National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11216-2023
Dated: 04/07/2023
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory Attn: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
®
TM
2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Patrick Mallett, Ph.D. Lead Validator
Jerome Myers, Ph.D. Senior Validator
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
George Kumi
Sai Sandeep Yanamandra
Shaunak Shah
Acumen Security, LLC
3
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 6
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 8
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 9
4.1 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................9
4.2 User Data Protection ....................................................................................................................................10
4.3 Identification and Authentication ...............................................................................................................10
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................11
4.5 Privacy...........................................................................................................................................................11
4.6 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................11
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels ................................................................................................................................11
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 12
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................12
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................12
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................13
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 14
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration ........................................................................................... 15
7.1 Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................................................15
8 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 17
8.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................17
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 18
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target .....................................................................................................................18
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation...............................................................................................18
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents............................................................................................................19
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities...............................................................................................19
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity .........................................................................19
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity ..............................................................................................................20
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................28
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 30
11 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 31
12 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 32
13 Glossary................................................................................................................................ 33
14 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 34
4
1 Executive Summary
This Validation Report (VR) is intended to assist the end user of this product and any security
certification Agent for that end user in determining the suitability of this Information Technology
(IT) product for their environment. End users should review the Security Target (ST), which is
where specific security claims are made, in conjunction with this VR, which describes how those
security claims were tested and evaluated and any restrictions on the evaluated configuration.
Prospective users should carefully read the Assumptions and Clarification of Scope in Section 5
and the Validator Comments in Section 10, where any restrictions on the evaluated configuration
are highlighted.
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 (TOE). It presents the
evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This VR is not an
endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the TOE is
either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to the specific version and configuration of
the product as evaluated and documented in the ST.
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in April 2023. The information in this report
is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report, all
written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Extended and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government Protection Profile for Security Requirements for the Protection Profile for
Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended
Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev. 5), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in
the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP],
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019
[TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016
[SSH-EP]. This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common
Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the
functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Based on
these findings, the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate,
5
the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence produced.
6
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs). CCTLs evaluate products
against Protection Profiles containing Assurance Activities, which are interpretation of CEM
work units specific to the technology described by the PP.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's Product Compliance
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile(s) to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1 Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation
Scheme
United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March
2019 [SWAPP]
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1,
dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG]
Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February
2016 [SSH-EP]
Security Target Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Security Target v 1.1
Evaluation
Technical Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File
Transfer v6.8, 1.1, 31 March 2023
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 5
Conformance
Result
CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Extended
Sponsor Fortra, LLC
Developer Fortra, LLC
7
Item Identifier
Common Criteria
Testing Lab
(CCTL)
Acumen Security LLC
Rockville, MD 20850
CCEVS
Validators
— Patrick Mallett: Lead Validator
Jerome Myers: Senior Validator
8
3 Architectural Information
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8
(MFT). The TOE is a software application that provides secure file transfer services over
HTTPS, TLS, and SSH. GoAnywhere MFT is a secure managed file transfer solution that
streamlines the exchange of data between systems, employees, customers, and trading partners. It
provides centralized control with extensive security settings, detailed audit trails, and helps
process information from files into XML, CSV, and JSON databases.
9
4 Security Policy
The TOE provides the security functionality required by [SWAPP], [TLS-PKG], and [SSH-EP].
4.1 Cryptographic Support
The TOE utilizes the GoAnywhere MFT Bouncy Castle FIPS Java API cryptographic library
version 1.0.2. This library implements all of the cryptographic algorithms required for SSH and
TLS, drawing entropy from the platform RBG.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described below.
Table 2 TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic
Protocol
Use within the TOE
SSHv2 Client File server transfers using SFTP or SCP
SSHv2 Server User file transfers using SFTP or SCP
HTTPS/TLSv1.2
Client
File server transfers using AS2, AS4, WebDAV, FTP/s, Amazon S3,
Azure Blob Storage, REST, SOAP, or HTTPS; Check for updates
HTTPS/TLSv1.2
Server
HTTPS Remote administration; HTTPS file access; AS2 or AS4
clients
TLSv1.2 Client Database server; Authentication Server; Mail Server;
TLSv1.2 Server User file transfers using FTP/s
Each of these cryptographic algorithms have been validated for conformance to the requirements
specified in their respective standards, as identified below.
Table 3 CAVP Algorithm Testing References
SFR Algorithm in ST CAVP Alg. CAVP
Cert #
FCS_CKM.1 RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of
2048-bit or greater that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.3
RSA KeyGen (n = 2048, 3072) C1876
ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [selection:
P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following:
FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.4
ECDSA KeyGen
ECDSA KeyVer
(Curve = P-256, P-384, P-521)
C1876
FFC Schemes using Diffie-Hellman group 14
that meet the following: RFC 3526, Section 3
NIAP Policy Letter #5,
Addendum #2, states “No NIST
CAVP, CCTL must perform all
assurance/evaluation
activities”.
Vendor
Affirmed.
FCS_CKM.2 RSA-based key establishment schemes that
meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 as
specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 8017, “Public-
NIAP Policy Letter #5,
Addendum #2, states “No NIST
CAVP exists, must be described
Vendor
Affirmed.
10
SFR Algorithm in ST CAVP Alg. CAVP
Cert #
Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”
in TSS – See FIPS 140-2 I.G. D.4:
Vendor Affirmation”.
Elliptic curve-based key establishment
schemes that meet the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A Revision 2,
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
Logarithm Cryptography”
KAS-ECC
(Curve = P-256, P-384, P-521)
C1876
Key establishment scheme using Diffie-
Hellman group 14 that meets the following:
RFC 3526, Section 3
NIAP Policy Letter #5,
Addendum #2 does not
provide any guidance for this
selection.
Vendor
Affirmed.
FCS_COP.1/
DataEncryption
AES used in [CBC, GCM] mode and
cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits]
AES-CBC (128-bit, 256-bit)
AES-GCM (128-bit, 256-bit)
C1876
FCS_COP.1/
SigGen
For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using
PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS
and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2,
Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature
scheme 3
RSA SigGen
RSA SigVer
(n = 2048, 3072)
C1876
For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and
Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-
256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section
6.4
ECDSA SigGen
ECDSA SigVer
(Curve = P-256, P-384, P-521)
C1876
FCS_COP.1/
Hash
[SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and
message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits
SHA-1
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
C1876
FCS_COP.1/
KeyedHash
[HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA- 256, HMAC-SHA-
384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key
sizes [256-bits, 160-bits, 384-bits, 512-bits]
and message digest sizes [160, 384, 512] bits
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-256
HMAC-SHA2-384
HMAC-SHA2-512
C1876
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 CTR_DRBG (AES) Counter DRBG (AES) C1876
4.2 User Data Protection
The TOE relies on the underlying platform to encrypt sensitive data at rest.
4.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to authenticate the TLS connection
to the external TLS servers. The TOE validates the X.509 certificates using the certificate path
validation algorithm defined in RFC 5280.
11
The TOE authenticates users using a username/password combination or X.509 TLS Client
Certificates.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE allows the configuration of users, file servers, file transfer services, keys and
certificates, and cryptographic protocols.
4.5 Privacy
The TOE does not transmit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) over the network.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE employs several mechanisms to ensure that it is secure on the host platform. The TOE
only allocates a limited amount of memory with both write and execute permission to support
just-in-time compiling. The TOE supports ASLR, stack-based overflow protections, and
platform security mechanisms (Windows Defender and SELinux).
The TOE is distributed as a Microsoft .EXE file (Windows) or a RPM (CentOS). The installers
are signed by Fortra so their integrity can be verified by the platform.
4.7 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE protects all data in transit using TLSv1.2 or SSHv2.
12
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
The following assumptions are drawn directly from the SWAPP.
Table 4 Assumptions
ID Assumption
A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform with a reliable
time clock for its execution. This includes the underlying platform and
whatever runtime environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully negligent or hostile,
and uses the software in compliance with the applied enterprise security
policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not careless, willfully
negligent or hostile, and administers the software within compliance of
the applied enterprise security policy.
5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed
level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
The following threats are drawn directly from the SWAPP.
Table 5 Threats
ID Threat
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may engage
in communications with the application software or alter
communications between the application software and other
endpoints in order to compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel or
elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers may
monitor and gain access to data exchanged between the
application and other endpoints.
13
ID Threat
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the same
computing platform on which the application executes.
Attackers may provide maliciously formatted input to the
application in the form of files or other local communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarifying. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made, with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3,
dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS),
Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell
(SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP].
• Consistent with the expectations of the Protection Profile, this evaluation did not
specifically search for, nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not
“obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an
“obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of
the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs. Any additional security related functional capabilities
included in the product were not covered by this evaluation.
14
6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
• Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Common Criteria Configuration Guide,
Version 1.1 [AGD]
Only the Configuration Guide listed above and the specific sections of the other documents
referenced by that guide should be trusted for the installation, administration, and use of this
product in its evaluated configuration.”
15
7 TOE Evaluated Configuration
7.1 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of the following Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File
Transfer v6.8 software application running on the following platforms when configured in
accordance with the documentation specified in section 6.
• CentOS 7 on ESXi 6.7 with Intel Xeon E5-4620v4 (Broadwell)
• Windows Server 2016 on ESXi 6.7 with Intel Xeon E5-4620v4 (Broadwell)
Note: The TOE is the application software only. The host platforms are not part of the
evaluation.
The TOE supports (sometimes optionally) secure connectivity with several other IT environment
devices as described below.
Table 6 IT Environment Components
Environment
Component
Require
d
Usage/Purpose Description
Web Browser Yes Remote administration and User file access over HTTPS/TLSv1.2.
Database
Server
Yes MySQL, PostgreSQL, MS SQL Server, Oracle, or DB2/400 for
storing settings. The server must support TLSv1.2 to enable secure
access by the TOE.
LDAP/AD
Server
No Remote authentication server supporting TLSv1.2.
Mail Server No Mail server supporting SMTP over TLSv1.2 for sending
notifications.
File Server No Remote file server for storing user files:
• AS2, AS4, or WebDAV servers supporting
HTTPS/TLSv1.2
• SFTP or SCP servers supporting SSHv2
• FTP/s servers supporting TLSv1.2
• Amazon S3 or Azure Blob Storage supporting
HTTPS/TLSv1.2
• REST, SOAP, or generic HTTPS/TlSv1.2 server
File Transfer
Client
No Client allowing users to store and retrieve files from the TOE:
• AS2 or AS4 clients supporting HTTPS/TLSv1.2
• SFTP or SCP clients supporting SSHv2
• FTP/s client supporting TLSv1.2
Java Runtime
Environment
Yes (on
CentOS)
Platform-provided Java SE 8 Java Runtime Environment (JRE).
Note: The Windows platform does not provide a JRE, so the
Windows version of the TOE includes the required JRE.
16
17
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the evaluation team. It is derived
from information contained in Evaluation Test Report for Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File
Transfer v6.8, which is not publicly available. The Assurance Activities Report provides an
overview of testing and the prescribed assurance activities.
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the Assurance Activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance documentation
and ran the tests specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated
01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1,
dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0,
dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP]. The Independent Testing activity is documented in the
Assurance Activities Report, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
18
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are presented
in detail in the proprietary documents: the Detailed Test Report (DTR) and the Evaluation
Technical Report (ETR). The reader of this document can assume that activities and work units
received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Fortra’s GoAnywhere
Managed File Transfer v6.8 to be Part 2 and Part 3 extended, and meets the SARs contained in the
PP. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance Activities specified in the AppSW, TLS-
PKG and SSH-EP.
9.1 Evaluation of Security Target
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST contains
a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of security
requirements claimed to be met by the Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 that are
consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that support the
requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance Activities
specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019
[SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March
2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February
2016 [SSH-EP].
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained in
the Security Target's TOE Summary Specification. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
Assurance Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3,
dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version
1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0,
dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP] related to the examination of the information contained in the
TOE Summary Specification.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team
19
was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to securely
administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the design and testing phases of the
evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally the evaluator performed the Assurance
Activities specified in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March
2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01
March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19
February 2016 [SSH-EP] related to the examination of the information contained in the operational
guidance documents.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the Assurance Activities, and that the conclusion reached by
the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found
that the TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in
accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation
team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity
The evaluation team applied each EAL 1 ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Application Software,
Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security
(TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell
(SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP] and recorded the results in a Test Report,
summarized in the Evaluation Technical Report and Assurance Activities Report.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient evidence was
provided by the evaluation team to show that the evaluation activities addressed the test activities
in the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP],
Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-
PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-
EP] and that the conclusion reached by the evaluation team was justified.
20
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity
The following was performed on January 15, 2023, and then repeated on March 29, 2023.
The evaluator searched the Internet for potential vulnerabilities in the Product using the web sites listed
below. The sources of the publicly available information are provided below.
• https://www.goanywhere.com
• http://nvd.nist.gov/
• http://www.us-cert.gov
• http://www.securityfocus.com/
• https://www.cvedetails.com/
The following components of the Product were searched:
Component CPE
fortra cpe:2.3:a:fortra
helpsystems 6.6.0 cpe:2.3:a:helpsystems:boks:6.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
helpsystems 6.7.1 cpe:2.3:a:helpsystems:boks:6.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
helpsystems 6.8.7 cpe:2.3:a:goanywhere:mft:6.8.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
goanywhere cpe:2.3:a:goanywhere:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
GoAnywhere MFT Bouncy
Castle FIPS Java API
cpe:2.3:a:GoAnywhereMFTBouncyCastleFIPSJavaAPI:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
centos 7.0 cpe:2.3:o:centos:centos:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
intel xeon e5-4620 v4 cpe:2.3:h:intel:xeon_e5-4620_v4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Azul Zulu Java SE 8
Update 272
cpe:2.3:a:azul:zulu:8:update272:*:*:*:*:*:*
vmware esxi 6.7 cpe:2.3:o:vmware:esxi:6.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
all-themes-1.0.8.jar cpe:2.3:a:all-themes-1.0.8.jar:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
apache tomcat 9:0:41 cpe:2.3:a:apache:tomcat:9.0.41:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
apache-mime4j-core-0.7.2cpe:2.3:a:apache:mime4j:core-0.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
aws-java-sdk-cloudfront cpe:2.3:a:amazon:aws_sdk_for_cloudfront:-:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
21
aws-java-sdk-core-
1.11.631
cpe:2.3:a:amazon:aws_sdk_for_core:1.11.631:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
aws-java-sdk-kms-
1.11.631
cpe:2.3:a:amazon:aws_sdk_for_kms:1.11.631:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
aws-java-sdk-s3-1.11.631 cpe:2.3:a:amazon:aws_s3_crypto_sdk:1:*:*:*:*:golang:*:*
aws-java-sdk-sts-1.11.631 cpe:2.3:a:amazon:aws_java_sdk_sts:1:*:*:*:*:golang:*:*
azure storage 5.5.0 cpe:2.3:a:azure:storage:5.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
apache batik 1.10 cpe:2.3:a:apache:batik:1.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
bouncy castle fips 1.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:fips_java_api:1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
bouncy castle mail fips
1.0.3
cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:mail:fips:1.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
bouncy castle pg fips 1.0.5 cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:pg:fips:1.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*
bouncy castle
cryptography APIs
cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:legion-of-the-bouncy-castle-java-crytography-
api:1.02:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
bctls fips 1.0.10.3 cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:tls:fips:1.0.10.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
bluesky 1.0.6 cpe:2.3:a:bluesky:1.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*
bsh-2.0b6 cpe:2.3:a:beanshell:beanshell:2.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*
chartcreator-1.2.0 cpe:2.3:a:chartcreator:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons_beanutils 1.9.4 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons_beanutils:1.9.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-cli 1.3.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-cli:1.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-codec 1.14 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-codec:1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons collections
3.2.2
cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons_collections:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons collections
4.4.1
cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons_collections:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
22
commons compress 1.19 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons_compress:1.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons configuration
1.7
cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons_configuration:1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons dbcp 1.3 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons:dbcp:1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons digestoer 1.8.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons:digester:1.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons discovery 0.4 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons:discovery:0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-el cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons:el:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons fileupload 1.4 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons_fileupload:1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons httpclient 3.0 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-httpclient:3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-io 2.6 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-io:2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-lang 2.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-lang:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-lang3 3.9 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-lang3:3.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons logging 1.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-logging:1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons math3 3.6.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-math3:3.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-net-3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:netcommons:netcommons:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-pool-1.6 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-pool:1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-validator-1.5.0 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-validator:1.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
commons-vfs2-2.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:commons-vfs2:2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cryptojce cpe:2.3:o:cryptojce:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cryptojcommon cpe:2.3:o:cryptojcommon:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
css parser cpe:2.3:a:horde:horde_css_parser:1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
curvesapi 1.0.6 cpe:2.3:o:curvesapi:1.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
db2jcc cpe:2.3:a:ibm:db2:11.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
23
derby cpe:2.3:a:apache:derby:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
derby client cpe:2.3:a:apache:derby:client:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ehcache-core-2.5.1 cpe:2.3:a:ehcache:core:2.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
esapi-2.1.0.1 cpe:2.3:a:owasp:enterprise_security_api:2.1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
facestrace 0.9.0 cpe:2.3:a:facestrace:0.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
face info set cpe:2.3:a:faceinfoset:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
font awesome 5.6.1 cpe:2.3:a:font:awesome:5.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
gmbal-api-only cpe:2.3:a:oracle:glassfish:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
gson 2.2.4 cpe:2.3:a:gson:2.2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
guava 26.0 cpe:2.3:a:google:guava:26.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ha-api cpe:2.3:a:ha:api:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
httpclient 4.5.13 cpe:2.3:a:apache:httpclient:4.5.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
httpcore 4.4.14 cpe:2.3:a:apache:httpcore:4.4.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
icu4j-63.1
cpe:2.3:a:icu-
project:international_components_for_unicode:63.1:*:*:*:*:c\/c\+\+:*:*
ifxjdbc cpe:2.3:a:ibm:informix_jdbc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
imagscalr-lib 4.2 cpe:2.3:a:imgscalr:lib:4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ion-java-1.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:amazon:ion:1.02:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
ipworkszip cpe:2.3:a:ipworkszip:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
itext 2.1.7 cpe:2.3:a:itextpdf:itext:2.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jackson annotations cpe:2.3:a:fasterxml:jackson:2.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jackson core cpe:2.3:a:fasterxml:jackson-core:*
jackson databind 2.10.5 cpe:2.3:a:fasterxml:jackson-databind:2.10.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
24
jakartha oro cpe:2.3:a:jakartha:oro:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jasperreports 6.7.1 cpe:2.3:a:jaspersoft:jasperreports:6.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jasperreports-chart-
themes 6.7.0
cpe:2.3:a:jaspersoft:jasperreports-chart-themes:6.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jasperreports-fonts 6.7.1 cpe:2.3:a:jaspersoft:jasperreports-fonts:6.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jasypt 1.9.2 cpe:2.3:a:jasypt_project:jasypt:1.9.2:*
java jwt 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:java:jwt:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
javax annotation cpe:2.3:a:oracle:javax:annotation:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
java xml soap cpe:2.3:a:javax:xml:soap:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxb-api cpe:2.3:o:jaxb-api:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxb core cpe:2.3:o:jaxb-core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxb-impl cpe:2.3:o:jaxb-impl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxb-jxc cpe:2.3:o:jaxb-jxc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxb-xjc cpe:2.3:o:jaxb-xjc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxws-rt cpe:2.3:o:jaxws-rt:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jaxws-tools cpe:2.3:o:jaxws-tools:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jcifs 1.3.18 cpe:2.3:o:jcifs:1.3.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jcmFIPS cpe:2.3:a:oracle:jcmFIPS:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jcommon-1.0.10 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:jcommon:1.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jfreechat 1.0.19 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:jfreechart:1.0.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jgroups 4.1.2 cpe:2.3:a:jgroups:jgroup:4.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jmespath java 1.11.631 cpe:2.3:a:amazon:jmespath:java:1.11.631:*:*:*:*:*:*
jms cpe:2.3:a:jenkins:jms_messaging:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:jenkins:*:*
25
jnq 1.3.6 cpe:2.3:o:jnq:1.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
joda-time 2.2 cpe:2.3:o:joda-time:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jsch 0.1.54 cpe:2.3:o:jsch:0.1.54:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
jsr181 api cpe:2.3:a:jsr181:*:*:*:*:*:*
jt400 cpe:2.3:a:jt400:*:*:*:*:*:*
jTDS3 cpe:2.3:a:jTDS3:*:*:*:*:*:*
jxl cpe:2.3:a:jxl:*:*:*:*:*:*
jzlib 1.1.2 cpe:2.3:a:jcraft:jzlib:1.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
log4j 1.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:log4j:1.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
log4j-1.2-api-2.13.3 cpe:2.3:a:apache:log4j:2.13.3:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
log4j-core 2.13.3 cpe:2.3:a:apache:log4j-core:2.13.3:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
log4j-slf4j-impl-2.13.3 cpe:2.3:a:slf4j:slf4j-log4j-2:13.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
lucene analyzers common
4.7.2
cpe:2.3:a:apache:lucene-analyzers:common:4.7.2*:*:*:*:*:*:*
lucene codecs 4.7.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:lucene-codecs:4.7.2*:*:*:*:*:*:*
lucene core 4.7.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:lucene-core:4.7.2*:*:*:*:*:*:*
lucene-grouping 4.7.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:lucene-grouping:4.7.2*:*:*:*:*:*:*
lucene-queries 4.7.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:lucene-queries:4.7.2*:*:*:*:*:*:*
lucene-queryparser 4.7.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:lucene-queryparser:4.7.2*:*:*:*:*:*:*
management-api cpe:2.3:a:management-api:*:*:*:*:*:*
mariadb-java-client 1.7.1 cpe:2.3:a:mariadb-java-client:1.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
maverick-legacy-server
1.7.34
cpe:2.3:a:maverick-legacy-server:1.7.34:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
26
mimepull cpe:2.3:a:mimepull:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mina-core 2.1.4 cpe:2.3:a:apache:mina:2.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
msbase cpe:2.3:a:msbase:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
mssqlserver cpe:2.3:a:mssqlserver:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
msutil cpe:2.3:a:msutil:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
myfaces 2.2.12 cpe:2.3:a:apache:myfaces:2.2.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
native-lib-loader 2.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:native-lib-loader:2.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
netty 4.1.48 cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:4.1.48:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
not going to be common
ssl 0.3.18
cpe:2.3:a:not-going-to-be-common:ssl:0.3.18*:*:*:*:*:*:*
ojdbc5 cpe:2.3:a:ojdbc5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
opensaml 2.6.6 cpe:2.3:a:shibboleth:opensaml:2.6.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
openws 1.5.4 cpe:2.3:a:shibboleth:openws:1.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
oro 2.0.8 cpe:2.3:a:jahia:oro:2.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
owasp sanitizer cpe:2.3:a:owasp:json-sanitizer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
poi 4.1.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:poi:4.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
poi ooxml 4.1.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:poi-ooxml:4.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
poi ooxml schemas 4.4.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:poi-ooxml-schemas:4.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
policy cpe:2.3:a:policy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
postgresql 42.2.14 cpe:2.3:a:postgresql:postgresql_jdbc_driver:42.2.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
prettyfaces-jsf2 3.3.0 cpe:2.3:a:apache:prettyfaces-jsf2:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
primefaces 7.0.14 cpe:2.3:a:primetek:primefaces:7.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
27
primefaces-extensions
7.0.1
cpe:2.3:a:primetek:primefaces-extensions:7.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
qname cpe:2.3:a:qname:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
resolver cpe:2.3:a:resolver:jar:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
saaj-impl cpe:2.3:a:sun:saaj:impl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sardine cpe:2.3:a:sardine:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
slf4j-api-1.7.25 cpe:2.3:a:qos:slf4j:1.7.25:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
snmp4j 2.3.4 cpe:2.3:a:snmp4j:2.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
spring beans 5.2.9 cpe:2.3:a:spring-beans:5.2.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
spring context 5.2.9 cpe:2.3:a:spring-context:5.2.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
spring core 5.2.9 cpe:2.3:a:spring-core:5.2.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sqljdbc4 cpe:2.3:a:microsoft:sqljdbc4*:*:*:*:*:*:*
sslj cpe:2.3:a:sslj:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
stax2-api cpe:2.3:a:stax2-api:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
stax2-api-3.1.4 cpe:2.3:a:stax2-api:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
stax2-api-1.0.2 cpe:2.3:a:stax2-api:1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
stax-ex cpe:2.3:a:stax-ex:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
streambuffer cpe:2.3:a:streambuffer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
taglibs-standard 1.2.3 cpe:2.3:a:apache:standard_taglibs:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
tinyradius 1.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:tinyradius:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
tomahawk20-1.1.14 cpe:2.3:a:apache:myfaces_tomahawk:1.1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
unboundid-ldapsdk-4.0.11 cpe:2.3:a:pingidentity:ldapsdk:4.0.11:*:*:*:*:java:*:*
velocity-1.7 cpe:2.3:a:apache:velocity_engine:1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
28
woodstox-core-asl cpe:2.3:a:apache:woodstox-core-asl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
woodstox-core-asl-4.4.1 cpe:2.3:a:apache:woodstox-core-asl:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
wsbuilder cpe:2.3:a:apache:wsbuilder:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
wsdl4j cpe:2.3:a:wsdl4j:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
xml-apis 1.3.04 cpe:2.3:a:xmlapis:1.3.04:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
xmlbeans 3.1.0 cpe:2.3:a:apache:xmlbeans:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
xmlgraphics commons 2.2 cpe:2.3:a:apache:xmlgraphics_commons:2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
xmlsec 2.1.4 cpe:2.3:a:xmlseclibs_project:xmlseclibs:2.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
xmltooling 1.4.6 cpe:2.3:a:xmltooling_project:xmltooling:1.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
openjdk 1.8.0 cpe:2.3:a:oracle:openjdk:1.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
microsoft windows server
2016
cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows_server_2016:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The searched components were identified based on processing network traffic and parsing file formats.
The evaluation team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability testing
and found that any vulnerabilities have been mitigated or did not result in the TOE being able to
be exploited in its evaluated configuration. The search terms, dates, and public databases used are
also documented in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence and
justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation addressed the
vulnerability analysis Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile for Application Software,
Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for Transport Layer Security
(TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended Package for Secure Shell
(SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP] and that the conclusion reached by the
evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The validation team's assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team performed the Assurance Activities in the Protection Profile
29
for Application Software, Version 1.3, dated 01 March 2019 [SWAPP], Functional Package for
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1, dated 01 March 2019 [TLS-PKG] and Extended
Package for Secure Shell (SSH), Version 1.0, dated 19 February 2016 [SSH-EP] and correctly
verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
30
10 Validator Comments & Recommendations
None.
31
11 Annexes
Not applicable.
32
12 Security Target
Please see the Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Security Target v1.1.
33
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
34
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5.
5. Protection Profile for Application Software, version 1.3, dated, 01 March 2019 [SWAPP].
6. Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Security Target version 1.1[ST].
7. Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Common Criteria Configuration Guide
version 1.1[AGD].
8. Evaluation Technical Report for Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 version
1.1 [ETR].
9. Assurance Activities Report for Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 version
1.1 [AAR].
10. Fortra’s GoAnywhere Managed File Transfer v6.8 Detailed Test Report version 1.4,
3/29/2023. [DTR].