestSGN
● CryptotestVBE
● DiskEditor
The first test tool KeytestSGN contains a second implementation of the security
functionality to access the key hierarchy stored in a PKCS#12 archive. The second test
tool CryptoTestVBE realizes a second implementation of the cryptographic mechanism
used for the encryption/decryption of the user data. The last test tool DiskEditor is for
analysing the disc sectors on the harddrive.
Tests of the Developer
TOE test configuration:
The developer describes test plan and test procedures in the following documents:
● SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption: Test Description and Analysis, [9]
● SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption: Test Cases for Functional Testing, [10]
These documents describe the test configuration, test preparation, test execution,
expected and actual results of the tests.
Testing approach:
The TOE will be tested by the developer in the normal operational state which is reached
after the installation according to the installation guidance for the two different operating
systems XP-SP2 and Vista-SP1. Hence, the test approach consists of the interaction with
the TOE using the user reachable interfaces and so stimulating the security functions.
Some test cases stimulate the security functions according to their normal using and the
error-free situations will be tested. Other test cases stimulate the security functions under
failure provoking circumstances and the correct reaction of the TOE will be checked.
For the check of the cryptographic algorithms additional test tools have been used. These
test tools are implemented using a different crypto implementation – implemented
independently from the TOE implementation – to find evidence about the correctness of
the TOEs implementation of the cryptographic mechanism.
In particular the following operations have been done:
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● Encrypting and Decrypting mobile and stationary storage devices
● Issuing and revoking password policies
● Testing of encryption functionality
● Assigning encryption keys to users
Amount of developer testing performed:
The test cases are dedicated to the demonstration of the proper implementation of all
security functions. For all commands resp. functionality test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate the expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby not all possible
parameters are tested but sufficiently representative sample of parameters.
Testing Results:
The test documentation is given by the developer in two different documents, [9] and [10].
In the first document the developer amongst others introduces the test plan. The second
document describes the test procedures and furthermore also the test runs as well as the
actual result of every test case exercised by the developer.
The actual test results of all test cases documented by the developer are "Tested and OK".
This shows that the execution of each test case was successful and all actual test results
were as the expected ones. Therefore the overall developer testing result is "OK".
Independent Evaluator Tests
Subset size chosen:
The developer delivered a whole broadband of test cases for the TSF that the TOE
operates as specified. In order not to multiply the redundancy the test subset conducted by
the evaluator in this matter consists of a few additional tests, more precisely of enhancing
four test cases, and therefore it refers to the actual test cases describing the TSF.
During the inspection of the developer test cases the evaluators produced the following
table introducing evaluator test cases which address aspects of TOE in addition of the
developer’s testing effort:
Test Case Security Function tested Description
SRC test case 00 –
Preparation step
- This isn’t a real test case. Some
configuration steps at the management
console are necessary for the following test
cases.
Installation ManualSRC
test case 01 – AES128
encryption
<SF2> Protection of data on
protected devices
The partition “C:\” of the test environment
shall be encrypted with AES128 using the
machine key. The integrity of the encryption
shall be tested by the CryptotestVBE Tool
provided by Utimaco. The result of the test
ends with the output “Encryption OK”.
SRC test case 02 –
AES256 encryption
<SF2> Protection of data on
protected devices
The partition “D:\” of the test environment
shall be encrypted with AES256 using the
group key of SRC. The integrity of the
encryption shall be tested by the
CryptotestVBE Tool provided by Utimaco.
The result of the test ends with the output
“Encryption OK”.
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Test Case Security Function tested Description
SRC test case 03 –
Removable volume
encryption
<SF2> Protection of data on
protected devices
A removable Volume and a USB-Stick shall
be encrypted with AES256 using the group
key of SRC. The integrity of the encryption
shall be tested by the CryptotestVBE Tool
provided by Utimaco. The result of the test
ends with the output “Encryption OK”.
SRC test case 04 –
Password policy
<SF1> Power On
Authentication (POA)
<SF3> Secure server-based
administration
In the Management Center a policy for
passwords shall be created. It contains a
minimum length of 6 characters and a
maximum length of 12 characters. Also one
special character and one digit have to be
part of the password. The policy shall be
distributed to the test environment. After
receiving the policy a password change has
to be done in order to match the
requirements.
Table 3: Security functions tested
"Random Number Generation and Key Generation" wasn’t explicitly tested by the
evaluators for the following reasons:
● The use of the random number generator and of the key generation is implicitly tested
in every case a new block device is initially encrypted.
● The developer provided a separate document regarding the quality assessment of the
random number generator [11].
● The developer provided a source code fragment providing evidence about the usage of
the random number generator in the context of the key generation.
Developer tests conducted by the evaluators at SRC in Bonn:
The evaluator tests were exercised between the 24.07.2009 and 17.08.2009 in the
premises of SRC in Bonn.
The TOE is part of an enterprise related software package consisting of a server
installation – which is not part of the TOE – and a client installation. The evaluation at hand
comprises this client related software part. To minimize the overall testing related costs the
developer provides an already installed server installation within a VMWare image. The
evaluators decided to use this provided server installation as part of the test environment
because the server isn’t in the focus of the evaluation, the TOE installation is
independently from the server and furthermore the interface between TOE and server was
inspected using a network sniffing tool (Wireshark) to check the effectiveness of the SSL
security mechanism.
The evaluators decided to re-conduct all developer test cases used by the developer for
the argumentation regarding the test coverage of the functional specification except one
test case which addresses the explicit test of the random number generator during
machine key generation.
Penetration test conducted by the evaluators at SRC in Bonn:
During the assessment about the developer’s vulnerability analysis and as a result of the
evaluators own vulnerability analysis the evaluators state that the TOE doesn’t provides
potential vulnerabilities. Due to these circumstances the evaluators considered that there
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are no penetration tests necessary. Therefore no penetration tests were defined nor
exercised for formal reasons of the CC.
The determination of the existence of a watermarked file on the encrypted device is not
considered as violating the security objectives of the TOE, hence not considered as
vulnerability here. However it could be stated that the cryptographic mechanism used to
protect the integrity and confidentiality of the user data doesn’t provide protection against
Watermarking attacks.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE test configuration is indicated in the test documentation [10] and it was used
SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30. The results of the evaluation can
only be applied on SafeGuard Enterprise Device Encryption, Version 5.30. Without a
preceding evaluation the extension of the results to other versions of the TOE is not
possible.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 3.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 3 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2, ADO_DEL.2, ADV_FSP.2,
ALC_LCD.1, AVA_MSU.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● for the Functionality: product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 3 augmented by ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2,
ADO_DEL.2, ADV_FSP.2, ALC_LCD.1, AVA_MSU.2
● The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : medium
SF1 (Power On Authentication), SF4 (Random Number Generation and Key
Generation).
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 20 (see [4])
were used.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
● the TOE Security Function SF1 (Power On Authentication (POA)) with RSA data
encryption and decryption with cryptographic key size 1024, 1536, 2048 or 4096 bits,
PKCS #1 v1.5, SHA-1 as pseudorandom function, Triple-DES in CBC mode with
cryptographic key size of 112 bits,
● the TOE Security Function SF2 (Protection of Data on Protected Devices) with AES-
128 with CBC mode of operation and block size 128 bits and cryptographic key size
128 bits according to FIPS-197, AES-256 with CBC mode of operation and block size
128 bits and cryptographic key size 256 bits according to FIPS-197
● the TOE Security Function SF3 (Secure Server-Based Administration) with SHA-1 as
pseudorandom function, Triple-DES in CBC mode with cryptographic key size of 112
bits and
● for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
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SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
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TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
VMware image - Virtualisation Image build with VMware
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target – SafeGuard Enterprise - Device Encryption, Version 5.30,
Document Version 1.22.00, Utimaco Safeware AG, 06.07.2009, file name: SGN5.3-
EAL3-ST.doc
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 29.09.2009, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Configuration list for the TOE (confidential document):
Configuration List for Evaluation Documentation, Utimaco Safeware AG, Version 8,
18.08.2009, file name: SGN5.3-EAL3-cfgList.doc
Configuration List for source code and binary files, Utimaco Safeware AG, Version
4, 08.07.2009, file name: SGN5.2-EAL3-cfgList_source.doc
[9] SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption: Test Description and Analysis, Utimaco
Safeware AG, Version 1.23.00, 10.08.2009, file name: SGN5.3-EAL3-TES.doc
[10] SafeGuard Enterprise – Device Encryption: Test Cases for Functional Testing,
Utimaco Safeware AG, Version 1.04.00, 14.08.2009, file name: SGN5.3-EAL3-
FTE.doc
[11] SafeGuard Enterprise Key Generation, Utimaco Safeware AG, Version 1.14.00,
24.06.2008, file name: SGN5.2-DRNG.doc
Guidance documentation for the TOE:
[12] SafeGuard Enterprise Version 5.30 - Administrator’s Manual, Utimaco Safeware
AG, file name: SGN_Admin_en.pdf
[13] SafeGuard Enterprise Version 5.30 - Installation, Utimaco Safeware AG, file name:
SGN_Installation_en.pdf
[14] SafeGuard Enterprise Version 5.30 – User Manual, Utimaco Safeware AG, file
name: SGN_Client_en.pdf
[15] SafeGuard Enterprise Version 5.30 – User and Administrator’s Manual Supplement:
Manual for Certification-compliant Operation, August 2009, Utimaco Safeware AG ,
file name: Client_CC_Certification_AddOn_SGN530_en.pdf
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
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[16] SafeGuard Enterprise Version 5.30 – SGN Client Online Help, Utimaco Safeware
AG, file name: SGNClient_0409.chm
(Note: This online help file is part of the TOE installation itself)
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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