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Reference: 2020-41-INF-3895- v1
Target: Pública
Date: 15.12.2022
Created by: I003
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
Dossier # 2020-41
TOE Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version
V300R006C10SPC300
Applicant B84136464 - Huawei Technologies España, S.L.
References
[EXT-6181] Certification Request
[EXT-7883] Evaluation Technical Report (1/2)
[EXT-7884] Evaluation Technical Report (2/2)
Certification report of the product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version
V300R006C10SPC300, as requested in [EXT-6181] dated 24/07/2020, and evaluated by DEKRA
Testing and Certification S.A.U., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-7883] and [EXT-
7884] received on 12/07/2022.
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3
TOE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................................................... 4
IDENTIFICATION.................................................................................................................................. 5
SECURITY POLICIES.............................................................................................................................. 6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 6
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS................................................................................ 6
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY ............................................................................. 6
ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................................... 7
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................. 7
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................ 8
DOCUMENTS....................................................................................................................................... 8
PRODUCT TESTING.............................................................................................................................. 9
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ............................................................................................................ 9
EVALUATION RESULTS ...................................................................................................................... 10
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ............................................. 10
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS....................................................................................................... 10
GLOSSARY ......................................................................................................................................... 10
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 11
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)............................................................ 11
RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS............................................................................................................ 12
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).................................................... 12
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)................................................................... 12
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the product Huawei
ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version V300R006C10SPC300.
The TOE is a router product series (network devices) that provide multi-service access on the edge
of metropolitan area networks (MANs).
Developer/manufacturer: Huawei Technologies España, S.L.
Sponsor: Huawei Technologies España, S.L..
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Dekra Testing and Certification S.A.U.
Protection Profile: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (v2.1), 24 September 2018.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 (assurance packages according to the [cPP_ND_21]).
Evaluation end date: 30/09/2022.
Expiration Date1
: 10/12/2027.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level of the [cPP_ND_21] have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the [cPP_ND_21] assurance level packages, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5, the
[cPP_ND_21] and the CEM v3.1 R5.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version V300R006C10SPC300, a positive
resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is the HUAWEI ATN Series Routers, which consists of the following products: ATN 980C,
ATN 910C-G, ATN 950D and ATN 910D-A. The software running on these devices is the Versatile
Routing Platform (VRP) software version V300R006C10SPC300, that is a network OS incorporating
1
This date refers to the expiration date of the certificate recognition within the scope of the mutual recognition
arrangements signed by this Certification Body.
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Huawei's proprietary intellectual properties and capable of supporting various network systems of
Huawei.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the assurance packages defined
in the [cPP_ND_21] according to Common Criteria v3.1 R5.
ASSURANCE CLASS ASSURANCE COMPONENT
ADV ADV_FSP.1
AGD AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
ASE ASE_CCL.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_INT.1
ASE_OBJ.1
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_TSS.1
ATE ATE_IND.1
AVA AVA_VAN.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements, according to the
Common Criteria v3.1 R5:
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_STG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
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FCS_COP.1/Hash
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
FIA_UAU.7
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
FPT_APW_EXT.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_STM_EXT.1
FTA_SSL.3
FTA_SSL.4
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
FTA_TAB.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1/Admin
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.3/LocSpace
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev
FIA_X509_EXT.2
FMT_MOF.1/Services
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys
IDENTIFICATION
Product: Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version V300R006C10SPC300.
Security Target: Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software V300R006C10SPC300 Security
Target, v1.4 (12 July 2022).
Protection Profile: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (v2.1), 24 September 2018.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R5 (assurance packages according to the [cPP_ND_21]).
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SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version
V300R006C10SPC300 shall implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different
standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target, section 3.4 (“Organizational
Security Policies”).
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the security properties
and functionalities compiled by the security target. These assumptions have been applied during
the evaluation in order to determine if the identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these assumptions for its
operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them could not be assumed, it would not
be possible to assure the secure operation of the TOE.
The detail of these assumptions is documented in the Security Target, section 3.3 (“Assumptions”).
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP
software, version V300R006C10SPC300, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack
potential according to the Basic of [cPP_ND_21] and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the
proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product security
properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are those defined in the Security Target,
section 3.2 (“Threats”).
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some of the
objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are those defined in the
Protection Profile and they are documented in the Security Target, section 4.1 (“Security Objectives
for the operational Environment”).
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ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above
consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
• Security audit
The log module of the host software records operations on a device and events that occur
to a device. The recorded operations and events are log messages. Log messages provide
evidence for diagnosing and maintaining a system.
• Cryptography support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote
administrative management.
• Identification and authentication
The authentication functionality provides validation by user’s account name and password.
Public key authentication is supported for SSH users. Detailed functionalities, for example
max idle-timeout period, max log-in attempts, UI lock, user kick out, can be applies by
administrator according to networking environment, customized security considerations,
differential user role on TOE, and/or other operational concerns.
• Secure Management
The TOE restricts the ability to determine the behavior of and modify the behavior of the
functions transmission of audit data to the security administrator. Only the security
administrator can manage the cryptographic keys. Only the security administrator has the
right of opening/closing the security services and creation/deletion/modification of the user
accounts.
• Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from reading them
by an unauthorized entity. The TOE stores the users or administrator passwords in non-
plaintext form preventing them from reading. The TOE verifies the packet before their
installation and uses the digital signature.
• TOE access through user authentication
The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol.
• Trusted path and channels for device authentication
The TOE supports the trusted connections using TLS for the communication with the audit
server.
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PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The physical scope of the TOE is described below:
Hardware:
Model Hardware
ATN 980C
ATN 980C Assembly Chassis, 2 slots for CXP (System Control, Cross-connect and Multi-protocol
Process Unit), 6 slots (AC) or 8 slots (DC) for PIC (Physical Interface Card)
ATN 950D
ATN 950D Assembly Chassis, 2 slots for CXP (System Control, Cross-connect and Multi-protocol
Process Unit), 4 slots (AC) or 6 slots (DC) for PIC (Physical Interface Card)
ATN 910C-G ATN 910C-G Integrated Chassis, Fixed interfaces.
ATN 910D-A ATN 910D-A Integrated Chassis, Fixed interfaces.
Software package:
Platform Package name Item version Signature file
ATN 980C
ATN950D980C-
V300R006C10SPC300.cc
V300R006C10SPC300
ATN950D980C-
V300R006C10SPC300.cc.asc
ATN 950D
ATN 910C-G
ATN910C910D-
V300R006C10SPC300.cc
V300R006C10SPC300
ATN910C910D-
V300R006C10SPC300.cc.asc
ATN 910D-A
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made available
together to the users of the evaluated version.
Document name Version
Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software V300R006C10SPC300 Operational user Guidance.pdf 1.2
Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software V300R006C10SPC300 Preparative Procedures.pdf 1.2
Huawei ATN 980C&980B&950C&950D&910D&910C&950B&905 Product Documentation.chm 05
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PRODUCT TESTING
Huawei has chosen ATN950D as the Reference/Canonical TOE. Additionally, the developer has
produced a rationale (TRR) describing its strategy for reusing test results of the Reference TOE
based upon the DAR.
The whole evaluation has been performed on the Reference TOE (ATN950D). All SFRs have been
tested according to the [cPP_ND_21] and [cPP_ND_21_SD]. For the remaining devices included in
the product series (ATN980C, ATN910C-G and ATN910D-A), the testing of the requirements that
need physical interaction, or those that due to their complexity had been chosen under the
evaluator’s criteria (e.g. exchange of large files or remote installation of a workstation for the
configuration of a TLS server), have not been tested remotely but just in the Reference TOE in
Dekra T&C Laboratory. The testing of the rest of the requirements have been carried out remotely
in the vendor premises (Huawei Development Center).
The evaluator has designed a set of tests following a suitable strategy for the TOE type taking into
account:
• All SFRs have been tested following the procedures defined in the supporting document
[cPP_ND_21_SD].
• Increasing test coverage of the four TSFIs (IF_SYSLOG, IF_SSH, IF_CLI and IF_NTP) varying the
input parameters: search for critical parameters in the TSFIs and the incorrect behaviour
suspicion with specific input values.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are indicated below.
Therefore, for the operation of the product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software,
version V300R006C10SPC300 it is necessary the disposition of the following software components:
• Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) software version V300R006C10SPC300.
Regarding the hardware components, the TOE includes the following platforms:
• ATN 980C
• ATN 950D
• ATN 910C-G
• ATN 910D-A
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version V300R006C10SPC300 has
been evaluated against the Security Target Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software
V300R006C10SPC300 Security Target, v1.4 (12 July 2022).
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level of the [cPP_ND_21] have been
assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory DEKRA Testing and Certification S.A.U.
assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for
the [cPP_ND_21] assurance level packages, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R5, the
[cPP_ND_21] and the CEM v3.1 R5.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These have been
collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered when using the product.
The TOE usage is recommended given that there are not exploitable vulnerabilities in the
operational environment. Nonetheless, the following usage recommendations are given:
• The fulfilment of the assumptions indicated in the Security Target is a key point as it implies
TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out of the scope.
• The application of the TLS encryption after the installation procedures is critical to maintain
the communication secure and safeguard the TOE assets.
• It is mandatory to strictly follow the steps indicated in the installation documentation in
order to download and install the correct version of the TOE in a proper manner.
• The user guidance must be read and understood in order to operate the TOE in an adequate
manner according to the Security Target.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request of the
product Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software, version V300R006C10SPC300, a positive
resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
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CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
components, Version 3.1, R5 Final, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Version 3.1, R5 Final,
April 2017.
[cPP_ND_21] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (v2.1), 24 September 2018.
[cPP_ND_21_SD] Evaluation activities for Network Devices cPP, v2.1 (September 2018).
[ST] Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software V300R006C10SPC300 Security Target, v1.4
(12 July 2022).
SECURITY TARGET / SECURITY TARGET LITE (IF APPLICABLE)
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is available in the
Certification Body:
• Huawei ATN Series Routers running VRP software V300R006C10SPC300 Security Target, v1.4
(12 July 2022).
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RECOGNITION AGREEMENTS
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under
certain conditions was agreed.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It
defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at
higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL
4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a
SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common
Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of
signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the
agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common
Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers
CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on
assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation
(ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-
2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-
2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity
(maintenance and re-certification)of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of
certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL
4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
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As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from
the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the
United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the
website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this
certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
The certificate of this TOE is recognized under CCRA for all assurance components selected.