National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-11059-2020
Dated: 07/21/2020
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 Validation Report Version 1.0, 07/21/2020
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell, Senior Validator
Jenn Dotson, ECR Team
Linda Morrison, ECR Team
Lisa Mitchell, Lead Validator
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 1
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................ 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 5
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Communication................................................................................................... 6
4.3 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 7
4.4 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
4.5 Security management.......................................................................................... 8
4.6 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.7 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.8 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 9
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 9
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 10
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 10
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 10
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 10
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 10
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 11
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ............................................................ 11
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 12
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 12
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 12
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 12
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 13
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 13
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 14
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 14
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 14
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 15
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 solution
provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and
the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in July 2020. The information in this report is largely derived from the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer Security
Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.1, 24 September 2018.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) and
the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore, the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Stealthwatch
Enterprise 7.1 Security Target, Version 1.1, July 17, 2020 and analysis performed by the
Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
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Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1
Protection Profile
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018
ST Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 Security Target, Version 1.1, July 17, 2020
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1, version 0.3,
07/17/2020
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
CCEVS Validators Paul Bicknell
Jenn Dotson
Linda Morrison
Lisa Mitchell
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise TOE is a centrally managed system of distributed
components for collection, storage, analysis, of network telemetry data. The evaluated
configurations of the TOE consist of one Stealthwatch Management Console (SMC), one or
more Flow Collectors (FC), one or more Flow Sensors (FS), and one or more UDP Directors
(UDPD). Each of the TOE components is available as a stand-alone physical appliance, or
as a virtual appliance. The physical and virtual appliances provide equivalent functionality
and a mixture of physical and virtual appliances can be deployed together.
Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise provides visibility and security analytics (threat detection, and
threat response) using on network traffic telemetry data. Stealthwatch Enterprise can
generate telemetry data directly (by directly monitoring traffic flows), or can collect
telemetry data generated by devices in an existing network infrastructure.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Configuration
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is a system comprised of four types of servers, each of which is comprised of both
software and hardware. The software is a proprietary build of Linux with Cisco Stealthwatch
applications; the hardware is Cisco UCS server platforms, which are used for the physical
appliances as well as for virtual appliances. The software is comprised of the Stealthwatch
software image Release 7.1.
The Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise components that comprise the TOE have common
hardware characteristics. Any hardware differences, e.g. the amount of RAM or drive space,
of the number of network interfaces, affect only non-TSF relevant functionality such as
throughput and amount of storage, and therefore support security equivalency of the TOE
component models.
This TOE is considered a ‘distributed’ TOE as defined in NDcPP in that this TOE requires
multiple distinct TOE components to operate as a logical whole in order to fulfil the
requirements of NDcPP, and those TOE components are separated (distributed) across a
network. This TOE includes one management component (SMC), and three types of
managed network devices (FC, FS, and UDPD).
The Stealthwatch Management Console (SMC) provides the administrative interface to
manage all TOE components. The SMC aggregates, organizes, and presents analysis from
up to 25 Flow Collectors, the Cisco Identity Services Engine, and other sources.
The Stealthwatch Flow Collector (FC) receives telemetry data from Stealthwatch Flow
Sensors and other sources such as routers, switches, firewalls, and endpoint agents. The FC
stores collected data in its internal database, analyses the data, sends event notifications to
SMC, and supports further forensics and long-term data analysis via customized reporting
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provided by the SMC. Multiple Flow Collectors may be managed by a single SMC and are
available as hardware appliances or as virtual machines.
The Flow Sensor (FS) produces telemetry for segments of the switching and routing
infrastructure that cannot generate NetFlow natively. The Flow Sensors connect directly to
a mirroring port or network tap to monitor network traffic and generate telemetry data.
Multiple Flow Sensors can be managed by a single SMC and are available as hardware
appliances or as virtual appliances to monitor virtual machine environments.
The UDP Director (UDPD) simplifies the collection and distribution of network and security
data across the enterprise. It helps reduce the processing power on network routers and
switches by receiving essential network and security information from multiple locations and
then forwarding it to a single data stream to one or more destinations. Multiple UDP
Directors can be managed by a single SMC and are available as hardware appliances or as
virtual appliances to monitor virtual machine environments.
The TOE consists of one or more physical devices and includes the Cisco Stealthwatch
software. The figure below shows each of the four TOE components in the operational
environment. The diagram shows one of each appliance (SMC, FC, FS, and UDPD), where
each appliance can be either physical or virtual. The diagram shows only a single icon for
the FC though the FC physical appliance is available in two forms: as a single appliance
(FC4210) with the engine and database installed to the same appliance; or as a pair of
appliances with the FC Engine on one appliance (FC5200E) and the FC Database on the
other appliance (FC5200D). Regardless of the form-factor, each FC model provides the
same TOE security functionality.
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This figure shows the protocols and connections (TLS, HTTPS, and the serial connections)
that are relevant to requirements within NDcPP. The TOE components also use other
protocols (e.g. domain name service (DNS), NetFlow and sFlow) that are not relevant to
NDcPP requirements as that traffic does not contain TSF data. Each appliance contains a
DNS client for fully qualified domain name (FQDN) resolution (e.g. for lightweight directory
access protocol (LDAP) servers, certification authorities (CAs), uniform resource locator
(URL) distribution points, and online certificate status protocol (OCSP) responders). The
FC receives NetFlow or sFlow traffic (depending on whether the FC was installed in sFlow
or NetFlow mode) from UDPD and FS. The FS monitors network traffic (via its promiscuous
(passive) interface) and generates sFlow or NetFlow data to transmit to an FC. The UDPD
receives sFlow or NetFlow traffic from monitored devices and forwards that traffic to an FC.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution composed of four major components: SMC,
FC, FS, and UDPD. The network, on which they reside, is considered part of the
environment. The TOE guidance documentation that is considered to be part of the TOE and
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includes the Cisco Stealthwatch Compliance Guide and additional guidance documents
referenced therein, all of which are downloadable from the http://cisco.com web site. The
TOE is comprised of the physical specifications as described in Section 8 below.
The ST identifies the following hardware, software and firmware in the operating
environment of the TOE:
• Management workstation with transport layer protocol (TLS) client (browser) –
required
• Management workstation with console connection – required
• Certification Authority – required
• LDAP Server – optional (the TOE also provides local authentication)
• Syslog Server - required
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Communication
3. Cryptographic support
4. Identification and authentication
5. Security management
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Security audit
The Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can
audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and
administrative actions. The Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise generates an audit record for each
auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event
description, and subject identity. The administrator configures auditable events, configures
secure transmission of audit records to a remote audit server, and manages audit data storage.
The TOE provides the administrator with a local circular audit trail. Audit messages are
stored locally and transmitted over an encrypted channel to an external audit server.
4.2 Communication
The TOE allows authorized administrators to control which Stealthwatch appliance (FC,
FS, and UDPD) is managed by the SMC. This is performed through a registration process
over TLS. The administrator can also de-register an appliance if he or she wishes to no
longer manage it through the SMC. For this TOE the process of registration/joining a new
managed appliance (FC, FS, UDPD) to the SMC is manually initiated by the administrator
installing each appliance. The initial TLS connection is authenticated to the SMC using the
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SMC administrator’s username/password, at which point the appliances exchange their
X.509 certificates, and from that point forward all TLS communications among appliances
are authenticated using X.509 certificates.
4.3 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other Cisco Stealthwatch security
functionality. This cryptography has been validated by the NIST CAVP.
The TOE provides cryptography in support for TLS, which is used for remote administrative
management, and secure communication among TOE components, and connects from the
TOE to LDAP and syslog servers. The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are
described in the table below.
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
AES Used to encrypt TLS session traffic.
ECDH Used to provide key exchange in TLS.
RSA Signature Services
X.509 certificate signing and verification.
Data signing and verification in TLS.
HMAC Used for keyed hash, integrity services in TLS session establishment.
DRBG
Used for random number generation
Used in TLS session establishment.
SHA Used to provide TLS traffic integrity verification
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Used in TLS session establishment.
During initial installation each TOE component generates its own unique self-signed
X.509v3 certificate, and during initial configuration all those certificates are replaced with
new CA-signed identity certificates which are then used for all TLS connections including
mutual authentication of TLS connections among TOE components. Each TOE component
generates its own unique keypair and its own certificate signing requests (CSR), and imports
TLS certificates that have been signed by an external CA server.
4.4 Identification and authentication
TOE components perform two types of authentication: password-based authentication of
administrators for remote administration TOE; and certificate-based authentication of
devices. Device-level authentication allows TOE components to establish secure channels
with other TOE components, and with external servers (LDAP and syslog).
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-
based authentication can be performed on the serial console, and the GUI (accessible via
HTTPS/TLS). For authentication to the GUI, the TOE optionally supports use of an
authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) server (using LDAP over TLS), which
would be outside the TOE boundary.
The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to
any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum
password length of 15 characters.
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After a configurable number of incorrect login attempts at administrative interfaces where
authentication is processed locally (i.e. where LDAP is not used), the TOE will lock the
offending account until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed.
4.5 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure HTTPS/TLS session or via a local console connection. The
TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification
and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality;
the timestamps maintained by the TOE; and updates to the TOE.
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by
the administrator. After a set amount of time of inactivity, the administrator will be locked
out of the administrator interface.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of plaintext cryptographic keys and passwords.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s
clock manually.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software. The TOE performs self-
testing to verify correct operation of its cryptographic module. The TOE components are
not general-purpose operating systems; root access is not permitted, external software
applications cannot be installed, and access to memory space is restricted to TOE functions.
The TOE is distributed, including multiple appliances that communicate with each other over
a network. These internal TOE communications between TOE components are protected
within TLS, and authenticated using X.509 certificates.
4.7 TOE access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate
to establish a new session.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface and the WebUI prior to allowing any administrative access to the
TOE.
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4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE establishes a trusted path with syslog servers using TLS, and with LDAP servers
using TLS. Remote administration of the TOE uses TLS/HTTPS. All communications
between TOE components are protected within TLS; the initial joining of TOE components
is authenticated using a username and password that’s manually entered during the joining
process, and subsequent communications between TOE components are automatically
authenticated using X.509 certificates.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP21 should be consulted if there
is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP21 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and
performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP21 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
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additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Cisco Stealthwatch Compliance Guide 7.1, Version 1.0, July 2, 2020
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21) for Cisco
Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1, Version 0.3, 07/17/2020 (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP21 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following physical and virtual devices all running
Cisco Stealthwatch software release 7.1.
Appliance Part Number Server platform Entropy Source
Stealthwatch appliances on UCS C-Series M5 servers
Stealthwatch Management
Console
ST-SMC2210-K9
L-ST-SMC-VE-K9
UCSC-C220-M5SX Intel®
Skylake
Scalable
Processor
Stealthwatch UDP Director
ST-UDP2210-K9
L-ST-UDP-VE-K9
Stealthwatch Flow Sensor
ST-FS1210-K9
ST-FS3210-K9
ST-FS4210-K9
L-ST-FS-VE-K9
Stealthwatch Flow Collector
ST-FC4210-K9
L-ST-FC-VE-K9
Stealthwatch Flow Collector
Engine
ST-FC5210E
Stealthwatch Flow Collector
Database
ST-FC5210D UCSC-C240-M5SX
Stealthwatch appliances on UCS C-Series M4 servers
Stealthwatch Management
Console
ST-SMC2200-K9
L-ST-SMC-VE-K9
UCSC-C220-M4S
Intel®
Xeon®
E5-
26XX
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Stealthwatch UDP Director
ST-UDP2200-K9
L-ST-UDP-VE-K9
Stealthwatch Flow Sensor
ST-FS1200-K9
ST-FS2200-K9
ST-FS3200-K9
ST-FS4200-K9
L-ST-FS-VE-K9
Stealthwatch Flow Collector
ST-FC4200-K9, or
L-ST-FC-VE-K9
Stealthwatch Flow Collector
Engine
ST-FC5200E
Stealthwatch Flow Collector
Database
ST-FC5200D UCSC-C240-M4S2
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Stealthwatch
Enterprise 7.1 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the security assurance requirements
(SARs) contained in the NDcPP21.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 products
that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP21 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP21 and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover
any residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there are
no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following sources:
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• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
• Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
• SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was performed on 06/22/2020 with the following search terms: “TCP", "router",
"switch", "TLS", "Cisco", "Stealthwatch".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the. Cisco Stealthwatch
Compliance Guide, Version 1.0, July 2, 2020. This includes ensuring that network time
protocol (NTP) communication, which is enabled by default, is properly disabled. In
addition, the Cisco Stealthwatch Compliance Guide contains compliance guidance for the
Department of Defense Information Network (DoDIN) approved products list (APL) as well
as the CC PCL; the Compliance Configuration Overview section indicates the sections of the
document that apply to each. Care must be taken to follow the guidance for those sections
marked as required for CC in order to place the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
The validation team notes that each TOE component listens on the default TLS/HTTPS port;
however, only the SMC supports remote authentication. Remote login is disabled on the
other components.
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The validation team notes that the TOE supports reference identifiers in either the Common
Name (CN) and the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension in X.509 certificates;
however, for inter-component communications, the SAN extension is required.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 Security Target,
Version 1.1, July 17, 2020.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 Validation Report Version 1.0, 07/21/2020
15
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.1, 24 September
2018.
[5] Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1 Security Target, Version 1.1, July 17, 2020 (ST).
[6] Assurance Activity Report (NDcPP21) for Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1,
Version 0.3, 07/17/2020 (AAR).
[7] Detailed Test Report (NDcPP21) for Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1, Version 1.2,
06/29/2020 (DTR).
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco Stealthwatch Enterprise 7.1, Version 0.3,
07/17/2020 (ETR)