IAS ECC V2
in configuration #1
Public Security Target
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About IDEMIA
OT-Morpho is now IDEMIA, the global leader in trusted identities for an increasingly digital
world, with the ambition to empower citizens and consumers alike to interact, pay, connect,
travel and vote in ways that are now possible in a connected environment.
Securing our identity has become mission critical in the world we live in today. By standing
for Augmented Identity, we reinvent the way we think, produce, use and protect this asset,
whether for individuals or for objects. We ensure privacy and trust as well as guarantee
secure, authenticated and verifiable transactions for international clients from Financial,
Telecom, Identity, Security and IoT sectors.
With close to €3bn in revenues, IDEMIA is the result of the merger between OT (Oberthur
Technologies) and Safran Identity & Security (Morpho). This new company counts 14,000
employees of more than 80 nationalities and serves clients in 180 countries.
| For more information, visit www.idemia.com / Follow @IdemiaGroup on Twitter
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© IDEMIA. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties of their respective owners.
- Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled -
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DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Business Unit – Department SE Campus France
Document type FQR
Document Title IAS ECC V2 in configuration #1 – Public Security Target
FQR No 110 8711
FQR Issue 3
Project Name IAS ECC V2
DOCUMENT REVISION
Date Revision Modification Modified by
[2017/12/11] 1.0 Creation IDEMIA
[2018/03/23] 2.0 Add § 6.3 10 and AGD_PRE version IDEMIA
[2018/04/24] 3.0 Life cycle precisions IDEMIA
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1 DEFINITIONS.......................................................................................................11
2 REFERENCES........................................................................................................13
3 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION.......................................................................16
3.1 Security Target Reference .................................................................................... 16
3.2 TOE Reference .................................................................................................... 16
3.3 TOE overview...................................................................................................... 17
3.3.1 TOE Type...................................................................................................... 17
3.3.2 Logical scope ................................................................................................ 17
3.3.3 Physical scope............................................................................................... 18
3.3.4 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware.............................................. 19
3.3.5 Usage and major security features .................................................................. 20
3.3.6 Scope of evaluation....................................................................................... 20
3.4 TOE Description .................................................................................................. 21
3.4.1 Data structure ............................................................................................... 21
3.4.1.1 File and File System................................................................................................... 21
3.4.1.2 Security Environment................................................................................................. 23
3.4.1.3 Security data Objects ................................................................................................. 24
3.4.2 Access Control Management .......................................................................... 25
3.4.3 Authentication of entities ............................................................................... 25
3.4.4 Electronic Services........................................................................................ 25
3.4.5 Administration of the TOE............................................................................. 26
3.4.6 Single Sign on feature (SSO).......................................................................... 26
3.5 Life Cycle ............................................................................................................ 26
3.5.1 Development................................................................................................ 28
3.5.1.1 Software development (phase 1) ................................................................................ 28
3.5.1.2 Hardware development (Phase 2) ............................................................................... 28
3.5.1.3 Javacard open platform manufacturing (phase 3)......................................................... 29
3.5.2 Production ................................................................................................... 29
3.5.2.1 Packaging and initialization (phase 4) .......................................................................... 29
3.5.2.2 Preparation (phase 5)................................................................................................. 29
3.5.3 Operational state.......................................................................................... 30
3.5.3.1 Applet pre-personalization (phase 6)........................................................................... 30
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3.5.3.2 TOE personalization (phase 6)..................................................................................... 30
3.5.3.3 TOE Usage (phase 7) .................................................................................................. 31
3.5.4 Coverage of the different Life cycle state by the assurance components [AGD] & [ALC]
................................................................................................................... 31
3.5.5 State of the TOE depending on the phase ........................................................ 32
3.5.6 Mapping with the Users................................................................................. 33
4 CONFORMANCE CLAIM........................................................................................35
4.1 CC and package Conformance claim...................................................................... 35
4.2 PP Conformance Claim......................................................................................... 35
4.3 Conformance rationale ........................................................................................ 36
4.3.1 Life cycle conformance .................................................................................. 36
4.3.2 Additional assets........................................................................................... 36
4.3.3 Additional Roles............................................................................................ 37
4.3.4 Additional threats ......................................................................................... 37
4.3.5 Additional OSPs ............................................................................................ 37
4.3.6 Additional objectives..................................................................................... 38
4.3.6.1 Additional Security objectives for the TOE ................................................................... 38
4.3.6.2 Additional Security objectives for the Operational Environment.................................... 38
4.3.7 Additional SFRs............................................................................................. 38
4.3.8 Package conformance.................................................................................... 39
5 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..........................................................................40
5.1 Assets and users.................................................................................................. 40
5.1.1 Assets.......................................................................................................... 40
5.1.1.1 Assets from protection profiles: User Data................................................................... 40
5.1.1.2 Additional Assets : TSF Data........................................................................................ 40
5.1.2 Subjects ....................................................................................................... 41
5.2 Threats............................................................................................................... 41
5.2.1 Threats drawn from the protection profiles...................................................... 41
5.2.1.1 T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data .................. 41
5.2.1.2 T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data........................................................ 41
5.2.1.3 T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces............................................ 42
5.2.1.4 T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature verification data ............................................ 42
5.2.1.5 T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE............................. 42
5.2.1.6 T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R ...................................................................... 42
5.2.1.7 T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature........................................................ 42
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5.2.2 Additional threats ......................................................................................... 42
5.2.2.1 T.Key_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of a key stored in the TOE........................ 42
5.2.2.2 T.Key_Derive Derive a key......................................................................................... 42
5.2.2.3 T.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Forgery Forgery of the public key of a TOE authentication key ..... 43
5.2.2.4 T.Authentication_Replay Replay of an authentication of an external entity ................... 43
5.3 Organisational Security Policies............................................................................ 43
5.3.1 Security policies drawn from the protection profiles ......................................... 43
5.3.1.1 P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate .............................................................................. 43
5.3.1.2 P.Qsign Qualified electronic signatures ...................................................................... 43
5.3.1.3 P. Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device .................................................. 43
5.3.1.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud Non-repudiation of signatures.......................................................... 44
5.3.2 Additional security policies............................................................................. 44
5.3.2.1 P.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate Link between a SCD stored in the TOE and the relevant qualified
certificate.................................................................................................................. 44
5.3.2.2 P.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Cert Certificate for asymmetric TOE authentication keys ............ 44
5.3.2.3 P.TOE_Construction Construction of the TOE by the Personalization Agent................... 44
5.3.2.4 P.eServices Provision of eServices............................................................................. 44
5.4 Assumptions....................................................................................................... 45
5.4.1 A.CGA Trustworthy certificate generation application...................................... 45
5.4.2 A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application........................................... 45
5.4.3 A.CSP Secure SCD/SVD management by SCD ................................................... 45
6 SECURITY OBJECTIVES..........................................................................................46
6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................. 46
6.1.1 Security Objectives drawn from the protection profiles..................................... 46
6.1.1.1 OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security........................................................................ 46
6.1.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation.............................................. 46
6.1.1.3 OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data......................................... 46
6.1.1.4 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD...................................... 46
6.1.1.5 OT.SCD_Auth_Imp Authorized SCD import .................................................................. 46
6.1.1.6 OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature creation data .............................................. 46
6.1.1.7 OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature................................. 47
6.1.1.8 OT.Sigy_SigF Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only ................... 47
6.1.1.9 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE .............................................. 47
6.1.1.10 OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security............................................. 47
6.1.1.11 OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection............................................................................... 47
6.1.1.12 OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance.................................................................. 47
6.1.1.13 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth Authentication proof as SSCD........................................................ 47
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6.1.1.14 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp TOE trusted channel for SVD export............................................. 47
6.1.1.15 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import....................................... 48
6.1.1.16 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp Trusted channel of the TOE for DTBS import .............................. 48
6.1.2 Additional Security Objectives for the TOE ....................................................... 48
6.1.2.1 OT.Authentication_Secure Secure authentication mechanisms..................................... 48
6.1.2.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Management Management of SCD/SVD ................................................. 48
6.1.2.3 OT.Key_Lifecycle_Security Life cycle security of the keys stored in the TOE .................... 48
6.1.2.4 OT.Keys_Secrecy Secrecy of Keys................................................................................ 49
6.1.2.5 OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique Uniqueness of the TOE authentication key(s) ......................... 49
6.1.2.6 OT.Lifecycle_Management Management of the life cycle.............................................. 49
6.1.2.7 OT.eServices Provision of eServices............................................................................ 49
6.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ............................................. 50
6.2.1 Security Objectives drawn from the protection profiles..................................... 50
6.2.1.1 OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD.......................................................................... 50
6.2.1.2 OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates....................................................... 50
6.2.1.3 OE.Dev_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisionning Service................ 50
6.2.1.4 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp Trusted channel of HID for VAD export ........................................ 50
6.2.1.5 OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed................................................ 50
6.2.1.6 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS export ..................................... 51
6.2.1.7 OE.Signatory Security obligation of the signatory........................................................ 51
6.2.1.8 OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation.............................................. 51
6.2.1.9 OE.SCD_Secrecy SCD Secrecy ..................................................................................... 51
6.2.1.10 OE.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data.......................................... 51
6.2.1.11 OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondance between SVD and SCD....................................... 51
6.2.1.12 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth Pre-initialisation of the TOE for SSCD authentication ...................... 51
6.2.1.13 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp CGA trusted channel for SVD import ........................................... 52
6.2.2 Additional security objectives for the operational environment.......................... 52
6.2.2.1 OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate Link betwaan SCD stored in the TOE and the relevant qualified
certificate.................................................................................................................. 52
6.2.2.2 OE.AuthKey_Transfer Secure transfer of authentication key(s) to the TOE ..................... 52
6.2.2.3 OE.AuthKey_Unique Uniqueness of the authentication key(s)...................................... 52
6.2.2.4 OE.TOE_PublicKeyAuth_Transfer Secure transfer of public authentication key(s) of the TOE52
6.2.2.5 OE_TOE_Construction Construction of the TOE by the Personalisation_Agent................ 52
6.3 Security Objectives Rationale ............................................................................... 53
6.3.1 Security objectives backtracking ..................................................................... 53
6.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency ........................................................................ 55
7 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION..................................................................61
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7.1 FPT_EMS TOE Emanation ..................................................................................... 61
7.2 FCS_RNG Random Number Generation ................................................................. 62
7.3 FIA_API Authentication proof of Identity............................................................... 63
8 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................65
8.1 Security Functional Requirements......................................................................... 65
8.1.1 Security attributes......................................................................................... 65
8.1.1.1 SCD/SVD Management............................................................................................... 65
8.1.1.2 SCD Operational ........................................................................................................ 66
8.1.1.3 IAS ECC Management................................................................................................. 66
8.1.1.4 Key Management ...................................................................................................... 66
8.1.2 SFRs drawn for PP ......................................................................................... 67
8.1.2.1 Phase 6&7................................................................................................................. 67
8.1.2.2 Phase 7 ..................................................................................................................... 80
8.1.3 Additional SFRs............................................................................................. 84
8.1.3.1 Phase 6 ..................................................................................................................... 84
8.1.3.2 Phase 7 ..................................................................................................................... 86
8.1.3.3 Phase 6 & 7 ............................................................................................................... 94
8.2 Security Assurance Requirements....................................................................... 103
8.2.1 AVA_VAN.5 augmentation ........................................................................... 104
8.2.2 ALC_DVS.2 augmentation ............................................................................ 104
9 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS ........................................................................118
9.1 SF.RAD_MGT..................................................................................................... 118
9.2 SF.SIG............................................................................................................... 118
9.3 SF.DEV_AUTH ................................................................................................... 119
9.4 SF.ADM_AUTH.................................................................................................. 119
9.5 SF.SM............................................................................................................... 120
9.6 SF.KEY_MGT ..................................................................................................... 120
9.7 SF.CONF ........................................................................................................... 121
9.8 SF.ESERVICE...................................................................................................... 121
9.9 SF.SAFESTATE_MGT........................................................................................... 121
9.10 SF.PHYS............................................................................................................ 122
10 ANNEX A – COMPOSITION WITH THE UNDERLYING JAVACARD PLATFORM ...........123
10.1 Evaluation assurance Level................................................................................. 123
10.2 Coverage of the Assumptions of the Javacard Open Platform (A.PLT vs TOE) .......... 123
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10.3 Coverage of the OSP of the Javacard Open Platform (OSP.PLT vs TOE) ................... 123
10.4 Coverage of the security objective of the Javacard Open Platform Environment (OE.PLT vs
TOE)................................................................................................................. 123
10.5 Support of the TOE TSFs by the Javacard Open Platform TSFs (TSF.TOE vs TSF.SFR). 123
10.6 Support of the TOE SFRs by the Javacard Open Platform SFRs (SFR.TOE vs SFR.PLT) 124
10.7 Coverage of the composite ST threats by the platform threats .............................. 127
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DEFINITIONS
ADF Application Dedicated File
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AID Application Identifier
AMB Access Mode Byte
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit (command received/Data sent by the chip)
API Application Programming Interfaces
CA Certification authority
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CGA Certificate Generation Authority (Authority in charge of generating the qualified certificate(s))
C/S Client / Server
CSE Current Security Environment
DAP Data Authentication Pattern (enable to ensure integrity & authenticity of javacard package when loaded)
CSP Certificate Service Provider
DAPP Device Authentication with Privacy Protection
DES Data Encryption Standard
DF Dedicated File
DH Diffie Hellman
DTBS Data to be signed (Sent by the SCA)
DTBS Representation Representation of the Data to be signed
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FID File identifier
GP Global Platform
HI Human Interface (used to enter the RAD and VAD by the user)
IC Integrated Chip
ICC Integrated Chip card
IFD Interface Device
MAC Message Authentication code
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RAD Reference Authentication Data (PIN stored)
RCA Root Certification Authority
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ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
RSA CRT Rivest Shamir Adleman – Chinese Remainder Theorem
SCA Signature creation Application (Application requiring a qualified signature to the chip)
SCB Security Condition Byte
SCD Signature Creation Data (Signature key)
SCP Secure Channel Procotol
SDO Security Data Object
SE Security Environment
SHA Secure hashing Algorithm
SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device
SSE Static Security Environment
SSESP Static Security Environment for Security Policies
SSO Single Sign On
SVD Signature Verification Data (Signature Verification key)
TOE Target of evaluation
URL Uniform Resource Locator
USB Universal Serial Bus
VAD Verification Authentication Data (PIN submitted by the holder)
XML eXtensible Markup Language
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REFERENCES
[Directive] Directive 1999/93/EC of the european parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a
community framework for electronic signatures
[AN10] JIL - Certification of "open" smart card products - Version 1.1 - 4 February 2013
[ANSIX9.31] "Digital Signatures using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry
(DSA)" - ANSI X9.31-1998, American Bankers Association
[ANSIX9.62] ANSI x9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry – The Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
[CC31-1] “Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
general model", September 2012, Version 3.1 revision 4
[CC31-2] “Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
requirements", September 2012, Version 3.1 revision 4
[CC31-3] “Common Criteria for information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
requirements", September 2012, Version 3.1 revision 4
[FIPS180-3] "FIPS PUB 180-3, Secure Hash Standard"
October 2008 , National Institute of Standards and Technology
[GP2.2.1] Global Platform, Card Specification - Version 2.2.1 – January 2011.
[IASECC] European Card for e-Services and national e-ID Applications - IAS ECC v1.0.1
[IEEE] IEEE Std 1363a-2004 Standard Specification of Public-Key Cryptography
[JIL-COMP] Joint Interpretation Library - Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices – v1.2
[Minidriver] Windows Smart Card Minidriver Specification - Version 7.06 - July 1, 2009
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[PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard - June 14, 2002
[PKCS#3] PKCS#3 - Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard - Version 1.4, November 1, 1993*
[PLT] Javacard Open platform certified under reference [ANSSI-CC-2017/49]
[PP0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with augmentation packages - Version 1.0 -
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[TR03111] Technical Guideline TR-03111 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Version 2.0
[RGS_B1] Référentiel général de sécurité, version 2.0 du 13/06/14 - Annexe B1 - Mécanismes
cryptographiques
[SCP03] Global Platform Card Technology, Secure Channel Protocol 03, Card
Specification v 2.2 - Amendment D - Version 1.1 - September 2009.
[SSCD2] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 2: Device with key
generation
Version 2.0.1 – 23/01/2012 – Reference BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01
[SSCD3] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import
Version 1.0.2 – 24/07/2012 – Reference BSI-CC-PP-0075
[SSCD4] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 4: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application
Version 1.0.1 – 14/11/12 – Reference BSI-CC-PP-0071
[SSCD5] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 5: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted communication with signature creation application
Version 1.0.1 – 14/11/12 – Reference BSI-CC-PP-0072
[SSCD6] Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 5: Extension for device with key
import and trusted communication with signature creation application
Version 1.0.4 – 03/04/13 – Reference BSI-CC-PP-0076
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[SP800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block, Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, Morris Dworkin, May 2005
[14890] CEN/EN14890:2013
Application Interface for smart cards used as Secure Signature Creation
[7816-4] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013, Identification Cards — Integrated circuit cards— Part 4 :
Organization, security and commands for interchange
[9797-1] ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
[11568-2] ISO 11568-2:2012,Financial services - Key management (retail) - Part 2 : symmetric ciphers, their
key management and life cycle
[ST Config#1] FQR 110 8326 Ed6 – Clytemnestre in Config #1 – IAS ECC V2 Security Target
[AGD_PRE]
FQR 110 8223 Ed3 – Clytemnestre – AGD_PRE
[AGD_OPE]
FQR 110 8380 Ed3 - Clytemnestre - AGD_OPE
[AGD_PRE_PLT]
FQR 110 7743 Ed4 - ID-One Cosmo V8.1 - Pre-Perso Guide
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SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
3.1 Security Target Reference
Title IAS ECC V2 in configuration # 1 – Public Security Target
Reference and version FQR 110 8711 Ed3
Author IDEMIA
CC version 3.1 revision 4
EAL EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
3.2 TOE Reference
TOE name IAS ECC v2 in configuration # 1
TOE version number R1
Developer name IDEMIA
Guidance document for preparation FQR 110 8223 Ed3 – Clytemnestre – AGD_PRE
Guidance document for operational
use
FQR 110 8380 Ed3 - Clytemnestre - AGD_OPE
Guidance document for preparation of
Platform
FQR 110 7743 Ed4 - ID-One Cosmo V8.1 - Pre-Perso Guide
Guidance document for operational
use of Platform
FQR 110 7744 Ed4 - ID-One Cosmo V8.1 - Reference Guide
FQR 110 8001 Ed1 - ID-One Cosmo V8.1 - Application Loading Protection Guidance
FQR 110 7999 Ed3 - ID-One Cosmo V8.1 - Security Recommendations
Name of [PLT]
Plateforme JavaCard de la carte à puce ID-One Cosmo V8.1 sur composant P6022y VB (NXP P60D145) =
ERATO large version
Certificate ANSSI-CC-2017/49-M01
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The TOE identification (AID and version) is described in [AGD_PRE].
3.3 TOE overview
3.3.1 TOE Type
The Target of Evaluation is a smartcard which is configured as a secure signature creation Device (SSCD), used to create advanced or qualified signature
in the sense of EC/1999/93.
The TOE is a composite product made up of an embedded software developed using javacard technology, composed on a javacard open platform. Both are
developed by IDEMIA.
The javacard open platform has already been certified. For more details see [PLT].
The embedded software is made up of four javacard components:
 a javacard Applet ([Applet]);
 a javacard API ([API]);
 two javacard Interfaces ([Interface]);
[Applet] relies on
 [API] which provides a wide range of services enabling to manage the files and cryptographic objects;
 [Interface] which provides the mechanisms for data sharing with other applets;
 Javacard API provided by the underlying javacard open platform;
3.3.2 Logical scope
The TOE is made up of:
 The underlying javacard open platform
 The javacard code ([Applet], [API] and [Interface])
Moreover, as the [PLT] is certified as a javacard open platform and complies with the requirements of the Application note 10 [AN10], and as the TOE
complies also with [AN10], the TOE may also contain any other applets that complies with [AN10] and the specific requirements of the TOE stated in the
guidance documents.
The logical scope of the TOE may be depicted as follows:
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Figure 1 - Limits of the TOE
3.3.3 Physical scope
The TOE is physically made up of several components:
 the javacard open platform [PLT], which contains in its ROM code the javacard packages [Applet], [API] and [Interface];
 A potential patch [patch] loaded in EEPROM. If a functional patch is required, its reference will be included in a maintenance report;
 the other applets that may potentially be loaded on the javacard open platform [PLT] at any time;
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Figure 2 - Physical scope of the TOE
The patch, if present, is self-protected (encrypted and signed). The other applets must fulfill the requirements stated in [AN10] and in the guidance
documentation of the TOE.
Once constructed, the TOE is a bare microchip with its external interfaces for communication. The physical medium on which the microchip is mounted is not
part of the target of evaluation because it does not alter nor modify any security functions of the TOE.
The TOE may be used on several physical medium
 within an inlay, or eCover;
 in a plastic card;
 within a USB key;
 ….;
3.3.4 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE is a Secure Signature Creation Device. It is an independent product and does not need any additional hardware/software/firmware to ensure its
security.
In order to be powered up and to be able to communicate, the TOE needs a card reader.
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3.3.5 Usage and major security features
The TOE intended usage is to be used as a “secure signature creation device” with key generation and/or key import, with respect to the European directive
EC/1999/93.
Within the framework described by [SSCD2], [SSCD3], [SSCD4], [SSCD5], and [SSCD6], the TOE allows to
 perform basic, advanced and qualified signature;
 authenticate the cardholder based on a PIN and/or Biometric data verification;
 authenticate one (or several) administrator(s) of the TOE, that may have special rights to administrate the SCD and SVD (generation, import), using
either symmetric and/or asymmetric mechanisms, or PIN and/or Biometric data verification;
 establish trusted channel, protected in integrity and confidentiality, with Trusted IT entities such as a SCA or a CSP. It may be realized by means of
symmetric and/or asymmetric mechanisms;
The scope of [SSCD2], [SSCD3], [SSCD4], [SSCD5], and [SSCD6], is extended in several ways:
 A super Administrator (TOE_Administrator) has special rights to administrate the signature creation function, the mode of communication, and the
type of cryptographic mechanisms to use.
 SCD/SVD pairs and other cryptographic objects may be generated and/or imported after issuance at any time, and in particular, they may be updated
during the TOE life cycle.
 The TOE may be used to realize digital signature in contact and/or contactless mode.
 eServices features are added, enabling the cardholder to perform C/S authentication, Encryption key decipherment….
 A complete access control over objects is ensured, whatever their type is : File or cryptographic objects (PIN, keys,…), ensuring it is not possible to
bypass the access rules.
The TOE may be used for various use cases requiring qualified signature:
 Electronic signature application;
 Electronic health card;
 Electronic services cards;
 ……;
Depending on the use case and or the ability of the underlying javacard open platform, the TOE may be used
 in contact mode (T=0 and/or T=1 protocol);
 in contactless protocol (T=CL);
3.3.6 Scope of evaluation
The scope of evaluation covers the following features:
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 Features covered by [SSCD2] ], [SSCD3], [SSCD4], [SSCD5], and [SSCD6]
 Authentication mechanisms based on cryptographic scheme
 Unblocking of RAD
 Management of the other keys (authentication and e-services)
3.4 TOE Description
The TOE is compliant with the specification [IASECC], and is enhanced with the following features:
 The TOE supports user authentication based on Biometric comparison. Two modes of operations, are possible: either a 1:1 Biometric comparison,
or a 1:n comparison can be made. These modes of operations are compliant to [14890] and [7816-4]
 The TOE supports Elliptic curves cryptography for electronic signature, encryption key decipherment, and C/S authentication. These modes of
operations are compliant to [14890].
 The TOE supports several modes of operation for the data hashing. The data may also be fully hashed on card or off card. These modes of operations
are compliant to [14890].
 The TOE supports secure messaging and authentication scheme based on AES block Cipher. These modes of operations are compliant to [14890].
 The TOE supports several features required by [Minidriver]
3.4.1 Data structure
The TOE manages two types of structures:
 The Files, compliant with [7816-4]
 The Security Data Objects, which are secure containers storing cryptographic data (PINs, Keys,…)
3.4.1.1 File and File System
The TOE handles the following types of file (described in [7816-4]):
 Transparent File - EF
 Application Dedicated File - ADF
 Dedicated File - DF
All these files are organized within a File System compliant to [7816-4]. It represents the hierarchy between all the files.
At the top of the structure stands the Root file (or Master File), it is the default selected file at reset. Under the Root file, are located the Application Dedicated
File.
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Figure 3 - Exemple of File System structure
The Root, as well as each ADF and DF, may contain up Elementary File (EF) or Security Data Object (SDO). Each of them may contain up to 255 files (EF
or DF) and 31 SDO of each type.
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The TOE allows to
 create, delete, activate, deactivate, and terminate any type of file (except the Application dedicated file), which update the File System.
 read, update, resize any transparent file (EF)
 move within the File Structure by use of file selection
Each file is characterized by its own attributes, such as:
 Access conditions
 File identifier
 Location within the File System
 Size (for EF)
The management of the file system is fully described in [IASECC].
3.4.1.2 Security Environment
The TOE handles Security Environments. Three types of Security Environment may be sorted out:
 Static Security Environment - SSE
 Static Security Environment for Security Policies – SSESP
 Current Security Environment - CSE
Basically a security environment contains several couple of cryptographic data, each of them containing:
 One or several key identifier : KEY_ID
 an algorithm identifier : ALGO_ID
 a mode of usage : USE
These cryptographic data may be used to:
 load a pre-defined cryptographic context to perform a cryptographic operation (for signature, for C/S authentication,…). It is the case of a SSE.
 define an access condition to fulfill before granting an access right: the key defined by the identifier KEY_ID shall be used with the algorithm ALGO_ID
and with the mode USE to grant an access right. It is the case of a SSESP.
 Store the current cryptographic context required to realize a given service. It is the case of the CSE.
The SSESP and SSE are bound to an ADF and are stored in security Data Objects located within an Application dedicated file (ADF). The CSE is unique for
the TOE at any moment
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3.4.1.3 Security data Objects
The TOE handles as well cryptographic data objects, called Security Data Objects (SDO), dedicated to store the keys, the PIN, the Biometric template, the
Diffie Hellmann parameters and the Security Environments, as well as their attributes. The following types of SDO are available:
 SDO PIN contains a Personal identification Number
 SDO BIO contains one or several Biometric template
 SDO RSA Public Key contains a RSA Public Key
 SDO RSA Private Key contains a RSA Private Key
 SDO ECC Public Key contains an ECC Public Key
 SDO ECC Private Key contains an ECC Private Key
 SDO Security Environment contains a Security Environment
 SDO Symmetric DES Key Set contains a Symmetric DES Key Set
 SDO Symmetric AES Key Set contains a Symmetric AES Key Set
 SDO Diffie Hellmann parameters contains a set of Diffie Helmann Domain parameters
The SDO may be located in any dedicated file (DF) or Application Dedicated file (ADF).
The TOE enables to create, update and use any of these SDO. The way the SDO may be used depends on its type:
 SDO PIN and SDO BIO may be changed, reset, verified
 SDO RSA Public Key may be used to verify a certificate
 SDO RSA Private Key and SDO ECC Private key may be used to sign, perform a C/S authentication or decrypt a cryptogram
 SDO Security Environment may be changed, reset, verified
 SDO Symmetric DES Key Set and SDO Symmetric AES Key Set may be used to verify an external authentication or to perform a mutual
authentication and establish a trusted channel
 SDO Diffie Hellmann parameters may be used to establish a secure channel (without authentication)
Each SDO is characterized by its own attributes, such as:
 Access conditions
 Location within the File System
 Size
 Type
 Secret value
 Usage counter and tries counter
 Algorithm to be used
The management of SDO is fully described in [IASECC].
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3.4.2 Access Control Management
One of the Core features of the TOE is to provide access control management on any operations on any objects it handles (Files of SDO).
The Access conditions encoding is the compact encoding described in [7816-4], enhanced as described in [IASECC]. It relies on access rules encoded by
means on Access Mode Bytes (AMB) and Security Conditions Bytes (SCB) as described in [7816-4] and [IASECC].
Prior to granting access to a given operation, the TOE checks the requested access rights are fulfilled. Basically, an Access condition is granted if the security
conditions are fulfilled. An access condition is a combination of security conditions based on identified keys/PIN/BIO/secrets:
 User Authentication (by PIN or Biometric comparison). It is used to authenticate the cardholder or an external entity administrator
 Authentication of an external entity administrator
 Mutual authentication with a trusted IT entity
 Communication protected in integrity and confidentiality
3.4.3 Authentication of entities
The TOE allows the authentication of several entities in order to grant them some rights.
 User Authentication (by PIN or Biometric comparison). It is used to authenticate the cardholder or an external entity administrator
 Authentication of an external entity administrator (based on symmetric or asymmetric scheme)
 Mutual authentication with an external entity and establishment of a trusted channel protected in integrity and confidentiality (based on symmetric or
asymmetric scheme)
 Personalization Agent authentication (for the phase 6)
 TOE Administrator authentication (in phase 7)
These authentication mechanisms are the cornerstone for the access control mechanisms used to grant access to resources (Files or SDO).
3.4.4 Electronic Services
The TOE supports as well several electronic services:
 C/S authentication: this feature enables to authenticate the TOE to an external entity.
 Digital signature: this feature enables the cardholder to electronically signs documents. The signature may be either advanced or qualified (compliant
with [SSCD2] and [SSCD3]).
 Encryption key decipherment: this feature enables the cardholder to store secret data on an electronic vault. The key needed to decipher the key
encrypting these data is securely stored in the TOE. The cardholder’s computer sends the encrypted encryption key to the TOE to get the plain
encryption key.
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3.4.5 Administration of the TOE
The TOE offers administration services. Upon successful authentication, the TOE Administrator may modify the following attributes:
 Communication medium: the administrator may restrict the ability to communicate with the TOE in contact and/or contactless mode.
 Hashing method to be used for digital signature: the administrator may restrict the ability to perform electronic signature (advanced or qualified) on
DTBS-representation partly computed by the TOE. In such case, the digital signature will only be done with last round of data hashing done on the
TOE.
 Authentication mechanism to be used: the administrator may restrict the cryptographic means to be used by the TOE to authenticate external entities
(Administrator or IT entity): either symmetric and/or asymmetric cryptography.
 Identification of the TOE : the administrator is entitled to identify the TOE
 Biometric threshold : the administrator can modify the biometric threshold
3.4.6 Single Sign on feature (SSO)
The TOE may also behave as a Single Sign on (SSO). It provides access points to any other applet willing to use authentication services based on a PIN stored in the Root
File (or Master File). In particular it is possible to:
 Check a PIN
 Change a PIN
 Reset a PIN
 Retrieve the remaining tries counter
 Retrieve the validation status
This feature is used for instance when the PIN(s) is shared with a legacy application. Even though the TOE offers these entry points, it does still enforce access control in the
same way it does when it receives incoming APDU to use a PIN.
3.5 Life Cycle
With respect to the Life cycle envisioned in [PP0084], seven different phases may be sorted out. The life cycle of the composite TOE may be depicted as follows:
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Figure 4 - TOE life cycle
The point of delivery of the TOE is the end of phase 3. At this moment, the TOE is self protected, but not constructed.
Patch
Phase
1
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The TOE Life cycle may be splitted in three steps
 Development (phase 1 to 3);
 Production (phase 4 and 5);
 Operational state (phase 6 and 7);
3.5.1 Development
The development of the TOE takes place in phase 1 to 3. In this step, the parts of TOE are designed, tested and manufactured. This step is covered by [ALC] tasks.
TOE development sites:
 IC development : covered by IC certification
 Platform and Patch Code: Colombes, Pessac
 Application Code: Colombes
3.5.1.1 Software development (phase 1)
This development environment of the Javacard Applet, the patch if any and javacard open platform (JOP) is enforced by IDEMIA.
The confidentiality and integrity of the cap files, the patch and of the javacard open platform is covered by the evaluation of the development premises of IDEMIA.
To ensure security, access to development tools and products elements (PC, card reader, documentation, source code...) is protected. The protection is based on measures for
prevention and detection of unauthorized access. Two levels of protection are applied:
 Access control to IDEMIA offices and sensitive areas.
 Access to development data through the use of a secure computer system to design, implement and test software
At the end of this phase, the code of the javacard applet is delivered to the javacard open platform development team, in order to be stored in the ROM code. The software
development phase of the javacard open platform is covered by [PLT].
3.5.1.2 Hardware development (Phase 2)
In this phase, the underlying integrated circuit is developped. This phase takes place at the manufacturing site of the silicium provider.
The confidentiality and integrity of the javacard packages and javacard open platform is covered by the evaluation of the development premises of the silicium manufacturer
(see [PLT])
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3.5.1.3 Javacard open platform manufacturing (phase 3)
In this phase, the code of the javacard open platform (JOP) and the applet are masked on the IC. This phase takes place at the manufacturing site of the silicium provider.
The confidentiality and integrity of the javacard packages and javacard open platform is covered by the evaluation of the development premises of the silicium manufacturer
(see [PLT]).
Depending on the choice made for the optional code loading, it may be loaded during this phase.
At the end of phase 3, the javacard open platform (JOP) and the TOE are self protected: all its security functions are activated. The point of delivery of the TOE is the end
of phase 3.
3.5.2 Production
The production environment encompasses the preparation of the TOE.
During this step, the following operations are made:
 The chip is mounted on a physical layout (card, USB token...)
 The javacard open platform is prepersonalized
 The javacard open platform is personalized
 The personalization key is loaded on the TOE
 The applet is instantiated
3.5.2.1 Packaging and initialization (phase 4)
This phase is performed by the Manufacturing Agent, which controls the TOE that is in charge of the packaging and initialization of the Javacard open platform (JOP).
This phase spans the phase 4 of the Javacard open platform (JOP) life cycle and is covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of [PLT].
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Manufacturing Agent prior to any operation.
3.5.2.2 Preparation (phase 5)
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the manufacturing Agent prior to any operation.
This phase spans the following phases of the javacard open platform (JOP):
 Phase 5
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 Phase 6
 Phase 7
The following process is applied during this phase
 a non-security patch [patch] (patch code that has no impacts on product auto-protection) is loaded in the javacard open platform (JOP) (if needed). Before the patch
is loaded in the javacard open platform, the TOE is made of two elements (the patch and the javacard open platform). This case is covered by [AGD_PRE] task of
[PLT];
 the javacard open platform (JOP) is switched in phase 5 and the applet may be instantiated in this phase. This case is covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and
[AGD_PRE] tasks of [PLT];
 the javacard open platform (JOP) is switched in phase 6 and the applet may be instantiated in this phase. This case is covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and
[AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT]
 the javacard open platform (JOP) is switched in phase 7 and the applet may be instantiated in this phase. This case is covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and
[AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT]
Moreover, during this phase, any other applet may be loaded at any time (phase 5, 6 or 7 of the javacard open platform life cycle), provided they fulfill the requirements laid
down in [AN10] read in [AGD_OPE] of [PLT]. This case is covered by [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
At the end of this phase, the javacard open platform is switched in phase 7 (DAP enforced).
3.5.3 Operational state
3.5.3.1 Applet pre-personalization (phase 6)
This phase is performed by the Personalization Agent, which controls the TOE. During this phase, the javacard applet is prepared as required by P.TOE_Construction.
All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalization Agent prior to any operation.
This step is covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
Moreover, during this phase, any other applet may be loaded provided they fulfil the requirements laid down in [AN10] read in [AGD_OPE] of [PLT]. This case is covered
by [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
3.5.3.2 TOE personalization (phase 6)
This phase is performed by the Personalization Agent, which controls the TOE, which is in charge of the javacard applet personalization.
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All along this phase, the TOE is self-protected as it requires the authentication of the Personalization Agent prior to any operation.
This phase may not necessarily take place in a manufacturing site, but may be performed anywhere. The Personalization Agent is responsible of ensuring a sufficient level
of security during this phase.
The javacard applet is personalized according to [AGD_PRE], and the following operations are made: creation of applicative data (SCD, SVD, RAD, File,...) and the
TOE_Administrator Agent key is loaded.
At the end of phase 6, the TOE is constructed.
This step is covered by [AGD_PRE] tasks of the TOE and [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
Moreover, during this phase, any other applet may be loaded provided they fulfil the requirements laid down in [AN10] read in [AGD_OPE] of [PLT]. This case is covered
by [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
3.5.3.3 TOE Usage (phase 7)
The TOE is under the control of the User (Signatory and/or Administrator) and TOE_Administrator.
During this phase, the TOE may be used to create a secure signature and manage the SCD, the SVD and the RAD.
This step is covered by [AGD_OPE] tasks of the TOE and [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
Moreover, during this phase, any other applet may be loaded provided they fulfill the requirements laid down in [AN10] read in [AGD_OPE] of [PLT]. This case is covered
by [AGD_OPE] tasks of [PLT].
3.5.4 Coverage of the different Life cycle state by the assurance components [AGD] & [ALC]
The following phases of the life cycle are covered as follows:
Steps Life cycle State TOE : covered by
Development Phase 1
ALC [PLT]
ALC [Applet]
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Patch is self protected
Phase 2
ALC [PLT]
ALC [Applet]
Phase 3
ALC [PLT]
ALC [Applet]
Patch is loaded
TOE is self protected
Point of delivery of the TOE
Production
Phase 4 AGD_PRE [PLT]
Phase 5
AGD_PRE [PLT]
AGD_OPE [PLT]
AGD_PRE [Applet]
Patch is loaded
Operational
Phase 6
AGD_OPE [PLT]
AGD_PRE [Applet]
TOE is constructed
Phase 6
AGD_OPE [PLT]
AGD_PRE [Applet]
Phase 7
AGD_OPE [PLT]
AGD_OPE [Applet]
The point of delivery of the TOE is the end of phase 3. The security of the patch loading (done after phase 3) is fully enforced by technical security measures that have been
evaluated in [PLT]. Therefore, phase 4 to 6 are fully covered by [AGD_PRE] and [AGD_OPE].
3.5.5 State of the TOE depending on the phase
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Life cycle State
TOE
Self protected constructed
Phase 1 No No
Phase 2 No No
Phase 3 No No
Phase 4 Yes No
Phase 5 Yes No
Phase 6 Yes Yes
Phase 7 Yes Yes
3.5.6 Mapping with the Users
For each of these phases, the following subjects may interact with the TOE
Life cycle phase Subject interacting with the TOE
Phase 1 IDEMIA
Patch ,if it exists, is self protected
Phase 2 IDEMIA
Phase 3 IDEMIA
TOE is self protected
Phase 4
Manufacturing Agent
Offcard
Phase 5
Manufacturing Agent
Offcard
Phase 6
Personalization Agent
Offcard
TOE is constructed
Phase 6 Personalization Agent
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Offcard
Phase 7 Users
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CONFORMANCE CLAIM
4.1 CC and package Conformance claim
This security target claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1, revision 4 ([CC31-1], [CC31-2] and [CC31-3]).
The conformance to the Common Criteria is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 1 Strict Conformance
Part 2 Conformance to the extended part.
 FCS.RNG.1: “Random number generation”
 FPT_EMS.1: “TOE Emanation”
 FIA_API.1: “Authentication proof of Identity”
Part 3 Conformance to assurance package EAL 5, augmented with
 AVA_VAN.5: “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
 ALC_DVS.2: “Sufficiency of security measures”
Moreover the security target claims compliance with Application note 10 [AN10].
4.2 PP Conformance Claim
This security target claims a strict conformance to the Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) Protection Profile [SSCD2], [SSCD3] conform to CC version
3.1 revision 3 and [SSCD4], [SSCD5], and [SSCD6] conform to CC version 3.1 revision 4.
This security target also addresses the manufacturing and personalization phases at TOE level (cf. TOE life cycle presented in §3.5. The additions do not
contradict any of the threats, assumptions, organizational policies, objectives or SFRs stated in the protection profiles that cover the operational phase of the
signature device.
Additional information are stated in the following chapter.
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4.3 Conformance rationale
4.3.1 Life cycle conformance
The life cycle of the TOE is described in §3.5. This chapter demonstrates the mapping of the TOE’s life cycle with the one described in the protection profiles.
Life cycle phase of the TOE Life cycle phase with respect to the protection profiles
Phase 1 Development phase: SSCD Development
Patch is self protected
Phase 2 Development phase: SSCD Production
Phase 3 Development phase: SSCD Production
TOE is self protected
Phase 4 N/A
Phase 5 N/A
Patch is loaded on the Javacard open platform
TOE is self protected
Phase 6 Usage phase: SSCD Preparation
TOE is constructed
Phase 6 Usage phase: SSCD Preparation
Phase 7 Usage phase: SSCD Operational use
4.3.2 Additional assets
All assets from the protection profiles are included in this security target. The following assets have been added:
Keys:
1. Private or secret keys used to authenticate an external user or entity, or to perform eServices. Their integrity and confidentiality must be maintained.
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2. public key used to perform eServices. Their integrity must be maintained.
4.3.3 Additional Roles
The roles from protection profiles are maintained in this security target; however the following refinements for the role R.Admin have been added:
 Personalisation Agent
 User_Admin
 TOE_Administrator
 SCA
 HID
 IFD
4.3.4 Additional threats
All the threats from the protection profiles are maintained in this security target. The following policies have been added:
 T.Key_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of a key stored in the TOE
 T.Key_Derive Derive a key
 T.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Forgery Forgery of the public key of a TOE authentication key
 T.Authentication_Replay Replay of an authentication of an external entity
4.3.5 Additional OSPs
All the Policies from the protection profiles are maintained in this security target. The following policies have been added:
 P.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate Link between a SCD stored in the TOE and the relevant qualified certificate
 P.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Cert Certificate for asymmetric TOE authentication keys
 P.TOE_Construction Construction of the TOE by the Personalization Agent
 P.eServices Provision of eServices
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4.3.6 Additional objectives
4.3.6.1 Additional Security objectives for the TOE
All the security objectives for the TOE from the protection profiles are maintained in this security target. The following objectives have been added:
 OT.Authentication_Secure Secure authentication mechanisms
 OT.SCD/SVD_Management Management of SCD/SVD
 OT.Key_Lifecycle_Security Life cycle security of the keys stored in the TOE
 OT.Keys_Secrecy Secrecy of Keys
 OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique Uniqueness of the TOE authentication key(s)
 OT.Lifecycle_Management Management of the life cycle
 OT.eServices Provision of eService
4.3.6.2 Additional Security objectives for the Operational Environment
All the security objectives for the operational environment from the protection profiles are maintained in this security target. The following objectives have
been added:
 OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate Link betwaan SCD stored in the TOE and the relevant qualified certificate
 OE.AuthKey_Transfer Secure transfer of authentication key(s) to the TOE
 OE.AuthKey_Unique Uniqueness of the authentication key(s)
 OE.TOE_PublicKeyAuth_Transfer Secure transfer of public authentication key(s) of the TOE
 OE_TOE_Construction Construction of the TOE by the Personalisation_Agent
4.3.7 Additional SFRs
All the SFRs from the protection profiles are maintained. The following SFRs have been added to cover supplemental features:
Additional SFRs Rationale
FCS_CKM.1 /Session keys Generation of secure messaging session keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys Generation of authentication and eServices keys
FCS_CKM.4/Session keys Destruction of secure messaging session keys
FCS_COP.1/DH Computation Cryptographic operation : Diffie Hellman
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4.3.8 Package conformance
The protection profiles require an assurance level of level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5.
This security target considers an assurance level EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2, which still complies with the requirements of the
protection profiles.
FCS_COP.1/SM in Confidentiality Cryptographic operation : protection in confidentiality of APDU
FCS_COP.1/SM in Integrity Cryptographic operation : protection in integrity and authenticity of APDU
FCS_COP.1/data hashing Cryptographic operation : Data hashing
FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth Cryptographic operation : C/S Authentication
FCS_COP.1/Enc key decipherment Cryptographic operation : Encryption key decipherment
FCS_COP.1/Sym Role Auth Cryptographic operation : symmetric role authentication
FCS_COP.1/Sym Device Auth Cryptographic operation : symmetric device authentication
FCS_COP.1/Certificate Verification Cryptographic operation : Certificate verification
FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth Cryptographic operation : asymmetric role authentication
FCS_COP.1/Asym Internal DAPP Auth Cryptographic operation : asymmetric internal DAPP Authentication
FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP Auth Cryptographic operation : asymmetric external DAPP Authentication
FCS_COP.1/GP Auth Cryptographic operation : GP authentication
FCS_COP.1/GP secret data protection Cryptographic operation : GP secret data protection
FCS_RNG.1 Cryptographic operation : Random number generation
FDP_ACC.1/IASECC Administration Access control policy for the administration operation of IAS ECC
FDP_ACC.1/Key Management Access control policy for the key management operations
FDP_ACF.1/IASECC Administration Access control rules for the administration operation of IAS ECC
FDP_ACF.1/Key Management Access control rules for the key management operations
FDP_ETC.1/Keys Export of keys
FDP_ITC.1/ Keys Import of keys
FIA AFL.1/Auth keys Management of wrong authentication with mechanisms based on cryptographic keys
FMT_MSA.1/TOE Management Management of Access rights for IAS ECC administration operations
FMT_MSA.1/Key Management Management of Access rights for key management operations
FMT_MTD.1/SCD and SCD_ID Link between a SCD and an identifier
FMT_MTD.1/TOE Serial number Loading of the TOE serial number
FMT_MTD.1/TOE State Transition of the life cycle of the TOE from phase 6 to phase 7
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock Unlocking of RAD by the administrator
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SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
5.1 Assets and users
5.1.1 Assets
5.1.1.1 Assets from protection profiles: User Data
1. SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation. The confidentiality, integrity and signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD
must be maintained.
2. SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature verification. The integrity of the SVD when it is exported must be
maintained.
3. DTBS and DTBS/R: set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign. Their integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the
signatory provided by the electronic signature must be maintained.
5.1.1.2 Additional Assets : TSF Data
1. Keys:
a. Private or secret keys used to authenticate an external user or entity, or to perform eServices. Their integrity and confidentiality must be
maintained
b. public key used to perform eServices. Their integrity must be maintained.
Note: Diffie Hellman parameters are considered as keys in the rest of the document.
2. RAD: Reference PIN code or biometrics authentication reference used to identify and authenticate the End User (integrity and confidentiality of RAD
must be maintained)
3. VAD: PIN code or biometrics data entered by the End User to perform a signature operation (confidentiality and authenticity of the VAD as needed
by the authentication method employed)
4. Session keys: Keys computed for secure messaging and used to ensure confidentiality and integrity of data.
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5.1.2 Subjects
1. User: End user of the TOE who can be identified as administrator or signatory. The subject S.User may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as
S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
2. Administrator: User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE (pre-) personalization or other TOE administrative functions. The subject
S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this user after successful authentication as administrator. The CSP (Certificate Service Provider) who is in
charge of generating SCD/SVD key pair and importing SCD also counts as Administrator. (Subject from PP).
The following refinements of R.Admin may appear in this document:
 Personalisation Agent: Administrator in charge of the personalisation in phase 6
 User_Admin: User with administrative rights in phase 7
 SCA: Signature Creation application
 HID: Human Interface Device
 IFD: Interface Device
3. TOE_Administrator: Administrator in phase 7 in charge of the TOE management (Additional Subject).
4. Signatory: User who holds the TOE and uses it on their own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity they represent. The subject
S.Sigy is acting in the role R.Sigy for this user after successful authentication as signatory. (Subject from PP).
5.2 Threats
5.2.1 Threats drawn from the protection profiles
5.2.1.1 T.SCD_Divulg Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data
An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD during generation, storage and use for signature creation in the TOE.
5.2.1.2 T.SCD_Derive Derive the signature creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data
exported outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
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5.2.1.3 T.Hack_Phys Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts physically with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary security compromises. This threat is directed against SCD, SVD
and DTBS.
5.2.1.4 T.SVD_Forgery Forgery of the signature verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CA. This results in loss of SVD integrity in the certificate of the signatory.
5.2.1.5 T.SigF_Misuse Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature creation function of the TOE to create SOD for data the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by
experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
5.2.1.6 T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.
5.2.1.7 T.Sig_Forgery Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges a signed data object, maybe using an electronic signature, which has been created by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object
is not detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with
advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
5.2.2 Additional threats
5.2.2.1 T.Key_Divulg Storing, copying, and releasing of a key stored in the TOE
An attacker can store, copy an authentication or eService key stored in the TOE outside the TOE. An authentication key may be either used to authenticate an external entity
or the TOE, and may be symmetric or asymmetric. An attacker can release an authentication or eService key during generation, storage and use in the TOE.
5.2.2.2 T.Key_Derive Derive a key
An attacker derives an authentication key (of the TOE or an external entity) or eService key from public known data, such as the corresponding public key or
cryptogram created by means of the key or any other data communicated outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the key.
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5.2.2.3 T.TOE_PublicAuthKey_ForgeryForgery of the public key of a TOE authentication key
An attacker forges the public key of a TOE authentication key presented by the TOE. This results in loss of the public key integrity in the authentication
certificate of the TOE.
5.2.2.4 T.Authentication_Replay Replay of an authentication of an external entity
An attacker retrieves by observation authentication data used by a third party during an authentication sequence. The attacker tries to replay this
authentication sequence to grant access to the TOE.
5.3 Organisational Security Policies
5.3.1 Security policies drawn from the protection profiles
5.3.1.1 P.CSP_QCert Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate (cf. [directive], article 2, clause 9, and Annex I) for the SVD.
The certificates contain at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The
CSP ensures that the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly available information.
5.3.1.2 P.Qsign Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic signature (cf. the directive, article 1, clause 2), which is a qualified
electonic signature if it is based on a valid qualified certificate (according to the directive, annexe I)1. The DTBS are presented to the signatory and sent by
the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates the electonic signature created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the signatory maintain under
their sole control and is linked to the DTBS/R in such manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.
5.3.1.3 P. Sigy_SSCD TOE as secure signature creation device
The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in Annex III of the directive. This implies the SCD is used for digital signature creation under the
sole control of the signatory and the SCD can pratically occur only once.
1 It is a non-qualified advanced electronic signature if it is based in a non-qualified certificate for the SVD
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5.3.1.4 P.Sig_Non-Repud Non-repudiation of signatures
The lifecycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the signatory is not able to deny having signed data if the signature is
successfully verified with the SVD contained in their unrevoked certificate.
5.3.2 Additional security policies
5.3.2.1 P.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate Link between a SCD stored in the TOE and the relevant qualified certificate
The Role in charge of creating and updating the SCD (Personalisation Agent, R.Admin, R.Sigy), or the trusted IT entity involved in the updating process
(CSP) shall ensure an unambiguous link between the (qualified) certificate(s) and the matching SCD(s). This link might be figured out by a PKCS#15
structures, an XML structure, an identifier .linking the file containing the (qualified) certificate or the URL hosting them to the SCD(s) loaded in the TOE. In
particular, it implies this link updated, each time the SCD(s) is created, imported, erased or generated.
5.3.2.2 P.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Cert Certificate for asymmetric TOE authentication keys
The TOE contains certificate(s) issued by a known entity ensuring its public key corresponding to its private key used for authentication is genuine.
5.3.2.3 P.TOE_Construction Construction of the TOE by the Personalization Agent
The recommendations indicated in [AGD_PRE] required to construct the TOE are correctly applied.
5.3.2.4 P.eServices Provision of eServices
The TOE provides eServices Mechanisms enabling to:
 decrypt encryption keys
 authenticate the TOE
 verify CVC certificates
Moreover the TOE ensures the keys it uses are genuine by enforcing an access control over the keys update, in order to ensure that only entitled entities
can change key values.
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5.4 Assumptions
5.4.1 A.CGA Trustworthy certificate generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in the (qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the
CSP.
5.4.2 A.SCA Trustworthy signature creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of the data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for
signing by the TOE.
5.4.3 A.CSP Secure SCD/SVD management by SCD
The CSP uses only a trustworthy SCD/SVD generation device and ensures that this device can be used by authorised user only. The CSP ensures that the
SCD generated practically occurs only once, that generated SCD and SVD actually correspond to each other and that SCD cannot be derived from the SVD.
The CSP ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE, does not use the SCD for creation of any signature and irreversibly
deletes the SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE.
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SECURITY OBJECTIVES
6.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
6.1.1 Security Objectives drawn from the protection profiles
6.1.1.1 OT.Lifecycle_Security Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the
signatory.
6.1.1.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorized users only may invoke the generation of the
SCD and the SVD.
6.1.1.3 OT.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair it creates as suitable for the advanced or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used
for signature creation shall practically occur only once and shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the
probability of equal SCDs is negligible.
6.1.1.4 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the TOE. This includes unambiguous reference of a created
SVD/SCD pair for export of the SVD and in creating an electronic signature creation with the SCD.
6.1.1.5 OT.SCD_Auth_Imp Authorized SCD import
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorized users only may invoke the import of the SCD
6.1.1.6 OT.SCD_Secrecy Secrecy of the signature creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably assured against attacks with a high attack potential.
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6.1.1.7 OT.Sig_Secure Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be
reconstructable using the digital signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even
when executed with a high attack potential.
6.1.1.8 OT.Sigy_SigF Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only
The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall
resist attacks with high attack potential.
6.1.1.9 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature
creation process where the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.
6.1.1.10 OT.EMSEC_Design Provide physical emanations security
The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits.
6.1.1.11 OT.Tamper_ID Tamper detection
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components, and uses those features to limit security breaches.
6.1.1.12 OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance
The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and components.
6.1.1.13 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth Authentication proof as SSCD
The TOE shall hold unique identity and authentication data as SSCD and provide security mechanisms to identify and to authenticate itself as SSCD.
6.1.1.14 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_ExpTOE trusted channel for SVD export
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA. The TOE shall enable the CGA to detect
alteration of the SVD exported by the TOE.
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6.1.1.15 OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel for the protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the VAD received from the HID as needed by the authentication
method emloyed
6.1.1.16 OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp Trusted channel of the TOE for DTBS import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the SCA to detect alteration of the DTBS/R received from the SCA. The TOE must not generate electronic
signatures with the SCD for altered DTBS.
6.1.2 Additional Security Objectives for the TOE
6.1.2.1 OT.Authentication_Secure Secure authentication mechanisms
The TOE provides strong mechanism to authenticate external users/entity and mechanisms to establish a strong trusted channel with an external IT entity.
The authentication protocols rely on cryptographic schemes that are based on either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. The TOE uses freshly generated
random number in the authentication mechanism in order to avoid replay attacks. The authentication protocols ensure that the cryptogram can not be forged
without the knowledge of the authentication key, and that they can not be reconstructed from the authentication cryptograms. The trusted channel ensures
integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of the data using strong encryption techniques. The trusted channel ensures protection against deletion, and
modification of commands. Moreover the TOE ensures the key its uses are genuine by enforcing an access control over the authentication keys update, in
order to ensure that only entitled entities can change key values.
6.1.2.2 OT.SCD/SVD_Management Management of SCD/SVD
The TOE enables to manage SCD/SVD. Each key (pair) and RAD may be created at any time and used to perform qualified signature during the TOE life
time. Several SCD, SVD, and RAD may be present on the TOE and used by the same holder. The TOE guarantees the SCD, SVD and RAD are independent
from each other.
6.1.2.3 OT.Key_Lifecycle_Security Life cycle security of the keys stored in the TOE
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The TOE shall provide safe destruction techniques for the
authentication keys (of the TOE and/or the external entities) and eServices keys it stores in case of erasure, re-import or re-generation.
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6.1.2.4 OT.Keys_Secrecy Secrecy of Keys
The secrecy of the authentication keys (of the TOE and/or the external entities) and eServices keys stored in the TOE is reasonably assured against attacks
with a high attack potential.
6.1.2.5 OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique Uniqueness of the TOE authentication key(s)
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the asymmetric authentication key pair used for the TOE authentication. The private key used for TOE
authentication can practically occur only once and cannot be reconstructed from the public key. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the
probability of equal TOE authentication key is negligible low.
6.1.2.6 OT.Lifecycle_Management Management of the life cycle
The TOE provides a life cycle management enabling to separate its life cycle in two main phases.
The first one (phase 6) is the one during the TOE is under the sole control of the Personalization Agent. The following operation may be realized:
 The SCD, SVD and keys may be created, generated, imported or erased
 The RAD (s) may be created and loaded
 SVD and public keys may be exported
Once performed, the Personalisation Agent switches the TOE in phase 7. This transition is irreversible leaving the TOE under the sole control of the R.Sigy,
R.Admin and the TOE_Administrator according to the security rules set by the Personalisation Agent.
6.1.2.7 OT.eServices Provision of eServices
The TOE provides eServices Mechanisms enabling to:
 decrypt encryption keys
 authenticate the TOE
 verify CVC certificates
Moreover the TOE ensures the key its uses are genuine by enforcing an access control over the keys update, in order to ensure that only entitled entities
can change key values.
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6.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
6.2.1 Security Objectives drawn from the protection profiles
6.2.1.1 OE.SVD_Auth Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment shall ensure the integrity and authenticity of the SVD sent to the CGA of the CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between
the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
6.2.1.2 OE.CGA_QCert Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (amongst others)
(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
(b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the signatory,
(c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding to the SVD is stored in a SSCD.
6.2.1.3 OE.Dev_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisionning Service
The SSCD provisionning service handles authentic devices that implement the TOE, prepares the TOE for proof as SSCD to external entities, personalises
the TOE for the legitimate user as signatory, links the identity of the TOE as SSCD with the identity of the legitimate user, and delivers the TOE to the
signatory.
6.2.1.4 OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp Trusted channel of HID for VAD export
The HID provides the human interface for user authentication. The HID will ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication
method employed including export to the TOE by means of a trusted channel.
6.2.1.5 OE.DTBS_Intend SCA sends data intended to be signed
The signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that
- generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing
by the TOE,
- sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R by the TOE,
- attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
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6.2.1.6 OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS export
The SCA provides a trusted channel to the TOE for the protection of the integrity of the DTBS to ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered undetected in
transit between the SCA and the TOE.
6.2.1.7 OE.Signatory Security obligation of the signatory
The signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD-provisioning service is in non-operational state. The signatory shall keep
their VAD confidential.
6.2.1.8 OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The CSP shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the generation of the SCD and the SVD.
6.2.1.9 OE.SCD_Secrecy SCD Secrecy
The CSP shall protect the confidentiality of the SCD during the generation and export to the TOE. The CSP shall not use the SCD for creation of any signature
and shall irreversibly delete the SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE.
6.2.1.10 OE.SCD_Unique Uniqueness of the signature creation data
The CSP shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair, which is generated in the environment, for the qualified or advanced electronic signature.
The SCD used for signature creation shall paractically occur only once, i.e. the probability of equal SCDs shall be negligible, and the SCD shall not be
reconstructable from the SVD.
6.2.1.11 OE.SCD_SVD_CorrespCorrespondance between SVD and SCD
The CSP shall ensure the correspondance between the SVD and the SCD generated by the CSP. This includes the correspondence between the SVD send
to the CGA and the SCD exported to the TOE of the signatory identified in the SVD certificate.
6.2.1.12 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth Pre-initialisation of the TOE for SSCD authentication
The CSP shall check by means of the CGA whether the device presented for application of a (qualified) certificate holds unique identification as SSCD,
successfully proved this identity as SSCD to the CGA, and whether this identity is linked to the legitimate holder of the device as applicant for the certificate.
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6.2.1.13 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_ImpCGA trusted channel for SVD import
The CGA shall detect alteration of the SVD imported from the TOE with the claimed identity of the SSCD.
6.2.2 Additional security objectives for the operational environment
6.2.2.1 OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate Link betwaan SCD stored in the TOE and the relevant qualified certificate
The role in charge of creating and updating the SCD (Personalisation Agent, R.Admin, R.Sigy), or the trusted IT entity involved in the updating process
(the CSP) shall ensure an unambiguous link between the (qualified) certificate(s) and the matching SCD(s). This link might be figured out by a PKCS#15
structures, an XML structure, an identifier .linking the file containing the (qualified) certificate or the URL hosting them to the SCD(s) loaded in the TOE. In
particular, it implies this link is updated, each time the SCD(s) is created, imported, erased or generated.
6.2.2.2 OE.AuthKey_Transfer Secure transfer of authentication key(s) to the TOE
The entity in charge of generating the authentication keys to be loaded in the TOE shall ensure the confidentiality of the key(s) transferred to the TOE.
6.2.2.3 OE.AuthKey_Unique Uniqueness of the authentication key(s)
The entity in charge of generating the authentication keys to be loaded in the TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the authentication key(s). The
authentication key used for authentication can practically occur only once and, in case of a TOE authentication key cannot be reconstructed from its public
portion. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the probability of equal keys is negligible low.
6.2.2.4 OE.TOE_PublicKeyAuth_Transfer Secure transfer of public authentication key(s) of the TOE
The entity in charge of generating the authentication certificate from the TOE’s authentication public key generated in the TOE shall ensure the authenticity
of this data when transferred from the TOE. This may be achieved by the retrieval of the public key according to certain rules imposed to the TOE holders.
6.2.2.5 OE_TOE_Construction Construction of the TOE by the Personalisation_Agent
The Personalization Agent in charge of administrating the TOE in phase 6 shall be a trusted person and shall be skilled enough to correctly apply the
recommendations indicated in [AGD_PRE]. These recommendations are required to construct the TOE.
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6.3 Security Objectives Rationale
6.3.1 Security objectives backtracking
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.Hack_Phys
T.SVD_Forgery
T.SigF_Misuse
T.DTBS_Forgery
T.Sig_Forgery
T.Key_Divulg
T.Key_Derive
T.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Forger
y
T.Authentication_Replay
P.CSP_QCert
P.QSign
P.Sigy_SSCD
P.Sig_Non-Repud
P.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificat
e
P.TOE_Construction
P.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Cert
P.eServices
A.CGA
A.SCA
A.CSP
OT.Lifecycle_Security X X X X
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen X X
OT.SCD_Unique X X X
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp X X X
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp X X X
OT.SCD_Secrecy X X X X
OT.Sig_Secure X X X X X
OT.Sigy_SigF X X X X
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE X X X X
OT.EMSEC_Design X X X
OT_Tamper_ID X X
OT_Tamper_Resistance X X X
OT_TOE_SSCD_Auth X X X
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp X X X
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp X X
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp X X X
OT.Authentication_Secure X X
OT.SCD/SVD_Management X
OT.Key_Lifecycle_Security X
OT.Keys_Secrecy X X
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OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique X
OT.Lifecycle_Management X
OT.eServices X
OE.SVD_Auth X X X
OE.CGA_QCert X X X X X
OE.Dev_Prov_Service X X
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp X X
OE.DTBS_Intend X X X X X
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp X X X
OE.Signatory X X
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen X X X X X
OE.SCD_Secrecy X X X X
OE.SCD_Unique X X X X X
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp X X X X
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth X X X
OE.CGA_TC_SDV_Imp X X X
OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate X X
OE.AuthKey_Transfer X
OE.AuthKey_Unique X
OE.TOE_PublicKeyAuth_Transfer X X
OE.TOE_Construction X
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6.3.2 Security objectives sufficiency
T.SCD_Divulg (storing,copying and releasing of the signature creation data) adresses the threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to
storage and copying of SCD outside the TOE, as expressed in recital (18) of the directive. This threat is countered by:
 OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD used by the TOE for signature creation
 OE.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD in the CSP environment
Furthermore, generation and/or import of SCD known by an attacker is countered by OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that only authorized SCD
generation in the environment is possible, and OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which ensures that only SCD import is possible.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature creation data) deals with the attacks on the SCD via public known data produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and
the signatures created with the SCD. This threat is countered by:
 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen by implementing cryptographically secure generation of the SCD/SVD pair.
 OT.Sig_Secure, which ensures cryptographically secure electronic signature.
 OE.SCD_Unique by implementing cryptographically secure generation of the SCD/SVD pair
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves
the secrecy of the SCD. OT_EMSEC_Design counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID
and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack_Phys by detecting and resisting tampering attacks.
OT.Keys_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of all the authentication and eServices keys stored in the TOE.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature verification data) deals with the forgery of the SVD given to the CGA for certificate generation. T.SVD_Forgery is
addressed by
 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which ensures correspondence between SCD and SVD and unambiguous reference of the SCD/SVD pair for the SVD export
and signature creation with the SCD
 OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp, wich ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD
 OE.SVD_Auth that ensures the integrity of the SVD given to the CGA of the CSP and verification of the correspondence between the SCD in the
SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the input it provides to the certificate generation function of the CSP.
 OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp, which ensures that the TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable form through a trusted channel to the CGA
 OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp, which provides verification of SVD authenticity by the CGA
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE) addreses the threat of misuse of the TOE signature creation function to create SDO
by others than the signatory to create an electonic signature on data which the signatory has not expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c)
of Annex III. OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) requires the TOE to detect flaws during initialisation, personalisation and operational usage including
secure destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the signatory. OT_Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) ensures
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that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE_DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed) ensures that the SCA
sends the DTBS/R only for data the signatory intends to sign. The combination of OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) and
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp (Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS) counters the undetected manipulation of the DTBS during the tranmsission from the SCA to
the TOE. OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) prevents the DTBS/R from alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA provides a human
interface for user authentication, OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel of HID for VAD) requires the HID to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.
The HID and the TOE will protect the VAD by a trusted channel between the HID and the TOE according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel of HID
for VAD) and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for VAD). OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD
when received from an SSCD-Provisioning service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes control
over the SSCD. OE.signatory ensures also that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
OT.LifeCycle_Management ensures that when the TOE is under the Personalisation Agent control, it can not be misused to sign on behalf of the legitimate
Signatory.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the DTBS/R sent to the TOE for signing which than does not
correspond to the DTBS/R corresponding to the DTBS the signatory intends to sign. The threat T.DTBS_Forgery is addressed by the security objectives
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp (Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS), which ensure that the
DTBS/R is sent through a trusted channel and cannot be altered undetected in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters internally this threat
by the means of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensuring the integrity of DTBS/R inside the TOE. The TOE IT environment also
addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been
presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the electronic signature. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique,
OE.SCD_Unique and OE.CGA_QCert address this threat in general. OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) ensures by means
of robust cryptographic techniques that the signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together. OT.SCD_Unique and OE.SCD_Unique
ensure that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding SVD cannot be included in another certificate by chance.
OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery of the certificate for the corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision concerning a forged signature.
T.Key_Divulg addresses the threat against the (1) authentication key of the TOE, (2) the authentication keys of entities and (3) the eServices keys stored in
the TOE due to storage and copying of key(s) outside the TOE. This threat is countered by OT.Keys_Secrecy which assures the secrecy of the keys stored
and used by the TOE. OE.AuthKey_Transfer ensures the confidentiality of the authentication keys transferred to the TOE.
OT.Key_Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) ensures the secrecy of the keys stored in the TOE during the whole life of the TOE.
T.Key_Derive deals with attacks on authentication and eServices keys via public known data produced or received by the TOE (public key, authentication
cryptogram,…). This threat is countered by OE.AuthKey_Unique (in case of import) and OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique (in case of TOE’s authentication key
generation) that provides cryptographic secure generation of the keys. OT.Authentication_Secure ensures secure authentication cryptograms.
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T.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Forgery deals with the forgery of the TOE’s public key used for authentication exported by the TOE to an entitled entity for the
generation of the certificate. This is addressed by OE.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Transfer which ensures the authenticity of the TOE’s public key for
authentication.
T.Authentication_Replay deals with the threats when an attacker retrieves an authentication cryptogram presented to the TOE by an entity and presents it
again to the TOE in order to grant some rights and gain access to some data on the TOE. This threat is addressed by OT.Authentication_Secure that
ensures the authentication cryptogram can not be replayed as they rely on random data internally generated by the TOE.
Enforcement of OSPs by security objectives
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) establishes the CSP generating qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate linking the signatory and
the SVD implemented in the SSCD under sole control of this signatory. P.CSP_QCert is addressed by
 OT.Lifecycle_Security, which requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage,
 OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which requires to ensure the correspondance between the SVD and the SCD during their generation, and ensures that the
SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA corresponds to the SCD stored in the TOE and used by the signatory.
 OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified certificates or non-qualified certificates which requires the CGA to certify the SVD matching the SCD
implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory.
 OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that the SCD/SVD generation can be invoked by authorized users only,
 OT.SCD_Auth_Imp which ensures that authorised users only may invoke the import of the SCD,
 OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which requires the CSP to ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD during their generation,
 OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth, which ensures that the copies of the TOE will hold unique identity and authentication data as SSCD and provide security
mechanisms enabling the CGA to identify and to authenticate the TOE as SSCD to prove this identity as SSCD to the CGA,
 OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth, ensures that the SP checks the proof of the device presented of the applicant that it is a SSCD.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign data with an advanced electronic signature, which is
a qualified electronic signature if based on a valid qualified certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures signatory’s sole control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to
provide the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others. OT.Sig_Secure ensures that the
TOE creates electronic signatures, which cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA_QCert addresses
the requirement of qualified or non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the electronic signature. OE.DTBS_Intend ensures that the SCA
provides only those DTBS to the TOE, which the signatory intends to sign.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature creation device) requires the TOE to meet Annex III. This is ensured as follows:
 OT.SCD_Unique and OE.SCD_Unique meet the paragraph 1(a) of Annex III, by the requirements that the SCD used for signature creation can
practically occur only once;
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 OT.SCD_Unique, OE.SCD_Unique, OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(a) of Annex III by the requirements
to ensure secrecy of the SCD. OT.EMSEC_Design and OT.Tamper_Resistance address specific objectives to ensure secrecy of the SCD against
specific attacks;
 OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the SCD cannot be
derived from SVD, the electronic signatures or any other data exported outside the TOE;
 OT.Sigy_SigF and OE.SCD_Secrecy meet the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of Annex III by the requirements to ensure that the TOE provides the
signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others;
 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirements in paragraph 2 of Annex III as the TOE must not alter the DTBS/R.
Paragraph 2 of Annex III, requires that an SSCD does not prevent the data to be signed from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature
process is obviously fulfilled by the method of TOE usage: the SCA will present the DTBS to the signatory and send it to the SSCD for signing. The
usage of SCD under sole control of the signatory is ensured by
 OT.Lifecycle_Security requiring the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage,
 OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen and OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen which limit invocation of the generation of the SCD and the SVD to authorized users only,
 OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which limits the SCD import to authorised users only,
 OE.SCD_Secrecy, which ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE, and deletes the SCD after export to the
TOE. The CSP does not use the SCD for signature creation,
 OT.Sigy_SigF, which requires the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against
the use of others.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the legitimate user obtains a TOE sample as an authentic, initialised and personalised TOE from an SSCD
Provisionning Service through the TOE delivery procedure. If the TOE implements SCD generated under control of the SSCD Provisionning Service the
legitimate user receives the TOE as SSCD. If the TOE delivered to the legitimate user without SCD in the operational phase he or she applies for the
(qualified) certificate as the Device holder and legitimate user of the TOE. The CSP will use the TOE security feature (addressed by the security objectives
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp) to check whether the device presented is a SSCD linked to the applicant as required by
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and the received SVD is sent by this SSCD as required by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. Thus the obligation of the SSCD provision
service for the first SCD/SVD pair is complemented in an appropriate way by the CSP for the SCD/SVD pair generated outside the secure preparation
environment.
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully
verified with the SVD contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation.
This policy is implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, which ensures the aspects of signatory’s
sole control over and responsibility for the electronic signatures created with the TOE.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the TOE, initialized and personalized as SSCD from the SSCD-provisioning
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service.
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, OE.SCD_Secrecy, and OE.SCD_Unique ensure the security of the SCD in the CSP environment. OE.SCD_Secrecy ensures
the confidentiality of the SCD during genetation, during and after the export to the TOE. The CSP does not use the SCD for creation of any signature and
deletes the SCD irreversibly after export to the TOE. OE.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD can pratically occur just once.
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD in the certificate of the signatory corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the copy of the TOE of the
signatory.
OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD to the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert
require the environment to ensure authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the signatory.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique provides that
the signatory’s SCD can practically occur just once.
OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD received from an SSCD- provisioning service is in non-operational state
(i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes into sole control over the SSCD).
The TOE security feature addressed by the security objectives OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp supported by OE.Dev_Prov_Service
enables the verification whether the device presented by the applicant is a SSCD as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and the received SVD is sent by the
device holding the corresponding SCD as required by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp.
OT.Sigy_SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature creation. As prerequisite OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory keeps their
VAD confidential.
The confidentiality of the VAD is protected during the transmission between the HI device and TOE according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel of
HID for VAD) and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for VAD).
OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp, and OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp ensure that the TOE creates electronic signatures
only for those DTBS/R, which the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure that only
this SCD may create a valid electronic signature that can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for signature verification. The security
objective for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the signature creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide
physical emanations security), OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) and OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) protect the SCD against any
compromise.
OT.LifeCycle_Management ensures that when the TOE is under the Personalisation Agent control, it can not be misused to sign on behalf of the legitimate
Signatory.
OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate and OT.SCD/SVD_Management ensure the SCA always uses the SCD it intends to, in order to create a digital signature.
OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate ensures that the SCA can unambiguously sort out within the TOE file structure the SCD matching any (qualified) certificate
it has chosen and intends to use. OT.SCD/SVD_Management ensures that the TOE create signature with the SCD that has been selected by the SCA. As
such it ensures the signature is always created with the SCD matching the (qualified) certificate selected by the SCA, avoiding any mismatch between SCD
and (qualified) certificate, that may cause the signature to be repudiated.
P.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate (Link between a SCD and its qualified certificate) ensures that the SCA can unambiguously find within the TOE File structure
the SCD matching a (qualified) certificate it has chosen to perform an electronic signature. It is addressed by OE.LinkSCD_QualifiedCertificate that ensures
an unambiguous link between each (qualified) certificate and the matching SCD loaded in the TOE.
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P.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Cert (Certificate for asymmetric TOE authentication keys) ensures that each private key(s) of the TOE for authentication matches
the public key stored within the relevant certificate issued by an entitled entity. The authentication public key is exported thanks to
OE.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Transfer.
P.TOE_Construction (TOE construction) ensures that all the recommendations indicated in [AGD_PRE] are applied for the construction of the TOE in phase
6. It is addressed by OE.TOE_Construction.
P.eServices (Provision of eServices) ensures that the TOE provides secure eServices functionalities. It is addressed by OT.eServices.
Upkeep of assumptions by security objectives:
A.CGA (Trustworthy certificate generation application) establishes the protection of the authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified
certificate by the advanced signature of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates), which
ensures the generation of qualified certificates, and by OE.SVD_Auth (Authenticity of the SVD), which ensures the protection of the integrity of the received
SVD and the verification of the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.
A.SCA (Trustworthy signature creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the SCA with respect to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by
OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed) which ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that have been presented to the signatory as
DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.
A.CSP (Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP) establishes several security aspects concerning handling of SCD and SVD by the CSP. That the SCD/SVD
generation device can only be used by authorized users is addressed by OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD generation), that the generated
SCD is unique and cannot be derived by the SVD is addressed by OE.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature creation data), that SCD and SVD
correspond to each other is addressed by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD), and that the SCD are kept confidential, are
not used for signature generation in the environment and are deleted in the environment once exported to the TOE is addressed by OE.SCD_Secrecy (SCD
Secrecy).
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EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
7.1 FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
The additional family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements
of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of
the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing
attacks, radio emanation etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations. The family FPT_EMS belongs to
the Class FPT because it is the class for TSF protection. Other families within the Class FPT do not cover the TOE emanation. The definition of the family
FPT_EMS is taken from the Protection Profile Secure Signature Creation Device [5].
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
- FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emitting intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.
- FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emitting interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN (Security audit data generation) is included in a PP or ST using FPT_EMS.1.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS TOE Emanation 1
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access
to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
7.2 FCS_RNG Random Number Generation
A physical random number generator (RNG) produces the random number by a noise source based on physical random processes. A non-physical true RNG
uses a noise source based on non-physical random processes like human interaction (key strokes, mouse movement). A deterministic RNG uses a random
seed to produce a pseudorandom output. A hybrid RNG combines the principles of physical and deterministic RNGs.
Family behavior:
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_ RNG.1 Random Number Generation has two constituents:
- FCS_RNG.1.1 Random number generator type
- FCS_RNG.1.2 Random number quality
Management:
There are no management activities foreseen
Audit:
FCS_RNG Random Number
Generation
1
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There are no actions defined to be auditable
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies. Definition
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic hybrid] random number generator that implements: [assignment:
list of security capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
7.3 FIA_API Authentication proof of Identity
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the class FIA (Identification and Authentication) is defined here.
This family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other
families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Family behaviour:
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of identity
Management:
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
FIA_API Authentication proof of identity 1
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Audit:
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies. Definition
FIA.API1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role]
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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
8.1 Security Functional Requirements
8.1.1 Security attributes
The security attributes and the related status for the subjects and objects are:
Subject or object the
security attribute is
associated with
Security Attribute type
Value of the
security attribute
S.User Role
R.Admin
R.Sigy
S.User SCD/SVD Management
Authorized
Not authorized
SCD SCD Operational
Yes
No
SCD SCD Identifier Arbitrary value
S.Admin
IAS ECC
Management
Medium
Contact
Contactless
HashOffCard Management
Authorized
Not authorized
SymAuthMechanisms
Management
Authorized
Not authorized
AsymAuthMechanisms
Management
Authorized
Not authorized
S.User Key Management
Key import Management
Authorized
Not authorized
Key generation Management
Key export Management
8.1.1.1 SCD/SVD Management
The TOE controls the access on every object it possesses, in particular the SCD and the SVD.
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In phase 6, S.Admin is the personalization Agent, and as such always has the attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “Authorized”.
In phase 7, two access modes may be distinguished by the TOE
 SCD/SVD generation (SSCD type 23)
 SCD/SVD import (SSCD type 2)
The access condition is granted to a user if the following conditions are met:
 The User is successfully authenticated
 The User was given the right to manage the SCD & SVD (import and/or generation).
If these two conditions are fulfilled, the attribute “SCD/SVD management” is set to “authorized”, otherwise it is set to “not authorized”.
8.1.1.2 SCD Operational
The attribute “SCD operational” is granted by the submission of the RAD by the User Signatory. The RAD may be a PIN or a Biometric template.
8.1.1.3 IAS ECC Management
The TOE may be configured to allow:
 communication in contact and/or contactless mode
 qualified signature to be computed from a hash off card
 enable/disable the authentication mechanism based on symmetric scheme
 enable/disable the authentication mechanism based on asymmetric scheme
The value of the related security attributes may be changed in phase 6 by the “Personalisation Agent” and in phase 7 by “TOE_Administrator”.
8.1.1.4 Key Management
In phase 6, the Personalisation Agent has the attribute Key import, generation and export Management set to Authorized
In phase 7, the TOE controls the access on every object it holds, in particular Keys including Diffie Hellman Domain parameters.
The access condition is granted to a user if the following conditions are fulfilled:
 The Subject is successfully authenticated
 The Subject was given the right to import/generate/export a key
When these two conditions are fulfilled, the security attribute is set to authorized, otherwise it is set to not authorized
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8.1.2 SFRs drawn for PP
The following SFRs are drawn from the protection profiles. They are sorted out depending on the life cycle of the TOE.
8.1.2.1 Phase 6&7
8.1.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall generate an SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm:
(1) RSA key generation
(2) Key pair over Elliptic curve2
and specified cryptographic key sizes:
(1) 1024 bits or 1536 bits or 2048 bits
(2) Any elliptic curve from 160 bits up to 521 bits with prime field p3
that meet the following:
(1) [ANSIX9.31]
(2) [IEEE]4
8.1.2.1.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
2
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
3
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
4
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting the buffer
containing the key with zero5 that meets the following: none6.
Application note:
This SFR applies to all keys, whether it is the SCD, the SVD or another one.
The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed on demand of the Signatory or Administrator. The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD
is re-imported into the TOE.
8.1.2.1.3 FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attributes based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation SFP on (1) subjects: S.User
(2) objects: SCD, SVD
(3) operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair
8.1.2.1.4 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/SCD/SVD_Generation The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation SFP to objects based on the following: the user S.User is
associated with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SCD/SVD_Generation The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized” is allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pair.
5
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
6
[assignment: list of standards].
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Refinement:
In phase 6, S.User is the “Personalisation Agent” and always has the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized”.
In phase 7, depending on the use case, the role allowed to generate SCD/SVD may be restricted to R.Admin, one of its sub roles, to R.Sigy
or any combination of them.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SCD/SVD_Generation The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SCD/SVD_Generation The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: S.User
with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “not authorized” is not allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pair.
Refinement:
In phase 6, S.User is the «Personalisation Agent» and always has the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized”.
8.1.2.1.5 FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/ SVD_Transfer The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SVD
(3) operations: export.
8.1.2.1.6 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/ SVD_Transfer The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on the following:
(1) the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role,
(2) the SVD.
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FDP_ACF.1.2/ SVD_Transfer The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed: R.Admin or R.Sigy7 is allowed to export SVD.
Refinement:
In phase 6 R.Admin is the “Personalisation Agent” and always has the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized”.
In phase 7, depending on the use case, the role allowed to export the SVD may be restricted to R.Admin, one of its sub roles, to “R.Sigy”
or any combination of them.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ SVD_Transfer The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/ SVD_Transfer The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
8.1.2.1.7 FDP_ACC.1/SCD_import Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/ SCD_Import The TSF shall enforce the SCD_Import SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: SCD
(3) operations: import of SCD.
8.1.2.1.8 FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/ SCD_Import The TSF shall enforce the SCD_Import SFP to objects based on the following: the S.User is associated with the
security attribute “SCD/SVD Management”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ SCD_Import The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed: S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized” is allowed to import
the SCD.
7 [selection : R.Admin, R.Sigy]
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Refinement:
In phase 6, S.User is the “Personalisation Agent” and always has the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized”.
In phase 7, depending on the use case, the role allowed to import the SCD may be restricted to R.Admin, one of its sub roles, to R.Sigy or
any combination of them.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ SCD_Import The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/ SCD_Import The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: S.User with
security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “not authorized” is not allowed to import the SCD.
8.1.2.1.9 FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the
resource from the following objects: SCD, RAD, VAD, Keys, Session keys and related data.
8.1.2.1.10 FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1/ Persistent The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based
on the following attributes: integrity checked stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2/ Persistent Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
(1) prohibit the use of the altered data
(2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
Application note: The following data persistently stored by the TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked persistent stored data":
1. SCD
2. SVD
3. RAD
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4. Keys including Diffie hellman parameters
8.1.2.1.11 FDP_ITC.1/SCD Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ITC.1.1/SCD The TSF shall enforce the SCD_Import SFP when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/SCD The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the SCD when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/SCD The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: SCD
shall be sent by an authorized CSP8.
Application note:
The TOE interacts with a CSP through a SCD/SVD generation application to import the SCD. Authorized CSP is able to establish a trusted channel
with the TOE for SCD transfer as required by FTP_ITC.1.3/SCD.
In phase 6, the authorized CSP is the «Personalisation Agent».
8.1.2.1.12 FDP_UCT.1/SCD Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1/SCD The TSF shall enforce the SCD_Import SFP to receive SCD in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure
8.1.2.1.13 FDP_DAU.2/SVD Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
8
[assignment: additional importation control rules]
73/128
Hierarchical to: FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing if identification
FDP_DAU.2.1/SVD The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of SVD
FDP_DAU.2.2/SVD The TSF shall provide CGA with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information and the identity of
the user that generated the evidence.
8.1.2.1.14 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) Self-test according to FPT_TST.1
(2) establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the TOE by means of the TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD
(3) establishing a trusted channel between the HID of the TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/VAD
(4) establishing a trusted channel between the CSP and the TOE by means of the TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD
(5) establishing a trusted channel between the CSP and the TOE by means of the TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS9.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified .
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
8.1.2.1.15 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
(1) Self-test according to FPT_TST.1,
(2) Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1.
(3) establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the TOE by means of the TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD
(6) establishing a trusted channel between the HID of the TOE by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/VAD
9
[assignment : list of additional TSF-mediated actions]
74/128
(7) establishing a trusted channel between the CSP and the TOE by means of the TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD
(4) establishing a trusted channel between the CSP and the TOE by means of the TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS10.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf
of that user.
8.1.2.1.16 FIA_API.1 Authentication proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide an authentication mechanism11 to prove the identity of the SSCD
Application note: The authentication mechanism may be:
- a device authentication (mutual authentication in the symmetric case and internal authentication in the asymmetric case) : phase 7
- GP authentication: phase 6
- Outgoing MAC: phase 6 and 7
8.1.2.1.17 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin, R.Sigy and TOE_Administrator.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
8.1.2.1.18 FMT_SMF.1 Security management functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
10
[assignment : list of additional TSF-mediated actions]
11
[assignment : authentication mechanism]
75/128
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
(1) Creation, modification, and unblocking of RAD,
(2) Enabling the signature creation function,
(3) Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational,
(4) Change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier.
(5) SCD/SVD Generation
(6) SCD import
(7) Management of the TOE
(8) Key management12
Application Note: There is no default value for the SCD Identifier
8.1.2.1.19 FMT_MSA.1/Admin Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/ Admin The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP and the SCD Import SFP to restrict the ability to modify the
security attributes SCD/SVD management to R.Admin.
8.1.2.1.20 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for:
12
[assignment : list of other security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
76/128
(1) SCD/SVD Management
(2) SCD operational.
(3) IAS ECC Management
(4) Key Management
8.1.2.1.21 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP, SVD Transfer SFP, SCD import SFP, Signature Creation SFP, IAS
ECC Administration SFP, and Key Management SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the authorized identified role to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
Refinement:
The authorized identified roles are defined in the following table depending on the TOE lifecycle phase
Security attribute Phase Authorized identified roles
SCD/SVD Management 6&7 R.Admin
SCD Operational 7 R.Admin
IAS ECC Management 6&7
Personalisation Agent in phase 6 and
TOE_Administrator in phase 7
Key Management 6&7
Personalisation Agent in phase 6
R.Sigy, CSP, SCA, HID, IFD and User_Admin in
phase 7
8.1.2.1.22 FMT_MSA.4 Security attribute value inheritance
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
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FMT_MSA.4.1 The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
(1) If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy being authenticated the security attribute “SCD
operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” as a single operation.
(2) If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to
“yes” as a single operation.
(3) If S.Admin imports SCD while S.Sigy is not currently authenticated, the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD
shall be set to “no” after import of the SCD as a single operation
(4) If S.Admin imports SCD while S.Sigy is currently authenticated, the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD shall
be set to “yes” after import of the SCD as a single operation
8.1.2.1.23 FMT_MTD.1/Admin Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Admin The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the RAD to R.Admin.
8.1.2.1.24 FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit side channel emission 13in excess of limits specified by the state of the art attacks on smart card IC14
enabling access to RAD, SCD and Keys.
FPT.EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure all users15 are unable to use the following interface external contacts emanations16 to gain access to
RAD, SCD, and Keys.
13
[assignment : types of emissions]
14
[assignment: specified limits]
15
[assignment: type of users]
16
[assignment: type of connection]
78/128
8.1.2.1.25 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
(1) self-test according to FPT_TST fails
(2) card reset or tearing
(3) Security violation detected by [PLT] with FAU_ARP.1,
(4) Failure detected by [PLT] with FPT_FLS.1, FPT_FLS.1/ADEL, FPT_FLS.1/ODEL, and FPT_FLS.1/SCP
(5) Integrity error detected on RAD, SCD, and Keys17
8.1.2.1.26 FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF’s devices or TSF’s elements has
occurred.
8.1.2.1.27 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing18 to the TSF19 by responding automatically such that the
SFRs are always enforced.
17
[assignment : list of other types of failures in the TSF]
18
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
19
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
79/128
8.1.2.1.28 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation20 to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF.
8.1.2.1.29 FTP_ITC.1/SCD Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1/SCD The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/SCD The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3/SCD The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
(1) data exchange integrity according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD
(2) none21
8.1.2.1.30 FTP_ITC.1/SVD Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
20
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self-test should occur]]
21
[assignment : list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
80/128
FTP_ITC.1.1/SVD The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product CGA that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/SVD The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3/SVD The TSF or the CGA shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
(3) data Authentication with Integrity of Guarantor according to FIA_API.1 and FDP_DAU.2/SVD
(4) none22
8.1.2.2 Phase 7
8.1.2.2.1 FCS_COP.1/Sign Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Sign The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
 PKCS#1 V1.5 Block type 1 with Message Digest Info RSA CRT and hashing algorithm SHA-1 or SHA-256
 ECDSA-SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-51223
and cryptographic key sizes:
 RSA: 1024 bits or 1536 bits or 2048 bits
 ECDSA: Any elliptic curve from 160 bits up to 521 bits with prime field p24
that meet the following:
 [PKCS#1]
 [ANSIX9.62]25
22
[assignment : list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
23
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
24
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
25
[assignment : list of standards]
81/128
8.1.2.2.2 FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/Signature_Creation The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP on
(1) subjects: S.User,
(2) objects: DTBS/R, SCD,
(3) operations: signature creation.
8.1.2.2.3 FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/ Signature_Creation The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on the following:
(1) the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and
(2) the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ Signature_Creation The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed:
R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which security attribute “SCD operational” is
set to “yes”.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ Signature_Creation The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/ Signature_Creation The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which security attribute “SCD operational”
is set to “no”.
8.1.2.2.4 FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
82/128
FDP_SDI.2.1/DTBS The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error on all objects, based
on the following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS.
FDP_SDI.2.2/DTBS Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
(1) prohibit the use of the altered data
(2) inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
Application note: The DTBS/R temporarily stored by the TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked stored data".
8.1.2.2.5 FDP_UIT.1/DTBS Data Exchange Integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1/DTBS The TSF shall enforce the signature creation SFP to receive user data in a manner protected from modification and
insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/DTBS The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification or insertion has occured
8.1.2.2.6 FIA_AFL.1 / RAD Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1/RAD The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 and 1526 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL .1.2/RAD When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall block RAD.
Application note:
These SFRs apply to R.Sigy and R.Admin if the latter uses a RAD to authenticate itself.
26
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]
83/128
8.1.2.2.7 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions signature creation function to R.Sigy.
8.1.2.2.8 FMT_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/Signatory The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes SCD
operational to R.Sigy.
8.1.2.2.9 FMT_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Signatory The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the RAD to R.Sigy.
Refinement: This requirement applies only if the RAD belonging to S.Sigy.
8.1.2.2.10 FTP_ITC.1/VAD Inter-TSF trusted channel – TC Human Interface Device
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
84/128
FTP_ITC.1.1/VAD The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product HID that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/VAD The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3/VAD The TSF or the HID shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
(5) User authentication according to FIA_UAU.1
(6) none27
8.1.2.2.11 FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Inter-TSF trusted channel – Signature Creation Application
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1/DTBS The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product SCA that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/DTBS The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3/DTBS The TSF or the SCA shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
(7) Signature creation
(8) none28
8.1.3 Additional SFRs
8.1.3.1 Phase 6
8.1.3.1.1 FCS_COP.1/GP secret data protection Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
27
[assignment : list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
28
[assignment : list of other functions for which a trusted channel is required]
85/128
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/GP secret data protection The TSF shall perform GP secret data encryption29 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
 SCP02 using TDES
 SCP03 using AES
 Proprietary SCP03 using AES30
and cryptographic key sizes:
 128 bits
 128, 192, and 256 bits
 128,192, and 256 bits31
that meet the following:
 [GP2.2.1]
 [SCP03]
 [PLT]32
Application Note 1:
The type of algorithm used by the TOE depends on the configuration set during the javacard open platform personalisation (For more details see
[AGD_PRE_PLT]).
Application Note 2:
The applet provides this service via the platform, it doesn’t own and cannot access the keys used to protect secret data. Their import/generation and
destruction are managed by the platform.
8.1.3.1.2 FMT_MTD.1/TOE Serial Number Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
29
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
30
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
31
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
32
[assignment : list of standards]
86/128
FMT_MTD.1.1/TOE Serial Number The TSF shall restrict the ability to set33 the serial number of the TOE34 to Personalisation_Agent35
8.1.3.1.3 FMT_MTD.1/TOE state Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_MTD.1.1/TOE state The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch36 the TOE from phase 6 to phase 737 to Personalisation_Agent38
8.1.3.2 Phase 7
8.1.3.2.1 FCS_CKM.1/Session keys Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/Session keys The TSF shall generate session keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: Key
derivation function39 and specified cryptographic key sizes:
(1) DES keys of 128 bits
(2) Two AES keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits
(3) Three AES keys of 128, 192, and 256 bits40
33
[selection : change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment : other operations]]
34
[assignment : list of TSF data]
35
[assignment : the authorized identified roles]
36
[selection : change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment : other operations]]
37
[assignment : list of TSF data]
38
[assignment : the authorized identified roles]
39
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
40
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
87/128
that meet the following: [14890]41
8.1.3.2.2 FCS_CKM.4/Session keys Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/Session keys The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method overwriting
the buffer containing the key with zero42 that meets the following: none43.
8.1.3.2.3 FCS_COP.1/DH Computation Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/DH Computation The TSF shall perform Key Agreement44 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: Diffie
Hellmann45 and cryptographic key sizes: 1024 bits, or 1536 bits, or 2048 bits46 that meet the following:
[PKCS#3]47
41
[assignment: list of standards]
42
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
43
[assignment: list of standards].
44
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
45
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
46
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
47
[assignment : list of standards]
88/128
8.1.3.2.4 FCS_COP.1/SM in confidentiality Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SM in confidentiality The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging in confidentiality48 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm:
(1) Encryption with TDES EDE in CBC mode
(2) Encryption with AES in CBC mode49
and cryptographic key sizes:
(1) 128 bits
(2) 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits50
that meet the following: [11568-2]51
Application Note: This algorithm is used during secure Messaging to ensure confidentiality of incoming and outgoing data.
8.1.3.2.5 FCS_COP.1/SM in integrity Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SM in integrity The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging in integrity and authenticity52 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm:
(1) Retail MAC: MAC algorithm 3 with padding method 2 and DES bloc Cipher
48
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
49
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
50
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
51
[assignment : list of standards]
52
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
89/128
(2) EMAC: MAC algorithm 2 with padding method 2 and AES bloc Cipher with a length of eight bytes
(3) CMAC: CMAC with pre padding method 2 and AES bloc Cipher with a length of eight bytes 53
and cryptographic key sizes:
(1) 128 bits
(2) 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits
(3) 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits54
that meet the following:
(1) [9797-1]
(2) [9797-1]
(3) [SP800-38B]55
Application Note: This algorithm is used during secure Messaging to ensure integrity and authenticity of incoming and outgoing data.
8.1.3.2.6 FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/C/S Auth The TSF shall perform Client/Server Authentication56 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: raw
ECDSA57 and cryptographic key sizes: Any elliptic curve from 160 bits up to 521 bits with prime field p58 that meet
the following: [ANSIX9.62]59
8.1.3.2.7 FCS_COP.1/Enc key decipherment Cryptographic operation
53
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
54
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
55
[assignment : list of standards]
56
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
57
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
58
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
59
[assignment : list of standards]
90/128
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Enc key decipherment The TSF shall perform Encryption key decipherment60 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: Diffie
Hellman on an Elliptic curve61 and cryptographic key sizes: Any elliptic curve from 160 bits up to 521 bits with prime
field p62 that meet the following: [TR03111]63
8.1.3.2.8 FCS_COP.1/Sym role Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Sym role Auth The TSF shall perform Symmetric role Authentication64 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
(1) Encryption using Triple DES EDE in mode CBC, Signature using Retail MAC
(2) Encryption using AES in mode CBC, Signature using EMAC
(3) Encryption using AES in mode CBC, Signature using CMAC
(4) Encryption using Triple DES EDE in CBC mode 65
and cryptographic key sizes:
(5) 128 bits
(6) 128, 192, and 256 bits
(7) 128, 192, and 256 bits
(8) 128 bits66
60
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
61
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
62
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
63
[assignment : list of standards]
64
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
65
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
66
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
91/128
that meet the following:
(1) [IASECC]
(2) [14890]
(3) [14890]
(4) [Minidriver]67
8.1.3.2.9 FCS_COP.1/Sym Device Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Sym Device Auth The TSF shall perform Symmetric Device Authentication68 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
(1) Encryption using Triple DES EDE in mode CBC, Signature using Retail MAC
(2) Encryption using AES in mode CBC, Signature using EMAC
(3) Encryption using AES in mode CBC, Signature using CMAC69
and cryptographic key sizes:
(1) 128 bits
(2) 128, 192, and 256 bits
(3) 128, 192, and 256 bits70
that meet the following:
(1) [IASECC]
(2) [14890]
(3) [14890]71
8.1.3.2.10 FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
67
[assignment : list of standards]
68
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
69
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
70
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
71
[assignment : list of standards]
92/128
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Certificate verification The TSF shall perform Certificate verification72 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: RSA with
ISO/IEC 9796-2 padding with partial recovery and with SHA-1 or SHA-25673 and cryptographic key sizes: 1024,
1536, or 2048 bits74 that meet the following: [IASECC]75
8.1.3.2.11 FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Asym Role Auth The TSF shall perform Asymmetric Role Authentication76 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
RSA with ISO/IEC 9796-2 padding with partial recovery and with SHA-1 or SHA-25677 and cryptographic key sizes:
1024, 1536, or 2048 bits78 that meet the following: [IASECC]79
8.1.3.2.12 FCS_COP.1/Asym Internal DAPP Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
72
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
73
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
74
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
75
[assignment : list of standards]
76
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
77
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
78
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
79
[assignment : list of standards]
93/128
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Asym Internal DAPP Auth The TSF shall perform Asymmetric Internal DAPP Authentication80 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm: RSA with ISO/IEC 9796-2 padding with partial recovery and with SHA-1 or SHA-
25681 and cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1536, or 2048 bits82 that meet the following: [IASECC]83
8.1.3.2.13 FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/Asym External DAPP Auth The TSF shall perform Asymmetric External DAPP Authentication84 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm: RSA with ISO/IEC 9796-2 padding with partial recovery and with SHA-1 or SHA-
25685 and cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1536, or 2048 bits86 that meet the following: [IASECC]87
8.1.3.2.14 FMT_MTD.1/SCD and SCD ID Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/SCD and SCD_ID
80
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
81
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
82
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
83
[assignment : list of standards]
84
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
85
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
86
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
87
[assignment : list of standards]
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The TSF shall restrict the ability to select88 the SCD using a SCD Identifier89 to S.User90.
Application note:
At creation, the SCD is given a SCD identifier that will be permanently associated to it and used by the TOE to select it.
8.1.3.2.15 FMT_MTD.1/Unblock Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1/Unblock The TSF shall restrict the ability to unblock91 the RAD92 to R.Admin93.
Application note:
This SFR apply to any RAD (belonging to R.Sigy or R.Admin).
8.1.3.3 Phase 6 & 7
8.1.3.3.1 FCS_CKM.1/Keys Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/Keys The TSF shall generate Keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm:
(3) RSA key generation
88
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
89
[assignment: list of TSF data]
90
[assignment: The authorized identified roles]
91
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
92
[assignment: list of TSF data]
93
[assignment: The authorized identified roles]
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(4) Key pair over Elliptic curve94
and specified cryptographic key sizes:
(3) 1024 bits or 1536 bits or 2048 bits
(4) Any elliptic curve from 160 bits up to 521 bits with prime field p95
that meet the following:
(3) [ANSIX9.31]
(4) [IEEE]96
8.1.3.3.2 FCS_COP.1/data hashing Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/data hashing The TSF shall perform data hashing97 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm: SHA-1, partial SHA-
1, SHA-224, SHA-256, partial SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-51298 and cryptographic key sizes: none99 that meet the
following: [FIPS 180-3]100
8.1.3.3.3 FCS_COP.1/GP Auth Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
94
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
95
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
96
[assignment: list of standards]
97
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
98
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
99
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
100
[assignment : list of standards]
96/128
FCS_COP.1.1/GP Auth The TSF shall perform Mutual Authentication101 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
(1) SCP02 using TDES
(2) SCP03 using AES
(3) Proprietary SCP03 using AES102
and cryptographic key sizes:
(1) 128 bits
(2) 128, 192, and 256 bits
(3) 128,192, and 256 bits103
that meet the following:
(1) [GP2.2.1]
(2) [SCP03]
(3) [PLT]104
Application Note 1:
The type of algorithm used by the TOE depends on the configuration set during the javacard open platform personalization (For more details see
[AGD_PRE_PLT]).
Application Note 2:
The applet provides this service via the platform, it doesn’t own and cannot access the keys used to process the authentication. Their
import/generation and destruction are managed by the platform.
8.1.3.3.4 FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a hybrid105 random number generator that implements none106.
101
[assignment : list of cryptographic operations]
102
[assignment : cryptographic algorithm]
103
[assignment : cryptographic key sizes]
104
[assignment : list of standards]
105
[selection : physical, non physical true, deterministic hybrid]
106
[assignment : list of security capabilities]
97/128
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [RGS_B1]107.
8.1.3.3.5 FDP_ACC.1/IASECC Administration Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/IAS ECC Administration The TSF shall enforce the IAS ECC Administration SFP108 on
(1) Subjects: TOE_Administrator (in phase 7), Personalisation Agent (Phase 6)
(2) objects: internal objects described in IASECC management
(3) operations: IAS ECC Management109.
8.1.3.3.6 FDP_ACC.1/key management Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/key management The TSF shall enforce the key management SFP110 on
(4) Subjects: S.User
(5) objects:keys including Diffie Hellman Domain parameters
(6) operations:
o Import of keys and Diffie Hellman Domain parameters
o Generation of asymmetric key pair
o Export of public keys and Diffie Hellman Domain parameters111.
107
[assignment : a defined quality metric]
108
[assignment : access control SFP]
109
[assignment : list of subjects, objects and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
110
[assignment : access control SFP]
111
[assignment : list of subjects, objects and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
98/128
8.1.3.3.7 FDP_ACF.1/ IASECC Administration Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/ IASECC Administration The TSF shall enforce the IASECC Administration SFP112 to objects based on the following: S.Admin is associated
with the security attribute “IAS ECC Management” 113.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ IASECC Administration The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed:
(1) In phase 6, subject with the security attribute “role” set to “Personalization Agent” is allowed to modify the
IAS ECC Management attributes
(2) In phase 7, subject with the security attribute “role” set to “TOE_Administrator” is allowed to modify the IAS
ECC Management attributes114.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ IASECC Administration The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none115.
FDP_ACF.1.4/ IASECC Administration The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
(1) In phase 6, subject without the security attribute “role” set to “Personalization Agent” is allowed to modify
the IAS ECC Management attributes
(2) In phase 7, subject without the security attribute “role” set to “TOE_Administrator” is allowed to modify the
IAS ECC Manageemnt attributes116.
8.1.3.3.8 FDP_ACF.1/key management Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
112
[assignment : access control SFP]
113
[assignment : list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security
attributes]
114
[assignment : rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operationson controlled objects]
115
[assignment : rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
116
[assignment : rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
99/128
FDP_ACF.1.1/ key management The TSF shall enforce the key management SFP117 to objects based on the following: S.User is associated with the
security attribute “Key management”118.
FDP_ACF.1.2/ key management The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled
objects is allowed:
(1) In phase 7, the user with the security attribute role set to S.Sigy, User_Admin, CSP, SCA, HID, IFD and with
the security attribute "Key import Management" set to "authorised" is allowed to import key and Diffie
Hellman Domain parameters
(2) In phase 6, the user with the security attribute "role" set to “Personalisation Agent” is allowed to import keys
and Diffie Hellman Domain parameters
(3) In phase 7, the user with the security attribute role set to S.Sigy, User_Admin, CSP, SCA, HID, IFD and with
the security attribute "Key generation Management" set to "authorised" is allowed to generate a key pair
(4) In phase 6, the user with the security attribute role set to Personalisation Agent is allowed to generate a key
pair
(5) In phase 7, the user with the security attribute role set to S.Sigy, User_Admin, CSP, SCA, HID, IFD and with
the security attribute "Key export Management" set to "authorised" is allowed to export a public key and
Diffie Hellman Domain parameters
(6) In phase 6, the user with the security attribute "role" set to “Personalisation Agent” is allowed to export a
public key and Diffie Hellman Domain parameters
(7) In phase 7, if the import, export or generation operation is set to Never, any user will not be allowed to
perform the operation
(8) In phase 7, if the export operation is set to Always, any user will be allowed to perform the operation119.
Application note:
In phase 6, the entity with the role “Personalisation Agent” always has the security attribute “Key export Management, “Key import Management”,
and “Key generation Management” set to “authorized”.
In phase 7, depending on the use case, the “role” allowed to import, generate or export the keys may be restricted to R.Sigy, User_Admin, CSP,
SCA, HID, IFD, or any combination of them.
FDP_ACF.1.3/ key management The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none120.
117
[assignment : access control SFP]
118
[assignment : list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security
attributes]
119
[assignment : rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]
120
[assignment : rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
100/128
FDP_ACF.1.4/ key management The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none121.
8.1.3.3.9 FDP_ETC.1/keys Export to Outside TSF control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_ETC.1.1/keys The TSF shall enforce the key management SFP122 when exporting user data, controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the
TOE.
FDP_ETC.1.2/keys the TSF shall export the user data without the user data’s associated security attributes.
8.1.3.3.10 FDP_ITC.1/Keys Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ITC.1.1/Keys The TSF shall enforce the key management SFP123 when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the
TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/Keys The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/Keys The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: Keys
shall be sent by the User with the “role” set to S.Sigy, User_Admin, Personalisation Agent, CSP, SCA, HID, IFD124.
121
[assignment : rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
122
[assignment : access control SFP]
123
[assignment : access control SFP]
124
[assignement : ]
101/128
Application note:
In phase 7, depending on the use case, the “role” allowed to import, generate or export the keys may be restricted to R.Sigy, User_Admin, CSP,
SCA, HID, IFD or any combination of them.
8.1.3.3.11 FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1/Auth keys The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment :positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive
integer within 1 and 15] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL .1.2/Auth keys When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [assignment: List of
actions]
Refinements:
Type of entity Entity Selection for FIA_AFL.1.1 list of actions
User “Personalisation Agent”
Positive integer
number ‘1’
Time of next authentication increases
User “TOE_Administrator”
Positive integer
number ‘1’
Time of next authentication increases
User
“User_Admin”
(when using symmetric role authentication)
Administrator
configurable positive
integer ‘N’
0  N  15
If N= ‘0’, no actions are taken.
If N != ‘0’, the key is blocked
User
“User_Admin”
(when using asymmetric role
authentication)
Positive integer
number ‘1’
The key is deallocated with respect to
FDP_RIP.1.1
User
“CSP, SCA, HID, IFD”
(when using symmetric device
authentication)
Administrator
configurable positive
integer ‘N’
0  N  15
If N= ‘0’, no actions are taken.
If N != ‘0’, the key is blocked
102/128
User
“CSP, SCA, HID, IFD”
(when using asymmetric device
authentication)
Positive integer
number ‘1’
The key is deallocated with respect to
FDP_RIP.1.1
8.1.3.3.12 FMT_MSA.1/ key management Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/ key management The TSF shall enforce the key management SFP125 to restrict the ability to modify126 the security attributes Key
management127
to:
(1) S.Sigy
(2) User_Admin
(3) Personalisation Agent
(4) CSP
(5) SCA
(6) HID
(7) IFD128
8.1.3.3.13 FMT_MSA.1/ TOE management Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
125
[assignment : access control SFP]
126
[selection: change_default, query, modidy, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
127
[assignment : list of security attributes]
128
[assignment : the authorized identified roles]
103/128
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1/ TOE management The TSF shall enforce the IASECC Administration SFP129 to restrict the ability to modify130 the security attributes
IASECC Management131
to:
(1) TOE_Administrator, or
(2) Personalisation Agent132
8.2 Security Assurance Requirements
129
[assignment : access control SFP]
130
[selection: change_default, query, modidy, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
131
[assignment : list of security attributes]
132
[assignment : the authorized identified roles]
Assurance class Assurance components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1: Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.5: Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_IMP.1: Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_INT.2: well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4: Semiformal modular design
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life Cycle Support
ALC_CMC.4: Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.5: Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1: Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2: Identification of security measures (augmented)
ALC_LCD.1: Developer defined life cycle model
ALC_TAT.2: Compliance with implementation standards
ASE: Security Target Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1: Conformance Claims
ASE_ECD.1: Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1: ST introduction
104/128
Table 1- EAL5 +
8.2.1 AVA_VAN.5 augmentation
The TOE is intended to function in a variety of signature creation systems for sualified electronic signatures. Due to the nature of its intended applications,
i.e. the TOE may be issued to users and may not be directly under the control of trained and dedicated administrators. Insecure states shall be easy to detect
and the TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF, OT.Sig_Secure
and OT.Keys_Secrecy.
This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component. Independent vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information.
The attacker is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the TOE. The attacker is presumed to have a high level of technical
sophistication.
8.2.2 ALC_DVS.2 augmentation
In order to protect the TOE on development Phase, the component ALC_DVS.2 was added. This latter requires security documentation justifying that the
security measures provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
ASE.OBJ.2: Security Objectives
ASE.REQ.2: Derived security requirements
ASE.SPD.1: Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1: TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.2: Analysis of Coverage
ATE_DPT.3: Testing modular design
ATE_FUN.1: Functional Testing
ATE_IND.2: Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.5: Methodical vulnerability analysis (augmented)
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8.3 Security Requirements Rationale
8.3.1 Security requirement coverage
TOE security
objectives
Functional
Requirements
OT.lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp
OT.Authentication_Secure
OT.SCD/SVD_Management
OT.Key_Lifecycle_Security
OT.Keys_Secrecy
OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique
OT.Lifecycle_Management
OT.eServices
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X X X
FCS_CKM.1/Keys X X X
FCS_CKM.1/Session_keys X
FCS_CKM.4 X X X X
FCS_CKM.4/Session keys X
FCS_COP.1/Sign X X
FCS_COP.1/GP secret data protection X X
FCS_COP.1/DH computation X X X
FCS_COP.1/SM in confidentiality X
FCS_COP.1/SM in integrity X
FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth X X
FCS_COP.1/Enc key decipherment X X
FCS_COP.1/Sym role auth X X X
FCS_COP.1/Sym Device auth X X X
FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification X X X
FCS_COP.1/Asym role auth X X X
FCS_COP.1/Asym internal DAPP auth X X X
FCS_COP.1/Asym external DAPPauth X X X
FCS_COP.1/data hashing X
FCS_COP.1/GP Auth X X X
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FCS_RNG.1 X X X X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X X
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_import X X X
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer X X X
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_creation X X X
FDP_ACC.1/IASECC Administration X X
FDP_ACC.1/key management X X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation X X X
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer X X X
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_import X X X
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_creation X X X
FDP_ACF.1/IASECC Administration X X
FDP_ACF.1/key management X X X
FDP_RIP.1 X X X X
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent X X X X X
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS X X
FDP_ITC.1/SCD X
FDP_UCT.1/SCD X X
FDP_DAU.2/SVD X
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS X
FDP_ETC.1/keys X X
FDP_ITC.1/keys X X
FIA_AFL.1/RAD X X X
FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys X X X X
FIA_UAU.1 X X X X X X X
FIA_UID.1 X X X X X X
FIA_API.1 X X
FMT_MOF.1 X X X
FMT_MSA.1/Admin X X X
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory X X
FMT_MSA.1/key management X X
FMT_MSA.1/TOE management X X
FMT_MSA.2 X X X X X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X X X X X
FMT_MSA.4 X X X X X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin X X X
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FMT_MTD.1/Signatory X X X
FMT_MTD.1/TOE serial number X
FMT_MTD.1/TOE state X
FMT_MTD.1/SCD and SCD ID X
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock X X
FPT_EMS.1 X X X
FMT_SMR.1 X X X X X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X X X X X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X X
FPT_TST.1 X X X X X X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD X X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD X
FTP_ITC/VAD X
FTP_ITC/DTBS X
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8.3.2 TOE security requirements sufficiency
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFR as follows.
The SCD import is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import and
FDP_ITC.1/SCD. The confidentiality of the SCD is protected during import according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD in
the trusted channel FTP_ITC.1/SCD.
Secure SCD/SVD generation is ensured by FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SCD/SVD generation
is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF
according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
The secure SCD usage is ensured cryptographically according to FCS_COP.1/Sign.The SCD usage is
controlled by access control FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation, FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation which is
based on the security attribute secure TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1/Admin,
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1. The test functions FPT_TST.1 provides failure
detection throughout the lifecycle.
The SFR FCS_CKM.4, ensures a secure SCD desctruction.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a SCD/SVD pair
requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 provide user
identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to authorized functions. The SFR
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation provide access control for the
SCD/SVD generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The SFR FMT_MSA.4 defines rules for
inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature creation data) implements the requirement of practically unique
SCD as laid down in Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified by
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD corresponds to
the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified by
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions
specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not modified, so to retain the correspondence.
Moreover, the SCD Identifier allows the environment to identify the SCD and to link it with the appropriate SVD.
The management functions identified by FMT_SMF.1 and by FMT_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to modify the default
value of the security attribute SCD Identifier.
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Authorized SCD import) is provided by the security functions specified by the following
SFR. FIA_UID.1 and FIA.UAU.1 ensure that the user is identified and authenticated before SCD can be
imported. FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import and FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import ensure that only authorised users can
import SCD.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature creation data) is provided by the security functions specified by the
following SFR.
FDP_UCT.1/SCD and FTP_ITC.1/SCD ensures the confidentiality for SCD import.
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD
generation. Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks
using the publicly known SVD.
The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information on SCD is
destroyed after the SCD has been use for signature creation and that destruction of SCD leaves no residual
information.
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The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is modified which could
alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the SCD. FPT_TST.1 tests the working
conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a secure state when integrity is violated and thus assures
that the specified security functions are operational. An example where compromising error conditions are
countered by FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis (DFA).
SFR FPT_EMS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure the confidentiality
of the SCD.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the cryptographic algorithms
specified by FCS_COP.1/Sign, which ensures the cryptographic robustness of the signature algorithms.
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE and FPT_TST.1
ensures self-tests ensuring correct signature creation.
OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided by an SFR for
identification authentication and access control. FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 ensure that no signature creation
function can be invoked before the signatory is identified and authenticated.
The security functions specified by FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the
authentication function. SFR FIA_AFL.1/RAD provides protection against a number of attacks, such as
cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks against authentication.
The security function specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of stored DTBS. The security
functions specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation and FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation provide
access control based on the security attributes managed according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/Signatory,
FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.4. The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 list these management
functions and the roles. These ensure that the signature process is restricted to the signatory. FMT_MOF.1
restricts the ability to enable the signature creation function to the signatory.
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attributes SCD operational to the signatory.
Furthermore, FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources containing the SCD after de-allocation (e.g. after
the signature creation process) and ensures that no attacker can get hold of the SCD (to create signatures
outside the TOE) once SCD has been deleted by the legitimate signatory.
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock ensures the unblocking of the RAD is made under the sole control of the administrator.
In phase 6, the RAD (PIN or Biometric Data) may be loaded on the TOE by the Personalisation Agent as
defined in FMT_SMF.1. The Personalisation Agent is authenticated with a mutual authentication performed
with FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1/GP Auth, and is authenticated with FMT_SMR.1. Effort to bypass the
access control by a frontal exhaustive attack is blocked by FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys. During the mutual
authentication, a session encryption key is agreed between the TOE and the Personalisation Agent and used
by the TOE to decrypt the RAD using FCS_COP.1/GP secret data Protection, ensuring the confidentiality of
the RAD during its transfer in phase 6.
In phase 6, FMT_MSA.1/ Signatory guarantees that the Personalisation Agent cannot sign on behalf of the
signatory, ensuring the signature creation features remains under the sole control of the signatory.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is not altered by the
TOE. The integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS require that the DTBS/R has not been altered by
the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible information is
emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMS.1.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive detection of physical
attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical attacks.
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OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (Authentication proof as SSCD) requires the TOE to provide security mechanisms to
identify and to authenticate themselves as SSCD, which is directly provided by FIA_API.1 (Authentication
proof of identity). The SFR FIA_UAU.1 allows establishment of the trusted channel before (human) user is
authenticated.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (TOE trusted channel for SVD export) requires the TOE to provide a trusted channel
to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA, which is directly provided by
 The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
 FDP_DAU.2/SVD (Data authentication with identity of guarantor), which requires the TOE to provide
CGA with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the SVD and the identity of the user that
generated the evidence.
 FTP_ITC.1/SVD (inter-TSF trusted channel), which requires the TOE to provide a trusted channel to
the CGA.
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import) is provided by FTP_ITC.1/VAD to provide
a trusted channel to protect the VAD provided by the HID to the TOE.
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS import) is provided by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS to
provide a trusted channel to protect the DTBS provided by the SCA to the TOE and by FDP_UIT.1/DTBS,
which requires the TSF to verify the integrity of the received DTBS.
OT.Authentication_Secure (Secure authentication mechanisms) is provided by the cryptographic algorithms
specified by (1) FCS_COP.1/DH Computation, FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification, FCS_COP.1/Asym
Internal DAPP Auth, FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP Auth and FCS_RNG.1 for the mutual authentication
based on an asymmetric scheme (DAPP), (2) FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1/Sym Device auth for the mutual
authentication based on symmetric scheme, (3) FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1/GP Auth for the authentication
of the personalisation agent and of the “TOE_Administrator”, (4) FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1.1/Sym Role
Auth for the authentication of an entity based on a symmetric scheme, (5) FCS_COP.1/Certificate
verification , FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth, and FCS_RNG.1 for the authentication of an entity based on an
asymmetric scheme. All these requirements ensure the cryptographic robustness of the authentication
mechanisms.
The use of a challenge freshly generated by the TOE with FCS_RNG.1 in theses authentication protocols
ensures a protection against replay attacks when authenticating external entities. FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys
ensures a correct detection and protection of authentication failure or exhaustive attacks. The security function
specified by FPT_TST.1 ensures that the security functions are performed correctly and
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent guarantees the integrity of the authentication key(s) used by the TOE. FMT_SMR.1
and FMT_SMF.1 ensure the TOE can distinguish between external entities successfully authenticated
(R.Admin) and can grant them dedicated rights.
In case of authentication protocols involving the import of ephemeral public key on the TOE (using Card
verifiable certificates), FDP_RIP.1 ensures that the key value is not kept by the TOE after usage and then can
not be reused for a replay attack.
This objective ensures as well the establishment of a trusted channel following a successful mutual
authentication ( (1) and (2) ). This trusted channel ensures authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of
communication. FCS_CKM.1/Session keys and FCS_COP.1/Data hashing generate session keys for the
secure communication from a common secret agreed between the TOE and the external entity during the
mutual authentication procedure.
Any incoming command shall contain a MAC computed by the issuer with the session key agreed during the
mutual authentication, so that any unauthenticated or non integer command is detected by the MAC verification
performed by the TOE using FCS_COP.1/SM in integrity. The data exchanged through this trusted channel
are also protected in confidentiality thanks to FCS_COP.1/SM in confidentiality, ensuring they can only be
disclosed to the parties authenticated during the mutual authentication step. The encryption key is ephemeral
as it is generated during the mutual authentication using a challenge freshly generated by the TOE using
FCS_RNG.1, which ensures that dictionary attacks cannot be performed on encrypted data. When an integrity
error is detected, or if the MAC is wrong (wrong authentication of the command issuer), the session keys (for
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integrity and confidentiality) are erased thanks to FCS_CKM.4/Session keys so that they cannot be reused
anymore, causing the trusted channel to be irreversibly lost. In particular, it ensures that encrypted data that
may be caught by an attacker cannot be reused anymore to masquerade the TOE.
In phase 6, the integrity and confidentiality of data is ensured by FCS_COP.1/GP secret data protection.
The type of authentication scheme used by the TOE to authenticate the administrator or perform a mutual
authentication may be controlled by the “TOE_Administrator”. It may enforce the TOE to allow the use of
symmetric scheme ( (2) and (4) ) and/or asymmetric ( (1) and (5) ) schemes. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1 provide “TOE_Administrator” identification and authentication prior to enabling access to
authorised functions. The attributes of the authenticated “TOE_Administrator” are provided by
FMT_MSA.1/TOE Management, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_MSA.4 for static attribute initialisation.
Access control is provided by FDP_ACC.1/IAS ECC Administration, FDP_ACF.1/ IAS ECC Administration,
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1. Effort to bypass the access control by a frontal exhaustive attack is blocked by
FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys.
The SSCD provides a proof of identity with FIA_API.1.
This objective ensures as well that any authentication key is loaded in the TOE by an authenticated user, so
that only genuine keys associated to genuine users are declared to the TOE. The key import defined by
FMT_SMF.1 is protected by access control as mandated by FDP_ACF.1/ Key Management and FDP_ACC.1/
Key Management. It is protected by the proper Agent(s) authentication that cannot be bypassed to access
these functions with the TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1. The agent entitled to load the
authentication key is (are) authenticated with FMT_SMR.1. Effort to bypass the access control by a frontal
exhaustive attack is blocked by FIA_AFL.1/RAD and FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys.
OT.SCD/SVD_Management (Management of SCD/SVD) enforces the link between SCD and the matching
certificate. This objective is ensured by FMT_MTD.1/SCD and SCD_ID that guarantees and unambiguous link
between the SCD and its identifier, which is connected to the certificate.
OT.Key_LifeCycle_Security (Lifecycle security of the key(s) stored in the TOE)
The keys management is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/Key management, FDP_ACF.1/Key
management. Keys import is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ITC.1/Keys and keys export is controlled
by TSF according to FDP_ETC.1/Keys. Secure Keys generation is ensured by FCS_CKM.1/Keys.
The secure keys usage is ensured cryptographically according to FCS_COP.1/DH Computation,
FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth, FCS_COP.1/Enc key Decipherement, FCS_COP.1/Sym Role Auth,
FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth, FCS_COP.1/Sym Device Auth, FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification,
FCS_COP.1/Asym internal DAPP Auth, FCS_COP.1/Asym external DAPP Auth. Keys usage is controlled
by access control FDP_ACC.1/Keys management, FDP_ACF.1/Keys management which is based on the
security attribute secure TSF management according to FMT_MSA.1/Key management, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1. The test functions FPT_TST.1 provides failure detection
throughout the lifecycle.
The SFR FCS_CKM.4 ensures a secure keys destruction.
OT.Keys_Secrecy (Secrecy of key(s) stored in the TOE) is provided by the security functions specified by the
following SFR.
FDP_ITC.1/Keys controls the key(s) import and FDP_ETC/Keys controls the key(s) export.
FCS_CKM.1/Keys ensure the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for keys generation.
Cryptographic quality of the asymmetric key pair(s) shall prevent disclosure of the TOE’s private authentication
key(s) and eServices key(s) by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known public key.
The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information on a key(s)
is destroyed after a key has been used for authentication (verification or proof) or an eServices keys has been
used and that destruction of key(s) leaves no residual information.
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The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is modified which could
alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the authentication key. FPT_TST.1 tests the
working conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a secure state when integrity is violated and thus
assures that the specified security functions are operational. An example where compromising error conditions
are countered by FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis (DFA).
FPT_EMS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of
the key(s).
OT.TOE_AuthKey_Unique (Uniqueness of the TOE authentication key(s)) implements the requirement of
practically unique TOE’s authentication private key, which is provided by the cryptographic algorithms specified
by FCS_CKM.1/Keys.
OT.Lifecycle_Management (Management of the TOE life cycle) ensures a correct separation of the TOE life
cycle between phase 6 and 7.
In phase 6, FMT_MTD.1/TOE State ensures the TOE irreversibly switches from phase 6 to phase 7 under the
sole control of the Personalisation Agent. The Personalisation Agent is authenticated with a mutual
authentication performed with FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1/GP Auth and is authenticated with FMT_SMR.1.
Effort to bypass the access control by a frontal exhaustive attack is blocked by FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys.
In phase 7, FDP_ACC.1/Signature creation, FDP_ACC.1/SVD transfer,
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FDP_ACC.1/SCD import, FDP_ACC.1/IAS ECC Administration,
FDP_ACC.1/Key Management, FDP_ACF.1/Signature creation, FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer,
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FDP_ACF.1/SCD import, FDP_ACF.1/IAS ECC Administration,
FDP_ACF.1/Key Management, FMT_MTD.1/Unblock, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1/Admin,
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory ensures the Personalization Agent does not control the TOE anymore.
In phase 6, the Personalization Agent has complete control over the administrative functions of the TOE. It
may import, erase, generate SCD/SVD, export SVD, manage Keys, create RAD and manage the configuration
of the TOE as mandated in FMT_SMF.1, according to the security policies defined in FDP_ACC.1/SVD
transfer, FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FDP_ACC.1/SCD import, FDP_ACC.1/IAS ECC
Administration, FDP_ACC.1/Key Management, FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer,
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation, FDP_ACF.1/SCD import, FDP_ACF.1/IAS ECC Administration,
FDP_ACF.1/Key Management, FDP_ETC.1/Keys. It may as well change TOE State (FMT_MTD.1/TOE
State), load the serial number of the TOE (FMT_MTD.1/TOE Serial Number). These functions are protected
by the Personalisation Agent authentication that cannot be bypassed to access these functions with the TSF
specified by FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1. FMT_MSA.1/Admin, FMT_MSA.1/TOE Management,
FMT_MSA.1/Key Management, FMT_MSA.2, FMT_MSA.3 ensure that the sole Personalisation Agent can
realize these functions. Effort to bypass the access control by a frontal exhaustive attack is blocked by
FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys.
OT.eServices (Provision of eServices) is provided by the cryptographic mechanisms specified by (1)
FCS_COP.1/DH Computation, (2) FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification, (3) FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth, (4)
FCS_COP.1/Enc key decipherment. These requirements ensure the cryptographic robustness of these
eServices.
The eServices keys may be loaded, generated, and the matching public key may be exported as required by
FMT_SMF.1. The Agent(s) entitled to perform such operations shall be authenticated with FMT_SMR.1 using
cryptographic protocols (1) FCS_COP.1/DH Computation, FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification,
FCS_COP.1/Asym Internal DAPP Auth, FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP Auth, and FCS_RNG.1 for the
mutual authentication based on an asymmetric scheme (DAPP), (2) FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_COP.1/Sym
Device auth for the mutual authentication based on symmetric scheme, (3) FCS_RNG.1 and
FCS_COP.1/Sym Role Auth for the authentication of an entity based on a symmetric scheme, (4)
FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification , FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth, and FCS_RNG.1 for the authentication
of an entity based on an asymmetric scheme. These functions are protected by the proper Agent(s)
authentication that cannot be bypassed to access these functions with the TSF specified by FIA_UID.1 and
FIA_UAU.1. Effort to bypass the access control by a frontal exhaustive attack is blocked by FIA_AFL.1/RAD
and FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys.
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8.3.3 Satisfaction of dependencies of security requirements
8.3.3.1 Dependencies
Functional Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Sign
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth
FCS_COP.1/Enc Key Decipherment
FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification
FCS_COP.1/Asym Internal DAPP
Auth
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/Session Keys
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SM in confidentiality
FCS_COP.1/SM in integrity
FCS_CKM.4/Session Keys
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4/Session keys
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1/Session Keys
FCS_COP.1/Sign
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/DH Computation
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SM in confidentiality
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_CKM.1/Session Keys
FDP_CKM.4/Session keys
FCS_COP.1/SM in integrity
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_CKM.1/Session Keys
FDP_CKM.4/Session keys
FCS_COP.1/data hashing
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Not satisfied (See §1.1.1.1)
FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Enc key decipherment
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Sym role Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Sym Device Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Not satisfied (See §1.1.1.1)
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Functional Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Not satisfied (See §1.1.1.1)
FCS_COP.1/Asym Internal DAPP
Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP
Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Not satisfied (See §1.1.1.1)
FCS_COP.1/GP secret data
protection
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Not satisfied (See §1.1.1.1)
FCS_COP.1/GP Auth
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4
Not satisfied (See §1.1.1.1)
FCS_RNG.1 No dependencies n/a
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_ACC.1/IASECC Administration FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/IASECC Administration
FDP_ACC.1/Key management FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1/Key management
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/IASECC Administration
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/IASECC Administration
FMT.MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/Key management
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Key management
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies n/a
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent No dependencies n/a
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS No dependencies n/a
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ITC/Keys
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Key management
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_UCT.1/SCD
[FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1],
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
FTP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import
FDP_DAU.2/SVD FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
[FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1]
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
FDP_ETC/Keys [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FDP_ACC.1/Keys management
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies n/a
FIA_AFL.1/RAD FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1
FIA_API.1 No dependencies n/a
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies n/a
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMR.1,
115/128
Functional Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Key management
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/Key management,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/TOE management
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/IASECC Administration,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2
[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1],
FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.1/Key management
FMT_MSA.1/TOE management
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.4 [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation,
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import,
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/SCD and SCD ID
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/TOE Serial Number
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MTD.1/TOE state
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_EMS.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies n/a
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies n/a
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies n/a
FTP_ITC.1/SCD No dependencies n/a
FTP_ITC.1/SVD No dependencies n/a
FTP_ITC.1/VAD No dependencies n/a
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS No dependencies n/a
Table 2 - Satisfaction of dependencies of SFR
Assurance Requirement Dependencies Satisfied by
116/128
EAL5 package
(dependencies of EAL5 package
are not reproduced here)
By construction, all
dependencies are satisfied in a
CC EAL package
AVA_VAN.5
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1
(all are included in EAL5
package)
ALC_DVS.2 No dependencies n/a
Table 3 - Satisfaction of dependencies of SAR
1.1.1.1 Justifications for non satisfaction of dependencies
FCS_COP.1/data hashing: The cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 and SHA-256 do not use any cryptographic
key. Therefore none of the SFRs listed in the dependencies ([FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1],
FCS_CKM.4) are needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of FCS_COP.1.
FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification : Two situations occur.
1- During the first round of certificate verification, the TOE uses a Root certificate verification public key. When
using this key, the following dependencies apply FDP_ITC.1/Keys and FCS_CKM.4.
As this certificate verification public key may be generated by the TOE, the following dependency applies:
FCS_CKM.1/Keys
The certificate contains an ephemeral public key protected by a cryptogram that only the certificate verification
public key can check.
Upon successful verification of the certificate (ensured by FCS_COP.1.1 / Certificate Verification), the
ephemeral public key nested within the certificate is securely imported in the TOE for the next use
2- In next step(s), the certificate is verified with the ephemeral key (which is extracted from a former certificate
verification step).The certificate contains a public key protected by a cryptogram that only the certificate
verification public key (which is trusted) can check.
Upon successful verification of the certificate (ensured by FCS_COP.1.1 / Certificate Verification), the key
nested within the certificate (which is an ephemeral key) is securely imported in the TOE for the next use
When the certificate verification fails, or when the sequence for certificate verification fails, the ephemeral
public key is erased with FDP_RIP.1.
FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth and FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP Auth: The key used for authentication
is an ephemeral key. It is securely imported on the TOE through successful certificate verification (ensured by
FCS_COP.1.1 / Certificate Verification) and by the initial link of trust coming from the Root Certificate
verification public key, the following dependencies apply: FDP_ITC.1/Keys and FCS_CKM.4.
When the User Authentication fails, or when the sequence for authentication is not fulfilled, the ephemeral
public key is erased with FDP_RIP.1.
FCS_COP.1/GP auth and FCS_COP.1/GP secret data protection:
The applet provides this service via the platform, it doesn’t own and cannot access the keys used to protect
secret data. Their import/generation and destruction are managed by the platform via FDP_CKM.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
117/128
118/128
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS
The TOE inherits all the security functions provided by the underlying javacard open platform [PLT] (see the
Security target). On top of these, it adds some supplemental security functions that are described hereafter.
9.1 SF.RAD_MGT
This security function is involved in the management of the RAD, whether it is PIN or Biometric based. It
ensures the link between each RAD(s) and its associated role (S.Sigy and S.Admin).
It enforces access control over any management operation on the RAD:
 In phase 6, it only allows the RAD(s) to be created by the Personalisation Agent. It requires the RAD
to be encrypted in order to ensure its confidentiality. This security function ensures the Personalisation
Agent can not verify the RAD, and impersonate the role R.Sigy.
 In phase 7, it only allows the RAD(s) to be created by R.Admin. Once loaded, the RAD can only be
changed under control of R.Sigy and unblocked by the R.Admin.
 In phase 7, it allows the TOE to authenticate any Role using a RAD comparison (R.Sigy, and R.Admin
if it uses a RAD).
This security function manages the validation process of the role associated to the RAD (R.Sigy or S.Admin).
It performs the comparison of the VAD with the RAD, and upon successful comparison it authenticates the
associated role. Each RAD is associated to an error counter which aims at ensuring its protecting against brute
force attacks. Upon each submission of an incorrect VAD, it decrements the error counter, and restores it to
its maximum value upon a successful VAD submission. When the error counter has reached ‘00’, the security
function blocks the usage of the RAD, and in particular bans the authentication of the associated role, and the
ability to change the RAD value (for both R.Sigy and R.Admin). Once blocked, the security function allows the
unblocking of the RAD after the successful authentication of R.Admin (please note that the R.Admin required
to unblock the RAD may be different from the one associated to the blocked RAD if ever).
This security function also ensures secure deallocation of VAD after verification and RAD after update.
This security function allows managing the RAD either through APDU commands, or through shared interfaces
(using sharing mechanism). They enable other applets potentially present on the javacard platform to manage
the RAD. The security function ensures the same security policy is applied on both interfaces, so that there
are no logical backdoor on the RAD management.
This security function relies on SF.DEV_AUTH and SF.ADM_AUTH to authenticate R.Admin required to create
the RAD.
9.2 SF.SIG
This security function manages the signature creation service.
It enforces access control over the signature creation service:
 In phase 6, it ensures the signature computation function is not accessible, and in particular that the
Personalization Agent cannot sign on behalf of the Signatory.
 In phase 7, it ensures the signature creation feature is activated only by the signatory.
 In phase 7, it enforces the integrity of DTBS, and ensures that R.Sigy is successfully authenticated
before creating the signature.
The security function enables to select the signature key to be used for the signature creation among all the
signature key hold by the TOE.
119/128
The security function ensures the data hashing (if hash on card, or partial hashing is used), and the secure
signature computation using either a RSA or ECDSA private key (SCD). During the signature creation, the
coherency with the matching signature public key (SVD) is verified.
This security function relies on:
 SF.DEV_AUTH to establish a trusted channel with the SCA
 SF.RAD_MGT to authenticate the Signatory
 SF.SM to transmit the DTBS
9.3 SF.DEV_AUTH
This security function manages the device authentication between the TOE and an external entity.
The device authentication is a mutual authentication between the TOE and an external entity that may be
either realized using symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. Upon successful mutual authentication, the
security function computes a shared secret (called the seed) from random numbers generated by both the
TOE and the external entity and known only to them. The seed is then used by SF.SM to generate session
keys to protect communication in integrity, authenticity and confidentiality, and then maintain the trusted
channel. As such, this security function allows generating a trusted channel with an external entity.
This security function allows the mutual authentication with the following external entities:
 Personalisation Agent (phase 6)
 SCA (phase 6 & 7), mingled with the personalisation agent in phase 6
 CSP (phase 6 & 7), mingled with the personalisation agent in phase 6
 HID (phase 6 & 7), mingled with the personalisation agent in phase 6
 IFD (phase 7)
It authenticates also the SSCD and proves its identity.
This security function manages as well the validation process of the role associated to the authentication key
used by the trusted IT entity. Upon successful device authentication, the associated role is authenticated. Each
key is associated to an error counter (it may be infinite) which aims at ensuring its protecting against brute
force attacks. Upon each wrong authentication, it decrements the error counter (if present), and restores it to
its maximum value upon a successful authentication. When the error counter has reached ‘00’, the security
function blocks the usage of the key, and bans the authentication of the associated role.
9.4 SF.ADM_AUTH
This security function manages the authentication of external entities by the TOE. It is only active in phase 7.
This security function enables the TOE to authenticate external entities and may be either realized using
symmetric or asymmetric cryptography.
This security function manages as well the validation process of the role associated to the authentication key
used by the external entity. Upon successful authentication, the associated role is authenticated. Each key is
associated to an error counter (it may be infinite) which aims at ensuring its protecting against brute force
attacks. Upon each wrong authentication, it decrements the error counter (if present), and restores it to its
maximum value upon a successful authentication. When the error counter has reached ‘00’, the security
function blocks the usage of the key, and bans the authentication of the associated role.
This security function allows the authentication of the following roles:
 TOE_Administrator
 User_Admin
120/128
9.5 SF.SM
This security function ensures the protection of communication between the TOE and an external entity. As
such, this security function maintains a trusted channel.
This security function requires the TOE and the external entity to establish first a trusted channel using a device
authentication (mutual) with SF.DEV_AUTH.
It ensures the following properties:
 In phase 6, it maintains the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the private keys (including the
SCD), the symmetric keys (DES and AES), and the RAD (PIN and biometric template)
 In phase 6, it maintains the integrity and authenticity of the asymmetric public key (including the SVD)
when being exported to the outside
 In phase 7, it maintains the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of communication exchanged
between the TOE and the external entity.
In phase 7, the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data is ensured by cryptographic means based on
symmetric cryptography. Data are encrypted and signed using the symmetric session keys generated from the
seed agreed during the device (mutual) authentication (see SF.DEV_AUTH). Moreover, the protection against
replay attacks is ensured by the signature which is computed using a dynamic ICV, incremented at each new
command.
In phase 6, the confidentiality (for the SCD), integrity and authenticity (for the SVD), is ensured by cryptographic
means based on symmetric cryptography. Data are encrypted using the symmetric session keys generated
from the seed agreed during the device (mutual) authentication (see SF.DEV_AUTH). The integrity of the SVD
is ensured by the
This security function is also in charge of building the session keys from the seed computed by SF.DEV_AUTH.
These session keys are ephemeral and unique, as the seed is computed from random numbers generated by
the TOE and the external entity.
This security function is also in charge of destroying the session keys in case an error is detected (data not
authentic or not integer), or when a command in plan text is sent.
9.6 SF.KEY_MGT
This security function is involved in the management of the keys (including SCDs and SVDs).
It enforces access control over any management operation on the keys:
 In phase 6, it only allows the key (including the SCD and SVD, and the DH parameters) to be loaded,
generated and exported (for the public keys) by the Personalisation Agent. It also requires the private
and secret keys to be encrypted in order to ensure their confidentiality. This security function ensures
the Personalisation Agent can not use the keys it has loaded or generated. It ensures the
personalisation Agent can not impersonate the associated role (in case of authentication keys), or
create a signature with the SCD.
 In phase 7, it enforces access control over the management operations on the SCD and SVD (import,
generation and export) and ensures the SCD is loaded in an encrypted form to ensure its
confidentiality.
 In phase 7, it enforces access control over the management operations on the authentication and
eServices keys (import, generation, and export of public keys) and the DH parameters (loading). It
ensures that any loading, generation or public export operation is performed by an authenticated entity
(Signatory, IFD, SCA, CSP, User_Admin), according to the TOE configuration.
This security function also ensures that after update or generation, the key (including SCD and SVD) are
securely destroyed.
121/128
This security function relies on:
 SF.DEV_AUTH to establish the trusted channel with the SSCD type 1
 SF.RAD_MGT to authenticate the Signatory
 SF.DEV_AUTH and SF.ADM_AUTH to authenticate the roles entitled to perform the operations
 SF.SM to maintain the trusted channel and transmit the DTBS
9.7 SF.CONF
This security function manages the configuration of the TOE.
1) It allows the modification of the following TOE attributes in both phase 6 and 7:
 Communication medium : contact and/or contactless
 Type of cryptography to be used for the external entities and subject authentication (symmetric or
asymmetric)
 Type of DTBS to be used: the DTBS representation fully computed outside the TOE may be used
This security function ensures their initialization to a default values when the applet instance is created, and
apply an access control over modification. Only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent (in phase
6) or “TOE_Administrator” (phase 7) can modify these attributes.
2) It also allows the modification of the following TOE attributes in phase 6:
 TOE serial number
 TOE State
This security function ensures an access control over these operations. Only the successfully authenticated
Personalisation Agent can modify these attributes.
3) It also allows the modification in phase 5 of the ability to retrieve the identification data of the TOE. The
security function ensures an access control over this operation. Only the successfully authenticated
Manufacturing Agent (phase 5) can modify these attributes.
This security function relies on
 SF.DEV_AUTH to authenticate the role personalisation Agent
 SF.ADM_AUTH to authenticate the role TOE_Administrator
9.8 SF.ESERVICE
This security function enables to perform electronic services. It is active in phase 7.
This security function offers the following electronic services:
 C/S authentication
 Decryption key decipherment
 Certificate verification
9.9 SF.SAFESTATE_MGT
This security function ensures the TOE is always in a safe state. It monitors the integrity of the TOE, its assets
and the TSF data (RAD, keys, DTBS) by performing selftests. When an unexpected event occurs (loss of
power, loss of integrity, tearing,…), it ensures
 the TOE returns in a safe state
 all sensitive data are erased
 the TOE returns in a restrictive secure state
122/128
When a major issue is detected, the security function ensures the destruction of the TOE, so that the assets
are not accessible anymore.
9.10 SF.PHYS
This security function ensures the protection of the TOE against physical manipulation aiming at getting access
to its assets. In particular, it ensures that the TOE
 detects physical manipulation (I/O manipulation, EM perturbation, temperature perturbation,…) and
takes countermeasures.
 is protected against probing and that there is no information leakage that may be used to reconstruct
sensitive data
When a major issue is detected, the security function ensures the destruction of the TOE, so that the assets
are not accessible anymore.
123/128
ANNEX A – COMPOSITION WITH THE UNDERLYING JAVACARD
PLATFORM
This annex discusses the composition with the underlying javacard platform [PLT] according to [JIL-COMP].
Evaluation assurance Level
The underlying javacard open platform [PLT] is certified at level EAL 5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and
ALC_DVS.2. As such it complies with the Evaluation level assurance of the composite TOE.
Coverage of the Assumptions of the Javacard Open Platform (A.PLT vs TOE)
Assumption of [PLT] Rationale
A.APPLET No Native API can be nested within Applet loaded in post issuance as the platform
only allows the loading of javacard bytecode
A.VERIFICATION This assumption is upheld by OE.VERIFICATION and OE.CODE_EVIDENCE.
These objectives are fulfilled by the applet included in the TOE (see §0).
For the other applet that may be loaded on the TOE, it is covered by
recommendations in [AGD_OPE] whose fulfilment shall be verified by the risk
manager.
Coverage of the OSP of the Javacard Open Platform (OSP.PLT vs TOE)
OSP of [PLT] Rationale
OSP.VERIFICATION This OSP is upheld by OE.VERIFICATION and OE.CODE_EVIDENCE. These
objectives are fulfilled by the applet included in the TOE (see §0).
For the other applet that may be loaded on the TOE, it is covered by
recommendations in [AGD_OPE] whose fulfilment shall be verified by the risk
manager.
Coverage of the security objective of the Javacard Open Platform Environment (OE.PLT vs TOE)
Security objective of
[PLT] environment
Rationale
OE.APPLET No Native API can be nested within Applet loaded in post issuance as the
platform only allows the loading of javacard bytecode
OE.VERIFICATION This objective is fulfilled by the applet included in the TOE. The applet is verified
then included in the generated platform in Oberthur technologies facilities.
For the other applet that may be loaded on the TOE, it is covered by
recommendations in [AGD_OPE] whose fulfilment shall be verified by the risk
manager.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE The verified applet is included in the TOE pre-issuance in Oberthur Technologies
facilities then the whole TOE is sent to the manufacturer according to audited
organizational measures. It ensures that it has not been changed since the code
verification required in OE.VERIFICATION.
Support of the TOE TSFs by the Javacard Open Platform TSFs (TSF.TOE vs TSF.SFR)
The following table shows how the security functions of the Composite TOE are supported by the security functions of
the underlying javacard open platform:
124/128
TSF of the TOE Supported by the following TSF of [PLT]
SF.RAD_MGT SF_CARDHOLDER_VERIFICATION
SF.SIG SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF_KEY_ACCESS
SF_MESSAGE_DIGEST
SF_RANDOM_NUMBER
SF_SIGNATURE
SF.DEV_AUTH SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF_ENTITY_AUTHENTICATION/SECURE_CHANNEL
SF_KEY_ACCESS
SF_MESSAGE_DIGEST
SF_RANDOM_NUMBER
SF_SIGNATURE
SF.ADM_AUTH SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF_ENTITY_AUTHENTICATION/SECURE_CHANNEL
SF_KEY_ACCESS
SF_MESSAGE_DIGEST
SF_RANDOM_NUMBER
SF_SIGNATURE
SF.SM SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF_ENTITY_AUTHENTICATION/SECURE_CHANNEL
SF_KEY_ACCESS
SF_KEY_DISTRIBUTION
SF_MESSAGE_DIGEST
SF_SIGNATURE
SF.KEY_MGT SF_KEY_ACCESS
SF_KEY_DESTRUCTION
SF_KEY_GENERATION
SF.CONF SF_PREPERSONALISATION
SF.ESERVICE SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF_KEY_ACCESS
SF_KEY_AGREEMENT
SF_MESSAGE_DIGEST
SF_SIGNATURE
SF.SAFESTATE_MGT SF_ATOMIC_TRANSACTION
SF_CLEARING_OF_SENSITIVE_INFORMATION
SF_DATA_COHERENCY
SF_DATA_INTEGRITY
SF_EXCEPTION
SF_FIREWALL
SF_KEY_DESTRUCTION
SF_KEY_MANAGEMENT
SF_MEMORY_FAILURE
SF_RUNTIME_VERIFIER
SF_SIGNATURE
SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF.PHYS SF_HARDWARE_OPERATING
SF_SIGNATURE
SF_ENCRYPTION_AND_DECRYPTION
SF_UNOBSERVABILITY
Support of the TOE SFRs by the Javacard Open Platform SFRs (SFR.TOE vs SFR.PLT)
The following table shows how the SFRs of the Composite TOE are supported by the SFRs of the underlying javacard
open platform:
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SFRs of the TOE
Supported by
[PLT]
SFRs of [PLT]
FCS_CKM.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Fully FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/Keys Fully FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1/Session Keys N/A N/A
FCS_CKM.4 Fully FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4.1 / Session keys Fully
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT ensures destruction
of session keys upon card reset
FCS_COP.1/Sign Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/DH Computation Fully FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/SM in confidentiality Fully FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/SM in integrity Fully FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/data hashing Fully FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/C/S Auth Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Enc key decipherment Fully FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Sym role Auth Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Sym Device Auth Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Certificate verification Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Asym Role Auth Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Asym Internal DAPP
Auth
Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/Asym External DAPP
Auth
Partially FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/GP secret data
protection
Fully FCS_COP.1/CM
FCS_COP.1/GP Auth Fully FCS_COP.1/CM
FCS_RNG.1 Fully FCS_RNG.1/SCP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation N/A N/A
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import N/A N/A
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer N/A N/A
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation N/A N/A
FDP_ACC.1/IASECC
Administration
N/A N/A
FDP_ACC.1/Key management N/A N/A
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation N/A N/A
FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import N/A N/A
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer N/A N/A
FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation N/A N/A
FDP_ACF.1/IASECC Administration N/A N/A
FDP_ACF.1/Key management N/A N/A
FDP_RIP.1 Partially
FDP_RIP.1/OBJECTS
FDP_RIP.1/ABORT
FDP_RIP.1/APDU
FDP_RIP.1/bArray
FDP_RIP.1/KEYS
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT
FDP_RIP.1/ADEL
FDP_RIP.1/ODEL
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Fully
FDP_SDI.2 for the PINs, Biometric templates,
keys and data stored in a secure store object
FCS_CKM.3 provides access to the signature
key used for integrity control of DH
parameters
FCS_COP.1 provides cryptographic means
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for the signature computation/verification of
DH parameters
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Partially
FCS_CKM.3 provides access to the signature
key used for integrity control
FCS_COP.1 provides cryptographic means
for the signature computation/verification
FDP_ITC.1/SCD Partially
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.3
FDP_ITC/Keys Partially
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_CKM.3
FDP_UCT.1/SCD Partially FCS_CKM.3
FDP_DAU.2/SVD Partially FCS_CKM.3
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS Partially FCS_CKM.3
FDP_ETC/Keys Partially FCS_CKM.3
FIA_UAU.1 N/A N/A
FIA_UID.1 N/A N/A
FIA_AFL.1/RAD Fully
FIA_AFL.1/PIN for the PIN
FIA_AFL.1/PIN_BIO for the Biometric
template
FIA_AFL.1/Auth keys Partially
FIA_AFL.1/CM for the authentication of the
roles Personalisation Agent and
TOE_Administrator
FIA_API.1 N/A N/A
FMT_SMR.1 N/A N/A
FMT_SMF.1 Partially
FCS_CKM.3 for the use of the cryptographic
keys
FMT_MOF.1 N/A N/A
FMT_MSA.1/Admin N/A N/A
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory N/A N/A
FMT_MSA.1/Key management N/A N/A
FMT_MSA.1/TOE management N/A N/A
FMT_MSA.2 Partially
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT ensures the security
attributes stored in ephemeral memory
(transient) are reset to restrictive default value
after card reset.The following security
attributes are concerned:
-SCD/SVD management
-SCD operational
-Key management
FMT_MSA.3 Partially
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT ensures the security
attributes stored in ephemeral memory
(transient) are reset to restrictive default value
after card reset.The following security
attributes are concerned:
-SCD/SVD management
-SCD operational
-Key management
FMT_MSA.4 N/A N/A
FMT_MTD.1/Admin N/A N/A
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory Partially
FMT_MTD.1/PIN for the PIN change
featureFMT_MTD.1/PIN_BIO for the
Biometric template change feature
FMT_MTD.1/Unblock Partially
FMT_MTD.1/PIN for the PIN unblocking
feature
FMT_MTD.1/PIN_BIO for the Biometric
template unblocking feature
FMT_MTD.1/SCD and SCD ID N/A N/A
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FMT_MTD.1/TOE Serial Number N/A N/A
FMT_MTD.1/TOE State N/A N/A
FPT_EMS.1 Fully
FPR_UNO.1 for the PIN and Biometric
management
FPR_UNO.1/Key_CM for the import/update
of the authentication keys of the
Personalisation Agent and
TOE_Administrator
FPR_UNO.1/USE_KEY when using the
authentication keys of the Personalisation
Agent and TOE_Administrator
FPR_UNO.1/Applet when comparing two
bytes arrays
FPT_FLS.1 Partially
FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL ensures the TOE
returns in a safe state in case an error occurs
in an atomic transation
FAU_ARP.1 ensures security actions are
taken upon security violations and that the
TOE returns in a safe state
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1/ADEL
FPT_FLS.1/ODEL
FPT_FLS.1/SCP
FPT_RCV.3/SCP ensures automated
recovery in the secure initial state
FPT_RCV.4/SCP ensures a secure state in
case of power loss during a reading/writing
FPT_PHP.1 Fully FPT_PHP.3/SCP
FPT_PHP.3 Fully FPT_PHP.3/SCP
FPT_TST.1 Partially
FPT_TST.1
FDP_SDI.2 for the integrity of patch and
javacard packages. Any loss of integrity is
detected
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Partially FTP_ITC.1/CM
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Partially FTP_ITC.1/CM
FTP_ITC.1/VAD N/A N/A
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS N/A N/A
Coverage of the composite ST threats by the platform threats
TOE threat
composite ST
threat
Platform threat covering the Composite ST
threat
T.SCD_Divulg YES
This threat addresses the disclosure of the SCD
during its generation or import which is covered by
the applet but also by collecting information after
its destruction, during storage or use which is
directed against the platform and meet
T.CONFID_APPLI_DATA, T.RESSOURCES,
T.OBJ_DELETION, and T.PHYSICAL
T.SCD_Derive YES
This threat addresses the derivation of the SCD
from the SVD, the signature or any other publicly
known data. A part of this threat involves the
integrity of the SCD and is addressed against the
platform. It meets T.INTEG_APPLI_DATA
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T.Hack_Phys YES
This threat is mainly addressed against the
platform and a large part is covered by
T.PHYSICAL. The following threats of the platform
also cover it T.RESSOURCES,
T.OBJ_DELETION, T.CONFID_APPLI_DATA
and T.INTEG_APPLI_DATA
T.SVD_Forgery YES
This threat addresses the forgery of the SVD.
When the applet is responsible of its integrity while
transporting it, the platform is responsible of its
integrity inside the container. The platform threat
for this problem is T.INTEG_APPLI_DATA
T.SigF_Misuse NO
The platform is not involved in the protection of the
TOE against this threat
T.DTBS_Forgery NO The applet ensures the integrity of the DTBS.
T.Sig_Forgery YES
This threat addresses the forgery of the signature
created by the TOE. A part of it is covered by the
platform threat T.INTEG_APPLI_DATA (against
SCD integrity)
T.Key_Divulg YES
This threat addresses the disclosure of the
authentication and eServices keys when
transporting them which is covered by the applet
but also by collecting information after their
destruction, during storage or use which is
directed against the platform and meet
T.CONFID_APPLI_DATA, T.RESSOURCES,
T.OBJ_DELETION, and T.PHYSICAL
T.Key_Derive YES
This threat addresses the derivation of the
authentication and eServices keys from the public
keys, the authentication cryptogram or any other
publicly known data. A part of this threat is under
the responsibility of the platform and meets
T.INTEG_APPLI_DATA (against keys storage
and destruction)
T.TOE_PublicAuthKey_Forgery NO This threat is covered by the applet
T.Authentication_Replay YES
This threat is mainly covered by the applet but the
part addressed against the platform meets
T.INTEG_APPLI_DATA (against storage and
destruction of keys used for the authentications)