JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
Certification Report
SAITO Yutaka, Commissioner
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
2-28-8 Honkomagome, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
IT Product (TOE)
Reception Date of Application
(Reception Number)
2023-04-20 (ITC-3844)
Certification Identification JISEC-C0792
Product Name
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX
8905i/8905/8995i/8995/8986i/8986 with PDL
Version and Release Numbers 310
Product Manufacturer Canon Inc.
Conformance of Functionality PP conformant functionality, CC Part 2 Extended
Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0
dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
Name of IT Security Evaluation
Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE has been certified as follows.
2023-10-13
YANO Tatsuro, Technical Manager
IT Security Technology Evaluation Department
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following standards
prescribed in the "IT Security Evaluation and Certification
Scheme Document."
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 Release 5
Evaluation Result: Pass
"Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i/8905/8995i/8995/8986i/8986 with PDL,
Version 310" has been evaluated based on the standards required, in accordance with the
provisions of the "Requirements for IT Security Certification" by Information-technology
Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report published
by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Product Overview............................................................................................................. 1
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package................................................................. 1
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality.............................................................................. 1
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives....................................................................... 2
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions ....................................................................... 2
1.1.3 Disclaimers................................................................................................................ 2
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation...................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Certification...................................................................................................................... 3
2 Identification............................................................................................................................ 4
3 Security Policy ......................................................................................................................... 6
3.1 Users.................................................................................................................................. 6
3.2 Assets ................................................................................................................................ 6
3.3 Threats.............................................................................................................................. 7
3.4 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................... 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ................................................................................ 9
4.1 Usage Assumptions .......................................................................................................... 9
4.2 Environmental Assumptions......................................................................................... 10
4.3 Clarification of Scope ......................................................................................................11
5 Architectural Information..................................................................................................... 12
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components .................................................................................. 12
5.2 IT Environment.............................................................................................................. 14
6 Documentation....................................................................................................................... 15
7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results ................................................ 16
7.1 Evaluation Facility......................................................................................................... 16
7.2 Evaluation Approach...................................................................................................... 16
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity.................................................................................... 16
7.4 IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................... 17
7.4.1 Developer Testing.................................................................................................... 17
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing ............................................................................. 17
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing............................................................................... 19
7.5 Evaluated Configuration ............................................................................................... 21
7.6 Evaluation Results......................................................................................................... 21
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 21
8 Certification ........................................................................................................................... 22
8.1 Certification Result........................................................................................................ 22
8.2 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 22
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
9 Annexes .................................................................................................................................. 22
10 Security Target................................................................................................................... 23
11 Glossary .............................................................................................................................. 24
12 Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 26
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report describes the content of the certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of "Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i/8905/8995i/8995/
8986i/8986 with PDL, Version 310" (hereinafter referred to as the "TOE") developed by
Canon Inc., and the evaluation of the TOE was completed on 2023-09-21 by ECSEC
Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Evaluation Facility").
It is intended to report to the sponsor, Canon Inc., and provide security information to
procurement entities and consumers who are interested in the TOE.
Readers of the Certification Report are advised to read the Security Target (hereinafter
referred to as the "ST") described in Chapter 10. Especially, details of security functional
requirements, assurance requirements and rationale for sufficiency of these requirements
of the TOE are described in the ST.
This Certification Report assumes procurement entities who purchase the TOE to be
readers. Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on
assurance requirements to which the TOE conforms, and does not guarantee an
individual IT product itself.
1.1 Product Overview
An overview of the TOE functions and operational conditions is described as follows.
Refer to Chapter 2 and subsequent chapters for details.
1.1.1 Protection Profile or Assurance Package
The TOE conforms to the following Protection Profile [14][15] (hereinafter referred to as
the "Conformance PP").
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
(Certification Identification: JISEC-C0553)
1.1.2 TOE and Security Functionality
The TOE is a multifunction product (hereinafter referred to as "MFP"), which has
functions such as print, scan, copy and document storage and retrieval.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP to prevent the
document data processed by the MFP and the setting data etc. affecting security from
unauthorized disclosure and alteration.
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For these security functions, the validity of the design policy and the accuracy of the
implementation were evaluated within the scope of the assurance requirements of the
Conformance PP.
Threats and assumptions assumed for the TOE are described in the following sections.
1.1.2.1 Threats and Security Objectives
The following threats are assumed for the TOE.
There are threats that user document data and data affecting security functions, which
are assets to be protected by the TOE, may be disclosed or altered by unauthorized
operation of the TOE or unauthorized access to the network to which the TOE is
connected.
There are also threats that security functions of the TOE may be compromised by the
failure of the TOE itself or installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE provides security functions required by the Conformance PP such as
identification and authentication, access control, encryption, and digital signature to
counter these threats.
1.1.2.2 Configuration and Assumptions
The TOE is assumed to be operated under the following configuration and assumptions.
It is assumed that the TOE is operated in the environment where unauthorized physical
access is restricted and it is connected to a LAN separated from the Internet.
The setting, administration and maintenance of the TOE must be performed in
accordance with the guidance documents by a trusted administrator. Users of the TOE
must have been trained in order to use the TOE securely.
1.1.3 Disclaimers
The following operation is not ensured by this evaluation:
- An environment different from that described in "4.2 Environmental Assumptions"
- TOE with settings different from those described in "7.5 Evaluated Configuration"
1.2 Conduct of Evaluation
Under the IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme that the Certification Body
operates, the Evaluation Facility conducted IT security evaluation and completed in 2023-
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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09, based on functional requirements and assurance requirements of the TOE according
to the publicized documents "IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme
Document"[1], "Requirements for IT Security Certification"[2], and "Requirements for
Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility"[3] provided by the Certification Body.
1.3 Certification
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report [13] prepared by the
Evaluation Facility as well as evaluation documentation, and confirmed that the TOE
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The certification
oversight reviews were also prepared for those concerns found in the certification process.
The Certification Body confirmed that all the concerns were fully resolved, and that the
TOE evaluation had been appropriately conducted in accordance with the CC ([4][5][6] or
[7][8][9]) and the CEM (either of [10][11]). The Certification Body prepared this
Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report and fully concluded
certification activities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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2 Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
TOE Name: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX
8905i/8905/8995i/8995/8986i/8986 with PDL
TOE Version: 310
This TOE is a product sold outside of Japan and one of the following:
・Sales area: North Americas
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995i with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8986i with PDL 310
・Sales area: South Americas
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995i with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8986i with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905 with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995 with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8986 with PDL 310
・Sales area: Europe, Oceania, Asia, Taiwan, Korea
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905 with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995 with PDL 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8986 with PDL 310
Users can verify that a product is the evaluated and certified TOE by the following
means.
Users confirm the following information displayed on the main unit and the control panel
of the TOE in accordance with the guidance documents:
- Vendor name: "Canon"
- Model name: One of the following:
“imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i”
“imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905”
“imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995i”
“imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995”
“imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8986i”
“imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8986”
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- Firmware: "310"
-PDL: "PCL" and "PS"
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3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the basic functions of the MFP such as print, scan, copy and document
storage and retrieval. It has the functionality to store the user document data in the TOE
and to communicate with user terminals and various servers via a network.
The TOE provides security functions that satisfy the requirements of the Conformance
PP, to protect the document data processed by the MFP and setting data etc. affecting
security.
As the background of the security functions provided by the TOE, user roles, assets,
threats, and organizational security policies assumed for the TOE are described in
following Section 3.1 to 3.4. Details of the security functions of the TOE are described in
Chapter 5.
3.1 Users
The user roles assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 User Roles
Designation Definition
Normal User A User who has been identified and authenticated and does not
have an administrative role
Administrator A User who has been identified and authenticated and has an
administrative role
3.2 Assets
The assets assumed to be protected by the TOE are shown in Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and
Table 3-4. There are two categories of the assets, User Data and TSF Data, as shown in
Table 3-2. Furthermore, User Data is classified as shown in Table 3-3 and TSF Data is as
shown in Table 3-4.
Table 3-2 Assets
Designation Asset category Definition
D.USER User Data Data created by and for Users that do not
affect the operation of the TSF
D.TSF TSF Data Data created by and for the TOE that might
affect the operation of the TSF
Table 3-3 Assets (User Data)
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Designation User Data Type Definition
D.USER.DOC User Document
Data
Information contained in a User’s Document,
in electronic or hardcopy form
D.USER.JOB User Job Data Information related to a User’s Document or
Document Processing Job
Table 3-4 Assets (TSF Data)
Designation TSF Data Type Definition
D.TSF.PROT Protected TSF
Data
TSF Data for which alteration by a User who
is neither the data owner nor in an
Administrator role might affect the security of
the TOE, but for which disclosure is
acceptable
D.TSF.CONF Confidential
TSF Data
TSF Data for which either disclosure or
alteration by a User who is neither the data
owner nor in an Administrator role might
affect the security of the TOE
3.3 Threats
The threats assumed for the TOE are shown in Table 3-5.
Table 3-5 Threats
Designation Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS An attacker may access (read, modify, or delete)
User Document Data or change (modify or delete)
User Job Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s
interfaces.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE An attacker may gain Unauthorized Access to TSF
Data in the TOE through one of the TOE’s
interfaces.
T.TSF_FAILURE A malfunction of the TSF may cause loss of security
if the TOE is permitted to operate.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE An attacker may cause the installation of
unauthorized software on the TOE.
T.NET_COMPROMISE An attacker may access data in transit or otherwise
compromise the security of the TOE by monitoring
or manipulating network communication.
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The organizational security policies required for the TOE are shown in Table 3-6.
Table 3-6 Organizational Security Policies
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Designation Definition
P.AUTHORIZATION Users must be authorized before performing
Document Processing and administrative
functions.
P.AUDIT Security-relevant activities must be audited and
the log of such actions must be protected and
transmitted to an External IT Entity.
P.COMMS_PROTECTION The TOE must be able to identify itself to other
devices on the LAN.
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION If the TOE stores User Document Data or
Confidential TSF Data on Field-Replaceable
Nonvolatile Storage Devices, it will encrypt such
data on those devices.
P.KEY_MATERIAL Cleartext keys, submasks, random numbers, or
any other values that contribute to the creation of
encryption keys for Field-Replaceable Nonvolatile
Storage of User Document Data or Confidential
TSF Data must be protected from unauthorized
access and must not be stored on that storage
device.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
This chapter describes the assumptions and the operational environment to operate the
TOE as useful information for the assumed readers to determine whether to use the TOE.
4.1 Usage Assumptions
Table 4-1 shows assumptions to operate the TOE. The effective performances of the TOE
security functions are not assured unless these assumptions are satisfied.
Table 4-1 Assumptions
Designation Definition
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it stores or processes, is assumed to be
provided by the environment.
A.NETWORK The Operational Environment is assumed to protect the
TOE from direct, public access to its LAN interface.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to administer the TOE
according to site security policies.
A.TRAINED_USERS Authorized Users are trained to use the TOE according
to site security policies.
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4.2 Environmental Assumptions
Figure 4-1 shows the operational environment assumed for the TOE. The TOE is installed
in a general office and used in an environment connected to the internal network of the
organization. Users operate the control panel of the TOE or a client PC connected to the
internal network to use the TOE.
Figure 4-1 Operational Environment of the TOE
The operational environment of the TOE consists of the following components.
(1) Client PC
It is a general PC used by users. The following software is required. Only system
administrators can operate the TOE from Web browser.
- OS: Windows 10
- Printer Driver:
Generic Plus UFRII Printer Driver V2.80
Generic Plus PS3 Printer Driver V2.80
Generic Plus PCL6 Printer Driver V2.80
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge（for administrators only）
(2) Audit Log Server
An audit log server is a server to store audit logs generated by the TOE. SMB
supporting software is required.
The following software was used in this evaluation.
・OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard
・SMB software: Included in OS
(3) Time Server
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A time server is a server for the TOE to obtain accurate time. SNTP supporting
software is required.
The following software was used in this evaluation.
・OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard
・SNTP software: Included in OS
(4) File Server
A file server is used to send user document data scanned by the TOE. SMB
supporting software is required.
The following software was used in this evaluation.
・OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard
・SMB software: Included in OS
It should be noted that the reliability of the hardware and the software other than the
TOE shown in this configuration is outside the scope of this evaluation. Those are
assumed to be trustworthy.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
There are the following restrictions on the functions provided by the TOE or ensured by
this evaluation.
1) Servers and client PCs
Various servers and client PCs that operate in cooperation with the TOE must be
connected via IPsec.
Furthermore, the TOE does not provide the function to select to apply or not apply
IPsec for each device communicated over network.
Therefore, it is not possible to apply IPsec to various servers and not apply IPsec to
client PCs.
Administrators are responsible for operating servers and client PCs cooperating
with the TOE securely.
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5 Architectural Information
This chapter explains the scope and the main components of the TOE.
5.1 TOE Boundary and Components
Figure 5-1 shows the composition of the TOE. In Figure 5-1, the TOE is the part described
as "TOE" in the center of the figure and is the entire MFP with the necessary option.
Figure 5-1 TOE boundary
The functions provided by the TOE consist of basic functions of the MFP and security
functions. In Figure 5-1, the colored parts in the TOE are security functions, and the
other functions in the TOE are basic functions. The security functions of the TOE are
described below. For details on the basic MFP functions, see Chapter 11.
(1) User Authentication Function
This function is a function to identify and authenticate users with their names and
passwords when users use the TOE from the control panel of MFP, Web browser of
client PC, or Printer driver of client PC.
LAN Data Protection Function
SSD
UI Func
User
Audit Log Server
LAN Data Protection
File Management
Function
File Server
LAN Data Protection
File Share Function
Client PC
LAN Data Protection
Web
Browser
DocData
DocData
Audit Log
Hardcopy
document
Time Server
Time Function
TimeInfo
Output Func
Input Func
Print
Scan
Copy Storage /
Retrieval
User Authentication Function
Self-Testing Function
Access Control Function
SSD Encryption Function
Management Function
Audit Log Function
Signature Verification and
Generation Function
LAN Data Protection
Flow of data
Operate/
Display
Hardcopy
document
Trusted Update
TOE
Printer
Driver
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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This function has the following functionality to reinforce the identification and
authentication.
- Restriction on the minimum password length.
- Account lockout after successive authentication failures.
- Termination of the session if there is no operation for a certain time after the
successful authentication.
(2) Access Control Function
This function is a function to control the access to the user data when users operate
the basic functions of the MFP on them.
The access control is performed based on the owner information of the user data and
on the user's identification information and role.
(3) SSD Encryption Function
This function is a function to encrypt the data stored in the TOE. The encryption of
the stored data uses AES XTS mode with a 256-bit key.
Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy
that is difficult to guess.
(4) LAN Data Protection Function
This function is a function to protect communication data between the TOE and IT
devices using encryption communication protocol, IPsec. Furthermore, HTTPS is
also available between the TOE and Web browser of client PC.
Encryption keys are generated using a random bit generator with enough entropy
that is difficult to guess.
(5) Signature Verification and Generation Function
This function is a function to verify and generate a digital signature used in "LAN
Data Protection function".
(6) Management Function
This function is a function to restrict the setting, etc. of the security functions to
administrators. However, normal users can change their passwords.
(7) Audit Log Function
This function is a function to generate audit logs on audit events relevant to the
security functions and send them to an audit log server. Generated audit logs are
also stored in the TOE.
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When the stored logs exceed the storage capacity, the oldest one is deleted to store a
new audit log. Only administrators can browse the stored audit logs from the web
browser of client PC.
(8) Trusted Update Function
This function is a function to verify the digital signature of new firmware when the
firmware is updated.
(9) Self-Testing Function
This function is a function to verify the digital signature of the firmware at start-up
of the TOE.
5.2 IT Environment
The TOE communicates with servers and client PCs via LAN.
The function of the TOE described in " (4) LAN Data Protection Function" works in
cooperation with those IT devices and uses the following protocols:
- Servers: IPsec
- Client PC (Printer driver): IPsec
- Client PC (Web browser): IPsec or IPsec and HTTPS
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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6 Documentation
The identification of documents attached to the TOE is listed in Table 6-1 and Table 6-2.
There are two sets of the guidance documents depending on the sales area. TOE users are
required to fully understand and comply with the following documents in order to satisfy
the assumptions.
Table 6-1 Guidance (English: USE Version)
Name Version
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8900 Series
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices adaptive
Security Settings Administrator Guide
USRMA-8883-00 20230920
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i / 8905 / 8995i
/ 8995 / 8986i / 8986 User's Guide (for CC
certification reference)
USRMA-8885-00
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8900 series
ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Administrator
Guide (for CC certification reference)
USRMA-8887-00
Table 6-2 Guidance (English: APE Version)
Name Version
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8900 Series
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices adaptive
Security Settings Administrator Guide
USRMA-8883-00 20230920
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905 / 8995 / 8986
User's Guide(for CC certification reference)
USRMA-8889-00
imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8900 series
ACCESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Administrator
Guide (for CC certification reference)
USRMA-8890-00
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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7 Evaluation conducted by Evaluation Facility and Results
7.1 Evaluation Facility
ECSEC Laboratory Inc., Evaluation Center that conducted the evaluation as the
Evaluation Facility is approved under JISEC and is accredited by NITE (National
Institute of Technology and Evaluation), the Accreditation Body, which joins Mutual
Recognition Arrangement of ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation).
It is periodically confirmed that the above Evaluation Facility meets the requirements on
the appropriateness of the management and evaluators for maintaining the quality of
evaluation.
7.2 Evaluation Approach
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the assurance requirements in the CC
Part 3 required by the Conformance PP using the evaluation methods prescribed in the
CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Details for evaluation activities were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report. The
Evaluation Technical Report explains the summary of the TOE as well as the content of
the evaluation and the verdict for each work unit in the CEM and assurance activity of
the Conformance PP.
7.3 Overview of Evaluation Activity
The history of the evaluation conducted is described in the Evaluation Technical Report
as follows.
The evaluation started in 2023-04 and concluded upon completion of the Evaluation
Technical Report dated 2023-09. The Evaluation Facility received a full set of evaluation
deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by the developer, and examined the
evidence in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Furthermore, the evaluator
conducted the evaluator testing at the developer site in 2023-05.
Concerns in the evaluation process that the Certification Body found were described as
the certification oversight reviews and sent to the Evaluation Facility.
After the Evaluation Facility and the developer examined the concerns, those were
reflected in the Evaluation Technical Report.
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7.4 IT Product Testing
As the verification results of the evidence presented in the evaluation process, the
evaluator performed the evaluator independent testing to ensure that the security
functions of the product are accurately implemented and the evaluator penetration
testing based on the vulnerability assessment.
7.4.1 Developer Testing
The developer testing is not included in the assurance requirements of this evaluation.
7.4.2 Evaluator Independent Testing
The evaluator conducted evaluator independent testing (hereinafter referred to as
"independent testing") based on the evidence presented during the evaluation to ensure
that the security functions of the product are accurately implemented. The independent
testing performed by the evaluator is explained as follows.
1) Independent Testing Environment
The environment for the independent testing is based on the operational
environment of the TOE shown in Figure 4-1. The components used in the
independent testing environment are listed in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Components of Independent Testing
Components Description
TOE Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905 with PDL
Version: 310
Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8995i with PDL
Version: 310
Client PC - OS: Windows 10
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge
- Printer Driver:
Generic Plus PS3 Printer Driver V2.80
Generic Plus PCL6 Printer Driver V2.80
Generic Plus UFRII Printer Driver V2.80
Audit Log Server - OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard Edition
Time Server - OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard Edition
File Server - OS: Windows Server 2022 Standard Edition
There are following differences between the configuration of the independent testing
and the TOE configuration identified in the ST. The evaluator determined that there
are no problems with those differences and that the security functions of the TOE
configuration identified in the ST can be considered properly tested.
(1) Tested models
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In the models of the TOE described in Chapter 2 "TOE identification," there are
multiple models due to the following differences:
- Differences in PDL Configurations (Standard or Optional)
- Difference in printing speed
The evaluator determined that the security functions of all the models of the TOE
can be considered to have been tested by testing the representative two models
considering the above differences, because the security functions of each models
are the same.
(2) Using a modified firmware for testing
In the independent testing, a firmware modified for testing was used to confirm
the encryption functions and input-output data of SSD instead of the firmware of
the TOE. The evaluator determined that the testing on the modified firmware is
valid because the modification for testing does not affect the functions of the test
target.
(3) Using additional testing tools
In the independent testing, some testing tools were used to confirm and alter the
communication data and to confirm the encryption functions. The validity of those
testing tools was confirmed by the evaluator.
2) Summary of the Independent Testing
A summary of the independent testing is as follows.
a. Viewpoints of the Independent Testing
The viewpoints of the independent testing devised by the evaluator based on the
requirements of the Conformance PP and on the evaluation documentation
submitted for evaluation are shown below.
<Viewpoints of the Independent Testing>
1. Confirm security functions for each Security Functional Requirement (SFR).
2. Confirm that the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms is correct.
b. Independent Testing Outline
An outline of the independent testing that the evaluator performed is as follows.
<Independent Testing Approach>
The behavior of the TOE for inputs using the control panel of the TOE, the client
PC and the testing tools was confirmed by following means:
- If the behavior can be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the
external interfaces of the TOE including audit logs are used.
- If the behavior cannot be confirmed from the external interfaces of the TOE, the
developer interface of the TOE is used.
<Content of the Performed Independent Testing>
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The independent testing was performed on 17 items by the evaluator.
Table 7-2 shows contents of the independent testing corresponding to the
viewpoints.
Table 7-2 Content of the Performed Independent Testing
Viewpoint Outline of the Independent Testing
1 Confirmation of security functions
Confirm that all security functions work as the specification with the test
items created based on the assurance activities of the Conformance PP for
each SFR or the requirements of the SFR.
2 Confirmation of implementation of cryptographic algorithms
Confirm the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented as the
specification using the test program installed in the TOE.
- RSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
- ECDSA (key generation, signature generation/verification)
- AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256
- XTS- AES-256
- SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384
- CTR_DRBG (AES), Hash_DRBG (SHA-256)
c. Result
All the independent testing performed by the evaluator was correctly completed,
and the evaluator confirmed the behavior of the TOE. The evaluator confirmed
consistencies between the expected behavior and all the testing results.
7.4.3 Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator devised and performed the evaluator penetration testing (hereinafter
referred to as the "penetration testing") on the potentially exploitable vulnerabilities of
concern under the assumed environment of use and attack level from the evidence
presented in the process of the evaluation. The penetration testing performed by the
evaluator is explained as follows.
(1) Summary of the Penetration Testing
A summary of the penetration testing performed by the evaluator is as follows.
a. Vulnerability of Concern
The evaluator searched into the provided documentation and the publicly available
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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information for the potential vulnerabilities, and then identified the following
vulnerabilities which require the penetration testing.
1. There is a concern that unintended network ports of the TOE may be open.
2. There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the Web interface of
the TOE.
3. There is a concern that known vulnerabilities may exist in the print processing
of the TOE.
4. There is a concern that unintended programs may be executed by the malicious
input from the control panel of the TOE or printer driver.
b. Penetration Testing Outline
The evaluator performed the following penetration testing to identify potentially
exploitable vulnerabilities.
<Penetration Testing Environment>
The penetration testing was performed in the same environment as that of the
evaluator independent testing, except for the additional tools for penetration
testing. Table 7-3 shows the tools used in the penetration testing.
Table 7-3 Penetration Testing Tools
Name Outline and Purpose of Use
nmap 7.92 A tool to detect available network service ports.
Burp Suite Pro 1.7.37 The tool is used to refer and alter the
communication data between Web browser and
Web server (TOE).
PRET 0.40 A tool to inspect various vulnerabilities in a
printing processing.
<Content of the Performed Penetration Testing>
Table 7-4 shows vulnerabilities of concern and the content of the penetration
testing corresponding to them.
Table 7-4 Content of the Performed Penetration Testing
Vulnerability Penetration Testing Outline
1 - Confirm that unexpected network ports of the TOE are not open using
Nmap.
2 - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in the Web interface
of the TOE using Burp Suite Pro.
3 - Confirm that there are no known vulnerabilities in print processing of
the TOE using PRET.
4 - Confirm that unexpected behaviour is not observed even if the
character strings that may cause unauthrised processing are input in
the control panel and printer driver of the TOE.
c. Result
In the penetration testing performed by the evaluator, the evaluator did not find
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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any exploitable vulnerabilities that attackers who have the assumed attack
potential could exploit.
7.5 Evaluated Configuration
The conditions of the TOE configuration, that are prerequisites for this evaluation, are as
described in the guidance documents listed in Chapter 6. In order to use the TOE securely
as ensured by the evaluation, the TOE must be set as described in the guidance
documents. Different settings are not subject to assurance by this evaluation.
7.6 Evaluation Results
The evaluator had concluded that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in the CEM
and all assurance activities in the Conformance PP as per the Evaluation Technical
Report.
In the evaluation, the following were confirmed.
- PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance [16]
Treatment regarding FCS_RBG_ EXT.1 Test
Treatment regarding FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1
Treatment regarding FCS_TLS_ EXT.1.1 Test
- Security functional requirements: Common Criteria Part 2 Extended
- Security assurance requirements: Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict "PASS" was confirmed for the following
assurance components required by the Conformance PP.
ASE_INT.1, ASE_CCL.1, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_OBJ.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_REQ.1,
ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The result of the evaluation is only applied to those which are composed by the TOE
corresponding to the identification described in the Chapter 2.
7.7 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
There is no evaluator recommendation to be addressed to procurement entities.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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8 Certification
Based on the evidence submitted by the Evaluation Facility during the evaluation
process, the Certification Body has performed certification by checking that the following
requirements are satisfied:
1. The submitted documentation was sampled, the content was examined, and the related
work units in the CEM and assurance activities of the Conformance PP shall be
evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical Report.
2. Rationale of the evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
3. The evaluator's evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical Report
shall conform to the CEM and the assurance activities of the Conformance PP.
Concerns found in the certification process were prepared as the certification oversight
reviews, and they were sent to the Evaluation Facility. The Certification Body confirmed
such concerns pointed out in the certification oversight reviews were solved in the ST and
the Evaluation Technical Report and issued this Certification Report.
8.1 Certification Result
As a result of verification of the Evaluation Technical Report, and related evaluation
documentation submitted by the Evaluation Facility, the Certification Body determined
that the TOE evaluation satisfies the assurance requirements required by the
Conformance PP.
8.2 Recommendations
Procurement entities who are interested in the TOE are advised to refer "4.3 Clarification
of Scope" and "7.5 Evaluated Configuration" to make sure the scope of the evaluation and
the operational requirements of the TOE meet the operational conditions assumed by
each user.
9 Annexes
There is no annex.
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10 Security Target
The Security Target [12] of the TOE is provided as a separate document from this
Certification Report.
Title: Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX
8905i/8905/8995i/8995/8986i/8986 with PDL Security Target
Version: 1.10
Publication Date: 2023-09-20
Author: Canon Inc.
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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11 Glossary
The abbreviations relating to the CC used in this report are listed below.
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
PP Protection Profile
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
The abbreviations relating to the TOE used in this report are listed below.
MFP Multifunction Product
PDL Page Description Language
The abbreviations relating to information technology used in this report are listed below.
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CTR_DRBG Counter (CTR) mode block cipher algorithm DRBG
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCM Galois/ Counter Mode
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SMB Server Message Block
SNTP Simple Network Time Protocol
XTS XEX encryption mode with tweak and ciphertext stealing
The definitions of terms used in this report are listed below.
Copy function A function to scan paper documents by operating the control
panel and print them.
Scan function A function to scan paper documents by operating the control
panel and send the scanned user document data to a file
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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server.
Print function A function to receive user document data from the printer
driver of a client PC, and then print out them by operating the
control panel of the MFP.
Document Storage
and Retrieval
function
A function to store user document data in the MFP and
retrieve them.
Document storage functionality is to scan paper documents by
operating the control panel of the MFP and store the scanned
user document data.
Document retrieval functionality is to print out stored user
document data by operating control panel of the MFP.
Assurance Activity Evaluation work to be performed by an evaluator in order to
conform to a PP. It is a supplement of the CEM. In the case of
the Conformance PP [14], it is described in the Conformance
PP.
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12 Bibliography
[1] IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme Document, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCS-01
[2] Requirements for IT Security Certification, October 2020,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-02
[3] Requirements for Approval of IT Security Evaluation Facility, October 2021,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, CCM-03
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001
[5] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002
[6] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003
[7] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-
001, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[8] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-002, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[9] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-003, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[10] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004
[11] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation methodology, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017,
CCMB-2017-04-004, (Japanese Version 1.0, July 2017)
[12] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i/8905/8995i/8995/8986i/8986 with PDL
Security Target, Version 1.10, September 20, 2023, Canon Inc.
[13] Canon imageRUNNER ADVANCE DX 8905i/8905/8995i/8995/8986i/8986 with PDL
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, September 21, 2023, ECSEC Laboratory
Inc., Evaluation Center
[14] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices 1.0 dated September 10, 2015 (Certification
Identification: JISEC-C0553)
JISEC-CC-CRP-C0792-01-2023
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[15] Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices - v1.0 Errata #1, June 2017
[16] Guideline for Certification Application with HCD-PP Conformance, Version 1.8,
November 11, 2020, Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan, JISEC-CERT-
2020-A18