BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022
for
IBM AIX 7.2.5
Service Pack 3 (SP3) Standard Edition (SE)
from
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 (*)
Operating System
IBM AIX 7.2.5
Service Pack 3 (SP3) Standard Edition (SE)
from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating
Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019, CCEVS-VR-
PP-0047, NIAP,
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version
1.0, 19 February 2016, CCEVS-VR-PP-0039, NIAP
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_TSU_EXT.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC
15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 8 July 2022
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Matthias Intemann L.S.
Head of Branch
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for
components up to EAL 2
and ALC_FLR only
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................17
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................17
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................19
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................19
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................20
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................20
12. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
13. Bibliography..............................................................................................................22
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................24
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................25
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the extended component
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 that is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
SOGIS MRA.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product IBM AIX 7.2.5, Service Pack 3 (SP3) Standard Edition (SE) has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product IBM AIX 7.2.5, Service Pack 3 (SP3) Standard Edition (SE)
was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 29
June 2022. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised
by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.
The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 8 July 2022
is valid until 7 July 2027. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product IBM AIX 7.2.5, Service Pack 3 (SP3) Standard Edition (SE) has been included
in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
IBM Corporation
11400 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758
USA
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating
system. It is compliant with major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the
Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) standards, X/Open Portability Guide (XPG)
4, and Spec 1170. It provides a platform for a variety of applications in the governmental
and commercial environment. AIX is available on a broad range of computer systems from
IBM, ranging from departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers, and is
capable of running in a Logical Partition (LPAR) environment.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019,
CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP [8] and an Extended Package [11]:
● Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016, CCEVS-VR-
PP-0039, NIAP.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.3. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 3 and there
is one additional extended component defined in the Protection Profile [8]. Thus the TOE is
CC Part 3 extended. The TOE meets the assurance requirements defined in the Protection
Profile.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Auditing The TOE contains an audit mechanism that generates local
audit records and stores them in local audit files.
Cryptographic Support The TOE includes an SSH client and server using OpenSSH
8.1p1. The TOE also includes TLS client support using the 32-
bit OpenSSL that resides in user space. The TOE supports two
trusted update mechanisms: cumulative updates and interim
fixes (ifixes) which use Java and OpenSSL to assert trust. The
TOE includes an Encrypted File System (EFS) feature for
encrypting sensitive data stored on non-volatile storage. In
addition, the TOE's boot integrity code uses the CLiC
cryptographic module in kernel space. The TOE also performs
key destruction of private keys and key material in volatile and
non-volatile memory under certain conditions.
User Data Protection The TOE's Journaled File System version 2 (JFS2) supports
the standard UNIX permission bit access control mechanism to
protect both TSF and user data in named file system objects
such as files and directories.
Identification and authentication The TOE supports authentication failure handling. The TOE
supports multiple authentication mechanisms. The TOE's TLS
client includes support for certificate-based authentication of a
TLS connection
Security management The TOE supports management of its security features by
administrators. These management features include the
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
following:
- Session timeout
- Auditing:
- Audit storage capacity configuration
- Audit event/rule configuration
- Password composition configuration
- Firewall configuration
Users can modify their session timeout values.
Protection of the TSF The TOE uses the access control mechanism to prohibit
unprivileged users from modifying TSF functions such as the
kernel, device drivers, security audit logs, etc. It also prohibits
unprivileged users from reading security-relevant data such as
security audit logs and system-wide credential repositories.
The TOE performs address space layout randomization
(ASLR) for all applications unless the application is marked as
an exception to ASLR. An administrator can selectively except
applications from ASLR.
The TOE implements a Stack Execution Disable (SED)
protection mechanism to aid in stopping stack buffer overflow
attacks. This mechanism prevents processes from executing
code residing on the process' stack.
The TOE uses digital signatures to validate its bootchain as
the TOE boots (a.k.a. boot integrity). The validation includes
the bootloader, kernel, device drivers, and kernel extensions.
The TOE performs digital signature validation of both OS
updates and application updates (a.k.a. trusted update). This
mechanism allows an administrator to validate the signatures
of the updates prior to installing them.
The TOE supports two trusted update mechanisms:
- Cumulative updates
- Interim fixes (ifixes)
The TOE prevents allocation of memory regions with both write
and execute permissions in the code, data, heap, and stack
segments.
TOE Access The TOE displays an administrator-configurable advisory
warning message before a user session is established.
Trusted path/channel The TOE supports a TLS client protocol implementation via
OpenSSL that allows applications to connect to TLS servers.
The TOE supports a general purpose OpenSSH client allowing
users to connect to other remote SSH servers via a secure
connection.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1.
The TOE Security Problem Definition has been taken from the Protection Profile [8] and is
defined in terms of Assumptions and Threats. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1 and 3.2.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
IBM AIX 7.2.5, Service Pack 3 (SP3) Standard Edition (SE)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 ISO AIX_v7.2_Install_7200-05-03 -
2136_flash_092021_LCD8236411.iso
(SHA256:
d63c2844baec2f1a21d2caed6925c85a87f14ab
dd22c54324cf63f714197131f )
7.2.5 D/L
2 DOC AIX 7.2 Technology Level 5 Service Pack 3
Common Criteria Administration Guidance
Version 1.3
(SHA256:
2a5c9a1a4a2993463d8e8cf736add9b25fcd064
8271139891c8f4e0a01dfe8ee )
1.3 D/L
3 DOC AIX 7.2 Reference Documentation
(SHA256:
5a55b80a6e9c356eb939a9a01b95d1263c6cb3
b3e836923a22d299517b3098a3 )
N/A D/L
4 TAR CCEMGR_fix
(SHA256:
21917e86ea568d2b28dc87c4cf2b5e6727567cd
51d6249b12dfa66faa415947f )
N/A D/L
5 TAR CCECCSUMA1_fix
(SHA256:
7ab9a64cd98d0b8160e6fc0b67b0cd72c977931
5b9ad293659e9a98dfa5c33e8 )
N/A D/L
6 TAR InstTU_fix
(SHA256:
a2606ac587237cdc60ab30ebc6793e94c607f69
f8bdf0d4910b4d9749d79d414 )
N/A D/L
7 TAR TD0325_fix N/A D/L
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
(SHA256:
cbbdff7aabec93b022872a4e57c9cf683ac806b1
e0bcbf0dbbc1fa4fd9f32a5b )
8 TAR efs_fix
(SHA256:
206fa67aae93f1a1df78b287e50a3d972092998
a80b5320b1dfe3e4c00651cf3 )
N/A D/L
9 TAR lscore_fix
(SHA256:
c4f97465829e8a25cccf3260057383626635b59
22f181a9450e6a5fbbf3558b9 )
N/A D/L
10 TAR mount_fix
(SHA256:
438f2e0d1bddedbb4983e962538664b8f0c1489
9233b859c9dd2e66228484835 )
N/A D/L
11 TAR openssh_fix14
(SHA256:
23a32151be35c6322d80d4a3633effff92ed3bab
8b45cc21f3494c5d92cf7678 )
N/A D/L
12 TAR audit_fix
(SHA256:
0c2ef6fcc0f743e0a1a0ab71a9451f1ca592c663
eb434c6af5219bea98cd1aeb )
N/A D/L
13 TAR kernel_fix3
(SHA256:
b217d346b5a6312ec15911ca9cbf64a5da098ed
bf8b47644273d71736c12de18 )
N/A D/L
14 TAR java_feb2022_fix
(SHA256:
68f682d919024ab8eb1db5ab4fdcd1037709605
424a55df5b7980baa9ff003e7 )
N/A D/L
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is distributed by download only. The ISO image for the initial TOE installation as
well as the download of the ifixes required for the evaluated configuration, are to be
downloaded from the IBM webpage over HTTPS.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Auditing, Cryptographic Support,
User Data Protection, Identification and Authentication, Security Management, Protection
of the TSF, TOE Access and Trusted Path/Channel.
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4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● The OS relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution.
● The user of the OS is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy. At the same time, malicious
software could act as the user, so requirements which confine malicious subjects are still
in scope.
● The administrator of the OS is not careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the OS within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.1.
5. Architectural Information
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking Unix based operating system.The TOE
Security Functionality (TSF) consist of functions of AIX that run in kernel mode plus a set
of trusted processes. These are the functions that enforce the security policy as defined in
this Security Target. Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used by an
administrative user need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way. But as
with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be part of this TSF. The
TOE supports standard networking applications and protocols, including applications
allowing access of the TOE via cryptographically protected communication channels, such
as SSH and TLS. System administration tools include the standard command line tools. A
user interface for system administration or any other operation is not included in the
evaluated configuration.
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
Auditing
The TOE contains an audit mechanism that generates local audit records and stores them
in local audit files.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes an SSH client and server using OpenSSH 8.1p1. The TOE also includes
TLS client support using the 32-bit OpenSSL that resides in user space. The TOE supports
two trusted update mechanisms: cumulative updates and interim fixes (ifixes) which use
IBM Java 8.6.30 TLS 1.2 client implementation and OpenSSL to assert trust. The TOE
includes an Encrypted File System (EFS) feature for encrypting sensitive data stored on
non-volatile storage. In addition, the TOE's boot integrity code uses the CLiC cryptographic
module in kernel space. The TOE also performs key destruction of private keys and key
material in volatile and non-volatile memory under certain conditions.
User Data Protection
The TOE's Journaled File System version 2 (JFS2) supports the standard UNIX
permission bit access control mechanism to protect both TSF and user data in named file
system objects such as files and directories.
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Identification and authentication
The TOE supports authentication failure handling. Also, the TOE supports multiple
authentication mechanisms, specifically username/password-based and key-based
authentication. The SSH server supports remote administration using
username/password-based and key-based authentication. The SSH client also supports
both username/password-based and key-based authentication. The TOE's TLS client
includes support for certificate-based authentication of a TLS connection.
Security management
The TOE supports management of its security features by administrators. These features
include the following: session timeout, auditing (audit storage capacity configuration and
audit event/rule configuration), password composition configuration and firewall
configuration. Users can modify their session timeout values.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE uses the access control mechanism to prohibit unprivileged users from modifying
TSF functions such as the kernel, device drivers, security audit logs, etc. It also prohibits
unprivileged users from reading security-relevant data such as security audit logs and
system-wide redential repositories. The TOE performs address space layout
randomization (ASLR) for all applications unless the application is marked as an exception
to ASLR. The TOE implements a Stack Execution Disable (SED) protection mechanism to
aid in stopping stack buffer overflow attacks. This mechanism prevents processes from
executing code residing on the process' stack.
The TOE uses digital signatures to validate its bootchain as the TOE boots (a.k.a. boot
integrity). The TOE performs digital signature validation of both OS updates and
application updates (a.k.a. trusted update). This mechanism allows an administrator to
validate the signatures of the updates prior to installing them.
The TOE supports two trusted update mechanisms.
● Cumulative updates
● Interim fixes (ifixes)
Cumulative updates, such as technology level updates and service packs, are provided at
scheduled times throughout each year. Ifixes are provided in between cumulative updates
making critical fixes available as soon as possible. Both update mechanisms can include
security updates. The TOE prevents allocation of memory regions with both write and
execute permissions in the code, data, heap, and stack segments.
TOE Access
The TOE displays an administrator-configurable advisory warning message before a user
session is established.
Trusted path/channel
The TOE supports a TLS client protocol implementation via OpenSSL that allows
applications to connect to TLS servers. The suma command uses the IBM Java TLS client
implementation to connect to the IBM fix server over HTTPS. The ifix commands use the
OpenSSL TLS client implementation to connect to the IBM fix server over HTTPS. The
TOE supports a general purpose OpenSSH client allowing users to connect to other
remote SSH servers via a secure connection. It also supports inbound remote
administration connections over SSH using OpenSSH.
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6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Evaluator Independent Testing
Testing effort
The evaluator performed all the tests defined in the OSPP and SSH-EP, which are around
100 tests. For the test requirements on crypto primitives and RNG, the ACVP tests were
performed on all applicable cryptographic algorithms.
Test approach
The evaluator followed the test requirements from the PP [8] and EP [11], and constructed
the tests. He used the test plan, which explains the test configuration, and links the test
requirements (including the complete text specification from the PP [8] and EP [11]), to the
actual test procedure.
The evaluator tests are partly manual tests, and partly automated.
Test configuration
The evaluator verified the correct setup test systems according to the documentation in the
Common Criteria Administration Guidance [9] and the test plan.
The evaluator tested setup defined in the Evaluation Technical Report, [7], chapter 3.2:
Hardware:
● IBM Power System E950 rack mounted server with an IBM POWER9 SMT8 core
processor and system firmware FW950
● IBM PowerVM Virtual I/O System (VIOS) version 3.1.1
Software:
● IBM AIX Standard Edition, Program Number 5765-G98, VRM1 07.02.05.03
● OpenSSH Client Software
● OpenSSH Server Software
● opensslfips-20.16.102.2103
In addition, the following ifixes (defined also in Table 2) were installed:
● CCEMGR_fix
● CCECCSUMA1_fix
● InstTU_fix
● TD0325_fix
● java_sep2021_fix
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● efs_fix
● lscore_fix
● mount_fix
● openssh_fix14
The evaluator notes, that this configuration is considered to be consistent with the one
defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 1.5.3.3. After the testing was concluded, the
developer, on 2022-03-03, announced three new ifixes, two of which are new and one
replaces a previous ifix:
● audit_fix, new ifix.
● kernel_fix3, new ifix.
● java_feb2022_fix, which replaces java_sep2021_fix, which was installed for the
evaluator's testing efforts.
The evaluator examined the additional and changed ifixes and determined their changed
functionality does neither impact any TSF nor any tested functionality. The evaluator
therefore determines, that the application of the ifixes mentioned above do not invalidate
the test results obtained.
Test Depth
Two types of tests were performed - independent testing as defined by the OSPP and
SSH-EP and CAVS algorithm testing:
Independent testing
The tests mainly comprised of tests that test the external interfaces, but there were also
tests that target TOE security behavior that is normally hidden from the outside:
● key destruction test: this test includes the modification of a test client to determine the
used keys, with a subsequent search through the TOE physical memory.
● stack and and buffer overflow protection: a tool has been used that analyses the binary
file meta data to determine whether stack protection is enforced.
● communication modification: proxy setups where deployed in order to modify live-traffic
to exercise the TOE behavior for situations where the TLS protocol is violated.
Algorithm testing
Multiple algorithm testing is required to be performed by the PP [8] and EP [11]. A function
of the lab‘s ACVP tool function was used to compare the TOE test vector responses (used
in the official CAVP certification) against the responses of a local reference implementation
under control of the lab. All of the test results could be validated by the lab using the
reference implementation.
Verdict: No deviation from the expected results have been encountered.
7.2. Evaluator Penetration Testing
The evaluator's search for publicly available vulnerability information was performed on
multiple occasions, predominately using the general CVE database. The developer's AIX
CVE database was also used to confirm findings and obtain more detail via linked AIX
support pages. The evaluator examined the operating system system calls (covering
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general system availability), the various installation methods the TOE provides as well as
the TOE's networking profile and configuration.
Verdict: None of the tests were able to penetrate the TOE's TSF with claimed attack
potential ‘basic’.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the configuration of the TOE specified in the ST [6], section 1.5.3.3
which is also defined in the evaluated Common Criteria Administration Guidance [9],
section 3.
The evaluated hardware platform for the TOE is the one specified in the Securirty Target
[6], section 1.4: IBM Power System E950 rack mounted server with an IBM POWER9
SMT8 core processor, VIOS Version 3.1.1 , System Firmware FW950.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems
Version 4.2.1, 22 April 2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP,
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19
February 2016, CCEVS-VR-PP-0039, NIAP
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
ASE_CCL.1, ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_OBJ.2,
ASE_REQ.2, ASE_SPD.1, ASE_TSS.1, ADV_FSP.1,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ALC_CMC.1, ALC_CMS.1,
ALC_TSU_EXT.1, ATE_IND.1, AVA_VAN.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex C of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column
'Security Level above 100 Bits' of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of
lower than 100 Bits (in general context) only.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions and Threats as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself
need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● As defined in the Security Target [6]: The ICC-cryptographic module's RNG shall only be
used with the TOE's suma command and for no other purposes.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ACVP Automated Cryptographic Validation Program
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BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Exact Conformance - a subset of Strict Conformance as defined by the CC, is defined as
the ST containing all of the requirements in the Security Requirements section of the PP,
and potentially requirements from Appendices of the PP. While iteration is allowed, no
additional requirements (from the CC parts 2 or 3) are allowed to be included in the ST.
Further, no requirements in the Security Requirements section of the PP are allowed to be
omitted.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022, Version 1.3, 2022-06-21, IBM AIX 7.2
Technology Level 5 Service Pack 3 Standard Edition Operating System Security
Target, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 7, 2022-06-28, Final Evaluation Technical
Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Protection Profile for General Purpose Operating Systems Version 4.2.1, 22 April
2019, CCEVS-VR-PP-0047, NIAP
[9] Guidance Documentation for the TOE, Version 1.3, 2022-04-04 IBM AIX 7.2
Technology Level 5 Service Pack 3 Common Criteria Administration Guidance
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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[10] Configuration List for the TOE, Version 0.9, 2022-06-20, IBM AIX Version 7.2
Technology Level 5 (TL5) Service Pack 3 (SP3) Life Cycle, (confidental document)
[11] Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, 19 February 2016,
CCEVS-VR-PP-0039, NIAP
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex C: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex C of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
1.1. Boot Integrity
Boot Integrity is achieved with CliC.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Integrity
verification
RSA PKCS1
v1.5 signature
verification with
SHA-256
FIPS 186-4 Modulus size
2048 bits
✓ -
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality for Boot Integrity
1.2. Encrypted File System (EFS)
Encrypted File System (EFS) cryptographic functions are provided by CliC.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes: CBC
FIPS 197
SP800-38A
128, 256 ✓ -
2 Key generation to
obtain per-user
KEK
RSA
16 rounds of
Miller-Rabin
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.3 and
C.3 for Miller
Rabin primality
tests.
Modulus size
2048 bits,
4096 bits
✓ -
3 Key wrapping RSA FIPS 186-4 Modulus size
2048 bits,
4096 bits
✓ -
4 Random number
generation
Hash DRBG with
SHA-512 core,
no PR
SP800-90A-
Rev1
FIPS 180-4
- - -
Table 4: TOE cryptographic functionality for Encrypted File System (EFS)
1.3. SSH
SSH cryptographic functions are provided by OpenSSL.
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes:
aes128-cbc,
aes256-cbc,
aes128-ctr,
aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm,
aes256-gcm
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP800-38A
(CBC, CTR)
SP800-38D
(GCM)
RFC4344
RFC 4253 (SSH-
TRANS)
128, 256 ✓ -
2 Integrity and
Authenticity
HMAC SHA-1
(hmac-sha1)
HMAC-SHA-256
(hmac-sha2-256)
HMAC-SHA-512
(hmac-sha2-512)
FIPS180-4
(SHA)
RFC2104,
FIPS198-1
(HMAC)
RFC4251/
RFC4253 (SSH
HMAC support)
RFC6668 (SHA-
2 support for
SSH)
Key length
equal to
digest length
✓ -
3 Key
establishment:
key agreement
ECDH with:
ecdh-sha2-
nistp256
ecdh-sha2-
nistp384
ecdh-sha2-
nistp521
RFC4253 (SSH-
TRANS)
RFC5656 (ECDH
for SSH)
Sec1-v2
Depending on
the curve
✓ -
4 IV/Key derivation PRF
SHA-1 / SHA-2
with hash type
defined by
selected ECDH
key agreement
mechanism
outlined above
RFC4253
FIPS 180-4
Depending on
chosen
cipher,
compliant to
RFC4253
✓ -
5 Authentication RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1.5
using SHA-256
or SHA-512
(ssh-rsa-256,
ssh-rsa-512)
FIPS 186-4
RFC3447,
(PKCS#1v2.1)
Sec. 8.2 (RSA)
RFC4253, Sec.
6.6 (SSH-
TRANS)
for host
authentication
RFC4252, Sec. 7
(SSH-
2048
3072
4096
✓ -
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
USERAUTH) for
user
authentication
method:
“publickey”
ECDSA with
signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-2 and NIST
P-256, P-384, P-
521
(ecdsa-sha2-
nistp256, ecdsa-
sha2-nistp384)
FIPS 186-4
RFC4253, Sec.
6.6 (SSH-
TRANS)
for host
authentication
RFC4252, Sec. 7
(SSH-
USERAUTH) for
user
authentication
method:
“publickey”
RFC 5656
(ECDSA for
SSH)
Sec1-v2
(ECDSA)
FIPS180-4
(SHA)
Keys size as
defined by
curves
✓ -
6 Key generation for
authentication
RSA
5 (2048 bits and
lower), 4 (larger
key sizes)
rounds of Miller-
Rabin
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.3 and
C.3 for Miller
Rabin primality
tests.
2048
3072
4096
✓ -
ECDSA with
NIST P-256, P-
384
FIPS 186-4, B.4 Keys size as
defined by
curve
✓ -
7 Key Generation
for ECDH
ECDSA with
NIST P-256, P-
384, P-521
SP800-56A rev.
3 section
5.6.1.2.2
RFC4253
Keys size as
defined by
curves
✓ -
8 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC_EXT.1,
ST
See list above - - Only
SSHv2
(RFC4253)
is
supported
in the
evaluated
configuratio
n.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
9 Random number
generation
CTR DRBG with
AES-256, with
DF, without PR
SP800-90A-
Rev1
- - -
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality for SSH
1.4. TLS (OpenSSL)
TLS protocol including the cryptographic primitives are provided by OpenSSL.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes: CBC,
GCM
CBC: RFC5246,
RFC5289
GCM: RFC5288,
RFC5289
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP800-38A
(CBC)
SP800-38D
(GCM)
128, 256 ✓ -
2 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
AES GMAC used
by GCM
RFC5246
FIPS 180-4
(SHA)
FIPS 198
(HMAC)
SP800-38D
(GCM / GMAC)
Key length
equal to
digest length
✓ -
3 Key Agreement ECDH with NIST
P-256, NIST P-
384, NIST P-521
RFC5246
SP800-56A rev.
3
Keys size as
defined by
curves
✓ -
4 Key Transport RSAES-PKCS1-
v1.5
Encryption/Decry
ption
RF5246
FIPS 186-4
Modulus 2048
bits, 3072
bits, 4096 bits
✓ -
5 IV / Key
derivation
(TLSv1.0/1.1 v1.2
handshake)
PRF
SHA-1/MD5 and
SHA-2 with hash
type chosen by
TLS cipher suite
RFC1321
RFC5246
FIPS 180-4
FIPS 198
Depending on
chosen
cipher,
compliant to
RFC5246
✓ -
6 Peer
authentication
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-
RFC 5246
FIPS 186-4
FIPS 180-4
Modulus 2048
bits, 3072
bits, 4096 bits
✓ -
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
PKCS1-v1.5
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2
RFC3447,
(PKCS#1v2.1)
Sec. 8 (RSA)
Keys size as
defined by
curves
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PSS
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2
ECDSA with
signature
generation and
verification using
SHA-1 and SHA-
2 with NIST P-
256, P-384, P-
521
FIPS 186-4
(ECDSA)
FIPS180-4
(SHA)
7 Key generation
for authentication
ECDSA using
NIST P-256, P-
384, P-521
FIPS 186-4, B.4 Modulus 2048
bits, 3072
bits, 4096 bits
Keys size as
defined by
curves
✓ -
RSA
5 (2048 bits and
lower), 4 (larger
key sizes) rounds
of Miller-Rabin
FIPS 186-4,
B.3.3 and
C.3 for Miller
Rabin primality
tests
8 Key generation
for ECDH
ECDSA with
NIST P-256, P-
384, P-521
SP800-56A rev.
3 section
5.6.1.2.2
RFC4306
Keys size as
defined by
curves
✓ -
9 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC_EXT.1,
ST
TLS
See listed above - - -
10 Random number
generation
CTR DRBG with
AES-256, without
DF, without PR
SP800-90A-
Rev1
- - -
Table 6: TOE cryptographic functionality for TLS (OpenSSL)
1.5. TLS (ICC)
The TLS protocol implementation used by the suma command including the cryptographic
primitives are provided by the ICC librabry.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Confidentiality Cipher: AES
Modes: GCM
GCM: RFC5288,
RFC5289
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP800-38D
(GCM)
128, 256 ✓ -
2 Integrity and
authenticity
HMAC SHA-1
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
AES GMAC used
by GCM
RFC5246
FIPS 180-4
(SHA)
FIPS 198
(HMAC)
SP800-38D
(GCM / GMAC)
Key length
equal to
digest length
✓ -
3 Key Transport RSAES-PKCS1-
v1.5
Encryption/Decry
ption
RF5246
FIPS 186-4
Modulus
2048 bits,
3072 bits,
4096 bits
✓ -
4 IV / Key
derivation
(TLSv1.0/1.1 v1.2
handshake)
PRF
SHA-1/MD5 and
SHA-2 with hash
type chosen by
TLS cipher suite
RFC1321
RFC5246
FIPS 180-4
FIPS 198
Depending on
chosen
cipher,
compliant to
RFC5246
✓ -
5 Peer
authentication
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-
PKCS1-v1.5
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2
RFC 5246
FIPS 186-4
FIPS 180-4
RFC3447,
(PKCS#1v2.1)
Sec. 8 (RSA)
Modulus
2048 bits,
3072 bits,
4096 bits
Keys size as
defined by
curves
✓ -
RSA signature
generation and
verification
RSASSA-PSS
using SHA-1 and
SHA-2
6 Trusted Channel FTP_ITC_EXT.1,
ST
TLS
See listed above - - -
7 Random number
generation
Hash DRBG with
AES-256, without
DF, without PR
SP800-90A-Rev1 - - -
Table 7: TOE cryptographic functionality for TLS (ICC)
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1.6. Trusted Update
The Trusted Update functionality uses OpenSSL to access cryptographic primitives.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
Comments
1 Integrity
verification
RSA PKCS1 v1.5
signature
verification with
SHA-1, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-
512
FIPS 186-4 Modulus size
2048 bits,
3072 bits,
4096 bits
✓ -
Table 8: TOE cryptographic functionality for Trusted Update
References for Table 3 to 8:
FIPS140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Date 2002-12-03
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/2/final
FIPS140-3 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Date 2019-03-22
Location https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/140/3/final
RFC4251 The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
RFC4252 The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
RFC4253 The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
RFC4254 The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
Author(s) T. Ylonen, C. Lonvick
Date 2006-01-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4254.txt
RFC5246 The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
Author(s) T. Dierks, E. Rescorla
32 / 33
BSI-DSZ-CC-1165-2022 Certification Report
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt
RFC5288 AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS
Author(s) J. Salowey, A. Choudhury, D. McGrew
Date 2008-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5288.txt
RFC0793 Transmission Control Protocol
Author(s) J. Postel
Date 1981-09-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0793.txt
RFC5289 TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
Author(s) E. Rescorla
Date 2008-08-01
Location
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt
RFC5647 AES Galois Counter Mode for the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) K. Igoe, J. Solinas
Date 2009-08-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5647.txt
RFC5656 Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
Author(s) D. Stebila, J. Green
Date 2009-12-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5656.txt
RFC6668 SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Author(s) D. Bider, M. Baushke
Date 2012-07-01
Location http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6668.txt
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