BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
for
IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step
G12 with firmware v80.505.04.1, optional
CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL v04.05.0040,
optional UMSLC v02.01.0040, optional NRG™
v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE v1.1.2,
optional SHA256 MISE v1.1.1 and user guidance
documents
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.47
BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 (*)
IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with firmware
v80.505.04.1, optional CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL
v04.05.0040, optional UMSLC v02.01.0040, optional NRG™
v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE v1.1.2, optional SHA256 MISE
v1.1.1 and user guidance documents
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
valid until: 19 March 2029
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria
for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408
and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details
on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 March 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Section
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks...................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements.............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification...............................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result................................................................................8
6. Publication..................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.....................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary..................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy..........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...........................................................................................15
6. Documentation..........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.....................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE....................................................27
11. Security Target........................................................................................................28
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES).............................................................28
13. Definitions...............................................................................................................28
14. Bibliography............................................................................................................29
C. Excerpts from the Criteria............................................................................................32
D. Annexes.......................................................................................................................33
5 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with firmware
v80.505.04.1, optional CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL v04.05.0040, optional
UMSLC v02.01.0040, optional NRG™ v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE v1.1.2,
optional SHA256 MISE v1.1.1 and user guidance documents has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-2023.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-2023 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with
firmware v80.505.04.1, optional CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL v04.05.0040,
optional UMSLC v02.01.0040, optional NRG™ v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE
v1.1.2, optional SHA256 MISE v1.1.1 and user guidance documents was conducted by
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 29 February 2024.
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 20 March
2024 is valid until 19 March 2029. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with firmware
v80.505.04.1, optional CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL v04.05.0040, optional
UMSLC v02.01.0040, optional NRG™ v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE v1.1.2,
optional SHA256 MISE v1.1.1 and user guidance documents has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Melli-Beese-Str. 9
86159 Augsburg
9 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_000068h,
IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with firmware version 80.505.04.1, optional
CryptoSuite version 04.05.007, optional HSL version 04.05.0040, optional UMSLC version
02.01.0040, optional NRG™ version 06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE version 1.1.2,
optional SHA-256 MISE version 1.1.1 and user guidance documents.
The TOE provides a 32-bit Arm v8-M CPU architecture. The major components of the
processor system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), a MPU (Memory Protection
Unit), a Security Attribution Unit (SAU), a Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC), an
Instruction Stream Signature (ISS) coprocessor, and a Masked Instruction Set Extension
(MISE) coprocessor and additional software libraries as indicated in the TOE name. The
TOE can communicate using contact-based interfaces.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 6
augmented by ALC_FLR.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_HC Hardware provided Cryptography
SF_CS CryptoSuite Services
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are derived from the Protection Profile. Based on
these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and
Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
11 / 34
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with firmware v80.505.04.1,
optional CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL v04.05.0040, optional UMSLC
v02.01.0040, optional NRG™ v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE v1.1.2, optional
SHA256 MISE v1.1.1 and user guidance documents.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW IFX_CCI_000068h,
IFX_CCI_000080h
G12 (design step) Postal transfer in cages as
bare dies (sawn wafer), PG-
X2QFN-20 packages, or in
chip-scale packaging (CSP).
2 FW BOS, ROM part of HSL,
Flash Loader
80.505.04.1
(Flash Loader version is also
separately identified as
version 10.01.0001)
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
3 SW NRG™ SW library (optional;
non-TOE)
06.10.0002 Secure download of object file
via iShare.
4 SW HSL (NVM part) (optional) 04.05.0040 Secure download of object file
via iShare.
5 SW UMSLC library (optional) 02.01.0040 Secure download of object file
via iShare.
6 SW CryptoSuite
(optional)
v04.05.007 Secure download of object file
via iShare.
7 SW Ascon-128 MISE 1.1.2 (sw library)
For documentation see #16
below (or [20]).
Secure download of object file
via iShare.
8 SW SHA256 MISE 1.1.1 (sw library)
For documentation see #17
below (or [21]).
Secure download of object file
via iShare.
9 DOC TEGRION™ SLC21 (32-bit
Security Controller – V24),
Hardware Reference
Manual
See [12] (or [AGD_HRM]) in
section Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
10 DOC TEGRION™ SLx2 security
controller family,
Programmer's Reference
Manual, SLx2_DFP
See [13] (or [AGD_PRM]) in
section Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
11 DOC SLC21, 32-bit Security
Controller – V24, Security
Guidelines
See [14] (or [AGD_SG]) in
section Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
12 DOC SLC21 (32-bit Security
Controller – V24),
Production and
personalization manual,
Flash Loader V10
See [15] (or [AGD_PPM]) in
section Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
13 DOC Crypto2304T V4, User
Manual
See [16] (or
[AGD_CryptoUM]) in section
Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
14 DOC CS-SLC21V24 CryptoSuite
32-bit Security Controller,
User interface manual
See [19] (or [AGD_CS]) in
section Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
15 DOC TEGRION™ SLC21 (32-bit
Security Controller – V24)
Errata sheet
See [17] (or [AGD_ES]) in
section Bibliography.
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
16 DOC Ascon-128 MISE Application
Note
(document only)
See [20] (or [AGD_ASCON])
in section Bibliography.
ASCII text files available as a
secure download via iShare.
The README files are part of
the respective application
note package, which also
contains the source files of
the library.
17 DOC SHA256 MISE Application
Note
(document only)
See [21] (or [AGD_SHA]) in
section Bibliography.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Regarding TOE delivery:
According to [8], section 1.2.3 the TOE or parts of it are delivered between the following
three parties:
● IC Embedded Software Developer,
● TOE Manufacturer (compromises all roles before TOE delivery),
● Composite Product Manufacturer (compromises all roles after TOE delivery except the
end consumer).
Therefore, three different delivery procedures must be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (e.g. ROM / Flash data, initialisation, and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
To determine the necessary procedures to maintain security when distributing versions of
the TOE the assumptions, threats, organisational security policies, and security objectives
identified in the ST must be considered for an appropriate level of protection on delivery.
● The internal delivery procedures of the TOE Manufacturer comprise all deliverables
among the several TOE Manufacturer sites themselves. These deliverables consist of
electronic as well as paper documents and physical items like wafers or masks. The
corresponding security procedures guarantee an integer and confidential transfer. These
internal procedures are evaluated within the ALC_DVS evaluation activity.
● Delivery from the TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer:
The delivery from Infineon Technologies (the TOE Manufacturer) to the IC Embedded
Software Developer is an external delivery process. This is not a delivery of the final
TOE. The delivered items are the optional software libraries and the user guidance. For
these items the integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity must be maintained. The
delivered items are either of type documentation or software. As such, they are delivered
electronically in encrypted form.
● Delivery from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE Manufacturer:
The delivery procedures from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer (i.e. IFX) are described in a specific developer document.
● Delivery from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product Manufacturer:
The deliverables and the way of protection are described in a separate document as well
as above. The delivered TOEs contain the actual TOE and the embedded software.
In general, the TOE is delivered via the logistics sites (see Table 8):
● DHL Singapore,
● KWE Shanghai, and
● K&N Großostheim.
Regarding TOE identification:
Depending on the blocking configuration, a TOE can have different sizes of the available
NVM. In the field, the IC Embedded Software Developer can identify a product in question
using the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM), which is described in [13] (or
[AGD_PRM]) section 8.4. This information can also be read out using the IFX mailbox area
(see [13] or [AGD_PRM] sections 8.9 and 8.10). Thereby, the exact and distinct
identification of any product with its exact configuration of this TOE is given.
In addition to the hardware part, the TOE consists of firmware parts and software parts.
The firmware part of the TOE is identified also via the GCIM.
The optional libraries comprise the HSL (NVM part), UMSLC, and NRG™ SW (not part of
the TSF), Crypto Suite, Ascon-128- and SHA-256 MISE libraries. These libraries are
identified by their version numbers. The user can identify the versions by calculating the
hash value of the provided library files and compare them to the hash values provided in
[6], section 8.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE,
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation, and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
Details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in sections 6 and 7
of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Details can be found in
the Security Target [6].
5. Architectural Information
Detailed information on the architectural information can be found in the Security Target
(see [6]).
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Developer’s testing approach:
All TSFs and related security mechanisms, subsystems and modules are tested to assure
complete coverage of all SFRs.
Different classes of tests are performed to test the TOE in a sufficient manner:
● Functional verification is done using simulation tests and formal verification during TOE
development. The simulation tests result in CRC checksums that are used for further
testing to check that a processed TOE matches the expected results from simulation.
● Post-silicon product qualification tests are conducted in Test Mode and User Mode after
production of the TOE. Here, the CRC checksums derived in simulation are used to
verify the design of the processed TOE. In addition, regression tests are conducted as
characterization of firmware parts of the TOE.
● For each produced TOE, production testing is conducted and aims to check the correct
functionality of each produced IC.
The TOE has passed all tests defined in the developer’s test plan so that all TSFs have
been tested successfully.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSFs behave as specified.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE behaves as expected.
Independent Evaluator Testing according to ATE_IND:
The evaluator's objective regarding this aspect was to test the functionality of the TOE and
to verify the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and to add independent
tests. During the evaluation of the TOE, the following classes of tests were carried out:
● Module tests,
● Simulation tests,
● Emulation tests,
● Tests in user mode,
● Tests in test mode,
● Hardware tests, and
● Optional library tests.
The results of the specified and conducted independent evaluator tests confirm the TOE’s
functionality. The TSF and the interfaces were found to operate as specified.
The results of the developer tests, which have been repeated by the evaluator, matched
the results the developer stated.
Overall, the TSF has been tested against the functional specification, the TOE design, and
the security architecture description. The tests demonstrate that the TSF performs as
specified.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN:
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential high was
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6], provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
The embedded software must implement the security advice given in [12] (or
[AGD_HRM]), [13] (or [AGD_PRM]), [14] (or [AGD_SG]), [15] (or [AGD_PPM]), [16] (or
[AGD_CryptoUM]), [17] (or [AGD_ES]), [19] (or [AGD_CS]), [20] (or [AGD_Ascon]) and
[21] (or [AGD_SHA]).
Testing Summary:
The tests performed by the developer were divided into the following categories:
● Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
● Qualification/Verification Tests, and
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools, and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluators or at the
developer’s site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment, and to verify
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the tests performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluators,
other test parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of
the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators
during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration test results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluation tests are performed with the chip IFX_CCI_000068h, produced by TSMC
fab 15 in Taiwan. The identifiers IFX_CCI_000068h and IFX_CCI_000080h may differ from
each other only in terms of blocked modules: They are still physically present on the TOE,
but not accessible. Thus, the tests were performed on a TOE without any blocked features.
This TOE is represented by various configurations called products. The module design,
layout, and footprint, of all products are identical. The degree of freedom for configuring
the TOE is predefined by the developer.
For specific configuration options, see [6], section 1.4.6.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle des
BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, W. Killmann, W.
Schindler, Version 2.0, 2011-09-18, T-Systems GEI GmbH and Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik. (same as [KS2011])
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a deterministic random number generator,
Version 0.9, 2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part
Deterministic Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.10, 2013-02-28,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Collection of Developer Evidence, Version 1.5,
April 2012, CCDB-2012-04-005.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Collection of Developer Evidence, Version 1.5, January
2012.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Security Architecture
requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices, Version 2.1, April 2014,
CCDB-2012-04-004.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC)
for smart cards and similar devices – Appendix 1, Version 2.0, April 2012.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – The Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0, Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-002.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart
cards and similar devices – Appendix 1, Version 2.0, January 2012.
● Joint Interpretation Library – The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0,
February 2009.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Security requirements for post-delivery code loading,
Version 1.0, February 2016.
● Validity of conducted tests on Security Smart Card ICs in dependence of test date,
Version 1, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-
03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Auswahl geeigneter Chips für DPA-Messungen, Version 1.1, 2008-12-07, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
● Special Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.4, 2011-06-08,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Requirements to perform
Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, May 2013, CCDB-2013-05-001.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2,
November 2022.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
Version 2.4, 2020, confidential.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations,
Version 1.1, February 2013.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 27, Transition from
ITSEC to CC, Version 5, 2010-08-17, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a physical true random generator, Version 0.8,
2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part True
Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.7, 2013-02-28,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-
Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document – Composite product
evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.4, December 2015, CCDB-
2015-12-001.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar
devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, December 2015, CCDB-2015-12-002.
● Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015.
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● Joint Interpretation Library – Certification of “open” smart card products, Version 1.1 (for
trial use), 2013-02-04.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie
und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-17, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● CC Supporting Document Guidance – Smartcard Evaluation, Version 2.0, February
2010, CCDB-2010-03-001.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 39, Formal Methods,
Version 3, 2008-10-24, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs
and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Guidance Document – The PP/ST Guide, Version 2, Revision 0, 2010-08, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen
zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die
Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Review-Protokoll zum (Krypto-)AVA-KickOff, Template-Version/Date: 2019-08-23,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Minimal Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve
Implementations, Version 1.0.4, 2011-07-01, BSI.
● Methodology for cryptographic rating of memory encryption schemes used in smartcards
and similar devices, Version 1.0, 2013-10-31, BSI.
● Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of RSA, DSA
and Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations, Version 1.0, 2013-01-14, BSI.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu
Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Guidance for Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Minimum Site Security Requirements, Version 3.0, 02/2020.
(see [4] for respective AIS references).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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● All components of the EAL 6 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_FLR.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 6 augmented by ALC_FLR.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size
in
Bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
Comments
Symmetric Co-Processor (SCP)
1 Cryptographic
Primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128,
192,
256
-- Cryptographic
Primitives might
have various use
case scenarios not
explicitly specified
on HW platform
level (e.g.
confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity
etc.). Hence no
rating on “security
level > 120 bits” but
considered
according to
AVA_VAN.5
penetration testing..
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size
in
Bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
Comments
2 Confidentiality #1 in ECB mode
for encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
No “No” is for ECB
mode in general for
all implementations
and certification
procedures.
Flash Loader
3 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128 -- --
4 Authenticated
encryption
#3 (AES) in CCM
mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 -- Not rated w.r.t.
“security level > 120
bits” but considered
according to
AVA_VAN.5
penetration testing.
5 Key derivation KDF in counter
mode with AES-
CMAC as PRF
[NIST SP800-108,
5.1]
[NIST SP800-38B,
6.2]
128 -- Not rated w.r.t.
“security level > 120
bits” but considered
according to
AVA_VAN.5
penetration testing.
CryptoSuite: Symmetric Functionality
6 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128,
192,
256
-- --
7 Confidentiality #6 in ECB mode
for encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
No “No” is for ECB
mode in general for
all implementations
and certification
procedures.
8 Confidentiality #6 in CBC, CTR,
CFB mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128,
192,
256
Yes --
9 Integrity #3 in CMAC mode
for MAC generation
[NIST SP800-38B] 128,
192,
256
No --
CryptoSuite: Asymmetric Functionality
10 Key agreement Finite field Diffie-
Hellman
[PKCS#3, 7.2] 1024-
2048
N/A --
11 Confidentiality RSA Encryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.1] 1024
–
4224
Yes for
>= 2800 bit
--
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size
in
Bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
Comments
12 Confidentiality RSA Decryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.2, 2a] 1024
–
2112
Yes for
>= 2800 bit
--
13 Confidentiality RSA Decryption
with CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.1.2, 2b] 1024
–
4224
Yes for
>= 2800 bit
--
14 Authenticity RSA Signature
generation
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1, 2a] 1024
–
2112
For Keysize
>=2000 bit:
security
level
>=100bit
--
15 Authenticity RSA Signature
generation with
CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1, 2b] 1024
–
4224
Yes for
>= 2800 bit
--
16 Authenticity RSA Signature
verification
[PKCS #1, 5.2.2] 1024
–
4224
Yes for
>= 2800 bit
--
17 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning probably
random primes p
and q.
-- 1024
–
2047
N/A Prime generation
method follows
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3]
but due to key size
considered
proprietary.
Method:
“Ccc_Rsa_KeyGen
PQ”.
18 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning probably
random primes p
and q.
[FIPS 186-4, B.3.3]
[FIPS 186-4, C.3.1]
2048
–
4128
N/A Step 1 not
implemented
Method:
“Ccc_Rsa_KeyGen
PQ”
19 Key generation Calculation of RSA
key components
(N, d) from p, q
[FIPS 186-4, B.3.1]
[PKCS#1, 3.1 /
3.2(1)]
1024
–
2112
N/A Method:
“Ccc_Rsa_KeyGen
PQ +
Ccc_Rsa_KeyGenN
+
Ccc_Rsa_KeyGenD
”
20 Key generation Calculation of RSA
CRT parameters
from p, q
[FIPS 186-4, B.3.1]
[PKCS#1, 3.1 /
3.2(2)]
1024
–
4224
N/A Method:
“Ccc_Rsa_KeyGen
PQ +
Ccc_Rsa_KeyGenC
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size
in
Bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
Comments
rt”
21 Key generation
(primality test)
Miller-Rabin
primality test
[FIPS 186-4], C.3.1 512 –
2064
N/A (Prime candidate
length)
22 Key generation
(primality test)
Enhanced Miller-
Rabin primality test
[FIPS 186-4], C.3.2 512 –
2064
N/A (Prime candidate
length)
23 ECC Supported elliptic
curves:
NIST curves over
prime fields in
[FIPS186-4],
Brainpool curves in
[RFC5639],
ANSII FRP256V1
in [ANSSI_EC],
BN P256 in
[ISO_15946, 7.3],
W-25519 in [NIST
SP800-186].
FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
[ANSSI_EC]
[ISO_15946]
[NIST SP800-186]
160-
521
“No” for BN
P256 in
[ISO_15946,
7.3] in
general
case, “not
rated w.r.t.
120 bits” in
specific
cases.
--
24 Authenticity ECDSA signature
generation on
curves listed in #23
[FIPS186-4, 6.4] 160-
521
Key size
160,163,192
, 224: No
Key sizes
>=250: Yes
(Note that the hash
calculation of
ECDSA s not
implemented by the
library and lies in
the responsibility of
the user.)
25 Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification on
curves listed in #23
[FIPS186-4, 6.4] 160-
521
Key size
160,163,192
, 224: No
Key sizes
>=250: Yes
(Note that the hash
calculation of
ECDSA s not
implemented by the
library and lies in
the responsibility of
the user.)
26 Key agreement Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key
agreement on
curves listed in #23
[NIST SP800-56A,
5.7.1.2]
160-
521
Key size
160,163,192
, 224: No
Key sizes
>=250: Yes
27 Key generation Elliptic Curve key
generation on
curves listed in #23
[FIPS186-4, B.4.1] 160-
521
N/A --
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Implementation
Standard
Key
Size
in
Bits
Security
Level above
120 Bits
Comments
CryptoSuite: Hash Functionality
28 Hash SHA-1 [FIPS180-4] N/A N/A --
29 Hash SHA-2 [FIPS180-4] N/A N/A
MISE: ASCON
30 Authenticated
encryption
Ascon-128 [ASCON, 2.4] 128 N/A Please note:
ASCON is final
candidate but
standard not yet not
finalized (as of date
of certification end).
MISE: Hash Functionality
31 Hash SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] N/A
Random Number generation (Hardware)
32 RNG Physical RNG According to PTG.2
in [KS2011]
N/A N/A --
CryptoSuite: RNG Functionality
33 RNG Physical RNG Corresponds to
PTG.2 in [KS2011]
N/A N/A
34 RNG Physical RNG with
cryptographic post-
processing
Corresponds to
PTG.3 in [KS2011]
and [NIST SP800-
90A]
N/A N/A Post-processing
based on [NIST
SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG.
35 RNG Deterministic RNG Corresponds to
DRG.3 in [KS2011]
and [NIST SP800-
90A]
N/A N/A Implementation
according to
CTR_DRBG
specified in [NIST
SP800-90A]
36 RNG Hybrid
deterministic RNG
Corresponds to
DRG.4 in [KS2011]
and [NIST SP800-
90A]
N/A N/A Post-processing
based on [NIST
SP800-90A]
CTR_DRBG.
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Please take into account the following additional information:
● Conformance evaluation and assessment to claimed cryptographic functionality
standards, as required by Common Criteria Part 1 section A.13, is documented in the
confidential report “Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification” [18].
● The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was also not assessed by BSI. However, the
evaluation of the Flash Loader’s implementation strength according to the TOE's
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
Evaluation Assurance Level (including AVA_VAN.5) did not reveal any implementation
weaknesses.
● A BSI-assessment of the memory encryption MCICE, based the public MemEnc-Guide
("Methodology for cryptographic rating of memory encryption schemes used in
smartcards and similar devices", v1.0, 31.10.2013), was positive.
The references within table 3 are as follows:
[ASCON] Ascon v1.2 Submission to NIST, 2021-05-31
[FIPS197] FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), Published 2001-11-26, Updated 2023-05-09,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information Technology
Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce /
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST SP800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, The CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST SP800-38C] NIST SP800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, May
2004 (errata update 07-20-2007), National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[NIST SP800-56A] NIST SP800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, 2018-04, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[ISO_9798-2] ISO/IEC 9798-2: 2008 - Information Technology - Security techniques -
Entity authentication - Part 2: Mechanisms using authenticated
encryption. Fourth edition 2019-06
[NIST SP800-90A] NIST Special Publication 800-90A, Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, June
2015, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
[NIST SP800-108] NIST Special Publication, NIST SP 800-108r1, Recommendation for
Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, August 2022,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27, 2012, RSA
Laboratories
[PKCS#3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, Version 1.4, November
1, 1993, RSA Laboratories
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024 Certification Report
[KS2011] A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators,
W. Killmann, W. Schindler, Version 2.0, 2011-09-18, T-Systems GEI
GmbH and Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[AGD_PPM] See [15].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
Requirements for the Usage of the Evaluated Product:
The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application that runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents in [12] - [21] must be considered.
The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [15] must be considered.
In addition, the following hints resulting from the ALC evaluation aspect must be
considered:
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● The security IC embedded software developer can deliver their software either to the
developer to let them implement it in the TOE (in the NVM) or to the composite product
manufacturer to let them download the software into the NVM.
● The TOE does not implement key generation (FCS_CKM.1) or key insertion
(FDP_ITC.1/2) as required by the FCS_COP.1 iterations (dependency) used in the PP
for symmetric cryptography. The IC Embedded Software has to provide this functionality
instead.
● The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the
composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024, Version 1.4.4, 2024-02-26,
“IFX_CCI_000068h/80h G12 Security Target”, Infineon Technologies AG (public
document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2024-02-27, “EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY)”, TÜV Informationstechnik, (confidential
document)
[8] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13
January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[9] (not used) - see [6]
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product, Version 2, 2024-
02-27, “ETR for Composite Evaluation”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[11] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.4, 2024-01-25 (confidential document)
[12] also referred to as [AGD_HRM], “TEGRION™ SLC21 (32-bit Security Controller –
V24), Hardware Reference Manual”, Version 5.0, 2023-12-11, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
[13] also referred to as [AGD_PRM], “TEGRION™ SLx2 security controller family,
Programmer's Reference Manual, SLx2_DFP”, Version 1.3.0, 2023-10-19, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
[14] also referred to as [AGD_SG], “SLC21, 32-bit Security Controller – V24, Security
Guidelines”, Version 1.00-3001, 2023.07-26, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[15] also referred to as [AGD_PPM], “SLC21 (32-bit Security Controller – V24),
Production and personalization manual, Flash Loader V10”, Version 10.01, 2023-06-
28, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[16] also referred to as [AGD_CryptoUM], “Crypto2304T V4, User Manual”, Version 2.0,
2023-07-14, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[17] also referred to as [AGD_ES], “TEGRION™ SLC21 (32-bit Security Controller –
V24) Errata sheet”, Version 3.0, 2024-01-09, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
[18] “SINGLE EVALUATION REPORT ADDENDUM to ETR-Part ADV Cryptographic
Standards Compliance Verification”, Version 4, 2024-02-27, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[19] also referred to as [AGD_CS], “CS-SLC21V24 CryptoSuite 32-bit Security
Controller User interface manual”, Version 4.05.007, 2023-11-08, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
7
See section 9.1 on usage of specific AIS.
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[20] also referred to as [AGD_ASCON], “Ascon-128 MISE Application Note
(ReadMe_AsconMise-v1.1.3.md)”, Version 1.1.3, 2023-09-13, Infineon Technologies
AG (confidential document)
[21] also referred to as [AGD_SHA], “SHA256 MISE Application Note
(ReadMe_ShaMise-v1.1.2.md)”, Version 1.1.2, 2023-09-13, Infineon Technologies
AG (confidential document)
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1206-V2-2024
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_000068h, IFX_CCI_000080h design step G12 with firmware
v80.505.04.1, optional CryptoSuite v04.05.007, optional HSL v04.05.0040, optional
UMSLC v02.01.0040, optional NRG™ v06.10.0002, optional Ascon-128 MISE v1.1.2,
optional SHA256 MISE v1.1.1 and user guidance documents (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 20 March 2024, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.5, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_FLR.1, ALC_TAT.3)
Besides the production and development sites, the relevant TOE distribution centers are
as follows:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced
Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Table 4: TOE Distribution Centers
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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