Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File
Transfer v6.8 Security Target
Document Version: 1.1
2400 Research Blvd
Suite 395
Rockville, MD 20850
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Table Of Contents
1 Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................5
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference ..............................................................................................5
1.2 TOE Overview................................................................................................................................5
1.3 TOE Description.............................................................................................................................5
1.3.1 Evaluated Configuration .......................................................................................................5
1.3.2 Physical Boundaries ..............................................................................................................6
1.3.3 Logical Boundaries ................................................................................................................6
1.3.4 TOE Documentation..............................................................................................................8
2 Conformance Claims.............................................................................................................................9
2.1 CC Conformance ...........................................................................................................................9
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance ...................................................................................................9
2.3 Conformance Rationale ................................................................................................................9
2.3.1 Technical Decisions...............................................................................................................9
3 Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................12
3.1 Threats ........................................................................................................................................12
3.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................................12
3.3 Organizational Security Policies..................................................................................................12
4 Security Objectives..............................................................................................................................13
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................13
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment................................................................14
5 Security Requirements........................................................................................................................15
5.1 Conventions ................................................................................................................................16
5.2 Security Functional Requirements..............................................................................................16
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)...............................................................................................16
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP).................................................................................................23
5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ..............................................................................24
5.2.4 Security Management (FMT) ..............................................................................................25
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)........................................................................................................................25
5.2.6 Protection of TSF (FPT)........................................................................................................25
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)................................................................................................27
5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs .................................................................................28
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5.4 Security Assurance Requirements ..............................................................................................28
5.5 Assurance Measures...................................................................................................................28
6 TOE Summary Specification................................................................................................................30
6.1 Windows APIs .............................................................................................................................36
6.2 Linux APIs....................................................................................................................................37
6.3 Third-Party Libraries....................................................................................................................38
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Revision History
Version Date Description
0.1 August 2019 Initial Draft
0.2 December 2019 Updated based on Fortra review
0.3 January 2020 Updated based on Fortra review
0.4 February 2020 Updated based on internal review
0.5 July 2020 Updated based TDs and Fortra review
0.6 October 2020 Updated based on ECR comments and operational testing
0.7 March 15, 2021 TD and other minor updates
0.8 August 3, 2021 Updated TDs and addressed ECR comments
0.9 December 7, 2022 Updated TDs
1.0 December 29, 2022 Final version
1.1 March 29, 2023 Minor update
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1 Security Target Introduction
1.1 Security Target and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Category Identifier
ST Title Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Security Target
ST Version 1.1
ST Date March 29, 2023
ST Author Intertek Acumen Security
TOE Identifier Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8
TOE Software Version 6.8
TOE Developer Fortra, LLC
Key Words Application, Linux, Windows, TLS, SSH, File Transfer
Table 1 TOE/ST Identification
1.2 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 (MFT). The TOE is
a software application that provides secure file transfer services over HTTPS, TLS, and SSH. GoAnywhere
MFT is a secure managed file transfer solution that streamlines the exchange of data between systems,
employees, customers, and trading partners. It provides centralized control with extensive security
settings, detailed audit trails, and helps process information from files into XML, CSV, and JSON
databases.
1.3 TOE Description
1.3.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE has been evaluated on the following host platforms:
• CentOS 7 on ESXi 6.7 with Intel Xeon E5-4620v4 (Broadwell)
• Windows Server 2016 on ESXi 6.7 with Intel Xeon E5-4620v4 (Broadwell)
Note: The TOE is the application software only. The host platforms are not part of the evaluation.
The TOE supports (sometimes optionally) secure connectivity with several other IT environment devices
as described below.
Environment
Component
Required Usage/Purpose Description
Web Browser Yes Remote administration and User file access over HTTPS/TLSv1.2.
Database Server Yes MySQL, PostgreSQL, MS SQL Server, Oracle, or DB2/400 for storing settings.
The server must support TLSv1.2 to enable secure access by the TOE.
LDAP/AD Server No Remote authentication server supporting TLSv1.2.
Mail Server No Mail server supporting SMTP over TLSv1.2 for sending notifications.
File Server No Remote file server for storing user files:
• AS2, AS4, or WebDAV servers supporting HTTPS/TLSv1.2
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Environment
Component
Required Usage/Purpose Description
• SFTP or SCP servers supporting SSHv2
• FTP/s servers supporting TLSv1.2
• Amazon S3 or Azure Blob Storage supporting HTTPS/TLSv1.2
• REST, SOAP, or generic HTTPS/TLSv1.2 server
File Transfer Client No Client allowing uses to store and retrieve files from the TOE:
• AS2 or AS4 clients supporting HTTPS/TLSv1.2
• SFTP or SCP clients supporting SSHv2
• FTP/s client supporting TLSv1.2
Java Runtime
Environment
Yes (on
CentOS)
Platform-provided Java SE 8 Java Runtime Environment (JRE).
Note: The Windows platform does not provide a JRE, so the Windows version
of the TOE includes the required JRE.
Table 2 IT Environment Components
1.3.2 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a software application running on a host platform (as listed above).
1.3.3 Logical Boundaries
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP], [TLS-PKG], and [SSH-EP].
1.3.3.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE utilizes the GoAnywhere MFT Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API cryptographic library version 1.0.2.
This library implements all of the cryptographic algorithms required for SSH and TLS, drawing entropy
from the platform RBG.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described below.
Cryptographic Protocol Use within the TOE
SSHv2 Client File server transfers using SFTP or SCP
SSHv2 Server User file transfers using SFTP or SCP
HTTPS/TLSv1.2 Client File server transfers using AS2, AS4, WebDAV, FTP/s, Amazon S3, Azure Blob
Storage, REST, SOAP, or HTTPS; Check for updates
HTTPS/TLSv1.2 Server HTTPS Remote administration; HTTPS file access; AS2 or AS4 clients
TLSv1.2 Client Database server; Authentication Server; Mail Server;
TLSv1.2 Server User file transfers using FTP/s
Table 3 TOE Provided Cryptography
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the requirements
specified in their respective standards, as identified below.
SFR Algorithm in ST CAVP Alg. CAVP
Cert #
FCS_CKM.1 RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of
2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
RSA KeyGen (n = 2048, 3072) C1876
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SFR Algorithm in ST CAVP Alg. CAVP
Cert #
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.3
ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [selection:
P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.4
ECDSA KeyGen
ECDSA KeyVer
(Curve = P-256, P-384, P-521)
C1876
FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14
that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3
NIAP Policy Letter #5,
Addendum #2, states “No NIST
CAVP, CCTL must perform all
assurance/evaluation
activities”.
Vendor
Affirmed.
FCS_CKM.2 RSA-based key establishment schemes that
meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-
Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”
NIAP Policy Letter #5,
Addendum #2, states “No NIST
CAVP exists, must be described
in TSS – See FIPS 140-2 I.G. D.4:
Vendor Affirmation”.
Vendor
Affirmed.
Elliptic curve-based key establishment
schemes that meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 2,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography”
KAS-ECC
(Curve = P-256, P-384, P-521)
C1876
Key establishment scheme using Diffie-
Hellman group 14 that meets the following:
RFC 3526, Section 3
NIAP Policy Letter #5,
Addendum #2 does not
provide any guidance for this
selection.
Vendor
Affirmed.
FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
AES used in [CBC, GCM] mode and
cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits]
AES-CBC (128-bit, 256-bit)
AES-GCM (128-bit, 256-bit)
C1876
FCS_COP.1/
SigGen
For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using
PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS
and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2,
Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature
scheme 3
RSA SigGen
RSA SigVer
(n = 2048, 3072)
C1876
For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-
256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section
6.4
ECDSA SigGen
ECDSA SigVer
(Curve = P-256, P-384, P-521)
C1876
FCS_COP.1/
Hash
[SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and
message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits
SHA-1
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
C1876
FCS_COP.1/
KeyedHash
[HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA- 256, HMAC-SHA-
384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
C1876
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SFR Algorithm in ST CAVP Alg. CAVP
Cert #
sizes [256-bits, 160-bits, 384-bits, 512-bits]
and message digest sizes [160, 384, 512] bits
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG (AES) Counter DRBG (AES) C1876
Table 4 CAVP Algorithm Testing References
1.3.3.2 User Data Protection
The TOE relies on the underlying platform to encrypt sensitive data at rest.
1.3.3.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to authentication the TLS connection to the
external TLS servers. The TOE validates the X.509 certificates using the certificate path validation
algorithm defined in RFC 5280.
The TOE authenticates users using a username/password combination or X.509 TLS Client Certificates.
1.3.3.4 Security Management
The TOE allows the configuration of users, file servers, file transfer services, keys and certificates, and
cryptographic protocols.
1.3.3.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) over the network.
1.3.3.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs several mechanisms to ensure that it is secure on the host platform. The TOE only
allocates a limited amount of memory with both write and execute permission to support just-in-time
compiling. The TOE supports ASLR, stack-based overflow protections, and platform security mechanisms
(Windows Defender and SELinux).
The TOE is distributed as a Microsoft .EXE file (Windows) or a RPM (CentOS). The installers are signed by
Fortra so their integrity can be verified by the platform.
1.3.3.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects all data in transit using TLSv1.2 or SSHv2.
1.3.4 TOE Documentation
• Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Security Target, Version 1.1 [ST]
• Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Common Criteria Configuration Guide, Version
1.1 [AGD]
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance
This TOE is conformant to:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 1, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 2, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017: Part 2 extended
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluations Part 3, Version 3.1, Revision 5,
April 2017: Part 3 extended
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance
This TOE is conformant to:
• Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP]
• Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-
PKG]
• Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP]
2.3 Conformance Rationale
This Security Target provides exact conformance to Version 1.3 of the Protection Profile for Application
Software, Version 1.1 of the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Version 1.0 of
the Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH). The security problem definition and security objectives in
this Security Target are taken from the Protection Profile unmodified. The security requirements in this
Security Target are all taken from the Protection Profile, Functional Package, and Extended Package
performing only operations defined there.
2.3.1 Technical Decisions
All NIAP Technical Decisions (TDs) issued to date that are applicable to [SWAPP], [TLS-PKG], and [SSH-EP]
have been considered. The following tables identify all applicable TD:
Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0668 – X.509 SFR Applicability in App PP Yes
0601 – X.509 SFR Applicability in App PP Yes
0600 – Conformance claim sections updated to allow
for MOD_VPNC_V2.3
Yes
0598 – Expanded AES Modes in FCS_COP for App PP Yes
0582 – PP-Configuration for Application Software and
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients now allowed
Yes
0561 – Signature verification update Yes
0554 – iOS/iPadOS/Android AppSW Virus Scan No This TD only applies to iOS and Android
platforms. The TOE runs on Linux and
Windows platforms.
0548 – Integrity for installation tests in AppSW PP 1.3 Yes
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Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0544 – Alternative testing methods for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
Yes
0543 – FMT_MEC_EXT.1 evaluation activity update Yes
0519 – Linux symbolic links and FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Yes
0515 – Use Android APK manifest in test No This TD only applies to Android platforms.
The TOE runs on Linux and Windows
platforms.
0510 – Obtaining random bytes for iOS/macOS No This TD only applies to iOS and macOS
platforms. The TOE runs on Linux and
Windows platforms.
0498 – Application Software PP Security Objectives
and Requirements Rationale
Yes
0495 – FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 Test Clarification Yes
0465 – Configuration Storage for .NET Apps Yes
0445 – User Modifiable File Definition Yes
0437 – Supported Configuration Mechanism Yes
0435 – Alternative to SELinux for FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 Yes
0434 – Windows Desktop Applications Test Yes
0427 – Reliable Time Source Yes
0416 – Correction to FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Test Activity Yes
Table 5 SWAPP Technical Decisions
Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0588 – Session Resumption Support in TLS package Yes
0513 – CA Certificate loading Yes
0499 – Testing with pinned certificates Yes
0469 – Modification of test activity for
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1 test 4.1
Yes
0442 – Updated TLS Ciphersuites for TLS Package Yes
Table 6 TLS-PKG Technical Decisions
Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0598 – Expanded AES Modes in FCS_COP for App PP Yes
0446 – Missing selections for SSH Yes
0420 – Conflict in FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1 and
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
Yes
0332 – Support for RSA SHA2 host keys Yes
0331 – SSH Rekey Testing Yes
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Identifier Applicable Exclusion Rationale (if applicable)
0240 – FCS_COP.1.1(1) Platform provided crypto for
encryption/decryption
Yes
Table 7 SSH-EP Technical Decisions
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3 Security Problem Definition
The security problem definition has been taken from [SWAPP] and is reproduced here for the
convenience of the reader. The security problem is described in terms of the threats that the TOE is
expected to address, assumptions about the operational environment, and any organizational security
policies that the TOE is expected to enforce.
3.1 Threats
The following threats are drawn directly from the [SWAPP].
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may engage in communications with the
application software or alter communications between the application software and
other endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or elsewhere on the
network infrastructure. Attackers may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same computing platform
on which the application executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted
input to the application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
Table 8 Threats
3.2 Assumptions
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the [SWAPP].
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable time clock for
its execution. This includes the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses the
software in compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
Table 9 Assumptions
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no OSPs.
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4 Security Objectives
The security objectives have been taken from [SWAPP] and are reproduced here for the convenience of
the reader.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following security objectives for the TOE were drawn directly from the [SWAPP].
ID TOE Objective
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their installation and update packages, and
also leverage execution environment-based mitigations. Software is seldom, if ever,
shipped without errors. The ability to deploy patches and updates to fielded
software with integrity is critical to enterprise network security. Processor
manufacturers, compiler developers, execution environment vendors, and
operating system vendors have developed execution environment-based
mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding complexity to the task of
compromising systems. Application software can often take advantage of these
mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime environment or by enabling the
mechanism through compiler or linker options.
Addressed by: FDP_DEC_EXT.1, FMT_CFG_EXT.1, FPT_AEX_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs leverage services and APIs
provided by the runtime environment rather than implementing their own versions
of these services and APIs. This is especially important for cryptographic services
and other complex operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging this
platform behavior relies upon using only documented and supported APIs.
Addressed by: FMT_MEC_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.1, FPT_API_EXT.2, FPT_LIB_EXT.1,
FPT_TUD_EXT.2, FCS_CKM.1(1)
O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise, conformant TOEs provide
consistent and supported interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and
maintenance. This includes the deployment of applications and application updates
through the use of platform-supported deployment mechanisms and formats, as
well as providing mechanisms for configuration. This also includes providing control
to the user regarding disclosure of any PII.
Addressed by: FMT_SMF.1, FPT_IDV_EXT.1, FPT_TUD_EXT.1, FPR_ANO_EXT.1,
FCS_COP.1(3)
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user data in the event of loss of
physical control of the storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest
protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored by the TOE in order to
prevent unauthorized access to this data. This also includes unnecessary network
communications whose consequence may be the loss of data.
Addressed by: FDP_DAR_EXT.1, FCS_STO_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_CKM.1(3),
FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(4)
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active (packet modification) network
attack threats, conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive data.
Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys, passwords, and any other data specific
to the application that should not be exposed outside of the application.
Addressed by: FTP_DIT_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FCS_RBG_EXT.2, FCS_CKM_EXT.1,
FCS_CKM.2, FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1, FDP_NET_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.1
Table 10 Objectives for the TOE
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives for the operational environment assist the TOE in correctly providing
its security functionality. These track with the assumptions about the environment.
ID Objective for the Operation Environment
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform for its execution. This
includes the underlying operating system and any discrete execution environment
provided to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile, and uses
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully negligent or
hostile, and administers the software within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
Table 11 Objectives for the environment
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5 Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE and/or Platform. The Security
Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5 and all international interpretations.
Requirement Description
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1(1)/SSH Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption (Refined)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Client
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
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Requirement Description
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti­Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
Table 12 SFRs
5.1 Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments
within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the
operations defined by the CC:
• Assignment: Indicated with italicized text;
• Refinement: Indicated with bold text;
• Selection: Indicated with underlined text;
• Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3); and/or a
slash followed by a short identifier, e.g., /SSH;
• Where operations were completed in the PP itself, the formatting used in the PP has been
retained.
Explicitly stated SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ after the requirement name for TOE SFRs.
Formatting conventions outside of operations matches the formatting specified within the PP.
5.2 Security Functional Requirements
5.2.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• implement DRBG functionality
] for its cryptographic operations.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 Random Bit Generation from Application
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.1
The application shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (DRBG) services in accordance
with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG (AES)]
FCS_RBG_EXT.2.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a platform-
based DRBG and [
• no other noise source
] with a minimum of [
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• 256 bits
] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and
hashes that it will generate.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• implement asymmetric key generation
].
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1(1)
The application shall [
• implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [
• [RSA schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following
FIPS PUB 186-4, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Appendix B.3" ,
• [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] ]that meet the following: [FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4] ,
• [FFC Schemes] using Diffie-Hellman group 14 that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3 ,
].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM.2.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method:
[
• [RSA-based key establishment schemes] that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1” ,
• [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”] ,
• [Key establishment scheme using Diffie-Hellman group 14] that meets the following: RFC 3526,
Section 3 ,
].
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The application shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [
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• AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
• AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
FCS_COP.1(1)/SSH Cryptographic Operation - Encryption/Decryption (Refined)
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
The SSH software shall [perform] encryption/decryption services for data in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm AES-CTR (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode and cryptographic key sizes
[128-bit, 256-bit].
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation - Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1(2)
The application shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
• SHA-1,
• SHA-256,
• SHA-384,
• SHA-512,
] and message digest sizes [
• 160,
• 256,
• 384,
• 512,
] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation - Signing
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
The application shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4 ,
• ECDSA schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB
186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5
] .
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation - Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
The application shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
• HMAC-SHA-256
and [
• SHA-1,
• SHA-384,
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• SHA-512,
] with key sizes [256-bits, 160-bits, 384-bits, 512-bits] and message digest sizes 256 and [160, 384, 512]
bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub
180-4 Secure Hash Standard.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Client
The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Client
The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the TLS package.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3/Client
The application shall [not establish the application-initiated connection] if the peer certificate is deemed
invalid.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server HTTPS Protocol
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1/Server
The application shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2/Server
The application shall implement HTTPS using TLS as defined in the TLS package.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2 HTTPS Protocol with Mutual Authentication
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2.1
The application shall [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• not store any credentials,
] to non-volatile memory.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH Protocol
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1
The SSH software shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254 and
[5656, 6668] as a [client, server]
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Client
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.1
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication
methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, and [password-based] .
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.2
The SSH client shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [65,535] bytes in an SSH
transport connection are dropped.
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FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.3
The SSH software shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption
algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc].
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.4
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-
512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdsa-sha2-nistp384] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other
public key algorithms.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.5
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96,
hmac-sha2-256] and [no other MAC algorithms] as its data integrity MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all
other MAC algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.6
The SSH client shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2-
nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.7
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH connection be rekeyed after [no more than 1 Gigabyte of data
has been transmitted, no more than 1 hour] using that key.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.8
The SSH client shall ensure that the SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local
database associating each host name with its corresponding public key or [no other methods] as
described in RFC 4251 section 4.1.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Protocol - Server
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.1
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication
methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, and [password-based] .
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.2
The SSH server shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [65,535] bytes in an SSH
transport connection are dropped.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.3
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption
algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc]
.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.4
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-
sha2-512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdsa-sha2-nistp384] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all
other public key algorithms.
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FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.5
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256,
hmac-sha2-512] and [no other MAC algorithms] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC
algorithm(s).
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.6
The SSH server shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2-
nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.7
The SSH server shall ensure that the SSH connection be rekeyed after [no more than 1 Gigabyte of data
has been transmitted, no more than 1 hour] using that key.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 TLS Protocol
FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement [
• TLS as a client,
• TLS as a server,
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 TLS Client Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a client that supports the
cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
] and also supports functionality for [
• mutual authentication,
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The product shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to RFC
6125.
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FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid [
• with no exceptions,
].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 TLS Client Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The product shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 TLS Client Support for Supported Groups Extension
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5.1
The product shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups
[
• secp256r1,
• secp384r1,
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 TLS Server Protocol
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.1
The product shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and [no earlier TLS versions] as a server that supports
the cipher suites [
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
] and also supports functionality for [
• mutual authentication,
• no session resumption or session tickets,
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.2
The product shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and [TLS 1.1].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3
The product shall perform key establishment for TLS using [
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• RSA with size [2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits] ,
• ECDHE parameters using elliptic curves [secp256r1, secp384r1] and no other curves ,
• no other key establishment methods
].
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 TLS Server Support for Mutual Authentication
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.1
The product shall support authentication of TLS clients using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.2
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the client certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2.3
The product shall not establish a trusted channel if the Distinguished Name (DN) or Subject Alternative
Name (SAN) contained in a certificate does not match one of the expected identifiers for the client.
5.2.2 User Data Protection (FDP)
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict its access to [
• network connectivity,
].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2
The application shall restrict its access to [
• system logs,
] .
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1
The application shall restrict network communication to [
• user-initiated communication for [check for updates],
• respond to [remote management, user file transfers ],
• [authentication server, database server, file server, mail server]
] .
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• leverage platform-provided functionality to encrypt sensitive data,
] in non-volatile memory.
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5.2.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The application shall [implement functionality] to validate certificates in accordance with the following
rules:
• RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
• The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
• The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension, that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are
met
• The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage
field
• The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [CRL as specified in
RFC 5280 Section 6.3]
• The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall
have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the
extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp
1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp
2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email
Protection purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-
kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA)
purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
[HTTPS ,TLS].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
application shall [not accept the certificate ].
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5.2.4 Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing and setting
configuration options.].
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1
The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured with
default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2
The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the application
binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged users.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
• [configure users,
• configure database server,
• configure authentication server,
• configure mail server.
• configure file servers,
• configure file transfer services,
• configure keys and certificates,
• configure cryptographic protocols]
] .
5.2.5 Privacy (FPR)
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1
The application shall [
• not transmit PII over a network ,
] .
5.2.6 Protection of TSF (FPT)
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1
The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
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FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti­Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The application shall [
• not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions ,
• allocate memory regions with write and execute permissions for only [JVM bytecode to machine
code just-in-time compilation]
] .
Application Note: On Linux, the TOE does not allocate any memory regions with both write and execute
permissions. On Windows, the TOE allocates memory regions with write and execute permissions.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files unless
explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The application shall [ provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4
Application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5
The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS ]
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The application shall be distributed using the format of the platform-supported package manager.
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FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can cryptographically
verify them prior to installation.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1
The application shall be packaged with only [the third-party libraries listed in section 6.1].
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1
The application shall be versioned with [SWID tags that comply with minimum requirements from
ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015] .
5.2.7 Trusted Path/Channel (FTP)
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1
The application shall [
• encrypt all transmitted [data] with [HTTPS as a client in accordance with
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Client, HTTPS as a server in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Server, HTTPS
as a server with mutual authentication in accordance with FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2, TLS as defined in
the TLS Package, SSH as conforming to the Extended Package for Secure Shell]
] between itself and another trusted IT product.
Application Note: The cryptographic protocols are mapped to trusted IT products as follows:
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 Web Server with or without TLS client authentication – Remote Administration
• TLSv1.2 client with or without TLS client authentication – Database server
• TLSv1.2 client with or without TLS client authentication – LDAP/AD server
• TLSv1.2 client without TLS client authentication – Mail server
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 client with or without TLS client authentication – AS2, AS4, or WebDAV file
servers
• SSHv2 client – SFTP or SCP file servers
• TLSv1.2 client – FTP/s file servers
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 client – Amazon S3 or Azure Blob Storage servers
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 client – REST, SOAP, or generic HTTPS servers
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 server – AS2 or AS4 clients
• SSHv2 server – SFTP or SCP clients
• TLSv1.2 server – FTP/s clients
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5.3 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs
The Protection Profile for Application Software contains all the requirements claimed in this Security
Target. As such, the dependencies are not applicable since the PP has been approved.
5.4 Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the Protection Profile for Application
Software which are derived from Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 5. The assurance requirements
are summarized in the table below.
Assurance Class Components Components Description
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Timely Security Updates
Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational
environment
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Table 13 Security Assurance Requirements
5.5 Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures
applied by Fortra to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details.
SAR How the SAR will be met
ADV_FSP.1 The functional specification describes the external interfaces of the TOE; such as the means for
a user to invoke a service and the corresponding response of those services. The description
includes the interface(s) that enforces a security functional requirement, the interface(s) that
supports the enforcement of a security functional requirement, and the interface(s) that does
not enforce any security functional requirements. The interfaces are described in terms of their
purpose (general goal of the interface), method of use (how the interface is to be used),
parameters (explicit inputs to and outputs from an interface that control the behavior of that
interface), parameter descriptions (tells what the parameter is in some meaningful way), and
error messages (identifies the condition that generated it, what the message is, and the
meaning of any error codes).
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SAR How the SAR will be met
AGD_OPE.1 The Administrative Guide provides the descriptions of the processes and procedures of how
the administrative users of the TOE can securely administer the TOE using the interfaces that
provide the features and functions detailed in the guidance.
AGD_PRE.1 The Installation Guide describes the installation, generation, and startup procedures so that the
users of the TOE can put the components of the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
ALC_CMC.1 The Configuration Management (CM) documents describe how the consumer identifies the
evaluated TOE. The CM documents identify the configuration items, how those configuration
items are uniquely identified, and the adequacy of the procedures that are used to control and
track changes that are made to the TOE. This includes details on what changes are tracked and
how potential changes are incorporated.
ALC_CMS.1
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Fortra uses a systematic method for identifying and providing security relevant updates to the
TOEs users via its support infrastructure.
ATE_IND.1 Fortra will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Fortra will provide the TOE for testing.
Table 14 TOE Security Assurance Measures
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6 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met
by the TOE.
SFR Rationale
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE implements DRBG functionality.
FCS_RBG_EXT.2 The TOE provides random bit generation services using an SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG using
AES-256. The TOE DRBG is seeded with at least 256 bits of entropy from the platform
DRBG, CryptGenRandom on Windows and /dev/random on CentOS.
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 The TSF implements asymmetric key generation as described in FCS_CKM.1(1).
FCS_CKM.1(1) The TSF generates RSA 2048-bit, and 3072-bit keys following the algorithm specified in
Sections 5.1 and B.3.3 of FIPS Pub 186-4. These keys are used for digital signature and
key agreement services in TLS or digital signature services in SSH.
The TSF generates ECDSA P-256, P-384, and P-521 keys following the algorithm
specified in Sections 6.2.1 and B.4.2 of FIPS Pub 186-4. P-256 and P-384 keys are used
for key agreement services in TLS and digital signature service in SSH. P-256, P-384, and
P-521 keys are used for digital signature services in TLS and key agreement services in
SSH.
The TSF also generates Diffie-Hellman Group 14 keys as specified in RFC 3526 Section 3.
These keys are used for key agreement services in SSH.
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_CKM.2 The TSF performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 key transport with 2048-bit, 3072-bit, and 4096-
bit keys in TLS.
The TSF performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with curves P-256 and P-384 in TLS and
SSH. SSH also supports P-521.
The TSF performs Diffie-Helman with Group 14 in SSH.
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(1)/SSH
The TSF provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC,
CTR, and GCM mode. 128-bit and 256-bits keys are supported in all modes. Encryption
and decryption are implemented as described in NIST 197, NIST SP 800-38A, and NISP
SP 800-38D.
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_COP.1(2) The TSF provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.”
The TSF uses all of the hashes for RSA SigGen & SigVer, ECDSA SigGen & SigVer, HMAC,
and SSH KDF; with the exception SHA-1 which is not used with ECDSA SigGen & SigVer.
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_COP.1(3) The TSF provides cryptographic signature services using RSA with key size of 2048 and
greater or ECDSA using curves P-256, P-384, and P-521 as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4,
“Digital Signature Standard”.
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_COP.1(4) The TSF implements the following HMAC algorithms as specified in FIPS Pub 198-1,
"The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code”:
HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-384 HMAC-SHA-512
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SFR Rationale
Key Length 160 bits 256 bits 384 bits 512 bits
Output MAC 96, 160 bits 256 bits 384 bits 512 bits
See Table 4 for validation details.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Clie
nt
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1/Serv
er
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.2
The TSF implements HTTPS as specified in RFC 2818 using TLSv1.2 as the secure
transport protocol. TLSv1.2 is specified in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.
When acting as an HTTPS server, the TSF supports TLS client authentication for remote
administration, HTTPS file access, and AS2 connections. If the client does not present a
certificate or the certificate is not authorized, the TSF falls back to application layer
authentication (e.g., username and password).
The TSF does not establish the connection (client or server) if the peer certificate is
invalid.
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The TSF does not store any credentials in non-volatile memory. The TSF requires the
environment to pass it the database password at start-up.
All other sensitive data (e.g., user passwords, private keys) is stored in the remote
database.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1 The TSF acts as an SSH Client and an SSH server as specified in FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 and
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1.
FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 The TSF is an SSHv2 client, compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, and
6668.
The TSF supports public-key and password-based authentication.
The TSF examines packet_length field in the SSH packet header. The TSF discards any
packets larger than 65,535 bytes.
The TSF supports the following encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-
cbc, and aes256-cbc.
The TSF supports the following public-key algorithms: ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-
512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp384.
The TSF supports the following data integrity algorithms: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96,
hmac-sha2-256, and hmac-sha2-512.
The TSF supports the following key exchange methods: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-nistp521.
The TSF tracks the number of bytes encrypted with each key and the time since the last
rekey. The TSF initiates a rekey if 1 GB of data is encrypted with an individual key or
when 1 hour has elapsed since the last rekey.
The TSF maintains a local database associating each server hostname or IP address with
a trusted public key.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 The TSF is an SSHv2 sever, compliant with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, and
6668.
The TSF supports public-key and password-based authentication.
The TSF examines packet_length field in the SSH packet header. The TSF discards any
packets larger than 65,535 bytes.
The TSF supports the following encryption algorithms: aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-
cbc, and aes256-cbc.
The TSF supports the following public-key algorithms: ssh-rsa, rsa-sha2-256, rsa-sha2-
512, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp384.
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SFR Rationale
The TSF supports the following data integrity algorithms: hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256,
and hmac-sha2-512.
The TSF supports the following key exchange methods: diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, and ecdh-sha2-nistp521.
The TSF tracks the number of bytes encrypted with each key and the time since the last
rekey. The TSF initiates a rekey if 1 GB of data is encrypted with an individual key or
when 1 hour has elapsed since the last rekey.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1 The TSF acts as a TLS Client and a TLS server as specified in FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 and
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1 The TSF is a TLSv1.2 client supporting the following ciphersuites:
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
The TSF automatically configures references identifiers based on the FQDN or IP
address configured used to specify the TLS server. When an FQDN has been configured,
the TOE establishes reference identifiers of DNS-ID and CN-ID. When the TOE compares
the reference identifies to the identifiers in the presented certificate, it will consider
the identifiers matching if they are an exact match or if the presented identifier exactly
matches with the exception of a wildcard in the left most position matching the left
most position of the reference identifier. When an IP address has been configured, the
TOE converts the IP address into a binary representation in network byte order. The
TOE converts the presented identifier from the SAN and converts it to a binary
representation in network byte order. The identifiers are only considered a match if the
binary representation is an exact match. For FQDN identifiers, the TOE will use the
SAN(s) in the presented certificate if present. The TSF will only match an FQDN
identifier from the CN if the certificate does not contain any SANs. When an IP address
is configured, the TOE only checks the SAN for a match. The TSF does not support
certificate pinning.
The TSF will not establish a trusted channel if the TLS server presents an invalid
certificate.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 The TSF supports TLS mutual authentication for FTP/s, AS2, and HTTPS connections. The
TSF is capable of presenting a certificate in response to a CertificateRequest message
from the server. The TSF only sends a certificate if the administrator has configured a
client certificate for the specific server in question.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.5 The TSF presents the Supported Groups (formerly named Supported Elliptic Curves)
extension in the ClientHello message with support for groups secp256r1 and
secp384r1.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1 The TSF is a TLSv1.2 server supporting the following ciphersuites:
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SFR Rationale
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
The TSF sends a Fatal protocol_version alert message if it receives a ClientHello
requesting SSLv2.0, SSLv3.0, TLSv1.0, or TLSv1.1.
The TSF supports RSA key agreement with RSA key sizes of 2048 bits, 3072 bits, or 4096
bits (i.e., the size of the RSA key in the TLS server certificate). The TSF supports ECDHE
key agreement using curves P-256 and P-384.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.2 The TSF can be configured to request a client certificate when establishing TLS
connections for remote administration, HTTPS file access, AS2, and FTP/s.
When the TSF is configured to authenticate TLS clients using certificates, the TSF sends
a Certificate Request message in the TLS handshake. The TSF requires the DN in the
presented certificate to match a DN that has been configured as authorized for the
services the client is connecting to. The TSF then verifies the certificate matches the
certificate pinned to the user’s account using a SHA-1 hash and validates the certificate
chain as described in FIA_X509_EXT.1.
If the client does not present a certificate or the certificate authentication fails, the TSF
falls back to username/password authentication. If certificate authentication is
required for a user, the username/password prompt will be presented; however,
username/password authentication will always deny access to that user.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The only hardware resource the TSF access is network connectivity.
The only sensitive information repository the TSF access is the system logs. The TSF
writes application events to the system logs.
FDP_NET_EXT.1 The TOE performs the following network communication:
• user-initiated communication:
o check for updates
• respond to:
o remote management
o user file transfers
• automatically initiate communications with:
o authentication server
o database server
o file server
o mail server
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 The TSF relies on platform provided functionality to encrypt data at rest. The TSF
requires the user to enable full drive encryption.
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SFR Rationale
FIA_X509_EXT.1 The TSF uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
TLS connections. The TSF performs certificate validation during the TLS handshake
when the non-TOE entity presents a certificate to the TSF.
The X.509 certificates are validated using the certificate path validation algorithm
defined in RFC 5280, which can be summarized as follows:
• the public key algorithm and parameters are checked
• the current date/time is checked against the validity period
• revocation status is checked
• issuer name of X matches the subject name of X+1
• name constraints are checked
• policy OIDs are checked
• policy constraints are checked; issuers are ensured to have CA signing bits
• path length is checked
The TSF performs revocation checking using CRLs.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 During the TLS handshake, the TSF uses the certificate presented by the TLS client or
server to authenticate the remote endpoint of the connection.
If the TSF cannot establish a connection to fetch a CRL, the TSF considers the certificate
invalid and rejects the certificate.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 The TOE stores settings and configuration options in C:\ProgramData for Windows and
/etc for CentOS.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 The TOE is not installed with any default credential. The TOE generates a self-signed
HTTPS server certificate as part of the installation process and requires the user create
a username and password prior to performing any other TOE operations.
The TOE is installed with default file permissions which prevent unprivileged users from
modifying application binaries and application configurations.
FMT_SMF.1 The TSF supports the following management functions:
• configure users,
• configure database server,
• configure authentication server,
• configure mail server.
• configure file servers,
• configure file transfer services,
• configure keys and certificates,
• configure cryptographic protocols – ciphers
FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The TOE does not transmit PII over the network. PII is defined as name, social security
number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, biometric records, etc. While
the TOE does transmit usernames these are pseudonyms that do not necessarily map
to a specific individual. The TOE transmits user files which may incidentally contain PII;
however, these are only generic files from the perspective of the TOE.
FPT_API_EXT.1 The TOE uses the Windows platform APIs listed in Section 6.1.
The TOE uses the Linux (CentOS) platform APIs listed in Section 6.2.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Windows
The TOE does not request that any memory is mapped to an explicit address. The TOE is
compiled without any specific flags on Windows to enable ASLR (/DYNAMICBASE is
enabled by default).
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SFR Rationale
The TOE does not allocate memory with write and execute permissions, with the
exception of the JVM code cache. The JRE uses this memory to perform just-in-time
compilation of Java bytecode into machine code.
The TOE is compatible with Windows Defender Exploit Guard.
The TOE does not write any data or user files to the directory containing TOE
executable files.
The TSF is composed of Java and native code. The native code implements stack-based
buffer overflow protections, being compiled with the /GS flag on Windows. All Java
objects are strictly typed with explicit sizes, so it is not possible to overflow a buffer in
Java code.
Linux
The TOE does not request that any memory is mapped to an explicit address. The TOE is
composed of Java code. ASLR is provided by the platform-provided JRE.
The TOE does not allocate memory with write and execute permissions.
The TOE is compatible with SELinux.
The TOE does not write any data or user files to the directory containing TOE
executable files.
The TSF is composed of Java code. All Java objects are strictly typed with explicit sizes,
so it is not possible to overflow a buffer in Java code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
The TSF allows the user to initiate a check for updates by navigating to ‘Help’ -> ‘Check
for Updates’.
The TSF allows users to query the current version of TSF software by opening the
‘About’ tab in the application.
The TOE is distributed in the format of the platform-supported package manager, .EXE
for Windows and .RPM for CentOS. Updates to the TOE are digitally signed and verified
by the platform (Windows Installer or RPM Package manager) prior to installation.
Updates for Windows are signed using a code signing cert issued by DigiCert SHA2
Assured ID Code Signing CA. The DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Code Signing CA is signed by
the DigiCert Assured ID Root CA which is trusted by the Windows platform. Updates for
Linux are signed using an OpenPGP RSA 2048 key. Adding the public key to the rpm
keyring allows the platform to verify the signature on updates. The signature
verification on each platform allows the platform to verify the update came from an
authorized source. The TSF does not update itself, but rather relies on the platform
package manager to install updates.
The TOE is not distributed with the platform OS.
When the uninstallation procedures are performed, all traces of the TOE are removed,
with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit events.
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The TOE is bundled with the third-party libraries listed in section 6.1.
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 The TSF is installed with a SWID tag containing a SoftwareIdentity element and an
Entity element.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 The TSF encrypts all transmitted data using HTTPS/TLSv1.2, TLSv1.2, or SSHv2 as
follows:
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 Web Server with or without TLS client authentication – Remote
Administration
• TLSv1.2 client with or without TLS client authentication – Database server
• TLSv1.2 client with or without TLS client authentication – LDAP/AD server
• TLSv1.2 client without TLS client authentication – Mail server
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SFR Rationale
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 client with or without TLS client authentication – AS2, AS4, or
WebDAV file servers
• SSHv2 client – SFTP or SCP file servers
• TLSv1.2 client – FTP/s file servers
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 client – Amazon S3 or Azure Blob Storage servers
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 client – REST, SOAP, or generic HTTPS servers
• HTTPS/TLSv1.2 server – AS2 or AS4 clients
• SSHv2 server – SFTP or SCP clients
• TLSv1.2 server – FTP/s clients
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Fortra uses various security tools to regularly scan the TOE throughout the
development lifecycle.
Vulnerability reports are submitted using a form on the Fortra website which is
protected using HTTPS. This protects the confidentiality of the vulnerability report.
GoAnywhere Support and Development Teams collaborate to evaluate any reports of
application vulnerabilities received. The teams work to understand the issue,
understand the impact, and evaluate potential courses of action. After confirming and
understanding the issue, the GoAnywhere team prepares the appropriate remediation
for the problem.
Fortra strives to meet the following timelines for addressing vulnerabilities:
• Zero-day and Critical Vulnerabilities: within a week
• High Vulnerabilities: within 30 days
• Medium and Low Vulnerabilities: 3-4 months
• If the vulnerability is in a third-party library, then Fortra must wait for the
library developers to address the issue, but Fortra will provide mitigation
recommendations to minimize potential risk.
Notifications are sent out in the form of a Security Advisory email. This notification
contains information describing the issue and remediation options. Depending on the
nature and severity of the issue, certain details will potentially be omitted from this
publication in order to give our customers enough time to apply the fix.
Table 15 TOE Summary Specification SFR Description
6.1 Windows APIs
The TOE uses the following Windows platform APIs:
• Locale.nls
• Kernel32.dll.mui
• SortDefault.nls
• comctl32.dll
• wsock32.dll
• ws2_32.dll
• winmr.dll
• winmmbase.dll
• winmm.dll
• windows.storage.dll
• win32u.dll
• version.dll
• user32.dll
• ucrtbase.dll
• shlwapi.dll
• shell32.dll
• SHCore.dll
• sechost.dll
• rsaenh.dll
• rpcrt4.dll
• rasadhlp.dll
• psapi.dll
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• profapi.dll
• powrprof.dll
• oleaut32.dll
• ole32.dll
• ntdll.dll
• ntasn1.dll
• nsi.dll
• nlaapi.dll
• ncrypt.dll
• NapiNSP.dll
• mswsock.dll
• msvcrt.dll
• msasn1.dll
• KernelBase.dll
• kernel32.dll
• kernel.appcore.dll
• IPHLPAPI.DLL
• gdi32full.dll
• gdi32.dll
• FWPUCLNT.DLL
• dpapi.dll
• dnsapi.dll
• dhcpcsvc6.dll
• dhcpcsvc.dll
• cryptsp.dll
• cryptbase.dll
• crypt32.dll
• combase.dll
• cfgmgr32.dll
• bcryptprimitives.dll
• bcrypt.dll
• apphelp.dll
• advapi32.dll
6.2 Linux APIs
The TOE uses the following Linux (CentOS) platform APIs:
• /dev/null
• /dev/random
• /dev/urandom
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/bin/java
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/jli/libjli.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libjava.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libmanagement.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libnet.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libnio.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libsunec.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libverify.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/libzip.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/amd64/server/libjvm.so
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/charsets.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/ext/cldrdata.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/ext/localedata.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/ext/nashorn.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/ext/sunec.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/ext/sunjce_provider.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/jce.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/jfr.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/jsse.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/resources.jar
• /usr/lib/jvm/java-1.8.0-openjdk-1.8.0.282.b08-1.el7_9.x86_64/jre/lib/rt.jar
• /usr/lib/locale/locale-archive
• /usr/lib64/ld-2.17.so
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• /usr/lib64/libc-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libdl-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libgcc_s-4.8.5-20150702.so.1
• /usr/lib64/libm-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libnss_dns-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libnss_files-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libpthread-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libresolv-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/librt-2.17.so
• /usr/lib64/libstdc++.so.6.0.19
• /usr/lib64/libz.so.1.2.7
6.3 Third-Party Libraries
The TOE is packaged with the following third-party libraries:
• Azul Zulu Java SE 8 Update 272
(Windows only)
• Apache Tomcat 9.0.41
• agent-commons.jar
• all-themes-1.0.8.jar
• apache-mime4j-core-0.7.2.jar
• aws-java-sdk-cloudfront-1.11.631.jar
• aws-java-sdk-core-1.11.631.jar
• aws-java-sdk-kms-1.11.631.jar
• aws-java-sdk-s3-1.11.631.jar
• aws-java-sdk-sts-1.11.631.jar
• azure-storage-5.5.0.jar
• batik-all-1.14.jar
• bc-fips-1.0.2.jar
• bcmail-fips-1.0.3.jar
• bcpg-fips-1.0.5.jar
• bcpkix-fips-1.0.4.jar
• bctls-fips-1.0.10.3.jar
• bluesky-1.0.6.jar
• bsh-2.0b6.jar
• chartcreator-1.2.0.jar
• commons-beanutils-1.9.4.jar
• commons-cli-1.3.1.jar
• commons-codec-1.14.jar
• commons-collections-3.2.2.jar
• commons-collections4-4.1.jar
• commons-compress-1.19.jar
• commons-configuration-1.7.jar
• commons-dbcp-1.3.jar
• commons-digester-1.8.1.jar
• commons-discovery-0.4.jar
• commons-el.jar
• commons-fileupload-1.4.jar
• commons-httpclient-3.1.jar
• commons-io-2.6.jar
• commons-lang-2.1.jar
• commons-lang3-3.9.jar
• commons-logging-1.2.jar
• commons-math3-3.6.1.jar
• commons-net-3.3.jar
• commons-pool-1.6.jar
• commons-validator-1.5.0.jar
• commons-vfs2-2.1.jar
• cryptojce.jar
• cryptojcommon.jar
• cssparser-0.9.14.jar
• curvesapi-1.06.jar
• db2jcc.jar
• derbyclient.jar
• derby.jar
• edi-definitions-1.0.jar
• ehcache-core-2.5.1.jar
• esapi-2.1.0.1.jar
• facestrace-0.9.0.jar
• FastInfoset.jar
• font-awesome-5.6.1.jar
• ga_classes.jar
• gaclient.jar
• gacmd.jar
• ga_resources.jar
• gateway-client.jar
• gateway-commons.jar
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• gfaces.jar
• ghttpsclient.jar
• gmbal-api-only.jar
• gofast-all.jar
• gson-2.2.4.jar
• gt-commons.jar
• guava-26.0.jar
• ha-api.jar
• httpclient-4.5.13.jar
• httpcore-4.4.14.jar
• icu4j-63.1.jar
• ifxjdbc.jar
• imgscalr-lib-4.2.jar
• ion-java-1.0.2.jar
• ipworkszip.jar
• iText-2.1.7.jar
• jackson-annotations-2.10.1.jar
• jackson-core-2.10.1.jar
• jackson-databind-2.10.5.1.jar
• jakarta-oro.jar
• jasperreports-6.16.0.jar
• jasperreports-chart-themes-6.16.0.jar
• jasperreports-fonts-6.16.0.jar
• jasypt-1.9.2.jar
• java-jwt-3.3.0.jar
• javax.annotation-api.jar
• javax.xml.soap-api.jar
• jaxb-api.jar
• jaxb-core.jar
• jaxb-impl.jar
• jaxb-jxc.jar
• jaxb-xjc.jar
• jaxws-api.jar
• jaxws-rt.jar
• jaxws-tools.jar
• jcifs-1.3.18.jar
• jcmFIPS.jar
• jcommon-1.0.10.jar
• jfreechart-1.0.19.jar
• jgroups-4.1.2.Final.jar
• jmespath-java-1.11.631.jar
• jms.jar
• JNQ-1.3.6.jar
• joda-time-2.2.jar
• jsch-0.1.54.jar
• jsr181-api.jar
• jt400.jar
• jTDS3.jar
• jxl.jar
• jzlib-1.1.2.jar
• licenseapi-2.0.jar
• linoma-batik.jar
• linoma-commons.jar
• linoma-crypto.jar
• linoma-expressions.jar
• linoma-httpclient.jar
• linoma-kt.jar
• linoma-projects.jar
• linoma-report-fonts.jar
• linoma-security.jar
• linoma-tools.jar
• linoma-wss4j-ws-security-common-
2.0.10.jar
• linoma-wss4j-ws-security-dom-
2.0.10.jar
• log4j-1.2-api-2.13.3.jar
• log4j-api-2.13.3.jar
• log4j-core-2.13.3.jar
• log4j-slf4j-impl-2.13.3.jar
• lucene-analyzers-common-4.7.2.jar
• lucene-codecs-4.7.2.jar
• lucene-core-4.7.2.jar
• lucene-grouping-4.7.2.jar
• lucene-queries-4.7.2.jar
• lucene-queryparser-4.7.2.jar
• management-api.jar
• mariadb-java-client-1.7.1.jar
• maverick-legacy-common-1.7.34.jar
• maverick-legacy-server-1.7.34.jar
• mimepull.jar
• mina-core-2.1.4.jar
• msbase.jar
• mssqlserver.jar
• msutil.jar
• myfaces-api-2.2.12.jar
• myfaces-bundle-2.2.12.jar
• myfaces-impl-2.2.12.jar
• native-lib-loader-2.0.2.jar
• netty-all-4.1.48.Final.jar
• not-going-to-be-commons-ssl-0.3.18.jar
• ojdbc5.jar
• opensaml-2.6.6.jar
Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Security Target
40
• openws-1.5.4.jar
• oro-2.0.8.jar
• owasp-java-html-sanitizer-r239.jar
• pesit-client-1.2.1.jar
• pesit-commons-1.1.3.jar
• pesit-server-1.1.4.jar
• poi-4.1.1.jar
• poi-ooxml-4.1.1.jar
• poi-ooxml-schemas-4.1.1.jar
• policy.jar
• postgresql-42.2.14.jar
• prettyfaces-jsf2-3.3.0.jar
• primefaces-7.0.14.jar
• primefaces-extensions-7.0.1.jar
• qname.jar
• resolver.jar
• saaj-impl.jar
• sardine.jar
• slf4j-api-1.7.25.jar
• snmp4j-2.3.4.jar
• spring-beans-5.2.9.RELEASE.jar
• spring-context-5.2.9.RELEASE.jar
• spring-core-5.2.9.RELEASE.jar
• sqljdbc4.jar
• sslj.jar
• stax2-api-3.1.4.jar
• stax2-api.jar
• stax-api-1.0-2.jar
• stax-ex.jar
• streambuffer.jar
• taglibs-standard-impl-1.2.3.jar
• taglibs-standard-jstlel-1.2.3.jar
• taglibs-standard-spec-1.2.3.jar
• tinyradius-1.1.0.jar
• tomahawk20-1.1.14.jar
• unboundid-ldapsdk-4.0.11.jar
• velocity-1.7.jar
• woodstox-core-asl-4.4.1.jar
• woodstox-core-asl.jar
• wsbuilder.jar
• wsdl4j.jar
• xml-apis-1.3.04.jar
• xml-apis-ext-1.3.04.jar
• xmlbeans-3.1.0.jar
• xmlgraphics-commons-2.6.jar
• xmlsec-2.1.4.jar
• xmltooling-1.4.6.jar