BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025
for
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider,
Version 1.4.1
from
fiskaly GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 (*)
Cryptographic Service Provider Light
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider
Version 1.4.1
from fiskaly GmbH
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration
Cryptographic Service Provider Light - Time Stamp
Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-
Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-
PP-0113-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1
valid until: 2 July 2030
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC
15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 3 July 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................18
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................21
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................21
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................21
13. Definitions................................................................................................................21
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................23
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................25
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 26
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.4.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V3-
2021. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V3-2021 were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.4.1 was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 7 April 2025. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: fiskaly GmbH.
The product was developed by: fiskaly GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation and in the following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if a
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 3 July 2025
is valid until 2 July 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.4.1 has been included in the
BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly in the listing found at the BSI
Website https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further information can
be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
fiskaly GmbH
Mariahilfer Straße 36/5, 4. OG
AT-1070 Wien
Österreich
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.4.1. It is
intended to be used with products requiring a certified Cryptographic Service Provider
Light (CSPLight).
The Security Target [5] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service
Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Key management functionality The key management functionality covers the security
functionality related to key management and administration
which only allows management of cryptographic keys and other
management functions to authorized roles. It includes
functionality for key generation, key derivation and key
agreement, internal storage of keys, import and export of keys
with protection of their confidentiality and integrity.
Data encryption The TOE provides the symmetric data encryption and decryption
algorithm AES with standardized key lengths of 128 and 256
bits.
‍
Hybrid encryption with message
authentication code
The TOE provides hybrid data encryption/decryption and MAC
calculation/verification of user data.
‍
Data integrity mechanisms The TOE provides data integrity protection by symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography.
‍
Authentication, attestation, trusted
channel
The TOE provides a cryptographically protected trusted
communication channel between the TOE and external entities
as well as the authentication of external entities.
‍
User identification and authentication The TOE implements user identification and authentication, all
subsystems implementing TSFI must perform this before giving
access to the specific TOE services.
‍
Access control The TOE enforces a strict role based access control. The roles
associated with the authenticated user and user’s current status
define the authorization and allowed use of services and
objects.
‍
Security management The TOE provides administrative services such as management
of security functions, roles and attributes.
‍
TOE security functionality protection The TOE performs tests of the TOE integrity, TSF data integrity,
access control system and cryptographic functionality.
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TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
‍
Update Code Package The TOE supports downloading, integrity and authenticity
verification and decryption of Update Code Packages (UCP).
The functionality requires to be authenticated by a user with the
Update Agent role.
‍
Time stamping The TOE provides a time stamp service. All time-related
services take place using access to the TOE’s internal system
clock which is synchronized using a trusted time service via an
authenticated Network Time Security (NTS) service provider.
‍
Clustering of TOEs for scalability of
performance and availability
The TOE supports clustering of a single master node and
multiple slave nodes to improve the availability of the TOE.
‍
Generation of audit records The TOE generates audit records on selected user activities and
security events of the TOE. Audit records are exported by the
TOE in signed and time stamped form.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [5], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [5],
chapters 3.4, 3.2 and 3.3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.4.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service
Provider
TOE Version:
1.4.1
Physical delivery of the signed
JAR file to the customer via a
fiskaly GmbH representative
2‍ DOC Preparative Procedures &
Operational User Guidance
Documentation
Document
Version: 1.4.7,
Date: 04.10.2024
Download via a web portal or
send by e-mail
SHA256: 5e8e7979332bb50349f31696efb37c65d9775bbcc64d8a6eb9fc48e55c2eb0a9
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 Certification Report
The fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider is provided as a pure software. Even though the
fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider is personally delivered, the customer shall check its
authenticity as follows:
1 $ minisign -P
RWRUupxsFLBrFlb7g2ZWVFSQE23BvMEtPszqNu2E8Q32U4L99AKexpl -V -m
cspl.jar
2 Signature and comment signature verified
3 Trusted comment : timestamp :1603971010 file : cspl.jar
The minisign tool requires the detached digital signature file (i.e. cspl.jar.minisig) that is
provided by fiskaly GmbH as well.
To ensure that the provided public key is genuine it shall be compared with the public key
contained and published in the Security Target (cf. [5]):
RWRUupxsFLBrtFlb7g2ZWVFSQE23BvMEtPszqNu2E8Q32U4L99AKexpl.
No individual public key for each TOE instance will be generated.
As the TOE is a JAR file, it is also digitally signed using an EV code signing certificate.
This signature shall be checked by using the following command
1 $ jarsigner - verify cspl.jar
2 jar verified
The TOE version can be checked after the installation and setup of the TOE via the HTTP
endpoint/api/v1/rc/app by sending the message
Version.Request
The TOE is fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, TOE Version: 1.4.1 according to [5].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Key management
● Data encryption
● Hybrid encryption with MAC for user data
● Data integrity mechanisms
● Time Stamp
● Authentication and attestation of the TOE, trusted channel
● User identification and authentication
● Access control
● Security Management
● Security Audit
● Protection of the TSF
● Import and verification of Update Code Package
● Clustering
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.CommInf: Communication infrastructure,
● OE.AppComp: Support of the Application component,
● OE.SecManag: Security management,
● OE.SecComm: Protection of communication channel,
● OE.SUCP: Signed Update Code Packages,
● OE.SecPlatform: Secure Hardware Platform,
● OE.Audit: Review and availability of audit records,
● OE.TimeSource: External time source,
● OE.ClusterCtrl: Control of the cluster, and
● OE.TSFdataTrans: Transfer of TSF data within the CSPLight cluster.
Details can be found in the Security Target [5], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software TOE running on dedicated non-TOE hardware (PrimeKey SEE
server) as well as dedicated non-TOE software (Alpine Linux, JVM), building the non-TOE
platform. The TOE is operated on a hardware platform PrimeKey SEE. The non-TOE
PrimeKey SEE platform is expected to provide protection against physical intrusion and
tampering. Additionally, the TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted entities due to
its SFR-enforcing subsystems. The non-TOE software is an Alpine Linux distribution with a
minimal functionality. The JVM is configured to allow only JAR files signed by the fiskaly
GmbH to access the net and any data on the disk.
The SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TOE are:
● Server subsystem
● Cryptographic subsystem
The server subsystem provides the following security functionality:
● Regular time synchronization
The server runs a timer that triggers the synchronization of date and time every 24 hours
● Access control
The server system will check for each implemented function if the calling user has the
role that is required for the operation. If this is not the case, an error will be returned and
the function will be terminated.
● Auditing functionality
The server system will provide the audit log messages for the function implementations.
● Key management
The server system has functions implemented for key related functionality, e.g. such as
derivation, deleting, export generation of keys.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025 Certification Report
● Role management
The server system provides functionality for managing the timeout values for roles.
● Attestation
The server system can verify the identity and functionality of the TOE.
● Cluster management
The server system has functions implemented for cluster related tasks, e.g. such as data
export, master and slave assignment and deletion and cluster status retrieval.
● Encryption / Decryption
The server system provides the functionality to encrypt and decrypt data via an ECKA-
EG or RSA-AES scheme.
● Random number generation
The server system provides the functionality to return random bytes to the requesting
caller.
● Signature
The server system provides the functionality to generate and verify signatures.
● Authentication
The server system implements functions to manage the authentication of users, e.g.
such as resetting and updating entity passwords.
● PACE
The server system identifies a client to the TOE and sets up the parameters of PACE
that shall be used in further communication, thus establishing a secure communication
channel with the client.
● UCP
The server system provides the functionality to update the TOE.
The cryptographic subsystem uses the following functionality of Bouncy Castle :
● Hash generation using SHA-2
● RSA based signature creation and verification
● RSA key generation
● EC key generation
● ECDSA generation and verification
● Parsing of X.509 certificate
● Random Number Generation
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Summary
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions. For all commands and functionality tests,
test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behavior. Repetition of
developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against basic attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
7.2. Developer Testing
TOE test configuration
The tests are performed on a test system running two virtual machines, the TOE-VM and
the Test-VM. The tested TOE version is 1.4.1.
Testing approach
The developer tests cover all interfaces and the random number generator of the
underlying hardware platform.
The tests performed can be categorized into three groups: unit, TSFI and manual tests.
Additionally the entropy of random numbers can be tested using the SP-800-90B entropy
assessment tool.
The test environment is configured by the developer and does not need any actions by the
evaluator to run the tests. This means that all necessary configuration files and flags are
set.
Amount of developer testing performed
The developer testing includes 465 test functions covering all TSFIs and operations, which
results in 3114 automated tests and 6 manual tests.
Testing Results
All test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result. If
necessary the developer gives additional annotations.
7.3. Independent Testing
Test Configuration
The TOE test configuration is defined by the notation: fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service
Provider Version 1.4.1 (as stated in [5]).
The configuration respectively the version of the TOE can be retrieved from the test
environment via the test function cc.tsfi.basic.VersionTest.TestAuthorized(). The evaluators
verified that the tested version, 1.4.1, of the TOE is compliant with the provided
documentation.
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Subset size chosen
The evaluators repeated all developer tests with the exception of the manual tests.
Selection criteria for the interfaces and interfaces tested
The developer tests cover all TSFIs. Since the evaluators repeated the complete list of
developer tests, all given interfaces are covered by the testing.
Additional evaluator tests
Additional the following independent evaluator tests were performed:
● T_User: User roles are changed and relevant tests repeated.
● T_Auditor: Complying FIA_UAU.1.1(3).
● T_Fuzzing: Fuzzing of the HTTP-Endpoint.
● T_Log: Testing in the case of full storage.
● T_Random: Entropy test of generated random numbers
The evaluators determined that all tests were executed successfully. For the penetration
tests see below.
7.4. Penetration Testing
Overview
The penetration testing was carried out in the evaluation lab on the non-TOE hardware.
All configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current re-evaluation
were tested, i.e. version 1.4.1.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was
actually successful.
Penetration testing approach
The approach is to try to inject arbitrary data into the TOE by a fuzzing attack on the
Secure RPC interface. Since the TOE accepts only communication via the combined
protobuf and PACE protocol, this means to overcome the protection of the protocol used
for data import.
TOE test configurations
The tested configuration of the TOE is 1.4.1. The testing was carried out on the non-TOE
hardware. A script was used in order to try to inject arbitrary data into the TOE endpoint.
Attack scenarios having been tested
The attack scenario that has been tested is “Fuzzing attack on the Secure RPC endpoint
in order to inject malicious code”.
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SFRs penetration tested
The following SFRs were covered by the penetration tests:
FDP_ITC.2/UD
The remaining SFRs were analysed, but not penetration tested due to non-exploitability of
the related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment also including an
attacker with a Basic attack potential.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [5] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE test configuration is defined by the notation:
● fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, Version 1.4.1
● The guidance documentation Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guidance
Documentation, Document Version 1.4.7
The exact version number of the TOE has been gathered by using the version.request
command test case and is for the TOE the version number 1.4.1.
The TOE is running on the hardware platform PrimeKey SEE with OpenJDK 17 on alpine
GNU/Linux based on BusyBox.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and 31 were used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V3-2021, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was the switch from NTP to
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NTS for synchronising the system time, the addition of new interfaces, bug fixes, and
updates to dependencies.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit –
Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February
2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3, ALC_LCD.1
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 120 Bits
1 Hashing SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[FIPS180-4] none yes
2 Random
Number
Generation
RNG [SP800-90A]; DRG.3 ≥ 125 bits
of entropy
yes
3 Key Generation AES [ISO18033-3] 128, 256 yes
4 Key Derivation AES [SP800-56C] 128, 256 yes
5 Key Generation Curve P-256 [FIPS186-4] B.4 and
D.1.2.3
256 yes
6 Key Derivation Curve P-256 with X9.63
Key Derivation Function
[FIPS186-4] B.4 and
D.1.2.3, [TR-03111],
chapter 4.3.3
256 yes
7 Key Generation RSA [RFC8017] 4096 yes
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security Level
above 120 Bits
8 Key Agreement ECDHE
Curve P-256 and 256-bit
random ECP group
[TR-03111] 128, 256 yes
9 Key Derivation ECKA-EG
Curve P-256 with X9.63
Key Derivation Function
[TR-03111], chapter
4.3.2.2
128, 256 yes
10 Key Generation ECKA-EG
Curve P-256
[FIPS186-4] B.4 and
D.1.2.3
256 yes
11 Key Generation AES-RSA Key generation
and RSA encryption
[ISO18033-3], [RFC8017] 128, 256 yes
12 Key Derivation AES-RSA key derivation
and decryption
[ISO14888-2] 128, 256 yes
13 Key Wrapping AES Key Wrap with
padding
[SP800-38F] 128, 256 yes
14 Confidentiality
Protection
AES in CBC mode [SP800-38A], [ISO18033-
3], [ISO10116]
128, 256 yes
15 Confidentiality
with MAC
AES in CBC mode with
CMAC
[SP800-38A], [SP800-
38B]
128, 256 yes
16 MAC AES with CMAC [SP800-38B] 128, 256 yes
17 Digital
Signatures
ECDSA
Curve P-256
[FIPS186-4] B.4 and
D.1.2.3
256 yes
18 Digital
Signatures
RSA and EMSA-PSS [ISO14888-2],
[RFC8017]
4096 yes
19 Trusted
Channel
Chip Authentication
Version 2
[TR-03110-2], section 3.4 128, 256 yes
20 Trusted
Channel
Terminal Authentication
Version 2
[TR-03110-2], section 3.3 128, 256 yes
21 Trusted
Channel
PACE
Curve P-256
[ICAO-9303-11], section
4.4
128, 256 yes
22 Trusted
Channel
AES in CBC mode [SP800-38A], [FIPS197] 128, 256 yes
23 Trusted
Channel
AES CMAC [SP800-38B], [FIPS197] 128, 256 yes
24 Verification of
digital signature
of the Issuer
ECDSA
Curve P-256
[TR-03111] 256 yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [5] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cryptographic Message Authentication Code
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSPL Cryptographic Service Provider Light
DRG Deterministic RNG
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC Elliptic Curve
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECKA-EG Elliptic Curve ElGamal Key Agreement
EMSA-PSS Encoding Method for Signature Appendix, Probabilistic Signature Scheme
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC Message Authentication Code
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman cryptosystem
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UCP Update Code Package
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile – A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal – Expressed in natural language.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
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Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Subject – An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1153-V4-2025, Document Version 1.3.6, 21.02.2025,
Security Target fiskaly Cloud Crypto Service Provider, fiskaly GmbH
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4.96, 23.06.2025, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) – Summary, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential
document)
7
specifically
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen
nach CC
• AIS 19, Version 9, Gliederung des ETR
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[7] Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
[8] Configuration list for the TOE, SHA256:
d8a445a85f789a2db99dbf1b944ba2909ae6e41c9e3454efd0d20c54677b5ece,
20.06.2025, CSPL-v1.4.1_CL-2025-06-20.csv (confidential document)
[9] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Document Version 1.4.7, 04.10.2024,
Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guidance Documentation
[10] [FIPS180-4] Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (FIPS 180-4), 04.08.2015, NIST
[FIPS186-4] Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (FIPS 186-4), 19.07.2013, NIST
[FIPS197] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (FIPS PUB 197), 26.11.2001, NIST
[ICAO-9303-11] Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents Part 11 — Security
Mechanisms for MRTDs, Seventh Edition, 2015, ICAO
[ISO10116] Information technology — Security techniques — Modes of operation for
an n-bit block cipher (ISO/IEC 10116:2017), Edition 4, Juli 2017, ISO
[ISO14888-2] Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signatures
with appendix — Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms (ISO/IEC 14888-
2:2008), Edition 2, April 2008, ISO
[ISO18033-3] Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption
algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers (ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010), Edition 2, December
2010, ISO
[RFC8017] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 (RFC 8017),
November 2016, Kathleen Moriarty and Burt Kaliski and Jakob Jonsson and
Andreas Rusch
[SP800-38A] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and
Techniques (SP 800-38A), 01.12.2001, NIST
[SP800-38B] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication (SP 800-38B), 01.05.2005, NIST
[SP800-38D] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC (SP 800-38D), 28.11.2007, NIST
[SP800-38F] Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for
Key Wrapping (SP 800-38F), 13.12.2012, NIST
[SP800-56C] Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-
Expansion (SP 800-56C), 28.11.2011, NIST
[SP800-90A] Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (SP 800-90A Rev. 1), 24.06.2015, NIST
[TR-03110-2] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 2: Protocols for electronic IDentification,
Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS) (TR-03110-2), Version 2.21, 21.12.2016,
BSI
[TR-03111] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (TR-03111), Version 2.10, 01.06.2018, BSI
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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