National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300
Series with FMC/FMCv
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11292-2023
Dated: February 13, 2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Daniel Faigin
DeRon Graves
Swapna Katikaneni
Viet Hung Le
Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Cody Cummins
Kevin Cummins
Douglas Kalmus
Charles Rice
Katie Sykes
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 2
3 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 3
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ................................................................................... 3
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................ 3
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................ 4
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 6
4.1 Security audit ...................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Communication................................................................................................... 6
4.3 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................ 6
4.4 Full residual information protection ................................................................... 7
4.5 Identification and authentication......................................................................... 7
4.6 Security management.......................................................................................... 7
4.7 Protection of the TSF.......................................................................................... 8
4.8 TOE access.......................................................................................................... 8
4.9 Trusted path/channels ......................................................................................... 8
4.10 Filtering............................................................................................................... 8
4.11 Intrusion prevention system................................................................................ 9
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ....................................................................... 9
6 Documentation.......................................................................................................... 12
7 IT Product Testing .................................................................................................... 13
7.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................. 13
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ............................................................. 13
8 Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 13
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 14
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE).......................................................... 14
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................ 14
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ............................................... 15
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)................................... 15
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) ............... 15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)....................................................... 15
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................ 16
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .................................................................. 16
11 Annexes..................................................................................................................... 16
12 Security Target.......................................................................................................... 17
13 Glossary .................................................................................................................... 17
14 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 17
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and
9300 Series with FMC/FMCv solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report
is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government,
and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in February 2023. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the
PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(STFFW14e), the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18
June 2020 (VPNGW11), and the PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), version
1.0, 11 May 2021 (IPS10).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300
Series with FMC/FMCv.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco FTD (NGFW)
7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv Security Target, Version 0.9,
February 9, 2023 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Device, Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS),
Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways,
Version 1.0, 18 May 2021: Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for
Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020
(STFFW14e), PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version
1.1, 18 June 2020 (VPNGW11), and PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems
(IPS), version 1.0, 11 May 2021 (IPS10)
ST Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv
Security Target, Version 0.9, February 9, 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and
9300 Series with FMC/FMCv, Version 1.1, February 13, 2023
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 extended
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Item Identifier
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators Daniel Faigin
DeRon Graves
Swapna Katikaneni
Viet Hung Le
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Cisco Firepower 4100 and 9300 security appliances are purpose-built, scalable platforms
with firewall, VPN and IPS capabilities provided by Firepower Threat Defense (FTD)
software that is running on the Firepower eXtensible Operating System (FXOS). The TOE
includes one or more Firepower appliances (running FTD and FXOS software) that are
centrally managed by a Firepower Management Center (FMC) appliance, and together the
FMC and Firepower (running FTD/FXOS) appliances form the TOE (Distributed TOE Use
Case 3).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The models are comprised of the
following: FP 4110, 4112, 4115, 4120, 4125, 4140, 4145, 4150, 9300 and Firepower
Management Center (FMC) (FMC1000-K9, FMC2500-K9, FMC4500-K9, FMC1600-K9,
FMC2600-K9, FMC4600-K9 and FMCv). The software is comprised of the FTD software
image Release 7.0 (running directly on a 4100 series, or on a security module in a 9300),
FXOS 2.10 (running on 4100 series or on the Supervisor blade of a 9300), and FMC (or
FMCv) version 7.0.
The Cisco Firepower 9300 security appliance is a modular, scalable, carrier-grade appliance
that includes the Chassis (including fans and power supply), Supervisor Blade1
(to manage
the security application running on the security module), network module (optional) and
security module that contains the FTD software. The FP4100 Series appliance is a complete
standalone, bundle unit that contains everything required above in one appliance.
1
Also known as the Cisco FXOS chassis.
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The Firepower eXtensible Operating System (FXOS) is used to manage the FTD. All the
platforms run an instance of FXOS that provides management of the hardware and loads
FTD. The 4k/9k chassis runs on its supervisor engine a fully featured build of FXOS referred
to as the Management Input Output (MIO) build of FXOS. A separate, more limited build
of FXOS runs on any Security Module (SM) installed within the chassis (the Firepower 4100
models contain one fixed Security Module, while the Firepower 9300 chassis supports up to
three removable Security Modules). The SM hardware is a form of Cisco UCS server (based
on a UCS B-series blade server), and as such it includes a Cisco Integrated Management
Controller (CIMC), which is firmware running on a CIMC daughterboard on the server
blade. The FTD software runs on FXOS on the SM. The FXOS software running on the
chassis supervisor maintains a list of administrative accounts that are able to log in to the
supervisor via CLI or WebUI/GUI, called Firepower Chassis Manager (FCM). All
administrative accounts can be managed via both CLI and GUI, and the same authentication
mechanisms can be used at the CLI or GUI.
The FMC is a fault-tolerant, purpose-built network appliance that provides a centralized
management console and database repository for the Sensors (i.e., FTD). The FMC is a key
component in the Cisco NGIPS system. Administrators can use the FMC to manage the full
range of Sensors that comprise the Cisco NGIPS system, and to aggregate, analyze, and
respond to the threats they detect on their network. By using the FMC to manage Sensors,
administrators can:
• Configure policies for all Sensors from a single location, making it easier to change
configurations.
• Install various types of software updates on Sensors.
• Push policies to managed Sensors and monitor their health status from the FMC.
The FMC aggregates and correlates intrusion events, anomaly, network discovery
information, and Sensor performance data, allowing administrators to monitor the
information the Sensors are reporting in relation to one another, and to assess the overall
activity occurring on their network. The following illustration lists what is transmitted
between a FMC and its managed Sensors.
The UCS hardware components, which provide the platform for the FMCv, in the TOE have
common hardware characteristics. These differing characteristics affect only non-TSF
relevant functionality (such as throughput, processing speed, number and type of network
connections supported, number of concurrent connections supported, and amount of storage)
and therefore support security equivalency of the FMCv in terms of hardware.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE consists of at least one Firepower device (Firepower 4K/9K series) running the
FXOS and FTD software and one physical FMC device running the FMC software or
virtual devices running FMCv software. The TOE includes the Cisco FTD, FMC, and
FXOS software. Each instantiation of the TOE has two or more network interfaces and is
able to filter IP traffic to and through those interfaces.
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The TOE can optionally connect to an NTP server via an IPsec tunnel for clock updates. If
the TOE is to be remotely administered, the management station must connect using
SSHv2. When web UI is used, a remote workstation with a TLS-enabled browser must be
available. A syslog server can also be used to store audit records, and the syslog server
must support syslog over TLS or IPsec.
FTD supports two different TLS clients that send syslog messages to the external syslog
server- FTD TLS client and FTD OS TLS Client. The FTD TLS Client is configured by
the FMC and is the main audit system for audits generated by FTD. It sends audit events
such as IPsec and login messages to the external syslog server. Mutual authentication is not
supported. The FTD OS TLS client implementation is configured through the FTD’s
command line and sends audit events such as SSH login, console login, etc. to an external
syslog server. Mutual authentication is not supported.
The TOE can filter connections to/from these external entities using its IP traffic filtering,
and can encrypt traffic where necessary using TLS, SSH, and/or IPsec. The TOE uses
X.509v3 certificates to support authentication for both IPsec and TLS, and the CA server in
the Operational environment can be used to obtain digital certificates.
The communication between the FMC software and FTD in Firepower appliance is
protected by TLSv1.2. Digital certificates from a CA server are obtained when certificates
are used as the authentication method for VPN connection. The TOE protects peer-to-peer
VPN connections between itself and VPN peers (connections can be initiated by the TOE
or by the peer) using IPsec.
The following figure provides a visual depiction of an example TOE deployment. The
TOE boundary is surrounded with a hashed red line.
Figure 1: Example TOE Deployment
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The previous figure includes the following:
o TOE components (at least one Firepower 4K/9K appliance (with FTD and FXOS) and
FMC)
o VPN Peer (Operational Environment) or another instance of the TOE
o VPN Client (Operational Environment) (Cisco AnyConnect VPN Client)
o Management Workstation (Operational Environment)
o NTP Server (Operational Environment)
o CA Server (Operational Environment)
o Syslog server (Operational Environment)
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Communication
3. Cryptographic support
4. Full residual information protection
5. Identification and authentication
6. Security management
7. Protection of the TSF
8. TOE access
9. Trusted path/channels
10. Filtering
11. Intrusion prevention system
4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions.
The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures
auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE
provides the administrator with a circular audit trail where the TOE overwrites the oldest
audit record with the newest audit record when space is full. Audit logs are backed up over
an encrypted channel to an external audit server.
4.2 Communication
The TOE allows authorized administrators to control which FTD device is managed by the
FMC. This is performed through a registration process over TLS. The administrator can also
de-register a FTD device if he or she wish to no longer manage it through the FMC.
4.3 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE
provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote
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administrative management via SSHv2, and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit
generators (RBGs) are seeded by an entropy noise source.
4.4 Full residual information protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual
information from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never
transmitted from the TOE.
4.5 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.
The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-
level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate based authentication or
pre-shared key methods.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the
TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized
administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15
characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE also implements a
lockout mechanism when the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts exceeds the
configured threshold.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-
based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH and HTTPS interfaces.
The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.
4.6 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console
connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users;
all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE
cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE; and the information
flow control policies enforced by the TOE including encryption/decryption of information
flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which equates to any
account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and
possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by
the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrative sessions will be
terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
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4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and administrator roles to limit configuration to authorized
administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE
memory space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s
clock manually via FMC or FXOS or can configure the TOE (FXOS) to use NTP via an
IPsec tunnel to synchronize the TOE’s clock with an external time source. Additionally, the
TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the appliance itself and that of the
cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures occur within the TOE the TOE will
cease operation.
4.8 TOE access
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by
the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN client
sessions will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also supports direct
connections from VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client connections.
The TOE disconnects sessions that have been idle too long and can be configured to deny
sessions based on IP, time, and day, and to NAT external IPs of connecting VPN clients to
internal network addresses.
4.9 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using
SSHv2 for CLI access, and TLS/HTTPS for GUI access. The TOE supports use of TLS
and/or IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers and use of IPsec for connections
with NTP servers. The TOE can establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using
IPsec, and VPN client tunnels using IPsec or TLS. Note that the VPN client is in the
operational environment.
4.10 Filtering
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering
(for IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of
information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of
services, and network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict
the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based
on source and/or destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the flow
of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on the
originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet inspection
is used to aid in the performance of packet flow through the TOE and to ensure that only
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packets are only forwarded when they’re part of a properly established session. The TOE
supports protocols that can spawn additional sessions in accordance with the protocol RFCs
where a new connection will be implicitly permitted when properly initiated by an explicitly
permitted session. The File Transfer Protocol is an example of such a protocol, where a data
connection is created as needed in response to an explicitly allowed command connection.
System monitoring functionality includes the ability to generate audit messages for any
explicitly defined (permitted or denied) traffic flow. TOE administrators have the ability to
configure permitted and denied traffic flows, including adjusting the sequence in which flow
control rules will be applied, and to apply rules to any network interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be
established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the
TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs
define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the
keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security
protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via
IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to
interfaces using crypto map set.
4.11 Intrusion prevention system
The TOE provides intrusion policies consisting of rules and configurations invoked by the
access control policy. The intrusion policies are the last line of defense before the traffic is
allowed to its destination. All traffic permitted by the access control policy is then inspected
by the designated intrusion policy. Using intrusion rules and other preprocessor settings,
these policies inspect traffic for security violations and, in inline deployments, can block or
alter malicious traffic.
If the vendor-provided intrusion policies do not fully address the security needs of the
organization, custom policies can improve the performance of the system in the environment
and can provide a focused view of the malicious traffic and policy violations occurring on
the network. By creating and tuning custom policies, the administrators can configure, at a
very granular level, how the system processes and inspects the traffic on the network for
intrusions.
Using Security Intelligence, the administrators can blacklist—deny traffic to and from—
specific IP addresses, URLs, and DNS domain names, before the traffic is subjected to
analysis by the access control rules. Optionally, the administrators can use a “monitor-only”
setting for Security Intelligence filtering.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
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• PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25
June 2020 (STFFW14e)
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020
(VPNGW11)
• PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), version 1.0, 11 May 2021
(IPS10)
That information has not been reproduced here and the
NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW11/IPS10 should be consulted if there is interest in that
material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW11/IPS10 as described for this TOE in the Security Target.
Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All
other functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
IPS, Firewall, & VPN Gateway and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
IPS, Firewall, VPN Gateway models was not included in the scope of the evaluation
and therefore should not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device
as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW11/IPS10 and
applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional
capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this evaluation.
Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Excluded Functionality
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Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Telnet for management purposes Telnet passes authentication
credentials in clear text and is
disabled by default.
Firepower Device Manager (FDM) Firepower Device Manager is a web-
based local manager. Use of FDM is
beyond the scope of this Common
Criteria evaluation.
Filtering of non-IP traffic provided by
the EtherType option when
configuring information flow policies
is excluded from the evaluated
configuration
Use of non-IP traffic filtering is
beyond the scope of this Common
Criteria evaluation.
Smart Call Home. The Smart Call
Home feature provides personalized,
e-mail-based and web-based
notification to customers about critical
events involving their individual
systems.
Use of Smart Call Home is beyond
the scope of this Common Criteria
evaluation.
Shell Access The shell access is only allowed for
pre-operational installation,
configuration, and post-operational
maintenance and troubling shooting.
Timeout Exemption Option The use of the “Exempt from Browser
Session Timeout” setting is not
permitted. This allows a user to be
exempted from the inactivity timeout
feature.
FXOS REST API Allows users to programmatically
configure and manage their chassis.
Use of REST API is beyond the scope
of this Common Criteria evaluation.
Clustering This feature is not tested and is out of
scope.
The services in the table above are disabled in the evaluated configuration.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Cisco FTD v7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC and FMCv Common
Criteria Supplemental User Guide, Version 0.6, February 8, 2023
• Cisco FXOS 2.10 on Firepower 4100/9300 for FTD Preparative Procedures &
Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified Configuration, Version
0.5, January 23, 2023
• FTD v7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC and FMCv Common
Criteria User Guide Supplement IPS & VPN Functionality, Version 0.5, January 23,
2023
• Firepower Management Center Configuration Guide, Version 7.0, September 20,
2022
• Cisco Firepower 4100/9300 FXOS CLI Configuration Guide, 2.10(1), January
18,2023
• Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Command Reference, January 18,2023
• Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Syslog Messages, November 29,2022
• Cisco Firepower 4100/9300 FXOS Command Reference, November 30,2022
• Cisco Firepower 4100/9300 Upgrade Guide, Firepower 6.0.1–7.0.x or ASA 9.4(1)–
9.16(x) with FXOS 1.1.1–2.10.1, August 08,2022
• Cisco Firepower 4100/9300 FXOS Firepower Chassis Manager Configuration
Guide, 2.10(1), January 19,2023
• Cisco Firepower Management Center 1000, 2500, and 4500 Hardware Installation
Guide, August 21, 2018
• Cisco Firepower 4110, 4120, 4140, and 4150 Hardware Installation Guide,
December 01, 2022
• Cisco Firepower 9300 Hardware Installation Guide, December 01, 2022
• Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense/Firepower Hotfix Release Notes, August 01,
2022
• Cisco Firepower 4100 Getting Started Guide, January 19,2023
• Cisco Firepower 9300 Getting Started Guide, January 19,2023
• Cisco Firepower Release Notes, Version 7.0, November 21, 2022
• Cisco Firepower Management Center Upgrade Guide, Version 6.0–7.0, December
19, 2022
• Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Virtual Getting Started Guide, January
18,2023
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower Validation Report Version 1.0, February 13, 2023
4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv
13
• Cisco Firepower 4112, 4115, 4125, and 4145 Hardware Installation Guide,
December 01, 2022
• Cisco Firepower Management Center 1600, 2600, and 4600 Hardware Installation
Guide, April 29, 2022
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is
configured as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cisco FTD
(NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv, Version 1.1, February
13, 2023 (DTR), as summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW11/IPS10
including the tests associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 3.4 lists the
tested devices, provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of at least one Firepower device (Firepower 4K/9K series) running the
FXOS and FTD software and one physical FMC device running the FMC software or virtual
devices running FMCv software.
Name Description
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower Validation Report Version 1.0, February 13, 2023
4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv
14
TOE Hardware
Models
• Firepower 4100 Series (4110, 4112, 4115, 4120, 4125, 4140,
4145 and 4150)
• Firepower 9300 (including chassis, supervisor blade, and security
module)
• Cisco Firepower Management Center (FMC) (FMC1000-K9,
FMC2500-K9, FMC4500-K9, FMC1600-K9, FMC2600-K9 and
FMC4600-K9)
• FMCv running on ESXi 6.7 or 7.0 on the Unified Computing
System (UCS) UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-C240-M5, UCSC-C480-
M5, UCS-E160S-M3 and UCS-E180D-M3
TOE Software
Version
FTD 7.0, FXOS 2.10 and FMC/FMCv 7.0
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Cisco FTD
(NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv TOE to be Part 2
extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW11/IPS10.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower
4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv products that are consistent with the Common
Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/
VPNGW11/IPS10 related to the examination of the information contained in the TSS.
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower Validation Report Version 1.0, February 13, 2023
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The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/STFFW14e/VPNGW11/IPS10
and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities and fuzz testing. Neither the public search for
vulnerabilities nor the fuzz testing uncovered any residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities in order to ensure there are
no publicly known and exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE from the following sources:
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower Validation Report Version 1.0, February 13, 2023
4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv
16
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
• Exploit / Vulnerability Search Engine (http://www.exploitsearch.net)
• SecurITeam Exploit Search (http://www.securiteam.com)
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The search was performed on 02/09/2023 with the following search terms: "ftd 7.0",
"Firepower threat defense", "cisco ssl fom", "Cisco Security Crypto", "Virtual fmc fom",
"Firepower management center", "openssh", "Firepower 4100", "Firepower 9300 ", "ESXi",
"Intel Atom C3000", "Intel Xeon D", "Intel Xeon E5", "Intel Xeon Silver", "Intel Xeon
Gold", "Intel Xeon Scalable".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE
being configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Common Criteria
Administrator Guide.
Please note that the functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the Security Target. The excluded functionality is specified in
section 5 of this report. All other items and scope issues have been sufficiently addressed
elsewhere in this document.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower Validation Report Version 1.0, February 13, 2023
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17
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300
Series with FMC/FMCv Security Target, Version 0.9, February 9, 2023.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower Validation Report Version 1.0, February 13, 2023
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[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
[5] PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25
June 2020 (STFFW14e)
[6] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.1, 18 June 2020
(VPNGW11)
[7] PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), version 1.0, 11 May 2021
(IPS10).
[8] Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series with FMC/FMCv
Security Target, Version 0.9, February 9, 2023 (ST).
[9] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300
Series with FMC/FMCv, Version 1.0, February 10, 2023 (AAR).
[10] Detailed Test Report for Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and 9300 Series
with FMC/FMCv, Version 1.1, February 13, 2023 (DTR).
[11] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco FTD (NGFW) 7.0 on Firepower 4100 and
9300 Series with FMC/FMCv, Version 1.1, February 13, 2023 (ETR)