Security Target
SQL Server 2008 Team
Author: Roger French
Version: 1.2
Date: 2009-01-23
Abstract
This document is the Security Target (ST) for the Common Criteria certification of the
database engine of Microsoft® SQL Server® 2008.
Keywords
CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target
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Table of Contents
Page
1 ST INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 6
1.1 ST and TOE Reference........................................................................................... 6
1.2 TOE Overview......................................................................................................... 7
1.3 TOE Description...................................................................................................... 7
1.3.1 Product Type ....................................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE ........................................................... 8
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE ......................................................................................11
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE............................................................11
1.4 Conventions ...........................................................................................................14
2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS...........................................................................................15
2.1 CC Conformance Claim .........................................................................................15
2.2 PP Conformance Claim..........................................................................................15
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ............................................................................16
3.1 Assets ....................................................................................................................16
3.2 Assumptions ..........................................................................................................17
3.3 Threats...................................................................................................................18
3.4 Organizational Security Policies .............................................................................19
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES.............................................................................................20
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE .............................................................................20
4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment ..............................................21
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale.................................................................................22
4.3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................22
4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives................................................................23
4.3.3 Rationale for environmental Security Objectives.................................................26
5 EXTENDED COMPONENT DEFINITION......................................................................28
5.1 Definition for FAU_STG.5.EXP...............................................................................28
6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................30
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements..................................................................31
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit...................................................................................32
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection........................................................................34
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication ........................................................35
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management......................................................................36
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements .................................................................40
6.3 Security Requirements rationale.............................................................................40
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale........................................................40
6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies ...........................................................44
6.3.3 Rationale for Assurance Requirements...............................................................45
7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...............................................................................46
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM) ..............................................................................46
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC) .........................................................................................46
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A) ..............................................................48
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7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU) ...........................................................................................49
8 APPENDIX....................................................................................................................51
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains................................................................................51
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain..........................................................51
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining.........................................................................51
8.2 References.............................................................................................................53
8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations....................................................................................54
8.3.1 Glossary .............................................................................................................54
8.3.2 Abbreviations......................................................................................................55
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List of Tables
Page
Table 1: Hardware and Software Requirements ...................................................................11
Table 2 - Assumptions..........................................................................................................17
Table 3 - Threats to the TOE................................................................................................18
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies............................................................................19
Table 5 - Security Objectives for the TOE.............................................................................20
Table 6 - Security Objectives for the TOE Environment........................................................21
Table 7 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale ...........................................................22
Table 8 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives..................................................................23
Table 9 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives ............................................................26
Table 10 - TOE Security Functional Requirements...............................................................31
Table 11 - Auditable Events .................................................................................................33
Table 12 - Default Server Roles ...........................................................................................39
Table 13 – Default Database Roles......................................................................................39
Table 14 – Rationale for TOE Security Requirements ..........................................................40
Table 15 – Functional Requirements Dependencies for the TOE .........................................44
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1: TOE........................................................................................................................ 9
Figure 2: Concept of Ownership Chaining ............................................................................52
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1 ST Introduction
This chapter presents Security Target (ST) and TOE identification information and a general
overview of the ST. An ST contains the information technology (IT) security requirements of
an identified Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security
measures offered by that TOE to meet stated requirements. An ST principally defines:
a) A security problem expressed as a set of assumptions about the security aspects
of the environment, a list of threats that the TOE is intended to counter, and any
known rules with which the TOE must comply (chapter 3, Security Problem
Definition)
b) A set of security objectives and a set of security requirements to address the
security problem (chapters 4 and 6, Security Objectives and IT Security
Requirements, respectively).
c) The IT security functions provided by the TOE that meet the set of requirements
(chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification).
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This chapter provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its Target of
Evaluation (TOE).
ST Title: Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Database Engine Common
Criteria Evaluation Security Target
ST Version: 1.2
Date: 2009-01-23
Author: Roger French, Microsoft Corporation
Certification-ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0520
TOE Identification: Database Engine of Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Enterprise
Edition (English) x86 and x64 and its related guidance
documentation ([AGD] and [AGD_ADD])
TOE Version: 10.0.1600.22
TOE Platform: Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition (English) Version
6.0.6001
CC Identification: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 1 as of September 2006 for
part I, revision 2 as of September 2007 for parts II and III,
English version.
Evaluation Assurance Level: EAL 1 augmented by ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2 and
ASE_SPD.1.
PP Conformance: none
Keywords: CC, ST, Common Criteria, SQL, Security Target
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1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the database engine of SQL Server 2008. SQL Server is a Database
Management System (DBMS).
The TOE has been developed as the core of the DBMS to store data in a secure way.
The security functionality of the TOE comprises:
 Security Management
 Access Control
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Audit
A summary of the TOE security functions can be found in chapter 1.3.4. A more detailed
description of the security functions can be found in chapter 7, TOE Summary Specification.
Please note that only the SQL Server 2008 database engine is addressed in this ST. Other
related products of the SQL Server 2008 platform, such as Service Broker, provide services
that are useful but are not central to the enforcement of security policies. Hence, security
evaluation is not directly applicable to those other products.
1.3 TOE Description
This chapter provides context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and
describing the evaluated configuration. The main purpose of this chapter is to bind the TOE
in physical and logical terms. The chapter starts with a description of the product type before
it introduces the physical scope, the architecture and last but not least the logical scope of
the TOE.
1.3.1 Product Type
The product type of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) described in this ST is a database
management system (DBMS) with the capability to limit TOE access to authorized users,
enforce Discretionary Access Controls on objects under the control of the database
management system based on user and/or role authorizations, and to provide user
accountability via audit of users‘ actions.
A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows authorized users to
retrieve and update that information. A DBMS may be a single-user system, in which only
one user may access the DBMS at a given time, or a multi-user system, in which many users
may access the DBMS simultaneously.
The TOE which is described in this ST is the database engine and therefore part of SQL
Server 2008. It provides a relational database engine providing mechanisms for Access
Control, Identification and Authentication and Security Audit.
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The SQL Server platform additionally includes the following tools which are not part of the
TOE:
 SQL Server Replication: Data replication for distributed or mobile data processing
applications and integration with heterogeneous systems
 Analysis Services: Online analytical processing (OLAP) capabilities for the analysis of
large and complex datasets.
 Reporting Services: A comprehensive solution for creating, managing, and delivering
both traditional, paper-oriented reports and interactive, Web-based reports.
 Integration Services: Microsoft Integration Services is a platform for building
enterprise-level data integration and data transformations solutions.
 Management tools: The SQL Server platform includes integrated management tools
for database management and tuning as well as tight integration with tools such as
Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM) and Microsoft Systems Management Server
(SMS).
 Development tools: SQL Server offers integrated development tools for the database
engine, data extraction, transformation, and loading (ETL), data mining, OLAP, and
reporting that are tightly integrated with Microsoft Visual Studio to provide end-to-end
application development capabilities
 Other tools offered by the installation process: Full Text Search, Business Intelligence
Development Studio, Client tools connectivity, Client tools backwards compatibility,
Client tools SDK, SQL client connectivity SDK, Microsoft sync framework.
The TOE itself only comprises the database engine of the SQL Server 2008 platform which
provides the security functionality as required by this ST. Any additional tools of the SQL
Server 2008 platform interact with the TOE as a standard SQL client. The scope and
boundary of the TOE will be described in the next chapter. Please refer to [AGD_ADD] for
more information about the installation process of the TOE.
1.3.2 Physical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
The TOE is the database engine of the SQL Server 2008 and its related guidance
documentation. This engine has been evaluated in two different configurations (x86 and x64)
while the IA64 version of the database engine has not been evaluated.
The following figure shows the TOE (including its internal structure) and its immediate
environment.
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Figure 1: TOE
As seen in Figure 1 the TOE internally comprises the following logical units:
The Communication part is the interface for programs accessing the TOE. It is the interface
between the TOE and clients performing requests.
All responses to user application requests return to the client through this part of the TOE.
The Relational Engine is the core of the database engine and is responsible for all security
relevant decisions. The relational engine establishes a user context, syntactically checks
every Transact SQL (T-SQL) statement, compiles every statement, checks permissions to
determine if the statement can be executed by the user associated with the request,
optimizes the query request, builds and caches a query plan, and executes the statement.
The Storage Engine is a resource provider. When the relational engine attempts to execute
a T-SQL statement that accesses an object for the first time, it calls upon the storage engine
to retrieve the object, put it into memory and return a pointer to the execution engine. To
perform these tasks, the storage engine manages the physical resources for the TOE by
using the Windows OS.
The SQL-OS is a resource provider for all situations where the TOE uses functionality of the
operating system. SQL-OS provides an abstraction layer over common OS functions and
was designed to reduce the number of context switches within the TOE. SQL-OS especially
contains functionality for Task Management and for Memory Management.
For Task Management the TOE provides an OS-like environment for threads, including
scheduling, and synchronization —all running in user mode, all (except for I/O) without
calling the Windows Operating System.
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The Memory Manager is responsible for the TOE memory pool. The memory pool is used to
supply the TOE with its memory while it is executing. Almost all data structures that use
memory in the TOE are allocated in the memory pool. The memory pool also provides
resources for transaction logging and data buffers.
The immediate environment of the TOE comprises:
The Windows 2008 Server Enterprise Edition Operating System, which hosts the TOE.
As the TOE is a software only TOE it lives as a process in the Operating System (OS) and
uses the resources of the OS. These resources comprise general functionality (e.g. the
memory management and scheduling features of the OS) as well as specific functionality of
the OS, which is important for the Security Functions of the TOE (see chapter 7 for more
details)
Other parts of the SQL Server 2008 Platform, which might be installed together with the
TOE. The TOE is the central part of a complete DBMS platform, which realizes all Security
Functions as described in this ST. However other parts of the platform may be installed on
the same machine if they are needed to support the operation or administration of the TOE.
However these other parts will interact with the TOE in the same way, every other client
would do.
Clients (comprising local clients and remote clients) are used to interact with the TOE during
administration and operation. Services of the Operating System are used to route the
communication of remote clients with the TOE.
The TOE relies on functionality of the Windows 2008 Server Operating System and has the
following hardware/software requirements:
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Table 1: Hardware and Software Requirements
CPU  Pentium III compatible at 1 GHz or faster (for the 32 bit edition)
 AMD Opteron, AMD Athlon 64, Intel Xeon with Intel EM64T
support, Intel Pentium IV with EM64T support at 1.4 GHz or faster 1
RAM 512 MB
Hard Disk Approx 1500 MB of free space
Other DVD ROM drive, display at Super VGA resolution, Microsoft mouse
compatible pointing device, keyboard
Software Windows Server 2008 Enterprise Edition (in 64 or 32 bit), English version,
version 6.0.6001
.NET Framework 3.5 SP 1
Windows Installer4.5
The following guidance documents and supportive information belong to the TOE:
 SQL Server 2008 Books Online: This is the general guidance documentation for the
complete SQL Server 2008 platform
 SQL Server Guidance Addendum / Installation / Startup: This document contains the
aspects of the guidance that are specific to the evaluated configuration of SQL Server
2008
The website https://www.microsoft.com/sql/commoncriteria/2008/EAL1/default.mspx contains
additional information about the TOE and its evaluated configuration. Also the guidance
addendum that describes the specific aspects of the certified version can be obtained via this
website. The guidance addendum extends the general guidance of SQL Server 2008 that
ships along with the product in form of Books Online.
This website shall be visited before using the TOE.
1.3.3 Architecture of the TOE
The TOE which is described in this ST comprises one instance of the SQL Server 2008
database engine but has the possibility to serve several clients simultaneously.
1.3.4 Logical Scope and Boundary of the TOE
SQL Server 2008 is able to run multiple instances of the database engine on one machine.
After installation one default instance exists. However the administrator is able to add more
instances of SQL Server 2008 to the same machine.
The TOE comprises one instance of SQL Server 2008. Within this ST it is referenced either
as "the TOE" or as "instance". The machine the instances are running on is referenced as
"server" or "DBMS-server".
1
Please note that IA64 CPUs are not supported for the certified version of the database engine of SQL Server
2008
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If more than one instance of SQL Server 2008 is installed on one machine these just
represent multiple TOEs as there is no other interface between two instances of the TOE
than the standard client interface
In this way two or more instances of the TOE may only communicate through the standard
client interface.
The TOE provides the following set of security functionality
 The Access Control function of the TOE controls the access of users to user and
TSF data stored in the TOE. It further controls that only authorized administrators are
able to manage the TOE.
 The Security Audit function of the TOE produces log files about all security relevant
events.
 The Management function allows authorized administrators to manage the behavior
of the security functions of the TOE.
 The Identification and Authentication2
function of the TOE is able to identify and
authenticate users.
The following functions are part of the environment:
 The Audit Review and Audit Storage functionality has to be provided by the
environment and provide the authorized administrators with the capability to review
the security relevant events of the TOE.
 The Access Control Mechanisms has to be provided by the environment for files
stored in the environment
 The environment provides Identification and Authentication2
for users for the cases
where this is required by the TOE (The environment AND the TOE provide
mechanisms for user authentication. See chapter 7.3 for more details).
 The environment has to provide Time stamps to be used by the TOE.
 The environment provides a cryptographic mechanisms for hashing of passwords
All these functions are provided by the underlying Operating System (Windows 2008 Server
Enterprise Edition) except Audit Review, for which an additional tool has to be used (e.g. the
SQL Server Profiler, which is part of the SQL Server Platform).
Access to the complete functionality of the TOE is possible via a set of SQL-commands (see
[TSQL]).
This set of commands is available via:
 Shared Memory
 Named Pipes
2
Note that the TOE as well as the environment provides a mechanism for identification and authentication.
Chapter 7 will describe this in more detail.
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 TCP/IP
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1.4 Conventions
For this Security Target the following conventions are used:
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in chapter C.4 of Part 1 of the CC. Each of
these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by bold text.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating
a requirement. Selections that have been made are denoted by italicized text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made are denoted by
showing the value in square brackets, [Assignment_value].
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing the iteration number in parenthesis following the component
identifier, (iteration_number).
The CC paradigm also allows protection profile and security target authors to create their
own requirements. Such requirements are termed ‗explicit requirements‘ and are permitted if
the CC does not offer suitable requirements to meet the authors‘ needs. Explicit
requirements must be identified and are required to use the CC class/family/component
model in articulating the requirements. In this ST, explicit requirements will be indicated with
the ―.EXP‖ following the component name.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims to be
 CC Part 2 (Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007) extended due to the use of
the component FAU_STG.5.EXP
 CC Part 3 (Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007) conformant as only
assurance components as defined in part III of [CC] have been used.
Further this Security Target claims to be conformant to the Security Assurance Requirements
package EAL 1 augmented by ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2 and ASE_SPD.1.
2.2 PP Conformance Claim
This Security Target does not claim compliance to any Protection Profile.
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3 Security Problem Definition
This chapter describes
 the assets that have to be protected by the TOE,
 assumptions about the environment of the TOE,
 threats against those assets and
 organizational security policies that TOE shall comply with.
3.1 Assets
The TOE maintains two types of data which represent the assets: User Data and TSF Data.
The primary assets are the User Data which comprises the following:
 The user data stored in or as database objects;
 User-developed queries or procedures that the DBMS maintains for users.
The secondary assets comprise the TSF data that the TOE maintains and uses for its own
operation. This kind of data is also called metadata. It specifically includes:
 The definitions of user databases and database objects
 Configuration parameters,
 User security attributes,
 Security Audit instructions and records
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3.2 Assumptions
The following table lists all the assumptions about the environment of the TOE.
Table 2 - Assumptions
Assumption Description
A.NO_EVIL Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and
follow all administrator guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on DBMS
servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
A.OS It is assumed that the TOE is installed on Windows Server
2008 Enterprise Edition and that this Operating System
provides functionality for
 Identification and authentication of users,
 Access Control for Files,
 Time stamps,
 Audit Storage,
 Hashing of passwords
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that appropriate physical security is
provided for the server, on which the TOE is installed,
considering the value of the stored, processed, and
transmitted information.
A.COMM It is assumed that any communication path from and to
the TOE is appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping
and manipulation.
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3.3 Threats
The following table lists the threats against the assets, which are protected by the TOE and
its environment.
Table 3 - Threats to the TOE
Threat Description
T. ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR An administrator may incorrectly install or
configure the TOE resulting in ineffective TSF
data and therewith ineffective security
mechanisms.
T.MASQUERADE A user or process may claim to be another
entity in order to gain unauthorized access to
data or TOE resources.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE A user or process may try to access (i.e. view,
modify or delete) configuration data of the
TOE. This could allow the user or process to
gain knowledge about the configuration of the
TOE or could bring the TOE into an insecure
configuration in which the security mechanisms
for the protection of the assets are not longer
working correctly.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may try to gain unauthorized access to
user data for which they are not authorized
according to the TOE security policy.
Within the scope of this threat the user just
tries to access assets, he doesn‘t have
permission on, without trying to masquerade
another user or circumventing the security
mechanism in any other way.
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3.4 Organizational Security Policies
An organizational security policy is a set of rules, practices, and procedures imposed by an
organization to address its security needs. This chapter identifies the organizational security
policies applicable to the TOE.
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies
Policy Description
P.ACCOUNTABILITY The authorized users of the TOE shall be held accountable for
their actions within the TOE.
P.ROLES The TOE shall provide an authorized administrators role for
secure administration of the TOE. This role shall be separate
and distinct from other authorized users.
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4 Security Objectives
The purpose of the security objectives is to detail the planned response to a security problem
or threat. This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and its operational
environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This chapter identifies and describes the security objectives of the TOE.
Table 5 - Security Objectives for the TOE
Objective Description
O.ADMIN_ROLE The TOE will provide authorized
administrators roles to isolate administrative
actions.
The TOE will provide administrators with the
necessary information for secure
management.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION The TOE will provide the capability to detect
and create records of security relevant
events associated with users.
O.MANAGE The TOE will provide all the functions and
facilities necessary to support the authorized
administrators in their management of the
security of the TOE, and restrict these
functions and facilities from unauthorized
use.
O.MEDIATE The TOE must protect user data in
accordance with its security policy.
O.I&A The TOE will provide a mechanism for
identification and authentication of users.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the operational Environment
The security objectives for the operational environment of the TOE are defined in the
following table.
Table 6 - Security Objectives for the TOE Environment
Objective Description
OE.NO_EVIL Sites using the TOE shall ensure that authorized
administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained and
follow all administrator guidance.
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
There will be no general-purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user applications) available on DBMS
servers, other than those services necessary for the
operation, administration and support of the DBMS.
OE.OS The TOE shall be installed on Windows Server 2008
Enterprise Edition. This Operating System provides
functionality for
 Identification and authentication of users,
 Access Control for Files,
 Time stamps,
 Audit Storage,
 Hashing of passwords
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security shall be provided for the server, on which
the TOE will be installed, considering the value of the
stored, processed, and transmitted information.
OE.COMM Any communication path from and to the TOE will be
appropriately secured to avoid eavesdropping and
manipulation.
OE.AUDIT_REVIEW The environment shall provide tools for the administrators to
review the audit logs that are produced by the TOE.
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4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1 Overview
The following table summarizes the rationale for the security objectives.
Table 7 – Summary of Security Objectives Rationale
Threats, Assumptions, OSP /
Security Objectives
O.ADMIN_ROLE
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
O.MANAGE
O.MEDIATE
O.I&A
OE.NO_EVIL
OE.NO_GENERAL_
PURPOSE
OE.OS
OE.PHYSICAL
OE.COMM
OE:AUDIT_REVIEW
T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERROR X
T.MASQUERADE X
T.TSF_COMPROMISE X
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS X X
P.ACCOUNTABILITY X X X
P.ROLES X
A.NO_EVIL X
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE X
A.OS X
A.PHYSICAL X
A.COMM X
Details are given in the following subchapters.
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4.3.2 Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Table 8 – Rationale for TOE Security Objectives
Threat/Policy Objectives Addressing the
Threat/Policy
Rationale
T.ACCIDENTAL_ADMIN_ERR
OR
An administrator may
incorrectly install or configure
the TOE resulting in ineffective
security mechanisms.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide administrators
with the necessary information for
secure management.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
counters this threat by ensuring the
TOE administrators have guidance
that instructs them how to administer
the TOE in a secure manner. Having
this guidance and considering the
assumption A.NO_EVIL mitigates
the threat that an administrator might
cause the TOE to be configured
insecurely to an acceptable level.
T.MASQUERADE
A user or process may claim to
be another entity in order to
gain unauthorized access to
data or TOE resources.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a mechanism
for identification and authentication of
users.
O.I&A
counters this threat by providing the
means to identify and authenticate
the user where the I&A mechanisms
of the environment is not used. The
correct identity of the user is the basis
for any decision of the TOE about an
attempt of a user to access data. In
this way it is not possible for a user or
process to masquerade as another
entity and the threat is removed.
T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A user or process may try to
access (i.e. view, modify or
delete) configuration data of
the TOE. This could allow the
user or process to gain
knowledge about the
configuration of the TOE or
could bring the TOE into an
insecure configuration in which
the security mechanisms for
the protection of the assets are
not longer working correctly.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all the functions
and facilities necessary to support
the authorized administrators in their
management of the security of the
TOE and restrict these functions and
facilities from unauthorized use.
O.MANAGE
counters this threat as it defines that
only authorized administrators shall
be able to use the management
functionality, provided by the TOE. In
this way the threat is removed.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS
A user may try to gain
unauthorized access to user
data for which they are not
authorized according to the
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect user data in
accordance with its security policy.
O.MEDIATE
ensures that all accesses to user
data are subject to mediation. The
TOE requires successful
authentication to the TOE prior to
gaining access to any controlled-
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TOE security policy.
Within the scope of this threat
the user just tries to access
assets, he doesn‘t have
permission on, without trying to
masquerade another user or
circumventing the security
mechanism in any other way.
access content Lastly, the TSF will
ensure that all configured
enforcement functions
(authentication, access control rules,
etc.) must be invoked prior to
allowing a user to gain access to
TOE or TOE mediated services.
The TOE restricts the ability to
modify the security attributes
associated with access control rules,
access to authenticated and
unauthenticated services, etc to the
administrator. Together with O.I&A
this mechanism ensures that no user
can gain unauthorized access to
data and in this way removes the
threat.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a mechanism
for identification and authentication
of users.
O.I&A
contributes to countering this threat
by providing the means to identify
and authenticate the user where the
I&A mechanism of the environment
is not used. The correct identity of
the user is the basis for any decision
of the TOE about an attempt of a
user to access data.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The authorized users of the
TOE shall be held accountable
for their actions within the TOE.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the capability to
detect and create records of security
relevant events associated with
users.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
addresses this policy by providing
the authorized administrator with the
capability of configuring the audit
mechanism to record the actions of a
specific user.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a mechanism
for identification and authentication
of users.
O.I&A
supports this policy by providing the
means to identify and authenticate
the user where the I&A mechanisms
of the environment cannot be used.
The identity of the user is stored in
the audit logs.
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OE.AUDIT_REVIEW OE.AUDIT_REVIEW supports the
policy for accountability as the
environment of the TOE provides a
means for audit review. Without this
objective for the environment it
would not be possible to review the
audit logs that are produced by the
TOE.
P.ROLES
The TOE shall provide an
authorized administrator role
for secure administration of the
TOE. This role shall be
separate and distinct from
other authorized users.
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide authorized
administrator roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE has the objective of
providing authorized administrator
roles for secure administration. In
this way the policy P.ROLES is
fulfilled. (by O.ADMIN_ROLE).
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4.3.3 Rationale for environmental Security Objectives
The following table contains the rationale for the IT Environmental Objectives.
Table 9 – Rationale for IT Environmental Objectives
Assumption Environmental Objective
Addressing the Assumption
Rationale
A.NO_EVIL
Administrators are non-hostile,
appropriately trained, and follow
all administrator guidance.
OE.NO_EVIL
Sites using the TOE shall
ensure that authorized
administrators are non- hostile,
are appropriately trained and
follow all administrator
guidance.
All authorized administrators
are trustworthy individuals,
having background
investigations commensurate
with the level of data being
protected, have undergone
appropriate admin training, and
follow all admin guidance.
A.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose
computing or storage repository
capabilities (e.g., compilers or
user applications) available on
DBMS servers, other than those
services necessary for the
operation, administration and
support of the DBMS.
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There will be no general-
purpose computing capabilities
(e.g., compilers or user
applications) available on
DMBS servers, other than those
services necessary for the
operation, administration and
support of the DBMS.
The DBMS server must not
include any general-purpose
computing or storage
capabilities. This will protect
the TSF data from malicious
processes.
A.OS
The TOE is installed on Windows
Server 2008 Enterprise Edition.
This Operating System provides
functionality for
 Identification and
authentication of users,
 Access Control for Files,
 Time stamps,
 Audit Storage,
 Hashing of passwords
The TOE shall be installed on
Windows Server 2008
Enterprise Edition. This
Operating System provides
functionality for
 Identification and
authentication of users,
 Access Control for
Files,
 Time stamps,
 Audit Storage,
Hashing of passwords
The specific requirement on
the Operating System ensures
that the IT environment
provides the necessary
functionality for the operation of
the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL
It is assumed that appropriate
physical security is provided for
the server, on which the TOE is
installed, considering the value of
the stored, processed, and
transmitted information.
OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security shall be
provided for the server, on
which the TOE will be installed,
considering the value of the
stored, processed, and
transmitted information.
The TOE, the TSF data, and
protected user data is assumed
to be protected from physical
attack (e.g., theft, modification,
destruction, or eavesdropping).
Physical attack could include
unauthorized intruders into the
TOE environment, but it does
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not include physical destructive
actions that might be taken by
an individual that is authorized
to access the TOE
environment.
A.COMM
It is assumed that any
communication path from and to
the TOE is appropriately secured
to avoid eavesdropping and
manipulation.
OE.COMM
Any communication path from
and to the TOE will be
appropriately secured to avoid
eavesdropping and
manipulation.
A.COMM is completely and
directly addressed by
OE.COMM. OE.COMM and
A.COMM both address the
requirement that any
communication path to and
from the TOE has to be
appropriately secured.
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5 Extended Component Definition
5.1 Definition for FAU_STG.5.EXP
This chapter defines the extended functional component FAU_STG.5.EXP (Administrable
prevention of audit data loss) of the existing functional class FAU (Security audit).
This component was defined because part II of [CC] does not contain any SFR which allows
specifying a set of allowed actions which can be taken in the case where the audit is full.
For the TOE described in this ST it was necessary to provide authorized administrators with
the possibility to specify what should happen if the audit log is full.
The family FAU_STG is extended by the new component FAU_STG.5.EXP as shown in the
following figure:
FAU_STG: Security audit event storage
1
3 4
2
5.EXP
Figure 1: FAU_STG Component Levelling
FAU_STG.5.EXP Extended prevention of audit loss, specifies administrable actions in case
the audit trail is full.
Management for FAU_STG.5.EXP:
The following actions could be considered for management functions in FMT:
a) maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of
audit storage failure.
Audit for FAU_STG.5.EXP:
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) Basic: Actions taken due to potential audit storage failure.
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FAU_STG.5.EXP Administrable prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data
loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.5.EXP.1 The TSF shall take one the following actions: [selection: “ignore
auditable events”, “prevent auditable events, except those taken
by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest
stored audit records”, “stop the TOE”, [assignment: other
actions]] as defined by [assignment: authorised role] if the audit
trail is full.
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6 IT Security Requirements
This chapter defines the IT security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE or its
environment:
Common Criteria divides TOE security requirements into two categories:
 Security functional requirements (SFRs) (such as, identification and authentication,
security management, and user data protection) that the TOE and the supporting
evidence need to satisfy to meet the security objectives of the TOE.
 Security assurance requirements (SARs) that provide grounds for confidence that the
TOE and its supporting IT environment meet its security objectives (e.g.,
configuration management, testing, and vulnerability assessment).
These requirements are discussed separately within the following subchapters.
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6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The TOE satisfies the SFRs delineated in the following table. The rest of this chapter
contains a description of each component and any related dependencies.
Table 10 - TOE Security Functional Requirements
Class FAU: Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_STG.5.EXP Administrable Prevention of audit data loss
Class FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
Class FMT: Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1(1) Revocation (user attributes)
FMT_REV.1(2) Revocation (subject, object attributes)
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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6.1.1 Class FAU: Security Audit
Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following
auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit listed in Table
11; and
c) [Start-up and shutdown of the DBMS;
d) Use of special permissions (e.g., those often used by authorized
administrators3
to circumvent access control policies)]
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if
applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the PP/ST, [none].
3
Note that in the context of this Security Target the term „Authorized Administrator― refers either to the „sysadmin―
(sa) or any other user who has the permission to perform the administration activity based on the DAC policy (see
also chapter 8.3.1).
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Table 11 - Auditable Events
Security Functional
Requirement
Auditable Event(s)
FAU_GEN.1 None
FAU_GEN.2 None
FAU_SEL.1 All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while
the audit collection functions are operating.
FDP_ACC.1 None
FDP_ACF.1 Successful requests to perform an operation on an object
covered by the SFP.
FIA_ATD.1 None
FMT_MOF.1 None
FMT_MSA.1 None
FMT_MSA.3 None
FMT_MTD.1 None
FMT_REV.1(1) Unsuccessful revocation of security attributes.
FMT_REV.1(2) Unsuccessful revocation of security attributes.
FMT_SMF.1 Use of the management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role.
FAU_STG.5.EXP Every modification to the setting
FIA_UAU.2 Every use of the authentication mechanism.
FIA_UAU.5 The final decision on authentication;
FIA_UID.2 Every use of the authentication mechanism.
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User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users4
, the TSF
shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of
the user that caused the event.
Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1)
FAU_SEL.1.1 The TSF shall allow only the administrator to select the set of audited
events from the set of all auditable events based on the following
attributes:
a) user identity, object identity,
b) [success of auditable security events, failure of auditable security
events]
Administrable Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG.5.EXP)
FAU_STG.5.EXP.1 The TSF shall take one of the following actions:
• Overwrite the oldest stored audit records
• Stop the TOE
as defined by [the administrator] if the audit trail is full.
6.1.2 Class FDP: User Data Protection
Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] on [all
subjects, all DBMS-controlled objects and all operations among them].
4
Please note that the term user in this context refers to a user or a group of users.
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Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to
objects based on the following:[
• The authorized user identity and/or group membership
associated with a subject,
• access operations implemented for DBMS-controlled objects,
and
• object identity].
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
[a) If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user,
deny access
b) If the requested mode of access is denied to any group of which the
authorized user is a member, deny access
c) If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user,
permit access.
d) If the requested mode of access is permitted to any group of which
the authorized user is a member, grant access
e) Else deny access]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to controlled
objects based on the following additional rules: [
• Authorized administrators, the owner of an object and owners
of parent objects have access
• in case of Ownership-Chaining access is always granted
].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
[no additional explicit denial rules].
6.1.3 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging
to individual users:[
• User identifier
• group memberships,
• login-type (SQL-Server login or Windows Account Name5
)
• For SQL-Server login: Hashed password].
5
A windows account name may be a Windows user or a Windows group
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User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU.2)
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [
• SQL Server Authentication and
• Access to Windows Authentication ]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user‘s claimed identity according to the
[following rules:
• If the login is associated with a Windows user or a Windows
group Windows Authentication is used,
• If the login is a SQL Server login the SQL Server
authentication is used.
].
User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2)
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4 Class FMT: Security Management
Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions
[relating to the specification of events to be audited] to [authorized
administrators].
Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to
restrict the ability to [manage] the security attributes [all] to [authorized
administrators].
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Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control policy] to
provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [no role] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [include or exclude] the [auditable
events] to [authorized administrators].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(1))
FMT_REV.1.1(1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [group membership]
associated with the users under the control of the TSF to [the
authorized administrators and database users as allowed by the
Discretionary Access Control policy].
FMT_REV.1.2(1) The TSF shall enforce the rules [Changes to logins are applied at the
latest as soon as a new session for the login is established].
Revocation (FMT_REV.1(2))
FMT_REV.1.1(2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke6
[Access Control Lists]
associated with the objects under the control of the TSF to [the
authorized administrators and database users as allowed by the
Discretionary Access Control policy].
FMT_REV.1.2(2) The TSF shall enforce the rules [The changes have to be applied
immediately].
6
In this context ―revocation‖ refers to any change to an Access Control List that is associated with an object.
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Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions: [
• Add and delete logins
• Add and delete users
• Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server
scoped roles
• Create and destroy database scoped groups
• Create, Start and Stop Audit
• Include and Exclude Auditable events
• Define the mode of authentication
• Define the action to take in case the audit file is full]
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:[
• Roles as defined in the following tables
• Roles to be defined by authorized administrators].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
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Table 12 - Default Server Roles
Role Descritpion
sysadmin Members of the sysadmin fixed server role can perform any activity
in the server. By default, all members of the Windows
BUILTIN\Administrators group, the local administrator's group, are
members of the sysadmin fixed server role.
Serveradmin Members of the serveradmin fixed server role can change server-
wide configuration options and shut down the server.
Securityadmin Members of the securityadmin fixed server role manage logins and
their properties. They can GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE server-
level permissions. They can also GRANT, DENY, and REVOKE
database-level permissions. Additionally, they can reset passwords
for SQL Server logins.
Processadmin Members of the processadmin fixed server role can end processes
that are running in an instance of SQL Server.
Setupadmin Members of the setupadmin fixed server role can add and remove
linked servers.
Bulkadmin Members of the bulkadmin fixed server role can run the BULK
INSERT statement.
Diskadmin The diskadmin fixed server role is used for managing disk files.
Dbcreator Members of the dbcreator fixed server role can create, alter, drop,
and restore any database.
Table 13 – Default Database Roles
Role Granted Permission(s)
db_owner Members of the db_owner fixed database role can perform all
configuration and maintenance activities on the database, and can
also drop the database.
db_securityadmin Members of the db_securityadmin fixed database role can modify
role membership and manage permissions. Adding principals to
this role could enable unintended privilege escalation.
db_accessadmin Members of the db_accessadmin fixed database role can add or
remove access to the database for Windows logins, Windows
groups, and SQL Server logins.
db_backupoperator Members of the db_backupoperator fixed database role can back
up the database.
db_ddladmin Members of the db_ddladmin fixed database role can run any Data
Definition Language (DDL) command in a database.
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db_datawriter Members of the db_datawriter fixed database role can add, delete,
or change data in all user tables.
db_datareader Members of the db_datareader fixed database role can read all
data from all user tables.
db_denydatawriter Members of the db_denydatawriter fixed database role cannot
add, modify, or delete any data in the user tables within a
database.
db_denydatareader Members of the db_denydatareader fixed database role cannot
read any data in the user tables within a database.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements for the TOE comprise all assurance requirements for EAL 1 as
defined in [CC] augmented by ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2 and ASE_SPD.1.
6.3 Security Requirements rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale
The following table contains the rationale for the TOE Security Requirements.
Table 14 – Rationale for TOE Security Requirements
Objective Requirements
Addressing the
Objective
Rationale
O.ADMIN_ROLE
The TOE will provide authorized
administrators roles to isolate
administrative actions.
The TOE will provide administrators
with the necessary information for
secure management.
FMT_SMR.1 The TOE will establish, at least,
an authorized administrator role.
The authorized administrator will
be given privileges to perform
certain tasks that other users will
not be able to perform. These
privileges include, but are not
limited to, access to audit
information and security
functions.
AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1
ensures the administrator has the
information necessary to install
the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1 mandates the
developer provide the
administrator and user with
guidance on how to operate the
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TOE in a secure manner.
O.AUDIT_GENERATION
The TOE will provide the capability to
detect and create records of security
relevant events associated with users.
FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 defines the set of
events that the TOE must be
capable of recording. This
requirement ensures that the
administrator has the ability to
audit any security relevant events
that takes place in the TOE. This
requirement also defines the
information that must be
contained in the audit record for
each auditable event.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 ensures that the
audit records associate a user
and/or group identity with the
auditable event.
FAU_SEL.1 FAU_SEL.1 allows the
administrator to configure which
auditable events will be recorded
in the audit trail. This provides
the administrator with the
flexibility in recording only those
events that are deemed
necessary by site policy, thus
reducing the amount of resources
consumed by the audit
mechanism.
FAU_STG.5.EXP FAU_STG.5.EXP allows the
administrator to define what
should happen in the case where
the audit file is full. This provides
the administrator with the
possibility to decide about
possible audit data loss or
stopping of services based on the
information stored in the TOE.
O.MANAGE
The TOE will provide all the functions
and facilities necessary to support the
authorized administrators in their
management of the security of the TOE,
and restrict these functions and facilities
from unauthorized use.
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_MOF.1 requires that the
ability to use particular TOE
capabilities be restricted to the
administrator.
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1 requires that the
ability to perform operations on
security attributes be restricted to
particular roles.
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 requires that default
values used for security attributes
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are restrictive.
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 requires that the
ability to manipulate TOE content
is restricted to administrators.
FMT_REV.1(1)
FMT_REV.1(2)
FMT_REV.1 restricts the ability to
revoke attributes to the
administrator
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 identifies the
management functions that are
available to the authorized
administrator.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
The access control policy of the
TOE ensures that only authorized
users (i.e. administrators) have
access to the management
functionality such that, for the
TOE, the use of that functionality
follows the same restrictions as
the access to data.
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 defines the specific
security roles to be supported.
O.MEDIATE
The TOE must protect user data in
accordance with its security policy.
FDP_ACC.1 The FDP requirements were
chosen to define the policies, the
subjects, objects, and operations
for how and when mediation
takes place in the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 defines the Access
Control policy that will be
enforced on a list of subjects
acting on the behalf of users
attempting to gain access to a list
of named objects. All the
operation between subjects and
objects covered are defined by
the TOE‘s policy.
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 defines the security
attribute used to provide access
control to objects based on the
TOE‘s access control policy.
O.I&A
The TOE will provide a mechanism for
identification and authentication of
users.
FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 defines the user
attributes, necessary for
authentication.
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2 realizes the
authentication part of O.I&A as it
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requires that each user has to get
successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated
action on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2 realizes the
identification part of O.I&A as it
requires that each user has to get
successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated
action on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.5 FIA_UAU.5 specifies that the
TOE uses two methods to ensure
that every user has to be
successfully authenticated.
On the one hand the TOE is able
to reuse the authentication results
from the environment and on the
other hand the TOE provides a
password based authentication
mechanism.
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6.3.2 Rationale for satisfying all Dependencies
The following table contains the rationale for satisfying all dependencies of the Security
Functional Requirements.
Table 15 – Functional Requirements Dependencies for the TOE
Requirement Dependency Satisfied
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 This requirement is satisfied by
the IT environment because the
DBMS is a software only TOE.
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
Satisfied
(FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1)
The dependency to FIA_UID.1
is either fulfilled by the TOE (for
SQL logins) or by the
environment (For windows
logins).
FAU_SEL.1 FAU_GEN.1
FMT_MTD.1
Satisfied
FAU_STG.5.EXP FAU_STG.1 The dependency to
FAU_STG.1 is satisfied by the
environment. The TOE as a
DBMS has to rely on the
Operating System to protect the
files.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Satisfied.
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Satisfied
FIA_ATD.1 None N/A
FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied
(FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1)
The dependency to FIA_UID.1
is either fulfilled by the TOE (for
SQL logins) or by the
environment (for windows
logins).
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FIA_UAU.5 None N/A
FIA_UID.2 None N/A
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied.
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1 or
FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Dependency satisfied by the
combination of FDP_ACC.1,
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied.
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Satisfied.
FMT_REV.1(1) FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied.
FMT_REV.1(2) FMT_SMR.1 Satisfied.
FMT_SMF.1 None N/A
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Satisfied
(FIA_UID.2 is hierarchical to
FIA_UID.1)
The dependency to FIA_UID.1
is either fulfilled by the TOE (for
SQL logins) or by the
environment (For windows
logins).
6.3.3 Rationale for Assurance Requirements
The "entry level" of EAL 1 has been chosen to gain an initial assurance that all required
functionalities are correctly implemented by the TOE.
Facing the situation that future releases of the TOE may be certified at a higher assurance
level it has been decided to augment the assurance level by ASE_OBJ.2, ASE_REQ.2 and
ASE_SPD.1 to have a ST that could also be used for higher assurance levels.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This chapter presents an overview of the security functions implemented by the TOE.
7.1 Security Management (SF.SM)
This Security Function of the TOE allows modifying the TSF data of the TOE and therewith
managing the behavior of the TSF.
This comprises the following management functions (FMT_SMF.1):
 Add and delete logins on an instance level
 Add and delete users on a database level
 Change role membership for DB scoped roles and Server scoped roles
 Create and destroy database roles
 Create, Start and Stop Security Audit
 Include and exclude Auditable events
 Define the mode of authentication for every login
 Define the action to take in case the audit file is full
All these management functions are available via T-SQL statements directly or realized by
Stored Procedures within the TOE which can be called using T-SQL.
The TOE maintains a set of roles on the server level and on the database level as listed in
Table 12 and 13. The TOE maintains a security ID for each login on a server level and each
database user. This security ID is used to associate each user with his assigned roles.
(FIA_ATD.1, FMT_SMR.1)
Changes to logins that are preformed via the management functions are applied at the latest
as soon as a new session for the login is established. (FMT_REV.1(1))
7.2 Access Control (SF.AC)
The TOE provides a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism to control the access of
users to objects based on the identity of the user requesting access, the membership of this
user to roles, the requested operation and the ID of the requested object.
The TOE maintains two kinds of user representations:
1. On an instance level an end user is represented by a login. On this level the Security
Function controls the access of logins to objects pertaining to the instance (e.g. to
view a database)
2. On a database level an end user is represented by a database user. On this level this
Security Function controls the access of database users to objects of the database
(e.g. to read or create a table).
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Members of the database roles ―db_owner‖ or ―db_accessadmin‖ are able to add users to a
database. The TOE maintains an internal security identifier (SID) for every user and role.
Each database user can be associated with at most one instance ―login‖.
Every object controlled by the TOE has an ID, an owner and a name.
Objects in the TOE form a hierarchy and belong to one of three different levels: server,
database and schema.
The TOE maintains an Access Control List (ACL) for each object within its scope. These
ACLs are stored in a system table which exists in every database for database related ACLs
and in a system table in the ‗master‘ database for instance level ACLs.
Each entry of an ACL contains a user SID and defines whether a permission is an ―Allow‖ or
a ―Deny‖ permission for that SID.
When a new object is created, the creating user is assigned as the owner of the object and
has complete control over the object. The ACL for a newly created object is always empty by
default. (FMT_MSA.3)
After creation, grant, deny or revoke permissions on objects can be assigned to users.
Changes to the security relevant attributes of objects are immediately applied.
(FMT_REV.1(2)
When a user attempts to perform an action to an object under the control of the TOE, the
TOE decides whether the action is to be permitted based on the following rules:
1. If the requested mode of access is denied to that authorized user, the TOE will deny
access
2. If the requested mode of access is denied to any role of which the authorized user is
a member, the TOE will deny access
3. If the requested mode of access is permitted to that authorized user, the TOE will
permit access
4. If the requested mode of access is permitted to any role of which the authorized user
is a member, the TOE will permit access
5. Else: The TOE will deny access
The TOE permission check for an action on an object includes the permissions of its parent
objects. The permissions for the object itself and all its parent objects are accumulated
together before the aforementioned rules are evaluated. Note: Some actions require more
than one permission.
This means that if a user or a role has been granted a permission to an object this
permission is also valid for all child objects. E.g. if a user has been granted a permission to a
schema, he automatically has the same permission on all tables within that schema, if the
permission has not explicitly been denied. Similarly, if a user has been denied a permission
on a schema, he will be denied the same permission to all tables within that schema,
regardless of explicit grant permissions.
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The rules as described before are always applied when a user requests access to a certain
object using a certain operation. There are only two situations where these access control
rules are overridden:
1. The system administrator, the owner of an object and owners of parent objects
always have access, so for these users the TOE will always allow access to the
object
2. In the case of ―Ownership Chaining‖ which is described in chapter 8.1 in more detail
the access is allowed
(FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1)
As the access to management functions of the TOE is controlled by the same functionality as
the access to user data this Security Function additionally ensures that the management
functions are only available for authorized administrators. (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1,
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_REV.1(1))
7.3 Identification and Authentication (SF.I&A)
This Security Function requires each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other actions on behalf of that user. This is done on an instance level and means that the
user has to be associated with a login of the TOE.
The TOE knows two types of logins: Windows accounts and SQL Server logins. The
administrator has to specify the type of login for every login he is creating.
The possibility for the TOE to perform its own authentication is necessary because not all
users connecting to the TOE are connecting from a Windows environment.
Microsoft Windows account names
These logins are associated with a user account of the Windows Operating System in
the environment.
For these logins the TOE requires that the Windows environment passes on the
Windows SID(s) of that user to authenticate the user before any other action on
behalf of that user is allowed.7
For these logins the Windows security identifier (SID) from the Windows account or
group is used for identification of that login within the TOE. Any permission is
associated with that SID. (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.5)
SQL Server login names
SQL Server logins are not associated with a user of Windows but are maintained by
the TOE itself. For every SQL Server login the TOE maintains a login name and a
password. The password is not stored in plain text, but hashed using the SHA-1 hash
function provided by the Operating System in the environment.
7
Windows authentication of users may be based on a username and password or alternative mechanisms. After
successful authentication of a user Windows associates a list of SID(s) with every user which represent the user
and every group the user is a member of.
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Each SQL Server login name is stored in a system table. SQL Server generates a
SID that is used as a security identifier and stores it in this table.
This SID is internally used as a security identifier for the login.
If a user is connecting to the TOE using a SQL Server login he has to provide the
username and password. The TOE hashes the password using the hash function
provided by the Operating System in the environment, and compares the hash to the
value stored for that user. If the values are identical the TOE has successfully
authenticated the user. (FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.5)
7.4 Security Audit (SF.AU)
The TOE produces audit logs for all security relevant actions. These audit logs are stored
into files in the environment of the TOE.
The Security Audit of the TOE especially comprises the following events:
 Startup and Shutdown of the TOE
 Start and Shutdown of Security Audit Function
 Every login attempt including the processes for authentication and session
establishment
 Every successful request to perform on operation on an object covered by the access
control function
 Modifications to the role membership of users
 The use of the Security Function SF.SM
The TOE maintains a set of events which can be additionally audited and provides the
administrator with the capability to start a Security Audit process to capture these events.
For each event in the Security Audit logs the following information is stored:
1. Date and Time of the event
2. Identity of the user causing the event (if available)
3. Type of the event
4. ID of the object
5. Outcome (success or failure) of the event
Furthermore each audit file contains an introduction with the list of events which are audited
in the file. (FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2)
The administrator has the possibility to specify, what should happen in case an audit file is
full. The following two scenarios are supported in the evaluated version:
1. Rollover
The administrator specifies a maximum size per trace file and a maximum number of files for
the Security Audit. If one audit file is full, the TOE starts the next file until the maximum
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number of files has been reached. When the maximum number of files has been reached
and the last audit file is full, the TOE will start overwriting the oldest audit file.
2. Shutdown
The administrator specifies one trace file with a maximum size and the option to shut down
the TOE on any audit error. When the maximum size of the trace file has been reached the
TOE will stop operation.
(FAU_STG.5_EXP)
The TOE provides the possibility to create a filter for the audit function. Using this filter
mechanism the administrator is able to exclude auditable events from being audited based
on the following attributes:
 User identity
 Object identity,
 Success or failure of auditable security events
However to modify the behavior of the Security Audit function by including additional or
excluding events from being audited the administrator has to stop the Security Audit process,
modify the Security Audit function and start the Security Audit process again. (FAU_SEL.1)
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8 Appendix
8.1 Concept of Ownership Chains
Database Objects within the TOE are not always only passive objects. Some objects refer to
other objects. This is especially true for Stored Procedures and Views. When multiple
database objects access each other sequentially, the sequence is known as a chain.
Although such chains do not independently exist, when the TOE traverses the links in a
chain, the TOE evaluates access permissions on the constituent objects differently than it
would if it were accessing the objects separately. These differences have important
implications for managing security.
Ownership chaining enables managing access to multiple objects, such as multiple tables, by
setting permissions on one object, such as a view. Ownership chaining also offers a slight
performance advantage in scenarios that allow for skipping permission checks.
8.1.1 How Permissions Are Checked in a Chain
When an object is accessed through a chain, the TOE first compares the owner of the object
to the owner of the calling object. This is the previous link in the chain. If both objects have
the same owner, permissions on the referenced object are not evaluated. In the context of
the Discretionary Access Control Mechanism this is not a circumvention of access control as
the owner of an object always has complete control over his objects. So if one user is the
owner of both objects, the calling object and the called object, the owner also would have
direct access to both objects.
8.1.2 Example of Ownership Chaining
In the following illustration, the July2003 view is owned by Mary. She has granted to Alex
permissions on the view. He has no other permissions on database objects in this instance.
What happens when Alex selects the view?
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Figure 2: Concept of Ownership Chaining
Alex executes SELECT * on the July2003 view. The TOE checks permissions on the view
and confirms that Alex has permission to select on it.
The July 2003 view requires information from the SalesXZ view. The TOE checks the
ownership of the SalesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner (Mary) as the view
that calls it, permissions on SalesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned.
The SalesXZ view requires information from the InvoicesXZ view. The TOE checks the
ownership of the InvoicesXZ view. Because this view has the same owner as the previous
object, permissions on InvoicesXZ are not checked. The required information is returned. To
this point, all items in the sequence have had one owner (Mary). This is known as an
unbroken ownership chain.
The InvoicesXZ view requires information from the AcctAgeXZ view. The TOE checks the
ownership of the AcctAgeXZ view. Because the owner of this view is different from the owner
of the previous object (Sam, not Mary), full information about permissions on this view is
retrieved. If the AcctAgeXZ view has permissions that allow access by Alex, information will
be returned.
The AcctAgeXZ view requires information from the ExpenseXZ table. The TOE checks the
ownership of the ExpenseXZ table. Because the owner of this table is different from the
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owner of the previous object (Joe, not Sam), full information about permissions on this table
is retrieved. If the ExpenseXZ table has permissions that allow access by Alex, information is
returned.
When the July2003 view tries to retrieve information from the ProjectionsXZ table, the TOE
first checks to see whether cross-database chaining is enabled between Database 1 and
Database 2. If cross-database chaining is enabled, the TOE will check the ownership of the
ProjectionsXZ table. Because this table has the same owner as the calling view (Mary),
permissions on this table are not checked. The requested information is returned.
8.2 References
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation –
Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2006,
version 3.1 R1
Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated September 2007,
version 3.1, R2
Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated September 2007,
version 3.1, R2
[CEM] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology
Security – Evaluation Methodology, dated September 2007, version
3.1 R2
[TSQL] http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-
us/acdata/ac_oview_4pcx.asp
[AGD] Books online as of 2008-07-10
[AGD_ADD] Microsoft SQL Server 2008 Database Engine Common Criteria
Evaluation Guidance addendum, Version 1.2, 2008-11-26
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8.3 Glossary and Abbreviations
8.3.1 Glossary
The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target:
Abbreviation Definition
Authorized
Administrators
This term refers to a group of users which comprise the ―sysadmin‖ (sa)
and any user who is allowed to perform a management operation
because the permission has been granted to him within the DAC either
by assigning him to a role with administrator permissions or by granting
him the possibility to perform an administrative operation explicitly.
DAC
Discretionary Access Control is a mechanism to limit the access of
users to objects based on the ID of the user, the ID of the object and a
set of access control rules.
DBMS A DBMS is a computerized repository that stores information and allows
authorized users to retrieve and update that information.
Object
An object within the TOE contains data and can be accessed by
subjects. However in the TOE an object is not necessarily only a
passive entity as some objects refer to other objects.
OC Ownership Chaining.
SQL The Structured Query Language is a language which can be used to
create, modify and retrieve data from a DBMS.
SQL Server SQL Server is a product of Microsoft to which the TOE belongs.
TDS Tabular Data Stream is a data format which is used for communication
with the TOE.
T-SQL Extension of the SQL language in order to support control flow,
variables, user authentication and various other functions.
See also http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-
us/acdata/ac_oview_4pcx.asp
Named Pipe Method for inter process communication
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8.3.2 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this Security Target:
Abbreviation Definition
ACL Access Control List
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CIM Consistency Instruction Manual
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DBMS Database Management System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETL Extract, Transform, Load
IT Information Technology
MOM Microsoft Operations Manager
MS Microsoft
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NSA National Security Agency
OC Ownership Chaining
ODS Open Data Services
OLAP Online analytical processing
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
sa System administrator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SID Security ID
SMS System Management Server
SOF Strength of Function
SQL Structured Query Language
ST Security Target
TDS Tabular Data Stream
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
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Abbreviation Definition
TSF TOE Security Functionality
T-SQL Transact SQL