C110 Certification Report
Amaris Data Diode for Air Gap (ADD-GAP) v 2.0.112
File name: ISCB-5-RPT-C110-CR-v1
Version: v1
Date of document: 17 June 2020
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
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C110 Certification Report
Amaris Data Diode for Air Gap (ADD-GAP) v 2.0.112
17 June 2020
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 7, Tower 1,
Menara Cyber Axis, Jalan Impact,
63000 Cyberjaya, Selangor, Malaysia
Tel: +603 8800 7999 Fax: +603 8008 7000
http://www.cybersecurity.my
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Document Authorisation
DOCUMENT TITLE: C110 Certification Report
DOCUMENT REFERENCE: ISCB-5-RPT-C110-CR-v1
ISSUE: v1
DATE: 17 June 2020
DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
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Copyright Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the
property of CyberSecurity Malaysia.
The document shall be held in safe custody.
©CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2020
Registered office:
Level 7, Tower 1
Menara Cyber Axis
Jalan Impact
63000 Cyberjaya
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Company Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
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Foreword
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th
Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to
build consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for licensed
Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations of ICT
products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised standards.
The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common Criteria
Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security Certification
Body (ISCB) Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security
Target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation
activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated
25 June 2020 and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of
product evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product
Register (MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the
official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement).
Reproduction of this report is authorised provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associate certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5
(Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 5 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate apply only to the
specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the MyCC Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This certification report and its associated certificate is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certification report and its associated certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
d1 9 June 2020 All Initial draft
v1 17 June 2020 All Final Released
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Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Amaris Data Diode For Air Gap (ADD-GAP) offers end
users a means to convey user data across the communication interface from the ADD-GAP
Send-Only circuit to the ADD-GAP Receive-Only circuit and the data’s target destination.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]) which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, the
security functional requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the product
is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Prospective consumers are advised to
verify that their operating environment is consistent with the evaluated configuration, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
This report confirms the findings of the security evaluation of the TOE to the Common
Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2). This report confirms that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the
Malaysia Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]).
The evaluation was performed by Cybertronics Lab and the evaluation was completed on
5 June 2020.
The Malaysia Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the Arrangements on the Recognition of
Common Criteria certificates and the product will be listed in the MyCC Scheme Certified
Products Register (MyCPR) at http://www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria
portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) at
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that Amaris Data Diode For Air Gap (ADD-GAP)
v2.0.112 meets their requirements. It is recommended that a potential user of the TOE
refer to the Security Target (Ref [6]) and this Certification Report prior to deciding whether
to purchase the product.
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Table of Contents
Document Authorisation...............................................................................................ii
Copyright Statement......................................................................................................iii
Foreword..............................................................................................................................iv
Disclaimer ............................................................................................................................v
Document Change Log..................................................................................................vi
Executive Summary....................................................................................................... vii
Index of Tables .................................................................................................................ix
Index of Figures ...............................................................................................................ix
1 Target of Evaluation....................................................................................................1
1.1 TOE Description ................................................................................... 1
1.2 TOE Identification.................................................................................... 3
1.3 Security Policy ....................................................................................... 4
1.4 TOE Architecture ................................................................................... 4
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries ........................................................... 4
1.4.2 Physical Boundaries.......................................................... 4
1.5 Clarification of Scope ........................................................................... 5
1.6 Assumptions ........................................................................................ 5
1.6.1 Environmental assumptions................................................ 5
1.7 Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................... 6
1.8 Delivery Procedures.............................................................................. 8
1.8.1 TOE Delivery Procedures....................................................................... 8
2 Evaluation...................................................................................................... 10
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities.............................................................. 10
2.1.1 Life-cycle support ............................................................... 10
2.1.2 Development ...................................................................... 10
2.1.3 Guidance documents .......................................................... 11
2.1.4 IT Product Testing.............................................................. 11
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3 Result of the Evaluation..........................................................................15
3.1 Assurance Level Information ...............................................................15
3.2 Recommendation ................................................................................15
Annex A References .....................................................................................................17
A.1 References ..........................................................................................17
A.2 Terminology........................................................................................17
A.2.1 Acronyms............................................................................................17
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms ...............................................................................18
Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification........................................................................................................... 3
Table 2 : Assumptions for the TOE environment ................................................................... 6
Table 3 : Independent Functional Test...................................................................................12
Table 4 : List of Acronyms ......................................................................................................17
Table 5 : Glossary of Terms ....................................................................................................18
Index of Figures
Figure 1 - ADD-GAP One-way unidirectional flow of data...................................................... 1
Figure 2 - TOE Block Diagram .................................................................................................. 2
Figure 3 - Independent TOE Testing Environment ................................................................. 7
Figure 4 - Microchip Firmware Tampering Environment........................................................ 8
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1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an Amaris Data Diode For Air Gap (ADD-GAP) offers
end users a means to convey user data across the communication interface between the
SEND-ONLY circuit as MASTER and RECEIVE-ONLY circuit as SLAVE. ADD-GAP was
designed as USB 2.0 mass storage controller with standard USB 2.0 Specification for
both MASTER and SLAVE drive, it has fake capacity of 8GB only, support plug & play
feature and not need any additional driver to be installed on the PC.
2 (ADD-GAP) is the product designed and manufactured by Advanced Product Design Sdn
Bhd. ADD-GAP provides an absolute deterministic one-way unidirectional flow of any
data and information between a source domain, the USB sending host system; tablet;
android; laptop; PDA; network to a destination domain, the USB or host system/network
that identified in this Security Target (Ref [6]).
3 There is no storage on the device itself and it only acts as a gateway to send data over
from sender to receiver side. The MASTER drive is a write only fake USB storage drive
whereas the SLAVE drive is a read only USB storage device with HID interface.
4 ADD-GAP is driverless which means no software is required on the sender side. Only a
receiver program on the receiver side is required to handle the file transfers and
destination folder.
Figure 1 - ADD-GAP One-way unidirectional flow of data
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5 The data diode's one-way policies which are implemented with a hardware pipeline
cannot be reconfigured by any software configuration. Specifically, the hardware is
designed to be contained within the data diode casing with CPU compliant USB 2.0
interface.
a. Master PC send data to Master controller.
b. Master controller sends data to slave through three SPI channels 1, 2 and 4.
c. At the same time LED blinks on & off to signal data transfer.
d. Slave receive data via three SPIs.
e. Slave controller alert Slave PC that data is available.
f. Slave PC Acknowledge to Master through SYNC pin. SYNC is just a low to high
and then high to low pulse for synchronization only. This is to tell MASTER that
we are ready to accept more data.
Figure 2 - TOE Block Diagram
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1.2 TOE Identification
6 The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme
Project Identifier C110
TOE Name Amaris Data Diode For Air Gap (ADD-GAP)
TOE Version V2.0.112
Security Target Title
Amaris Data Diode For Air Gap (ADD-GAP) Security Target
Security Target Version V1.0
Security Target Date 5 June 2020
Assurance Level Evaluation Assurance Level 2
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (Ref [2])
Methodology
Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5
(Ref [3])
Protection Profile
Conformance
None
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant
CC Part 3 Conformant
Package conformant to EAL 2
Sponsor
Advanced Product Design Sdn Bhd
No. 209, Jalan Impian Emas 22, Taman Impian Emas,
81300 Skudai, Johor, Malaysia.
Developer
Advanced Product Design Sdn Bhd
No. 209, Jalan Impian Emas 22, Taman Impian Emas,
81300 Skudai, Johor, Malaysia.
Evaluation Facility
Cybertronics Lab
C-5-15, Centum @ Oasis Corporate Park
No 2, Jalan PJU 1A/2, Ara Damansara
47301 Selangor, Malaysia
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1.3 Security Policy
7 There is no organisational security policy defined regarding the use of TOE.
1.4 TOE Architecture
8 The TOE consist of logical and physical boundaries which are described in Section 1.6
of the Security Target (Ref[6]).
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries
9 The logical scope of TOE is described based on one security functional requirement.
• User Data Protection
ADD-GAP offers end users a means to convey user data across the
communication interface from the ADD-GAP Send-Only circuit to the ADD-GAP
Receive-Only and the data’s target destination. Since we have established that
the TOE provides an absolute deterministic one-way unidirectional flow of any
data and information between two devices, there is no way to extract the data
from the ADD-GAP Receive-Only side, thus achieving user data protection.
• Protection of the TSF
ADD-GAP offers passive detection of physical attack, it provides for features that
indicate when a TSF device or TSF element is subject to tampering. However,
notification of tampering is not automatic; an authorised user must perform
manual physical inspection to determine if tampering has occurred.
1.4.2 Physical Boundaries
10 The TOE consists of two microchips i.e. Sender and Receiver. These two microchips
are physically connected to each other on a printed circuit board (PCB).
11 The supporting hardware and software for TOE are as following:
a) Universal serial bus (USB)
Universal serial bus, USB is a plug and play interface that allows a computer to
communicate with peripheral and other devices.
b) Computers/ Laptops/ Servers (Private Devices)
The TOE will connect public and private devices for data transfer purpose. The
connection will be established via USB port of the computer/ Laptops/ Servers. The
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private device will be the machine to receive data and must running in Microsoft
Windows based operating system.
c) Computers/ Laptops/ Servers (Public Devices)
The TOE will connect public and private devices for data transfer purpose. The
connection will be established via USB port of the computer/ Laptops/ Servers. The
public device will be the machine to send data.
d) DiodeCore.dll
The core engine that consists all the core functions for Diode Receiver (Windows
application) to communicate with ADD-GAP.
e) DiodeDecode.dll
All sub-functions used to decode received packets and generate the specific file.
1.5 Clarification of Scope
12 The TOE is designed to be suitable for use in accordance with user guidance that is
supplied with the product.
13 Section 1.4 of this document describes the scope of the evaluation, which is limited to
those claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]).
14 Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services of the
overall product have not been evaluated as part of this evaluation. Potential consumers
of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and services
outside of the evaluated configuration.
1.6 Assumptions
15 This section summarises the security aspects of the environment/configuration in which
the product is intended to operate. Consumers should understand their own IT
environment and requirements for secure operation of the TOE as defined in the Security
Target (Ref [6]).
1.6.1 Environmental assumptions
16 Assumptions for the TOE environment as described in the Security Target (Ref[6]):
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Table 2 : Assumptions for the TOE environment
Assumption Statements
A.USER The users are trusted; the users shall not maliciously
compromise the security functionality of the TOE. The
users are well-trained; the user shall comply to the
operating procedures stipulated in the user guidance.
A.DATAFLOW The data flow between Public Device and Private Device
must pass through the TOE and there will be no other
connection between Public Device and Private Device.
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
17 ADD-GAP may be deployed in a number of configurations consistent with the
requirements as below:
a) Domain Separation
The TOE does not provide security domains to potentially-harmful entities. The TOE
management functionality described does not provide security domains, but is a
direct implementation of the security requirements. In short, security domains are
not applicable for this TOE.
b) Initialisation
After the TOE securely delivered to the customer, the TOE will be usable directly
based on the Operation Steps in APD [ADD-GAP] Diode Receiver (DR) Software User
Guideline-ver3.0.
c) Protection from Tampering
- Physical Protection: ADD-GAP come with a hard metal case to protect the
microchip and circuit board of the TOE. Additionally, the programming pin of
the microchip is sealed with Epoxy Resins.
- Logical: Logical protection is not applicable for the TOE device. This is due to no
authentication feature been implemented at the TOE.
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d) Protection from Bypassing
TSF ensures that the security functionality is always invoked and hence, with the
self-protection (as described earlier in this document) and correct functional
behaviour (as described in the FSP/TDS evaluation evidence), the SFRs are always
enforced.
18 Figure 3 shows the testing environment to test the TOE. The TOE establish a
communication bridge between two test machines via the Universal Serial Bus (USB)
interface. The TOE consists of two microchips which is MASTER and SLAVE. These two
microchips are logically connected to each other on a printed circuit board (PCB).
MASTER is connected to the sender device while SLAVE is connected to the receiver
device. “DiodeCore.dll” is the core library file for “DiodeReceiver.exe”, which will be used
to control the file transfer process.
Figure 3 - Independent TOE Testing Environment
19 Figure 4 shows the testing environment for microchip firmware testing. Test jig is
connected to the test machine via USB port and the application named MPLAB Integrated
Programming Environment (IPE) is loaded in the test machine. Test jig is used to connect
the programming pin on the TOE to the test machine thus allow MPLAB Integrated
Programming Environment (IPE) to read the microchip firmware.
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Figure 4 - Microchip Firmware Tampering Environment
1.8 Delivery Procedures
20 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it describes
all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
21 The evaluators also examined the aspects of the delivery process and determined that
the delivery procedures are used.
1.8.1 TOE Delivery Procedures
22 The TOE is delivered by Advanced Product Design personnel to the customer.
23 Advanced Product Design personnel will prepare the User Guide document for ADD-GAP
and deliver through E-mail to the customers.
24 Advanced Product Design personnel will label the ADD-GAP device with ADD-GAP
identification and serial number.
25 The TOE is wrap with protective sponge foam and package it with a box.
26 The TOE packaging box will be sealed with security tape to avoid the product being
tampered during delivery to the customer.
27 The product will be hand-delivered to customer.
28 Once the package is delivered, the customer is expected to perform the following
measures:
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a. Receive the package.
b. Acknowledge received items receipt as per Appendix A.
29 Advanced Product Design personnel will keep the Acknowledge received items as proof
of product receipt. Acceptance of product will be based on customer’s selection of
product functionalities
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2 Evaluation
30 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common
Criteria, version 3.1 Revision 5 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1 Revision 5 (Ref [3]). The evaluation was conducted at
Evaluation Assurance Level 2. The evaluation was performed conformant to the MyCC
Scheme Requirement (MyCC_REQ) (Ref [4]) and ISCB Evaluation Facility Manual
(ISCB_EFM) (Ref [5]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
31 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE, including the
following components:
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
32 An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated
documentation was performed. The evaluators found that the configuration items were
clearly and uniquely labelled, and that the access control measures as described in the
configuration management documentation are effective in preventing unauthorised
access to the configuration items. The developer’s configuration management system
was evaluated, and it was found to be consistent with the provided evidence.
33 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described
all of the procedures required to maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution
to the consumer.
2.1.2 Development
34 The evaluators analyzed the TOE functional specification; they determined that the
design completely and accurately describes the TOE security functionality interfaces
(TSFIs), and how the TOE security function (TSF) implements the security functional
requirements (SFRs).
35 The evaluators examined the TOE design specification; they determined that the
structure of the entire TOE is described in terms of subsystems. They also determined
that, it provides a complete, accurate, and high-level description of the SFR-enforcing
behavior of the SFR-enforcing subsystems.
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36 The evaluators examined the TOE security architecture description; they determined
that the information provided in the evidence is presented at a level of detail
commensurate with the descriptions of the SFR-enforcing abstractions contained in the
functional specification and TOE design.
37 At the end, the evaluators confirmed that all the requirements for this class were fulfilled
and passed.
2.1.3 Guidance documents
38 The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user
guidance, and determined that it sufficiently and unambiguously described how to
securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration, and how to use and
administer the product in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational
environment. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational
guidance, and determined that they were complete and sufficiently detailed to result in
a secure configuration.
39 The evaluators confirmed that the TOE guidance was fulfilled all the requirements and
passed for this class.
2.1.4 IT Product Testing
40 Testing at EAL 2 consists of assessing developer tests, performing independent
functional test, and conducting penetration tests. The TOE testing was conducted by
Cybertronics Lab. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures,
test cases, expected results and actual results are documented in a separate Test Plan
Report.
2.1.4.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
41 The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by
repeating some developer test, as documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref
[7]) (not a public document because it contains information proprietary to the developer
and/or the evaluator). The results of the evaluators’ tests are consistent with the
developers’ test results defined in their evaluation evidences submitted.
2.1.4.2 Independent Functional Testing
42 At EAL 2, independent functional testing is the evaluation conducted by evaluators
based on the information gathered by examining design and guidance documentation,
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examining developer’s test documentation, executing a subset of the developer’s test
plan, and creating test cases that are independent of the developer’s tests.
43 All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow
repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The results of the independent
functional tests were recorded by the evaluators and are consistent with the expected
test results in the test documentation.
Table 3 : Independent Functional Test
Test ID Description Results
AVCC006-FT001 To ensure the data transmission is
operate in a desire manner.
Passed.
AVCC006-FT002 To ensure the TSF deterministic ONE-
WAY unidirectional flow of information.
Passed.
AVCC006-FT003 To ensure the data diode is capable of
transfer data within the designed fake
storage capacity.
Passed.
AVCC006-FT004 To ensure the fake capacity in the data
diode will wipe the storage after file
successfully transferred.
Passed.
AVCC006-FT005 To ensure the data diode will not
perform data transfer without user
control or intention.
Passed.
AVCC006-FT006 To ensure the data diode microchip
firmware is protected by Epoxy seal.
Passed.
AVCC006-FT007 To ensure the Epoxy sealant cannot be
removed from the PCB.
Passed.
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Test ID Description Results
AVCC006-FT008 To ensure the data diode hard metal case
will not easily pry open.
Passed.
44 All testing performed by evaluators produced the expected results and as such the TOE
behaved as expected.
2.1.4.3 Vulnerability Analysis
45 The evaluators performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. This vulnerability analysis considered public domain
sources and an analysis of guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE
design, and security architecture description.
46 From the vulnerability analysis, the evaluators conducted penetration testing to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attack performed by an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential. The following factors have been taken into consideration during
penetration tests:
a) Any public knowledge of the vulnerability or known exploit;
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialised expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE);
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other equipment required for exploitation.
2.1.4.4 Vulnerability testing
47 The penetration tests focused on:
a) Code Tempering and Reverse Engineering
b) Extraneous Functionality
c) Client Code Quality
48 The result of the penetration testing noted that there is no residual vulnerability found.
However, it is important to ensure that the TOE is use only in its evaluated configuration
and in secure environment as specified in the Security Target (Ref[6]).
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2.1.4.5 Testing Results
49 Tests conducted for the TOE produced the expected results and demonstrated that the
product behaved as specified in its Security Target (Ref [6]) and its functional
specification. Therefore, the certifiers confirmed that all the test conducted were PASSED
as expected.
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3 Result of the Evaluation
50 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by the
certifiers and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref[7]), the Malaysian Common Criteria
Certification Body certifies the evaluation of Amaris Data Diode for Air Gap (ADD-GAP) v
2.0.112 which is performed by Cybertronics Lab.
51 Cybertronics Lab found that Amaris Data Diode for Air Gap (ADD-GAP) v 2.0.112 upholds
the claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]) and supporting documentations, and
has met the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2.
52 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable
vulnerabilities. There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities
remain undiscovered in its claimed security functionality. The risk is reduced as the
certified level of assurance increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
53 EAL 2 provides assurance by a full security target and analysis of the SFRs in that Security
Target, using functional and interface specifications, guidance documentation and a
description of the design of the TOE and the implementation to understand the security
behaviours.
54 The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer
testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of the
developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional
specification, TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence
provided) demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with a basic attack
potential.
55 EAL 2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system and
evidence of secure delivery procedures.
3.2 Recommendation
56 The Malaysian Certification Body (MyCB) is strongly recommended that:
a) A strict adherence to guidance documentations and procedures provided by the
developer are highly recommended.
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b) The TOE users should be aware and implement available security or critical updates
related to the TOE security features and its supporting hardware, software, firmware
or relevant guidance documents.
c) Users are advice to seek assistance or guidance directly from the developer of the
TOE if specific requirements shall be configured or implemented by the TOE to meet
certain policies, procedures and security enforcement within the users’
organization. This is important in order to reduce operational error,
misconfiguration, malfunctions or insecure operations of the TOE that may
compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the assets that is
protected by the TOE.
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Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, July, 2014.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] MyCC Scheme Requirement (MYCC_REQ), v1, CyberSecurity Malaysia, December 2019.
[5] ISCB Evaluation Facility Manual (ISCB_EFM), v2, December 2019.
[6] Amaris Data Diode For Air Gap (ADD-GAP) Security Target, Version 1.0, 5 June 2020.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2.0, 9 June 2020.
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 4 : List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organisation for Standardization
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
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Acronym Expanded Term
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 5 : Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
CC International
Interpretation
An interpretation of the CC or CEM issued by the CCMB that
is applicable to all CCRA participants.
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of
a specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification
and for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation
and Certification Scheme. Source CCRA
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other
valid target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an
applicant against the standards covered by the scope defined
in its application against the certification criteria specified in
the rules of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS-ISO/IEC Guide
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Term Definition and Source
Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation
and certification under the authority of a certification body
in order to ensure that high standards of competence and
impartiality are maintained and that consistency is achieved.
Source CCRA.
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of
the criteria or the methodology. An interpretation may be
either a national interpretation or a CC international
interpretation.
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects
of a specific evaluation task.
Maintenance Certificate The update of a Common Criteria certificate to reflect a
specific version of a product that has been maintained under
the MyCC Scheme.
National Interpretation An interpretation of the CC, CEM or MyCC Scheme rules that
is applicable within the MyCC Scheme only.
Security Evaluation Facility An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems
using the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and
Certification Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also
be the developer.
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