Security Target (ST)
-D’Guard v5.0 -
Version 1.2
The Security Target is related to the certified TOE. This Security Target is written in Korean and
translated from Korean into English.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
2 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Revision History
Ver Date Revision Author
1.0 May 14, 2024 First Issue Jaehong Kang
1.1 Jul 12, 2024 TOE Requirements, etc. to take effect Jaehong Kang
1.2 Sep 17, 2024 TOE Version, etc. to take effect Jaehong Kang
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
3 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Table of Contents
1. ST Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................8
1.1. ST reference......................................................................................................................................................8
1.2. TOE reference ..................................................................................................................................................9
1.3. TOE overview ...................................................................................................................................................9
1.3.1. Database encryption overview ......................................................................................................9
1.3.2. TOE type and scope............................................................................................................................9
1.3.3. TOE usage and major security features.................................................................................. 10
1.3.4. Non-TOE and TOE operational environment....................................................................... 10
1.4. TOE description............................................................................................................................................ 16
1.4.1. Physical scope of the TOE............................................................................................................. 16
1.4.2. Logical scope of the TOE .............................................................................................................. 18
1.5. Conventions................................................................................................................................................... 26
1.6. Terms and definitions................................................................................................................................ 26
1.7. ST organization............................................................................................................................................ 35
2. Conformance claim........................................................................................................................................................ 36
2.1. CC conformance claim ............................................................................................................................. 36
2.2. PP conformance claim.............................................................................................................................. 36
2.3. Package conformance claim.................................................................................................................. 37
2.4. Conformance claim rationale ................................................................................................................ 37
3. Security Objectives......................................................................................................................................................... 42
3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment ................................................................ 42
4. Extended components definition............................................................................................................................ 44
4.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)................................................................................................................. 44
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
4 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
4.1.1. Random Bit Generation.................................................................................................................. 44
4.2. Identification & authentication (FIA) ................................................................................................. 45
4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication ......................................................................................... 45
4.3. User data protection (FDP)..................................................................................................................... 46
4.3.1. User data encryption....................................................................................................................... 46
4.4. Security Management (FMT) ................................................................................................................. 47
4.4.1. ID and password................................................................................................................................ 47
4.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT) .................................................................................................................... 48
4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data ..................................................................................................... 48
4.6. TOE Access (FTA)......................................................................................................................................... 49
4.6.1. Session locking and termination ............................................................................................... 49
5. Security requirements................................................................................................................................................... 52
5.1. Security functional requirements (Mandatory SFRs).................................................................. 53
5.1.1. Security audit (FAU) ......................................................................................................................... 53
5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)....................................................................................................... 58
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP)........................................................................................................... 66
5.1.4. Identification and authentication (FIA) ................................................................................... 67
5.1.5. Security management (FMT)........................................................................................................ 71
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................... 76
5.1.7. TOE access............................................................................................................................................ 79
5.2. Security assurance requirements......................................................................................................... 80
5.2.1. Security Target evaluation............................................................................................................. 81
5.2.2. Development....................................................................................................................................... 86
5.2.3. Guidance documents ...................................................................................................................... 87
5.2.4. Life-cycle support ............................................................................................................................. 88
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
5 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
5.2.5. Tests......................................................................................................................................................... 89
5.3. Security requirements rationale ........................................................................................................... 91
5.3.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements.......................................... 91
5.3.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements .......................................... 93
6. TOE Summary Specification....................................................................................................................................... 94
6.1. Security audit (FAU) ................................................................................................................................... 94
6.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alert ................................................................................................................ 94
6.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation............................................................................................ 94
6.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis ................................................................................... 96
6.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review................................................................................................................. 96
6.1.5. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review........................................................................................... 96
6.1.6. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss..................................................... 96
6.1.7. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss............................................................................... 97
6.1.8. SFR Mapping....................................................................................................................................... 97
6.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)................................................................................................................. 97
6.2.1. FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption) ..................... 97
6.2.2. FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption) ....................... 98
6.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution.......................................................................... 99
6.2.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic destruction.................................................................................100
6.2.5. FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)................................100
6.2.6. FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)..................................101
6.2.7. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended) ................................................................102
6.2.8. SFR Mapping.....................................................................................................................................102
6.3. User data protection (FDP)...................................................................................................................102
6.3.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption ............................................................................................102
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
6 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.3.2. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection ..........................................................104
6.3.3. SFR Mapping.....................................................................................................................................105
6.4. Identification and authentication (FIA) ...........................................................................................105
6.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling ..........................................................................105
6.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 TOE internal mutual authentication (Extended) .........................................105
6.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets .............................................................................................106
6.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication prior to all actions ........................................................107
6.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism...........................................................107
6.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback..................................................................107
6.4.7. FIA_UID.2 User identification prior to all actions .............................................................108
6.5. Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................108
6.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior ...........................................108
6.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data..................................................................................109
6.5.3. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended) ........................................110
6.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.....................................................111
6.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles...........................................................................................................111
6.5.6. SFR Mapping.....................................................................................................................................112
6.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT) ..................................................................................................................112
6.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection ....................................................112
6.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended) .........................................113
6.6.3. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing....................................................................................................................115
6.6.4. SFR Mapping.....................................................................................................................................116
6.7. TOE access (FTA)........................................................................................................................................116
6.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurred sessions............116
6.7.2. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)...................................117
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
7 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.7.3. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment ...................................................................................117
6.7.4. SFR Mapping.....................................................................................................................................117
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
8 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
1. ST Introduction
This chapter introduces the Security Target (ST) of D’Guard v5.0 of INEB Inc.
1.1. ST reference
[Table 1] ST reference
Title D’Guard v5.0 Security Target
Version V1.2
Evaluation
Assurance Level
EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
Developer INEB Inc.
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(Notification No. 2013-51 of the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future
Planning)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
· Common Criteria Part 1 : Introduction and General Model v3.1 r5
(Version 3.1 revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001)
· Common Criteria Part 2 : Security Functional Components v3.1 r5
(Version 3.1 revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002)
· Common Criteria Part 3 : Security Assurance Components v3.1 r5
(Version 3.1 revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003)
Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-
PP-0820a-2017, December 11, 2019
Common
Criteria Version
CC V3.1 r5
Product
Classification
DB Encryption
Keywords Database, Encryption
Issue Date Aug 19, 2024
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
9 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
1.2. TOE reference
[Table 2] TOE reference
TOE Identification D’Guard v5.0
TOE Version V5.0 (v5.0.1)
TOE Component
D’Guard KMS v5.0.1
D’Guard Plug-In v5.0.1
D’Guard API v5.0.1
Final Release August 19, 2024
TOE Developer INEB Inc.
1.3. TOE overview
1.3.1. Database encryption overview
D’Guard v5.0 (hereinafter referred to as the TOE) is the product that encrypts important information
in the database (hereinafter “DB”) by the unit of column to contain the confidential information.
The TOE performs the function of preventing the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.
The encryption target of the TOE is the DB managed by the database management system
(hereinafter “DBMS”) in the organization’s operating environment, and some or all user data is
encrypted according to the security policy. The main security functions provided by the TOE are the
encryption and decryption of data stored in the DB, cryptographic key management and auditing.
1.3.2. TOE type and scope
D’Guard v5.0 (hereinafter referred to as the TOE) is database encryption software that encrypts and
decrypts the user data in a column of a database to be protected.
The TOE types defined in this ST are grouped into the ‘plug-in type’ and ‘API type’, depending on
the TOE operation type. The TOE supports both types. The plug-in type is a method that performs
encryption on the DB Server and operates dependent on the database. Since TOE module(the plug-
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
10 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
in type) is installed in the protected DB server to perform encryption/decryption, the DBMS is
limited to Oracle database and Tibero database. The API type performs encryption in the application
server (hereinafter ‘AP’) and is classified into Java API according to application work environment.
Components of the TOE are the management server that manages policies and keys (hereinafter
referred to as D’Guard KMS), agents that perform encryption in the Java work environment
(hereinafter referred to ad D’Guard API). And it consists of agent (D’Guard Plug-In) which performs
encryption in DB Server. The D’Guard KMS provides services that perform key distribution roles,
perform policy management roles and collect agent logs. The TOE administrator accesses the
D’Guard KMS through a web browser and performs management roles. It also plays an
administrative role in the console environment for initialization.
1.3.3. TOE usage and major security features
The TOE is used to encrypt/decrypt the user data stored in the DB server according to the policy
set by the authorized administrator to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the confidential
information.
In order that the authorized administrator can operate the TOE securely in the operational
environment of the organization, the TOE provides various security features such as the security
audit function that records and manages major auditable events; cryptographic support function
such as cryptographic key management to encrypt the user and the TSF data, and cryptographic
operation; user data protection function that encrypts the user data and protects the residual
information; identification and authentication function such as verifying the identity of the
authorized administrator, authentication failure handling, and mutual authentication among the TOE
components; security management function for security functions, role definition, and configuration;
TSF protection functions including protecting the TSF data transmitted among the TOE components,
protecting the TSF data stored in the storage that is controlled by the TSF, and TSF self-test; and
TOE access function to manage the access session of the authorized administrator.
The DEK (Data Encryption Key) used to encrypt/decrypt the user data is protected by encryption
with the KEK (Key Encryption Key). For the requirements regarding how to generate and use the
DEK and KEK, refer to 5.1.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS).
1.3.4. Non-TOE and TOE operational environment
The TOE operational environment defined in this ST can be classified into two: plug-in type and API
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
11 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
type.
[Figure 1] shows the general operational environment of the plug-in type. The agent, which is
installed in the protected database server of the DB, encrypts the user data received from the
application server before storing it in the DB according to the policy configured by the authorized
administration, and decrypts the encrypted user data sent form the database server to the
application server.
Since the TOE module(the plug-in type) is installed in the protected database to perform encryption/
decryption, the DBMS that can be installed and operated by the TOE is limited to Oracle 19.3 and
Tibero 7.
[Figure 1] Plug-In type operational environment
The authorized administrator performs policy management distributed to D’Guard Plug-In according
to the scope required by the organizations security policy through D’Guard KMS. In addition, the
authorized administrator can perform security management through access to the management
server.
[Figure 2] shows the general operational environment of the API type. The application, which is
installed in the application server and provides application services, is developed using the D’Guard
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
12 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
API provided by API module in order to use the cryptographic function of the TOE. The D’Guard
API module is installed in the application server and performs encryption/decryption of the user
data in accordance with the policies configured by authorized administrator. The user data entered
by the application service user is encrypted by D’Guard API module, which is installed in the
application server, and sent to the database server. The encrypted user data received from the
database server is decrypted by the D’Guard API module, which is installed in the application server,
and sent to the application service user.
[Figure 2] API type operational environment
The authorized administrator performs policy management through the D’Guard KMS as an D’Guard
API module according to the scope of the organization’s security policy. In addition, the authorized
administrator can perform security management through access to the management server.
The communication among the TOE components performs encrypted communication using the
approved cryptographic algorithm of the validated cryptographic module, and the transmitted the
TSF data includes security policy data and audit data transmitted from the agent. The self-
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
13 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
implemented mutual authentication is performed when communicating among the TOE
components.
Administrator accesses the management server through a web browser to perform security
management functions. HTTPS (TLS 1.2), which implements a secure security protocol, is used for
the communication section of the web environment-based administrator. The communication
section for management access is excluded from the evaluation scope.
As an external IT entity required to operate TOE, there is a Mail server for administrator notifications
authorized when predicting audit data loss. TOE works with an external Mail server to send security
alerts to administrators according to security policies defined by the administrator.
The hardware and software requirements for operating the TOE are as follows.
[Table 3] Requirements for TOE operational environment of the D’Guard KMS
D’Guard KMS
HW (or SW) Type Minimum operation specification
Hardware
CPU Intel® Core™ i5 CPU @ 3.00 GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 10GB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 100/1000 Mbps 1 network port or higher
Software
OS Ubuntu 20.04 (Linux Kernel 5.4.0-181) 64bit
3rd
Party
DBMS PostgreSQL 15.8
WAS Apache Tomcat 9.0.95
Java JRE 8(Java SE Runtime Environment 8u421)
OS (Ubuntu 20.04)
[Tbale3] shows the operating system for the D’Guard KMS operation.
DBMS (PostgreSQL 15.8)
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
14 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
The DBMS provides the basic storage function of the D’Guard KMS to store policy information
registered by administrator and log information collected by each agent.
WAS (Apache Tomcat 9.0.95)
It is included with the D’Guard KMS and installed when installing management server. It provides
web-based security management interface (GUI : Graphical User Interface) through WAS.
JRE 8(Java SE Runtime Environment 8u421)
It is the foundation framework for running the D’Guard KMS’s security management interface.
[Table 4] Requirements for TOE operational environment of the D’Guard Plug-In
D’Guard Plug-In
HW (or SW) Type Minimum operation specification
Hardware
CPU Intel® Core™ i5 CPU @ 3.00 GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 1GB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 100/1000 Mbps 1 network port or higher
Software
OS Rocky 8.6 (Linux Kernel 4.18.0-372) 64bit
DBMS
Oracle 19.3
Tibero 7
OS (Rocky 8.6)
[Tbale3] shows the operating system for the D’Guard Plug-In operation.
DBMS (Oracle 19.3)
DBMS is operational environment Oracle database which the D’Guard Plug-In is installed
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
15 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
DBMS (Tibero 7)
DBMS is operational environment Tibero database which the D’Guard Plug-In is installed
[Table 5] Requirements for TOE operational environment of the D’Guard API
D’Guard API
HW (or SW) Type Minimum operation specification
Hardware
CPU Intel® Core™ i5 CPU @ 3.00 GHz or higher
RAM 8GB or higher
HDD 1GB or higher necessary for installing the TOE
NIC 100/1000 Mbps 1 network port or higher
Software
OS Ubuntu 20.04 (Linux Kernel 5.4.0-181) 64bit
Java JRE 8(Java SE Runtime Environment 8u421)
OS (Ubuntu 20.04)
[Tbale3] shows the operating system for the D’Guard API operation.
JRE 8(Java SE Runtime Environment 8u421)
It is a work program development environment which the D’Guard API is installed.
[Table 6] Requirements for TOE operational environment of the administrator PC
TOE administrator PC
HW (or SW) Type Minimum operation specification
Software Web Browser Chrome 129.0 (64bit)
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
16 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Web Browser (Chrome 1290)
It provides GUI of web environment to execute manager of the D’Guard KMS.
External IT entities
Mail Server
It is used to send information mail to administrator in case of potential security threat of the TOE.
1.4. TOE description
1.4.1. Physical scope of the TOE
The physical scope and boundaries of the TOE are shown in the following figure.
[Figure 3] Physical scope of the TOE (Plug-In type)
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
17 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
[Figure 4] Physical scope of the TOE (API type)
The physical scope of the TOE is divided into the D’Guard KMS, D’Guard Plug-In, D’Guard API and
documentation.
[Table 7] Physical composition of the TOE
Comp
osition
Type Identification information
Withi
n the
TOE
scope
CD-
ROM
(1EA)
S/W
TOE
Installation
Program
D’Guard KMS v5.0.1 D’Guard_KMS_v5.0.1.zip O
D’Guard API v5.0.1 D’Guard_API_v5.0.1.zip O
D’Guard Plug-In v5.0.1
D’Guard_Plug-
In_v5.0.1.zip
O
Electro
nic
docum
ent
(PDF)
Guidance
document
D’Guard v5.0 KMS Preparatory document and user
operation manual v1.2
(D’Guard v5.0 KMS Preparatory document and user
operation manual v1.2.pdf)
O
D’Guard v5.0 Plug-In Preparatory document and user
operation manual v1.2
(D’Guard v5.0 Plug-In Preparatory document and user
O
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
18 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
operation manual v1.2.pdf)
D’Guard v5.0 API Preparatory document and user
operation manual v1.2
(D’Guard v5.0 API Preparatory document and user
operation manual v1.2.pdf)
O
The physical scope of the TOE includes all the information in [Table 7] TOE component information,
including software and documentation. The CD includes 3rd
party software JRE 8.0, PostgreSQL 15.8,
and Apache Tomcat 9.0.95, which are provided for the convenience of the operator. JRE, PostgreSQL,
Apache Tomcat are excluded from the scope of the TOE.
The distributed the TOE package consists of CD 1EA, and CD is provided by direct delivery method.
The validated cryptographic module(KCMVP) used in the TOE is Java module in the D’Guard KMS,
the D’Guard API, and C module used in the the D’Guard Plug-In.
[Table 8] The validated cryptographic module(KCMVP) of the TOE
Item Specification
Cryptographic
module name
MagicCrypto V3.0.0 INISAFE Crypto for C V5.4
Developer Dreamsecurity Co., Ltd. INITECH Co., Ltd.
Validation number CM-200-2026.12 CM-233-2028.6
Module type S/W S/W
Validation date 2021. 12. 31 2023. 06. 19
Expiration date 2026. 12. 31 2028. 06. 19
Components
D’Guard KMS
D’Guard API
D’Guard Plug-In
1.4.2. Logical scope of the TOE
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
19 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
[Figure 5] Logical scope of the TOE
D’Guard KMS
[Security audit(FAU)]
The security audit function consists of generating audit data, inquiring audit data, analyzing and
responding to potential security violations, and protecting audit data. The generation of audit data
is generated by including the start and end of the TOE, the result of performing security
management for the TOE of the authorized administrator, and audit data collected by the Plug-In
agent and API module, and is generated including the date and time of the event, the type of the
event, the identity of the subject, and the event result information.
The authorized administrator may selectively check the generated audit data by distinguishing the
driving and termination of the TOE and user data encryption according to the optional AND
condition, and the generated audit data is protected from unauthorized deletion.
The TOE analyzes potential security violations, such as successive failure of administrator
authentication, sends alarm mail to authorized administrators and generates audit data. In addition,
by analyzing violations of the threshold of the audit repository, when the primary threshold of 80%
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
20 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
is exceeded, an alarm mail is sent to the authorized administrator, and when the secondary threshold
of 90% is exceeded, an alarm mail is sent to the authorized administrator, and after deleting some
of the oldest audit data, audit data is generated.
[Cryptographic support(FCS)]
The TOE supports cryptographic key management, cryptographic operation, and random bit
generation.
The Encryption key generation for encryption of user data and TSF data is generated using
HASH_DRBG_SHA256, which is a random bit generator of the validated cryptographic module.
The generated user data encryption key is encrypted and stored using ARIA256(KCMVP) in the
policy DB and integrity verification information is stored together using HMAC-SHA256. For TSF
data protection, ARIA256 and HMAC-SHA256 are used to store encryption and integrity verification
information.
The management server receives a policy distribution request from the agent, encrypts the security
policy including the user data encryption key with the RSAES 2048-bit algorithm of the verified
encryption module, and safely distributes it.
TOE destroys the memory in the area in three zeroing procedures according to the encryption key
destruction procedure used internally, including the user data encryption key.
[User data protection(FDP)]
The TOE protects against unauthorized attacks by initializing all information used inside the TOE for
cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, cryptographic operation, and random
bit generation after use.
In order to protect user data stored in the DBMS to be protected, block encryption algorithms
(ARIA-128/256, SEED-128, and LEA-128/256) are encrypted and decrypted according to the security
policy set by the administrator authorized through the verified encryption module. In addition, one-
way encryption is supported through hash algorithms (SHA-256/512). Once the
encryption/decryption is completed, it performs initialization to prevent the restoration of the
previous value of the original user data.
It provides a function of encrypting and decrypting user data by column, and prevents the same
ciphertext from being generated for the same plaintext when encrypting user data.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
21 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
[Identification and authentication(FIA)]
The TOE performs the identification and authentication based on user ID and password. All TOE
management functions cannot be used before user authentication is performed.
When authenticating a user, password input protects against exposure by displaying only blank or
masking characters and does not provide reason for failure when authentication fails. It also protects
against authentication reuse attacks by receiving one-time captcha during authentication. In case
of continuous authentication failure, time delay is disabled and account lockout is performed
according to the set value to protect against unauthorized attack. It also sends alert mails to
authorized administrators.
The password combination rule for authentication must be 10 or more and 20 or less digits, and
must use three combinations of English characters/number and special characters. The character
must not be more than 3 consecutive digits, and cannot be used even if the same character is more
than 3 times. Account information should not be included, and the same password as the password
used before 3 times cannot be used.
In order to secure the communication interval between TOE components, the management server
and the agent exchange each communication encryption key after mutual authentication using the
RSA 2048-bit public key pair, and then encrypt and transmit the security policy using ARIA256.
Mutual authentication uses a self-implemented method based on public key cryptography.
[Security management(FMT)]
The TOE user is divided into super manager who manages all the security functions of the TOE and
security user who can only perform the inquiry function of audit data and security policy. The
security management function can be performed by authorized administrator only.
The TOE provides a management function of a console CLI environment and a management function
of a web GUI environment. The management function of the console CLI environment is used at
the time of initial installation, and after that, it provides encryption and integrity verification data
update functions for major information in the configuration file (TSF data). The management
function of the web GUI environment provides a security management function including generation
of a user data encryption key and inquiry of audit data.
The use of TOE's security management function is limited to authorized administrators who have
performed authentication. It also forces the authorized administrator's password to be initialized
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
22 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
during the TOE installation process.
[Protection of the TSF(FPT)]
The TOE encrypts using ARIA256, which is a verification algorithm of validated cryptographic module,
in order to prevent exposure and modification of data stored in the storage controlled by TSF. The
TOE generates and stores integrity verification information using HMAC-SHA256 algorithm. In
addition, the TOE encrypts using ARIA256, which is a verification algorithm of validated
cryptographic module, to prevent the exposure and modification of transmission data between
physically separated TOE components, and performs integrity verification using HMAC-SHA256
algorithm.
The TOE monitors whether the main processes of the TOE operate normally through the TSF's own
tests. The TOE performs self-test periodically during startup and operation to send an alarm mail
and generate audit data to the authorized administrator when the integrity verification of the
configuration file and execution module fails during startup or after normal operation.
[TOE access(FTA)]
The TOE limits the maximum number of simultaneous sessions to one by using the administrative
access sessions that attempted access from the terminal designated as accessible IP and limiting
the simultaneous access of the same user.
The TOE provides the function to terminate the session when the authorized administrator has not
been active for a certain period of time after logging in.
[Additional Function(Non TSF)]
Access control policy management: It provides an access control policy management function by
an authorized administrator when performing user data encryption according to date, time, and
day of the week based on database account, IP address, and application. This function is a security
function of TOE that is excluded from the evaluation range. The access control policy management
function based on database account, IP address, and application is not a security requirement
required by the national database encryption protection profile (PP).
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
23 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
D’Guard Plug-In
[Security audit(FAU)]
The TOE generates audit data on startup and shutdown, management server interworking policy
distribution, TSF self-test, and user data encryption processing results.
The audit data for encryption success and decryption success in the user data encryption processing
result is determined whether or not audit data is generated by the setting of an authorized
administrator.
[Cryptographic support(FCS)]
The TOE supports the cryptographic key management, cryptographic operation, and random bit
generation.
The TOE requests the management server for interlocking distribution and encrypts the security
policy including the user data encryption key to receive it safely. In order to distribute the security
policy securely, after mutual authentication, the communication encryption key is exchanged. At this
time, it is generated by using HASH_DRBG_SHA256, which is a random bit generator of the validated
cryptographic module.
The TOE encrypts and stores the security policy including the user data encryption key received
from the management server by using ARIA256 and verifies the integrity verification information by
using HMAC-SHA256.
[User data protection(FDP)]
The TOE protects against unauthorized attacks by initializing all information used inside the TOE for
cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, cryptographic operation, and random
bit generation after use.
The TOE provides an interface for encrypting user data using the user data encryption key
distributed from the management server.
[Identification and authentication(FIA)]
To secure the communication between TOE components, the management server and the agent
mutually authenticate each other using the public key pair of 2048 bits of RSA. After exchanging
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
24 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
the communication encryption key, the security policy is encrypted using ARIA256. The mutual
authentication uses a self-implemented method based on public key cryptography.
[Protection of the TSF(FPT)]
The TOE encrypts and stores using ARIA256, which is a verification algorithm of validated
cryptographic module, in order to prevent exposure and modification of TSF data used internally
for operation. In addition, the TOE encrypts using ARIA256, which is a verification algorithm of
validated cryptographic module, to prevent the exposure and modification of transmission data
between physically separated TOE components, and performs integrity verification using HMAC-
SHA256 algorithm.
The TOE monitors the TOE's major processes for normal operation through the TSF's own tests. The
TOE performs self-test periodically during startup and operation to generate audit data when the
integrity verification of the configuration file and execution module fails during startup or after
normal operation.
D’Guard API
[Security audit(FAU)]
The TOE generates audit data on the management server interworking policy distribution, the TSF
self-test results, and user data encryption processing results.
The audit data for encryption success and decryption success in the user data encryption processing
result is determined whether or not audit data is generated by the setting of an authorized
administrator.
[Cryptographic support(FCS)]
The TOE supports the cryptographic key management, cryptographic operation, and random bit
generation.
The TOE receives the interworking distribution request from the management server by encrypting
the security policy including the user data encryption key. In order to distribute the security policy
securely, after mutual authentication, the communication encryption key is exchanged. At this time,
it is generated by using HASH_DRBG_SHA256, which is a random bit generator of the validated
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
25 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
cryptographic module.
The TOE encrypts and stores the security policy including the user data encryption key received
from the management server by using ARIA256 and verifies the integrity verification information by
using HMAC-SHA256.
[User data protection(FDP)]
The TOE protects against unauthorized attacks by initializing all information used inside the TOE for
the cryptographic key generation, cryptographic key distribution, cryptographic operation, and
random bit generation after use.
The TOE provides an interface for encrypting user data using the user data encryption key
distributed from the management server.
[Identification and authentication(FIA)]
To secure the communication between the TOE components, the management server and the agent
mutually authenticate each other using the public key pair of 2048 bits of RSA. After exchanging
communication encryption key, security policy is transmitted using ARIA256. The mutual
authentication uses a self-implemented method based on public key cryptography.
[Protection of the TSF(FPT)]
The TOE encrypts and stores using ARIA256, which is a verification algorithm of the validated
cryptographic module, in order to prevent the exposure and modification of the TSF data used
internally for operation. In addition, the TOE encrypts using ARIA256, which is a verification
algorithm of the validated cryptographic module, to prevent the exposure and modification of
transmission data between physically separated TOE components, and performs integrity verification
using HMAC-SHA256 algorithm.
The TOE monitors the TOE's major processes for normal operation through the TSF's own tests. The
TOE performs self-test periodically during startup and operation to generate audit data when the
integrity verification of the configuration file and execution module fails during startup or after
normal operation.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
26 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
1.5. Conventions
The notation, formatting and conventions used in this ST are consistent with the Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation.
The CC allows several operations to be performed for functional requirements: iteration, assignment,
selection and refinement. Each operation is used in this ST.
Iteration
Iteration is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of iteration is
marked with an iteration number in parenthesis following the component identifier, i.e., denoted as
(iteration No.)
Assignment
This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length). The result
of assignment is indicted in square brackets like [ assignment_value ].
Selection
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement. The result
of selection is shown as underlined and italicized.
Refinement
This is used to add details and thus further restrict a requirement. The result of refinement is shown
in bold text.
1.6. Terms and definitions
Terms used in this ST, which are the same as in the CC, must follow those in the CC.
Approved cryptographic algorithm
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
27 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
A cryptographic algorithm selected by Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Authority for block
cipher, secure hash algorithm, message authentication code, random bit generation, key agreement,
public key cipher, digital signatures cryptographic algorithms considering safety, reliability and
interoperability
Application Server
The application server defined in this ST refers to the server that installs and operates the application,
which is developed to provide a certain application service by the organization that operates the
TOE. The pertinent application reads the user data from the DB, which is located in the database
server, by the request of the application service user, or sends the user data to be stored in the DB
to the database server.
Approved mode of operation
The mode of cryptographic module using approved cryptographic algorithm
Assets
Entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon
Assignment
The specification of an identified parameter in a component (of the CC) or requirement
Attack potential
Measure of the effort to be expended in attacking a TOE expressed as an attacker’s expertise,
resources and motivation
Augmentation
Addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
28 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Authorized Administrator
Authorized user to securely operate and manage the TOE
Authentication Data
Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user
Authorized User
The TOE user who may, in accordance with the SFRs, perform an operation
Can/could
The ‘can’ or ‘could’ presented in Application notes indicates optional requirements applied to the
TOE by ST author’s choice
Column
A set of data values of a particular simple type, one for each row of the table in a relational database
Component
Smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based
Critical Security Parameters (CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the security of the encryption module if exposed or
changed (e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key, password, or Personal Identification
Number)
Class
Set of CC families that share a common focus
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
29 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Database
A set of data that is compiled according to a certain structure in order to receive, save, and provide
data in response to the demand of multiple users to support multiple application duties at the same
time. The database related to encryption by column, which is required by this ST, refers to the
relational database.
Database Server
The database server defined in this ST refer to the server in which the DBMS managing the protected
DB is installed in the organization that operates the TOE
DBMS (Database Management System)
A software system composed to configure and apply the database. The DBMS related to encryption
by column, which is required by this ST, refers to the database management system based on the
relational database model
Data Encryption Key (DEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts the data
Decryption
The act that restoring the ciphertext into the plaintext using the decryption key
Dependency
Relationship between components such that if a requirement based on the depending component
is included in a PP, ST or package, a requirement based on the component that is depended upon
must normally also be included in the PP, ST or package
Encryption
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
30 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
The act that converts the plaintext into the ciphertext using the encryption key
Element
Indivisible statement of a security need
External Entity
Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL)
Set of assurance requirements drawn from CC part 3, representing a point on the CC predefined
assurance scale, that form an assurance package
Family
Set of components that share a similar goal but differ in emphasis or rigour
Identity
Representation uniquely identifying entities (e.g. user, process or disk) within the context of the TOE
Iteration
Use of the same component to express two or more distinct requirements
Key Encryption Key (KEK)
Key that encrypts and decrypts another cryptographic key
Management access
The access to the TOE by using the HTTPS, SSH, TLS, etc to manage the TOE by administrator,
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
31 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
remotely
Object
Passive entity in the TOE containing or receiving information and on which subjects perform
operations
Operation (on a component of the CC)
Modification or repetition of a component. Allowed operations on components are assignment,
iteration, refinement and selection
Operation (on a subject)
Specific type of action performed by a subject on an object
Private Key
A cryptographic key which is used in and asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely
associated with an entity (the subject using the private key), not to be disclosed
Public Key (asymmetric) cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm that uses a pair of public and private keys
Random bit generator
A device or algorithm that outputs a binary string that is statistically independent and is not biased.
The RBG used for cryptographic application generally generates 0 and 1 bit string, and the string
can be combined into a random bit block. The RBG is classified into the deterministic and non-
deterministic type. The deterministic type RBG is composed of and algorithm that generates bit
strings from the initial value called a “seed key,” and the non-deterministic type RBG produces
output that depends on the unpredictable physical source.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
32 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Recommend/be recommended
The ‘recommend’ or ‘be recommended’ presented in Application notes is not mandatorily
recommended, but required to be applied for secure operations of the TOE
Refinement
Addition of details to a component
Role
Predefined set of rules on permissible interactions between a user and the TOE
Security Function Policy (SFP)
A Set of rules that describes the specific security action performed by TSF (TOE security functionality)
and describe them as SFR (security function requirement)
Secret Key
A cryptographic key which is used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm and is uniquely
associated with one or several entity, not to be disclosed
Security Target (ST)
Implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE
Security attribute
The characteristics of the subject used to define the SFR, user (including the external IT product),
object, information, session and/or resources. These values are used to perform the SFR
Security Token
PBKDF2-based encrypted file for public key pair for mutual authentication and secure
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
33 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
communication between the TOE and master key of the TOE
Selection
Specification of one or more items from a list in a component
Shall/must
The ‘shall’ or ‘must’ presented in Application notes indicates mandatory requirements applied to
the TOE
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
This is a security protocol proposed by Netscape to ensure confidentiality, integrity and security
over a computer network
Symmetric cryptographic technique
Encryption scheme that uses the same secret key in mode of encryption and decryption, also known
as secret key cryptographic technique
Subject
Active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
Set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance
Threat Agent
Entity that can adversely act on assets
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
34 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
TLS (Transport Layer Security)
This is a cryptographic protocol between a SSL-based server and a client and is described in RFC
2246
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon
for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
TSF Data
Data for the operation of the TOE upon which the enforcement of the SFR relies
Unstructured File
File with unstructured form and structure
User
Refer to “External entity”
User Data
Data for the user that does not affect the operation or the TSF
dgfile
A program that encrypts and decrypts all unstructured files
dgsam
This is a program that encrypts and decrypts the value of a specific item by separating the values
of each item from the unstructured file by a separator or a fixed length.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
35 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
1.7. ST organization
This document is structured as below:
Chapter 1 Introduction describes the Security Target and TOE reference, TOE overview, TOE
description, conventions and terms and definitions.
Chapter 2 Conformance Claims describes the conformance with the Common Criteria, protection
profile and package and presents the conformance rationale and protection profile conformance
statement.
Chapter 3 describes the security objectives for the operational environment.
Chapter 4 defines the extended components for the database encryption.
Chapter 5 describes the security functional and assurance requirements.
Chapter 6 describes the TOE summary specification.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
36 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
2. Conformance claim
2.1. CC conformance claim
[Table 9] CC conformance claim
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5
· Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-001, April, 2017)
· Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-002, April, 2017)
· Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, Version
3.1, Revision 5 (CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017)
Conformance
claim
Part 2 Security
functional
components
Extended: FCS_RBG.1, FIA_IMA.1, FDP_UDE.1, FMT_PWD.1,
FPT_PST.1, FTA_SSL.5
Part 3 Security
assurance
components
Conformant
Package Augmented: EAL1 augmented (ATE_FUN.1)
2.2. PP conformance claim
This ST conforms to the “National PP of Database Encryption V1.1”
✓ PP Title and Version: National PP for Database Encryption V1.1
✓ Certificate No/Data: KECS-PP-0820-2017/2019-12-11
✓ Publication Date: 2019-12-11
✓ Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL1+(ATE_FUN.1)
✓ Conformance Type: Strict PP conformance
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
37 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
2.3. Package conformance claim
This ST claim conformance to assurance package EAL1 augmented with ATE_FUN.1.
2.4. Conformance claim rationale
In this security target specification, the TOE type, security purpose, and security requirements were
all the same according to the strict compliance method of 'National Database Encryption Protection
Profile V1.1'.
[Table 10] Conformance claim rationale
Standard
list
PP ST Claim Rationale
TOE Type
Separate into 'Plug-in'
and 'API'
Separate into 'Plug-in'
and 'API'
Same as PP
Security
Purpose
OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL Same as PP
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Same as PP
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPME
NT
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPME
NT
Same as PP
OE.LOG_BACKUP OE.LOG_BACKUP Same as PP
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_
RE-INFORCEMENT
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_
RE-INFORCEMENT
Same as PP
OE.TIME_STAMP OE.TIME_STAMP
More restrictive than PP
PP does not have security
issues and security
requirements for
timestamps used for audit
records, but this ST
additionally identifies the
assumption that a secure
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
38 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Standard
list
PP ST Claim Rationale
timestamp is received from
the operational
environment of the TOE
OE.SECURE_DBMS OE.SECURE_DBMS
More restrictive than PP
PP does not have a
security problem definition
and security requirements
for DBMS storing data and
audit data, but this ST
further identifies the
assumption that it
operates physically and
safely
OE.TRUSTED_PATH OE.TRUSTED_PATH
More restrictive than PP
PP did not define security
issues and requirements
for the communication
section accessed by the
administrator, but this ST
further identifies the
assumption that
information transmitted
when the administrator
accesses the management
server is protected through
a secure channel
Security
Features
Requirement
FAU_ARP.1 FAU_ARP.1 Same as PP
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Same as PP
FAU_SAA.1 FAU_SAA.1 Same as PP
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 Same as PP
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
39 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Standard
list
PP ST Claim Rationale
FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.3 Same as PP
FAU_STG.1 -
FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4
have a dependent
relationship with
FAU_STG.1, but in this ST,
audit data is stored in the
DBMS that works with TOE,
thereby satisfying the
dependent relationship in
the OE.SECURE_DBMS
FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.3 Same as PP
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4 Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1(1) FCS_CKM.1(1) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.1(2) FCS_CKM.1(2) Same as PP
FCS_CKM.2 FCS_CKM.2 Same as PP
FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.4 Same as PP
FCS_COP.1(1) FCS_COP.1(1) Same as PP
FCS_COP.1(2) FCS_COP.1(2) Same as PP
FCS_RBG.1 FCS_RBG.1 Same as PP
FDP_UDE.1 FDP_UDE.1 Same as PP
FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 Same as PP
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_AFL.1 Same as PP
FIA_IMA.1 FIA_IMA.1 Same as PP
FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1 Same as PP
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.2
Use hierarchical FIA_UAU.2
in accordance with the
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
40 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Standard
list
PP ST Claim Rationale
application precautions of
PP FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4 FIA_UAU.4 Same as PP
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.7 Same as PP
FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.2
Use hierarchical FIA_UID.2
in accordance with the
application precautions of
PP FIA_UID.1, FIA_UID.2
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MOF.1 Same as PP
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 Same as PP
FMT_PWD.1 FMT_PWD.1 Same as PP
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Same as PP
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Same as PP
FPT_ITT.1 FPT_ITT.1 Same as PP
FPT_PST.1 FPT_PST.1 Same as PP
FPT_STM.1 -
Not required in TOE with
select SFR
FPT_TEE.1 -
Not required in TOE with
select SFR
FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Same as PP
FTA_MCS.2 FTA_MCS.2 Same as PP
FTA_SSL.5 FTA_SSL.5 Same as PP
FTA_TSE.1 FTA_TSE.1 Same as PP
FTP_ITC.1 -
Not required in TOE with
select SFR
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
41 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Standard
list
PP ST Claim Rationale
FTP_TRP.1 -
Not required in TOE with
select SFR
Security
Purpose
ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1 Same as PP
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1 Same as PP
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1 Same as PP
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1 Same as PP
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1 Same as PP
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1 Same as PP
ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1 Same as PP
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1 Same as PP
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1 Same as PP
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1 Same as PP
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1 Same as PP
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1 Same as PP
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1 Same as PP
AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1 Same as PP
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
42 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
3. Security Objectives
The following are the security objectives handled by technical and procedural method supported
from operational environment in order to provide the TOE security functionality accurately.
3.1. Security objectives for the operational environment
OE.PHYSICAL_CONTROL
The place where the TOE components are installed and operated shall be equipped with access
control and protection facilities so that only authorized administrator can access.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall be non-malicious users, have appropriately trained
for the TOE management functions and accurately fulfill the duties in accordance with
administrator guidance.
OE.SECURE_DEVELOPMENT
The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and authentication
function in the operational environment of the business system shall ensure that the security
functions of the TOE are securely applied in accordance with the requirements of the manual
provided with the TOE.
OE.LOG_BACKUP
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall periodically checks a spare space of audit data
storage in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup (external log server
or separate storage device, etc.) to prevent audit data loss.
OE.OPERATION_SYSTEM_RE-
INFORCEMENT
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
43 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
The authorized administrator of the TOE shall ensure the reliability and security of the operating
system by performing the reinforcement on the latest vulnerabilities of the operating system in
which the TOE is installed and operated.
OE.TIME_STAMP
The TOE shall accurately record security-relevant events by using reliable time stamps provided
by the TOE operational environment.
OE.SECURE_DBMS
The DBMS that stores TSF data and audit data should be operated physically and safely.
OE.TRUSTED_PATH
Information transmitted when an authorized administrator accesses a web server using a web
browser should be protected through a secure channel.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
44 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
4. Extended components definition
4.1. Cryptographic support (FCS)
4.1.1. Random Bit Generation
Family Behaviour
This family (FCS_RBG, Random Bit Generation) defines requirements for the TSF to provide the
capability that generates random bits required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Component Leveling
FCS_RBG Random bit generation 1
FCS_RBG.1 random bit generation requires TSF to provide the capability that generates random bits
required for TOE cryptographic operation.
Management: FCS_RBG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FCS_RBG.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.1.1.1. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate a
cryptographic key using the specified random bit generator that meets
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
45 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
the following [assignment: list of standards]
4.2. Identification & authentication (FIA)
4.2.1. TOE Internal mutual authentication
Family Behaviour
This family (FIA_IMA, TOE Internal Mutual Authentication) defines requirements for providing mutual
authentication between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Component Leveling
FIA_IMA TOE internal mutual authentication 1
FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication requires that the TSF provides mutual authentication
function between TOE components in the process of user identification and authentication.
Management: FIA_IMA.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FIA_IMA.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation family
is included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success and failure of mutual authentication
b) Minimal: Modification of authentication protocol
4.2.1.1. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
46 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication between [assignment:
different parts of TOE] using the [assignment: authentication protocol]
that meets the following [assignment: list of standards]
4.3. User data protection (FDP)
4.3.1. User data encryption
Family Behaviour
This family provides requirements to ensure confidentiality of user data.
Component leveling
FDP_UDE User data encryption 1
FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption requires confidentiality of user data.
Management: FDP_UDE.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of user data encryption/decryption rules
Audit: FDP_UDE.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
47 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
4.3.1.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FDP_UDE.1.1 The TSF shall provide TOE users with the ability to encrypt/decrypt
user data according to [assignment: the list of encryption/decryption
method] specified.
4.4. Security Management (FMT)
4.4.1. ID and password
Family Behaviour
This family defines the capability that is required to control ID and password management used in
the TOE, and set or modify ID and/or password by authorized users.
Component leveling
FMT_PWD ID and password 1
FMT_PWD.1 ID and password management, requires that the TSF provides the management function
of ID and password.
Management: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Management of ID and password configuration rules.
Audit: FMT_PWD.1
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
48 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
included in the PP/ST:
a) Minimal: All changes of the password.
4.4.1.1. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of
[assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified
roles].
1. [assignment: password combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special
characters unusable of password, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [assignment: list
of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
1. [assignment: ID combination rules and/or length]
2. [assignment: other management such as management of special
characters unusable for ID, etc.]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [selection, choose one of:
setting ID and password when installing, setting password when
installing, changing the ID and password when the authorized
administrator access for the first time, changing the password when
the authorized administrator access of the first time].
4.5. Protection of the TSF (FPT)
4.5.1. Protection of stored TSF data
Family Behaviour
This family defines rules to protect TSF data stored within containers controlled by the TSF from
the unauthorized modification or disclosure.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
49 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Component leveling
FPT_PST Protection of stored TSF data 1
FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data, requires the protection of TSF data stored in
containers controlled by the TSF.
Management: FPT_PST.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_PST.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
4.5.1.1. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [assignment: TSF data] stored in containers
controlled by the TSF from the unauthorized [selection: disclosure,
modification].
4.6. TOE Access (FTA)
4.6.1. Session locking and termination
Family Behaviour
This family (FTA_SSL, Session locking and termination) defines requirements for the TSF to provide
the capability for TSF-initiated and user-initiated locking, unlocking, and termination of interactive
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
50 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
sessions.
Component leveling
In CC Part 2, the session locking and termination family consists of four components. In this ST, it
consists of five components by extending one additional component as follows.
 The relevant description for four components contained in CC Part 2 is omitted.
FTA_SSL.5 The management of TSF-initiated sessions, provides requirements that the TSF locks or
terminates the session after a specified time interval of user inactivity.
Management: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Specification for the time interval of user inactivity that is occurred the session locking and
termination for each user
b) Specification for the time interval of default user inactivity that is occurred the session
locking and termination
Audit: FTA_SSL.5
The following actions are recommended to record if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
3
2
4
5
FTA_SSL Session locking and termination
1
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
51 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
a) Minimal: Locking or termination of interactive session
4.6.1.1. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies [FIA_UAU.1 authentication or No dependencies.]
FTA_SSL.5.1 The TSF shall [selection:
· lock the session and re-authenticate the user before unlocking
the session
· terminate] an interactive session after a [assignment: time
interval of user inactivity]
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
52 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
5. Security requirements
The security requirements specify security functional requirements and assurance requirements that
must be satisfied by the TOE that claims conformance to this ST.
The security functional requirements included in this ST are derived from CC Part 2 and Chapter 4
Extended Components Definition.
The following table summarizes the security functional requirements used in the ST
[Table 6] Security functional requirements
Security
functional
class
Security functional component
FAU
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FCS
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)
FCS_RBG.1(Extended) Random bit generation
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
53 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FDP
FDP_UDE.1(Extended) User data encryption
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FIA
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_IMA.1(Extended) TOE Internal mutual authentication
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User authentication prior to all actions
FMT
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_PWD.1(Extended) Management of ID and password
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PST.1(Extended) Basic protection of stored TSF data
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FTA
FTA_MCS.2
Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent
sessions
FTA_SSL.5(Extended) Management of TSF-initiated sessions
FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
5.1. Security functional requirements (Mandatory SFRs)
5.1.1. Security audit (FAU)
5.1.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
54 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [sending a warning email to the authorized
administrator] upon detection of a potential security violation.
5.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) [Refer to the “auditable events” in [Table 12] Audit events, no
other components].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;
and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event
definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST
[Refer to the contents of “additional audit record” in [Table 12]
Audit events, no other components].
[Table 7] Audit events
Security
functional
class
Auditable event
Additional audit
record
FAU_ARP.1 Actions taken due to potential security violations
FAU_SAA.1
Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis
mechanisms, Automated responses performed by the
tool
FAU_STG.3 Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
55 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FAU_STG.4 Actions taken due to the audit storage failure
FCS_CKM.1(1) Success and failure of the activity
FCS_CKM.2
Success and failure of the activity
(only applying to distribution of key related to user data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_CKM.4
Success and failure of the activity
(only applying to destruction of key related to user data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(1) Success and failure of the activity
FDP_UDE.1 Success and failure of user data encryption/decryption
FIA_AFL.1
The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful
authentication attempts and the actions taken, and the
subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal
state
FIA_IMA.1
Success and failure of mutual authentication
Modify of authentication protocol
FIA_UAU.2 All use of the authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 Attempts to reuse authentication data
FIA_UID.2
All use of the user identification mechanism,
Including the user identity provided
FMT_MOF.1
All modifications in the behavior of the functions in the
TSF
FMT_MTD.1 All modifications to the values of TSF data
Modified values of
TSF data
FMT_PWD.1 All changes of the password
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the user group of rules divided
FPT_TST.1 Execution of the TSF self-tests and the results of the tests
Modified TSF data
or execution code in
case of integrity
violation
FTA_MCS.2
Denial of a new session based on the limitation of
multiple concurrent sessions
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
56 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FTA_SSL.5 Locking or termination of interactive session
5.1.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited
events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the
enforcement of the SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:
a) [Potential violation analysis
- Among the audit cases of FIA_UAU.2, the audit case of failure
of certification, the audit case of integrity violation among the
audit cases of FPT_TST.1, and the failure of self-test of the
verified cryptographic module(KCMVP)
- Audit evidence storage threshold exceeded event in
FAU_STG.3 and audit evidence storage saturation event in
FAU_STG.4
]
b) [Other audit event rules including potential violations
- FIA_UAU.2: duplicate authentication failures occurred during
an administrator’s authentication failure audit (Account
deactivation: 5-minute authentication delay when
authentication fails more than 5 times)
- FIA_STG.3: limit of the audit trail exceeds 80%
- FIA_STG.4: limit of the audit trail saturates 90%
- Self-test failure incident of verified cryptographic
module(KCMVP)
]
5.1.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
57 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall provide [authorized administrator] with the capability to
read [all the audit data] from the audit records.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the
authorized administrator to interpret the information.
5.1.1.5.FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to apply [methods of selection
and/or ordering] of audit data based on [criteria with logical relations]
[
· Criteria with logical relations: Combination with AND
operation when entering the selected criteria events in
[Table 13] Auditable events and selection criteria
· Methods of selection and/or ordering: Select audit data
according to [Table 13] Auditable events and selection criteria
and order audit data in descending order based on time of
occurrence
]
[Table 8] Auditable events and selection criteria
Selection Criteria Operation Remarks
Incident date Select (Start ~ End)
· Criteria of audit data creation date (day, month,
year)
IP Search (IP address)
· D’Guard KMS’s IP
· D’Guard KMS GUI’s connect administrator IP
· D’Guard KMS CLI’s connect administrator IP
· D’Guard Plug-In’s IP
· D’Guard API’s IP
User account
Search (Identifiable user
account)
· D’Guard KMS’s connect administrator account
· D’Guard KMS GUI’s Connect administrator
account
· D’Guard Plug-In’s security token account
· D’Guard API’s Security token account
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
58 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Result Select (all/true/fail) · Processing result of audit data action
5.1.1.6. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF should take [Notify the authorized administrator, [None]] if the
audit trail exceeds that when reached threshold [80%] of audit storage.
5.1.1.7. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF should overwrite the oldest stored audit records and execute
[Send mail to an authorized administrator] if the audit trail is full.
Application notes
✓ When the audit storage saturation setting is exceeded (90%), the oldest audit record is
deleted with the number of audit data corresponding to 5% of the total count of audit
records, and the audit data is generated and an alert email is sent to the authorized
administrator.
5.1.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
59 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [“Cryptographic
algorithm” of [Table 14] User data encryption algorithm and key length]
and specified cryptographic key sizes [“Cryptographic key sizes” of
[Table 14] User data encryption algorithm and key length] that meet
the following: [“Standard list” of [Table 15] Encryption key generation].
[Table 9] Encryption key generation
Standard list
Cryptographic
operations
Cryptographi
c algorithm
Comple
xity of
cryptogr
aphic
Cryptogra
phic key
sizes
Purpose
ISO/IEC
18031
Random bit
generator
HASH-
DRBG-
SHA256
256 -
For generating user data
and TSF data encryption
keys
[Table 15] User data encryption algorithm and key length
Standard list
Cryptographic
operations
Cryptographi
c algorithm
Comple
xity of
cryptogr
aphic
Cryptogra
phic key
sizes
Purpose
KS X 1213-1
Symmetric key
encryption
ARIA (CBC)
128 128
Encrypt user data
(symmetric key
ciphering)
256 256
TTAS.KO-
12.0004/R1
Symmetric key
encryption
SEED (CBC) 128 128
TTAK.KO-
12.0223
Symmetric key
encryption
LEA(CBC)
128 128
256 256
ISO/IEC
10118-3
Secure Hash SHA-2
256 None
Encrypt user data
(HASH)
512 None
TTAK.KO-
12.0191
Random bit
generator
HASH-
DRBG-
SHA256
256 -
Random IV
(Use to prevent the
same ciphertext from
being generated in the
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
60 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
same plaintext)
Application notes
✓ The key length generated by the Random bit generator (HASH-DRBG-SHA256) is 32 bytes
with a default value of 8 (quantitative number of 8). Entering the length according to the
cipher ratio as a factor produces a key of that length.
5.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [“Cryptographic
algorithm” of [Table 16] TSF data cryptographic key algorithm and key
sizes] and specified cryptographic key sizes [“Cryptographic key sizes”
of [Table 16] TSF data cryptographic key algorithm and key sizes] that
meet the following: [“Standard list” of [Table 15] Encryption key
generation].
[Table 16] TSF data cryptographic key algorithm and key sizes
TOE
Module
Standar
d list
Cryptogra
phic
algorithm
Cryptog
raphic
key
sizes
Cryptograp
hic
operations
Describe the key
type and purpose
Cryptographic
key creation
D’Guard
KMS
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used to encrypt
KMS token files with
KEK
PBKDF2(PIN)
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used to store Agent
token files
encryption with KEK
ISO/IEC SHA-2 None Secure Use PBKDF2 -
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
61 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
10118-3 (256) Hash
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used to encrypt
security policies,
audit log and
settings file with
master key
Using the
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
10118-3
SHA-2
(256)
None
Secure
Hash
Used administrator
password one-way
encryption
-
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
For encrypting user
data cryptographic
keys in memory with
master key
Using the
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
18033-2
RSAES 2048
Public key
encryption
For mutual
authentication and
session key
exchange
Using the
RSA key
generation
algorithm
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used session key for
interval encrypt
between TOE
Using the
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
9797-2
HMAC
(SHA-2)
256
Integrity
Verification
Configuration files,
communication built
data integrity
verification
-
Agent
(D’Guar
d Plug-
In)
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used to decrypt
Agent token files
with file KEK
PBKDF2(PIN)
ISO/IEC
10118-3
SHA-2
(256)
None
Secure
Hash
Use PBKDF2 -
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Encrypt key
information such as
configuration files
with agent token
keys
Using the
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
18033-2
RSAES 2048
Public key
encryption
For mutual
authentication and
session key
exchange
Using the
RSA key
generation
algorithm
KS X ARIA 256 Symmetric Used session key for Using the
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
62 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
1213-1 (CBC) key
encryption
interval encrypt
between TOE
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
9797-2
HMAC
(SHA-2)
256
Integrity
Verification
Configuration files,
communication built
data integrity
verification
-
Agent
(D’Guar
d API)
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used to decrypt
Agent token files
with file KEK
PBKDF2(PIN)
ISO/IEC
10118-3
SHA-2
(256)
None
Secure
Hash
Use PBKDF2 -
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Encrypt key
information such as
configuration files
with agent token
keys
Using the
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
18033-2
RSAES 2048
Public key
encryption
For mutual
authentication and
session key
exchange
Using the
RSA key
generation
algorithm
KS X
1213-1
ARIA
(CBC)
256
Symmetric
key
encryption
Used session key for
interval encrypt
between TOE
Using the
random bit
generator
ISO/IEC
9797-2
HMAC
(SHA-2)
256
Integrity
Verification
Configuration files,
communication built
data integrity
verification
-
Application notes
✓ Master Key: It is a key used by D’Guard KMS to encrypt security policies and encryption
keys.
✓ Agent Token Key: Key that is encrypted in the agent security token and is used to encrypt
key information, including security policies and encryption keys
5.1.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
63 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attribute, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attribute, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key distribution method [“Distribution method”
of [Table 17] Cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the
following: [“Standard list” of [Table 17] Cryptographic key distribution
method].
[Table 17] Cryptographic key distribution method
Standard list
Cryptographic
algorithm
Cryptographic
key sizes
Distribution method
ISO/IEC 18031
HASH-DRBG-
SHA256
256
Generate communication
cryptographic key
ISO/IEC 18033-2 RSAES 2048
Encrypt communication
cryptographic key used for
communication section encryption.
And mutual authentication.
KS X 1213-1 ARIA 256
Encrypt security policy including
user data cryptographic key.
ISO/IEC 9797-2 HMAC-SHA256 256
TSF data transmission and integrity
check.
5.1.2.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic destruction
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attribute, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attribute, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destruct cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [“Destruction method”
of [Table 18] [Table 19] Cryptographic key destruction method] that
meets the following: [“Standard list” of [Table 18] [Table 19]
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
64 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Cryptographic key destruction method].
[Table 18] Cryptographic key destruction method of D’Guard KMS
Standard list
Destruction
object
Cryptographic
key storage
location
Destruction
method
Detailed
method of
destruction
Destruction
point
None
User data
cryptographic
key
DB deletion
Execute SQL
to delete
form DB
When the
master
administrator
deletes the
cryptographic
key
None Session key Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite key
memory area
3 times in a
row with
0x00
When calling
communication
shut-down
None Master key Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite key
memory area
3 times in a
row with
0x00
When calling
process shut-
down
None
Security
policy
information
Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite key
memory area
3 times in a
row with
0x00
After policy
deployment
communication
completes
[Table 19] Cryptographic key destruction method of Agent(Plug-In Agent, API Module)
Standard list
Destruction
object
Cryptographic
key storage
location
Destruction
method
Detailed
method of
destruction
Destruction
point
None
User data
cryptographic
key
Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite
key memory
area 3 times
After the
cryptographic
operation is
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
65 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
in a row with
0x00
complete
None Program KEK Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite
key memory
area 3 times
in a row with
0x00
When calling
process shut-
down
None Program DEK Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite
key memory
area 3 times
in a row with
0x00
When calling
process shut-
down
None Session key Memory
Memory
zeroization
Overwrite
key memory
area 3 times
in a row with
0x00
When calling
communication
shut-down
5.1.2.5. FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attribute, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attribute, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [“list of cryptographic operations” of [Table 15]
User data encryption algorithm and key length] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [“Cryptographic algorithm” of [Table
15] User data encryption algorithm and key length] and cryptographic
key sizes [“Cryptographic key sizes” of [Table 15] User data encryption
algorithm and key length] that meet the following: [“Standard list” of
[Table 15] User data encryption algorithm and key length].
5.1.2.6.FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)
Hierarchical to No other components
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
66 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Dependencies [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attribute, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attribute, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [“Cryptographic operations” of [Table 16] TSF
data cryptographic key algorithm and key sizes] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [“Cryptographic algorithm” of [Table
16] TSF data cryptographic key algorithm and key sizes] and
cryptographic key sizes [“Cryptographic key sizes” of [Table 16] TSF
data cryptographic key algorithm and key sizes] that meet the
following: [“Standard list” of [Table 16] TSF data cryptographic key
algorithm and key sizes].
5.1.2.7. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies No dependencies.
FCS_RBG.1.1 The TSF shall generate random bits required to generate an
cryptographic key using the specified random bit generator that meets
the following [[Table 20] Random bit generator “Standard list”]
[Table 20] Random bit generator
Standard list Random bit generator Base function
ISO/IEC 18031 HASH-DRBG-SHA256 HASH function
5.1.3. User data protection (FDP)
5.1.3.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
67 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FCS_UDE.1.1 The TSF shall provide a function that can encrypt/decrypt the user data
to the TOE user according to the specified [encryption/decryption
method by column, [None]].
5.1.3.2. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to,
deallocation of the resource from the following objects: [user data].
5.1.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to No other components
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [5] unsuccessful authentication attempts
occur related to [Administrator authentication attempts].
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met, the TSF shall [list of actions]
[
· Disable identification and authentication (fixed value of 5
minutes)
· Send alert mail to administrator
]
Application notes
✓ If the administrator’s authentication attempt occurs more than 5 times, the identification
and authentication functions are disabled, so normal login can be performed after 5
minutes.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
68 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
5.1.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 TOE Internal mutual authentication (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_IMA.1.1 The TSF shall perform mutual authentication using [The internally
implemented authentication protocol (RSA-2048bit) using the
validated cryptographic module] in accordance with [None] between
[[Table21] TOE internal mutual authentication “Mutual verification
interval among the TOE components”].
[Table 21] TOE internal mutual authentication
Mutual verification interval among the TOE components Validated cryptographic module
D’Guard KMS D’Guard Plug-In
Refer to [Table 8] The validated
cryptographic module of the TOE
D’Guard KMS D’Guard API
Application notes
✓ The TOE performs mutual authentication between its physically separated TOE components
regardless of the operation method through its internally implemented authentication
protocol. The internally implemented authentication protocol performs mutual
authentication with RSA (2048 bit) public key encryption and exchanges session keys.
1) Generating a security token (including public key pair) for the agent in D'Guard KMS
2) Manual distribution of the agent's public key pair to the agent
3) Encrypt the random bit in the agent with D'Guard KMS public key and send it
4) Decrypt and confirm with own secret key in D'Guard KMS
5) Encrypt the random bit in the D’Guard KMS with the agent public key and send it
6) Decrypt and confirm with own secret key in the agent
7) D'Guard KMS and the agent combine the two random bit exchanged with each other,
and then exchange and complete the session key.
5.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to No other components.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
69 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [The
following defined acceptance criteria].
[
a) Minimum/Maximum length
· 10 to 20 digits
b) Combination rules
· Combination of 3 or more among English alphabets/
numbers / special characters
· Excluded if a password has 3 or more successive letters
(abc, def, 123, 432, etc.)
· Excluded if a password has 3 or more successive letters
on the keyboard (asd, qwe, jkl, etc.)
· Excluded if a password has 3 or more same letters (aaa,
222, 999, etc.)
· Excluded if a password contains administrator account
information
· Excluded if a password was used the last three times (3
times by default)
c) Change interval (the period during which the password is
used)
· 60 days by default, the interval is defined by the
authorized administrator
]
5.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication prior to all actions
Hierarchical to FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall successfully authenticate the authorized administrator
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of the
authorized administrator.
5.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to No other components.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
70 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Dependencies No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [The
following identified authentication mechanisms].
[
When the administrator of the TOE authenticates, the captcha, which
is one-time verification data, is generated for each session to prevent
reuse of the authentication data. The default captcha is valid for 120
seconds.
· The console captcha: Numbers 5 digits
· The web captcha: English alphabets (small letters)/ numbers 5
digits
]
5.1.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.2 User authentication prior to all actions
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [‘*’ characters, no input characters displayed]
to the user while the authentication is in progress.
Application notes
✓ The web authentication: The replacement character ‘*’ is displayed on the password input
screen, and ‘The Login information does not match’ is displayed on the screen when
authentication fails.
✓ The console authentication: The Password input character is not displayed, and if
authentication fails, 'Login Failed' is displayed on the screen.
5.1.4.7. FIA_UID.2 User identification prior to all actions
Hierarchical to FIA.UID.1 Timing of identification
Dependencies No dependencies.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
71 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF successfully identifies each authorized administrator before
allowing all other actions mediated by the TSF on behalf of the
authorized administrator.
5.1.5. Security management (FMT)
[Table 22] Security management action and management type by component
Security
functional
component
Management function Management type
FAU_ARP.1
Management of actions (addition, removal,
modification)
Management of
security functions
FAU_SAA.1
Maintenance of the rules (addition, deletion and
modification of the rules in the rule group)
Management of
security functions
FAU_SAR.1
Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the
group of users with read access right to the audit
records
Management of
security roles
FAU_STG.3
Maintenance of threshold
Management of TSF
data threshold
Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of
actions to be taken in case of imminent audit storage
failure
Management of
security functions
FAU_STG.4
Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of
actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure
Management of
security functions
FDP_UDE.1
Management of the user data encryption/decryption
rules
Management of
security functions
FIA_AFL.1
Management of the threshold for unsuccessful
authentication attempts
Management of TSF
data threshold
Management of actions to be taken in the event of an
authentication failure
Management of
security functions
FIA_IMA.1
Management of the authentication protocol for
mutual authentication
Management of
security functions
FIA_SOS.1 Management of the metric used to verify the secrets
Management of
security functions
FIA_UAU.2
Management of the authentication data by an
administrator,
Management of the authentication data by the
associated user
Management of TSF
data
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
72 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Management of the list of actions that can be taken
before the user is authenticated
Management of
security functions
FIA_UID.2
Management of the user identities
Management of TSF
data
If an authorized administrator can change the actions
allowed before identification, the managing of the
action lists
Management of
security functions
FMT_MOF.1
Management of the group of roles that can interact
with the functions in the TSF
Management of
security roles
FMT_MTD.1
Management of the group of roles that can interact
with the TSF data
Management of
security roles
FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password configuration rules
Management of
security functions
FMT_SMR.1
Management of the group of users that are part of a
role
Management of
security roles
FMT_ITT.1
Management of the types of modification against
which the TSF should protect
Management of the mechanism used to provide the
protection of the data in transit between different
parts of the TSF
Management of
security functions
FPT_TST.1
Management of the conditions under which TSF self-
testing occurs, such as during initial start-up, regular
interval, or under specified conditions
Management of the time interval if appropriate
Management of TSF
data
FTA_MCS.2
Management of the maximum allowed number of
concurrent user sessions by an administrator
Management of TSF
data threshold
FTA_SSL.5
Specification of the time of user inactivity after which
lock-out occurs for an individual user
Specification of the default time of user inactivity after
which lock-out occurs
Management of TSF
data
FTA_TSE.1
Management of the session establishment conditions
by the authorized administrator
Management of TSF
data
5.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
73 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to conduct management actions of
the functions [[Table 23] List of security functions behavior of
administrator] to [the authorized administrators]
[Table 23] List of security functions behavior of administrator
Administrator
Type
Classification Security Function
Ability
Determine
the
behavior
Disable Enable
Modify
the
behavior
Security user
Resource
management
Common DB
management
 - - -
Security token
management
 - - -
Policy
management
Encryption policy
management
 - - -
Super
manager
Resource
management
Common DB
management
 - - 
Security token
management
 - - 
Configuration
management
 - - 
Policy
management
Encryption policy
management
   
Security policy
distribution
 - - -
Security user
Super
manager
Additional
management
Cryptographic
operation status
 - - -
Audit data review  - - -
Super
manager
(Console)
Initialization TOE initialization setting  -  -
Integrity
validation
Integrity validation file
modification
 -  -
5.1.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
74 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage [the following list of TSF
data] to [the authorized administrators]
[
The TSF data management of [Table 24] List of TSF data and
management ability is restricted to authorized administrators.
]
[Table 24] List of TSF data and management ability
Administrator
Type
TSF data
Ability
query modify delete generate initialize
Security user
Account information  - - - -
Encryption policy  - - - -
Audit data  - - - -
Set value - - - - -
Super
manager
(Web GUI)
Account information     -
Encryption policy     -
Audit data  - - - -
Set value     -
Super
manager
(Console CLI)
Account information - - - - 
Encryption policy - - - - -
Audit data - - - - -
Set value -  - - 
Application notes
✓ The super manager must initialize the security policy and audit data to start and operate
D’Guard KMS in the console CLI environment, and generate an encryption key such as a
master key.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
75 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
5.1.5.3. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_PWD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the password of
[Administrator of the TOE] to [the authorized administrator].
1. [None]
2. [None]
FMT_PWD.1.2 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the ID of [Administrator of
the TOE] to [the authorized administrator].
1. [None]
2. [None]
FMT_PWD.1.3 The TSF shall provide the capability for [changing the password when
the authorized administrator accesses for the first time]
5.1.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
[
· Security function management: Management functions as
specified in FMT_MOF.1
· TSF data management: Management functions as specified in
FMT_MTD.1
· Password management: Management functions as specified
in FMT_PWD.1
]
5.1.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to No other components.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
76 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Dependencies FIA_UID.2 User identification prior to all actions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [the following authorized roles].
[
· Super manager: Performs all management functions such as
generating and deleting a security user account with the top-
level administrative account (both web and console
environments)
· Security user: It does not perform the change function, but
only the query function. Performing audit query and
monitoring functions (web environment only)
]
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users and their roles defined in
FMT_SMR.1.
5.1.6. Protection of the TSF
5.1.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect the TSF data from disclosure, modification by
verifying encryption and message integrity when the TSF data is
transmitted among TOE’s separated parts.
5.1.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_PST.1.1 The TSF shall protect [the following TSF data] in containers controlled
by the TSF from the unauthorized disclosure, modification.
[TSF data:
· Encryption policy: Table name, column name, user Data
Encryption Key (DEK), IP
· Audit data
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
77 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
· Administrator (Super manager, Security user) account
information
· Agent account information
· User DB access account information
· D’Guard KMS’s token file (Master Key, RSA private key/ public
key)
· Agent’s token file (RSA private key/ public key)
· Set value of the TOE: Integrity check cycle, IP, Port information,
Email address etc.
]
5.1.6.3. FPT_TST.1 TSF Self-test
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up, periodically
during normal operation to demonstrate the correct operation of
[[Table 25] Items subject to TOE self-test]
[Table 25] Items subject to TOE self-test
Classification Item Content (role)
D’Guard KMS
Cryptographic module Self-test
Process(Policy Service)
Process name: java
Determine whether the startup was
successful during startup or periodically
operating during regular operation and
generate audit logs
D’Guard Plug-In
Cryptographic module Self-test
Process(Agent Daemon)
Process name: eap
Determine whether the startup was
successful during startup or periodically
operating during regular operation and
generate audit logs
D’Guard API Cryptographic module Self-test
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
78 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Process(Agent Daemon)
Process name: java
Determine whether the startup was
successful during startup or periodically
operating during regular operation and
generate audit logs
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to
verify the integrity of [“item” of configuration file for [Table 26] Items
subject to TOE integrity test].
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to
verify the integrity of [“item” of Stored TSF executable code for [Table
26] items subject to TOE integrity test].
Application notes
✓ The D’Guard KMS: The period of self-testing periodically during normal operation is 1 hour
✓ The D’Guard Plug-In: The period of self-testing periodically during normal operation is 1
hour
✓ The D’Guard API: The period of self-testing periodically during normal operation is 1 hour.
[Table 26] Items subject to TOE integrity test
Classificat
ion
Item
Content
(role)
File
D’Guard
KMS
Configuration
file
TOE
configuration
file
dguard.xml
db.properties
Stored TSF
executable
code
KMS daemon
process
propolicyCore.jar
pstool.jar
KCMVP MagicJCrypto-v3.0.0.jar
D’Guard
Plug-In
Configuration
file
TOE
configuration
file
eap.conf
license.conf
token.conf
Stored TSF
executable
Plug-In
behavior
eap
eaptoken
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
79 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
code process dgfile
dgsam
Library
module
libDGuardAPI_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libDGuardAPI_S_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libDGuardExtproc_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libDGuardExtproc_S_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libDGuardFile_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libDGuardFile_S_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libDGuardEAP_v5.0.1_Linux_4.18_x64.so
libINISAFE_PKI_for_C_v5.2.0_Linux_2.6_64.so
KCMVP libINISAFE_Crypto_for_C_v5.4.0_Linux_4.18_64.so
D’Guard
API
Configuration
file
TOE
configuration
file
dguard.conf
Stored TSF
executable
code
Library
module
DguardAPI.jar
KCMVP MagicJCrypto-v3.0.0.jar
5.1.7. TOE access
5.1.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Hierarchical to FTA_MCS.1 Basic limitation on multiple concurrent sessions
Dependencies FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FTA_MCS.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the maximum number of concurrent sessions
[belonging to the same administrator according to the rules for the
list of management functions defined in FMT_SMF1.1]
a) Limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions to 1 for
management access by the same administrator who has the
right to perform FMT_MOF.1.1 “Management actions” and
FMT_MTD.1.1 “Management”
b) Limit the maximum number of concurrent sessions to {1} for
management access by the same administrator who doesn’t
have the right to perform FMT_MOF.1.1 “Management actions”
but has the right to perform a query in FMT_MTD.1.1
“Management” only
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
80 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
c) [None]
FTA_MCS.2.2 The TSF shall enforce a limit of [1] session per administrator by default.
5.1.7.2. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies FIA_UAU.1 authentication or No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.5.1 The TSF shall [terminate] the administrator’s interactive session after a
[time interval of the administrator inactivity (10 minutes)]
5.1.7.3. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
Hierarchical to No other components.
Dependencies No dependencies.
FTA_TSF.1.1 The TSF shall be able to refuse the management access session of
the administrator, based on [Access IP, the status of activating the
management access session of the administrator other than security
manager having the same rights, [None]].
Application notes
✓ The number of super manager connectable IPs provided by the TOE is one.
5.2. Security assurance requirements
Assurance requirements of this ST are comprised of assurance components in CC part 3, and the
evaluation assurance level is EAL1+. The following table summarizes assurance components.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
81 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
[Table 27] Security assurance requirements
Security assurance class Security assurance component
Security Target
evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Tests
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
5.2.1. Security Target evaluation
5.2.1.1. ASE_INT.1 Introduction
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
FTA_TSF.1.1 The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and
presentation elements
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
82 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a
TOE overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall uniquely identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarize the usage and major security
features of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/ software/
firmware required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview,
and the TOE description are consistent with each other.
5.2.1.2. ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action
elements
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and
presentation elements
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that
identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim
conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST
to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
83 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST
to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type
is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is
being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement
of the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of
the security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is
being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement
of security objectives is consistent with the statement of security
objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement
of security requirements is consistent with the statement of security
requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.3. ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives
Content and
presentation elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security
objectives for the operational environment
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
84 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_OBJ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.4. ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and
presentation elements
ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended
security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended
component for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and
classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC
components, families, classes, and methodology as a model for
presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these
elements can be demonstrated.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
5.2.1.5. ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
85 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Dependencies ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action
elements
ASE_REQ.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
Content and
presentation elements
ASE_REQ.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.1.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities
and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be
defined.
ASE_REQ.1.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on
the security requirements.
ASE_REQ.1.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
ASE_REQ.1.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied,
or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not
being satisfied.
ASE_REQ.1.6C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_REQ.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.1.6. ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_RREQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action
elements
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
86 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Content and
presentation elements
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
Evaluator action
elements
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is
consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
5.2.2. Development
5.2.2.1. ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ADV_FSP.1.1D The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2D The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification
to the SFRs.
Content and
presentation elements
ADV_FSP.1.1C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of
use for each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2C The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with
each SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3C The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit
categorization of interfaces as SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4C The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the
functional specification.
Evaluator action
elements
ADV_FSP.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
87 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
ADV_FSP.1.2E The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an
accurate and complete instantiation of the SFRs.
5.2.3. Guidance documents
5.2.3.1. AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action
elements
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and
presentation elements
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
user-accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a
secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how
to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters
under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible
functions that need to be performed, including changing the security
characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of
operation of the TOE (including operation following failure of
operational error), their consequences and implications for maintaining
secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action
elements
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
88 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2. AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative
procedures.
Content and
presentation elements
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the
developer’s delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the
operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for
the operational environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action
elements
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that
the TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
5.2.4. Life-cycle support
5.2.4.1. ALC_CMC.1 TOE Labelling of the TOE
Dependencies ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Developer action
elements
ALC_CMC.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
89 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Content and
presentation elements
ALC_CMC.1.1C The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
Evaluator action
elements
ALC_CMC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.4.2. ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Dependencies No dependencies.
Developer action
elements
ALC_CMS.1.1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and
presentation elements
ALC_CMS.1.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself, and the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
Evaluator action
elements
ALC_CMS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5. Tests
5.2.5.1. ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Dependencies ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
Developer action
elements
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
90 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
presentation elements
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results
and actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe
the scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include
any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator action
elements
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.2.5.2. ATE_IND.1 independent testing – conformance
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedure
Developer action
elements
ATE_IND.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and
presentation elements
ATE_IND.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action
elements
ATE_IND.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
5.2.6. Vulnerability assessment
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
91 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
5.2.6.1. AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Dependencies ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedure
Developer action
elements
AVA_VAN.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and
presentation elements
AVA_VAN.1.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action
elements
AVA_VAN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to
identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities, to determine that the TOE is resistant to
attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential.
5.3. Security requirements rationale
5.3.1. Dependency rationale of security functional requirements
The following table shows dependency of security functional requirements.
[Table 28] Rationale for the dependency of the security functional requirements
No.
Security functional
requirements
Dependency Reference No.
1 FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 3
2 FAU_GEN.1 FPT.STM.1 Rationale (1)
3 FAU_SAA.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
4 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 2
5 FAU_SAR.3 FAU_SAR.1 4
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
92 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6 FAU_STG.3 FAU_STG.1 Rationale (2)
7 FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 Rationale (2)
8 FCS_CKM.1(1)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] 11, 13
FCS_CKM.4 12
9 FCS_CKM.1(2)
[FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] 11, 13
FCS_CKM.4 12
10 FCS-CKM.2
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9, 10
FCS_CKM.4 12
11 FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9, 10
12 FCS_COP.1(1)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 9
FCS_CKM.4 12
13 FCS_COP.1(2)
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1] 10
FCS_CKM.4 12
14 FCS_RBG.1 - -
15 FDP_UDE.1 FCS_COP.1 13, 14
16 FDP_RIP.1 - -
17 FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 21
18 FIA_IMA.1 - -
19 FIA_SOS.1 - -
20 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 24
21 FIA_UAU.4 - -
22 FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 21
23 FiA_UID.2 - -
24 FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
25 FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
26 FMT_PWD.1
FMT_SMF.1 28
FMT_SMR.1 29
27 FMT_SMF.1 - -
28 FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 24
29 FPT_ITT.1 - -
30 FPT_PST.1 - -
31 FPT_TST.1 - -
32 FTA_MCS.2 FIA_UID.1 24
33 FTA_SSL.5 FIA_UAU.1 21
34 FTA_TSE.1 - -
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
93 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Rationale (1): FAU_GEN.1 has a dependent relationship with FPT_STM.1, but this security target
specification assumes the use of a trusted timestamp and satisfies the dependent relationship in
the OE.TIME_STAMP.
Rationale (2): FAU_STG.3 and FAU_STG.4 have the dependency on FAU_STG.1. However, This ST
satisfies the dependent relationship in OE.SECURE_DBMS, because the audit data is stored in the
DBMS that interacts with the TOE.
FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.7 have FIA_UAU.1 as a dependent relationship, but are satisfied by FIA_UAU.2,
which has a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UAU.1.
FIA_UAU.2, FMT_SMR.1, and FTA_MCS.2 have FIA_UID.1 as a dependent relationship, but are satisfied
by FIA_UID.2, which has a hierarchical relationship with FIA_UID.1.
5.3.2. Dependency rationale of security assurance requirements
The dependency of EAL1 assurance package provided in the CC is already satisfied, the rationale is
omitted.
The augmented SAR ATE_FUN.1 has dependency on ATE_COV.1 but, ATE_FUN.1 is augmented to
require developer testing in order to check if the developer correctly performed and documented
the tests in the test documentation, ATE_COV.1 is not included in this ST since it is not necessarily
required to show the correspondence between tests and the TSFIs.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
94 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions that satisfy the SFRs of the TOE
TOE security functionality can be largely divided into security audit, cryptographic support, user
data protection, security management, protection of the TSF, and TOE access. Afterwards, this
section describes how the TOE satisfies the SFRs specified in [Table 11].
6.1. Security audit (FAU)
When audit data is generated using a reliable timestamp provided by the TOE operation
environment, audit data is guaranteed to be generated sequentially.
6.1.1. FAU_ARP.1 Security alert
When the TOE detects a potential security violation, it sends an alert mail to the authorized
administrator.
For related potential security violations, see 6.1.3.
When a potential security violation is detected, an alert mail is sent to the mail server, mail server
account and mail recipient (authorized administrator) information registered in the configuration
file. Alarm mail is sent by D'Guard KMS, and is sent through a common module used internally. One
or more mail recipients are registered.
6.1.2. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
The TOE stores audit data generated during operation.
Audit data generated by D'Guard KMS is immediately stored in the audit data store.
The audit data generated by the agent is collected from the log daemon of D'Guard KMS, first
saved as a file, and then stored in the audit data store. The files collected from the log daemon are
stored in the audit data store at regular intervals (5 minutes).
The following audit data is generated in the TOE.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
95 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
[Table 29] Audit data type
Subject Audit data
D’Guard KMS
Identification and authentication, shutdown of session
Registration, modification and deletion of the policy management
Start-up and shutdown of the service
Master security token creation and super manager password initialization
Self-testing
Policy distribution
In case of potential security violation, audit data is generated after sending
an alert email
D’Guard Plug-In
Start-up and shutdown of the service
Policy distribution and mutual authentication
User data encryption
Self-testing
D’Guard API
Policy distribution and mutual authentication
User data encryption
Self-testing
The audit data generated by the TOE includes the following.
[Table 30] Audit data composition
Composition Content
Time · Audit data creation time
Subject
· D’Guard KMS (Policy, Security Admin, PSTOOL)
· Agent hos name
Type
· Administrator log-in and log-out
· Start-up and shutdown of the service
· Registration, modification and deletion of the security management items
(Including modified TSF data value)
· Management and distribution of the policy
· Agent user data encryption/decryption
· TSF data or execution code changed in case of integrity violation
· Self-testing etc.
Success or Failure · Results of audit data success/failure
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
96 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
content · Audit data details
6.1.3. FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
When the TOE detects a potential violation event such as a self-test of the cryptographic module,
the TOE sends an alert email to the authorized administrator.
[Table 31] Potential violation events and Action
Security violation events Action
Accumulation of authentication
failure events (5 times)
· Sending a warning emails to authorized administrators
· Limitation on login attempts for 5 minutes (disable
authentication)
Self-test failure · Sending a warning emails to authorized administrators
Disk capacity excess (80%) · Sending a warning emails to authorized administrators
Disk capacity saturation (90%)
· Sending a warning emails to authorized administrators
· Deletion on some of the old audit records (5%)
6.1.4. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
The TOE provides the authorized administrator with a function to review all the audit data of the
TOE according to the subject of the event, the type of audit data, and the time of the audit data
creation. Audit review is provided by the GUI function of D'Guard KMS. Super managers and security
users have the authority to review audits.
For the types of TOE audit data, see [Table 29].
6.1.5. FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
The TOE orders in descending order based on the occurrence time of the audit data based on the
selection criteria according to the events to be audited.
The search conditions for all audit data by the authorized manager can be viewed by AND operation
when entering the "Selection Criteria" value.
6.1.6. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
The TOE provides a function to action and prevent audit data loss. When the space of the audit
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
97 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
trail storage reaches the specified limit, a security alert mail is sent to the authorized administrator.
The maximum size of the audit trail repository is not limited by the TOE and is determined by the
size of the system repository.
If the audit storage exceeded 80%, the alert log is sent to the authorized administrator after
generating the audit log.
6.1.7. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
When the audit storage saturation stage exceeds 90%, the audit log corresponding to 5% of the
entire audit record is deleted with the sending of an alert email to the authorized administrator
after the generation of the audit log.
6.1.8. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FAU_ARP.1, FAU_GEN.1, FAU_SAA.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.3,
FAU_STG.4
6.2. Cryptographic support (FCS)
The TOE provides encryption functions for TSF data and user data. In addition, it provides functions
such as generating, distributing, and destroying encryption keys necessary to provide encryption
functions.
For the validated cryptographic modules that have been used in the TOE, see [Table 8] The validated
cryptographic module of the TOE.
6.2.1. FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (User data encryption)
The TOE generates an encryption key for encrypting user data using the verification algorithm of
the validated cryptographic module. The identification information of the validated cryptographic
module is as follows. For information such as the verification number, refer to [Table 8] The validated
cryptographic module of the TOE.
The validated cryptographic module used in D'Guard KMS is MagicJCrypto, and the identification
modules are MagicJCrypto-v3.0.0.jar. The validated cryptographic module used in D'Guard Plug-In
is INICrypto, and the identification module is libINISAFE_Crypto_for_C_v5.4.0_Linux_4.18_64.so. The
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
98 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
validated cryptographic module used in D'Guard API is MagicJCrypto, and the identification
modules are MagicJCrypto-3.0.0.jar.
The user data encryption algorithm supported by the TOE supports ARIA128, ARIA256, LEA128,
LEA256 and SEED128 of symmetric key encryption. The length of the encryption key is 128 bits for
ARIA128/LEA128/SEED128, 256 bits for ARIA256/LEA256, depending on the encryption ratio. It also
supports secure hash SHA256 and SHA512 algorithms for encryption that does not decrypt, such
as passwords. In the case of secure hash, a 256-bit encryption key is generated and used as a salt
when using the algorithm.
For more information on the algorithm used for encrypting user data, the secret ratio of the
encryption key and the supported algorithm, refer to [Table 15] User data encryption algorithm and
key length.
6.2.2. FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation (TSF data encryption)
The TOE generates an encryption key for TSF data encryption using the verification algorithm of
the validated cryptographic module. The identification information of the validated cryptographic
module is as follows. For information such as the verification number, refer to [Table 8] The validated
cryptographic module of the TOE.
The validated cryptographic module used in the TOE is the same as FCS_CKM (1).
The encryption key generation for TSF data encryption in the TOE includes the master key for
encryption of security policy and audit log, session key for encryption of communication section,
RSA public key pair for mutual authentication and session key exchange, and KEK (Key for encryption
of encryption key).
The master key and session key are generated by a random bit generator. The algorithm uses HASH-
DRBG-SHA256, and the standard list is ISO/IEC 18031. The actual encryption uses the ARIA256
algorithm, and the encryption key length is 256 bits.
The RSAES algorithm is used for RSA public key pair generation for mutual authentication and
session key exchange, and the standard list is ISO / IEC 18033-2. The actual encryption uses the
RSAES algorithm, and the encryption key length is 2048 bits.
KEK generation uses the PBKDF2 algorithm, and the standard list is PKCS # 5 RFC 2898. The actual
encryption uses the ARIA256 algorithm, and the encryption key length is 256 bits.
For detailed information on the algorithm used for TSF data encryption, the encryption key ratio
and the supported algorithm, refer to [Table 16] TSF data cryptographic key algorithm and key sizes.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
99 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
The TOE distributes the cryptographic key through the cryptographic key distribution method
defined in FCS_CKM.2.1. The algorithm used for the distribution of the cryptographic key uses the
cryptographic algorithm to be verified by the validated cryptographic module that has been verified
for safety and implementation suitability. For the standard list used for distribution of cryptographic
keys, see [Table 17] Cryptographic key distribution method.
As a preliminary task for distribution of cryptographic keys, D'Guard KMS generates a security token
to be used by the agent. The security token is generated in the form of a file for delivery to the
agent. The agent security token contains the public key pair for the session key exchange, the ID of
the security token, and the password of the security token, and is encrypted using PBKDF2.
The cryptographic key distribution procedure is as follows.
· The agent generates a part of the first session key using a random bit generator and the
first session key is transmitted by encrypting it with the public key of D'Guard KMS.
· D'Guard KMS decrypts the first session key with a secret key, generates a part of the second
session key using a random bit generator, encrypts and sends the second session key with
the agent's public key.
· The agent decrypts the second session key with a secret key and combines a part of the
first session key generated by the agent with a part of the second session key generated
by D'Guard KMS. After that, generate the third session key and send the result to D'Guard
KMS
· The third session key is generated by combining the second session key of D'Guard KMS
and the first session key of the agent, and the third session key is exchanged and completed
· D'Guard KMS encrypts the user data encryption key and security policy with the third
session key and transmits it to the agent.
· The agent decrypts the user data encryption key and security policy with the third session
key and completes distribution of the encryption key.
· After the session key is exchanged, data for data integrity verification is transmitted
together when the encryption key is distributed. Data for integrity verification is generated
using HMAC-SHA256 for the entire professional data.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
100 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.2.4. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic destruction
D'Guard KMS destroys the cryptographic key for encryption of user data generated and managed
by the super manager when executing the SQL statement when the cryptographic key is deleted
from the management screen and deletes it from the storage (DB).
In memory area zeroing, the actual memory area is overwritten three times with 0x00 to destroy
existing data.
The master key loaded and used in memory is destroyed by zeroing the memory area at the end
of the process.
The session key loaded and used in memory is destroyed by zeroing the memory area at the end
of communication.
The security policy information loaded in the memory for distribution to the agent is destroyed by
zeroing the memory area after completing the policy distribution communication.
The cryptographic key for encrypting user data used by the agent (D'Guard Plug-In, D'Guard API)
exists only in the memory area. After the cryptographic operation is completed, the memory area
is zeroed and destroyed.
The cryptographic key for encrypting the security policy information distributed to the agent exists
in the memory area, and when the process ends, the memory area is zeroed and destroyed. The
session key loaded and used in memory is destroyed by zeroing the memory area at the end of
communication.
For information on the cryptographic key and the destruction method to be destroyed, refer to
[Table 18] Cryptographic key destruction method of D’Guard KMS and [Table 19] Cryptographic key
destruction method of Agent.
6.2.5. FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (User data encryption)
The TOE performs user data cryptographic operation using the cryptographic algorithm to be
verified by the validated cryptographic module that has been verified for safety and implementation
conformity through the cryptographic module verification system, and the validated cryptographic
module that is verified uses the operation mode for verification when performing cryptographic
operation.
The validated cryptographic module used in the TOE is the same as FCS_CKM (1).
The user data encryption algorithm supported by the TOE supports ARIA128, ARIA256, LEA128,
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
101 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
LEA256 and SEED128 of symmetric key encryption. It also supports secure hash SHA256 and SHA512
algorithms for encryption that does not decrypt, such as passwords.
For the symmetric-key encryption ARIA128 and ARIA256 algorithms, the standard list is KSX 1213-
1 in 128-bit and 256-bit encryption key length. For the LEA128 and LEA256 algorithms, the standard
list of 128-bit and 256-bit encryption keys is TTAK.KO-12.0223. For the SEED128 algorithm, the
standard list of 128-bit encryption keys is TTAS.KO-12.0004/R1.
The standard list of Secure Hash SHA256 and SHA512 algorithms is ISO / IEC 10118-3. The length
of the generated cryptographic key is 256 bits, which is used as salt in the actual cryptographic
operation.
For more information on the algorithm used for encrypting user data, encryption key ratio and
supported algorithm, refer to [Table 15] User data encryption algorithm and key length.
6.2.6. FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (TSF data encryption)
The TOE performs TSF data cryptographic operation using the cryptographic algorithm to be verified
by the validated cryptographic module that has been verified for safety and implementation
conformity through the cryptographic module verification system, and the validated cryptographic
module that is verified uses the operation mode for verification when performing cryptographic
operation.
The validated cryptographic module used in the TOE is the same as FCS_CKM (1).
D'Guard KMS uses the ARIA256 algorithm to encrypt the token file, security policy and audit log,
key information of the configuration file, communication section and key information loaded in
memory, and the standard list for the length of the 256-bit cryptographic key is KSX 1213-1.
The one-way encryption of the administrator password uses the SHA256 algorithm, and the standard
list is ISO/IEC 10118-3. RASAE algorithm is used for mutual authentication and session key exchange,
and the standard list of 2048-bit cryptographic key length is ISO/IEC 18033-2.
The encryption of security policy, communication section and user data encryption key loaded in
memory in the agent (D'Guard Plug-In, D'Guard API) use ARIA256 algorithm, and the standard list
for 256-bit cryptographic key length is KSX 1213-1. The RASAE algorithm is used for mutual
authentication and session key exchange, and the standard list of 2048-bit cryptographic key length
is ISO/IEC 18033-2.
For TSF data encryption target, cryptographic algorithm, and key length information, refer to [Table
16] TSF data cryptographic algorithm and key sizes.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
102 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.2.7. FCS_RBG.1 Random bit generation (Extended)
The TOE uses a secure random bit generator of the validated cryptographic modules whose safety
and implementation suitability are verified through the cryptographic module verification system.
The TOE does not allow the use of the non-verified algorithm when using the validated
cryptographic module.
The TOE uses the HASH-DRBG-SHA256 random bit generator when generating the cryptographic
key, and the key length generated through the random bit generator is the default value of 32
bytes. The key is generated as long as the TOE is input as an argument (multiple positive number
of 8). If the length according to the cryptographic ratio is entered as a factor, a key of the
corresponding length is generated.
6.2.8. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FCS_CKM.1(1), FCS_CKM.1(2), FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2),
FCS_RBG.1(Extended)
6.3. User data protection (FDP)
In order to protect user data, the TOE encrypts it using the validated cryptographic module that
has been verified for its stability and implementation suitability, and deletes some residual
information used internally.
6.3.1. FDP_UDE.1 User data encryption
The TOE provides encryption/decryption functions for each column to protect user data.
The API type supports encryption/decryption of user data by calling the encryption interface
(encryption, decryption API, etc.) from the user application, and the Plug-In type supports
encryption/decryption by calling the encryption interface from the DBMS.
The user data encryption processing procedure is as follows.
Plug-In Type
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
103 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
· The authorized administrator sets the cryptographic policy, such as generating a security
token and generating a cryptographic key to be used by D'Guard KMS and agents.
· The authorized administrator manually distributes the security token to be used by the
agent to the agent system.
· The agent receives the cryptographic key and security policy using the distributed security
token. The agent encrypts and stores it in the shared memory inside the system.
· When the user calls the initialization interface for encryption in the Oracle Database, the
agent cryptographic module checks the information of the agent security token, decrypts
the cryptographic policy stored in the shared memory in the system, and encrypts and
stores it in the internal memory.
· The agent cryptographic module encrypts user data with the cryptographic policy
information in the internal memory when the user calls the encryption interface from the
Oracle Database.
API Type
· The authorized administrator sets the cryptographic policy, such as generating a security
token and generating a cryptographic key to be used by D'Guard KMS and agents.
· The authorized administrator manually distributes the security token to be used by the
agent to the agent system.
· When the Java interface (WAS, etc.) calls the initialization interface to encrypt the Java API
interface, the agent receives the cryptographic key and security policy using the distributed
security token. And, the agent encrypts and stores the cryptographic key and security policy
in the internal memory.
· When the Java interface (WAS, etc.) calls the encryption interface of the Java API interface,
the agent encrypts the user data with cryptographic policy information in the internal
memory.
The TOE provides the basic option that the same encrypted text is not generated for the same plain
text when the authorized administrator generates the cryptographic key for user data in D'Guard
KMS.
The internal procedure of generating different ciphertexts for the same plaintext is as follows.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
104 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Encryption using random bit IV
· The random bit generator is used to generate a 6-byte random number.
· Combining the IV 16 bytes of the cryptographic policy received from the D'Guard KMS and
6 bytes of the random number, a random bit IV is generated with 16 bytes out of the 32
bytes values generated through the SHA256 algorithm.
· User data encryption key and random bit IV of the cryptographic policy received from
D'Guard KMS encrypt user data.
· After combining the 6-byte random number and the user data encryption result, base64
encoding is performed to complete the encryption.
Decryption using random bit IV
· The user data ciphertext is Base64 decoded.
· Among the Base64 decoded bytes, the front 6 bytes are extracted with a random number.
· Combining the IV 16 bytes of the cryptographic policy received from the D'Guard KMS and
the front 6 bytes of the random number, a random bit IV is generated with 16 bytes out
of the 32 bytes values generated through the SHA256 algorithm.
· User data encryption key and random bit IV of the cryptographic policy received from
D'Guard KMS decrypt user data.
6.3.2. FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
The TOE satisfies the requirement that all original user data is deleted after encryption/decryption
of the user data.
The Deletion of original user data refers to unrecoverable deletion. In the case of the Plug-In type
and API type of the TOE, encryption and decryption of user data is performed through user
application development or modification. In the case of the Plug-In type, the query included in the
application code is modified and applied. In the case of the API type, the application code is directly
modified and applied. The TOE does not store the user data to be encrypted separately, and the
TOE documentation includes precautions so that the application developer can delete all the original
user data in compliance with the requirements provided by the TOE.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
105 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.3.3. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FDP_UDE.1, FDP_RIP.1
6.4. Identification and authentication (FIA)
The TOE identifies the authorized administrator accessing the management server. No functions of
the TOE can be used until identification is achieved.
6.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
The TOE provides the user account lock function to protect the TOE from malicious user
authentication attempts. When the number of failed authentication attempts exceeds the set
information, the TOE performs identification and deactivation of authentication functions for a
certain period of time.
If the authentication failure deactivation count (5 times) is exceeded, the account is deactivated (5
minutes) and authentication cannot be attempted, and an alert email is sent to the authorized
administrator.
6.4.2. FIA_IMA.1 TOE internal mutual authentication (Extended)
The TOE performs mutual authentication between the physically separated TOE components
through its internally implemented authentication protocol, and the TOE components are D'Guard
KMS and agents (D'Guard Plug-In, D'Guard API).
The RASAE algorithm is used for mutual authentication between TOE components, and the standard
list of 2048-bit encryption key length is ISO/IEC 18033-2.
The time when mutual authentication is performed in the TOE is performed when the agent starts
a service and requests security policy distribution to D'Guard KMS. The mutual authentication
procedure and mechanism are as follows.
· In advance, D'Guard KMS generates a security token (Agent public key pair, D'Guard KMS
public key) to be used by the agent and manually distributes it to the agent.
· After generating a part of the first session key from the agent to the random bit generator,
it is encrypted and transmitted with the public key of D'Guard KMS.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
106 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
· The secret key of D'Guard KMS decrypts the first session key. The random number
generator of D'Guard KMS generates part of the second session key, and the second
session key is encrypted with the agent's public key and transmitted.
· The agent's secret key decrypts the second session key. Part of the first session key
generated by the agent and part of the second session key generated by D'Guard KMS are
combined to generate a third session key. After that, the result is sent to D'Guard KMS.
· D'Guard KMS checks the result of generating the third session key. Part of the first session
key generated by the agent and part of the second session key generated by D'Guard KMS
are combined to generate a third session key. Exchange the third session key and complete
the process.
· D'Guard KMS encrypts the policy information including the encryption key with the third
session key that has been exchanged and sends it to the agent.
· The agent decrypts the policy information including the encryption key with the third
session key that has been exchanged.
6.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
The TOE is operated so that the confidential information satisfies the acceptance criteria defined by
the authorized administrator. The password of the authorized administrator is combined with three
or more rules among alphabet / number / special characters, and is generated with a length of at
least 10 digits and a maximum of 20 digits.
The TOE verifies that the following defined allowance criteria for the administrator password are
satisfied at the time of password registration and change.
Minimum/Maximum length
· 10 to 20 digits
Combination rules
· Combination of 3 or more among English alphabets/ numbers / special characters
· Excluded if a password has 3 or more successive letters (abc, def, 123, 432, etc.)
· Excluded if a password has 3 or more successive letters on the keyboard (asd, qwe, jkl, etc.)
· Excluded if a password has 3 or more same letters (aaa, 222, 999, etc.)
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
107 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
· Excluded if a password contains administrator account information
· Excluded if a password was used the last three times (3 times by default)
Change interval (the period during which the password is used)
· 60 days by default, the interval is defined by the authorized administrator
When the D'Guard KMS is accessed for the first time, the super manager is provided with the default
(account: manager, password: admin) information. Upon authentication and initialization, the super
manager can change the account information. Should be changed.
6.4.4. FIA_UAU.2 User authentication prior to all actions
The security administrator (super manager, security user) can perform web security management
after D'Guard KMS authentication through password based on administrator ID information through
the screen interface.
Super manager can perform console security management after D'Guard KMS authentication
through password based on administrator ID information.
6.4.5. FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanism
The security administrator (super manager, security user) generates a security character (Captcha)
for each session on the login screen of the web GUI environment and verifies it by entering it by
the security administrator. Re-use of security administrator authentication is prevented through
verification of the security letter. The valid period of the captcha is 60 seconds, and it is a 5-digit
character composed of lowercase letters and numbers.
The super manager verifies the security code displayed on the console screen of the CLI environment
for each session and inputs it to the super manager. The security code has a validity period of 60
seconds and consists of 5 digits.
6.4.6. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
The web authentication: The replacement character ‘*’ is displayed on the password input screen,
and ‘The Login information does not match’ is displayed on the screen when authentication fails.
The console authentication: The Password input character is not displayed, and if authentication
fails, 'Login Failed' is displayed on the screen.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
108 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
6.4.7. FIA_UID.2 User identification prior to all actions
Security administrators (super manager, security users) can perform web security management after
D'Guard KMS authentication through password based on security manager ID information through
a screen interface.
Super manager can perform console security management after D'Guard KMS authentication
through password based on administrator ID information.
6.4.8. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FIA_AFL.1, FIA_IMA.1(Extended), FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.7,
FIA_UID.2
6.5. Security management (FMT)
The security management of the TOE provides security management functions such as response
actions, rules, and audits.
6.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
The TOE performs security function management such as adding, deleting, and modifying condition
rules that can determine the security function behavior. Security function management restricts the
role to be performed by an authorized administrator.
An authorized administrator means a security administrator. The security administrator is divided
into a super manager and a security user. In the case of D'Guard KMS web GUI environment, both
the super manager and the security user perform security function management, and only the super
manager has the ability to stop, start, and modify the behavior. In the case of the console CLI
environment, only the super manager can manage the security functions.
[Table 32] Menu of the web management server
Menu Sub menu Description
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
109 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Account
Token management Security token for agent assignment
User management
Management of the super manager and security
user
Key Key management Generate and manage user data encryption keys
DB Encryption
DBMS management Management of the database information
Policy management
Management of encryption policies and
permissions
Audit Audit log Search for audit data
Configuration
User constraints
Constraints management for administrators and
security users
Server configurations Configurations of the D’Guard KMS
[Table 33] Menu of the console management server
Menu Description
Operation of the service Start-up/shut down of the D’Guard KMS’s service
Encryption
Encrypt important data information in the D’Guard KMS's
configuration file
Integrity Generate integrity information stored in configuration files
6.5.2. FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
The TOE provides management donation for TSF data. In addition, it is possible to perform the
functions of modification, deletion, and generation other than query according to the role, and
restricts the execution role to an authorized administrator.
The authorized administrator's ability to manage TSF data is as follows.
The super manager initializes the super manager information for starting and operating the TOE in
the console CLI environment, and initializes the security token including the public key pair and
master key of D'Guard KMS.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
110 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
[Table 34] List of TSF data and management ability
Administrator
Type
TSF data
Ability
Query Modify Delete Generate Initialize
Security user
Account information  - - - -
Encryption policy  - - - -
Audit data  - - - -
Configuration information - - - - -
Super
manager
(Web GUI)
Account information     -
Encryption policy     -
Audit data  - - - -
Configuration information     -
Super
manager
(Console CLI)
Account information - - - - 
Encryption policy - - - - -
Audit data - - - - -
Configuration information -  - - 
6.5.3. FMT_PWD.1 Management of ID and password (Extended)
The creation and modification of accounts and passwords is limited to authorized administrators.
The password is limited to a character length between 10 and 20 digits in 3 combinations including
alphabetic characters, numbers and special characters. The TSF also forces the password to be
initialized when the TOE is accessed for the first time in the console CLI environment during the
installation process. The password is encrypted and stored using the SHA256 algorithm in the
D'Guard KMS internal DB. Refer to FIA_SOS.1 for the password length and combination rules
selected when registering or changing the password.
TSF forces the password to be initialized during the first TOE access in the console CLI environment
during the installation process. The password is encrypted and stored in the D'Guard KMS internal
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
111 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
DB using the SHA256 algorithm.
6.5.4. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TOE performs the management function of the security attribute list specified in FMT_MOF.1 /
FMT_MTD.1 / FMT_PWD.1.
The authorized administrators are restricted from using TOE security functions according to their
management capabilities. The super manager can use all security functions provided by the TOE,
but the security user only has the ability to decide the action in addition to the ability to stop,
initiate, and modify the action. For the security functions provided by the TOE and whether the
security functions of the administrator are available, refer to [Table 23] List of the security functions
behavior of administrator.
The TOE limits TSF data management according to the role of the authorized administrator. The
super manager can manage all TSF data managed by the TOE, and the security user can manage
queries only in addition to the TSF data generation, modification, and deletion management
functions. TSF data includes security policy, audit log, administrator account information, agent
account information, user DB access account information, D'Guard KMS token file, agent token file,
and TOE settings.
The TOE limits the administrator's generation function and administrator's password change function
to authorized administrators. The super manager can perform the super manager and all security
user generation and password change functions. Security users cannot be generated as
administrators, only their passwords can be changed.
When generating and changing an administrator's password, it must be set according to the
prescribed password combination rules. Combination rules must use 3 combinations of English
letters / numbers / special characters with a length of 10 to 20 digits. Consecutive characters must
not be more than 3 digits and cannot be used even if the same character is 3 or more times. The
administrator account information should not be included, and the password used before and the
same password cannot be used up to 3 times.
When installing the TOE, the super manager's ID and password must be set, but the password must
be set according to the combination rules.
6.5.5. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TOE generates and initializes a super manager when D'Guard KMS is initialized in the console
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
112 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
CLI environment. The super manager is the only account that holds all rights of D'Guard KMS.
The security user can be generated / modified / deleted by the super manager in the web GUI
environment. Security users can only search in the account, policy, and audit menus except for the
security settings menu of D'Guard KMS.
6.5.6. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_PWD.1(Extended), FMT_SFM.1, FMT_SMR.1
6.6. Protection of the TSF (FPT)
The TOE provides a protection function for internally transmitted TSF data.
6.6.1. FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
The TOE protects TSF data from exposure when TSF data is transferred between separate parts of
the TOE. The communication section encryption between D'Guard KMS and the agent uses the
HandShake encryption method using the validated cryptographic module to exchange session keys
for the section encryption, and performs communication section encryption and mutual
authentication between the TOE modules.
D'Guard KMS and the agent have a public key pair, and the public key length is 2048 bits public
key. All parameters transmitted after the session key exchange and mutual authentication are
completed are encrypted and transmitted using the session key. The transmitted parameters include
user data encryption key and authority information as security policy information.
[Table 35] Basic internal TSF data transfer encryption
Classification Item Description
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
113 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
Mutual
authentication
and session key
exchange
Mutual authentication
(Asymmetric key
encryption)
· Generating a security token (including public
key pair) for the agent in D'Guard KMS
· Manual distribution of the agent's public key
pair to the agent
· Encrypt the random bit in the agent with
D'Guard KMS public key and send it
· Decrypt and confirm with own secret key in
D'Guard KMS
· Encrypt the random bit in the D’Guard KMS with
the agent public key and send it
· Decrypt and confirm with own secret key in the
agent
· D'Guard KMS and the agent combine the two
random bit exchanged with each other, and
then exchange and complete the session key.
· The agent sends the result to complete mutual
authentication
Cryptographic
algorithm
Random bit generator
· HASH-DRBG-SHA256
Integrity
· HMAC-SHA256
Asymmetric key encryption
· RSAES
Transferred data
Symmetric encryption
· D'Guard KMS sends security policy with session
key encryption
Cryptographic
algorithm
Symmetric encryption
· ARIA256
Integrity
· HMAC-SHA256
6.6.2. FPT_PST.1 Basic protection of stored TSF data (Extended)
The TOE protects TSF data stored in the storage controlled by the TSF from unauthorized exposure.
Basically, TSF data that is encrypted and stored is as follows.
✓ Cryptographic key (User data encryption key, Master key, etc.)
✓ Critical security parameters (Password option values such as IV value)
✓ TOE settings (Security policy and environment settings)
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
114 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
✓ Administrator account information
✓ Policy DB account information
✓ User DB account information
The TOE does not perform encryption on configuration files or executable files that do not include
the TOE configuration values, such as IP address, port information, and security alarm email address.
Configuration files under the TOE installation folder, config folder, executable modules under the lib
folder, and executable script files under the bin folder are included in the integrity check.
The mechanisms for protecting stored TSF data are data encryption and integrity verification. The
cryptographic key and critical security parameters, which are essential encryption targets among
TSF data, are protected by storing the integrity information together with encryption.
The security token file of D'Guard KMS is encrypted with ARIA256 algorithm using KEK derived from
PBKDF2 using the PIN entered by the administrator. The security token includes the public key pair
and master key of D'Guard KMS. The master key is the public key of the D'Guard KMS RSA public
key pair, and is second-encrypted by the RSAES algorithm.
The algorithm used to store the administrator password in one-way encryption is SHA256.
When storing the TOE settings, critical information such as IP address is encrypted using the
ARIA256 algorithm using the master key.
The cryptographic key and critical security parameters in the agent (D'Guard Plug-In, D'Guard API)
are encrypted with ARIA256 algorithm using KEK derived from PBKDF2. PBKDF2 is a password-
based key derivation algorithm. The password used as a parameter is a combination of the password
declared in the source code and the host name.
The symmetric cryptographic algorithm used in TSF data of the TOE is ARIA256, the cryptographic
mode is CBC, and the cryptographic key length is 256 bits.
The critical TSF data stored in the TOE is encrypted using the validated cryptographic module. The
following is the TSF data stored in the TOE.
[Table 36] Encryption of stored TSF data
Components TSF data
Storage
location
Protection method
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
115 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
D’Guard KMS
Security token File
ARIA256-CBC
(PBKDF2)
User data cryptographic key Policy DB ARIA256-CBC
Security Policy (User data encryption) Policy DB ARIA256-CBC
Administrator account information Policy DB SHA256
Policy DB account information File ARIA256-CBC
User DB account information Policy DB ARIA256-CBC
Security token information of Agent Policy DB ARIA256-CBC
Audit data Policy DB ARIA256-CBC
Integrity Policy DB HMAC-SHA256
D’Guard Plug-In
Security token File
ARIA256-CBC
(PBKDF2)
Configuration file File ARIA256-CBC
Configuration file (Module integrity) File HMAC-SHA256
D’Guard API
Security token File
ARIA256-CBC
(PBKDF2)
Configuration file File ARIA256-CBC
Configuration file (Module integrity) File HMAC-SHA256
6.6.3. FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
The TOE performs self-tests periodically at startup and during normal operation to verify the correct
operation of all TSFs. The self-test performs major functional tests necessary for the operation of
the TOE and integrity verification of TSF execution modules and configuration files.
D'Guard KMS performs self-tests periodically at service startup and during regular operation (1
hour). The self-test performs an integrity check by comparing the main functions required for the
operation of D'Guard KMS and the integrity values of the TSF execution module and configuration
file. Depending on the point of failure of the self-test, an alarm e-mail is sent to the registered
manager and then stopped at startup. If it is in operation, an alert email is sent to the registered
manager.
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
116 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
D'Guard Plug-In performs self-tests periodically at service startup and during regular operation (1
hour). The self-test performs an integrity check by comparing the main functions required for the
operation of the D'Guard Plug-In and the integrity values of the TSF execution module and
configuration files. Depending on the point of failure of the self-test, the audit data is transmitted
and stopped at startup, and only the audit data is transmitted when in operation.
The D'Guard API runs its own tests periodically (1 hour) at service startup and during normal
operation. The self-test performs an integrity check by comparing the main functions required for
the operation of the D'Guard API and the integrity values of the TSF execution module and
configuration file. Depending on the point of failure of the self-test, when the initialization interface
is called from the Java program, the audit data is transmitted and then the exception is handled.
When operating, only the audit data is transmitted.
For details of the TOE self-test subject, refer to [Table 25] Items subject to TOE self-test and [Table
26] Items subject to TOE integrity test.
6.6.4. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PST.1(Extended), FPT_TST.1
6.7. TOE access (FTA)
The TOE provides session setting functions such as limiting the number of sessions per user attribute
and session timeout for access to the management server.
6.7.1. FTA_MCS.2 Per user attribute limitation on multiple concurred sessions
The TOE provides a function of limiting the number of basic concurrent access sessions for D'Guard
KMS access. The TOE provides a function of limiting the number of basic concurrent access sessions
for D'Guard KMS access.
D'Guard KMS stores the administrator session information in memory when the security
administrator (super manager, security user) authenticates. Thereafter, when authenticating to the
same administrator, memory session information is checked to limit concurrent sessions. In addition,
one default concurrent session limit for the same manager is forced.
At the same time when the security administrator (super manager, security user) is connected
simultaneously and in the case of the web GUI environment, the previously connected session is
D’Guard v5.0 Security Target (ST)
117 / 117 www.inebsoft.com
forcibly terminated. In addition, in the case of a console CLI environment, simultaneous access by
the super manager is blocked from new connections.
6.7.2. FTA_SSL.5 Management of TSF-initiated sessions (Extended)
The TOE automatically terminates the session when the inactivity period of the administrator and
security user exceeds the set time. In D'Guard KMS 'web GUI and console CLI session, if there is no
interaction after the administrator inactivity period (10 minutes), the session is terminated. Session
termination due to inactivity applies to both super administrators and security users.
6.7.3. FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment
The TOE provides the function to set the access allowance list based on the access IP address and
administrator account.
D'Guard KMS security administrator (super manager, security user) restricts session to the same
administrator based on the access IP. In the case of the super manager, it is limited to one IP that
can be accessed when the installation is initialized. In the case of security users, the super manager
can set up to 2 accessible IPs per administrator account. For reference, the administrator can modify
the IP that can be accessed by the super manager, and the previous connection session is
automatically blocked when the connection IP is modified.
Only one IP registration that can be accessed by the security administrator can be registered, and
settings that mean the entire range of the network are not allowed.
6.7.4. SFR Mapping
SFR to be satisfied: FTA_MCS.2, FTA_SSL.5(Extended), FTA_TSE.1