Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-15-06
Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580,
M4583 Series
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0578-2015
2015. 1. 20
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report Page 2
History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2015.1.20 -
Certification report for Samsung Multifunction ProXpress
M4580, M4583 Series
- First documentation
Certification Report Page 3
This document is the certification report for Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580,
M4583 Series of SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Certification Report Page 4
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 5
2. Identification........................................................................................................ 7
3. Security Policy..................................................................................................... 9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ........................................................... 9
5. Architectural Information.................................................................................. 10
6. Documentation .................................................................................................. 15
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 15
8. Evaluated Configuration ................................................................................... 16
9. Results of the Evaluation.................................................................................. 16
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)......................................................................... 17
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC).................................................................... 17
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).............................................................. 18
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ........................................................................... 18
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE) .......................................................................................... 19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) ........................................................................... 19
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ................................................................................ 20
10. Recommendations ............................................................................................ 21
11. Security Target................................................................................................... 21
12. Acronyms and Glossary ................................................................................... 22
13. Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 24
Certification Report Page 5
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL2+ evaluation of Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583
Series from SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd. with reference to the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1].
It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is MFPs (Multi- Function Peripherals) as an IT
product. It controls the operation of the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and
fax functions on the MFP controller.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Security Evaluation
Laboratory (KSEL) and completed on January 8, 2015. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) KSEL had submitted [3] and the Security Target (ST)
[4]. The ST has conformance claim to U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std.2600.2™-2009) [5]. All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon functional components
in CC Part 2, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE is operated in an internal network protected by a firewall. U.USER is
connected to the TOE and may perform jobs that are allowed (see Figure 1).
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
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The TOE is intended to operate in a network environment that is protected by a
firewall from external malicious attacks, and with reliable PCs and authenticated
servers. U.USER is able to access the TOE by using local user interface (LUI) or
remote user interface (RUI). The LUI is designed to be accessed by U.USER. The
U.USER can operate copy, scan, and fax functions through the LUI. In the case of a
scanning job, U.USER can operate the scanning job using the LUI and transfer the
scanned data to a certain destination by email addresses and servers. U.USER can
also use their PCs to print out documents or to access the TOE through the internal
network. U.ADMINISTRATOR can enable/disable Automatic Image Overwrite;
start/stop Manual Image Overwrite, and change a Password via the LUI.
U.ADMINISTRATOR can access TOE through the RUI using a web browser
through IPSec protocol. If IPSec is not configured in the TOE, all of network
connection would be blocked. From there, U.ADMINISTRATOR can
add/change/delete user accounts, change the U.ADMINISTRATOR’s ID and
password, review the security audit service, and download the security audit report.
The U.USER’s account information that requires asking for internal authentication
by TOE can be stored on the hard disk drive of the TOE. All of the information
stored on the hard disk drive is protected by the TOE. In the case of external
authentication using Kerberos, LDAP, SMB server, the external authentication
servers will perform the user authentication using database of authentication server.
The authentication server is assumed to be protected from external environmental
space.
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes
or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives
effect to the certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Page 7
2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
[Table 1] TOE identification
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 8, 2013)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 , CCMB-2012-
09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
EAL EAL2+(augmented by ALC_FLR.2)
Protection Profile IEEE Std.2600.2™-2009
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0
Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Sponsor SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
January 8, 2015
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
Developer SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Name Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series
Version B6.31
Hardware
(MFP Model) M4580FX, M4583FX
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[Table 3] shows the specification for TOE.
MFP Model M4580FX M4583FX
Color
/Mono
Mono Mono
PPM 45ppm 45ppm
Processor Chorus4N (Dual Core : Cortex-A9 1000MHz, ARM9 250MHz)
RAM DDR3 2,048MB
ROM NAND 128MB
Interface
High-Speed USB 2.0 Host, High-Speed USB 2.0 Peripheral,
Ethernet 10/100/1000 Base TX
FAX ITU-T G3, Super G3, 33.6 Kbps, MH/MR/MMR/JBIG
HDD SATA2 320 GB
Display
10.1” 1024 x 600 WSVGA TFT Color Graphic LCD with Touch-Screen, 24-
bit color
[Table 2] Additional identification information
Certification Report Page 9
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [4] by security objectives and
security requirements. The TOE provides security features to identify and authenticate
authorized users, to generate audit records of the auditable events, and to securely
manage the TOE functionality and authorized user accounts information.
For more details refer to the ST [4].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational environment
in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed and precise
definition of the assumption refer to the ST [4], chapter 3.3):
 The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
 TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization and are trained and competent to follow those policies and
procedures.
 Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance
and documentation, and to correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures.
 Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
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5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] and [Figure 3] show the scope of the TOE.
[Figure 2] Physical Structure of MFP
[Figure 3] Logical boundary of the TOE
Certification Report Page 11
The following security functions are provided by the TOE:
 Identification & Authentication
The TOE provides two types of user identification and authentication methods. If
U.ADMINISTRATOR configures the local authentication, the MFP will authenticate the
U.USER against an internal database. If U.ADMINISTRATOR selects the external
authentication as an authentication method, then MFP will authenticate the U.USER
using an external authentication server.
U.USER should be identified and authenticated by entering both ID and Password to
access to the TOE management functions. If U.USER fails to login specific times, the
system blocks the session of the U.USER during predefined duration.
U. ADMINISTRATOR can configure Identification & Authentication Policy by using LUI
or RUI.
U. ADMINISTRATOR can also give specific permission for U.USER to only use certain
feature of the machine.
The TOE provides the Common Access Control & TOE Function Access Control based
on the user role assigned to a user group ID by U.ADMINISTRATOR when U.NORMAL
performs read/delete/modify operations on the data owned by U.NORMAL or when
U.NORMAL accesses print/scan/copy/fax functions offered by the MFP.
The TOE shall terminate an interactive session after predefined time interval of user
inactivity.
 Network Access Control
The MFP system has a network interface connected to a network. The MFP system can
send/receive data and MFP configuration information and thus is able to configure MFP
settings.
There are a couple of methods to access and communicate with the MFP from outside
of the TOE through the network, and the TOE manages all incoming packets via a
network interface.
1) Protocol and Port Control:
The TOE can only allow protocols and ports configured by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
U.ADMINISTRATOR can configure this information via the LUI or RUI.
2) IP and MAC address filtering:
U.ADMINISTRATOR can make filtering rules for IP addresses and MAC addresses.
After that, packets are only allowed as per the IP filtering rule registered by
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U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Packets via MAC addresses registered by U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed.
 Security Management
The TOE accomplishes security management for the security function, TSF data, and
security attribute.
Only U.ADMINISTRATOR can manage the security functions through the LUI (Local
User Interface) and RUI (Remote User Interface): security functions can be start and
stop by U.ADMINISTRATOR. The LUI is touch-screen based management service
which is provided by TOE. RUI is web-based management service using HTTP/HTTPS
protocol.
TSF data and their possible operations are specified by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Security attributes can be operated by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
 Security Audit Data
The TOE creates an audit record security audit event including job log, security event
log, and operation log. The audit data consist of the type of event, date and time of the
event, success or failure, log out and access of log data.
Only U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to view (or export) the audit data but even
U.ADMINISTRATOR shall not delete log data manually.
The TOE protects Security Audit Data stored on the hard disk drive. It prevents any
unauthorized alteration to the Security Audit Data, and when each log events exceeds
the maximum number, the TOE overwrites the oldest stored audit records and generates
an audit record of overwriting.
 Image Overwrite
The TOE provides Image Overwrite functions that delete the stored file from the MFP’s
hard disk drive. The Image Overwrite function consists of Automatic Image Overwrite
and Manual Image Overwrite. The TOE implements an Automatic Image Overwrite to
overwrite temporary files created during the copying, printing, faxing and scanning (scan
to e-mail, scan to FTP, and scan to SMB task processes). The image overwrite security
function can also be invoked manually only by U.ADMINISTRATOR through the LUI.
Once invoked, the Manual Image Overwrite cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the
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printer interface (network), overwrites the hard disk according to the procedures set by
U. ADMINISTRATOR. If there are any problems during overwriting, the Manual
Image Overwrite job automatically restarts to overwrite the remaining area.
 Data Encryption
The TOE provides an encryption function during the data storage procedure and a
decryption function in the process of accessing stored data from hard disk drive.
The TOE generates cryptographic keys when the TOE is initialized at the first setout the
secret key (256 bits) is used for encrypting and decrypting user data and TSF data that
is stored on the HDD. Access to this key is not allowed to any U.USER including
U.ADMINISTRATOR.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with overwriting a used
cryptographic key with a newly generated cryptographic key. Before storing temporary
data, document data, and system data on the HDD of the MFP, the TOE encrypts the
data using AES 256 algorithm and cryptographic key.
When accessing stored data, the TOE decrypts the data using the same algorithm and
key.
Therefore, the TOE protects data from unauthorized reading and falsification even if the
HDD is stolen.
 Fax Data Control
If the received fax data includes malicious content, it may threaten the TOE asset. To
prevent this kind of threat, the TOE inspects whether the received fax image is
standardized with MMR, MR, or MH of T.4 specification or not before forwarding the
received fax image to e-mail or SMB/FTP. U. ADMINISTRATOR can restrict this
forwarding function. When non-standardized format data are discovered, the TOE
destroys the fax image.
 Self Testing
During initial start-up, the TOE performs self test. Self testing executes TSF function to
verify the correct operation of the HDD encryption function. Also, the TOE verifies the
integrity of the encryption key data and TSF executable code by the self testing.
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 Secure Communication
The TOE also provides secure communication between the TOE and the other trusted
IT product to protect communicated data from modification or disclosure by IPSec. The
network which connected without IPSec shall not be allowed to communicate with MFP.
 Non-TSF Function
TOE includes the local user interface based on Android platform. Although the Android
platform is used to TOE’s user interface, local user interface does not provide any core
Android system application such as Android system setting, Search, Brower, Contacts,
Gallery, and Music. Therefore, U.USER cannot access any core Android system
application and its related setting interfaces.
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. The
developer’s tests were performed on each distinct operational environment of the TOE
(see chapter 1 of this report for details about operational environment of the TOE).
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.1. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined in the functional specification, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
described in the functional specification.
Therefore the developer tested all SFRs defined in the ST [4].
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests, and conducted independent testing
listed in ETR [3], based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator set
up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST [4]. The
evaluator considered followings when devising a test subset:
 TOE security functionality: The TOE is an embedded software product for
MFPs (Multi-Function Peripherals) as an IT product. It controls the operation of
the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP
controller, and
Identifier Version
Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series User’s Guide V1.1
Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series Installation Guide V1.0
Certification Report Page 16
 Developer's testing evidence: The evaluator analyzed evaluation deliverables
for ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1, and ATE_IND.2 to understand behavior of the
TOE security functionality and to select the subset of the interfaces to be
tested, and
 Balance between evaluator's activities: The targeted evaluation assurance
level is EAL2+, and the evaluator tried to balance time and effort of evaluator's
activities between EAL2+ assurance components.
In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities.
These tests cover weakness analysis of source code, privilege check of executable
code, bypassing security functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, flaws in networking
protocol implementation, vulnerability scanning using commercial tools, disclosure of
secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack
potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [3].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series. The TOE is an
embedded software product for MFPs as an IT product. It controls the operation of the
entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP controller.
The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number including release number. The
TOE identification information is provided GUI.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated with
the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [3] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all
assurance components of EAL2+.
Certification Report Page 17
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security
problem definition and the division of this problem between the TOE
and its operational environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_OBJ.2. The ST doesn't define any extended component. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be use as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer clearly identifies the TOE and its all associated configuration items.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.2.
The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes
the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, and the evaluation evidence. Therefore,
the verdict of ALC_CMS.2 is the Pass.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
Certification Report Page 18
ALC_DEL.1.
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, and the delivery activity.
The flaw remediation procedures are established and they provide for the correctness
of security flaws and for assurance that the corrections introduce no new security
flaws. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_FLR.2.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the
secure use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation,
facilitates prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or
unreasonable. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the
TOE in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various
types of users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose
incorrect actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The security architecture document is structured to ensure that TSF cannot be
compromised or bypassed, and appropriately describes that the TSF which provides
the security domain separates these domains from each other. Therefore, the verdict
of ADV_ARC.1 is the Pass.
The functional specifications specifies the objective, way of using, input parameter,
operation, and error message to the TSFI at equal detail level, and accurately and
completely describes the TSFI. Therefore, the verdict of ADV_FSP.2 is the Pass.
The TOE design description provides the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems,
identify all subsystems of the TSF, and describe the behavior of each SFR-supporting
Certification Report Page 19
or SFR-non-interfering. Therefore, the verdict of ADV_TDS.1 is the Pass.
Therefore, the security architecture document (the TSF architecture attribute which
describes how to the TSF security enforcement is not compromised or bypassed),
functional specification(TSF interface description), design description and
implementation representation(architecture description about how the TSF behaves to
execute the functions related to the claimed SFR), and implementation
representation(description of source code level), which are included in the
development documentation, are adequate to give understanding about how the TSF
satisfies the SFRs, and how these SFRs implementation are not damaged or
bypassed.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test
documentation and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_COV.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test
documentation. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.2.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing less than an enhanced-basic attack potential to violate the
SFRs. The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
Certification Report Page 20
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.2 ALC_CMS.2.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMC.2 ALC_CMC.2.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DEL.1.2E PASS PASS
ALC_FLR.2 ALC_FLR.2.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ADV_TDS.1.2E PASS
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.2.1E PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.2.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.1.1E PASS PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.2 AVA_VAN.2.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.2.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.4E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
Certification Report Page 21
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 Since the TOE is assumed to be evaluated product under specific configuration
settings in connection with TSF, administrator should operate the TOE
according to the settings specified in Evaluated Configuration in evaluation
technical report. Therefore, administrator should keep in mind that the TOE is
not considered to be evaluated product if it is operated with different settings
specified in the Evaluated Configuration.
 All of the external IT entities (User/Administrator’s PC, External storage server,
External authentication server, NTP server, etc.) that communicate with the
TOE over a network should support IPSEC protocol that is compatible with the
security policy of the TOE. It should be remembered that all network
communications are not allowed if there is no IPSEC channel to securely
communicate with the TOE.
 If there are any problems, such as blackout or power failure, during manual
image overwriting, the image overwriting function is terminated remaining the
image overwriting of the memory area uncompleted. Therefore, administrator
should keep in mind that the manual image overwriting function automatically
restarts to overwrite the remaining memory area if the power is supplied again.
 There are two types of users, administrator(role of admin) allowed to manage
the security functions of the TOE and general user(role of general user,
restricted info. user, limited resource user, guest) allowed to use the MFP basic
functions such as printing, copying, scanning and faxing. Therefore,
administrator should be careful not to grant the role of admin to general user.
 Use the TOE function to configure allowed administrator’s IP’s so that
unauthorized access can be blocked.
11. Security Target
Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series Security Target Version 1.2,
December 30, 2014 [4] is included in this report by reference.
Certification Report Page 22
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
LUI Local User Interface
RUI Remote User Interface
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
PP Protection Profile
RFC Request For Comments
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
PPM Pages Per Minute
MMR Secure Socket Layer
MR Modified Modified READ coding
MH Modified Huffman Coding
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Multi-Function Printer, MFP MFP is a machine that incorporates the functionality of
multiple devices (copy, print, scan, or fax) in one
U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority
to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose
actions may affect the TOE security policy.
Administrators may possess special privileges that
provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP.
U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document
Data processing functions of the TOE
U.USER Any authorized User
Manual Image Overwrite The Manual Image Overwrite function overwrites all stored
files, including image files and preserved files on the hard
disk drive, and the function should only be manually
performed by a U.ADMINISTRATOR through the LUI. The
image data is completely overwritten 1 ~ 9 times by using
DoD 5220.28-M, DoD 5220.28-M(ECE), Australian ACSI
Certification Report Page 23
33, VSITR (German standard) standard, and Custom
setting methods
Automatic Image Overwrite The Automatic Image Overwrite automatically carries out
overwriting operations on temporary image files at the end
of each job such as copy, scan, scan-to-email, scan-to-
FTP, or scan-to-SMB. Or the Automatic Image Overwrite
overwrites the files on the hard disk drive when a user
initiates a delete operation
Image file Temporarily stored file that is created during scan, copy,
or fax job processing
Image Overwrite This is a function to delete all stored files on the hard disk
drive. There are two kinds of image overwriting: Automatic
Image Overwrite and Manual Image Overwrite
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3] Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series, Evaluation Technical
Report V1.00, January 8, 2015
[4] Samsung Multifunction ProXpress M4580, M4583 Series, Security Target V1.2,
December 30, 2014
[5] IEEE Std.2600.2™-2009, U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S.
Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0