Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 1 Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170 / imagePRESS C165 / imagePRESS Lite C170 / imagePRESS Lite C165 2600 model Security Target Version 2.07 2021/03/29 Canon Inc. Significant portions of this document were excerpted from IEEE Std 2600.1 and 2600.2, -2009 - copyright IEEE 2009 and reproduced with permission from IEEE. , All rights reserved. An use beyond what is permitted, please contact mailto:stds-ipr@ieee.org. This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target written in Japanese. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 2 Table of Contents 1 ST introduction.................................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 ST reference.......................................................................................................4 1.2 TOE reference....................................................................................................4 1.3 TOE overview.....................................................................................................4 1.3.1 TOE Type ...................................................................................................5 1.3.2 The usage and major security function of the TOE..............................................5 1.3.3 TOE Operational Environment ........................................................................5 1.4 TOE description .................................................................................................7 1.4.1 Physical Scope of the TOE .............................................................................7 1.4.2 Logical Scope of the TOE...............................................................................9 1.5 Terms and Abbreviations .................................................................................... 11 2 Conformance claims.......................................................................................................................... 14 2.1 CC Conformance claim....................................................................................... 14 2.2 PP claim, Package claim ..................................................................................... 14 2.3 SFR Packages................................................................................................... 14 2.3.1 SFR Packages reference ............................................................................... 14 2.3.2 SFR Package functions................................................................................. 15 2.3.3 SFR Package attributes................................................................................ 16 2.4 PP Conformance rationale................................................................................... 16 3 Security Problem Definition.............................................................................................................. 19 3.1 Notational conventions....................................................................................... 19 3.2 Users of the TOE.............................................................................................. 19 3.3 Assets of the TOE............................................................................................. 20 3.3.1 User Data.................................................................................................. 20 3.3.2 TSF Data................................................................................................... 20 3.3.3 Functions .................................................................................................. 21 3.4 Threats agents.................................................................................................. 21 3.5 Threats to TOE Assets ...................................................................................... 21 3.6 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE ......................................................... 22 3.7 Assumptions..................................................................................................... 22 4 Security Objectives ........................................................................................................................... 23 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.......................................................................... 23 4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment............................................................ 23 4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment ..................................................... 23 4.4 Security Objectives rationale............................................................................... 24 5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD).................................................................................. 28 5.1 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces ............................. 28 6 Security requirements........................................................................................................................ 30 6.1 Security functional requirements .......................................................................... 30 6.1.1 User Authentication Function ....................................................................... 30 6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function................................................................. 32 6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions .................................................................. 35 6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function.................................................................... 38 6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function............................................................................ 39 6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function..................................................................... 39 Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 3 6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function...................................................................... 40 6.1.8 Self-Test Function ...................................................................................... 41 6.1.9 Audit Log Function ..................................................................................... 41 6.1.10 Management Function.................................................................................. 44 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements......................................................................... 48 6.3 Security functional requirements rationale ............................................................. 49 6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements...................................................... 49 6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements.......................................................... 50 6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements...................................................... 51 6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale ............................................................. 53 7 TOE Summary specification ............................................................................................................. 54 7.1 User Authentication Function.............................................................................. 54 7.2 Function Use Restriction Function ....................................................................... 55 7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions......................................................................... 55 7.3.1 Job Cancel................................................................................................. 56 7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control .......................................................................... 56 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs .................................................................. 58 7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function.......................................................................... 58 7.5 HDD Data Erase Function .................................................................................. 58 7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function........................................................................... 59 7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function ................................................................... 59 7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function ....................................................... 59 7.7 LAN Data Protection Function ............................................................................ 60 7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function ...................................................................... 60 7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function ....................................................... 60 7.8 Self-Test Function ............................................................................................ 60 7.9 Audit Log Function ........................................................................................... 61 7.10 Management Functions....................................................................................... 62 7.10.1 User Management Function .......................................................................... 62 7.10.2 Device Management Function ....................................................................... 62 Trademark Notice - Canon, the Canon logo, imageRUNNER, imageRUNNER ADVANCE, imagePRESS, MEAP, and the MEAP logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Canon Inc. - Microsoft, Internet Explorer, and Active Directory are trademarks or registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the U.S. and other countries. - eDirectry is a trademark of Novell, Inc. in the U.S. - All names of companies and products contained herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of the respective companies. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 4 1 ST introduction 1.1 ST reference This section provides the Security Target (ST) identification information. ST name: Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 2600 model Security Target Version: 2.07 Issued by: Canon Inc. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 1.2 TOE reference This section provides the TOE identification information. TOE name: Canon imagePRESS C1970KG/ imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 2600 model Version: 2.0 The TOE is comprised of the following software and hardware ([] indicates TOE identification). Japanese name) ・iPR セキュリティーキット・D2 for IEEE 2600 Ver 1.00（制御ソフトウェア） [セキュリティーキット for IEEE 2600] [コントローラーバージョン 3210] [PCL] [PS] ・Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 ファクス・PDL 付き [iPR C170, iPR C165] [スーパーG3FAX ボード] ・Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11 [Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11] English name) ・iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00(system software) [Security Kit for IEEE 2600] [Controller Version 3210] [PCL] [PS] ・Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 with Fax & PDL [iPR C170, iPR C165] [Super G3 FAX Board] ・Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11 [Canon MFP Security Chip 2.11] 1.3 TOE overview This section describes an owerview of the usage and major security features of the TOE. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 5 1.3.1 TOE Type The TOE is a digital multifunction device with printing, scanning, copying, faxing, document storage and retrieval, and HDD encryption. 1.3.2 The usage and major security function of the TOE The TOE is an MFP having a print function, a scan function, a copy function, an I-fax reception function, a fax reception function, a fax transmission function, a universal send function, and a user box function, and is used by connecting to an internal LAN. In order to protect these functions, there are functions for identifying and authenticating users, access control functions for document data and functions based on authority, transfer restriction of received jobs, encryption functions for setting information and document data stored in storage in TOE, HDD data complete erasure function, LAN data protection function, self-test function, audit log acquisition function for auditing user operations, and management functions limited to administrators. 1.3.3 TOE Operational Environment The TOE is a MFP that offers Copy, Print, Universal Send, Fax, I-Fax RX, and Mail Box capabilities. The TOE, which conforms to "U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009))" is designed to operate in an environment such as the one shown below (as excerpted from "U.S. GovernmentApproved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)" clause "1.1 Scope"). Figure 1 shows the environment for which the TOE or < Canon imagePRESS C1970KG/ imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 2600 model > has been designed, with options included. Since not all of these features may be required, the actual operational environment is expected to differ than what is shown here. Figure 1 The assumed operational environment of the MFP < Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 with Fax & PDL> Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 6 PC HDD LAN Firewall Mail server Mail Box Memory RX Inbox Send via I-Fax/E-Mail Receive I-Fax Hardcopy document Hardcopy document Web browser Internet MFP User authentication server User authentication Authentication result Time server PC Fax RX Fax TX PSTN File server for audit log (SMB server) Syslog server In Figure 1, the MFP is connected by an internal LAN, to all of the other major components, namely the Mail Server, User Authentication Server, File Server for Audit Log (SMB Server)1 , Syslog Server 2 , PC, and Firewall. Furthermore, the internal LAN is protected by Firewall from threats from the Internet. To send (via I-Fax or email) a previously scanned document or when receiving a document by I-Fax for example, the MFP connects to the Mail Server. By using a PC with a Web browser3 , functions such as printing, storing, or I-Fax can also be executed remotely. However, in order to print from a PC, the appropriate printer driver needs to be installed in the PC. Alternatively, a USB cable could be used to connect the PC directly, and print or store document data from the PC. In this case, some configuration is required initially, in order to protect against data being taken out of the MFP and stored in a PC or USB device. The TOE also obtains accurate time from the Time server for time synchronization, and supports user authentication through the External Authentication Server. In addition, it is possible to output audit logs to file server for audit log at regular intervals or to output audit logs to a syslog server.The TOE also has HDD encryption function to encrypt all the data to be stored in the internal HDD. 1 This evaluation was performed using Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition as the file server for audit log. 2 In a test environment for CC evaluation, the Syslog server utilized psyslog v 1.04 on Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard Edition. 3 This evaluation was performed using Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 as the Web browser. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 7 1.4 TOE description The TOE conforms to "U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009)" and is designed to meet the requirements specified therein, as described below. The physical and logical scopes of the TOE are described below. 1.4.1 Physical Scope of the TOE The TOE is a MFP consisting of hardware and software components. The physical scope of the TOE is shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 Hardware and software components of the TOE control software （TOE Software） Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 with Fax & PDL MFP Main Unit （TOE Hardware） The which is the main body hardware constituting the TOE is the fax board recognized by purchasing the appropriate factory board option to the Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 shown in Table 1- List of Product Lineups List and mounting it on the main body. The sales name of the main unit hardware will be sold as imagePRESS C1970KG in Korea. Canon imagePRESS Lite C170/imagePRESS Lite C165 for the Americas and Canon imagePRESS C170/imagePRESS C165 for other regions. In either case, the identification name of the main body hardware is "iPR C170" or "iPR C165" as follows. Table 1 - List of Product Lineups List of Product Lineups : Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 iPR C1970KG iPR C170 iPR C170 EUO iPR C165 iPR C165 EUO * The KG model is a Korean government model. * The Korean government model differs from other models in terms of the name of the product. The difference from similar model names is that there is a "9" in the middle of the number and KG is added after the number. * Models with "EUO" in the product name indicate that PCL page description language processing is included as standard. The names of the fax boards to be procured together with the non-fax models are as follows. Japan: スーパーＧ３ＦＡＸボード・BA1 Americas or South Korea: Super G3 Fax Board-AS2 Other regions: Super G3 Fax Board-AS1 Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 8 The control software constituting the TOE is provided on a disk medium in < iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00> (controller version V32.10). In addition, to enable PCL and PS page description languages, it is necessary to procure appropriate license options and enable the functions according to the guidance. The license option names to be procured are as follows. Japan: ＰＣＬエミュレーション拡張キット4・ＡＳ１, ＰＳマルチキット・Ｇ１4 Outside of Japan, Americas, and South Korea: imagePRESS PS Printer Kit-G14 Americas, South Korea: None (standard, no option required) The control software included in the < iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00 > is installed in the < Canon imagePRESS C1970KG / imagePRESS C170/ imagePRESS C165/ imagePRESS Lite C170/ imagePRESS Lite C165 with Fax & PDL > and various settings described in the guidance are performed to complete the TOE. The guidance included in the TOE will also be provided to consumers in a < iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00 > package. The identification and distribution media are described below.  iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Administrator Guide [FT6- 2749 (000)] (booklet)  iPR セキュリティーキット・D2 for IEEE 2600 アドミニストレーターガイド[FT6-2748 (000)] (booklet)  Before Using the iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification [FT6- 2750(000)] (paper) (Japanese name) iPR セキュリティーキット・D2 for IEEE 2600 をお使いになる前にお読みくださ い  imagePRESS C1970KG/ imagePRESS C170 / imagePRESS C165 / imagePRESS Lite C170 / imagePRESS Lite C165 2600 model (2.0) User's Guide [FT6-2751 (000)] (CD) The TOE is delivered directly from the distributor or via the distributor to the consumer with the following information for each consciousness.  imagePRESS C1970KG (Delivery to South Korea), imagePRESS Lite C170 / imagePRESS Lite C165 (Delivery to the Americas), imagePRESS C170 / imagePRESS C165 (Delivery to Japan), imagePRESS C170 EUO / imagePRESS C165 EUO (Delivery to other regions)  スーパーＧ３ＦＡＸボード・BA1 (Delivery to Japan), Super G3 FAX Board-AS2 (Delivery to the Americas or South Korea) Super G3 FAX Board-AS1 (Delivery to other regions)  iPR セキュリティーキット・D2 for IEEE 2600 Ver 1.00 (English name: iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00)  ＰＣＬエミュレーション拡張キット・ＡＳ１ 及び ＰＳマルチキット・G１ (Delivery to Japan), PS Printer Kit-G1 (Delivery outside of Japa, the Americas, and South Korea) 4 The actual components of the licensing option are contained in the control software provided as iPR Security Kit-D2 for IEEE 2600 Common Criteria Certification Ver 1.00. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 9 1.4.2 Logical Scope of the TOE The logical scope of the TOE is shown in Figure 3 (excluding: User, UserAuthentication Server, Mail Server, File Server for Audit Logs, Syslog Server, PC, and Time Server). In the table, the security functions of the TOE are shown in blue. Figure 3 Functional configuration of the TOE LAN Data Protection Function HDD UI Func User User Auth Server LAN Data Protection User Auth Function Mail Server LAN Data Protection Email Function PC LAN Data Protection Web Browser DocData DocData AuthInfo Hardcopy document Time Server Time Function TimeInfo Output Func Input Func Print Scan Send Copy Mailbox/Inbox Function Use Restriction Job Output Restriction User Authentication HDD Data Erase HDD Data Encryption Management Function Self-Test Audit Log LAN Data Protection Flow of data Operate/ Display Forward Received Jobs Receive TOE PC DocData USB connection FAX DocData Phone Lite File Server for audit Log Syslog Server File Management Function LAN Data Protection AuditLogInfo Hardcopy document The TOE embodies the following basic functionality. – Copy function Produces duplicates of the hardcopy document by scanning and printing. – Print function Produces a hardcopy document from its electronic form (contained in the MFP or sent from a PC). – I-Fax RX (receive) function Uses the Internet to receive faxes. Data received by I-fax is not printed immediately; rather it is stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent or deleted later. – Fax RX (receive) function Uses a fax line to receive faxes. Data received by fax is not printed immediately; rather it is stored in Memory RX Inbox for processing at a later time. Stored documents can be printed, sent or deleted later. – Fax TX (send) function Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox can be retrieved for transmission by fax. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 10 – Universal Send function Scanned document data or electronic documents stored in Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox can be transmitted by email or I-fax, or sent to a shared folder on a PC, in TIFF or PDF file format. – Mail Box function Refers to the storage of image files into a Mail Box or in Memory RX Inbox, or to functions that utilize the Mail Box/inbox functionality. - Image files Stored in Mail Box Scanned document data or electronic data specified for storage from a PC, are stored in a Mail Box. - Functions that utilize Mail Box functionality The following functions can be executed on data stored in a Mail Box. – Edit (document/print setting) – Print – Send – Delete – UI function The user operates the TOE using the operation panel, and the TOE is displayed on the operation panel. The TOE embodies the following security functions. – User Authentication Function Performs authentication on the user, to prevent any unauthorized access to the TOE. Two types of user authentication are supported: Internal Authentication wherein authentication takes place internally within the TOE, and External Authentication which uses an external user authentication server. External authentication uses Kerberos5 or LDAP6 authentication. – Function Use Restriction Function Uses role management to restrict the functions that each authenticated user can use. – Job Output Restriction Function This function restricts access to print, cancel, and other job operations, to the user that executed the job. – Forward Received Jobs Function This function restricts the machine from forwarding received data directly to the LAN. It is provided as a countermeasure against threats arising from misuse of the fax line. – HDD Data Erase Function Function for erasing unnecessary data from the hard disk by overwriting the data, in order to prevent unauthorized use of previously generated image data. 5 This evaluation was performed using Active Directory Domain Services as the authentication server software for Kerberos. 6 This evaluation was performed using eDirectory 8.8 SP8 as the authentication server software for LDAP authentication. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 11 – HDD Data Encryption Function All data stored in the HDD are encrypted by the encryption chip mounted on the MFP in order to prevent removal of HDD and unauthorized access to the HDD data. – LAN Data Protection Function To protect LAN data from IP packet sniffing, IP packets are encrypted using IPSec. – Self-Test Function When the machine starts, this function checks to see that the primary security functions are running properly. – Audit Log Function Allows auditing of user operations by generating logs which are stored in the HDD. Stored audit logs are protected and can be viewed. Audit Log can also be saved to an audit log file server or a syslog server. The date/time recorded on the audit log is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is obtained from the Time Server. – Management Function Consists of user management functions such as user registration and role management, and device management functions which enable proper operation of various security functions, which can only be specified by Administrators. 1.5 Terms and Abbreviations The following terms and abbreviations are used throughout this ST. Table 2 - Terms and Abbreviations Terms/Abbreviations Description Multi-Function Product (MFP) A machine which incorporates the functionality of multiple devices in one, such as copier, fax, printer, and Universal Send, and containing a large capacity HDD to facilitate such capabilities. Control software Software that runs on the hardware of the device, and controls security functions. PDL It is a page description language expressing print contents, and there are various types. The print function converts print data expressed in the corresponding page description language and prints the generated image on paper. Control panel One of the hardware elements of the MFP, consisting of a touch panel and operation keys, which provides the interface for operation of the MFP. Remote UI An interface that provides access to the MFP from a Web browser via the LAN, to allow the acquisition of operating status, perform job operations or BOX operations, and making various settings. HDD Hard disk drive mounted on the MFP, where control software and assets are stored. I-Fax Short for Internet Fax. Uses the Internet to receive and send faxes. Image file Image data generated within the MFP, from operations such as scan, print, and receive. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 12 Terms/Abbreviations Description Temporary image file Image files generated during jobs such as Copy and Print, which are needed only until the job completes. Roles Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can use. One role is associated with each user. In addition to pre-defined default roles, default roles may be modified to create custom roles. The default roles are: Administrator, Power User, General User, and Limited User. Auser assigned theAdministrator role is capable of using management operations (administrative privileges). Administrator User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges. Equivalent to U.ADMINISTRATOR defined in the PP. Job When a user uses the functions of the TOE to execute an operation on a document, a Job is the intended document data combined with the user instructions for processing those data. The operations that can be performed on a document are: Scan, Print, Copy, Fax TX, Save, and Delete. The processing phases for a Job issued by the user are: generation, execution, and completion. Document data User data processed within the MFP, consisting of image files and print setting. Memory RX (Reception) Allows data received by fax/I-fax to be stored in the Memory RX Inbox for later processing. Box Collective name for Mail Boxes, Fax Inboxes, or the Memory RX Inbox wherein data from operations such as scan, print, and received faxes are stored in the MFP. *Use of Fax Inboxes is not included in this TOE. Mail Box Whether a general user feeds data to the MFP directly, or specifies a document for printing from a PC, data can be stored here to be printed later. Memory RX Inbox When memory reception is set, documents received by fax/I-fax are stored in the Memory RX Inbox. Stored documents can be printed or sent later. Mail server Server that facilitates I-fax transmission or email transmission of document data in the MFP. User authentication server Server that maintains user information such as user ID and password, for user authentication over the network. Firewall Device or system designed to protect the internal LAN against threats from the Internet. Time server Server that uses the Network Time Protocol to provide the accurate time over the Internet. [Print] A button on the control panel that activates the function to operate on-hold print jobs. [Copy] A button on the control panel that activates the Copy function. [Fax] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax function. [Scan] Indicates the [Scan and Store] and [Scan and Send] buttons on the control panel, that allow the user to scan paper documents to be stored as files, or scanned documents to be sent to some location such as to an email address or a shared folder in a PC, respectively. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 13 Terms/Abbreviations Description [Fax/I-Fax Inbox] A button on the control panel that activates the Fax/I-Fax Inbox function. There are two types of Fax/I-Fax Inbox: the Memory RX Inbox and Confidential Fax Inbox. You can use both inboxes to store files received by Fax and I-Fax. [Access Stored Files] A button on the control panel that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail Box/Inbox. Remote UI [Access Received/Stored Files] A button on the remote UI that allows the user to access files stored in a Mail Box/Inbox. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 14 2 Conformance claims 2.1 CC Conformance claim This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria (CC). – Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Release 5 – Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant – Assurance level: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 2.2 PP claim, Package claim This ST conforms to the following Protection Profile (PP). - Title: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009) – Version:1.0 This ST is package-conformant to and package-augmented by the following SFR Packages: – 2600.2-PRT conformant – 2600.2-SCN conformant – 2600.2-CPY conformant – 2600.2-FAX conformant – 2600.2-DSR conformant – 2600.2-SMI augmented 2.3 SFR Packages 2.3.1 SFR Packages reference Title: 2600.2-PRT, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as printers, paper-based fax machines, and MFPs) that perform a printing function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output. Title: 2600.2-SCN, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as scanners, paper-based fax machines, and MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 15 Title: 2600.2-CPY, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This Protection Profile shall be used for HCD products (such as copiers and MFPs) that perform a copy function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output. Title: 2600.2-FAX, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as fax machines and MFPs) that perform a scanning function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a printing function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output. Title: 2600.2-DSR, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Retrieval (DSR) Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products (such as MFPs) that perform a document storage and retrieval feature in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs. Title: 2600.2-SMI, SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface Functions, Operational Environment B Package version: 1.0, dated March 2009 Common Criteria version: Version 3.1 Revision 2 Common Criteria conformance: Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant Package conformance: EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 Usage: This SFR Package shall be used for HCD products that transmit or receive User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio frequency wireless media. This package applies for TOEs that provide a trusted channel function allowing for secure and authenticated communication with other IT systems. If such protection is supplied only by the TOE environment, then this package cannot be claimed. 2.3.2 SFR Package functions Functions perform processing, storage, and transmission of data that may be present in HCD products. The functions that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile, are listed in Table 3. Table 3 - SFR Package functions Designation Definition F.PRT Printing: a function in which electronic document input is converted to physical document output F.SCN Scanning: a function in which physical document input is converted to electronic document output F.CPY Copying: a function in which physical document input is duplicated to physical document output F.FAX Faxing: a function in which physical document input is converted to a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) transmission, and a function in which a telephone-based document facsimile (fax) reception is converted to physical document output F.DSR Document storage and retrieval: a function in which a document is stored during one job and retrieved during one or more subsequent jobs Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 16 Designation Definition F.SMI Shared-medium interface: a function that transmits or receives User Data or TSF Data over a communications medium which, in conventional practice, is or can be simultaneously accessed by multiple users, such as wired network media and most radio-frequency wireless media 2.3.3 SFR Package attributes When a function is performing processing, storage, or transmission of data, the identity of the function is associated with that particular data as a security attribute. This attribute in the TOE model makes it possible to distinguish differences in Security Functional Requirements that depend on the function being performed. The attributes that are allowed, but not required in any particular conforming Security Target or Protection Profile, are listed in Table 4. Table 4 -SFR Package attributes Designation Definition +PRT Indicates data that are associated with a print job. +SCN Indicates data that are associated with a scan job. +CPY Indicates data that are associated with a copy job. +FAXIN Indicates data that are associated with an inbound (received) fax job. +FAXOUT Indicates data that are associated with an outbound (sent) fax job. +DSR Indicates data that are associated with a document storage and retrieval job. +SMI Indicates data that are transmitted or received over a Shared-medium interface. 2.4 PP Conformance rationale In addition to the primary functionality of the MFP (Copy, Print, Scan, and Fax), the TOE implements the document storage function and the LAN data encryption function. As such, it is appropriate to conform to all of the SFR Package defined in the PP(Chapter 2.2 PP claim, Package claim). The PP to which this ST claims to be conformant conforms to IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std 2600-2008, Operational Environment B and includes the contents defined in CCEVS Policy Letter #20 are also included. In the following, the ST is compared against the PP containing all six of the aforementioned SFR Packages. First, regarding Security Problem Definition, comparing PP and ST, it is the same except for adding one OSP as follows. P.STORAGE.CRYPT This is an OSP that constrains the TOE, not the operating environment. Therefore, the following is established. - All TOEs that meet the ST security challenge definition also meet the PP security challenge definition - All operating environments that meet the PP security challenge definition also meet the ST security challenge definition Next, regarding Objective, comparing PP and ST, it is the same except for adding one Objective below. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED In order to realize this Objective, FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h) have been added. These limit the behavior of TOE rather than PP. Therefore, this Objective is an Objective that restricts TOE. Therefore, the following is established. - All TOEs that meet the ST TOE security policy also meet the PP TOE security policy Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 17 - All operating environments that meet the security policy for the operating environment of PP also meet the security policy for the operating environment of ST. In terms of the functional requirements, the ST compared with the PP contains all functional requirements of the PP including the six SFR Packages, as well as additional functional requirements, as shown in Table 5. Where "-" is indicated in the PP Package column and the PP functional requirement column, it indicates that there is no applicable package or function requirement. Table 5 - Functional requirements specified in the PP and the ST PP_Package PP functional requirement ST functional requirement Common FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 Common FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.2 Common FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 Common FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.2 Common FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 Common FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.4 Common FDP_ACC.1(a) FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) Common FDP_ACC.1(b) FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Common FDP_ACF.1(a) FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Common FDP_ACF.1(b) FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Common FDP_RIP.1 FDP_RIP.1 Common FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 Common FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 Common FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 Common FIA_USB.1 FIA_USB.1 Common FMT_MSA.1(a) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Common FMT_MSA.3(a) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Common FMT_MSA.1(b) FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Common FMT_MSA.3(b) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(a)) FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Common FMT_MTD.1(FMT_MTD.1.1(b)) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Common FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 Common FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 Common FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 Common FPT_TST.1 FPT_TST.1 Common FTA_SSL.3 FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui) PRT FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) PRT FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) SCN FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) SCN FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) CPY FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) CPY FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) FAX FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FAX FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) DSR FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) DSR FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) SMI FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 SMI FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FPT_FDI_EXP.1 SMI FTP_ITC.1 FTP_ITC.1 Common - FIA_AFL.1 Common - FIA_SOS.1 Common - FIA_UAU.7 - - FCS_COP.1(h) - - FCS_CKM.1(h) SMI - FCS_CKM.1(n) SMI - FCS_COP.1(n) Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 18 PP_Package PP functional requirement ST functional requirement SMI - FCS_CKM.2 Note the following: For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Delete of +FAXIN D.DOC, and Delete of +FAXIN D.FUNC is specified as U.NORMAL. For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, withAccess Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as "Denied". For FDP_ACC.1 in the PP, the Subject for a Read of +FAXIN D.DOC is specified as U.NORMAL. For FDP_ACC.1(in-job) in the ST, the Subject for a Read is specified as U.ADMINISTRATOR, with Access Control rule for U.NORMAL specified as "Denied". The ST functional requirements as mentioned above, are restrictive in the scope of Subjects allowed to Delete or Read, and restrains U.NORMAL from having access to any Object. As such, the ST functional requirements specify greater restrictions than the corresponding PP functional requirements. For FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP, the Subject for a Modify of +FAXIN D.FUNC is specified as U.NORMAL. For FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) in the ST, the Subject is specified as U.User, with Access Control rule specified as "Denied". The ST functional requirement as mentioned above, does not allow use of the function to any Subject. As such, the ST functional requirement specifies greater restriction than the corresponding PP functional requirement. Consequently, the SFRs of the ST are equivalent or more restrictive than SFRs of the PP. As such: - All TOEs that would meet the SFRs in the ST would also meet the SFRs in the PP. In terms of the Security Assurance Requirements, the ST and PP are equivalent. As such, this ST compared with the PP, specifies equal or greater restrictions on the TOE, and at most equal restrictions on the operational environment of the TOE. Therefore, this ST claims demonstrable conformance to the PP. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 19 3 Security Problem Definition 3.1 Notational conventions a) Defined terms in full form are set in title case (for example, "Document Storage and Retrieval"). b) Defined terms in abbreviated form are set in all caps (for example, "DSR"). c) In tables that describe Security Objectives rationale, a checkmark ("") place at the intersection of a row and column indicates that the threat identified in that row is wholly or partially mitigated by the objective in that column. d) In tables that describe completeness of security requirements, a bold typeface letter "P" placed at the intersection of a row and column indicates that the requirement identified in that row performs a principal fulfillment of the objective indicated in that column. A letter "S" in such an intersection indicates that it performs a supporting fulfillment. e) In tables that describe the sufficiency of security requirements, a bold typeface requirement name and purpose indicates that the requirement performs a principal fulfillment of the objective in the same row. Requirement names and purposes set in normal typeface indicate that those requirements perform supporting fulfillments. f) In specifications of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs): 1) Bold typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been completed or refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition. 2) Italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that must be completed by the ST Author in a conforming Security Target. 3) Bold italic typeface indicates the portion of an SFR that has been partially completed or refined in this Protection Profile, relative to the original SFR definition in Common Criteria Part 2 or an Extended Component Definition, but which also must be completed by the ST Author in a conforming Security Target. g) The following prefixes in Table 6 are used to indicate different entity types: Table 6 - Notational prefix conventions Prefix Type of entity U. User D. Data F. Function T. Threat P. Policy A. Assumption O. Objective OE. Environmental objective + Security attribute 3.2 Users of the TOE The TOE has two types of users (U.USER): U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR Table 7 - Users Designation Definition U.USER Any authorized User. – U.NORMAL A User who is authorized to perform User Document Data processing functions of the TOE. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 20 Designation Definition U.ADMINISTRATOR A User who has been specifically granted the authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy (TSP). Administrators may possess special privileges that provide capabilities to override portions of the TSP. 3.3 Assets of the TOE There are three types of assets: user data, TSF data, and functions. 3.3.1 User Data User data are created by the user, and have no effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of user data: D.DOC and D.FUNC. Table 8 - User Data Designation Definition D.DOC User Document Data consists of the information contained in a user’s document. This includes the original document itself in either hardcopy or electronic form, image data, or residually-stored data created by the hardcopy device while processing an original document and printed hardcopy output. D.FUNC User Function Data are the information about a user’s document or job to be processed by the TOE. 3.3.2 TSF Data TSF Data are data that have an effect on TOE security functions. There are two types of TSF data: D.PROT and D.CONF. Table 9 -TSF Data Designation Definition D.PROT TSF Protected Data are assets for which alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE, but for which disclosure is acceptable. D.CONF TSF Confidential Data are assets for which either disclosure or alteration by a User who is neither an Administrator nor the owner of the data would have an effect on the operational security of the TOE. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 21 A list of the TSF data used in this TOE is given in Table 10. Table 10 - List of TSF data Type TSF Data Description Stored in D.PROT User name User identification information used by the user identification and authentication function. HDD Role Used by access restriction functions to restrict the functions that each user can use. HDD Lockout policy settings Settings for the lockout function, such as number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time. HDD Password policy settings Policy for the password for user authentication, such as minimum password length, allowed characters, and combination of character types. HDD Auto Reset Time setting Settings for session timeout in the control panel. HDD Session Management Settings Remote UI session timeout time setting information HDD Date/Time setting Specifies the date and time that is set. RTC HDD Data Erase setting Settings for the HDD Data Erase function, including the settings to enable or disable the HDD Data Erase function. HDD IPSec settings Settings for the LAN Data Protection function, including the settings to enable or disable the LAN Data Protection function. HDD D.CONF Password Password used to authenticate the user in the User Identification and Authentication function. HDD Audit logs Logs generated by the Audit Log function. HDD Box PIN PIN used for access control to the Mail Box or the Memory RX Inbox where the data is stored, for Job Output Restriction functions. HDD 3.3.3 Functions Refer to the functions listed in Table 3. 3.4 Threats agents This security problem definition addresses threats posed by four categories of threat agents: a) Persons who are not permitted to use the TOE who may attempt to use the TOE. b) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to use TOE functions for which they are not authorized. c) Persons who are authorized to use the TOE who may attempt to access data in ways for which they not authorized. d) Persons who unintentionally cause a software malfunction that may expose the TOE to unanticipated threats. The threats and policies defined in this Protection Profile address the threats posed by these threat agents. 3.5 Threats to TOE Assets This section describes threats to assets described in clause 3.3. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 22 Table 11 - Threats to User Data for the TOE Threat Affected asset Description T.DOC.DIS D.DOC User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons T.DOC.ALT D.DOC User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.FUNC.ALT D.FUNC User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons Table 12 - Threats to TSF Data for the TOE Threat Affected asset Description T.PROT.ALT D.PROT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons T.CONF.DIS D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons T.CONF.ALT D.CONF TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons 3.6 Organizational Security Policies for the TOE This section describes the Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) that apply to the TOE. OSPs are used to provide a basis for Security Objectives that are commonly desired by TOE Owners in this operational environment but for which it is not practical to universally define the assets being protected or the threats to those assets. Table 13 - Organizational Security Policies for the TOE Name Definition P.USER.AUTHORIZATION To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner. P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF. P.AUDIT.LOGGING To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized personnel. P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment. P.STORAGE.CRYPT*) Data recorded on TOE HDD must be encrypted *) A customer who has a policy that MFP has HDD encryption function is assumed. 3.7 Assumptions The Security Objectives and Security Functional Requirements defined in subsequent sections of this Protection Profile are based on the condition that all of the assumptions described in this section are satisfied. Table 14 - Assumptions Assumption Definition A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE. A.USER.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures. A.ADMIN.TRAINING Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and documentation, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 23 4 Security Objectives 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE This section describes the Security Objectives that are satisfied by the TOE. Table 15 - Security Objectives for the TOE Objective Definition O.DOC.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized disclosure. O.DOC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Document Data from unauthorized alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect User Function Data from unauthorized alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO_DIS The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO_ALT The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE shall require identification and authentication of Users, and shall ensure that Users are authorized in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the TOE O.INTERFACE.MANAGED The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies. O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF. O.AUDIT.LOGGED The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events and prevent its unauthorized disclosure or alteration. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED The TOE must be encrypted when data is written to the HDD. 4.2 Security Objectives for the IT environment This section describes the Security Objectives for the IT environment. Table 16 - Security Objectives for the IT environment Objective Definition OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED If audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records are protected from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications. OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED If audit records generated by the TOE are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT product, the TOE Owner shall ensure that those records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorized persons. OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED The IT environment shall provide protection from unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces. 4.3 Security Objectives for the non-IT environment This section describes the Security Objectives for non-IT environments. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 24 Table 17 - Security Objectives for the non-IT environment Objective Definition OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED The TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored area that provides protection from unmanaged physical access to the TOE. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED The TOE Owner shall grant permission to Users to be authorized to use the TOE according to the security policies and procedures of their organization. OE.USER.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization and have the training and competence to follow those policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRAINED The TOE Owner shall ensure that TOE Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization; have the training, competence, and time to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and documentation; and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED The TOE Owner shall establish trust that TOE Administrators will not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED The TOE Owner shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals for security violations or unusual patterns of activity. 4.4 Security Objectives rationale This section demonstrates that each threat, organizational security policy and assumption is mitigated/eased by at least one security objective, and that such security objectives counter the threat, implement the security policy and support assumption. Table 18 - Completeness of Security Objectives Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED OE.USER.AUTHORIZED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED OE.PHYISCAL.MANAGED OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED OE.ADMIN.TRAINED OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED OE.USER.TRAINED T.DOC.DIS                     T.DOC.ALT                     T.FUNC.ALT                     T.PROT.ALT                     T.CONF.DIS                     T.CONF.ALT                     P.USER.AUTHORIZATION                     P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION                     P.AUDIT.LOGGING                     P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT                     P.STORAGE.CRYPT                     A.ACCESS.MANAGED                     Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 25 A.ADMIN.TRAINING                     A.ADMIN.TRUST                     A.USER.TRAINING                     Table 19 - Sufficiency of Security Objectives Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 26 Threats. Policies, and Assumptions Summary Objectives and rationale T.DOC.DIS User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons. O.DOC.NO_DIS protects D.DOC from unauthorized disclosure. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. T.DOC.ALT User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons. O.DOC.NO_ALT protects D.DOC from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. T.FUNC.ALT User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons. O.FUNC_ NO_ALT protects D.FUNC from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. T.PROT.ALT TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons. O.PROT.NO_ALT protects D.PROT from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. T.CONF.DIS TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons. O.CONF.NO_DIS protects D.CONF from unauthorized disclosure. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. T.CONF.ALT TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons. O.CONF.NO_ALT protects D.CONF from unauthorized alteration. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. P.USER.AUTHORIZAT ION Users will be authorized to use the TOE. O.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes user identification and authentication as the basis for authorization to use the TOE. OE.USER.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to appropriately grant authorization. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 27 P.SOFTWARE.VERIFI CATION Procedures will exist to self- verify executable code in the TSF. O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED provides procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF. P.AUDIT.LOGGING An audit trail of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, protected, and reviewed. O.AUDIT.LOGGED creates and maintains a log of TOE use and security-relevant events, and prevents unauthorized disclosure or alteration. OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED protects exported audit records from unauthorized access, deletion and modifications. OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED establishes responsibility of, the TOE Owner to provide appropriate access to exported audit records. OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to ensure that audit logs are appropriately reviewed. P.INTERFACE.MANA GEMENT Operation of external interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED manages the operation of external interfaces in accordance with security policies. OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED establishes a protected environment for TOE external interfaces. P.STORAGE.CRYPT Encrypt the data recorded on the HDD O.STORAGE.CRYPTED encrypts data as it is written to the HDD. A.ACCESS.MANAGED The TOE environment provides protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE. OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED establishes a protected physical environment for the TOE. A.ADMIN.TRAINING TOE Users are aware of and trained to follow security policies and procedures. OE.ADMIN.TRAINED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate Administrator training. A.ADMIN.TRUST Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes. OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to have a trusted relationship with Administrators. A.USER.TRAINING Administrators are aware of and trained to follow security policies and procedures. OE.USER.TRAINED establishes responsibility of the TOE Owner to provide appropriate User training. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 28 5 Extended components definition (APE_ECD) Protection Profile defines components that are extensions to Common Criteria 3.1 Revision 2, Part 2. These extended components are defined in the Protection Profile but are used in SFR Packages, and therefore, are employed only in TOEs whose STs conform to those SFR Packages. 5.1 FPT_FDI_EXP Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Family behaviour: This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external interface to another external interface. Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are connected to the TOE’s external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality. Component leveling: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the functionality to require TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role. Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: a) Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities b) Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role c) Revocation of such an allowance Audit: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security Audit Data Generation is included in the PP/ST: There are no auditable events foreseen. Rationale: Quite often, a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external interface before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without processing the data first) between different external interfaces is therefore a function that-if allowed at all-can only be allowed by an authorized role. It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended component. The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of User Data flow in its FDP class. However, in this FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces 1 Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 29 Protection Profile, the authors needed to express the control of both User Data and TSF Data flow using administrative control instead of attribute-based control. It was found that using FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC for this purpose resulted in SFRs that were either too implementation-specific for a Protection Profile or too unwieldy for refinement in a Security Target. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this functionality. This extended component protects both User Data and TSF Data, and it could therefore be placed in either the FDP or FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class, and this lead the authors to define a new family with just one member. FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to [assignment: list of external interfaces]. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 30 6 Security requirements 6.1 Security functional requirements This section describes the security functional requirements for the TOE. The text in brackets following the component identifier or element name denotes iteration operations. 6.1.1 User Authentication Function FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events]. [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: range of acceptable values]]  an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 to 10 [assignment: list of authentication events]  Login attempts from the control panel or remote UIs. FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met, surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions]. [selection: met, surpassed]  met [assignment: list of actions]  Lockout FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [assignment: list of security attributes]. [assignment: list of security attributes].  User name, role FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 31 with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access- controlled Functions of the TOE]  Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU .7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in progress. [assignment: list of feedback]  *, ● FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access-controlled Functions of the TOE] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions that do not conflict with access- controlled Functions of the TOE]  Submission of print jobs, fax jobs, I-fax jobs FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes]. [assignment: list of user security attributes].  User name, role Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 32 FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes].  None FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes with the subjects acting on behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]. [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]  None FTA_SSL.3(lui) TSF-initiated termination Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FTA_SSL.3.1(lui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of userinactivity]. [assignment: time interval of userinactivity].  User inactivity at the control panel lasting for the specified period of time FTA_SSL.3(rui) TSF-initiated termination Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FTA_SSL.3.1(rui) The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of userinactivity]. [assignment: time interval of userinactivity].  User inactivity at the remote UI lasting for the specified period of time 6.1.2 Function Use Restriction Function FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) Management of security attributes Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP, [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 33 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]  None [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]  query, modify, delete, create [assignment: list of security attributes]  Role [assignment: the authorised identified roles].  U.ADMINISTRATOR FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) Static attribute initialisation Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.3.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control Policy, [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of : restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]  None [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]  Restrictive [refinement]  TOE Function Access Control Policy → TOE Function Access Control SFP FMT_MSA.3.2(exec-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles]  Nobody FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP on users as subjects, TOE functions as objects, and the right to use the functions as operations. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 34 FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the TOE Function Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: users and [assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP]. [assignment: list of TOE functions and the security attribute(s) used to determine the TOE Function Access Control SFP]  objects controlled under the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 20 FDP_ACF.1.2(exec-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]]. [selection: the user is explicitly authorized by U.ADMINISTATOR to use a function, a user that is authorized to use the TOE is automatically authorized to use the functions [assignment: list of functions], [assignment: other conditions]]  [assignment: other conditions] [assignment: other conditions]  rules specified in the TOE Function Access Control SFP in Table 20 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: the user acts in the role U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: other rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]  None FDP_ACF.1.4(exec-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]  None Table 20- TOE Function Access Control SFP Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Attribute Access control rule [Print] +PRT Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 35 Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Attribute Access control rule [Copy] +CPY +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Scan] +SCN +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Fax] +FAXOUT Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Fax/I-Fax Inbox] +FAXIN Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. [Access Stored Files] +DSR Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role For the attribute of the Object, the role associated with the Subject, must be authorized to perform the Operation. Remote UI [Access Received/Stored Files] +DSR +FAXIN Use of the function, using pointer to the Object. U.USER Role If the role associated with the Subject is Administrator, the Operation is permitted. 6.1.3 Job Output Restriction Functions 6.1.3.1 Delete Job FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) Management of security attributes Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles]. [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]  In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]  Refer to "Operation" in Table 21. [assignment: list of security attributes]  Refer to "Security Attributes" in Table 21. [assignment: the authorised identified roles] Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 36  Refer to "Role" in Table 21. Table 21 - Management of security attributes security attributes Operation Role User name delete, create, query U.ADMINISTRATOR Box PINs modify, create U.ADMINISTRATOR PIN of own Mail Box modify U.NORMAL FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) Static attribute initialisation Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.3.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP. [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]  Common Access Control SFP in Table 22  In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]  restrictive FMT_MSA.3.2(delete-job) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorized identified roles] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created. [assignment: the authorized identified roles]  Nobody FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 on the list of users as subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22. FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 37 FDP_ACF.1.1(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 to objects based on the following: the list of users as subjects and objects controlled under the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 22. FDP_ACF.1.2(delete-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the Common Access Control SFP in Table 22 governing access among controlled users as subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]  U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete any D.DOC/D.FUNC.  U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to modify any +CPY, +SCN, +DSR, +FAXOUT D.FUNC. FDP_ACF.1.4(delete-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]  None Table 22-Common Access Control SFP Object Attribute Operation(s) Subject Access control rule D.DOC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY, +FAXOUT, +DSR Delete U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL Denied D.FUNC +PRT,+SCN,+CPY, +FAXOUT, +DSR Modify; Delete U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own function data D.FUNC +FAXIN Modify U.USER Denied D.FUNC +FAXIN Delete U.NORMAL Denied 6.1.3.2 In The Job FDP_ACC.1(in-job) Subset access control Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 on the list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23.. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 38 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) Security attribute based access control Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF.1.1(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 to objects based on the following: the list of subjects and objects controlled under the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23, and for each, the indicated security attributes in Table 23. FDP_ACF.1.2(in-job) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: rules specified in the In The JOB Access Control SFP in Table 23 governing access among Users and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects. FDP_ACF.1.3(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]  U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to read any +FAXIN/+DSR D.DOC FDP_ACF.1.4(in-job) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]. [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]  None Table 23- In The JOB Access Control SFP Object Attribute(s) Operation Subject Access control rule D.DOC +PRT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC +SCN Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC +CPY Read U.USER Denied D.DOC +FAXIN Read U.NORMAL Denied D.DOC +FAXOUT Read U.USER Denied, except for his/her own documents D.DOC +DSR Read U.NORMAL Denied, except for his/her own documents 6.1.4 Forward Received Jobs Function FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on any Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 39 external Interface from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to any Shared-medium Interface. 6.1.5 HDD Data Erase Function FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies:: No dependencies FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: D.DOC, [assignment: list of objects]. [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]  deallocation of the resource from [assignment: list of objects].  None 6.1.6 HDD Data Encryption Function 6.1.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function FCS_COP.1(h) Cryptographic operation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1.1(h) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]  Encryption of data written to the HDD  Decryption of data read out from the HDD [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]  AES [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]  256 bit [assignment: list of standards]  FIPS PUB 197 Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 40 6.1.7 LAN Data Protection Function 6.1.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function FCS_COP.1(n) Cryptographic operation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1.1(n) The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: list of cryptographic operations]  Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN.  Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN. [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]  Refer to "Cryptographic Algorithm" in Table 24. [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]  Refer to "Cryptographic Key Sizes" in Table 24. [assignment: list of standards]  Refer to "List of Standards" in Table 24. Table 24 - IPSec cryptographic algorithm,key sizes and standards cryptographic algorithm cryptographic key sizes list of standards AES-CBC 256 bit FIPS PUB 197 AES-GCM 256 bit SP800-38D FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from modification or disclosure. FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel. FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for communication of D.DOC, D.FUNC, D.PROT, and D.CONF over any Shared-medium Interface. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 41 6.1.8 Self-Test Function FPT_TST.1 TSF testing Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]. [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]  during initial start-up [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]  Cryptographic algorithms used with the LAN Data Protection Function (AES) FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF Data]. [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF Data]  [assignment: parts of TSF] [assignment: parts of TSF]  Audit Log FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code. 6.1.9 Audit Log Function FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events: a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and c) All Auditable Events as each is defined for its Audit Level (if one is specified) for the Relevant SFR in Table 25 ; [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]. [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]  not specified [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]  None FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 42 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, for each Relevant SFR listed in Table 25: (1) information as defined by its Audit Level (if one is specified), and (2) all Additional Information (if any is required); [assignment: other audit relevant information]. [assignment: other audit relevant information]  None Table 25- Audit data requirements Auditable event Relevant SFR Audit level Additional information Job completion FDP_ACF.1 Not specified Type of job Both successful and unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism FIA_UAU.1 Basic None required Both successful and unsuccessful use of the identification mechanism FIA_UID.1 Basic Attempted user identity, if available Use of the management functions FMT_SMF.1 Minimum None required Modifications to the group of users that are part of a role FMT_SMR.1 Minimum None required Changes to the time FPT_STM.1 Minimum None required Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism7 FTA_SSL.3 Minimum None required Failure of the trusted channel functions FTP_ITC.1 Minimum None required FAU_GEN.2 User identity association Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 7 See "Section 13.1 IEEE Std 2600.1 Errata" in the PP Guide. In IEEE Std 2600.1, this is indicated as "Locking of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism" but notes that this is a transcription error. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 43 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records. [assignment: authorised users]  U.ADMINISTRATOR [assignment: list of audit information]  Refer to the audit logs listed in Table 25. FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been granted explicit read-access. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion. FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail. [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]  prevent FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 44 [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]  "overwrite the oldest stored audit records" [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]  None 6.1.10 Management Function 6.1.10.1 User Management Function FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: No dependencies FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a defined quality metric]. [assignment: a defined quality metric]  Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length  Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters  Use at least one uppercase character (A to Z)  Use at least one lowercase character (a to z)  Use at least one number (0-9)  Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) Management of TSF Data Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD.1.1 (user-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL] to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to whom such TSF Data are associated]]. [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]  Refer to "Operation" in Table 26. [assignment: list of TSF Data associated with a U.NORMAL or TSF Data associated with documents or jobs owned by a U.NORMAL]  Refer to "TSF Data" in Table 26. [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, the U.NORMAL to whom such TSF Data are associated]]  Refer to "Role" in Table 26. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 45 Table 26- User information management TSF data Role Operation User name U.ADMINISTRATOR delete, create, query role U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create, query Passwords U.ADMINISTRATOR modify, delete, create Own password U.NORMAL modify FMT_SMR.1 Security roles Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles U.ADMINISTRATOR, U.NORMAL, [selection: Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]]. [selection: Nobody, [assignment: the authorised identified roles]]  Nobody FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles, except for the role "Nobody" to which no user shall be associated. 6.1.10.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function FCS_CKM.1(h) Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1.1(h) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]  Random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using Hash_DRBG [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]  256 bit [assignment: list of standards]  Not specified FCS_CKM.1(n) Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 46 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1.1(n) The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]  Random number generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using CTR_DRBG [assignment: cryptographic key sizes]  256 bit [assignment: list of standards]  Not specified FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution Hierarchical to: No other components. Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards]. [assignment: cryptographic key distribution method]  DH (Diffie Hellman) and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) [assignment: list of standards]  SP800-56A 6.1.10.3 Device Management Function FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) Management of TSF Data Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD.1.1(device-mgt) The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]] [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]  Refer to "Operation" in Table 27. [assignment: list of TSF data]  Refer to "TSF Data" in Table 27. [selection, choose one of: Nobody, [selection: U.ADMINISTRATOR, [assignment: Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 47 the authorized identified roles except U.NORMAL]]]  Refer to "Role" in Table 27. Table 27- Device management function TSF Data Role Operation Date/Time settings U.ADMINISTRATOR modify HDD Data Erase settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify IPSec settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Auto Reset settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Session Management settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Lockout policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Password policy settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify Audit log U.ADMINISTRATOR query, delete Audit log Auto Export settings U.ADMINISTRATOR query, modify FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions Hierarchical to: No other components Dependencies: No dependencies FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]. [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]  Refer to "Management Function" in Table 28. Table 28- The management of security requirements Management Function Operation Date/Time settings modify HDD Data Erase settings query,modify IPSec settings query,modify Auto Reset settings query,modify Session Management settings query, modify Lockout policy settings query,modify Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 48 Management Function Operation Password policy settings query,modify Audit log query, delete Audit log Auto Export settings query,modify Username delete, create,query role modify,delete, create,query Password modify,delete, create Box PIN modify, create Own password modify PIN of own Mail Box modify 6.2 Security Assurance Requirements Table 29 lists the Security Assurance Requirements for 2600.2-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational Environment B, and related SFR Packages, EAL 2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. Table 29- IEEE 2600.2 Security Assurance Requirements Assurance class Assurance components ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_TDS.1 Basic design AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures (augmentation of EAL2) ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition ASE_INT.1 ST introduction ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_IND.2 Independent testing-sample AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 49 6.3 Security functional requirements rationale 6.3.1 The completeness of security requirements Table 30 provides a mapping of TOE Security Objectives and security functional requirements. This shows how each of the security functional requirements corresponds to at least one TOE Security Objective. Bold typeface items provide principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide supporting (S) fulfillment. Table 30- The completeness of security requirements SFRs Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED FIA_AFL.1 S FIA_ATD.1 S FIA_UAU.1 P P FIA_UAU.7 S FIA_UID.1 S S S S S S P P S FIA_USB.1 P FTA_SSL.3(lui) P P FTA_SSL.3(rui) P P FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) S FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) S FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) P FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) S FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) S S S FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) S S S FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) P P P FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) S S S FDP_ACC.1(in-job) P FDP_ACF.1(in-job) S FPT_FDI_EXP.1 P FDP_RIP.1 P FCS_COP.1(h) S S P FCS_COP.1(n) S S S S S S FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P FCS_CKM.1(h) S S P FCS_CKM.1(n) S S S S S S FCS_CKM.2 S S S S S S FPT_TST.1 P FAU_GEN.1 P FAU_GEN.2 P FAU_SAR.1 P FAU_SAR.2 P FAU_STG.1 P Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 50 SFRs Objectives O.DOC.NO_DIS O.DOC.NO_ALT O.FUNC.NO_ALT O.PROT.NO_ALT O.CONF.NO_DIS O.CONF.NO_ALT O.USER.AUTHORIZED O.INTERFACE.MANAGED O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED O.AUDIT.LOGGED O.STORAGE.CRYPTED FAU_STG.4 P FPT_STM.1 S FIA_SOS.1 S FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) P P P FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S S FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt) P P P FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S 6.3.2 The sufficiency of security requirements This section provides the rationale on how the security functional requirements are sufficient to satisfy the Security Objectives. O.DOC.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures user document data is protected from unauthorized disclosure. O.DOC.NO_DIS is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for access control. The identified users are allowed to cancel only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete- job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job). The identified users are allowed to access only his/her own document data in print job, according to FDP_ACC.1(in-job)/FDP_ACF.1(in-job), and Nobody is allowed to access any document data in other job types. Furthermore, by FDP_RIP.1, complete deletion of residual information of user document data created as a result of job processing is ensured. By FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided. O.DOC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user document data from unauthorized alteration. O.DOC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for access control. The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete- job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job). Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided. O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of user function data from unauthorized alteration. O.FUNC.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for access control. The identified users are allowed to operate only his/her own job according to FMT_MSA.1(delete- job)/FMT_MSA.3(delete-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job)/FDP_ACF.1(delete-job). Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 51 Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. By FMT_SMF.1, management functions related to these actions, are provided. O.PROT.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF protected data from unauthorized alteration. O.PROT.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1. Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. O.CONF.NO_DIS is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from unauthorized disclosure. O.CONF.NO_DIS is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1. Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(h) and FCS_CKM.1(h), user data and TSF data in the HDD are protected from unauthorized disclosure. By FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective that ensures protection of TSF confidential data from unauthorized alteration. O.CONF.NO_ALT is addressed by the following: Based on user identification information managed by FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) and resulting from FIA_UID.1, roles managed by FMT_SMR.1 are assigned for the Device Management function as specified by FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), and FMT_SMF.1. Furthermore, by FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1(n), and FCS_CKM.2, user data and TSF data sent over the LAN are protected from unauthorized alteration and disclosure. O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective that ensures user identification and authentication. O.USER.AUTHORIZED is addressed by the following: Users authenticated by the identification and authentication mechanism specified by FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_AFL.1, with user sessions managed by FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, and FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), are granted use of the function, as determined by access control specified by FDP_ACC.1(exec-job)/FDP_ACF.1(exec-job). Furthermore, authorized user information are managed by FIA_SOS.1, FMT_MSA.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job), FMT_SMR.1. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective that ensures control of operations of the I/O interfaces in accordance with security policy. O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is addressed by the following: By FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui)/FTA_SSL.3(rui), the user interface is managed. By FPT_FDI_EXP.1, restricted forwarding of data to the LAN is specified. O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is addressed by providing the self-test procedures specified by FPT_TST.1. O.AUDIT.LOGGED is addressed by providing the Audit Log function as specified by FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, and FAU_STG.4. FIA_UID.1 and FPT_STM.1 provide the means for user information and timestamps generated on audit logs. O.STORAGE.CRYPTED is realized by the encryption/decryption function of FCS_COP.1(h) and the encryption key management function of FCS_CKM.1(h). 6.3.3 The dependencies of security requirements This section provides the justification for any dependencies not met. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 52 Table 31 - The dependencies of security requirements Functional Requirement Dependencies required by CC Dependencies satisfied by ST Reason for not meeting dependencies FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_UID.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FTA_SSL.3(lui) No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FTA_SSL.3(rui) No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1(exec-job) FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACF.1(exec-job) FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1(exec-job) FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MSA.1(delete-job) [FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FDP_ACC.1(delete- job) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1(delete- job) FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACC.1(delete-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1(delete- job) FMT_MSA.3(delete- job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1(in-job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_ACF.1(in-job) FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3 FDP_ACC.1(in-job) FMT_MSA.3(delete- job) N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FPT_FDI_EXP.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FCS_COP.1(h) [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1(h)] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1(h) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FTP_ITC.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FCS_COP.1(n) [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1(n)] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1(n) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.1(h) FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1(h) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 53 Functional Requirement Dependencies required by CC Dependencies satisfied by ST Reason for not meeting dependencies cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.1(n) [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1(n) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1(n)] FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1(n) FCS_CKM.4 is not claimed because: Cryptographic keys are stored in RAM, and disappear when power is shut off. Also, extraction of cryptographic keys is prevented by the design of the system. As such, cryptographic keys are managed securely enough not to require any method for their destruction. FPT_TST.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FPT_STM.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_MTD.1(device- mgt) FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 N/A (dependencies are satisfied) FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies No dependencies N/A (no dependencies) 6.4 Security assurance requirements rationale This Protection Profile has been developed for Hardcopy Devices to be used in commercial information processing environments that require a moderate level of document security, network security, and security assurance. The TOE will be exposed to only a low level of risk because it is assumed that the TOE will be located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides almost constant protection from unauthorized and unmanaged access to the TOE and its data interfaces. Agents cannot physically access any nonvolatile storage without disassembling the TOE except for removable nonvolatile storage devices, where protection of User and TSF Data are provided when such devices are removed from the TOE environment. Agents have limited or no means of infiltrating the TOE with code to effect a change, and the TOE self-verifies its executable code to detect unintentional malfunctions. As such, the Evaluation Assurance Level 2 is appropriate. EAL 2 is augmented with ALC_FLR.2, Flaw reporting procedures. ALC_FLR.2 ensures that instructions and procedures for the reporting and remediation of identified security flaws are in place, and their inclusion is expected by the consumers of this TOE. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 54 7 TOE Summary specification This section describes the TOE summary specifications. 7.1 User Authentication Function – Supported functional requirements: FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FIA_AFL.1, FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui) When the control panel or a remote UI is used to operate the MFP, before permitting such operations, the TOE requires user authentication in order to identify and authenticate valid users. However, the submission of print jobs, fax jobs, and I-fax jobs is always permitted.[FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1] Two methods of user authentication are supported: – External Authentication Authentication is based on user information registered in the authentication server. This may be an Active Directory server that uses Kerberos authentication, or LDAP server that uses LDAP authentication. – Internal Authentication Authentication is based on user information registered in the device. For user authentication, the TOE prompts input of the user name, password, and the login destination. User authentication succeeds only if the user name and password matches the one at the specified destination. The password text area at the time of password input is displayed as "*" in the operation panel and "●" in the remote UI. [FIA_UAU.7] The TOE maintains user names and roles as attributes for the user. If the user's identity is successfully authenticated, the attribute is allocated by issuing an access control token (ACT) for each user.[FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1] The TOE provides a lockout function in order to minimize invalid login attempts.[FIA_AFL.1] – This function locks out any user that fails to login successfully within the maximum number of failed authentication attempts. A value from 1 to 10 can be specified as the number of attempts before lockout (Initial value: 3). – Any user that is locked out will not be able to login until the lockout time passes. A value from 1 to 60 minutes can be specified as the lockout time (Initial value: 3 minutes). The TOE terminates an interactive session when there is no user activity at the control panel or remote UI lasting for a specified period of time.[FTA_SSL.3(lui), FTA_SSL.3(rui)] – At the control panel, session timeout occurs after a specified period of user inactivity. A value from 10 seconds to 9 minutes can be specified (Initial value: 2 minutes). – When the timeout period set by the session management setting function has elapsed without operating the Remote UI. Choose from 15 to 150 minutes (Initial value: 15 minutes). Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 55 7.2 Function Use Restriction Function – Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(exec-job), FDP_ACF.1(exec-job), FMT_MSA.3(exec-job) For each UI, the TOE provides Function Use Restriction, which controls access based on the contents of the ACT issued to authenticated users. For Function Use Restriction, the attribute of the Object is the functions itself, and is therefore fixed. When the control panel is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions depending on the settings in "Application Restrictions", which are based on the role contained in the ACT. When a remote UI is used, Function Use Restriction Function permits or denies use of functions based on attribute values associated with the role in the ACT. Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are allowed use of all functions. Table 32- Function Use Restriction Policy UI Object Condition Operation Control panel Pointer to [Print] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Print] function. Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Copy] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Copy] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Scan and Send] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Scan and Send] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Fax] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Scan and Send] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Fax/I-Fax Inbox] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Access Stored Files] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Access Stored Files] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Access Stored Files] function Executed by activating the Object. Pointer to [Scan and Store] The role associated with U.USER must have permission to the [Scan and Store] function Executed by activating the Object. Remote UI Pointer to [Access Received/Stored Files] The role associated with U.USER is anything other than Administrator. Cannot be executed. 7.3 Job Output Restriction Functions For Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs, the TOE provides the following security functions. Job Output Restriction restricts access to submitted jobs, to the user that executed the job. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 56 7.3.1 Job Cancel – Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) TOE can delete Print, Copy, Scan, and Fax TX jobs according to following. The user name of these jobs is initialized by username of the user that executed the job. – U.NORMAL is authorized to delete his/her own job. – U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to delete all jobs. With the cancellation of the job, the attribute value to be attached to the job is deleted. 7.3.2 In The JOB Access Control – Supported functional requirements:FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job), FMT_MSA.3(delete-job) TOE provides the following access control functions for documents in each jobs. User name of these jobs is initialized by username of the user that executed the job. Copy, Scan, Fax TX Jobs – Nobody is authorized to read documents in any copy jobs. However, the job owner and U.ADMINISTRATOR may perform interrupt/priority printing. – Nobody is authorized to read documents in any scan, and Fax TX jobs, except in case of 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs. Temporarily Stored Print Jobs If a print job is submitted, the job is temporarily stored in the machine without being output. Additionally, it uses the user name associated with the print job to determine its owner, in order to realize access restriction as described below. For temporarily stored jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. – Print – Change priority for printing – Delete For jobs to which print is instructed, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following: – Delete Received Fax Jobs For documents received by fax/I-fax, the TOE provides the Memory RX Inbox where these jobs may be stored as files, to be output at a later time. Since these are stored in the Memory RX Inbox, access control to this inbox, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to the Memory RX Inbox, to prevent unauthorized access by a user. Only U.ADMINISTRATORs are authorized to initialize, set, modify, or delete the PIN on the Memory RX Inbox, which means only U.ADMINISTRATORS are allowed access to the stored document data. The TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.ADMINISTRATOR that enters the correct PIN to be the Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 57 owner of the stored document data, preventing any U.NORMAL from executing print or send operations on the document data. If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without entering any PIN. – Print – Send – Delete If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering the correct PIN. – Print – Send – Delete Document Data Stored in Mail Box For Copy or Scan jobs, the TOE provides Mail Boxes where these jobs may be stored as document data, to be printed or sent at a later time. Since these are stored in Mail Boxes, access control to Mail Boxes, is equivalent to access control to the stored document data. A seven digit PIN can be assigned to a Mail Box, to help prevent unauthorized access by a user. No PIN is required when storing document data in a Mail Box. The TOE realizes access restriction, by determining the U.USER that enters the correct PIN, to be the owner of the stored document data. For document data stored in a Mail Box, the following operations are made available to U.NORMAL only by entering the correct PIN. – Print – Change print settings – Preview – Send – Delete If the control panel is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations without entering any PIN. – Print – Change print settings – Preview – Send – Delete If a remote UI is used, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed access to the following operations only by entering the correct PIN. – Print Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 58 – Change print settings – Preview – Send – Delete 7.3.3 Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs – Supported functional requirements: FDP_ACC.1(in-job), FDP_ACF.1(in-job), FDP_ACC.1(delete-job), FDP_ACF.1(delete-job) There are two types of Send Jobs: Fax TX job and Scan job.And there are Delayed Send function and Preview function as Temporarily Stored FAX TX Jobs function to store jobs temporarily. Delayed Send When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with transmission time specified, it is first stored temporarily, until sending at the specified time. For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.NORMALs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. – Change destination For all temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, U.ADMINISTRATOR is allowed to execute the following: – Change destination Preview When the TOE receives a FAX TX job with Preview setting, it is first stored temporarily and previewed, later it is send. For temporarily stored FAX TX jobs, the following operations are available to U.USERs, only if the user's name matches the user name associated with the desired job. – Preview – Delete Pages – Delete Jobs 7.4 Forward Received Jobs Function – Supported functional requirements: FPT_FDI_EXP.1 The design of the TOE prevents received data from being forwarded directly to a server or computer. This function enables the user to restrict forwarding of received jobs to the LAN. 7.5 HDD Data Erase Function – Supported functional requirements: FDP_RIP.1 By overwriting with random data, the TOE permanently erases document data (including temporary image files) in the HDD, to ensure that no trace of the document data remains on the HDD. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 59 One type of complete erasure can be selected from the following methods, and the selected data is encrypted and written to the HDD with built-in TOE. – Overwrite with random data three times – Overwrite once with random data – Overwrite once with null data The timing in which data are erased is specified below. – Image files temporarily stored in the HDD as a result of job processing is completely erased during or after processing of the job. – Document data are completely erased from the HDD, immediately after being deleted from Mail Box/Memory RX Inbox. – Residual information that remained unerased due to a sudden power shutdown, are completely erased from the HDD upon startup of the TOE. 7.6 HDD Data Encryption Function The security functions provided by the HDD data encryption chip mounted on the TOE controller board are described below. The encryption/decryption function provides confidentiality protection for user data and TSF data stored in the HDD. 7.6.1 Encryption/Decryption Function – Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(h) To protect the confidentiality of user data and TSF data stored in the HDD, the TOE performs the following cryptographic operations to encrypt all data stored in the HDD. – Encryption of data written to the HDD. – Decryption of data read out from the HDD. The cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key size are specified below: – AES algorithm (FIPS PUB 197) – 256 bit key length 7.6.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function – Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(h) The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the HDD data encryption function. – Uses a random number generation algorithm according to NIST SP800-90A Hash_DRBG(SHA- 256) for cryptographic key generation – Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length The cryptographic key is managed as follows. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 60 – Upon startup, the TOE reads the seed information stored in FlashROM and generates a cryptographic key. – After generating the cryptographic key, the TOE stores the key in RAM. No method is available for acquiring the seed from the encryption chip. Note also, that because the cryptographic key is stored in volatile RAM memory, it disappears when power is shut off. 7.7 LAN Data Protection Function LAN Data Protection Function encrypts/decrypts all IP packets that are used in communication with an IT device. 7.7.1 IP Packet Encryption Function – Supported functional requirements: FCS_COP.1(n), FTP_ITC.1 To ensure confidentiality and integrity of user data and TSF data communicated to and from an IT device, the TOE uses IPSec to encrypt/decrypt all IP packets. – Encryption of IP packets sent to the LAN – Decryption of IP packets received from the LAN The following cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes are used. – See Table 24 7.7.2 Cryptographic Key Management Function – Supported functional requirements: FCS_CKM.1(n), FCS_CKM.2 The TOE uses the following specifications for generating the cryptographic key that is used by the IP packet encryption function. – Cryptographic key generation algorithm according to SP800-90A using CTR_DRBG(AES-256) – Generates a cryptographic key with 256 bit key length The following method is used by the TOE, to transmit the cryptographic key used by the IP Packet Encryption Function, to the other party – ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman) and DH (Diffie Hellman) according to SP800-56A 7.8 Self-Test Function – Supported functional requirements: FPT_TST.1 At startup, the TOE performs the following self-test. – Checks whether cryptographic algorithms are running properly (AES) – Checks the integrity of the Audit Log – Checks the integrity of the executable code of the cryptographic algorithm Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 61 7.9 Audit Log Function – Supported functional requirements: FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FPT_STM.1, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1 The TOE generates logs for the following events. – Startup – Shutdown – Job completion – User authentication success/failure – Logout – Use of device management functions – Use of user management functions – Changes to the date/time setting – IPSec connection failures The items that are recorded on each log, are listed below. The date/time is provided by the TOE. The TOE's date/time information is set by the Management Function, or is set by time synchronization when the accurate time is obtained from the Time Server. – Date/Time, User Name, Event Type, Outcome (Success/Failed) Other log events may have additional items as described below. – Job type (job completion) – Name of the user that failed authentication (authentication failure) Also, export of audit logs can be performed from a remote UI, in order to read out log records, although use of this function is restricted to U.ADMINISTRATOR only.Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed to export audit logs when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI. It also provides the ability to automatically export audit logs to an audit log file server. To use this function, U.ADMINISTRATOR must set the destination and transmission time and enable the function. The TOE provides the ability to send audit logs to a syslog server. To use this function, U.ADMINISTRATOR must set the destination and transmission protocol and enable the function. When accessing the TOE from a remote UI, another capability restricted to U.ADMINISTRATORs only is the deletion of log records from the [Deleting Collected Logs] menu. Users other than U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed access to this capability when logged in to the TOE from a remote UI, thus preventing unauthorized alterations from occurring. A maximum of 40,000 audit records can be maintained. Once this becomes full, the oldest audit record is overwritten with the newest. Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 62 7.10 Management Functions 7.10.1 User Management Function – Supported functional requirements: FIA_SOS.1 , FMT_MTD.1(user-mgt) , FMT_MSA.1(exec- job), FMT_MSA.1(delete-job), FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1 The TOE restricts the use of the following user management functions to the U. ADMINISTRATOR with the Administrator role only. However, U.NORMAL can only change their own passwords and the PIN for the Mail Box they use. – User name：query, create, delete – Role：modify,delete, create, query – Password：modify,delete, create – Box PIN：modify, create – Access restriction information：modify,delete, create [Setting/Changing/Deleting User, Role, and Access Restriction Information] New users are registered by setting the user name and password, and assigning a role to the user. Registered user information can be modified by changing the password, or the assigned role, or the user's registration can be deleted altogether. User specified passwords are checked to see that they are consistent with the password policy. Four roles exist, which are called "Base Roles": Administrator, Power User, General User, and Limited User. To create a new "Custom Role" different from these, any one of four base roles is used as a template for the new role, which can then be registered. The Administrator role is a role whose base role is "Administrator", and has administrative privileges. The access restriction information that determines whether use of certain functions is permitted or denied, is specified by the "Application Restrictions" setting, which depends on what role is assigned. Although the initial value for "Application Restrictions" is fixed for base roles, the initial value of "Application Restrictions" can be changed for custom roles. [Box PIN] Grant the ability to register or change a PIN to access the box only to U.ADMINISTRATOR assigned to the Administrator role. U.NORMAL are allowed to change the PIN of the box they can use. [Types of Role] There are two types of role: U.ADMINISTRATOR and U.NORMAL. – U.ADMINISTRATOR User assigned the Administrator role and has administrative privileges. – U.NORMAL General user assigned a role other than Administrator role. 7.10.2 Device Management Function – Supported functional requirements: FMT_MTD.1(device-mgt), FMT_SMF.1 Date of Issue: 2021/03/29 Copyright CANON INC. 2020 63 To provide for the effective enforcement of security functions, the TOE allows only U.ADMINISTRATORs to set the device management settings in Table 27. The following settings are also provided. [Password Policy Settings] To encourage the use of strong passwords, the following password policy may be set. – Use a password 4 to 32 characters in length – Prohibit the use of 3 or more consecutive characters – Use at least one uppercase characters (A to Z) – Use at least one lowercase characters (a to z) – Use at least one number (0-9) – Use at least one non-alphabet characters (^-@[]:;,./¥!"#$%&'()=~|{`+*}_?><) [Lockout Policy Settings] The number of attempts before lockout and the lockout time can be set. – Number of attempts before lockout Select a value from 1 to 10 (Initial value: 3) – Lockout time Select a value from 1 to 60 minutes (Initial value: 3 minutes) END