1
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cog Systems
Level 1, 277 King Street
Newtown NSW 2042 Australia
HTC A9 Secured by Cog Systems D4
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10776-2017
Dated: May 25, 2017
Version: 0.3
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Stelios Melachrinoudis
The MITRE Corporation
Marybeth Panock
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
James Arnold
Tammy Compton
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary....................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.................................................................................................................. 5
3 Architectural Information .............................................................................................. 6
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ...................................................................................... 6
3.2 TOE Architecture................................................................................................... 6
3.3 Physical Boundaries............................................................................................... 7
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................... 7
4.1 Cryptographic support ........................................................................................... 7
4.2 User data protection ............................................................................................... 7
4.3 Identification and authentication............................................................................ 8
4.4 Security management............................................................................................. 8
4.5 Protection of the TSF............................................................................................. 8
4.6 TOE access............................................................................................................. 8
4.7 Trusted path/channels ............................................................................................ 9
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................... 9
6 Clarification of Scope .................................................................................................... 9
7 Documentation............................................................................................................. 10
8 IT Product Testing ....................................................................................................... 10
8.1 Developer Testing................................................................................................ 10
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing ................................................................ 10
8.3 Test Environment................................................................................................. 10
9 Evaluated Configuration .............................................................................................. 11
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................. 11
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)............................................................. 11
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)............................................................... 12
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) .................................................. 12
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ...................................... 12
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE) .................. 12
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN).......................................................... 13
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results........................................................................... 13
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 13
12 Annexes........................................................................................................................ 14
13 Security Target............................................................................................................. 14
14 Glossary ....................................................................................................................... 15
15 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 16
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team for the evaluation of the HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4
solution provided by Cog Systems. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and
the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of
Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or
implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in May 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the evaluation
sensitive Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by
Gossamer Security Solutions. That information is summarized in the Assurance Activity
Report (MDFPP20) For HTC A9 Secured By COG Systems D4 (AAR). The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant,
and meets the assurance requirements of the Protection Profile For Mobile Device
Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4, and the
associated TOE guidance documentation.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are
correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the HTC A9, Secured
by Cog Systems D4 (MDFPP20) Security Target, version 0.5, May 12, 2017 and the analysis
of the evaluation evidence as performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4
Protection Profile
Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
ST HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 Security Target, version 0.5, May 12, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4, version
0.2, May 12, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cog Systems
Developer Cog Systems
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
CCEVS Validators Stelios Melachrinoudis,
The MITRE Corporation
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Item Identifier
Marybeth Panock,
Kenneth Stutterheim,
The Aerospace Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation is the D4 Secure Mobile device. The D4 Secure is a smartphone
based upon HTC A9 hardware which uses Qualcomm System on a Chip (SoC) (Snapdragon
617, MSM8952). This is a custom built smartphone intended to support military and civil
service users.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of one D4 Secure Mobile device.
Product
Security SW
Version
OS Version HTC Software Version Number
HTC-A9 0.3 Android v6.0.1 1.57.617.52
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE utilizes an OKL4 separation kernel (hypervisor), to provide 'cells' (i.e., a virtualized
environment) that virtualize and isolate different aspects of the phone's hardware. The TOE
includes the Qualcomm Secure Execution Environment (QSEE) Trustzone, the separation
kernel/hypervisor, custom D4 Secure Mobile 'cells' and a high-level operating system, along
with the HTC A9 hardware. While the D4 Secure Mobile can support any operating system,
the high level OS included in this evaluation is Android version 6.0.1.
The HTC A9 hardware is based upon the Qualcomm Snapdragon 617, MSM 8952 SoC. The
SoC includes a Qualcomm Integrated Cryptographic Engine (ICE) to perform encryption and
decryption operations with hardware implemented AES algorithm and software configured
keys.
The TOE’s Android cell includes a high-level OS. This high-level OS is a full
implementation of Android 6.0.1, modified as necessary to satisfy MDFPP20 requirements.
The Android cell provides an Application Programming Interface to mobile applications and
provides users installing an application with the ability to either approve or reject an
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application based upon the API access that the application requires. The Android cell
provides many (but not all) of the TOE security functions required by the MDFPP20.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and controlled
set of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment. Communication via those
interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of administration or is directed through
the TOE for communication among network devices. In both cases the TOE implements a
set of policies to control the services available and those services are intended to protect and
ensure the secure operation of the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE's physical boundary is the physical perimeter of the mobile device enclosure.
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes multiple instances of the OpenSSL cryptographic library with CAVP
validated algorithms to support cryptographic functions including: asymmetric key
generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption,
cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are
supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization
vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These
primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement security protocols such as TLS and
HTTPS and also to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data, keys,
and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also
accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected.
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4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, except for limited functionality such as making phone calls to an emergency
number and receiving notifications, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must
be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the password
must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they
cannot be read from the TOE's display. The TOE limits the frequency of password entry such
that when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE performs a full wipe of protected
content. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and
special characters. Passwords up to 14 characters in length are supported.
The TOE serves as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and can use X509v3 certificates and perform
certificate validation for a number of functions such as EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS
exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions claimed in the
corresponding Security Target (and conforming to the MDFPP requirements) as well as other
functions that might be commonly found in mobile devices.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features. It protects sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not
accessible or exportable. It has access to a timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time
information is available (e.g., for cryptographic operations). It enforces read, write, and
execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization and stack-based
buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. Those
features help to protect the TOE from modification by applications as well as to isolate the
address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications. The TOE
employs a Secure Boot process that uses cryptographic signatures to ensure the authenticity
and integrity of the bootloader, and the secure boot partition produced by Cog. The
cryptographic signatures utilize data fused into the device processor.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect if it is failing or is corrupt. If any self-test fails, the TOE will not enter
an operational mode. The TOE also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the
updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital
signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, either by a user or after a configured interval of inactivity, thereby
obscuring its display. The TOE has the capability to display an advisory message (banner)
when users unlock the TOE for use.
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The TOE is able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, and/or EAP-TLS to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP20 should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP20 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by
the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device model and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP20 and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
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7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 HTC A9, Secured By D4 Administrator Guide Instructions, Version 0.34, 6 March
2017
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available on-
line was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for
HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4, Version 0.2, May 12, 2017 (DTR) and as summarized
in the publically available Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for HTC A9 Secured by
COG Systems D4, Version 0.3, 5.19.17 (AAR).
8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to Common Criteria Certification
documents and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP20 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
8.3 Test Environment
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
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9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of one D4 Secure smartphone based upon HTC A9
hardware which uses Qualcomm SoCs (Snapdragon 617, MSM8952). The product must be
configured as specified in the HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 Adminstrator Guide
Instructions, 6 March 2017, version 0.34.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the HTC A9,
Secured by Cog Systems D4 TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Security Assurance
Requirements (SAR) contained in the MDFPP20.
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4
product that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP20 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP20 and recorded the results in a Test
Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
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conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database at the following URL:
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and the Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: “HTC A9, D4 Secure,
msm8952, Android, Openssl, and Boringssl”.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The security functionality that was evaluated was scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements as specified in the Security Target, and only the functionality
implemented by the SFR’s within the Security Target was evaluated. All other functionality
provided by the product, to include software or components that were not part of the
evaluated configuration, need to be assessed separately and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness. For example, note that the ST specifies that: “The TOE
includes the C2-Agent cell, the HSM Proxy cell, the Inner DAR cell and the Outer DIT cell
that are not in the scope of this evaluation."
The validators encourage the consumers of these products to understand the relationship
between the products and any functionality that may be provided via Mobile Device
Management solutions. This evaluation neither covers, nor endorses, the use of any particular
MDM solution; only the MDM interfaces of the products were exercised as part of the
evaluation. In practice, the MDM application provided to perform functions as the
administrator is not available, though its settings could be managed via a suitable MDM and
corresponding agent. Alternatively, a downloadable application that can be utilized to put the
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device into CC mode – “Android For Work”, may also come pre-installed where required.
The HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 Administrator Guide Instructions contains
instructions on how the application can be acquired. As of the conclusion of this evaluation,
an administrator can send an e-mail to md4support@cogsystems.com for the “testing app,
guide, and the list of natively installed applications.”
Consumers should note that the Android for Work application was used to place the device
into the evaluated configuration; however, the application itself was not evaluated. The
mobile devices must be configured into Common Criteria mode as directed in the HTC A9,
Secured by Cog Systems D4 Administrator Guide Instructions, version 0.34, Sections 3.1 and
3.2, in order to be in the evaluated configuration.
Note that the evaluated configuration of the device does not support over the air (OTA)
updates of its firmware, rather the device must be updated via the SD card. Note that while
the device does have an SD card slot, it can be used only for provisioning the device. There
is no access to the external SD card once the phone is booted up (e.g., from the Android OS
the user has access to) therefore the use of SD card for any other functionality, such as data
storage was neither tested nor evaluated.
In place of OTA updates, the Admin Guide informs users that bugs and vulnerabilities are
addressed, along with patches applied, as they are reported. Customers are notified via e-
mail when updates are available, including security updates for Android that are addressed
in the monthly security bulletins. Once available, these updates can be downloaded “from
the authorized Customer Portal.” Users and enterprise administrators should remain
cognizant of updates and the update cycles offered. The bug reporting process, along with
contact information, can be found in Section 3.6 of the Admin Guide.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 (MDFPP20)
Security Target, Version 0.5, May 12, 2017.
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14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
[5] HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 0.5,
May 12, 2017 (ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4,
Version 0.3, May 19, 2017 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4, Version
0.2, May 12, 2017 (DTR)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4, Version
0.2, May 12, 2017 (ETR)
[9] HTC A9, Secured by Cog Systems D4 Adminstrator Guide Instructions, 6 March
2017, version 0.34