Forescout v8.4.1
Security Target
ST Version: 2.1
February 27, 2023
Forescout Technologies, Inc.
190 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA, USA 95134
Prepared By:
Cyber Assurance Testing Laboratory
1100 West St
Laurel MD 20707
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Table of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................6
1.1 ST Reference.................................................................................................................................6
1.2 ST Identification ...........................................................................................................................6
Document Organization........................................................................................................6
Terminology..........................................................................................................................6
Acronyms..............................................................................................................................7
Reference ..............................................................................................................................8
1.3 TOE Reference..............................................................................................................................9
1.4 TOE Overview..............................................................................................................................9
1.5 TOE Type....................................................................................................................................10
2 TOE Description.................................................................................................................................11
2.1 Evaluated Components of the TOE ............................................................................................11
2.2 Components and Applications in the Operational Environment.................................................11
2.3 Excluded from the TOE..............................................................................................................12
Not Installed........................................................................................................................12
Installed but Requires a Separate License...........................................................................12
Installed But Not Part of the TSF........................................................................................13
2.4 Physical Boundary ......................................................................................................................14
2.5 Logical Boundary........................................................................................................................16
Security Audit .....................................................................................................................16
Cryptographic Support........................................................................................................16
Identification and Authentication........................................................................................17
Security Management .........................................................................................................17
Protection of the TSF..........................................................................................................17
TOE Access ........................................................................................................................17
Trusted Path/Channels ........................................................................................................18
3 Conformance Claims ..........................................................................................................................19
3.1 CC Version..................................................................................................................................19
3.2 CC Part 2 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................19
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3.3 CC Part 3 Conformance Claims..................................................................................................19
3.4 PP Claims....................................................................................................................................19
3.5 Package Claims...........................................................................................................................19
3.6 Package Name Conformant or Package Name Augmented........................................................19
3.7 Technical Decisions....................................................................................................................19
3.8 Conformance Claim Rationale....................................................................................................22
4 Security Problem Definition ...............................................................................................................23
4.1 Threats.........................................................................................................................................23
4.2 Organizational Security Policies.................................................................................................24
4.3 Assumptions................................................................................................................................24
4.4 Security Objectives .....................................................................................................................25
TOE Security Objectives ....................................................................................................25
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment........................................................25
4.5 Security Problem Definition Rationale.......................................................................................26
5 Extended Components Definition.......................................................................................................26
5.1 Extended Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................26
5.2 Extended Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................27
6 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................................................28
6.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................................28
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Summary..............................................................................28
6.3 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................29
Class FAU: Security Audit .................................................................................................29
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support.....................................................................................31
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication .....................................................................35
Class FMT: Security Management .....................................................................................37
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF .......................................................................................38
Class FTA: TOE Access .....................................................................................................40
Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels......................................................................................40
6.4 Statement of Security Functional Requirements Consistency ....................................................41
7 Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................42
7.1 Class ASE: Security Target evaluation.......................................................................................42
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1).............................................................................................42
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Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)....................................................................................43
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD)............................................................................44
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1) ...................................45
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1).................................................................45
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1).......................................................................46
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1).........................................................................47
7.2 Class ADV: Development...........................................................................................................48
Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)....................................................................48
7.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation .......................................................................................49
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1) ........................................................................49
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)...............................................................................50
7.4 Class ALC: Life Cycle Support ..................................................................................................50
Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)..................................................................................50
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1) ....................................................................................51
7.5 Class ATE: Tests.........................................................................................................................51
Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1) ...........................................................51
7.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment.......................................................................................52
Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1) .................................................................................52
8 TOE Summary Specification ..............................................................................................................53
8.1 Security Audit.............................................................................................................................53
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU GEN.2 ...........................................................................................53
FAU_STG_EXT.1 ..............................................................................................................54
8.2 Cryptographic Support................................................................................................................54
FCS_CKM.1 .......................................................................................................................55
FCS_CKM.2 .......................................................................................................................55
FCS_CKM.4 .......................................................................................................................56
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption ..............................................................................................57
FCS_COP.1/SigGen............................................................................................................58
FCS_COP.1/Hash ...............................................................................................................58
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash.....................................................................................................58
FCS_RBG_EXT.1...............................................................................................................59
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FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 .............................................................................................................59
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.............................................................................................................60
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 .............................................................................................................60
8.3 Identification and Authentication................................................................................................61
FIA_AFL.1..........................................................................................................................61
FIA_PMG_EXT.1...............................................................................................................62
FIA_UAU.7 ........................................................................................................................62
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 and FIA_UIA_EXT.1...........................................................................62
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and FIA_X509_EXT.3 ................................62
8.4 Security Management .................................................................................................................63
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate, FMT_MTD.1/CoreData, and FMT_SMF.1........................63
FMT_SMR.2.......................................................................................................................64
8.5 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................................65
FPT_APW_EXT.1..............................................................................................................65
FPT_SKP_EXT.1................................................................................................................65
FPT_STM_EXT.1...............................................................................................................65
FPT_TST_EXT.1................................................................................................................65
FPT_TUD_EXT.1...............................................................................................................66
8.6 TOE Access ................................................................................................................................67
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 ...............................................................................................................67
FTA_SSL.3.........................................................................................................................67
FTA_SSL.4.........................................................................................................................68
FTA_TAB.1........................................................................................................................68
8.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................68
FTP_ITC.1 ..........................................................................................................................68
FTP_TRP.1/Admin .............................................................................................................68
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Table of Tables
Table 1: Customer Specific Terminology........................................................................................................ 7
Table 2: CC Specific Terminology.................................................................................................................. 7
Table 3: Acronym Definition........................................................................................................................... 8
Table 4: TOE Models..................................................................................................................................... 11
Table 5: Supporting Components in the Operational Environment............................................................... 12
Table 6: CT-R Model Rev22 ......................................................................................................................... 14
Table 7: CT/CEM Models Rev40.................................................................................................................. 14
Table 8: CT/CEM Models Rev50.................................................................................................................. 15
Table 9: 4130 and 51xx Models..................................................................................................................... 16
Table 10: Cryptographic Services.................................................................................................................. 17
Table 11: Technical Decisions....................................................................................................................... 22
Table 12: TOE Threats................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 13: TOE Organization Security Policies.............................................................................................. 24
Table 14: TOE Assumptions.......................................................................................................................... 25
Table 15: TOE Operational Environment Objectives.................................................................................... 26
Table 16: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE............................................................................. 29
Table 17: Auditable Events............................................................................................................................ 30
Table 18: Self-Test List ................................................................................................................................. 39
Table 19: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for OpenSSL .............................................................................. 55
Table 20: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for Bouncy Castle....................................................................... 55
Table 21: Identification of Cryptographic Services Supporting Secured Communication Channel ............. 56
Table 22: Crypto key destruction table.......................................................................................................... 57
Table 23: Management Functions to Management Interface Identification .................................................. 64
Table 24: Self-Test List with Failure Results ................................................................................................ 65
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1 Security Target Introduction
This chapter presents the Security Target (ST) identification information and an overview. An ST contains
the Information Technology (IT) security requirements of an identified Target of Evaluation (TOE) and
specifies the functional and assurance security measures offered by the TOE.
1.1 ST Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of Evaluation.
1.2 ST Identification
ST Title: Forescout v8.4.1 Security Target
ST Version: 2.1
ST Publication Date: February 27, 2023
ST Author: Booz Allen Hamilton
Document Organization
Chapter 1 of this document provides identifying information for the ST and TOE as well as a brief
description of the TOE and its associated TOE type.
Chapter 2 describes the TOE in terms of its physical boundary, logical boundary, exclusions, and dependent
Operational Environment components.
Chapter 3 describes the conformance claims made by this ST.
Chapter 4 describes the threats, assumptions, objectives, and organizational security policies that apply to
the TOE.
Chapter 5 defines extended Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs).
Chapter 6 describes the SFRs that are to be implemented by the TSF.
Chapter 7 describes the SARs that will be used to evaluate the TOE.
Chapter 8 provides the TOE Summary Specification, which describes how the SFRs that are defined for the
TOE are implemented by the TSF.
Terminology
This section defines the terminology used throughout this ST. The terminology used throughout this ST is
defined in Table 1 & 2. These tables are to be used by the reader as a quick reference guide for terminology
definitions.
Term Definition
Administrator,
System Administrator,
Security Administrator
The class of TOE administrators that are tasked with managing the TOE’s functional
and security configuration. Embodies those administrators that have access to the
CLI and Console.
Connection One to One simple flows between a network port and a tool port.
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Term Definition
Console or Console
application
The Forescout Console is a GUI application used for creating NAC, firewall and IPS
policies, generating reports, viewing and managing detection information, and
managing Forescout Appliances.
Endpoint
A Network Host discovered by the Forescout platform, for example desktop, laptop,
server, etc.
Enterprise Manager
A Forescout platform configured to manage multiple Appliances distributed across
the network.
Local CLI
When the TOE’s command line interface (CLI) is accessed locally with a physical
connection to the TOE via the keyboard/video ports or a serial port and a terminal
emulator that is compatible with serial communications is referred to as the local
console.
Plugins
Functionality enhancement modules that can be incorporated into the Forescout
platform. Plugins enable deeper inspection as well as broader control over network
endpoints. Bundled plugins are pre-packaged with the Forescout platform. Other
plugins may be available from Forescout or from a third party.
Network Port
Where data arrives into the TOE. The ports which receive copied network data for
the TOE.
Remote console
When the TOE’s CLI is accessed remotely using SSH is referred to as the remote
console.
Table 1: Customer Specific Terminology
Term Definition
Authorized
Administrator
The claimed Protection Profile defines an Authorized Administrator role that is
authorized to manage the TOE and its data. For the TOE, this is considered to be any
user with the “administrator” role.
Security Administrator Synonymous with Authorized Administrator and System Administrator.
Trusted Channel
An encrypted connection between the TOE and a system in the Operational
Environment.
Trusted Path
An encrypted connection between the TOE and the application an Authorized
Administrator uses to manage it (web browser, terminal client, etc.).
Table 2: CC Specific Terminology
Acronyms
The acronyms used throughout this ST are defined in Table 3. This table is to be used by the reader as a
quick reference guide for acronym definitions.
Acronym Definition
CC Common Criteria
CLI Command-line Interface
CPU Central Processing Unit
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GUI Graphical User Interface
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
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Acronym Definition
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NTP Network Time Protocol
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
RU Rack Unit
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SCP Secure Copy Protocol
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TAP Test Access Point
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TP Tool Port
TSF TOE Security Function
UI User Interface
Table 3: Acronym Definition
Reference
[1] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e 20200323 [NDcPP]
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
and general model, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-004-001
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-004-002
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-004-003
[5] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
Methodology, dated April 2017, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-004-004
[6] NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3 Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018
[7] FIPS PUB 186-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Digital Signature
Standard, July 2013
[8] ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010, Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Encryption
algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers
[9] ISO/IEC 10116:2017, Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Modes of
operation for an n-bit block cipher
[10] ISO/IEC 19772:2009, Information Technology – Security techniques – Authenticated
encryption
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[11] ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004, Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Hash-functions -
- Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions
[12] ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function
[13] ISO/IEC 18031:2011, Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Random bit
generation
[14] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010, Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms
1.3 TOE Reference
The TOE is Forescout which is a family of products, which includes the following appliance models:
CT-R, CT-100, CT-1000, CT-2000, CT-4000, CT-10000, CEM-5, CEM-10, CEM-25, CEM-50, CEM-100,
CEM-150, CEM-200, 4130, 5110, 5120, 5140, and 5160.
Each appliance runs Forescout software version 8.4.1.
1.4 TOE Overview
The TOE is the Forescout product and is referred to as the Forescout platform or TOE from this point
forward. The Forescout platform is used to dynamically identify and evaluate network infrastructure,
devices and applications connected to the network, and provide enforcement of Network Access Policy
(NAC) and Enterprise Conformance Policies. Forescout’s agentless technology discovers, classifies and
assesses devices. The Forescout platform interrogates the network infrastructure to discover devices as they
connect to the network. After discovering a device, the Forescout platform uses a combination of passive
and active methods to classify the device according to its type and ownership. Based on its classification,
The Forescout platform then assesses the device security posture and allows organizations to set policies
that establish the specific behavior the device is allowed to have while connected to a network.
The Forescout Console application (aka Console) is a separately installed Windows executable which
provides an administrator with a graphical user interface to manage the TOE. The Console must be installed
on a separate Windows OS host platform. The Console communicates with the TOE via a secure TLS
channel shown as external interface 3 (E3 in yellow circle) in figure below.
The TOE also provides a Command Line Interface (CLI) for remote and local management of the device.
To access the CLI an administrator must either be locally connected (E1), via the keyboard/video or the
serial port connections, or use SSHv2 to establish a secure connection (E2).
The CLI provides lower level configuration of the device such as initial IP address configuration which
cannot be done via the Console, and some diagnostic capabilities. The CLI does not provide any OS-level
or shell type access to the embedded OS on the TOE.
The following figure depicts the TOE boundary and operational environment:
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Figure 1: TOE Boundary
The Forescout device communicates with an audit server (E7), Active Directory Server (E6), Certificate
Authority Server (E5), and the remote management workstation (Console) over a dedicated out-of-band
network management connection (E3). The connection to the enterprise network (E4) is a separate
connection to the enterprise network environment that the TOE is monitoring and managing. A detailed
description of each interface is in Table 5 below.
The Forescout platform can be configured as Centralized Enterprise Manager (CEM) or as an Appliance.
The CEM configuration provides all of the functionality of an Appliance and provides an additional
centralized hierarchical management functionality over Appliances. The additional functionality provided
by the CEM is considered outside the scope of the evaluation because hierarchical management functions
do not trace or map to any NDcPP requirements. The TOE, regardless of being configured as a CEM or
Appliance, claims conformance to all NDcPP requirements as a standalone entity. Therefore, the TOE was
tested as a standalone entity in both configurations to ensure that the claimed NDcPP functionality was
conformant regardless of the TOE being configured as a CEM or an Appliance.
1.5 TOE Type
The TOE type for this product is a standalone network device that is used to dynamically identify and
evaluate network infrastructure, devices and applications connected to the network, and provide
enforcement of Network Access Policy (NAC) and Enterprise Conformance Policies.
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2 TOE Description
This section provides a description of the TOE in its evaluated configuration. This includes the physical and
logical boundaries of the TOE.
2.1 Evaluated Components of the TOE
The following table describes the TOE components in the evaluated configuration:
Table 4: TOE Models
2.2 Components and Applications in the Operational Environment
These components and the functionality they provide are outside the scope of evaluation testing but are
needed to support the tested functionality of the TOE. The following table lists components and
applications are used in the operational environment for the TOE’s evaluated configuration.
Component Definition
Management Workstation
Any general-purpose computer that is used by an administrator to manage the TOE. For
the TOE to be managed remotely the management workstation is required to have:
• Non-dedicated machine:
o 2GB memory
o 1GB disk space
• OS running:
o Windows 7/8/8.1/10
o Windows Server 2008 / 2008 R2 / 2012 / 2012 R2 / 2016 / 2019
o Linux RHEL/CentOS 7 / 8
o macOS 10.12 / 10.13 / 10.14 / 10.15 / 11
o SSHv2 client installed to access the TOE’s CLI
• Forescout Console application (Console) installed
TCP communications from the Management Workstation to the TOE is secured using:
• SSH for remote access to the CLI (remote console)
• TLS for remote access from the Console
The TOE acts as a server for both protocols. This OE component is required to support
interfaces E1, E2, E3, & E8 as defined in Figure 1 above.
The TOE’s CLI can also be accessed locally with a physical connection to the TOE using
the keyboard/video or the serial port and must use a terminal emulator that is compatible
with serial communications (local console).
Active Directory Server
A system that is capable of receiving authentication requests over TLS and validating
these requests against identity and credential data that is defined in the directory
(Microsoft version of an LDAP Server). The TOE is the TLS client for this
communication. Required to support interface E6 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Audit Server
The TOE connects to an audit server to send the audit records for remote storage via TLS
connection where the TOE is the TLS client. This is used to send copies of audit data to
TOE Components Hardware Components
Software
Version
Forescout Appliances
CT-R, CT-100, CT-1000, CT-2000, CT-4000, CT-10000,
CEM-5, CEM-10, CEM-25, CEM-50, CEM-100, CEM-
150, CEM-200, 4130, 5110, 5120, 5140, and 5160
Forescout
v8.4.1
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Component Definition
be stored in a remote location for data redundancy purposes. This OE component is
required to support interface E7 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Certificate Authority (CA)
Server/Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP)
Responder
Certificate authority servers can manage certificate enrollment requests from customers
and are able to issue and revoke digital certificates. CA Servers are built to address the
identity management requirements. Sending a request to a CA server is usually performed
using Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) over HTTP or Enrollment over
Secure Transport (EST) RFC7030 using TLS.
An OCSP responder (a server typically run by the certificate issuer) may return a signed
response signifying that the certificate specified in the request is 'good', 'revoked', or
'unknown'. If the OCSP responder cannot process the request, it may return an error code.
Communications are based on HTTP protocol where the TOE is the client. This OE
component is required to support interface E5 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Network Infrastructure
The network infrastructure contains components such as routers, switches, DNS server,
etc. Figure 1 identifies these interfaces as a single interface. The interface to the managed
network infrastructure is a separate connection to the enterprise operational environment
the TOE is managing.
The TOEs management of the enterprise operational environment is out of scope for the
NDcPP. Therefore, interface E4 to these components is out of scope of the evaluation.
Update Server
A general-purpose computer controlled by the vendor that includes a web server and is
used to store software update packages that can be retrieved by product customers using
HTTPS/TLS enabled browser or Console. The host of the Forescout Console provides the
secure channel and not the TOE. Therefore, HTTPS is not declared in this ST. The
Forescout device does not automatically download or update itself nor does it connect to
the update server directly. The TOE receives the update from the Forescout Console.
Interface E8 is out of scope of the evaluation. It is being declared as part of the test
environment for completeness as it is used to support trusted updates testing.
Table 5: Supporting Components in the Operational Environment
2.3 Excluded from the TOE
The following TOE functionality, components, and/or applications are not included in the evaluated
configuration. They provide no added security related functionality for the evaluated product. They are
separated into three categories: not installed, installed but requires a separate license, and installed but not
part of the TSF.
Not Installed
There are no components, applications, and/or functionality that are not installed.
Installed but Requires a Separate License
There are no excluded components, applications, and or functionality that are installed and require a
separate license for activation.
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Installed But Not Part of the TSF
This section contains functionality that is part of the purchased product but is not part of the TSF relevant
functionality that is being evaluated as the TOE based on the Protection Profile.
• Web Portals – The different Web Portals provide functionality that allows TOE users, through a
local browser or the Console, to view descriptive information such as trend information,
vulnerabilities, and network inventory. The Web Portals contain no remote or local security
management functionality. They can only provide read-only descriptive information in a dashboard
display or that can be incorporated into customized report using the Console. Since the Web Portal
interfaces do not have any administrative functionality or any functionality that can be mapped to
the NDcPP, they are considered beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
• Hierarchical Functionality/Trusted Appliance Interface – This interface is for a Forescout
platform configured as an Enterprise Manager to communicate with another instantiation of the TOE
configured as a Forescout Appliance (not an Enterprise Manager) for creating a hierarchical
monitoring of a distributed Enterprise network. TLS communications for this interface uses a
preconfigured vendor certificate. This interface is not used for remote or local administration.
Functionality and Data flow between the two devices does not map to any NDcPP SFRs and is
considered beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
• Host Scanning – This functionality allows the TOE to collect vulnerability data and the data used
to enforce network access control policies from the network. This functionality is beyond the scope
of the claimed Protection Profile.
• Network Monitor – This functionality allows the TOE to monitor and track network traffic. This
functionality is beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
• Network Response – This functionality allows the TOE to send responses back into the protected
network. This functionality is beyond the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
• HTTP Redirection – This functionality allows the TOE to send HTTP (or HTTPS) formatted
communications (Web or Intranet) to users on network endpoints. This functionality is beyond the
scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
• SNMP – The TOE can be configured to use SNMP to communicate with network switches and
routers and to receive SNMP traps from network switches and routers. This functionality is beyond
the scope of the claimed Protection Profile.
• SMTP – The TOE can be configured to use SNMP to send e-mail messages to the administrators or
other personnel regarding information of interest. This functionality is beyond the scope of the
claimed Protection Profile.
• RADIUS – The TOE can be configured to support the use of RADIUS authentication services. This
functionality is not being claimed and is beyond the scope of the evaluation.
• Forescout Cloud services/plugins/functions –The TOE has the ability to support integrating with
Forescout Cloud services through the use of plugins and tools. These functions are not claimed as
part of this evaluation and cloud services are not covered by this protection profile.
• Additionally, the TOE includes a number of capabilities in support of its primary function that are
outside the scope of the claimed Protection Profile. These functions are not part of the TSF because
there are no SFRs that apply to them.
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2.4 Physical Boundary
The following table outlines the models and their key differentiators that are part of the evaluation.
System Name Equipment
Forescout:
Appliance (CT-)
&
Enterprise Manager
(CEM-)
Software/Firmware Hardware Model Component/Configuration
Forescout v8.4.1
operating on CentOS
7.5
CT-Remote
1U Desktop
2 USB 2.0
1 CPU Intel Celeron J1900 (Bay Trail)
4x Intel-based 10/100/1000 NIC Ports
Table 6: CT-R Model Rev22
System Name Equipment
Forescout:
Appliance (CT-)
&
Enterprise Manager
(CEM-)
Software/Firmware Hardware Model Component/Configuration
Forescout v8.4.1
operating on CentOS
7.5
CT-100
1U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0 (front)
1 CPU Intel Xeon E5 2609 v3 (Haswell)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-1000; CEM-05,
and CEM-10
1U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0 (front)
1 CPU Intel Xeon E5 2620 v3 (Haswell)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-2000; CEM-25,
and CEM-50
2U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0 (front)
1 CPU Intel Xeon E5 2640 v3 (Haswell)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-4000; and
CEM-100
2U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0 (front)
2 CPU Intel Xeon E5 2640 v3 (Haswell)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-10000; and
CEM-150, CEM-
200
2U Rack-mount
3x RAID1 with hot spare
2x USB 2.0 (back), 2x USB 1.0 (front)
2 CPU Intel Xeon E5 2650 v3 (Haswell)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
Table 7: CT/CEM Models Rev40
System Name Equipment
Forescout:
Appliance (CT-)
&
Enterprise Manager
(CEM-)
Software/Firmware Hardware Model Component/Configuration
Forescout v8.4.1
operating on CentOS
7.5
CT-100
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
1x Xeon Silver 4110 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-1000; CEM-05,
and CEM-10
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
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System Name Equipment
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
1x Xeon Silver 4110 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-2000; CEM-25,
and CEM-50
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
2 x Xeon Silver 4114 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-4000; and
CEM-100
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
2 x Xeon Silver 4114 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
CT-10000; and
CEM-150, CEM-
200
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
2 x Xeon Gold 5118 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
Table 8: CT/CEM Models Rev50
System Name Equipment
Forescout:
Appliance (CT-)
&
Enterprise Manager
(CEM-)
Software/Firmware Hardware Model Component/Configuration
Forescout v8.4.1
operating on CentOS
7.5
4130
1U Rack-mount
1 HDD
4 x USB 3.1 Gen2
2 x USB 3.1 Gen1
Gen 8 Intel® Core™ i5-8500T (Coffee
Lake)
6 x Intel-based NIC Ethernet Ports
5110
1U Desktop
1 HDD
2 USB 2.0
1 CPU Intel Celeron J1900 (Bay Trail)
4x 10/100/1000 NIC Ports
5120
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
1 x Xeon Silver 4110 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
5140
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
2 x Xeon Silver 4114 (Skylake)
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4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
5160
1U Rack-mount
3 HDD (RAID1+HS)
1 USB 2.0 and 1 micro-USB 2.0 (front),
2 USB 3.0 (Rear)
2 x Xeon Gold 6132 (Skylake)
4 (up to 8)x Intel-based NIC Ethernet
Ports
Table 9: 4130 and 51xx Models
2.5 Logical Boundary
The TOE is comprised of the following security features that have been scoped by the protection profile:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path/Channels
Security Audit
The TOE contains mechanisms to generate audit data to record predefined events on the TOE. The audit
logs are stored in an internal database on the TOE’s local hard drive. An authorized administrator has the
ability to enable/disable the forwarding of events to an audit server. In the evaluated configuration, the audit
data is also securely transmitted to the audit server using a TLS v1.2 communication channel.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of SSH and TLS (v1.2) trusted communications. Two different
cryptography software packages are included with the TOE: Bouncy Castle and OpenSSL. Bouncy Castle is
used specifically for communications with the management workstation running the Console. OpenSSL is
used for all other TLS and SSH communications. The TOE immediately destroys keys when no longer
used. The following table identifies the cryptographic services per cryptographic library.
SFR
OpenSSL Implementation
CAVP #C1887 and #A1941
Bouncy Castle Implementation
CAVP #C1888 and #A1959
FCS_CKM.1
RSA per FIPS 186-4 Key Generation N/A
FFC using Diffie-Hellman group 14, per
RFC 3526 Section 3
N/A
FCS_CKM.2
RSA Key Establishment per RSAES-
PKCS-v1_5
RSA Key Establishment per RSAES-
PKCS-v1_5
Diffie-Hellman group 14 Key
Establishment RFC 3526 Section 3
N/A
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryp
tion
AES CTR: 128 and 256 bits
AES CBC: 128 and 256 bits
AES GCM: 128 and 256 bits
AES CBC: 128 and 256 bits
AES GCM: 256 bits
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Table 10: Cryptographic Services
Identification and Authentication
The TSF provides a configurable number of maximum consecutive authentication failures that are permitted
by a user. Once this number has been met, the account is locked for a configurable time interval or until a
Security Administrator manually unlocks the account.
The TOE provides local password authentication for CLI and Console users as well as providing the ability
to securely connect to an Active Directory server for the authentication of Console users. Communications
over this interface is secured using TLS in which the TOE is acting as a client. The TOE enforces the use of
X.509 certificates to support authentication for TLS connections. The only function available to an
unauthenticated user is the ability to acknowledge a warning banner. Passwords that are maintained by the
TSF can be composed of upper case, lower case, numbers and special characters. A Security Administrator
can define the minimum password length between 15 and 30 characters.
Security Management
The TOE can be administered locally and remotely and uses role-based access control to prevent
unauthorized management and access to TSF data. The TOE maintains the role of Security Administrator
which is fulfilled by users with the “cliadmin” role for the CLI interfaces and by users with the
“administrator” role (default account “admin”) for the Console interface.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE is expected to ensure the security and integrity of all data that is stored locally and accessed
remotely. Passwords are not stored in plaintext. The TOE does not support automatic updates. An
administrator has the ability to query the TOE for the currently executing version the TOE software and is
required to manually initiate the update process from the Console. The TOE automatically verifies the
digital signature of the software update prior to installation. If the digital signature is found to be invalid for
any reason the update is not installed. If the signature is deemed invalid, the administrator will be provided
a warning banner. There is no means for an administrative override to continue the installation if the
signature is completely missing. The TOE implements a self-testing mechanism that is automatically
executed during the initial start-up and can be manually initiated by an administrator after authentication, to
verify the correct operation of product and cryptographic modules. The TOE provides its own time via its
internal clock.
TOE Access
The TOE displays a configurable warning banner prior to its use. Inactive sessions will be terminated after
an administrator-configurable time period. Users are allowed to terminate their own interactive session.
Once a remote session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate to establish a new
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
RSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Services
2048 bits
RSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Services 2048
bits
FCS_COP.1/Hash
SHS: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512
SHS: SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512
HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and
HMAC-384
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR DRBG Hash DRBG
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session. Local and remote sessions are terminated after the administrator configured inactivity time limit is
reached.
Trusted Path/Channels
Users can access a CLI for administration functions remotely via SSH (remote console) or a local physical
connection (local console) to the TOE. The TOE provides the SSH server functionality. The Console is the
main administrator interface, which is running on a separate Windows PC and requires the use of TLS to
communicate with the TOE.
The TOE acts as a TLS client to initiate the following secure paths to
• User authentication (Active Directory)
• Auditing (audit server)
The TOE acts as a TLS server and receives requests to establish the following secure paths from:
• Forescout Console
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3 Conformance Claims
3.1 CC Version
This ST is compliant with Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5 April 2017.
3.2 CC Part 2 Conformance Claims
This ST and Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Part 2 extended to include all applicable NIAP and International
interpretations through February 27, 2023.
3.3 CC Part 3 Conformance Claims
This ST and Target of Evaluation (TOE) are conformant to Part 3 to include all applicable NIAP and
International interpretations through February 27, 2023.
3.4 PP Claims
This ST claims exact conformance to the following Protection Profiles:
• Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version 2.2e (NDcPP), March 23, 2020
3.5 Package Claims
The TOE claims exact compliance to the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices Version
2.2e, which is conformant with CC Part 3.
The TOE claims following Selection-Based SFRs that are defined in the appendices of the claimed PP:
• FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
• FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
• FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
• FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev
• FIA_X509_EXT.2
• FIA_X509_EXT.3
The TOE does not claim any Optional SFRs that are defined in the appendices of the claimed PP.
This does not violate the notion of exact conformance because the PP specifically indicates these as
allowable options and provides both the ST author and evaluation laboratory with instructions on how these
claims are to be documented and evaluated.
3.6 Package Name Conformant or Package Name Augmented
This ST and TOE are in exact conformance with the NDcPP version 2.2e.
3.7 Technical Decisions
Technical Decisions that effected the SFR wording have been annotated with a Footnote.
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The following list of the NDcPP2e Technical Decisions apply to the TOE because SFR wording,
application notes, or assurance activities were modified for SFRs claimed by the TOE:
TD # Title References
Changes Analysis to this evaluation
SFR AA Notes NA Reason
TD0527
Updates to Certificate
Revocation Testing
(FIA_X509_EXT.1)
FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV,
FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT
X
AA: Testing Update.
No ST updates
required.
TD0528
NIT Technical Decision for
Missing EAs for
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4 X X
AA: Testing Update.
N/A: SFR not
claimed.
TD0536
NIT Technical Decision for
Update Verification
Inconsistency
AGD_OPE.1 X
AA: Guidance
Update.
No ST updates
required.
TD0537
NIT Technical Decision for
Incorrect reference to
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 X
SFR claimed but note
change has no impact
on ST.
TD0538
NIT Technical Decision for
Outdated link to allowed-with list
Section 2 X
PP claimed but note
change has no impact
on ST.
TD0546
NIT Technical Decision for
DTLS - clarification of
Application Note 63
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1 X X N/A: SFR not claimed
TD0547
NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification on developer
disclosure of AVA_VAN
AVA_VAN X
Clarification of
AVA_VAN
No ST updates
required.
TD0555
NIT Technical Decision for RFC
Reference incorrect in TLSS Test
NDSDv2.2,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4,
Test 3
X
AA: Test clarification
no wording change
No ST updates
required.
TD0556
NIT Technical Decision for RFC
5077 question
NDSDv2.2,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4,
Test 3
X X
N/A: Test for
renegotiation does not
apply.
TD0563
NiT Technical Decision for
Clarification of audit date
information
NDcPPv2.2e,
FAU_GEN.1.2
X
Clarified date time
stamp requirements
No ST updates
required.
AGD Section 8 shows
compliance.
TD0564
NiT Technical Decision for
Vulnerability Analysis Search
Criteria
NDSDv2.2, AVA_VAN.1 X
Clarified AVA public
search requirements.
TD0569
NIT Technical Decision for
Session ID Usage Conflict in
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7
ND SD v2.2,
FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7,
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4
X X
AA: TSS, AGD, ATE
Neither session tickets
nor resumption is
claimed.
TD0570
NiT Technical Decision for
Clarification about FIA_AFL.1
FIA_AFL.1 X
Makes FIA_AFL.1
mandatory.
FIA_AFL.1 was
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already claimed. Not
marked with footnote
as no SFR wording
changes were
mandated.
TD0571
NiT Technical Decision for
Guidance on how to handle
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
X
Makes
FIA_PMG_EXT.1,
FIA_AFL.1, and
FMT_SMF.1
mandatory. All were
previously claimed.
Not marked with
footnote as no SFR
wording changes were
mandated.
TD0572
NiT Technical Decision for
Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP
address identifiers
FTP_ITC.1 X
Clarification; no
changes to AA or ST
required.
TD0580
NIT Technical Decision for
clarification about use of DH14
in NDcPPv2.2e
FCS_CKM.1.1,
FCS_CKM.2.1
X X X
AA:TSS, Test
Footnote 2
TD0581
NIT Technical Decision for
Elliptic curve-based key
establishment and NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
FCS_CKM.2 X X
SFR word changes to
update Revision
number to 3.
N/A: Not claiming
Elliptic Curves.
TD0591
NIT Technical Decision for
Virtual TOEs and hypervisors
A.LIMITED_FUNCTION
ALITY, ACRONYMS
Assumption wording
change. Footnote 1.
TD0592
NIT Technical Decision for
Local Storage of Audit Records
FAU_STG
Clarification of PP
text.
TD0631
NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification of public key
authentication for SSH Server
ND SDv2.2,
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1,
FMT_SMF.1
X X X
AA:TSS, Testing
Update.
Footnote 3 and 4
TD0632
NIT Technical Decision for
Consistency with Time Data for
vNDs
ND SD2.2,
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2
X X
N/A: TOE is not a
vND
TD0633
NIT Technical Decision for IPsec
IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance
ND SD2.2,
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7,
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8
X X
N/A: Not claiming
IPSEC
TD0634
NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification required for testing
IPv6
FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.2,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2, ND
SD v2.2
X AA: Testing Update.
TD0635
NIT Technical Decision for TLS
Server and Key Agreement
Parameters
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3,
NDSD v2.2
X X
N/A: Not claiming
DHE or ECDHE
algorithms.
TD0636
NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification of Public Key User
Authentication for SSH
ND SD2.2,
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
X X X X
N/A: Not claiming
SSH Client
functionality
TD0638
NIT Technical Decision for Key
Pair Generation for
Authentication
NDSDv2.2, FCS_CKM.1 X
Explanation of
expectation. TOE
fulfills this
expectation. Claiming
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Table 11: Technical Decisions
3.8 Conformance Claim Rationale
Section 1.2 of the NDcPP states: The NDcPP defines a network device as “a device that is connected to a
network and has an infrastructure role within that network. The TOE may be standalone or distributed,
where a distributed TOE is one that requires multiple distinct components to operate as a logical whole in
order to fulfil the requirements of this cPP…” Additionally, the NDcPP says that example devices that fit
this definition include “physical and virtualised routers, firewalls, VPN gateways, IDSs, and switches.”
The TOE is a standalone network device, composed of hardware and software, that is connected to the
network and enables network access control, threat protection, and compliance of the entire enterprise based
on network security policies. Therefore, the TOE provides an infrastructure role in internetworking of
different network environments across an enterprise.
The Forescout appliance is a device that is used to dynamically identify and evaluate network infrastructure,
devices and applications connected to the network, and to provide enforcement of Network Access Policy
(NAC) and Enterprise Conformance Policies. Therefore, this conformance claim is appropriate. The TOE
type is justified because the TOE.
RSA keygen with
RSA for TLS (server)
key establishment
TD0639
NIT Technical Decision for
Clarification for NTP MAC Keys
FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2,
FAU_GEN.1,
FCS_CKM.4,
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
X X
N/A: Not claiming
NTP functionality
TD0670
NIT Technical Decision for
Mutual and Non-Mutual Auth
TLSC Testing
ND SD2.2,
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
X X X
N/A: Not claiming
mutual authentication
functionality
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4 Security Problem Definition
4.1 Threats
This section identifies the threats against the TOE. These threats have been taken from the NDcPP.
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to
the Network Device by nefarious means such as
masquerading as an Administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying
an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected
portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which
would provide access to the administrative session, or
sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining
Administrator access allows malicious actions that
compromise the security functionality of the device and
the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms
or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or
brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS
Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms
or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space.
Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key
sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or
brute force exhaust the key space and give them
unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate
and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that
use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints, e.g. a
shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly
designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the
Administrator or another device, and the attacker could
insert themselves into the network stream and perform a
man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network
traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of
confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network
Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which undermines the
security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak
cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to
surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the Network Device
without Administrator awareness. This could result in the
attacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in
the product) to compromise the device and the
Administrator would have no knowledge that the device
has been compromised.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data
enabling continued access to the Network Device and its
critical data. The compromise of credentials includes
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s
credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining
the Administrator or device credentials for use by the
attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING
Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the
device. Having privileged access to the device provides
the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and
may allow them to take advantage of any trust
relationships with other Network Devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed
or compromised security functionality and might therefore
subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior
authentication to access, change or modify device data,
critical network traffic or security functionality of the
device.
Table 12: TOE Threats
4.2 Organizational Security Policies
This section identifies the organizational security policies which are expected to be implemented by an
organization that deploys the TOE. These policies have been taken from the NDcPP.
Policy Policy Definition
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal
agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing
the TOE.
Table 13: TOE Organization Security Policies
4.3 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in this section are assumed to exist in the TOE’s Operational Environment.
These assumptions have been taken from the NDcPP.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security or interfere with the device’s physical
interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to
be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result,
the cPP does not include any requirements on physical tamper
protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP does not
expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that
allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or
otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to
the physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY1
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core
function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as
general purpose computing. For example, the device should not
provide a computing platform for general purpose applications
(unrelated to networking functionality).
1
TD0591
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Assumption Assumption Definition
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as
specified in Section 1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with
only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform.
The exception being where components of a distributed TOE run inside
more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND,
no non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance
regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the
Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the
device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that
is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity,
is not covered by the ND cPP. It is assumed that this protection will be
covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network
Devices (e.g., firewall).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to
be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization.
This includes appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to
guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure
passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack
malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious
Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security
of the device. For TOEs supporting .509v3 certificate-based
authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully
validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA
certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust
store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust
anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated
by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of
product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
Network Device are protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access
possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys,
keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when
the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational
environment.
Table 14: TOE Assumptions
4.4 Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment. The security
objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and its environment in meeting the security needs.
TOE Security Objectives
The NDcPP does not define any security objectives for the TOE.
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The TOE’s operational environment must satisfy the following objectives:
Objective Objective Definition
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is provided by the environment.
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Objective Objective Definition
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers
or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services
necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.
Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of the its own
VM, and does not include other VMs or the VS.
OE.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It
is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other
security and assurance measures in the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance
documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS
Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement
ND functionality.
For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the
Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation
status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any
certificate from the TOE’s trust store in case such certificate can no
longer be trusted.
OE.UPDATES
The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a
regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to
known vulnerabilities.
OE.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the TOE
must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic
keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking
equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment. For vNDs, this applies when the physical
platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational
environment.
Table 15: TOE Operational Environment Objectives
4.5 Security Problem Definition Rationale
The assumptions, threats, OSPs, and objectives that are defined in this ST represent the assumptions,
threats, OSPs, and objectives that are specified in the Protection Profile to which the TOE claims
conformance. The associated mappings of assumptions to environmental objectives, SFRs to TOE
objectives, and OSPs and objectives to threats are therefore identical to the mappings that are specified in
the claimed Protection Profile.
5 Extended Components Definition
5.1 Extended Security Functional Requirements
The extended Security Functional Requirements that are claimed in this ST are taken directly from the PP to
which the ST and TOE claim conformance. These extended components are formally defined in the PP in
which their usage is required.
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5.2 Extended Security Assurance Requirements
There are no extended Security Assurance Requirements in this ST.
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6 Security Functional Requirements
6.1 Conventions
The CC permits four functional component operations—assignment, refinement, selection, and iteration—
to be performed on functional requirements. This ST will highlight the operations in the following manner:
• Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Indicated with italicized text.
• Refinement: allows the addition of details. Indicated with bold text.
• Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Indicated with underlined
text.
• Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. Indicated with a
sequential number in parentheses following the element number of the iterated SFR and/or
separated by a “/” with a notation that references the function for which the iteration is used, e.g.
“/LocSpace” for an SFR that relates to local storage space
When multiple operations are combined, such as an assignment that is provided as an option within a
selection or refinement, a combination of the text formatting is used.
If SFR text is reproduced verbatim from text that was formatted in a claimed PP (such as if the PP’s
instantiation of the SFR has a refinement or a completed assignment), the formatting is not preserved. This
is so that the reader can identify the operations that are performed by the ST author as opposed to the PP
author.
6.2 Security Functional Requirements Summary
The following table lists the SFRs claimed by the TOE:
Class Name Component Identification Component Name
Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and
Verification)
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
Identification and
Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X509 Certificate Requests
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Class Name Component Identification Component Name
Security
Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
Protection of the
TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner
Trusted Path
/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path
Table 16: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
6.3 Security Functional Requirements
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions comprising:
• Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user
accounts are required for administrators).
• Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a
change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
• Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action
itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
• Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
• [no other actions]
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 17.
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of
the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components
included in the cPP/ST, information specified in column three of Table 17.
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Requirement Auditable Event(s)
Additional Audit Record
Contents
FAU_GEN.1 None. None.
FAU_GEN.2 None. None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.1 None. None.
FCS_CKM.2 None. None.
FCS_CKM.4 None. None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption None. None.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen None. None.
FCS_COP.1/Hash None. None.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash None. None.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. None.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH session. Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session Reason for failure
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 Failure to establish a TLS session Reason for failure
FIA_AFL.1
Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or
exceeded
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None. None.
FIA_UAU.7 None. None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
All use of the identification and
authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate Reason for failure
FIA_X509_EXT.2 None. None.
FIA_X509_EXT.3 None. None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Any attempt to initiate a manual update None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData None. None.
FMT_SMF.1 All management activities of TSF data. None.
FMT_SMR.2 None. None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1
Discontinuous changes to time - either
Administrator actuated or changed via an
automated process. (Note that no continuous
changes to time need to be logged. See also
application note on FPT_STM_EXT.1)
For discontinuous changes to
time: The old and new values for
the time. Origin of the attempt to
change time for success and
failure (e.g., IP address).
FPT_TST_EXT.1 None. None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
Initiation of update; result of the update
attempt (success or failure)
None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if “terminate the
session” is selected)
The termination of a local session by the
session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.3
The termination of a remote session by the
session locking mechanism.
None.
FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session. None.
FTA_TAB.1 None. None.
FTP_ITC.1
• Initiation of the trusted channel.
• Termination of the trusted channel.
• Failure of the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the initiator and
target of failed trusted channels
establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin
• Initiation of the trusted path.
• Termination of the trusted path.
• Failures of the trusted path functions.
Identification of the claimed user
identity.
Table 17: Auditable Events
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FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted
channel according to FTP_ITC.1.
FAU_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [
• The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally]
FAU_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall [[invoke a DB purge that will delete oldest entries based on first-in-first-out (FIFO) rules
and generate a audit record for the purge event]] when the local storage space for audit data is full.
Class FCS: Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm: [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
• FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special Publication
800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC 3526]
].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key establishment method: [
• RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”
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• FFC Schemes using “safe-prime” groups that meet the following: ‘NIST Special Publication
800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups listed in RFC 3526]2
].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction
method
• For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [single overwrite
consisting of [zeroes]];
• For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of
an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [
o logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single]-pass
overwrite consisting of [zeroes]]
that meets the following: No Standard.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1/DataEncryption
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
AES used in [CTR, CBC, GCM] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] that meet the
following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO
10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772].
FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)
FCS_COP.1.1/SigGen
The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits]
]
that meet the following: [
• For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS
#1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital
signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3].
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)
2
TD0580
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FCS_COP.1.1/Hash
The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits
that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash
The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, implicit] and
cryptographic key sizes [160 bits, 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384,
512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC
18031:2011 using [Hash_DRBG (any), CTR_DRBG (AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from
[[4] software-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest
security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash
Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol in accordance with: RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254,
[4256, 4344, 6668].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.23
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication
methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [32,768] bytes in an SSH
transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
3
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The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms
and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-
gcm@openssh.com].
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ssh-rsa] as its
public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-
sha2-512, implicit] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1] and [no other methods] are the only allowed
key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.8
The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no
longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data.
After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The
TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites: [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288]
and no other ciphersuites.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches [the reference identifier per RFC 6125
section 6 and no other attribute types].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
When establishing a trusted channel, by default the TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the
server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also [
• Not implement any administrator override mechanism].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall [not present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension] in the Client
Hello.
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FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement [TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246)] and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS
implementation will support the following ciphersuites: [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288]
and no other ciphersuites.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and [TLS 1.1].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using [RSA with key size [2048 bits]] and no other
curves].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall support [no session resumption or session tickets].
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1-10] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a
password.
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [prevent
the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any authentication
method that involves a password until [a manual unlock of the account] is taken by an Administrator;
prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any
authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed].
FIA_PMG_EXT.1 Password Management
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:
a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters,
numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, “)”];
b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between [15] and [30] characters.
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FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in
progress at the local console.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a local [password-based, SSH public key-based, [Active Directory]
authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the
identification and authentication process:
• Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
• [no other actions].
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1/Rev
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation supporting a minimum path length
of three certificates.
• The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
• The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification
path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
• The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960].
• The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have
the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp
1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
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o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2/Rev
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and
the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for [TLS],
and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [not
accept the certificate].
FIA_X509_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the
following information in the request: public key and [Common Name].
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate
Response.
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security
Administrators.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CoreData
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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FMT_SMF.1.14
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
• Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
• Ability to configure the access banner;
• Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
• Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using [digital signature] capability prior to
installing those updates;
• Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA_AFL.1;
• [
o Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
o Ability to modify the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity
o Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
o Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
o Ability to manage the trusted public keys database;
o Ability to manage the TOE's trust store and designate X509.v3 certificates as trust anchors;
].
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FMT_SMR.2.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles:
• Security Administrator.
FMT_SMR.2.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.2.3
The TSF shall ensure that the conditions:
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
• The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
are satisfied.
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
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FPT_SKP_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.
FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_STM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
FPT_STM_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time].
FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on), at the request
of the authorised user] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [Specifically defined in Table
18].
# Validation Component
1. HMAC + Built-in Crypto Self-test Kernel
2. Built-in RPM Verification Core OS and packages (including OpenSSH)
3. HMAC verified against fipshmac Fipscheck utility
4. Fipscheck (including OpenSSL self-check) Crypto: OpenSSL
5. Built-in RPM Verification OpenSSL rpm package
6. Built-in crypto package self-test (KAT) Crypto: Bouncy Castle
7.
SHA-256 verified against last known or stored
hash.
Core Platform and plugin installation packages and
extracted files.
8.
Running kernel version compared to version
defined in grub;
System current state vs system configuration
Table 18: Self-Test List
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of
the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a [digital
signature] prior to installing those updates.
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Class FTA: TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [
• terminate the session]
after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time
interval of session inactivity.
FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own interactive session.
FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banner
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-
specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.
Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of using [TLS] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and
authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [authentication server] that is
logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel
data.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
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The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [export audit, authentication
decision].
FTP_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path
FTP_TRP.1.1/Admin
The TSF shall be capable of using [SSH, TLS] to provide a communication path between itself and
authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and
provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from
disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_TRP.1.2/Admin
The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Admin
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote
administration actions.
6.4 Statement of Security Functional Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the ST represent all required SFRs specified in the PPs
against which exact conformance is claimed and a subset of the optional SFRs. All hierarchical
relationships, dependencies, and unfulfilled dependency rationales in the ST are considered to be identical
to those that are defined in the claimed PP.
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7 Security Assurance Requirements
This section identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) that are claimed for the TOE. The
SARs which are claimed are in exact conformance with the NDcPP.
Security Target (ASE) ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
7.1 Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Developer action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1D
The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_INT.1.1C
The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE overview and a TOE
description.
ASE_INT.1.2C
The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C
The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.
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ASE_INT.1.4C
The TOE overview shall summarise the usage and major security features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C
The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C
The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C
The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C
The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and the TOE description are
consistent with each other.
Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Developer action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1D
The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D
The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1C
The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to
which the ST and the TOE claim conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C
The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2
conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
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ASE_CCL.1.3C
The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3
conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C
The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C
The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to which the ST claims
conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C
The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as either package-
conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent with the TOE type
in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security problem definition
is consistent with the statement of the security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is
being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security objectives is
consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C
The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security requirements is
consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being
claimed.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
Security problem definition (ASE_SPD)
Developer action elements:
ASE_SPD.1.1D
The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
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Content and presentation elements:
ASE_SPD.1.1C
The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C
All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C
The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C
The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the operational environment of
the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_SPD.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
Developer action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1D
The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1C
The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the operational
environment.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_OBJ.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
Developer action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1D
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The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D
The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1C
The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C
The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security
requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C
The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the
existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C
The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components, families, classes, and
methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C
The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective elements such that conformance or
nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed using existing
components.
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
Developer action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1D
The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D
The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
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Content and presentation elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1C
The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C
All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and other terms that are used in the
SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C
The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C
All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C
Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or the security requirements
rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C
The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_REQ.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C
The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR. In the case of entropy
analysis, the TSS is used in conjunction with required supplementary information on Entropy.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E
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The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E
The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview
and the TOE description.
7.2 Class ADV: Development
Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1D
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_FSP.1.1C
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and SFR-
supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorization of interfaces as SFR-
non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_ FSP.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_ FSP.1.2E
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete instantiation
of the SFRs.
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7.3 Class AGD: Guidance Documentation
Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and interfaces,
in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as
appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-relevant
event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including changing the
security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining
secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be followed in
order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E
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The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_ PRE.1.1C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered
TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_ PRE.1.2C
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and
for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for
the operational environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_ PRE.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_ PRE.1.2E
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely
for operation.
7.4 Class ALC: Life Cycle Support
Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1C
The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference.
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Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1D
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1C
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence required
by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
7.5 Class ATE: Tests
Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.1.1E
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The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
7.6 Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)
Developer action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1C
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.1.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities in the
TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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8 TOE Summary Specification
The following sections identify the security functions of the TOE and describe how the TSF meets each
claimed SFR. They include Security Audit, Cryptographic Support, Identification and Authentication,
Security Management, Protection of the TSF, TOE Access and Trusted Path/Channels.
8.1 Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU GEN.2
The TOE has the mechanisms to automatically generate audit records based on the behavior that occurs
within the TSF. The TOE generates audit records for all administrative functions including Login/Logout,
security related changes, resetting of passwords, and certificate management. Additionally, Table 17
identifies the audit records that are inclusive to the PP evaluation scoping. The TOE records the date and
time, type of event, subject identity (identity of the user associated with each audited event that occurred
due to a user action), and the outcome in the audit record. The TOE associates each auditable event with the
identity of the user that caused the event. For a full list of the audit events samples that are generated by the
TOE, please refer to the Supplemental Administrative Guidance Document (AGD).
The TOE application layer maintains two separate log files in an internal database to record all the records
needed to satisfy this requirement as scoped by the PP. The host OS also maintains an audit log (OS log)
that is stored locally on the hard drive. All OS log records are incorporated into the appropriate application
layer logs based on the type of event. The two application layer logs are as follows:
• User Audit Trail
The User Audit Trail records information concerning TOE user activity for both CLI (OS log) and
Console interface, for example: administrative changes to the security configuration of the TOE or
updated/resetting of user passwords. The logs give additional information about the activity, such as
the date of the activity and the IP address from which it was carried out.
• System Event Log
The System Event Log records information about system activity, for example: successful and
failed administrator authentication attempts, startup and shutdown of TOE or services,
cryptographic key generation and destruction, and OS events. The startup and shutdown of the
TOE’s audit functionality is synonymous with the startup and shutdown of the TOE.
The following is an example audit record for the Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of
cryptographic keys (Timestamp, User: Admin, Event: Change Configuration with details:
Fingerprint of certificate, Issued to, Issued by, Purpose/Use of certificate).
Generating/import of, changing, or
deleting of cryptographic keys
Feb 7 09:08:07 FS3 FS3[17471]: User admin changed Configuration.
Details: Change trusted certificates configuration definition to Added
Fingerprint 'c4650e925d4334c895f3bd163884886a9d9d0116', Issued To
'intermediate02.cctl.com', Issued By 'Intermediate01.cctl.com', enabled,
Trusted By 'All' on 'All'
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FAU_STG_EXT.1
The TSF provides the ability for an administrator to enable/disable the near real-time forwarding of the
audit trail to an external audit server in the operational environment. The forwarding of the audit trail to an
audit server is mandated for compliance to the NDcPP. Once enabled, the generated audit is first saved
locally in the internal database and then the TOE will securely transmit audit data to the Operational
Environment audit server without administrator intervention via a TLS channel. During a connection outage
to the audit server, the TOE continues to save audit locally. Once the connection to the audit server is re-
established, the TOE automatically starts forwarding new audit records. The TOE does not forward the
records created during the outage. This is a standalone TOE that is responsible for storing and sending its
own generated audit records.
Application layer audit events are stored in the TOE database (DB). The TOE runs an automatic DB purge
function to prevent audit logs from filling up the internal database and hard drive to capacity. The DB, as
part of the installation, determines a maximum size based on hard drive availability. This predefined and
configurable threshold is used to trigger the DB purge function. The DB purge function is initiated when 75
percent of this predefined and configurable threshold is exceeded. When the DB threshold is exceeded, the
DB purge function deletes entries in a FIFO (oldest events deleted first) fashion. The DB purge function
causes an audit event to be sent by the TOE.
The TOE also takes into consideration the storage needed for the OS log files when preventing the hard
drive being filled to capacity. The TOE enforces a maximum size of 50MB for the OS log file and 5 OS log
files (5 = 1 current plus 4 historical) saved at the OS level.
When the OS log file reaches the maximum size, the log file is closed and renamed sequentially (i.e.
audit.log.1, audit.log.2). Therefore, with 5 audit logs and a maximum file size of 50MB each, this would
result in 5*50MB= 250MB of total audit space required for the OS logs. Once the number of log files
reaches its configured maximum amount, the oldest log file is automatically deleted, and the remaining log
files roll over in order to allow the new file to be created for the new audit records.
The TOE provides a means to review all of the audit records via the Console interface. The TOE does not
provide a means for any user to manually delete or manipulate the audit logs stored at the OS level or those
in the internal DB. The management interfaces (Console or CLI) do not allow the audit records to be
modified or deleted. The audit functionality starts automatically with the TOE and cannot be disabled by
any means.
8.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE implements two different cryptographic libraries: OpenSSL and Bouncy Castle. Both libraries
include algorithms that are certified under the following consolidated CAVP certificates:
a) OpenSSL FIPS library under CAVP Certificate # C1887 and A1941
b) BC-FJA (Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API) Software Version 1.0.2 under CAVP Certificate # C1888
and A1959
The following tables contain the CAVP algorithm certificates for the two cryptographic libraries
implemented in the TOE:
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SFR Algorithm/Protocol
OpenSSL
CAVP Cert #
FCS_CKM.1
RSA per FIPS 186-4 Key Generation C1887 and A1941
FFC using Diffie-Hellman group 14, per RFC 3526 Section 3 N/A
FCS_CKM.2
RSA Key Establishment per RSAES-PKCS-v1_5
Vendor
Affirmation
Diffie-Hellman group 14 Key Establishment RFC 3526 Section 3 N/A
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
AES CTR 128 and 256 bits
AES CBC 128 and 256 bits
AES GCM 128 and 256 bits
C1887 and A1941
FCS_COP.1/SigGen RSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Services 2048 bits C1887 and A1941
FCS_COP.1/Hash SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 C1887 and A1941
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-384, HMAC-SHA-512 C1887 and A1941
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR DRBG C1887 and A1941
Table 19: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for OpenSSL
Table 20: Cryptographic Algorithm Table for Bouncy Castle
FCS_CKM.1
OpenSSL provides the key generation services for RSA certificate creation. Bouncy Castle is not used for
certificate creation.
The TOE implements a FIPS PUB 186-4 conformant RSA key generation mechanism for establishing TLS
connections. Specifically, the TOE’s implementation of RSA key generation complies with FIPS 186-4
(Digital Signature Standard (DSS) Appendix B.3) supporting a 2048-bit key size. See Tables 19 & 20
Cryptographic Algorithm Table for certification numbers.
In addition, the TOE implements FFC schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meets RFC 3526,
Section 3 for SSH communications. This is used to generate the keys of size 2048 bits for diffie-hellman-
group14-sha1. DH group 14 support is only provided by OpenSSL.
FCS_CKM.2
The TOE implements RSA key establishment, conformant to RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 in support of the TOE’s
client and server services (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and FCS_TLSS_EXT.1). The TOE complies with section
7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
SFR Algorithm/Protocol
Forescout
CAVP Cert #
FCS_CKM.1 RSA FIPS 186-4 Key Generation N/A
FCS_CKM.2 RSA Key Establishment RSAES-PKCS-v1_5
Vendor
Affirmation
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
AES CBC 128 and 256 bits
AES GCM 256 bits
C1888 and A1959
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
RSA FIPS 186-4 Signature Generation and Signature Verification
2048 bits
C1888 and A1959
FCS_COP.1/Hash SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-384 C1888 and A1959
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-384 C1888 and A1959
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Hash DRBG C1888 and A1959
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Version 2.1 and all subsections regarding RSA key pair generation and key establishment in RSAES-
PKCS1-v1_5. The TOE uses OpenSSL to generate RSA key pairs with a modulus of at least 2048 bits
which has an equivalent key strength of 112 bits.
The RSA key establishment is used for TLS communications for remote administration using the Console,
exporting audit data to the audit server, and authentication requests to external authentication server.
Below is a table that summarizes which cryptographic library is supporting which claimed interface.
OE Component Definition of Communication (protocol, client/server, cryptographic service)
Management
Workstation
Communications are secured using TLS where the TOE is the Server.
TOE crypto required to support interface E3 as defined in Figure 1 above.
RSA Key Generation Cryptographic services for certificate creation: OpenSSL
RSA Key Establishment and encryption services for TLS: Bouncy Castle
Communications are secured using SSH where the TOE is the Server
TOE crypto required to support interface E2 as defined in Figure 1 above.
Key Generation Cryptographic services: OpenSSL
Diffie-Helman Group 14 Key establishment and encryption services for SSH: OpenSSL
Active Directory
Server
Communications are secured using TLS where the TOE is the client.
TOE crypto required to support interface E6 as defined in Figure 1 above.
RSA Key Generation Cryptographic services: OpenSSL
RSA Key establishment and encryption services for TLS: OpenSSL
Audit Server
Communications are secured using TLS where the TOE is the client.
TOE crypto required to support interface E7 as defined in Figure 1 above.
RSA Generation Cryptographic services: OpenSSL
RSA Key establishment and encryption services for TLS: OpenSSL
Table 21: Identification of Cryptographic Services Supporting Secured Communication Channel
In addition, the TOE implements a key establishment scheme using “safe-prime” Diffie-Hellman group 14
that meets NIST SP800-56A Revision 3 and RFC 3526 in support of the TOE SSH Server services
(FCS_SSHS_EXT.1). DH group 14 support is provided by OpenSSL. The TSF uses Diffie-Hellman-
group14-SHA1 and is used for SSH communication establishment in support of remote CLI administration.
The Diffie-Hellman group 14 is implemented by using the KexAlgorithms parameter as specified in RFC
3526 Section 3. SSH is also forced to only work with DH group 14. This is hardcoded with no ability for an
administrator to modify the settings.
FCS_CKM.4
The following table describes what keys were used, where they are stored, and also how they are destroyed.
There are no known instances where key destruction does not happen as defined.
Name Origin Store Zeroization / Destruction
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
SSH Server /
client
applications
RAM
Destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00)*. After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated. The
key is zeroized immediately after it is no
longer needed and when the TOE is
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Name Origin Store Zeroization / Destruction
shutdown or reinitialized. Automatically
zeroized after DH exchange.
Diffie-Hellman private
exponent
SSH Server /
client
applications
RAM
Destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00)*. After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated. The
key is zeroized immediately after it is no
longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized. Automatically
zeroized after DH exchange
SSH session key
SSH Server /
client
applications
RAM
Destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00)*. After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated. The
key is zeroized immediately after it is no
longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized. Automatic
zeroized after SSH session is terminated.
SSH Server Host Private
Key
Generated on
platform during
initial setup of
device.
Filesystem
Filesystem: Generation of a new key will
only be accomplished during a reinstallation
of the product where all files would be
overwritten which would in effect also
destroy the abstraction that represented the
key.
TLS Server Host Certificate
Private Key
Generated on
platform
(OpenSSL)
during initial
setup or imported
after installation.
OpenSSL TLS
Communications
for audit server
and AD
Bouncy Castle
TLS
Communication
for Console
RAM and
Filesystem
RAM: The Server Certificate’s private key is
destroyed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of zeroes (0x00)*. After
overwriting, the TSF reads the memory to
verify the key has been destroyed. If the
read-verify fails, the process is repeated. The
key is zeroized immediately after it is no
longer needed and when the TOE is
shutdown or reinitialized.
Filesystem: Private key is deleted when
generation of a new certificate are imported
or when certificates are removed. The TOE
will invoke an interface, provided by a part
of the TSF, that instructs a the TSF to destroy
the abstraction that represents the key (i.e.
delete the resource).
Table 22: Crypto key destruction table
*OPENSSL_cleanse() and Bouncy Castle: JVM garbage collection APIs that perform zeroization
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
The TOE performs encryption and decryption using the AES algorithm in CTR, CBC, and GCM modes
with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits. The AES algorithm meets ISO 18033-3, CTR and CBC meet ISO 10116
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and GCM meets ISO 19772. The TOE’s AES implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 19 &
20 Cryptographic Algorithm Table for certification numbers.
• OpenSSL supports:
o TLS communication: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-GCM-256
o SSH communication: AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256
o CTR DRBG: AES-CTR-256
• Bouncy Castle supports:
o TLS communication: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-GCM-256.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
The TOE performs digital signature services generation and verification in accordance with RSA Digital
Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with key sizes (modulus) 2048 bits. The RSA schemes are in accordance with
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes
RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital
Signature scheme 3. The TOE’s RSA implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 19 & 20
Cryptographic Algorithm Table for certification numbers.
This is applicable to both cryptographic libraries being implemented.
FCS_COP.1/Hash
The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512* as
specified in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004 (FIPS PUB 180-4). The TOE’s SHS implementation is validated under
CAVP. See Tables 19 & 20 Cryptographic Algorithm Table for certification numbers. This is applicable to
both cryptographic libraries being implemented. The hashing function is used to support password hashing
of all passwords stored on the TOE (FPT_APW_EXT.1), Trusted updates digital signature verification
(FPT_TUD_EXT.1), and TSF self-testing hash value check verification (FPT_TST_EXT.1).
*Only OpenSSL provides the SHA-512 hashing support. Meaning:
• OpenSSL supports: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
• Bouncy Castle supports: SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
The TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services that meet ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 (FIPS
PUB 198-1, and FIPS PUB 180-4), Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”. The TOE supports the following:
• HMAC-SHA-1 [key-size: 160 bits, digest size: 160 bits, block size: 512 bits, MAC lengths: 160
bits] for SSH and TLS communication support
• HMAC-SHA-256 [key-size: 256 bits, digest size: 256 bits, block size: 512 bits, MAC lengths:
256 bits] for SSH and TLS communication support
• HMAC-SHA-384 [key-size: 384 bits, digest size: 384 bits, block size: 1024 bits, MAC lengths:
384 bits] for TLS communication support only
• HMAC-SHA-512* [key-size: 512 bits, digest size: 512 bits, block size: 1024 bits, MAC
lengths: 512 bits] for SSH communication support only
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The TOE’s HMAC implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 19 & 20 Cryptographic Algorithm
Table for certification numbers.
*Only OpenSSL provides HMAC-SHA-512 keyed-hashing message authentication. Meaning:
• OpenSSL supports: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512
• Bouncy Castle supports: HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, and HMAC-SHA-384.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
The TOE implementation of Bouncy Castle uses a hash deterministic random bit generator (Hash_DRBG).
The TOE implementation of OpenSSL uses a counter mode random be generator (CTR DRBG). Both
DRBG used by the TOE are in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011. There is no ability to specify the use
of an alternative DRBG. The different TOE models uniformly provide four software-based noise-based
entropy sources as described in the proprietary entropy specification. The amount of entropy that is
collected is based on the function that the DRBG is being used for. In all cases, this amount is greater than
or equal to the security strength of the data that is being output. For example, a 256-bit AES key generation
operation will collect at least 256 bits of entropy before the DRBG is invoked. The largest AES key
generation operation supported is 2048-bit.
Both Bouncy Castle and OpenSSL collect entropy from /dev/random, which is a blocking entropy source.
The /dev/random entropy pools are protected by being in kernel memory and are not accessible from user
space. The entropy source is described in greater detail in the proprietary Entropy Assessment Report.
The TOE relies on kernel modules to gather and output entropy for our random uses:
• Interrupt events - the timestamp of the event, the IRQ number and interrupt flags are used
• Disk events - the timestamp of a disk operation completion event is used
• Keyboard event - the timestamp of a keyboard press/release event and the key code are used
• CPU cycles event - the output of the 32-bit counter that measures CPU cycles
The TOE’s DRBG implementation is validated under CAVP. See Tables 19 & 20 Cryptographic Algorithm
Table for certification numbers.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1
The TOE acts as an SSHv2 server for remote CLI sessions that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253,
4254, 4256, 4344, and 6668. The TOE implementation of SSH supports public key-based and password-
based user authentication. SSH is used for remote administrators to connect securely to the TOE for CLI
connections. If a public key is presented for user authentication, the TOE will verify that the SSH client’s
presented public key matches one that is stored within the SSH server’s authorized keys database. If the
SSH client’s presented public key does not match a stored key on the TOE, the TOE will consider this a
failed authentication attempt and the connection will not be established. In the case of password-based
authentication attempt, the presented user credentials are verified using the TOE’s native authentication
mechanism. If the presented user credentials cannot be verified, then the connection will not be established.
The SSH implementation will detect all large packets greater than 32,768 bytes and drop accordingly.
Additionally, the TSF enforces the connection to be rekeyed after no longer than one hour, and no more
than one gigabyte of transmitted data, whichever threshold is reached first. The SSH rekey time and size
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threshold parameters are administratively configurable via the CLI. One hour and one gigabyte are the
maximum settings allowed for the rekey threshold parameters in the evaluated configuration.
The TOE’s implementation of SSHv2 only supports:
• aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com for its encryption
algorithms
• ssh-rsa as its only public key algorithm (user and host)
• hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, and implicit for data integrity
• diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 for key exchange method in accordance with RFC 3526 Section 3
OpenSSL provides all cryptographic support required for SSH communication.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
The TOE when acting as a TLS client will only support TLSv1.2 protocols to connect and secure the
following trusted channels:
• performing authentication requests with the AD Server,
• audit data transfer
Mutual authentication is not being claimed. Elliptic Curves are not supported.
The following ciphersuites are used for the evaluated configuration:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
The TOE will only establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is valid. The TSF shall verify the
presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC 6125. The Common Name and
Subject Alternative Name (DNS Name only) are the only reference identifiers in the certificate that are part
of that validation. The TOE will only support a wildcard in the left-most label (e.g. *.example.com). All
other usages of a wildcard will cause a failure in the connection. The TOE does not support URI, IP
addresses, service name reference identifiers, or pinned certificates.
OpenSSL provides the cryptographic support for key establishment and encryption for these TLS channels
when TOE acts as client.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1
The TOE, when acting as a TLS server, will only support TLSv1.2 protocols to connect and secure the
following trusted channels:
• Console remotely connecting to the TOE for remote management
The TOE will deny connections from a client requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 protocol
versions. When the TOE receives a TLS connection request with the wrong (unsupported) version, it returns
a Fatal Alert: Handshake failure message and terminates the connection.
The following ciphersuites are used for the evaluated configuration:
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• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
Session resumption and Elliptic Curves are not supported. Mutual authentication is not being claimed.
Bouncy Castle provides the cryptographic support for key establishment and encryption TLS channel when
TOE acts as server.
8.3 Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1
The TSF provides a configurable counter for consecutive failed authentication attempts that will lock a user
account when the failure counter threshold is reached. CLI user accounts are separate from Console user
accounts, meaning a CLI user cannot log into the Console and vice versa. A valid login that happens prior
to the failure counter reaching its threshold will reset the counter to zero.
The Console Security Administrator configures the number of failed attempts lockout threshold through the
Console. The threshold can be set to a minimum of 1 and maximum of 10 consecutive failed attempts and
applies to both the CLI and Console users. The default setting is 3 consecutive failed attempts.
The Console Security Administrator is also able to define a time period when locked Console accounts will
automatically unlock. The default for this setting is 30 minutes for the Console. The lockout time period can
be configured between 5-1000 minutes.
For Console user accounts that are locked: A user with a locked account cannot login into the
Console application until another Console Security Administrator manually unlocks the account via
the Console or by a CLI Security Administrator. A locked Console user account can be manually
unlocked by the Console Security Administrator by navigating to the “Tools” > “Options” >
“CounterACT User Profiles” page in the Console, selecting the locked user account, and pressing
the activated “Unlock” button. Additionally, a CLI Security Administrator may unlock a Console
user account using the “fstool unlock_console_user <user-id>” command.
The CLI Security Administrator is able to define a time period when a locked CLI account will
automatically unlock. The default for this setting is 24 hours for the CLI users. The lockout time period can
be configured between 1-1000 minutes using the “fstool set_property os.lockout.fail
<time in seconds>” command.
For CLI user accounts that are locked: A user with a locked account cannot login to either the
remote CLI or local console until a CLI Security Administrator manually unlocks the account using
the “fstool user faillock reset <locked username>” command or when the CLI
configured time limit set by the CLI Security Administrator has elapsed. A CLI user account cannot
be unlocked via the Console.
Multiple Console and CLI Security Administrator accounts are required to prevent complete user lockout.
During installation and configuration of the TOE, the “Admin” user must create at least one new Console
Security Administrator account and the “cliadmin” user must be used to create at least one new CLI
Security Administrator account. These new Security Administrator accounts will provide the ability to
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unlock accounts that have been locked due to reaching the failed number of authentication attempts
threshold.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
The TOE supports the ability for a Console Security Administrator to set the minimum password length to
15 characters or greater with a maximum of 30 characters. Passwords can be composed of any combination
of upper and lower-case letters, numbers and special characters. The accepted special characters include:
“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”.
FIA_UAU.7
When authenticating to the TOE with a local physical connection (local console) to access the CLI, the
password is obscured by suppressing the echo of keystrokes to the screen. No indication of progress is
provided while typing in a password. Also, in the case of an invalid username or password, the TOE does
not reveal any information about the invalid component.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2 and FIA_UIA_EXT.1
The warning banner text can be configured by the administrator. The display and acknowledgement of this
banner is the only TOE functionality that is available to an unauthenticated user.
When connecting to the TOE remotely using an SSH client (remote console) or using a local physical
connection (local console) to gain access to the CLI, the TOE displays the pre-authentication warning
banner. Users are authenticated using a native username/password credential authentication mechanism for
local physical connections and SSH connections. SSH connections also support public key-based
authentication.
When connecting to the TOE remotely using the Console application, which establishes a TLS connection,
the TOE displays the pre-authentication warning banner is displayed. The TOE can be configured to request
an authentication decision from an Active Directory server or use the native username/password credential
authentication mechanism for users connecting to the TOE using the Console.
Access is only granted once the user provides a valid username/password that is verified using Active
Directory or native username/password credential authentication mechanism.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev, FIA_X509_EXT.2, and FIA_X509_EXT.3
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for TLS connections to external IT entities in
accordance with RFC 5280. The TOE performs certificate validity checking for all outbound TLS
connections.
When the TSF cannot determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF will not accept the certificate and not
establish a connection. The TSF does not provide a mechanism to override the validation decision.
The TSF determines the validity of certificates by ensuring that the certificate and the certificate path is
valid in accordance with RFC 5280. In addition:
• The TSF treats a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the
CA flag is set to TRUE
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate.
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• The TSF validates a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension
and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
• The TSF validates the certificate revocation status using the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960. This includes the leaf certificate and all intermediate
certificates received.
• When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate the TSF
does not accept the certificate and denies the connection.
• The TSF validates the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification must have
the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage
field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS must have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp
1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS must have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses must have the OCSP Signing purpose
(id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
A Certificate Request is generated as specified in RFC 2986 containing the public key and “Common
Name” in order for the TOE to have its own certificate. The chain of certificates is validated from the root
CA when the CA Certificate Response is received. In order for the TOE to authenticate to the remote audit
server and Active Directory servers, trusted CA certificates must be installed into the TOE’s certificate trust
store.
8.4 Security Management
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate, FMT_MTD.1/CoreData, and FMT_SMF.1
The SFRs listed above have been combined to clarify the Security Management functions of the TOE
including how the TOE implements authentication, identification, and also RBAC. The following
description will also include restrictions for these roles and functions.
The TOE uses role-based access control (RBAC), as described in FMT_SMR.2, to restrict access to the
functions that manage the TSF data. The available functionality that is presented to an authenticated user is
based on the group of permissions and the privileges associated with the permissions. These
permissions/privileges are bound to the user only after the user has successfully authenticated. Display and
acknowledgement of a warning banner is the only TOE functionality available prior to identification and
authentication. The Console limits the presented functionality based on the privileges bound to that user.
The TSF restricts the ability to manage the TSF data to only Security Administrators.
The TSF management functions that are restricted to Security Administrators based on local or remote
administration, and scoped by this evaluation are:
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Management Function
Local CLI
(physical
connection)
Remote CLI
(SSH)
Console
(TLS)
Configure Banner Text X
Configure Idle Session Timeout X
Initiate Manual Update X
Configure Failed Lockout Threshold X
Configure Lockout Duration X X X
Configure audit server information for audit data transmission X
Configure thresholds for SSH rekeying X X
Re-enable Administrator accounts X X X
Configure System Time X X
Manage trusted public keys database X X
Manage the TOE's trust store and designate X.509v3 certificates as
trust anchors
X
Table 23: Management Functions to Management Interface Identification
FMT_SMR.2
There are two types of user accounts, those that access the TOE through the CLI interfaces, and those that
access through the Console. The TOE maintains the role of Security Administrator which is fulfilled by the
users with the “cliadmin” role assigned for the CLI interfaces and users assigned the “administrator” role
for the Console by applying ‘select all’ permissions for the user account.
The TOE is designed to use permissions which allow, limit or prevent user access to specific Console tools
(access to the management functions available through the Console). Upon successful authentication, the
TSF associates the administratively defined set of permissions (role) for that user to the subject acting on
behalf of that user. The TSF then enforces role-based access control (RBAC) to limit access to TSF
functions and data based on the set of permissions bound to the subject.
A Console user assigned the TOE’s “administrator” role has access to all Console tools and features and is
able to administer the TOE remotely as a Security Administrator. All other Console users that do not have
the full set of administrative permissions are categorized as a “Console User” and are not Security
Administrators of the TOE.
The TOE has one predefined Console administrative user called “Admin”. The “Admin” account is
assigned the “administrator” role and these permissions cannot be modified or customized. A customized
password must be created during installation by the customer. The “Admin” account is used to create
additional Console Security Administrators.
A Console Security Administrator must assign permissions when creating any additional Console user.
These permissions may be modified later by a Console Security. A Console User’s set of permissions are
customized by adding and subtracting specific permissions to allow/disallow the user TOE functionality.
To create an additional Console Security Administrator, all the permissions must be selected and assigned
to the user.
Additionally, the TOE has one predefined CLI administrative role called “cliadmin”. CLI roles and
permissions cannot be modified or customized at any time. A CLI Security Administrator is able to
administer the TOE remotely via SSH or locally. A customized password must be created during
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installation by the customer. The “cliadmin” account is used to create additional CLI Security
Administrators.
8.5 Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1
No passwords are stored by the TOE in plaintext. All Console user passwords are hashed using SHA-256
and then encrypted using AES-256. CLI user passwords are hashed using SHA-512. There is no function
provided by the TOE to display a password value in plaintext nor is the password data recoverable.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
The TOE does not provide a mechanism to view pre-shared keys, symmetric keys and private keys. Volatile
memory used to store secret keys, private keys, and secret key data is not accessible by administrators and
neither is the file system of the OS. Key data stored on the TOE are encrypted using AES-256. There are no
keys stored in plaintext.
FPT_STM_EXT.1
The TOE provides its own time via its internal clock that is set manually by a CLI Security Administrator.
The TOE uses the clock for several security-relevant purposes, including:
• Audit record timestamps (seconds, milliseconds, microseconds, or nanoseconds).
• X.509v3 certificate validation
• Inactivity of remote sessions
• Inactivity of local session
FPT_TST_EXT.1
Upon the startup of the TOE, multiple Power-On Self-Tests (POSTs) are run. The POSTs provide
environmental monitoring of the TOE’s components (hardware and software), in which early warnings can
prevent whole component failure.
The following self-tests are performed to verify the integrity of the software and cryptographic modules.
The self-tests will also be run on service restarts and are available for manual execution. The following tests
are part of the self-test suite:
# Component Validation
Fail
Result
1. Kernel HMAC + Built-in Crypto Self-test Hard-fail
2. Core OS and packages (including OpenSSH) Built-in RPM Verification Hard-fail
3. fipscheck utility HMAC verified against fipshmac Hard-fail
4. Crypto: OpenSSL fipscheck (including OpenSSL self-check) Hard-fail
5. OpenSSL rpm package Built-in RPM Verification Hard-fail
6. Crypto: Bouncy Castle Built-in crypto package self-test (KAT) Hard-fail
7.
Core Platform and plugin installation packages and
extracted files.
SHA-256 verified against last known or stored
hash.
Soft-fail
8. System current state vs system configuration
Running kernel version compared to version
defined in grub;
FIPS mode running status compared to
configuration in grub.
Soft-fail
Table 24: Self-Test List with Failure Results
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• Hard-fail: Kernel test failure will result in panic the OS. Machine will not start.
• Soft-fail: Upon test failure, the function would alert the local CLI Security Administrator upon
login, write an audit event and send the audit record to the external audit server (if configured). The
main TOE service will not start (i.e. not available for operational use), alert will be displayed on the
local CLI.
A CLI Security Administrator may execute the self-test check manually using the selftest command.
The output will be displayed to the screen in the following format:
selftest:144141:1628543527.855930:Mon Aug 9 17:12:07 EDT -0400 2021: Started
selftest:144141:1628543527.856168:Mon Aug 9 17:12:07 2021: Verifying fipscheck
selftest:144141:1628543527.912380:Mon Aug 9 17:12:07 2021: Verifying grub
selftest:144141:1628543527.936682:Mon Aug 9 17:12:07 2021: Verifing rpm: kernel (64-bit)
etc.
An example of an error discovered on a plugin check:
selftest:144141:1628543550.799895:Mon Aug 9 17:27:20 2021: problem plugin: hwi,
plugin/hwi/scripts/hwi_cert_store_new.exe, file sha256sum,
6e23399aabb23038e07151c67b2c9008753509ee2d675b4a0d81d63744590c04 !=
c6f0d923ce293167507206795b3f3b982e6c8057a1929231f9ff86eb4753e9bf
These tests are sufficient to validate the correct operation of the TSF because they verify that the software
has not been tampered with and that the underlying hardware does not have any anomalies that would cause
the software to be executed in an unpredictable or inconsistent manner.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
The Console Security Administrator can query the TOE for the currently executing version of the TOE
software by going to the top menu bar, click the “Help” drop down menu, and then click “About
Forescout”.
The TOE does not automatically check for or download an update itself nor does it connect to the update
server directly. When an update is available, a Security Administrator must download the update package to
the management workstation. Once the update is on the management workstation the Console Security
Administrator must manually initiate the installation via the Console.
For an Appliance Model: Upon execution of the upgrade command the Console Security
Administrator has the choice of the following option:
• Upload and Upgrade - Upload the file to the device and begin the upgrade.
For an Enterprise Manager Model: Upon execution of the upgrade command the Console Security
administrator has the choice of the following three options:
• Upload Only – Upload the file to the device but do not begin the upgrade
• Upload and Upgrade – Upload the file to the device and begin the upgrade
• Upgrade – Upgrade the device from the previously uploaded file.
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The Console uploads the update package over the existing TLS path that is already established between the
Console and the TOE appliance. Only one upgrade package can be uploaded to the TOE device at a time. A
second attempt to upload an upgrade package will result in the administrator being warned that this will
overwriting the existing upgrade package. The following provide more details to each of the installation
options identified above:
Upload Only – The TSF automatically verifies the update’s digital signature during the upload
process. The TSF uses a locally stored public key (on the appliance) to verify update package
authenticity. This key is installed as part of the initial software installation and cannot be modified
or changed by an administrator. The TSF will delete the uploaded file if the digital signature is
determined to be invalid for any reason. There is no means for an administrative override to
continue the upload. Once the upload is complete and the digital signature is valid, the Console
indicates its success.
Upgrade Only – When there is an upgraded package available, a Console Security Administrator
can select the Upgrade Only option to initiate the installation. The TOE will re-verify the digital
signature prior to initiating the installation. The TSF will not continue with the installation if the
digital signature is determined to be invalid for any reason. There is no means for an administrative
override to continue the installation. Once the device has been upgraded, the device will reboot
automatically, the upload storage area is emptied (meaning another upgrade package can now be
uploaded but not installed), and the current operating version will be updated to reflect the recent
upgrade version.
Upload and Upgrade – The TSF automatically verifies the update’s digital signature during the
upload process. Once the upload is complete and the digital signature is valid, the installation will
begin. The TOE will re-verify the digital signature prior to initiate the installation. The TSF will
not continue with the installation if the digital signature is determined to be invalid for any reason.
There is no means for an administrative override to continue the installation. Once the device has
been upgraded, the device will reboot automatically, the upload storage area is emptied (meaning
another upgrade package can now be uploaded but not installed), and the current operating version
will be updated to reflect the recent upgrade version.
8.6 TOE Access
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
When a local session is inactive for the configured period of time, the TOE will terminate the session. The
inactivity timer is configured by the Console Security Administrator via the Console and is set in minutes or
hours.
FTA_SSL.3
The TOE will terminate a remote session due to inactivity according to the configuration threshold set by
the Console Security Administrator. The inactivity timer is configured by the Console Security
Administrator via the Console and is set in minutes or hours.
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FTA_SSL.4
Any user accessing the TOE is capable of terminating their own session. A Console user terminates their
own current session by clicking the “exit” command from the File menu. A CLI user terminates their own
current session by typing "quit" at the command line.
FTA_TAB.1
There are three possible administrative ways to log into the TOE: locally via physical connection to access
the CLI, remotely via SSH connection to access the CLI, and remotely using the Console which establishes
a TLS connection. When logging in locally or remotely, the pre-authentication banner is displayed and is
viewed prior to authentication. The authentication banner is administratively customizable by the Console
Security Administrator via the Console.
8.7 Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1
The TOE provides the ability to secure sensitive data in transit to and from the Operational Environment.
The TOE, acting as the TLS client, uses the TLS protocol to initiate and establish the trusted channel to
support the following capabilities:
• to export audit data to an audit server
• authenticate users via an Active Directory server
The TOE appliance’s TLS client implementation is conformant to FCS_TLSC_EXT.1. TLS
communications use X.509v3 certificates to support authentication.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin
Remote administration is secured by using SSH and TLS protocols.
The Console establishes the TLS connection to the TOE appliance on behalf of the user for remote
administration. The TOE appliance is acting as a TLS server and is conformant to FCS_TLSS_EXT.1. The
Console is using the host platforms TLS client capabilities.
A user can connect to the TOE appliance using SSH to remotely manage the TOE appliance via the CLI
(remote console). The TOE appliance’s SSH server implementation is conformant to FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.