MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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Dossier: 2014-43
C/ Argentona nº 20
Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
REF: 2014-43-INF-1560 v1
Target: Expediente
Date: 16.03.2016
Created by: CERT9
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2014-43 ASSET MANAGER WITH CONNECT-IT
Applicant: HP Hewlett-Packard development Company
References:
[EXT 2621] Certification request of ASSET MANAGER WITH CONNECT-IT
[EXT 2898] HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 Evaluation Technical
Report, v 1.0, 30-12-2015.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product “HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60
version build #12154 (AM) and 010 (CIT)”, as requested in [EXT 2621] dated 04-11-
2014, and evaluated by the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U., as detailed in the
Evaluation Technical Report [EXT 2898] received on 30/12/2015.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................5
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..............................................................................................6
IDENTIFICATION..............................................................................................................................................7
SECURITY POLICIES .......................................................................................................................................7
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...........................................................................7
THREATS .........................................................................................................................................................8
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY.................................................................................8
ARCHITECTURE................................................................................................................................................9
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE...........................................................................................................................9
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE.......................................................................................................................10
DOCUMENTS ....................................................................................................................................................11
PRODUCT TESTING........................................................................................................................................12
PENETRATION TESTING.............................................................................................................................13
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .................................................................................................................13
EVALUATION RESULTS................................................................................................................................ 14
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM.......................................15
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................15
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................................15
BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................................................................................................15
SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................16
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product “HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 version build #12154 (AM)
and 010 (CIT)”.
The TOE is a software-only TOE and provides an organized way to manage the life
cycle of IT infrastructure from procurement to end-of-life. AM facilitates enterprise
management of physical objects and the events associated with the life cycle of
these objects. CIT is integrated with AM to assist in importing data to the AM
database.
Developer/manufacturer: Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Development L.P.
Documentary evidences developed by Corsec Security, Inc.
Sponsor: Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Development L.P.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Epoche & Espri S.L.U.
Protection Profile: No.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 – EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.2).
Evaluation end date: 30/12/2015.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2+ (augmented
with ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL2 +
ALC_FLR.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product “HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 version build #12154
(AM) and 010 (CIT)”, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE summary
The TOE is a software-only TOE and provides an organized way to manage the life
cycle of IT infrastructure from procurement to end-of-life. AM facilitates enterprise
management of physical objects and the events associated with the life cycle of
these objects. CIT is integrated with AM to assist in importing data to the AM
database.
AM provides organizations with visibility into their current IT hardware and software
inventories, as well as non-IT assets such as office supplies, machines, and tools.
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AM provides insights into the current status of assets, such as contracts, licensing
obligations, and when software is over-deployed for an environment. Assets are
organized within AM into portfolio items, which contain a list of assets, information
relevant to who is responsible for the assets, and where the assets are located
geographically.
Connect-It is embedded in AM to assist in importing asset data from external
discovery tools. Connect-It not only feeds various types of data into AM, but also
pushes asset data to external service management, configuration management,
cloud services, and other corporate systems.
TOE major security features
The major security features implemented by the TOE and subject to evaluation (no
assurance can be supposed to any other functionality) to can be summarised as
follows:
- Cryptographic Support: the TOE provides two FIPS 140-2 validated
cryptographic libraries that provide cryptographic services for the TOE. All
keys are generated according to FIPS standards for key generation and
destroyed via FIPS-approved zeroization methods. Cryptographic
operations are provided to secure communications among various
physically-separated TOE components and trusted IT products in the TOE
environment. Secure operations use TLS v1.1 or v1.2 in the evaluated
configuration.
- User Data Protection: the TOE implements role-based access controls on
all users attempting to access the various screens of the AM UIs, the data
stored in the AM database, and all connectors attempting to import data to
or export data from the TOE. By default, all users with accounts on the
TOE are given a set of guest permissions that can be modified by a user
with Administrative rights permissions. Users with Administrative rights
permissions can also give a different set of permissions to each user.
- Identification and Authentication: the Connect-It client allows users to
create and manage scenarios and connections to external discovery and
inventory tools prior to identification and authentication. For all other
functions, the TOE requires users to authenticate before granting access
to functionality or data within the TOE. While authenticating, the TOE
obscures user passwords by replacing the individual characters with
bullets while the user is typing the password at the login prompt. The TOE
supports the use of certificates or LDAP for authentication. User accounts
can be configured to be locked out after a user with Administrative rights
permissions-configurable number of failed login attempts.
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- Security Management: the TOE is managed primarily via the AM and
Connect-It UIs. All user accounts have an “Administration Rights”
permission which can be enabled by authorized users with Administrative
rights permissions to grant full access to the functionality of these
interfaces and all data in the database. Otherwise, access is constrained
by a highly customizable role-based access control system. Management
tasks available to users with Administrative rights permissions include
management of license keys, databases, and user roles and permissions.
- Protection of the TSF: the TOE provides a secure connection to a remote
LDAP server that is used whenever credentials are passed to be
evaluated. The TOE performs cryptographic self-tests during startup to test
the proper function of the cryptographic modules. The TOE also performs
conditional self-tests during the operation of the cryptographic module in
order to ensure that critical functionality of the cryptographic module is
working properly.
- Trusted Path/Channels: the TOE provides a trusted path between users
accessing the TOE via the AM web UI. This path uses TLS and its
supported cryptographic functionality to secure all communications
between the user workstation and the Tomcat server running on the server
components of the TOE.
- Asset Management Analysis: once data is imported or input into AM, the
data can be analyzed to ensure that only authorized users have access to
assets and that authorized hardware and software is being used with an
asset.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidences required to fulfil the evaluation
level EAL2 and the evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.2
Flaw reporting procedures, according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
Class Family/Component
ASE:
Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional
specification
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ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
Class Family/Component
FCS FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(a)
FCS_COP.1(b)
FDP FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ETC.2
FDP_ITC.1
FIA FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UID.1
FMT FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT FPT_ITC.1
FPT_TST.1
FTP FTP_TRP.1
AMA_SAA.1
AMA_SAD.1
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IDENTIFICATION
Product: “HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 version build #12154 (AM)
and 010 (CIT)”
Security Target: Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Development L.P. Asset Manager
v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 Security Target, v 1.4
Protection Profile: No.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 – EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.2).
SECURITY POLICIES
There are no Organizational Security Policies defined for this evaluation.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target [ST]. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
- A.INSTALL The TOE is installed on the appropriate, dedicated hardware
and operating system.
- A.NETCON The TOE environment provides the network connectivity
required to allow the TOE to perform its intended functions.
- A.LOCATE The TOE and external database are located within a controlled
access facility.
- A.PROTECT The TOE software will be protected from unauthorized
modification.
- A.MANAGE There are one or more competent individuals assigned to
manage the TOE and the security of the information it contains.
- A.NOEVIL The users with Administrative rights who manage the TOE and
database administrators who manage the TOE environmental components
are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all guidance.
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THREATS
The threats to the IT assets against which protection is required by the TOE or by
the security environment are listed below. The threat agents are divided into two
categories:
- Attackers who are not TOE users: They have public knowledge of how the
TOE operates and are assumed to possess a basic skill level, limited
resources to alter TOE configuration settings or parameters and no
physical access to the TOE. An attacker may initiate a process within the
TOE to act on its behalf. This process is assumed to have all attributes of
the attacker.
- TOE users: They have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and
are assumed to possess a high skill level, moderate resources to alter
TOE configuration settings or parameters and no physical access to the
TOE. TOE users only have access to the TOE remotely.
Both are assumed to have a low level of motivation. The IT assets requiring
protection are the TSF and user data saved on or transitioning through the TOE and
the hosts on the protected network. The threats defined are:
- T.MASQUERADE An attacker or process may masquerade as another
entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources.
- T.TAMPERING An attacker or process may be able to bypass the TOE’s
security mechanisms by tampering with the TOE or TOE environment.
- T.UNAUTH An attacker or a TOE user may gain access to user or TSF
data on the TOE, even though they are not authorized in accordance with
the TOE security policy.
- T.FALREC Attackers may use the TOE to order or install unauthorized
items on the network.
- T.INTERCEPT The TOE may communicate with remote IT entities and
user workstations that lie outside of the organization's trusted network. An
attacker may attempt to intercept these communications in order to read or
modify critical TSF data.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem. The security objectives declared for
the TOE operational environment are categorized below.
IT Security Objectives that are to be satisfied by the environment:
- OE.PROTECT: the TOE environment must protect itself and the TOE from
external interference or tampering.
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- OE.PLATFORM: the TOE hardware and OS must support all required
TOE functions.
- OE.ACCESSIBILITY: the TOE is positioned on the network such that
authorized users are able to access the TOEs functionality while
unauthorized external users are blocked from accessing the TOE.
Non-IT Security Objectives that are to be satisfied without imposing technical
requirements on the TOE:
- OE.MANAGE: sites deploying the TOE will provide competent, non-hostile
TOE administrators who are appropriately trained and follow all
administrator guidance. TOE administrators will ensure the system and its
environment are used securely.
- OE.PHYSICAL: the physical environment must be suitable for supporting a
computing device in a secure setting.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The software-only TOE is a resource tracking tool which provides an organized way
to manage the life cycle of IT infrastructure from procurement to end-of-life.
The TOE is deployed on three platforms. The platforms are part of the TOE
environment, but the TOE components on each platform are described below:
- Client:
 AM Client provides user interface and CLI utilities for AM.
 Connect-It Client provides user interface and CLI utilities for Connect-It and all
Connect-It functionality.
 OpenSSL FIPS module provides secure communications for the Client
- AM Front End Server:
 AM Web Tier provides web-based access for non-client users.
 Apache Tomcat server hosts the web interfaces.
 BSAFE Crypto-J FIPS module provides secure communications for Front End
Server.
- AM Back End Server:
 AM API provides access to database and accepts connections from AM Front
End and external components.
 Apache Tomcat server hosts the web interfaces.
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 BSAFE Crypto-J FIPS module provides secure communications for Back End
Server.
 AM Server Components includes Asset Portfolio, Procurement, Contracts,
Financials, and Software Asset Management as described above.
The BSAFE Crypto-J FIPS libraries and OpenSSL FIPS library provide the TOE with
the capability to generate and destroy keys and perform cryptographic operations.
These operations include secure communications between some TOE components,
secure management on the AM web UI, and secure communications with a LDAP
server. These libraries also perform start-up self tests to verify cryptographic
functions prior to offering these functions.
The Connect-It client allows users to create and manage scenarios and connections
to external discovery and inventory tools prior to identification and authentication. For
all other functions, the TOE requires user to authenticate before granting access to
functionality or data within the TOE. During authentication the TOE obscures user
passwords with bullets. After authentication, the TOE implements role-based access
controls for user attempting to access the various screens of the AM UI, the data
stored in the AM database, and all connectors attempting to import data to or export
data from the TOE. By default, users are given a set of guest permissions that can
be modified by a user with Administrative rights permission. A user with
Administrative rights permissions can configure user accounts to lock out users after
a configurable number of failed login attempts.
The AM and Connect-It UIs are the primary management interfaces for the TOE.
Users with Administrative rights permissions are granted full access to the
functionality of these interfaces and all data in the database. Other users have
access restricted according their role-based access control settings. Administrative
rights permissions allow a user to manage license keys, databases, database
objects, and user roles and permissions.
Data stored within the AM database can be analyzed to ensure that only authorized
users have access to assets and that only authorized hardware and software is used
by an asset.
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The next figure illustrates the physical scope and the physical boundary of the
overall solution and ties together all of the components of the TOE.
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The TOE is a resource tracking tool which runs on a Windows or Linux Operating
System (OS). The TOE is software only is delivered via the HP download site
https://softwaresupport.hp.com/. The TOE is installed on a client and two server
platforms as depicted in the previous figure. The essential physical components of
the TOE in the evaluated configuration are
- Asset Manager v9.50 software
- Connect-It v9.60 software
- Server to host the Asset Manager software,
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
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- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 Installation and Upgrade
- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 Administration
- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 Concepts and Implementation
- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 Programmer Reference
- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 User Interface
- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 Release Notes
- HP Asset Manager Software Version: 9.50 Web Implementation
- HP Connect-It Software Version: 9.60 Quick Start
- HP Connect-It Software Version: 9.60 User Guide
- HP Connect-It Software Version: 9.60 Connector Guide
- HP Connect-It Software Version: 9.60 Asset Manager Database Integration
Solution
- HP Connect-It Software Version: 9.60 Programmer’s Reference
- HP Connect-It Software Version: 9.60 Release Notes
PRODUCT TESTING
The tests performed by both the evaluator and the developer are based on the TSFIs
description included in the functional specification and the SFRs description included
in the security target [ST].
The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOE and its
operational environment following the steps included in the installation and operation
manuals. The TOE configuration used to execute the independent tests is consistent
with the evaluated configuration according to security target [ST]. The evaluator has
repeated all the cases specified by the developer in the test documentation and has
compared the obtained results with those obtained by the developer and
documented in each associated report. The test repetition performed by the
evaluator has demonstrated that the test plan and report provided by the vendor
contains information enough to make a reader able to repeat all tests included.
Additionally, after the repetition, the evaluator has obtained the same results as the
expected ones. The independent testing has covered 100% of SFRs of the [ST] and
TSFIs defined in the functional specification for the TOE, sampling has not been
performed. The test cases have taken into account critical parameters values,
searching that the TOE behaves in a non-expected manner. There has not been any
deviation from the expected results under the environment defined in security target
[ST].
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PENETRATION TESTING
The evaluator has performed an installation and configuration of the TOE and its
operational environment following the steps included in the installation and operation
manuals. The TOE does NOT present exploitable vulnerabilities under the
environment defined in the security target [ST]. All identified vulnerabilities can be
considered closed if the TOE is installed and operated according to the security
target [ST] and related documentation. The overall test result is that no deviations
were found between the expected and the actual test results taking into account that
environment. No attack scenario with the attack potential “Basic” has been
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target
[ST] when all measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its name and version number:
- HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 version build #12154 (AM) and
010 (CIT)
To set up the TOE in a way consistent to the evaluated configuration and the
operational environment defined in the security target [ST], users must follow the
steps included in the installation and operation manuals (see section DOCUMENTS).
The deployed configuration for the evaluation is presented in the following figure:
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EVALUATION RESULTS
The product “HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 version build #12154
(AM) and 010 (CIT)” has been evaluated against the “Hewlett-Packard Enterprise
Development L.P. Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 Security Target, v 1.4”
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri
S.L.U assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator
actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2, as defined by the
Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
The TOE usage is recommended given that there are not exploitable vulnerabilities
in the operational environment. Nonetheless, the following usage recommendations
are given:
- The fulfilment of the assumptions within indicated in the security target [ST] is a
key point as it implies TOE environment configurations that leave some potential
vulnerabilities out of the scope.
- It is very important the adequate fulfilling of the installation procedures; the
installation procedure may be vulnerable if those procedures are not followed.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product “HP Asset Manager v9.50 with Connect-It v9.60 version build #12154
(AM) and 010 (CIT)”, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
SFR Security Functional Requirement
TOE Target Of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
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[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R4 Final, Sept. 2012.
[ST] Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Development L.P. Asset Manager v9.50 with
Connect-It v9.60 Security Target, v 1.4
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body:
- Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Development L.P. Asset Manager v9.50 with
Connect-It v9.60 Security Target, v 1.4.