Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014
Database Engine
Common Criteria Evaluation
(EAL2+)
Security Target
SQL Server 2014 Team
Author: Roger French
(Microsoft Corporation)
Version: 1.42
Date: 2015-03-27
Abstract
This document is the Security Target (ST) for the Common Criteria certification of the database
engine of Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014.
Keywords
CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target, DBMS, Database Management System
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Table of Contents
Page
1 ST INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 ST and TOE Reference........................................................................................................... 6
1.2 TOE Overview ......................................................................................................................... 6
1.3 TOE Description ...................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.1 Product Type ....................................................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE .......................................................................... 8
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE ..................................................................................................... 10
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE .......................................................................... 10
1.4 Conventions........................................................................................................................... 11
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS............................................................................................................. 13
2.1 CC Conformance Claim......................................................................................................... 13
2.2 PP Conformance Claim ......................................................................................................... 13
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION.............................................................................................. 15
3.1 Assets.................................................................................................................................... 15
3.2 Assumptions .......................................................................................................................... 15
3.3 Threats................................................................................................................................... 16
3.4 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................ 16
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................................ 17
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment ............................................................ 17
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale................................................................................................ 18
4.3.1 Overview............................................................................................................................ 18
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives.............................................................................. 20
4.3.3 Rationale for environmental Security Objectives............................................................... 23
5 EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION....................................................................................... 25
5.1 Definition for FAU_STG_EXP.5............................................................................................. 25
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.................................................................................................... 26
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements ................................................................................ 26
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit ................................................................................................. 27
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection...................................................................................... 29
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ...................................................................... 30
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management .................................................................................... 30
6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions ...................................................... 33
6.1.6 Class FTA: TOE Access.................................................................................................... 33
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements................................................................................ 34
6.3 Security Requirements rationale ........................................................................................... 34
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale...................................................................... 34
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies ......................................................................... 38
6.3.3 Rationale for extended requirements ................................................................................ 41
6.3.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements............................................................................. 41
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION................................................................................................. 42
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM) ............................................................................................. 42
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC) ........................................................................................................ 42
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)............................................................................. 44
7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU) .......................................................................................................... 44
7.5 Session Handling (SF.SE)..................................................................................................... 45
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8 APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................................... 47
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains............................................................................................... 47
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain........................................................................ 47
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining ....................................................................................... 47
8.2 References ............................................................................................................................ 48
8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations................................................................................................... 49
8.3.1 Glossary............................................................................................................................. 49
8.3.2 Abbreviations..................................................................................................................... 49
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List of Tables
Page
Table 1 - Hardware and Software Requirements.................................................................................... 9
Table 2 – Assumptions.......................................................................................................................... 15
Table 3 – Threats to the TOE................................................................................................................ 16
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................ 16
Table 5 – Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................ 17
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE Environment....................................................................... 17
Table 7 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale........................................................................... 19
Table 8 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives.................................................................................. 20
Table 9 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives............................................................................ 24
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements.............................................................................. 26
Table 11 – Auditable Events ................................................................................................................. 27
Table 12 – Auditable Events for additional SFRs.................................................................................. 28
Table 13 – Default Server Roles ........................................................................................................... 32
Table 14 – Default Database Roles ...................................................................................................... 32
Table 15 - Rationale for TOE Security Requirements........................................................................... 34
Table 16 - Rationale for Environment Requirements ............................................................................ 38
Table 17 - Rationale for satisfying all dependencies............................................................................. 39
Table 18 - Rationale for Explicit Requirements..................................................................................... 41
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1 - TOE Structure ......................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2 – FAU_STG Component Levelling.......................................................................................... 25
Figure 3 - Concept of Ownership Chaining ........................................................................................... 48
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1 ST Introduction
This chapter presents Security Target (ST) and TOE identification information and a general overview
of the ST. A ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target
of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by that TOE
to meet stated requirements. A ST principally defines:
a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects of the
environment, a list of threats that the TOE is intended to counter, and any known rules
with which the TOE must comply (chapter 3, Security Problem Definition).
b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the security
problem (chapters 4 and 6, Security Objectives and IT Security Requirements,
respectively).
c) The IT security functionality provided by the TOE that meets the set of requirements
(chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification).
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This chapter provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation
(TOE).
ST Title: Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Database Engine
Common Criteria Evaluation (EAL2+)
Security Target
ST Version: 1.42
Date: 2015-03-27
Author: Roger French, Microsoft Corporation
Certification-ID: ITC-3480
TOE Identification: Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Database Engine Enterprise
Edition x64 (English)
(and its related guidance documentation ([AGD] and [AGD_ADD]))
TOE Version: 12.0.2000.8
TOE Platform: Windows Server 2012 R2 (English), Standard Edition and
Datacenter Edition
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1, Revision 4 as of September 2012, English version
([CC]).
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2
PP Conformance: U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management
Systems, Version 1.3, December, 24
th
2010 ([PP])
Keywords: CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target, DBMS,
Database Management System
1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the database engine of SQL Server 2014. SQL Server is a Database Management
System (DBMS).
The TOE has been developed as the core of the DBMS to store data in a secure way.
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The security functionality of the TOE comprises:
 Security Management
 Access Control
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Audit
 Session Handling
A summary of the TOE security functionality can be found in chapter 1.3.4. A more detailed description
of the security functionality can be found in chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification.
Note that only the SQL Server 2014 database engine is addressed in this ST. Other related products
of the SQL Server 2014 platform, such as Analysis Services, provide services that are useful but are
not central to the enforcement of security policies. Hence, security evaluation is not directly applicable
to those other products.
1.3 TOE Description
This chapter provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and describing the
evaluated configuration. The main purpose of this chapter is to bind the TOE in physical and logical
terms. The chapter starts with a description of the product type before it introduces the physical scope,
the architecture and last but not least the logical scope of the TOE.
1.3.1 Product Type
The product type of the TOE described in this ST is a database management system (DBMS) with the
capability to limit TOE access to authorized users, enforce Discretionary Access Controls on objects
under the control of the database management system based on user and/or role authorizations, and
to provide user accountability via audit of users’ actions.
A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows authorized users to retrieve
and update that information. A DBMS may be a single-user system, in which only one user may
access the DBMS at a given time, or a multi-user system, in which many users may access the DBMS
simultaneously.
The TOE which is described in this ST is the database engine and therefore part of SQL Server 2014.
It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for Access Control, Identification and
Authentication and Security Audit.
The SQL Server platform additionally includes the following tools which are not part of the TOE:
 SQL Server Replication: Data replication for distributed or mobile data processing applications
and integration with heterogeneous systems
 Analysis Services: Online analytical processing (OLAP) capabilities for the analysis of large
and complex datasets.
 Reporting Services: A comprehensive solution for creating, managing, and delivering both
traditional, paper-oriented reports and interactive, Web-based reports.
 Management tools: The SQL Server platform includes integrated management tools for
database management and tuning as well as tight integration with tools such as Microsoft
Operations Manager (MOM) and Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS).
 Development tools: SQL Server offers integrated development tools for the database engine,
data extraction, transformation, and loading (ETL), data mining, OLAP, and reporting that are
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tightly integrated with Microsoft Visual Studio to provide end-to-end application development
capabilities.
The TOE itself only comprises the database engine of the SQL Server 2014 platform which provides
the security functionality as required by this ST. Any additional tools of the SQL Server 2014 platform
interact with the TOE as a standard SQL client. The scope and boundary of the TOE will be described
in the next chapter.
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
The TOE is the database engine of the SQL Server 2014 and its related guidance documentation.
This engine is available in two different configurations (x86, x64). Only the x64 version is subject to
this evaluation.
Further, SQL Server 2014 is available in different editions. Only the Enterprise Edition (EE) is subject
to this evaluation.
The following figure shows the TOE (including its internal structure) and its immediate environment.
Figure 1 - TOE Structure
As seen in Figure 1 the TOE internally comprises the following units:
The Communication part is the interface for programs accessing the TOE. It is the interface between
the TOE and clients performing requests.
All responses to user application requests return to the client through this part of the TOE.
The Relational Engine is the core of the database engine and is responsible for all security relevant
decisions. The relational engine establishes a user context, syntactically checks every Transact SQL
(T-SQL) statement, compiles every statement, checks permissions to determine if the statement can
be executed by the user associated with the request, optimizes the query request, builds and caches a
query plan, and executes the statement. The Relational Engine allows compiling a subset of T-SQL
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statements into native code to create natively compiled Stored Procedures. The Visual C compiler
used for this native compilation is not part of the TOE.
The Storage Engine is a resource provider. When the relational engine attempts to execute a T-SQL
statement that accesses an object for the first time, it calls upon the storage engine to retrieve the
object, put it into memory and return a pointer to the execution engine. To perform these tasks, the
storage engine manages the physical resources for the TOE by using the Windows OS.
The SQL-OS is a resource provider for all situations where the TOE uses functionality of the operating
system. SQL-OS provides an abstraction layer over common OS functions and was designed to
reduce the number of context switches within the TOE. SQL-OS especially contains functionality for
Task Management and for Memory Management.
For Task Management the TOE provides an OS-like environment for threads, including scheduling,
and synchronization - all running in user mode, all (except for I/O) without calling the Windows
Operating System.
The Memory Management is responsible for the TOE memory pool. The memory pool is used to
supply the TOE with its memory while it is executing. Almost all data structures that use memory in the
TOE are allocated in the memory pool. The memory pool also provides resources for transaction
logging and data buffers.
The immediate environment of the TOE comprises:
The Windows Server Operating System hosts the TOE. As the TOE is software only it lives as a
process in the Operating System (OS) and uses the resources of the OS. These resources comprise
general functionality (e.g. the memory management and scheduling features of the OS) as well as
specific functionality of the OS, which is important for the security functionality of the TOE (see chapter
7 for more details).
Other parts of the SQL Server 2014 Platform might be installed together with the TOE. The TOE is
the central part of a complete DBMS platform, which realizes all security functionality as described in
this ST. However other parts of the platform may be installed on the same machine if they are needed
to support the operation or administration of the TOE. However these other parts will interact with the
TOE in the same way, every other client would do.
Clients (comprising local clients and remote clients) are used to interact with the TOE during
administration and operation. Services of the Operating System are used to route the communication
of remote clients with the TOE.
The TOE relies on functionality of the Operating System and has the following hardware/software
requirements:
Table 1 - Hardware and Software Requirements
Aspect Requirement
CPU AMD Opteron, AMD Athlon 64, Intel Xeon with Intel EM64T support, Intel Pentium
IV with EM64T support at 1.4 GHz or faster
RAM 1 GB
Hard Disk Approx. 1500 MB of free space
Other DVD drive, display at Super VGA or higher resolution, Microsoft mouse compatible
pointing device, keyboard
OS Windows Server 2012 R2 (English), Standard Edition or Datacenter Edition
Software .NET Framework 4.0, Windows PowerShell 2.0
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The TOE is downloadable as a DVD image via the Microsoft volume licensing service center
(https://www.microsoft.com/licensing/servicecenter/default.aspx).
The following guidance documents and supportive information belong to the TOE:
 SQL Server Books Online: This is the general guidance documentation for the complete SQL
Server 2014 platform ([AGD]).
 SQL Server Guidance Addendum: This document contains the aspects of the guidance that
are specific to the evaluated configuration of SQL Server 2014 ([AGD_ADD]).
The website https://www.microsoft.com/sqlserver/en/us/common-criteria.aspx (tab “SQL Server 2014”)
contains additional information about the TOE and its evaluated configuration. Also the guidance
addendum that describes the specific aspects of the certified version can be obtained via this website.
The guidance addendum extends the general guidance of SQL Server 2014.
This website shall be visited before using the TOE.
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE
The TOE which is described in this ST comprises one instance of the SQL Server 2014 database
engine but has the possibility to serve several clients simultaneously.
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
SQL Server 2014 is able to run multiple instances of the database engine on one machine. After
installation one default instance exists. However the administrator is able to add more instances of
SQL Server 2014 to the same machine.
The TOE comprises one instance of SQL Server 2014. Within this ST it is referenced either as "the
TOE" or as "instance". The machine the instances are running on is referenced as "server" or "DBMS-
server".
If more than one instance of SQL Server 2014 is installed on one machine these just represent
multiple TOEs as there is no other interface between two instances of the TOE than the standard
client interface.
In this way two or more instances of the TOE may only communicate through the standard client
interface.
The TOE provides the following set of security functionality:
 The Access Control function of the TOE controls the access of users to user and metadata
stored in the TOE. It further controls that only authorized administrators are able to manage
the TOE.
 The Security Audit function of the TOE produces log files about all security relevant events.
 The Security Management function allows authorized administrators to manage the behavior
of the security functionality of the TOE.
 The Identification and Authentication
1
function of the TOE is able to identify and
authenticate users.
 The Session Handling mechanism which limits the possibilities of users to establish sessions
with the TOE and maintains a separate execution context for every operation. Also the
1
Note that the TOE as well as the environment provides a mechanism for identification and authentication.
Chapter 7 will describe this in more detail.
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Memory Management functionality belongs to the area of Session Handling and ensures that
any previous information in memory is made unavailable before the memory is used either by
overwriting the memory explicitly with a certain pattern or by overwriting the memory
completely with new information.
The following functions are part of the environment:
 The Audit Review and Audit Storage functionality has to be provided by the environment
and provide the authorized administrators with the capability to review the security relevant
events of the TOE.
 The Access Control Mechanisms has to be provided by the environment for files stored in
the environment.
 The environment provides Identification and Authentication1 for users for the cases where
this is required by the TOE (The environment AND the TOE provide mechanisms for user
authentication. See chapter 7.3 for more details).
 The environment has to provide Time stamps to be used by the TOE.
 The environment provides a cryptographic mechanism for hashing of passwords.
 The environment provides residual information protection for memory which is allocated to
the TOE.
All these functions are provided by the underlying Operating System except Audit Review. An
additional tool (e.g. the SQL Server Profiler, which is part of the SQL Server Platform) has to be used
for Audit Review.
Access to the complete functionality of the TOE is possible via a set of SQL-commands.
This set of commands is available via:
 Shared Memory
 Named Pipes
 TCP/IP
1.4 Conventions
For this Security Target the following conventions are used:
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements: refinement, selection,
assignment, and iteration are defined in chapter C.4 of Part 1 of [CC]. Each of these operations is
used in this ST.
A refinement operation (denoted by bold crossed out text) is used to remove unnecessary details of
a requirement, though it does not change the meaning of the requirement.
Moreover, a refinement operation (denoted by bold text) is used to add details to a requirement, and
thus further restricts a requirement.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made are denoted by italicized text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as the
length of a password. Assignments that have been made are denoted by showing the value in square
brackets, [Assignment_value].
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier,
(iteration_number).
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The CC paradigm also allows security target authors to create their own requirements. Such
requirements are termed ‘extended requirements’ and are permitted if the CC does not offer suitable
requirements to meet the authors’ needs. Extended requirements must be identified and are required
to use the CC class/family/component model in articulating the requirements. In this ST, extended
requirements will be indicated with the “EXP” following the component name.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be
 CC Part 2 (Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012) extended due to the use of the
component FAU_STG_EXP.5 and
 CC Part 3 (Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012) conformant as only assurance
components as defined in part III of [CC] have been used.
Further this Security Target claims to be conformant to the Security Assurance Requirements package
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
2.2 PP Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be conformant to:
 U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems, Version 1.3,
December 24 2010 ([PP]).
The Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to [PP]. The statement of security problem
definition in this ST is equivalent to the statement of the security problem definition in the PP. Only
security objectives (and corresponding threats) have been removed from this ST which are inherently
fulfilled by the Security Assurance Requirements package EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2:
 O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE is satisfied by ALC_DEL.1,AGD_PRE.1,AGD_OPE.1
 O.CONFIGURATION_IDENTIFICATION is satisfied by ALC_CMS.2,ALC_FLR.2
 O.DOCUMENTED_DESIGN is satisfied by ADV_FSP.2,ADV_TDS.1
 O.INTERNAL_TOE_DOMAINS is satisfied by ADV_ARC.1
 O.PARTIAL_FUNCTIONAL_TEST is satisfied by ATE_COV.1,ATE_FUN.1,ATE_IND.2
 O.PARTIAL_SELF_PROTECTION is satisfied by ADV_ARC.1
 O.VULNERABILITY_ANALYSIS is satisfied by AVA_VAN.2
These security objectives counter the following threats in [PP] which have also been removed from
this ST:
 T.ACCIDENTIAL_ADMIN_ERROR
 T.POOR_DESIGN
 T.POOR_IMPLEMENTATION
 T.POOR_TEST
These threats do not need to be given explicitly because they have been implicitly considered by the
chosen assurance components. Consequently, the threats in this ST are equivalent to the threats in
the PP.
The ST contains an additional security objective (O.I&A), thereby making the security objectives of the
ST more restrictive than the statement in the PP.
Moreover, the statement of security requirements of this ST is stricter than the statement of security
requirements in the PP. As described below the SFRs are stricter than the SFRs in the PP whereas
the SARs are identical to the SARs in the PP (cf. section 2.1).
The following SFRs are marked as extended in the PP but are not defined as extended SFRs in this
ST because they are refinements of CC Part 2 SFRs:
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FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 SFR is a refinement of FAU_GEN.1.
FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407 SFR is a refinement of FAU_SEL.1.
FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 SFR is a refinement of FDP_ACF.1.
The following SFRs are marked as extended in the PP and have been replaced in the ST by the
original SFRs from [CC, Part 2], thereby making these SFRs stricter than in the PP.
FAU_GEN_(EXT).2 SFR has been replaced by FAU_GEN.2.
FMT_MSA_(EXT).3 SFR has been replaced by FMT_MSA.3.
FPT_TRC_(EXT).1 SFR has been replaced by FPT_TRC.1.
FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 SFR has been replaced by FTA_TAH.1.
As FAU_GEN.2 is a refinement of FAU_GEN_(EXT).2, and FMT_MSA_(EXT).3, FPT_TRC_(EXT).1,
and FTA_TAH_(EXT).1 had been extended in the PP by removing SFR elements from the original
SFRs from [CC, Part 2], the SFRs in this ST are stricter than the corresponding SFRs in the PP.
Please note that the Security Functional Requirements FMT_REV.1(1) and FMT_REV.1(2) as defined
in [PP] differ from [CC, Part 2] and have been modified to be conformant to [CC, Part 2].
In addition, the extended SFR FAU_STG_EXP.5 and the SFRs FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.5 and
FIA_UID.2 from [CC, Part 2] have been added to the ST. Therefore, the statement of security
requirements of this ST is stricter than the statement of security requirements in [PP].
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3 Security Problem Definition
This chapter describes
 the external entities interacting with the TOE,
 the assets that have to be protected by the TOE,
 assumptions about the environment of the TOE,
 threats against those assets, and
 organizational security policies that TOE shall comply with.
3.1 Assets
The following external entities interact with the TOE:
 Administrator:
The administrator is authorized to perform the administrative operations and able to use the
administrative functions.
 User:
A person who wants to use the TOE.
 Attacker:
An attacker is any individual who is attempting to subvert the operation of the TOE. The
intention may be to gain unauthorized access to the assets protected by the TOE.
The TOE maintains two types of data which represent the assets: User Data and TSF Data.
The primary assets are the User Data which comprises the following:
 The user data stored in or as database objects;
 User-developed queries or procedures that the DBMS maintains for users.
The secondary assets comprise the TSF data that the TOE maintains and uses for its own operation.
This kind of data is also called metadata. It specifically includes:
 The definitions of user databases and database objects
 Configuration parameters,
 User security attributes,
 Security Audit instructions and records.
3.2 Assumptions
The following table lists all the assumptions about the environment of the TOE. These assumptions
have been directly taken from [PP] without any modification.
Table 2 – Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and
follow all administrator guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on DBMS servers,
other than those services necessary for the operation,
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Assumption Description
administration and support of the DBMS.
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that appropriate physical security is provided
within the domain for the value of the IT assets protected by
the TOE and the value of the stored, processed, and
transmitted information.
3.3 Threats
The following table identifies the threats to the TOE. These threats have been directly taken from [PP]
with only the changes as indicated in the PP conformance rationale (section 2.2).
Table 3 – Threats to the TOE
Threat Description
T.MASQUERADE A user or process may masquerade as another entity in
order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE
resources
T.RESIDUAL_DATA A user or process may gain unauthorized access to data
through reallocation of TOE resources from one user or
process to another.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE A malicious user or process may cause configuration data
to be inappropriately accessed (viewed, modified or
deleted).
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to user data for which
they are not authorized according to the TOE security
policy.
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS Failure of the authorized administrator to identify and act
upon unauthorized actions may occur.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs. This chapter identifies the organizational security policies
applicable to the TOE. These organizational security policies have been taken from [PP] without any
changes.
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies
Policy Description
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for
their actions within the TOE.
P.ROLES The TOE shall provide an authorized administrator role for
secure administration of the TOE. This role shall be separate
and distinct from other authorized users.
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4 Security Objectives
The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem or threat.
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This chapter identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE. The objectives have been
directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text and the changes as
indicated in the PP conformance rationale (section 2.2).
Table 5 – Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
O.ACCESS_HISTORY The TOE will store and retrieve information (to
authorized users) related to previous attempts to
establish a session.
O.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide authorized administrator roles to
isolate administrative actions.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION The TOE will provide the capability to detect and create
records of security relevant events associated with
users.
O.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and facilities
necessary to support the authorized administrators in
their management of the security of the TOE, and restrict
these functions and facilities from unauthorized use.
O.MEDIATE The TOE must protect user data in accordance with its
security policy.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The TOE will ensure that any information contained in a
protected resource within its Scope of Control is not
released when the resource is reallocated.
O.TOE_ACCESS The TOE will provide mechanisms that control a user’s
logical access to the TOE.
O.I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for identification
and authentication of users.
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
The security objectives for the TOE Environment are defined in the following table. The objectives for
the environment have been directly taken from [PP] without any changes (typos are not reproduced).
Table 6 – Security Objectives for the TOE Environment
Objective Description
OE.NO_EVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized
administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained and
follow all administrator guidance.
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Objective Description
OE.NO_GENERAL_ PURPOSE There will be no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on DBMS
servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security will be provided within the domain for
the value of the IT assets protected by the TOE and the
value of the stored, processed, and transmitted
information.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Overview
The following table maps the security objectives to assumptions / threats / OSPs:
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Threats, Assumptions, OSP / Security
Objectives
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
O.ADMIN_ROLE
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
O.MANAGE
O.MEDIATE
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
O.TOE_ACCESS
O.I&A
OE.NO_EVIL
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
OE.PHYSICAL
T.MASQUERADE X X
T.RESIDUAL_DATA X
T.TSF_COMPROMISE X X
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS X X X
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS X
P.ACCOUNTABILITY X X X
P.ROLES X
A.NO_EVIL X
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE X
A.PHYSICAL X
Table 7 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale
Details are given in the following table. These details are directly taken from [PP] with only the
changes indicated by bold italic text and the changes as indicated in the PP conformance rationale
(section 2.2).
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 20/50
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Table 8 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
T.MASQUERADE
A user or process may masquerade
as another entity in order to gain
unauthorized access to data or TOE
resources.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide
mechanisms that control a
user’s logical access to
the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS mitigates
this threat by controlling the
logical access to the TOE and
its resources. By constraining
how and when authorized
users can access the TOE,
and by mandating the type and
strength of the authentication
mechanism this objective
helps mitigate the possibility of
a user attempting to login and
masquerade as an authorized
user. In addition, this objective
provides the administrator the
means to control the number
of failed login attempts a user
can generate before an
account is locked out, further
reducing the possibility of a
user gaining unauthorized
access to the TOE.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of
users.
O.I&A mitigates this
threat by providing the
means to identify and
authenticate the user. The
correct identity of the
user is the basis for any
decision of the TOE about
an attempt of a user to
access data.
T.RESIDUAL_DATA
A user or process may gain
unauthorized access to data through
reallocation of TOE resources from
one user or process to another.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMAT
ION
The TOE will ensure that
any information contained
in a protected resource
within its Scope of Control
is not released when the
resource is reallocated.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
counters this threat by
ensuring that TSF data and
user data is not persistent
when resources are released
by one user/process and
allocated to another
user/process.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A user or process may cause, through
an unsophisticated attack, TSF data,
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMAT
ION
The TOE will ensure that
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
is necessary to mitigate this
threat, because even if the
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Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
or executable code to be
inappropriately accessed (viewed,
modified, or deleted).
any information contained
in a protected resource
within its Scope of Control
is not released when the
resource is reallocated.
security mechanisms do not
allow a user to view TSF data,
if TSF data were to reside
inappropriately in a resource
that was made available to a
user, that user would be able
to view the TSF data without
authorization.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and facilities
necessary to support the
authorized administrators
in their management of the
security of the TOE, and
restrict these functions
and facilities from
unauthorized use.
O.MANAGE is necessary
because an access control
policy is specified to control
access to TSF data. This
objective is used to dictate
who is able to view and modify
TSF data, as well as the
behavior of TSF functions.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
A user may gain unauthorized access
to user data for which they are not
authorized according to the TOE
security policy.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect
user data in accordance
with its security policy.
O.MEDIATE ensures that all
accesses to user data are
subject to mediation, unless
said data has been specifically
identifies as public data. The
TOE requires successful
authentication to the TOE prior
to gaining access to any
controlled-access content. By
implementing strong
authentication to gain access
to these services, an attacker’s
opportunity to conduct a man-
in-the-middle and/or password
guessing attack successfully is
greatly reduced. Lastly, the
TSF will ensure that all
configured enforcement
functions (authentication,
access control rules, etc.) must
be invoked prior to allowing a
user to gain access to TOE or
TOE mediated services. The
TOE restricts the ability to
modify the security attributes
associated with access control
rules, access to authenticated
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Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
and unauthenticated services,
etc to the administrator. This
feature ensures that no other
user can modify the
information flow policy to
bypass the intended TOE
security policy.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
The TOE will store and
retrieve information (to
authorized users) related
to previous attempts to
establish a session.
O.ACCESS_HISTORY is
important to mitigate this threat
because it ensures the TOE
will be able to store and
retrieve the information that
will advise the user of the last
successful login attempt and
performed actions without their
knowledge.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of users.
O.I&A
contributes to countering
this threat by providing the
means to identify and
authenticate the user. The
correct identity of the user is
the basis for any decision of
the TOE about an attempt of
a user to access data.
T.UNIDENTIFIED_ACTIONS
Failure of the authorized administrator
to identify and act upon unauthorized
actions may occur.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and facilities
necessary to support the
authorized administrators
in their management of the
security of the TOE, and
restrict these functions
and facilities from
unauthorized use.
The threat of an authorized
administrator failing to know
about malicious audit events
produces the objectives of the
authorized administrator
having the capability to use the
mechanisms (O.MANAGE) to
review audit records.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The authorized users of the TOE shall
be held accountable for their actions
within the TOE.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect and
create records of security
relevant events associated
with users.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
addresses this policy by
providing the authorized
administrator with the
capability of configuring the
audit mechanism to record the
actions of a specific user, or
review the audit trail based on
the identity of the user.
Additionally, the
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Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing
the Threat/Policy
Rationale
administrator’s ID is recorded
when any security relevant
change is made to the TOE
(e.g., access rule modification,
start-stop of the audit
mechanism, establishment of a
trusted channel, etc.).
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide
mechanisms that control a
user’s logical access to
the TOE.
O.TOE_ACCESS supports this
policy by requiring the TOE to
identify and authenticate all
authorized users prior to
allowing any TOE access or
any TOE mediated access on
behalf of those users.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of users.
O.I&A supports this policy
by providing the means to
identify and authenticate the
user. The identity of the user
is stored in the audit logs.
P.ROLES
The TOE shall provide an authorized
administrator role for secure
administration of the TOE. This role
shall be separate and distinct from
other authorized users.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide
authorized administrator
roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE has the objective of
providing an authorized
administrator role for secure
administration. The TOE may
provide other roles as well, but
only the role of authorized
administrator is required
(O.ADMIN_ROLE).
4.3.3 Rationale for environmental Security Objectives
The following table contains the rationale for the IT Environmental Objectives. This rationale has
directly been taken from [PP] without any changes (typos are not reproduced).
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 24/50
Table 9 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
A.NO_EVIL
Administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow
all administrator guidance.
OE.NO_EVIL
Sites using the TOE shall ensure
that authorized administrators are
non-hostile, are appropriately
trained and follow all
administrator guidance.
All authorized administrators
are trustworthy individuals,
having background
investigations commensurate
with the level of data being
protected, have undergone
appropriate admin training,
and follow all admin
guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DBMS servers,
other than those services
necessary for the operation,
administration and support of
the DBMS.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose
computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications)
available on DBMS servers, other
than those services necessary for
the operation, administration and
support of the DBMS.
The DBMS server must not
include any general-purpose
commuting capabilities. This
will protect the TSF data from
malicious processes.
A.PHYSICAL
Physical security,
commensurate with the value of
the TOE and the data it
contains, is assumed to be
provided by the IT environment.
OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security will be provided
within the domain for the value of
the IT assets protected by the
TOE and the value of the stored,
processed, and transmitted
information.
The TOE, the TSF data, and
protected user data is
assumed to be protected
from physical attack (e.g.,
theft, modification,
destruction, or
eavesdropping). Physical
attack could include
unauthorized intruders into
the TOE environment, but it
does not include physical
destructive actions that might
be taken by an individual that
is authorized to access the
TOE environment.
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5 Extended Component Definition
5.1 Definition for FAU_STG_EXP.5
This chapter defines the extended functional component FAU_STG_EXP.5 (Administrable prevention
of audit data loss) of the existing functional class FAU (Security audit). All other extended
requirements that are used in this Security Target have been directly taken from [PP].
This component was defined because part II of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows
specifying a set of allowed actions which can be taken in the case where the audit is full. Moreover,
none of the components in part II of [CC] allows only authorized administrators to specify what should
happen if the audit log is full.
The family FAU_STG is extended by the new component FAU_STG_EXP.5 as shown in the following
figure:
FAU_STG: Security audit event storage
1
3 4
2
EXP.5
Figure 2 – FAU_STG Component Levelling
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Extended prevention of audit loss, specifies administrable actions in case the audit
trail is full.
Management for FAU_STG_EXP.5:
The following actions could be considered for management functions in FMT:
a) Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of audit
storage failure.
Audit for FAU_STG_EXP.5:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in
the PP/ST:
a) Basic: Actions taken due to potential audit storage failure.
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Administrable prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG_EXP.5.1 The TSF shall take the following actions: [selection: “ignore auditable
events”, “prevent auditable events, except those taken by the
authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit
records”, “stop the TOE”, [assignment: other actions]] as defined by
[assignment: authorised role] if the audit trail is full.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 26/50
6 IT Security Requirements
This chapter defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its environment:
Common Criteria divides TOE security requirements into two categories:
 Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication, security
management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting evidence need to
satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.
 Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the TOE
and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g., configuration
management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).
These requirements are discussed separately within the following subchapters.
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in the following table. The rest of this chapter contains a
description of each component and any related dependencies.
Table 10 – TOE Security Functional Requirements
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407 Selective audit
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Administrable Prevention of audit data loss
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1(1) Revocation (user attributes)
FMT_REV.1(2) Revocation (subject, object attributes)
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
FTA_TAH.1 TOE access history
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410)
FAU_GEN.1.1-
NIAP-0410
Refinement: The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the
following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the minimum level of audit listed in Table 11;
c) [Start-up and shutdown of the DBMS;
d) Use of special permissions (e.g., those often used by authorized
administrators to circumvent access control policies); and
e) events as specified in Table 12].
FAU_GEN.1.2-
NIAP-0410
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, [no additional
information].
Table 11 – Auditable Events
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 None None
FAU_GEN.2 None None
FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407 All modifications to the audit
configuration that occur while the
audit collection functions are
operating.
The identity of the authorized
administrator that made the
change to the audit configuration
FDP_ACC.1 None None
FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 Successful requests to perform
an operation on an object covered
by the SFP.
The identity of the subject
performing the operation
FDP_RIP.1 None None
FIA_ATD.1 None None
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 28/50
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Contents
FMT_MOF.1 None None
FMT_MSA.1 None None
FMT_MSA.3 None None
FMT_MTD.1 None None
FMT_REV.1(1) Unsuccessful revocation of
security attributes.
Identity of individual attempting to
revoke security attributes
FMT_REV.1(2) Unsuccessful revocation of
security attributes.
Identity of individual attempting to
revoke security attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management
functions.
Identity of the administrator
performing these functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the group of
users that are part of a role.
Identity of authorized
administrator modifying the role
definition
FTA_MCS.1 Rejection of a new session based
on the limitation of multiple
concurrent sessions
None
FTA_TAH.1 None None
FTA_TSE.1 Denial of a session establishment
due to the session establishment
mechanism
Identity of the individual
attempting to establish a session
Table 12 – Auditable Events for additional SFRs
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s) Additional Audit Record
Content
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Every modifications to the setting -
FIA_UAU.2 Every use of the authentication
mechanism.
-
FIA_UAU.5 The final decision on
authentication;
-
FIA_UID.2 Every use of the identification
mechanism.
-
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be
able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that
caused the event.
Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407)
FAU_SEL.1.1-
NIAP-0407
Refinement: The TSF shall allow only the administrator to include or
exclude auditable events from the set of audited events based on the
following attributes:
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 29/50
a) user identity and/or group identity,
b) event type,
c) object identity,
d) [none];
e) [success of auditable security events;
f) failure of auditable security events; and
g) [no additional criteria].]
Administrable Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG_EXP.5)
FAU_STG_EXP.5.1 The TSF shall take one of the following actions:
 Overwrite the oldest stored audit records
 Stop the TOE
as defined by [the administrator] if the audit trail is full.
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] on [all
subjects, all DBMS-controlled objects and all operations among them].
Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407)
FDP_ACF.1.1-
NIAP-0407
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to objects
based on the following:
 [the authorized user identity and/or group membership associated with
a subject,
 access operations implemented for DBMS-controlled objects, and
 object identity].
FDP_ACF.1.2-
NIAP-0407
Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and DBMS-controlled objects is
allowed:[
 The Discretionary Access Control policy mechanism shall, either by
explicit authorized user action or by default, provide that database
management system controlled objects are protected from unauthorized
access according to the following ordered rules:
a) If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user deny
access
b) If the requested mode of access is denied to [any] group of which the
authorized user is a member, deny access
c) If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user,
permit access.
d) If the requested mode of access is permitted to any group of which the
authorized user is a member, grant access
e) Else deny access].
FDP_ACF.1.3-
NIAP-0407
Refinement: The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to
DBMS-controlled objects based on the following additional rules: [
 Authorized administrators, the owner of an object and owners of parent
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 30/50
objects have access
 in case of Ownership-Chaining access is always granted].
FDP_ACF.1.4-
NIAP-0407
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following rules: [no additional explicit denial rules].
Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to the following objects
[objects that are related to or may be exposed through user sessions].
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
 [Database user identifier and/or group memberships;
 Security-relevant database roles; and
 [login-type (SQL-Server login or Windows Account Name)
 For SQL-Server login: Hashed password]].
User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2)
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [
 SQL Server Authentication and
 Access to Windows Authentication]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
[following rules:
 If the login is associated with a Windows user or a Windows group
Windows Authentication is used,
 If the login is a SQL Server login the SQL Server authentication is used.
].
User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2)
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions [relating
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 31/50
to the specification of events to be audited] to [authorized administrators].
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control
policy] to restrict the ability to [manage] all the security attributes to
[authorized administrators].
Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the
SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [no role] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [include or exclude] the [auditable
events] to [authorized administrators].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(1))
FMT_REV.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [the list of the security attributes
as defined in FIA_ATD.1.1] associated with the users under the control of
the TSF to [the authorized administrators].
FMT_REV.1.2(1) The TSF shall enforce the rules [Changes to logins are applied at the latest
as soon as a new session for the login is established]
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(2))
FMT_REV.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [the list of security attributes as
defined in FDP_ACF.1.1-NIAP-0407] associated with the objects under the
control of the TSF to [the authorized administrators and database users as
allowed by the Discretionary Access Control policy].
FMT_REV.1.2(2) The TSF shall enforce the rules [The changes have to be applied
immediately].
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [
 Add and delete logins
 Add and delete users
 Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles
 Create and destroy database scoped groups
 Create, Start and Stop Audit
 Include and Exclude Auditable events
 Define the mode of authentication
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 32/50
 Manage Attributes for Session Establishment
 Define the action to take in case the audit file is full]
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall maintain the roles:
 [sysadmin]; and
 [roles as defined in the following tables
 Roles to be defined by authorized administrators].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Table 13 – Default Server Roles
Role Description
sysadmin Members of the sysadmin fixed server role can perform any activity in the
server. By default, all members of the Windows BUILTIN\Administrators
group, the local administrator’s group, are members of the sysadmin fixed
server role.
Serveradmin Members of the serveradmin fixed server role can change server-wide
configuration options and shut down the server.
Securityadmin Members of the securityadmin fixed server role manage logins and their
properties. They can GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE server-level permissions.
They can also GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE database-level permissions.
Additionally, they can reset passwords for SQL Server logins.
Processadmin Members of the processadmin fixed server role can end processes that are
running in an instance of SQL Server.
Setupadmin Members of the setupadmin fixed server role can add and remove linked
servers.
Bulkadmin Members of the bulkadmin fixed server role can run the BULK INSERT
statement.
Diskadmin The diskadmin fixed server role is used for managing disk files.
Dbcreator Members of the dbcreator fixed server role can create, restore and drop any
database, and can alter their own databases.
Table 14 – Default Database Roles
Role Granted Permission(s)
db_owner Members of the db_owner fixed database role can perform all configuration
and maintenance activities on the database, and can also drop the
database.
Db_securityadmin Members of the db_securityadmin fixed database role can modify role
membership and manage permissions. Adding principals to this role could
enable unintended privilege escalation.
Db_accessadmin Members of the db_accessadmin fixed database role can add or remove
access to the database for Windows logins, Windows groups, and SQL
Server logins.
Db_backupoperator Members of the db_backupoperator fixed database role can back up the
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 33/50
Role Granted Permission(s)
database.
Db_ddladmin Members of the db_ddladmin fixed database role can run any Data
Definition Language (DDL) command in a database.
Db_datawriter Members of the db_datawriter fixed database role can add, delete, or
change data in all user tables.
Db_datareader Members of the db_datareader fixed database role can read all data from all
user tables.
Db_denydatawriter Members of the db_denydatawriter fixed database role cannot add, modify,
or delete any data in the user tables within a database.
Db_denydatareader Members of the db_denydatareader fixed database role cannot read any
data in the user tables within a database.
6.1.5 Class FPT: Protection of the TOE Security Functions
Internal TSF consistency (FPT_TRC.1)
FPT_TRC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that TSF data is consistent when replicated between
parts of the TOE by providing a mechanism to bring inconsistent TSF
data into a consistent state in a timely manner.
FPT_TRC.1.2 When parts of the TOE containing replicated TSF data are disconnected, the
TSF shall ensure the consistency of the replicated TSF data upon
reconnection before processing any requests for [no function, since the TOE
does not contain physically separated parts].
6.1.6 Class FTA: TOE Access
Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions (FTA_MCS.1)
FTA_MCS.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions that
belong to the same user.
FTA_MCS.1.2 The TSF shall enforce, by default, a limit of [5] sessions per user.
TOE access history (FTA_TAH.1)
FTA_TAH.1.1 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display at the client
interface the date and time of the last successful session establishment to the
user.
FTA_TAH.1.2 Upon successful session establishment, the TSF shall display at the client
interface the date and time of the last unsuccessful attempt to session
establishment and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful
session establishment.
FTA_TAH.1.3 The TSF shall not erase the access history information from the user interface
without giving the user an opportunity to review the information.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 34/50
TOE session establishment (FTA_TSE.1)
FTA_TSE.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based
on [attributes that can be set explicitly by authorized administrators,
including user identity and/or group identity, time of day, day of the week],
and [no additional attributes].
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements for the TOE comprise all assurance requirements for EAL 2 as defined in
[CC] augmented by ALC_FLR.2.
6.3 Security Requirements rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale
The following table contains the rationale for the TOE Security Requirements. This rationale has been
directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text and the changes as
indicated in the PP conformance rationale (section 2.2).
Table 15 - Rationale for TOE Security Requirements
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
O.ACCESS_HISTORY
The TOE will store and
retrieve information (to
authorized users)
related to previous
attempts to establish a
session.
FTA_TAH.1 The TOE must be able to store and
retrieve information about previous
unauthorized login attempts and the
number times the login was attempted
every time the user logs into their
account. The TOE must also store the
last successful authorized login. This
information will include the date, time,
method, and location of the attempts.
When appropriately displayed, this will
allow the user to detect if another user
is attempting to access their account.
These records should not be deleted
until after the user has been notified of
their access history. (FTA_TAH.1)
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide
authorized administrator
roles to isolate
administrative actions.
FMT_SMR.1 The TOE will establish, at least, an
authorized administrator role. The
authorized administrator will be given
privileges to perform certain tasks that
other users will not be able to perform.
These privileges include, but are not
limited to, access to audit information
and security functions (FMT_SMR.1).
O.AUDIT_ FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 defines the
set of events that the TOE must be
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 35/50
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
GENERATION
The TOE will provide the
capability to detect and
create records of
security relevant events
associated with users.
capable of recording. This requirement
ensures that the administrator has the
ability to audit any security relevant
events that takes place in the TOE.
This requirement also defines the
information that must be contained in
the audit record for each auditable
event. This requirement also places a
requirement on the level of detail that
is recorded on any additional security
functional requirements an ST author
adds to this [PP].
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 ensures that the audit
records associate a user identity with
the auditable event.
FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407 FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407 allows the
administrator to configure which
auditable events will be recorded in the
audit trail. This provides the
administrator with the flexibility in
recording only those events that are
deemed necessary by site policy, thus
reducing the amount of resources
consumed by the audit mechanism.
FAU_STG_EXP.5 FAU_STG_EXP.5 allows the
administrator to define what should
happen in the case where the audit
file is full. This provides the
administrator with the possibility to
decide about possible audit data
loss or stopping of services based
on the information stored in the
database.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all
the functions and
facilities necessary to
support the authorized
administrators in their
management of the
security of the TOE, and
restrict these functions
and facilities from
unauthorized use.
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MOF.1 requires that the ability to
use particular TOE capabilities be
restricted to the administrator.
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1 requires that the ability to
perform operations on security
attributes be restricted to particular
roles.
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 requires that default
values used for security attributes are
restrictive and cannot be changed by
any role.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 36/50
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 requires that the ability to
manipulate TOE content is restricted to
administrators.
FMT_REV.1(1)
FMT_REV.1(2)
FMT_REV.1 restricts the ability to
revoke attributes to the administrator.
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 identifies the
management functions that are
available to the authorized
administrator.
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific
security roles to be supported.
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 defines the user level
security attributes.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect
user data in accordance
with its security policy.
FDP_ACC.1 The FDP requirements were chosen to
define the policies, the subjects,
objects, and operations for how and
when mediation takes place in the
TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 defines the Access
Control policy that will be enforced on
a list of subjects acting on the behalf of
users attempting to gain access to a
list of named objects. All the operation
between subject and object covered
are defined by the TOE’s policy.
FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 defines the
security attribute used to provide
access control to objects based on the
TOE’s access control policy.
FPT_TRC.1 Replicated TSF data that specifies
attributes for access control must be
consistent across distributed
components of the TOE. The
requirement is to maintain consistency
of replicated TSF data.
The TOE does not consist of
distributed components. Therefore
this SFR is not applicable.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORM
ATION
The TOE will ensure
that any information
contained in a protected
FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 is used to ensure the
contents of resources are not available
to subjects other than those explicitly
granted access to the data.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 37/50
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
resource within its
Scope of Control is not
released when the
resource is reallocated.
O.TOE_ACCESS
The TOE will provide
mechanisms that control
a user’s logical access
to the TOE.
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 defines the attributes of
users, including a user ID that is used
by the TOE to determine a user’s
identity and/or group memberships and
enforce what type of access the user
has to the TOE.
FTA_MCS.1 FTA_MCS.1 ensures that users may
only have a maximum of a specified
number of active sessions open at any
given time.
FTA_TSE.1 FTA_TSE.1 allows the TOE to restrict
access to the TOE based on certain
criteria.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a
mechanism for
identification and
authentication of
users.
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2 realizes the
authentication part of O.I&A as it
requires that each user has to get
successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated
action on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2 realizes the identification
part of O.I&A as it requires that each
user has to get successfully
identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated action on behalf of
that user.
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 defines the attributes of
users, including a user ID that is
used by the TOE to determine a
user’s identity and/or group
memberships and enforce what type
of access the user has to the TOE.
FIA_UAU.5 FIA_UAU.5 specifies that the TOE
uses two methods to ensure that
every user has to be successfully
authenticated.
On the one hand the TOE is able to
reuse the authentication results
from the environment and on the
other hand the TOE provides a
password based authentication
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 38/50
Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
mechanism.
The following table includes the rationale for the IT Environment Requirements. This rationale has
been directly taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text (typos are not
reproduced).
Table 16 - Rationale for Environment Requirements
Environmental Objective Requirements Addressing
the Objective
Rationale
OE.NO_EVIL
Sites using the TOE shall
ensure that authorized
administrators are non-hostile,
are appropriately trained and
follow all administrator
guidance.
N/A This objective does not contain
any IT security requirements
because it is a non-IT related
objective. Thus, the CC does
not mandate it map to any
requirements.
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
There will be no general-
purpose computing
capabilities (e.g., compilers or
user applications) available on
DBMS servers, other than
those services necessary for
the operation, administration
and support of the DBMS.
N/A This objective does not contain
any IT security requirements
because it is a non-IT related
objective. Thus, the CC does
not mandate it map to any
requirements.
OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security will be
provided within the domain for
the value of the IT assets
protected by the TOE and the
value of the stored, processed,
and transmitted information.
N/A This objective does not contain
any IT security requirements
because it is a non-IT related
objective. Thus, the CC does
not mandate it map to any
requirements.
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies
The following table contains the rationale for satisfying all dependencies of the Security Requirements.
This rationale has been taken from [PP] with only the changes indicated by bold italic text
2
.
2
Both [PP, 5.1] and [PP, 6.5] list the dependencies of Security Functional Requirements. The rationale
in Table 17 is based on the dependencies given in [PP, 6.5].
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 39/50
Table 17 - Rationale for satisfying all dependencies
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 FPT_STM.1 This requirement must be satisfied by the
IT environment because the DBMS is a
software only TOE.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410
FIA_UID.1
Satisfied
The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is
fulfilled by the TOE (FIA_UID.2 is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1) or by the
environment.
FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407 FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410
FMT_MTD.1
Satisfied
Satisfied
FAU_STG_EXP.5 FAU_STG.1 The dependency to FAU_STG.1 is
satisfied by the environment. The TOE
as a DBMS has to rely on the Operating
System to protect the files.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 Satisfied
FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Satisfied
FDP_RIP.1 None N/A
FIA_ATD.1 None N/A
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is
fulfilled by the TOE (FIA_UID.2 is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1) or by the
environment.
FIA_UAU.5 None N/A
FIA_UID.2 None N/A
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied
Satisfied
FMT_MSA.1
[FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMF.1 1
FMT_SMR.1
Dependency satisfied by FDP_ACC.1.
Satisfied
Satisfied
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied
Satisfied
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1 Satisfied
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 40/50
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied
FMT_REV.1(1) FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied
FMT_REV.1(2) FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied
FMT_SMF.1 None N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied
The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is
fulfilled by the TOE (FIA_UID.2 is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1) or by the
environment.
FPT_TRC.1 FPT_ITT.1
This dependency does not need to be
fulfilled because the TOE does not
comprise physically separated parts.
FTA_MCS.1 FIA_UID.1
The dependency to FIA_UID.1 is either
fulfilled by the TOE (FIA_UID.2 is
hierarchical to FIA_UID.1) or by the
environment.
FTA_TAH.1 None N/A
FTA_TSE.1 None N/A
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 41/50
6.3.3 Rationale for extended requirements
Table 18 presents the rationale for the inclusion of the extended functional requirements.
Table 18 - Rationale for Explicit Requirements
Explicit Requirement Identifier Rationale
FAU_STG_EXP.5 Administrable
Prevention of audit
data loss
It has been necessary to develop this explicit
Security Functional Requirement because part II
of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows
specifying a set of allowed actions which can be
taken in the case where the audit is full.
For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary
to provide authorized administrators with the
possibility to specify what should happen if the
audit log is full. However there should only be one
action to be taken in this case.
However this SFR has been developed based on
the definition of FAU_STG.4 and has the same
family behaviour except that it is not hierarchical to
any other SFR. .
6.3.4 Rationale for Assurance Requirements
The ‘entry level’ of EAL 2 has been chosen to gain an initial assurance that all required functionalities
are correctly implemented by the TOE. The additional use of ALC_FLR.2 is necessary in order to stay
compliant to [PP].
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 42/50
7 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter presents an overview of the security functionality implemented by the TOE. Please note
that the TOE does not contain physically separated parts, hence, the SFR FPT_TRC.1 is trivially met
as intended by the application note in [PP, 5.1.5.1].
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM)
This security functionality of the TOE allows modifying the TSF data of the TOE and therewith
managing the behavior of the TSF.
This comprises the following management functions (FMT_SMF.1):
 Add and delete logins on an instance level,
 Add and delete users on a database level,
 Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles,
 Create and destroy database roles,
 Create, Start and Stop Security Audit,
 Include and exclude Auditable events,
 Define the mode of authentication for every login,
 Manage attributes for Session Establishment,
 Define the action to take in case the audit file is full.
All these management functions are available via T-SQL statements directly or realized by Stored
Procedures within the TOE which can be called using T-SQL.
The TOE maintains a set of roles on the server level and on the database level as listed in Table 13
and Table 14. The TOE maintains a security ID for each login on a server level and each database
user. This security ID is used to associate each user with his assigned roles (FIA_ATD.1,
FMT_SMR.1).
Changes to logins that are preformed via the management functions are applied at the latest as soon
as a new session for the login is established (FMT_REV.1(1)).
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC)
The TOE provides a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism to control the access of users to
objects based on the identity of the user requesting access, the membership of this user to roles, the
requested operation and the ID of the requested object.
The TOE maintains two kinds of user representations:
1. On an instance level an end user is represented by a login. On this level the TOE controls the
access of logins to objects pertaining to the instance (e.g. to view a database).
2. On a database level an end user is represented by a database user. On this level the TOE
controls the access of database users to objects of the database (e.g. to read or create a
table).
Further the TOE is able to manage a user account completely within a database. In this case the user
account in the database is associated with a login that is also contained in this database. The
authentication then happens against this database.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 43/50
Members of the database roles “db_owner” or “db_accessadmin” are able to add users to a database.
The TOE maintains an internal security identifier (SID) for every user and role. Each database user
can be associated with at most one instance “login”.
Every object controlled by the TOE has an ID, an owner and a name.
Objects in the TOE form a hierarchy and belong to one of three different levels: server, database and
schema.
The TOE maintains an Access Control List (ACL) for each object within its scope. These ACLs are
stored in a system table which exists in every database for database related ACLs and in a system
table in the ‘master’ database for instance level ACLs.
Each entry of an ACL contains a user SID and defines whether a permission is an “Allow” or a “Deny”
permission for that SID.
When a new object is created, the creating user is assigned as the owner of the object and has
complete control over the object. The initial ACL for a newly created object is always empty by default
and cannot be overridden by any role (FMT_MSA.3).
After creation, grant, deny or revoke permissions on objects can be assigned to users. Changes to the
security relevant attributes of objects are immediately applied (FMT_REV.1(2)).
When a user attempts to perform an action to an object under the control of the TOE, the TOE decides
whether the action is to be permitted based on the following rules:
1. If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user, the TOE will deny access
2. If the requested mode of access is denied to any role of which the authorized user is a
member, the TOE will deny access
3. If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user, the TOE will permit
access
4. If the requested mode of access is permitted to any role of which the authorized user is a
member, the TOE will permit access
5. Else: The TOE will deny access
The TOE permission check for an action on an object includes the permissions of its parent objects.
The permissions for the object itself and all its parent objects are accumulated together before the
aforementioned rules are evaluated. Note: Some actions require more than one permission.
This means that if a user or a role has been granted a permission to an object this permission is also
valid for all child objects. E.g. if a user has been granted a permission to a schema, he automatically
has the same permission on all tables within that schema, if the permission has not explicitly been
denied. Similarly, if a user has been denied a permission on a schema, he will be denied the same
permission to all tables within that schema, regardless of explicit grant permissions.
The rules as described before are always applied when a user requests access to a certain object
using a certain operation. There are only two situations where these access control rules are
overridden:
1. The system administrator, the owner of an object and owners of parent objects always have
access, so for these users the TOE will always allow access to the object
2. In the case of “Ownership Chaining” which is described in chapter 8.1 in more detail the
access is allowed
(FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1-NIAP-0407)
As the access to management functions of the TOE is controlled by the same functionality as the
access to user data this security functionality additionally ensures that the management functions are
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 44/50
only available for authorized administrators (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1,
FMT_REV.1(1)).
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)
This security functionality requires each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other actions on behalf of that user. This is done on an instance level and means that the user has to
be associated with a login of the TOE.
The TOE knows two types of logins: Windows accounts and SQL Server logins. The administrator has
to specify the type of login for every login he is creating.
The possibility for the TOE to perform its own authentication is necessary because not all users
connecting to the TOE are connecting from a Windows environment.
Microsoft Windows account names
These logins are associated with a user account of the Windows Operating System in the
environment.
For these logins the TOE requires that the Windows environment passes on the Windows
SID(s) of that user to authenticate the user before any other action on behalf of that user is
allowed.
3
For these logins the Windows security identifier (SID) from the Windows account or group is
used for identification of that login within the TOE. Any permission is associated with that SID
(FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.5).
SQL Server login names
SQL Server logins are not associated with a user of Windows but are maintained by the TOE
itself. Logins exist on a server level (and users in databases can be associated with a login)
and on a database level itself (for contained databases). For every SQL Server login the TOE
maintains a login name and a password. The password is not stored in plain text, but hashed
using the SHA-1 hash function provided by the Operating System in the environment.
Each SQL Server login name is stored in a system table. SQL Server generates a SID that is
used as a security identifier and stores it in this table.
This SID is internally used as a security identifier for the login.
If a user is connecting to the TOE using a SQL Server login he has to provide the username
and password. The TOE hashes the password using the hash function provided by the
Operating System in the environment, and compares the hash to the value stored for that
user. If the values are identical the TOE has successfully authenticated the user (FIA_UAU.2,
FIA_UID.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.5).
7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU)
The TOE produces audit logs for all security relevant actions. These audit logs are stored into files in
the environment of the TOE.
The Security Audit of the TOE especially comprises the following events:
 Startup and Shutdown of the TOE,
3
Windows authentication of users may be based on a username and password or alternative mechanisms. After
successful authentication of a user Windows associates a list of SID(s) with every user which represent the user
and every group the user is a member of.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 45/50
 Start and Shutdown of Security Audit Function,
 Every login attempt including the processes for authentication and session establishment,
 Every successful request to perform on operation on an object covered by the access control
function,
 Modifications to the role membership of users,
 The use of SF.SM,
 Every rejected attempt to establish a session.
The TOE maintains a set of events which can be additionally audited and provides the administrator
with the capability to start a Security Audit process to capture these events.
For each event in the Security Audit logs the following information is stored:
1. Date and Time of the event,
2. Identity of the user causing the event (if available),
3. Type of the event,
4. ID of the object,
5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event.
Furthermore each audit file contains an introduction with the list of events which are audited in the file.
(FAU_GEN.1-NIAP-0410 and FAU_GEN.2).
The administrator has the possibility to specify, what should happen in case an audit file is full. The
following two scenarios are supported in the evaluated version:
1. Rollover
The administrator specifies a maximum size per audit file and a maximum number of files for
the Security Audit. If one audit file is full, the TOE starts the next file until the maximum
number of files has been reached. When the maximum number of files has been reached and
the last audit file is full, the TOE will start overwriting the oldest audit file.
2. Shutdown
The administrator specifies one audit file with a maximum size and the option to shut down the
TOE on any audit error. When the maximum size of the audit file has been reached the TOE
will stop operation (FAU_STG_EXP.5).
The TOE provides the possibility to create a filter for the audit function. Using this filter mechanism the
administrator is able to exclude auditable events from being audited based on the following attributes:
 User identity,
 Event Type,
 Object identity,
 Success or failure of auditable security events.
However, to modify the behavior of the Security Audit function by including additional or excluding
events from being audited the administrator has to stop the Security Audit process, modify the Security
Audit function and start the Security Audit process again (FAU_SEL.1-NIAP-0407).
7.5 Session Handling (SF.SE)
After a user attempting to establish a session has been successfully authenticated by SF.I&A this
security functionality decides whether this user is actually allowed to establish a session to the TOE.
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 46/50
The TOE uses two sets of additional criteria to decide whether a user is allowed to establish a session.
First the TOE enforces a limit of the number of concurrent sessions a user is allowed to have at one
time. This limit is set to 5 by default but can be modified by authorized administrators as described in
SF.SM. If a user reached the limit of concurrent sessions the TOE will deny establishing another
session for that user (FTA_MCS.1).
As a second criterion the admin is able to specify a set of rules to explicitly deny session
establishment based on:
 User’s identity,
 Time of the day, and
 Day of the week.
The TOE only establishes a session for a user if no explicit deny rule for that user has been specified
(FTA_TSE.1).
For every attempt to establish a session (whether successful or not) the TOE stores the date and time
of the event and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful attempt. This
information is available at the client interface at any time. It is not erased but only overwritten with
updated values between sessions, i.e. the time of the last successful logon, the time of the last
unsuccessful logon and the number of unsuccessful logon attempts between the last successful logon
and the current successful logon are available until the user logs out (FTA_TAH.1).
After the TOE established a session to a user the user context is held in a context with limited
permission. SF.SE maintains a separate context for the execution of each operation by a user. As
soon as a user performs an operation on an object the TOE starts at least one thread to perform this
operation.
When the TOE reuses memory which could contain previous information content and which is related
to the context of a user’s session (i.e. to which a user could gain access), this previous information will
not be available for any user. To ensure this, the TOE either directly overwrites any memory that will
be used for users sessions completely with new information or with a certain pattern. Before the
previous information has been overwritten the resource is not available for any usage. For memory
which is allocated using the Operating System the TOE uses a function of the OS, which ensures that
only empty memory is provided to the TOE. Whenever data is written to or loaded from disc this is
done page wise where a page has the size of 8 KB (FDP_RIP.1).
Security Target (EAL2+) - Microsoft® SQL Server® 2014 Page 47/50
8 Appendix
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains
Database Objects within the TOE are not always only passive objects. Some objects refer to other
objects. This is especially true for Stored Procedures and Views. When multiple database objects
access each other sequentially, the sequence is known as a chain. Although such chains do not
independently exist, when the TOE traverses the links in a chain, the TOE evaluates access
permissions on the constituent objects differently than it would if it were accessing the objects
separately. These differences have important implications for managing security.
Ownership chaining enables managing access to multiple objects, such as multiple tables, by setting
permissions on one object, such as a view. Ownership chaining also offers a slight performance
advantage in scenarios that allow for skipping permission checks.
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain
When an object is accessed through a chain, the TOE first compares the owner of the object to the
owner of the calling object. This is the previous link in the chain. If both objects have the same owner,
permissions on the referenced object are not evaluated. In the context of the Discretionary Access
Control Mechanism this is not a circumvention of access control as the owner of an object always has
complete control over his objects. So if one user is the owner of both objects, the calling object and the
called object, the owner also would have direct access to both objects.
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining
In the following illustration, the July2003 view is owned by Mary. She has granted to Alex permissions
on the view. He has no other permissions on database objects in this instance. What happens when
Alex selects the view?
Alex executes SELECT * on the July2003 view. The TOE checks permissions on the view and
confirms that Alex has permission to select on it.
The July 2003 view requires information from the SalesXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership of the
SalesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner (Mary) as the view that calls it, permissions on
SalesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned.
The SalesXZ view requires information from the InvoicesXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership of
the InvoicesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner as the previous object, permissions on
InvoicesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned. To this point, all items in the
sequence have had one owner (Mary). This is known as an unbroken ownership chain.
The InvoicesXZ view requires information from the AcctAgeXZ view. The TOE checks the ownership
of the AcctAgeXZ view. Because the owner of this view is different from the owner of the previous
object (Sam, not Mary), full information about permissions on this view is retrieved. If the AcctAgeXZ
view has permissions that allow access by Alex, information will be returned.
The AcctAgeXZ view requires information from the ExpenseXZ table. The TOE checks the ownership
of the ExpenseXZ table. Because the owner of this table is different from the owner of the previous
object (Joe, not Sam), full information about permissions on this table is retrieved. If the ExpenseXZ
table has permissions that allow access by Alex, information is returned.
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Figure 3 - Concept of Ownership Chaining
When the July2003 view tries to retrieve information from the ProjectionsXZ table, the TOE first
checks to see whether cross-database chaining is enabled between Database 1 and Database 2. If
cross-database chaining is enabled, the TOE will check the ownership of the ProjectionsXZ table.
Because this table has the same owner as the calling view (Mary), permissions on this table are not
checked. The requested information is returned.
8.2 References
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:
[AGD] Microsoft SQL Server 2014 Books Online
[AGD_ADD] Microsoft SQL Server 2014 Database Engine Common Criteria Evaluation –
Guidance Addendum (delivered via
https://www.microsoft.com/sqlserver/en/us/common-criteria.aspx (tab “SQL Server
2014”)
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1 R4
Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated September 2012, version 3.1, R4
Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated September 2012, version 3.1, R4
[PP] U.S. Government Protection Profile for Database Management Systems, Version
1.3, December 24, 2010
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8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations
8.3.1 Glossary
The following terms are used in this Security Target:
Term Definition
Attacker The term attacker refers to any individual (or technical entity) that is attempting to
subvert the security functionality of the TOE. In this Security Target it is assumed
that the attacker has an attack potential of “enhanced basic”.
Authorized
Administrators
This term refers to a group of users which comprise the “sysadmin” (sa) and any
user who is allowed to perform a management operation because the permission
has been granted to him within the DAC either by assigning him to a role with
administrator permissions or by granting him the possibility to perform an
administrative operation explicitly.
DAC Discretionary Access Control is a mechanism to limit the access of users to
objects based on the ID of the user, the ID of the object and a set of access
control rules.
DBMS A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows
authorized users to retrieve and update that information.
Named Pipe Method for inter process communication.
Object An object within the TOE contains data and can be accessed by subjects.
However in the TOE an object is not necessarily only a passive entity as some
objects refer to other objects.
OC Ownership Chaining.
SQL The Structured Query Language is a language which can be used to create,
modify and retrieve data from a DBMS.
SQL Server SQL Server is a product of Microsoft to which the TOE belongs.
TDS Tabular Data Stream is a data format which is used for communication with the
TOE.
T-SQL Extension of the SQL language in order to support control flow, variables, user
authentication and various other functions.
User The term user refers to technical entities (e.g. applications, other instances of the
TOE) or human users (using a SQL-client) that are using the services of the TOE.
8.3.2 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target:
Abbreviation Definition
ACL Access Control List
CC Common Criteria
DAC Discretionary Access Control
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Abbreviation Definition
DBMS Database Management System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETL Extract, Transform, Load
IT Information Technology
MOM Microsoft Operations Manager
MS Microsoft
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NSA National Security Agency
OLAP Online analytical processing
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Functionality
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SID Security ID
SMS System Management Server
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functionality
T-SQL Transact SQL