BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
for
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a
from
Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 (*)
Smart Tachograph: Vehicle Unit
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a
from Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.15, 6 June 2021, BSI-CC-PP-0094-V2-2021
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 13 January 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 14 January 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................22
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................22
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................22
13. Definitions................................................................................................................22
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................28
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 29
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V2-2023. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V2-2023 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a was
conducted by Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 20
December 2024. Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Continental Automotive Technologies
GmbH.
The product was developed by: Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis. According to Tachograph Ordinance 165/2014,
a re-assessment is to be made every two years.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 14 January
2025 is valid until 13 January 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH
Heinrich-Hertz-Strasse 45
78052 Villingen-Schwenningen
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release
4.1a. The TOE is a second generation vehicle unit (VU) in the sense of Annex IC [9]
intended to be installed in road transport vehicles. Its purpose is to record, store, display,
print and output data related to driver activities. It is connected to a motion sensor with
which it exchanges vehicle’s motion data. The TOE is providing security functionality
conformant to the protection profile “Digital Tachograph – Vehicle Unit (VU PP)” [8].
The software which includes the whole tachograph application and the software upgrade
module is running in a distributed environment of five microcontrollers and one ASIC.
There are two configurations of the vehicle unit that are delivered to the approved
workshops.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.15, 6 June 2021,
BSI-CC-PP-0094-V2-2021 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TOE_SS.Identification_Authentication The TOE identifies and authenticates tachograph cards and
motion sensors. The TOE identifies and authenticates the
workshop user by his card and additionally his PIN.
TOE_SS.Access_Control The TOE controls access to stored data and functions based on
the mode of operation.
TOE_SS.Accountability of users User activity is recorded such that users can be held
accountable for their actions.
TOE_SS.Audit of events and faults The TOE detects and records a range of events and faults.
TOE_SS.Residual information protection
for secret data
Encryption keys and certificates are deleted from the TOE when
no longer needed, such that the information can no longer be
retrieved.
TOE_SS.Integrity and authenticity of
exported data
The integrity and authenticity of user data exported
(downloaded) to an external storage medium, in accordance
with Annex IC, Appendix 7, is assured through the use of digital
signatures.
TOE_SS.Stored_Data_Accuracy Data stored in the TOE fully and accurately reflects the input
values from all sources (motion sensor, VU, real time clock,
calibration connector, Tachograph cards, VU keyboard, external
GNSS facility (if applicable- Note: not applicable)).
TOE_SS.Reliability The TOE provides features that aim to assure the reliability of its
services. These features include but are not limited to self-
testing, physical protection, control of executable code, resource
management, and secure handling of events.
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange The TOE provides this security service of data exchange with
the motion sensor and tachograph cards.
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support The TOE provides this security service of cryptographic support
using standard cryptographic algorithms and procedures.
Detailed properties of this security service are described in
Appendix 11 of Annex IC.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8 in this
report.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381,
Release 4.1a: configuration 1: with
internal DSRC
Hardware Version: 4.1a
Software Version: 04.01.40
Software Update Module
Version: 0506
Separate unit in a
closed case
(Manufacturing
option)
2 DOC Digitaler Tachograph DTCO – DTCO®
4.1 … 4.1a Bedienungsanleitung für
Unternehmer & Fahrer, Continental AG
[14]
Version 2
May 2024
Paper or PDF file
3 DOC Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 4.1x und
KITAS 2185 REL. 1.21 Leitfaden für
Kontrollorgane, BA00.1381.41.200 101,
Continental AG [12]
Version 2.4
July 2024
Paper or PDF file
4 DOC Digitaler Tachograph DTCO® 4.1 …
4.1a Technische Beschreibung,
TB_DTCO41a_DE_2024-01-20, Con-
tinental AG [13]
Version 2
May 2024
Paper or PDF file
5 DOC DTCO 1381 R4.0e, Anleitung für DTCO
SW Upgrade, Continental AG [16]
Revision 1.0
25 June 2020
Paper or PDF file
6 SW Software Package, Release 4.1a Software Version 04.01.40
Software Update Module
Version: 0506
Signed and
encrypted file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
2.1. Overview of the Delivery Process for the DTCO 1381
The manufactured device reaches in delivery condition a sorting station. There the device
is assigned to the corresponding customer and receives its packaging. After the assembly
the TOE is sealed with a factory lead seal including stamped lettering. Neutral lead seals
will be supplied as accessories if the sealing occurs outside of the factory. Trucks deliver
the TOE in the customer receptacle together with its shipping documents and where
appropriate operating manuals and/or operating instructions to the customer. For the
activation and calibration of the TOE at the customer, an authentication with the workshop
card along with PIN code must be done.
The shipping documents are sent in a customer-specific receptacle together with the TOE
via trucks to “fitter + workshop”. Every receptacle contains shipping documents (production
order) with all relevant order information as production order number, variant, quantity, and
customer data. Per customer order the receptacles are automatically palletized where
each pallet also gets a shipping document assigned. The unambiguous material number
on the production order guarantees that the materials necessary for a specific
configuration at the individual assembly stations are available.
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With the loading of the product onto the trucks, a data transmission (DFÜ) of the receipt to
the customer is done via SAP R/3 and customer-specific information method (VDA,
ODETTE, EDIFACT). After receipt of the pallet in the packing department, the packaging
note and appropriate labels (Odette format) are printed according to the shipping
documents. The packaging note contains customer-relevant data as customer ordering
number of the variant, quantity, weight, and packaging method.
The operating manual for the retail/end user is transported in the receptacle together with
the TOE via trucks to „fitter + workshop“. If the package is targeted at commerce, the
operating manuals will be packed by the packing department, too. OEM customers order
the operating manuals at a later point in time and enclose them with the vehicle papers.
Self-collectors/companies can obtain the DTCO in 1381 only from workshops which are
authorized for the calibration of the DTCO 1381 (possession of a valid workshop card
necessary). By following the order instructions it is guaranteed that the device delivery was
initiated by the manufacturer and not by a third person. In this way it is also guaranteed
that the customer receives an approved device.
2.2. Overview of the Delivery Process for the Software Update
The software update is performed in a workshop using the workshop-tab, refer to [16]. The
program implemented on the workshop-tab guides the operator through update process.
The update package depends on the hardware release of the DTCO. In case the DTCO
hardware is able to run the release R4.1a, the update package is downloaded from the
Server of Continental. When the update process is completed, the operator can print the
properties of the installed software to confirm that the Release R4.1a was installed.
2.3. Identification of TOE
The authenticity of the TOE can be checked by the customer by comparing the
identification data stored in the device with the device data on the type plate, see table 2
above.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements logical security functionality in order to
enable it to record, store, display, print and output data related to driver activities in
exchange with a motion sensor with which it exchanges vehicle’s motion data.
Hence, the TOE enforces:
● protection of data memory in such a way as to prevent unauthorized access to and
manipulation of the data and the detection of such attempts,
● confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor
and the vehicle unit,
● integrity, authenticity and where applicable, confidentiality of data exchanged between
the vehicle unit and the tachograph cards,
● confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data output through the remote early
detection communication for control purposes, and
● integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of data downloaded.
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Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Section
1.2 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE Environment.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE receives motion data from the motion sensor and activity data via the facilities for
entry of user’s. It stores all this user data internally and can export them to the tachograph
cards inserted, to the display, to the printer, and to electrical interfaces. The architecture
comprises nine subsystems which are divided into four groups M1, M2, M3, and M4:
● The main system group M1 contains the certified Security Controller hardware including
a software library (PSL).
● The main system group M2 contains the main controller of the system.
● The main system group M3 provides the power supply for the other main system groups.
● The main system group M4 contains the Bluetooth, the GNSS and DSRC Controller,
their application code and related hardware components.
The TOE supports external connections or interfaces to the following:
● a motion sensor (MS)
● two smart cards
● a power supply unit
● global navigation system(s) (GNSS)
● a remote early detection communication reader
● external device(s) for ITS applications
● other devices used for calibration, data export, software upgrade and diagnostics
● intelligent dedicated equipment for data download
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
The developer considered the TOE environment as defined in the Security Target.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
The developer systematically tested the TOE. For the security tests the developer used
two approaches. The first approach is software tests. With this approach the developer
tests the software in depth. The developers choose to test single steps in the sequence
diagrams used during development. With these tests the SFR-enforcing modules and the
interactions between the modules are tested in depth. Using this approach complete test
coverage of all important program flows is achieved.
The second approach is the system tests. With this approach the complete system, and
especially the TSFI, are tested. The system tests cover all security relevant activities. The
focus of these tests is the correct behaviour at the TSFI boundaries and a correct program
execution of the complete system. With these tests the results of the software tests are
confirmed and additional confidence in the system behaviour is gained.
Using these test approaches high test coverage is achieved. This leads to a high
assurance in the correct implementation of the system and especially in its security
relevant parts.
The test documentation consists of a test coverage and depth of testing analysis, a test
plan, test specifications for each of the security functionalities, and test result logs.
The test result logs show that the tests identified in the test coverage and depth of testing
analysis have been executed as expected by the developer.
Evaluator Tests
The evaluators spent adequate testing effort for the desired resistance of the TOE against
attackers with a high attack potential. The evaluators spent several days each for
analysing the test specification and ensuring that the specification has been correctly
implemented in the test scripts,
• for creating ideas for independent evaluator tests,
• for ensuring that the test environment delivers correct test results, and
• for repeating developer tests as well as carrying out independent tests.
TOE Test Configuration
The TOE under test is “Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a” which covers both
TOE configurations, as described in the developer’s test specifications. The evaluator tests
have been carried out against the following TOE modifications: The TOE could be
prepaired with different Motion Sensors and supported further test commands that must be
implemented for test usage.
For the integration tests,.a few tests were performed using real Motion Sensors. Most tests
were performed using a simulator of the Motion Sensor. Since this simulator was only
available at developer’s site, these tests were examined and reviewed during a remote
session with the developer. The evaluators devised tests based on the functional tests of
the developer because the developer used the same test environment for tests described
under ATE_FUN.
For the penetration testing the TOE was tested in its operative state. Modifications of the
devices were performed before the TOE was brought into its operative state in order to
suppress warnings. The later tests were performed in the operative state of the TOE.
Independent Tests
Independent tests were identified based on the developer tests already available. The
developer tests have been compared with the ST, the FSP and TDS document in order to
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determine the fields of further investigation. Furthermore the evaluator devised tests based
on a systematically analysis of the ST.
The evaluators conducted independent testing at the lab of the evaluation facilities.
The evaluator tests have been carried out against the following TOE configurations: The
TOE was brought in every production control state. A testing motion sensor, which allows
for repeated pairing, was used. Furthermore, every card type (Driver card, workshop card,
control card, and company card) was used during the tests.
According to EAL4, functional testing is performed down to the depth of SFR-enforcing
module interfaces.
The tests showed that the TOE behaves as expected in all configurations that are
considered as part of the evaluation. No deviation was found between the expected and
the actual test results. The depth of testing is adequate for the evaluation assurance level
chosen (EAL4+). The TOE has successfully passed independent testing.
Penetration Tests
The penetration testing was performed using the developer’s testing environment.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
On the basis of the methodical vulnerability analysis some potential vulnerabilities have
been identified by the evaluator. These potential vulnerabilities have been analysed, if they
are exploitable in the planned operational environment. For every potential vulnerability
which was identified to be a candidate to be exploitable in the planned operational
environment the evaluator devised and conducted penetration tests.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version is fixated by the document “Konfigurationsliste,
1381R3.BOD.0986.Konfigurationsliste_DTCO_1381.xlsb, Continental AG, Revision 1.66,
11.12.2024 ”, [11].
The evaluated configuration is 1381.xxxxxxxxxxx with tachograph application version
04.01.40 and software update module version 0506. The placeholder xxxxxxxxxxx stands
for variants of the non-security relevant hardware options. For every variant the softwares
tachograph application version 4.1.40 and update module version 0506 are used.
The variants are summarized as follows:
● Mainboard: not configurable
● Housing: standard / without spacer / with spacer and cap (black/white)
● DSRC/GNSS plug: DSRC detached antenna or DSRC CAN module / GNSS intern
antenna or extern antenna with red or blue connector
● Seal: not configurable
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
● Additional configurable (optional) parts that have no impact on the security functionality
of the TOE
There is one configuration delivered to accredited workshops which assemble the vehicle
unit into vehicles. This configuration as well as further steps for necessary activation and
calibration of the TOE in a vehicle is described in [13].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying
platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware [19, 20] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(ii) Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(iii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and Similar Devices
(iv) Application of Attack Potential to Hardware Devices with Security Boxes
(v) Terminology and preparation of Smartcard-Evaluations
(vi) Use of Interpretation for Security Evaluation and Certification of Digital Tachographs
(vii) Evaluation methodology for Hardware Devices with Security Boxes
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36, AIS 37, AIS 40, AIS 49).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 were used (see [4]).
ALC evaluation results including site audits were re-used based on the guidance provided
in AIS 38 (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V2-2023, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on:
● changes in the SW regarding bug fixing and improvement of usability,
● the re-evaluation of a development site and
● the discontinuation of one development site.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.15, 6 June
2021, BSI-CC-PP-0094-V2-2021 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where its specific
appropriateness is stated. The standard of application is according to Appendix 11 of
Annex 1C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 [9].
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity Period
Secure messaging authenticated
mode DTCO 1381 <-> tachograph
card
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
Retail-MAC IEC_9797_1 [21],
Appendix 11 of
Annex 1C of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 2.2.3 and
ANSI X9.19
112 Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 5.3
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Secure messaging encrypted mode
DTCO 1381 <-> tachograph card
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
Triple-DES in
CBC mode
PUB_46_3 [24]
SP_800_38A
[30]
Appendix 11 of
Annex 1C of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 2.2.3
112 Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 5.4
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Mutual authentication DTCO 1381
<-> tachograph card
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
RSA PKCS #1 [23]
Appendix 11 of
Annex 1C of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 2.2.1
(see Application
Note 1)
1024 Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_020
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
digital signature for downloading to
external media
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
RSA PKCS #1 [23];
Appendix 11 of
Annex 1C of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 2.2.1
1024 Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_034
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Mutual authentication DTCO 1381
<-> tachograph card
SHA-1 IEC_9797_1 [21];
Appendix 11 of
n/a Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity Period
digital signature
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
Annex 1C of IR
2016/799 [9],
sec. 2.2.2
2016/799 [9],
CSM_020,
CSM_034
VO_2016_799
[9]
Secure messaging DTCO 1381 <->
Motion Sensor
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
AES in CBC
mode
PUB_197 [20] 128, 192
and 256
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM 42
ISO_16844_3
[33], sec. 7.6
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Secure messaging encryption
DTCO 1381 <-> tachograph card
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
AES in CBC
mode
PUB_197 [27]
ISO_10116 [22]
128, 192
and 256
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM 40
CSM_186
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Secure messaging authentication
DTCO 1381 <-> tachograph card
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
AES-CMAC SP_800_38B [31] 128, 192
and 256
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_187
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Mutual authentication DTCO 1381 <-
> tachograph card
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
Elliptic curve
cryptography
Brainpool and
NIST according
to
A1C_11,
CSM_48
PUB_186_4 [26],
RFC_5480 [28],
RFC_5639 [29]
256, 384
and
512/521
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_155
CSM_169,
CSM_48
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Smart Card and VU Certificates ECDSA signing
algorithm
PUB_186_4 [26] 256, 384
and
512/521
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_46,
CSM_150
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
VU Authentication
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
ECDSA signing
algorithm
PUB_186_4 [26] 256, 384
and
512/521
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_163
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Smart Card Authentication
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
ECKA-EG key
agreement
TR_03111 [32] 256, 384
and
512/521
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_175,
CSM_178
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Standard of
Application
Validity Period
Hashing algorithm
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
SHA- 256,
SHA-384 and
SHA-512
PUB_180_4 [25] n.a. No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Authenticity and confidentiality of
data communicated from a vehicle
unit to a control authority over a
DSRC remote communication
channel
TOE_SS.Data_Exchange,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
AES (in CBC
Mode), MAC
PUB_197 [27]
ISO_10116 [22]
128, 192
and 256
Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9],
CSM_119,
CSM_226
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
Signature for downloading data
TOE_SS.Integrity and authenticity of
exported data,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
ECDSA signing
algorithm
PUB_186_4 [26] 256, 384
and
512/521
No require-
ments in EU
regulation
VO_2016_799
[9]
De-/encrypting the transport key of
the upgrade file (SWUM)
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
RSA PKCS #1 [23] 2048 - -
Digital signature of the upgrade file
for the software upgrade
TOE_SS.Crypto-graphic_support
ECC RFC_5639 [29] 256 brain-
poolP256r1
-
Authentication of the management
device
TOE_SS.Identification_Authenti-
cation,
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
ECC RFC_5639 [29] 256 brain-
poolP256r1
-
Confidentiality of the upgradefile
Protection of the SWUM.SK, the
SecDev.PK, the curve parameters of
the underlying elliptic curve and the
CBC-MAC key itself
TOE_SS.Cryptographic_support
AES PUB_197 [27] 128 - -
Key derivation for DSRC HMAC-based
Extract-and-
Ex-pand Key
Derivation
Function
(HKDF)
RFC_5869 [35]
(see Application
note 2)
128 Appendix 11
of Annex 1C
of IR
2016/799 [9]
[CSM_124]
-
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Application note 1: The transport key is encrypted with the RSA algorithm using a 3072-bit
key. The underlying padding is PKCS #1 v2.2 [34] RSAES-OAEP from
RSA Laboratories.
For the method of PKCS #1, [23] are used the corresponding methods
of these cure controller SLI 37 underlying platform) [17]
Application note 2: The key derivation for DSRC is done at KBA.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
According to Appendix 11 of Annex 1C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU)
2016/799 [9] the algorithms are suitable for:
● signature generation (signature for downloading data to external media) and verification
(proof of signed data and certificates),
● secure messaging and
● mutual authentication between the DTCO 1381 and a tachograph card, a motion sensor
(MS) and a DSRC communication module.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ASIC Application-specific integrated circuit
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
22 / 30
BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
CAN Controller Area Network
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DFÜ Datenfernübertragung
DOC Document
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Profile
DTCO Digital Tachograph
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EDIFACT Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FSP Functional Specification
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
IT Information Technology
ITS Intelligent Transportation System
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
HW Hardware
KBA Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt
MD Management Device
MS Motion Sensor
PIN Personal Identification Number
PP Protection Profile
PSL Policy Simulation Library
RNG Random Number Generation
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
SW Software
SWUM Software Upgrade Module
TDS TOE Design
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
VDA Verband der Automobilindustrie
VU Vehicle Unit
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
24 / 30
BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025, Version 1.6, 18 September 2024,
Smart Tachograph DTCO1381 R4.1a Security Target, Continental AG (public
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 18 December 2024, Evaluation Technical
Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3, Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH, (confidential
document)
[8] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.15, 6 June 2021, BSI-CC-PP-
0094-V2-2021
[9] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016
implementing Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation,
operation and repair of tachographs and their components, Annex IC last amended
by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/980 of 16 May 2023
Annex 1C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799
Appendix 11 of Annex 1C of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799
[10] Impact Analysis Report, Continental AG, Revision 0.18, 1 November 2024
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.66, 11 December 2024, Konfigurationsliste,
Continental AG (confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 37, Version 3, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 49, Version 1, Evaluation methodology for Hardware Devices with Security Boxes
• AIS 50, Version 1, Guidance for Tool-supported and automated Software Testing
25 / 30
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
[12] Digitaler Tachograph – DTCO 4.1x und KITAS 2185 REL. 1.21 Leitfaden für
Kontrollorgane, BA00.1381.41.200 101, Continental AG, Version 2.4, July 2024
[13] Digitaler Tachograph DTCO® 4.1 … 4.1a Technische Beschreibung,
TB_DTCO41a_DE_2024-01-20, Continental AG, Version 2, May 2024
[14] Digitaler Tachograph DTCO – DTCO® 4.1 … 4.1a Bedienungsanleitung für
Unternehmer & Fah-rer, Continental AG, Version 2, May 2024
[15] Technische Beschreibung Digitaler Tachograph DTCO® 1381 – ab Release 4.0
Software Upgrade, Continental AG, Release 4.0, April 2018
[16] DTCO 1381 R4.0e, Anleitung für DTCO SW Upgrade, Continental AG, Revision 1.0,
25 June 2020
[17] Public Security Target Lite IFX_CCI_00003Fh IFX_CCI_000059h IFX_CCI00005Bh
IFX_CCI_00003Ch IFX_CCI_00003Dh IFX_CCI_00005Ah G11 and H11 including
optional software libraries: Flash Loader according Package1 and HCL, RCL, HSL,
ACL and SCL, Infineon Technologies AG, Revision 2.6, 16 August 2024
[18] Certificate NSCIB-CC-2200060-02 by TrustCB B.V. Date of 2nd Issue: 30 August
2024
[19] Certification report NSCIB-CC-2200060-02 by TrustCB B.V. 30 August 2024
[20] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for NSCIB-CC-
2200060-02, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Version 3, 22 August 2024
[21] ISO/IEC 9797-1, Information technology -- Security techniques – Message
Authentication Codes (MACs), 2011
[22] ISO 10116: Information technology — Security techniques — Modes of operation of
an n- bit block cipher. Third edition, 1 February 2006
[23] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.0. RSA Laboratories,
September 1998
[24] FIPS PUB 46-3: Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Data
Encryption Standard (DES) Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
[25] FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard, NIST, March 2012
[26] FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS), NIST, July 2013
[27] FIPS PUB 197, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL), Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)
[28] RFC 5480 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information, March 2009
[29] RFC 5639 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) — Brainpool Standard Curves and
Curve Generation, 2010
[30] SP 800-38A National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special
Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Methods and Techniques , National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S
Department of Commerce, 2001
[31] SP 800-38B National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special
Publication 800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005
26 / 30
BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
[32] TR-03111, Technical Guideline, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, BSI; version 2.00, 28
June 2012
[33] ISO 16844-3: Road vehicles, Tachograph systems, Part 3: Motion sensor interface,
First edition, 2004-11-01, Corrigendum 1, 1 March 2006
[34] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.2. RSA Laboratories,
October 2012
[35] RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF), May
2010
27 / 30
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
28 / 30
BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
29 / 30
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1158-V3-2025
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Digital Tachograph DTCO 1381, Release 4.1a (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 14 January 2025, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Continental Automotive Technologies GmbH, Heinrich-Hertz-Str. 45, 78052
Villingen, Germany (HW + SW Development, HW + SW + System Testing,
Production of the final TOE, Delivery)
b) Continental Automotive Romania SRL, Strada Siemens Nr. 1, 300704
Timisoara, Romania (SW Development, SW Module Testing)
c) Continental Automotive Components (India) Private Ltd, 12th Floor Sattva
South Gate, Plot No.1, Veerasandra Industrial Area, Survey nos. 17, 18, 19
and 20, Veerasandra Village, Hosur Main Road, Attibele Hobli, Anekal Taluk,
Bangalore Destrict – 560100 (SW Testing)
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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