BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11,
SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11,
SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11,
SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-a11,
SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11,
SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11,
SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11,
SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and
SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11
all with specific IC dedicated software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.27
BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11, SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11,
SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-a11,
SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11,
SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and
SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11 all with specific IC dedicated software
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Teil 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 25 November 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Department
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................20
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL
1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises
certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom
within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, and AVA_VLA.4 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11,
SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-
a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES /
m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11 all with specific
IC dedicated software have undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0538-2008. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0538-2008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11, SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES /
m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11,
SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-
a11 and SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11 all with specific IC dedicated software was
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 18
November 2008. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11,
SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-
a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES /
m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11 all with specific
IC dedicated software has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information
can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
Infineon Technologies AG
CCS M PS
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11, SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES /
m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11,
SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-
a11 and SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11 all with specific IC dedicated software. This TOE,
comprising the group of derivates listed above, is principally based on the same hardware
as the first contactless PE-derivate group comprising the derivates with their different
memory sizes which have successfully passed the EAL5+ evaluation as well. These were
the BSI internal processes BSI-DSZ-CC-0399-2006, BSI-DSZ-CC-0430-2007, BSI-DSZ-
CC-0482-2007 and also BSI-DSZ-CC-0538-2008. The latter process comprised almost the
same hardware in the design step a14 but comes in the current process with an STS
update, an enhanced radio interface and some improvements and optimizations. For more
details please refer to [6, chapter 1.2].
The ICs consists of a dedicated non standard microprocessor (CPU) with a MMU (Memory
Management Unit), several different memories, security logic, a timer, an interrupt-
controlled I/O interface, a AIS31 compatible RNG (Random Number Generator), and a
checksum module (CRC module) and further components are integrated on the chip too.
The TOE’s block diagram is shown in Figure 1 of the Security Target [6, chapter 2.1]. The
term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and
applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications, including high speed security authentication and data encryption. Several
security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be
provided to ensure proper operations and integrity and confidentiality of stored data. The
TOE is available in nine derivates differ only in their EEPROM size and the interface
configuration. The EEPROM sizes available are 18 kByte, 8 kBytes and 4 kByte.
The CPU accesses the memory via the integrated Memory Encryption and Decryption unit
(MED). The access rights of the application to the memories can be controlled with the
memory management unit (MMU). Errors in the NVM are automatically detected and
corrected. Security, sleep mode and interrupt logic as well as the RNG are specially
designed for smart card applications. The sleep mode logic (clock stop mode per ISO/IEC
7816-3) is used to reduce the overall power consumption. The timer permits easy
implementation of communication protocols such as T=1 and all other time-critical
operations. The UART-controlled I/O interface allows the smart card controller and the
terminal interface to be operated independently in terms of timing. The virtual PLL (VPLL)
unit allows operating all variants with a multiplication factor over the external clock signal
or free running with maximum frequency. The RNG does not supply a pseudorandom
number sequence, but instead produces genuine random numbers under all conditions.
The checksum module allows simple calculation of checksums per ISO 3309 (16 bit CRC).
The module implemented for cryptographic operations is the Cryptographic Unit (DDES)
for Dual Key DES calculations. This module is especially designed for chip-card
applications with respect to the security and power consumption. The DDES module
computes the complete DES algorithm within a few clock cycles and is especially designed
to counter attacks like DPA or EMA.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the triple-DES operation only.
For more detail please refer to the Security Target [6, chapter 2.1].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures), AVA_MSU.3 (validation of
analysis) and AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant).
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6, chapter 5.1]. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6, chapter 5.2].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
SEF1 Operating state checking
SEF2 Phase management with test mode lock-out
SEF3 Protection against snooping
SEF4 Data encryption and data disguising
SEF5 Random number generation
SEF6 TSF self test
SEF7 Notification of physical attack
SEF8 Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SEF9 Cryptographic support
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6, chapter 6].
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 6] is confirmed. The rating of the strength of
functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see
BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security [6, chapter 3.1]. Based
on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of assumptions, threats and
policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6 , chapter 3.2 to 3.4].
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11 (produced in Dresden),
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
● SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 (produced in Dresden),
● SLE66CL48PE / m2983-a11 (produced in Dresden),
For more details please refer to chapter 8
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-a11,
SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM /
m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11,
SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and SLE66CL48PE /
m2983-a11 all with specific IC dedicated software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1a HW SLE66CL187PEM Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2984-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1b HW SLE66CL187PE Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2985-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1c HW SLE66CL187PES Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2986-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1d HW SLE66CL88PEM Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2995-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1e HW SLE66CL88PE Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2994-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1f HW SLE66CL87PEM Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2992-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery
1g HW SLE66CL87PES Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2993-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1h HW SLE66CL87PE Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2991-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
1i HW SLE66CL48PE Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2983-a11 with
production line indicator:
“2” (Dresden)
Wafer or
packaged module
2 FW STS Self Test Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
V57.09.08 Stored in Test
ROM
on the IC
3 FW RMS-E Resource Management
System (the IC Dedicated Support
Software) [11]
RMS_E V06 Stored in reserved
area of User ROM
on the IC
4 DOC Data Book – SLE66C(L)
(X)xxxPE(M/S) Security Controller
Family incl. the errata sheet [11]
2008-09 Hardcopy and pdf-
file
5 DOC Confidential Errata & Delta Sheet -
SLE66C(L)(X)xxxPE(M/S) Controllers
- Product and Boundout [12]
2008-10 Hardcopy and pdf-
file
6 DOC Security Programmers’ Manual -
SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers [13]
08.07 Hardcopy and pdf-
file
7 DOC Security & Chip Card ICs –
SLE66CxxxPE – Instruction Set [14]
07.04 Hardcopy and pdf-
file
8 DOC Chip Card & Security ICs -
SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Instruction
Set and Special Function Registers –
Quick Reference [15]
11.06 Hardcopy and pdf-
file
9 DOC Application Notes [16]..[30] see lsection 13 Hardcopy and pdf-
file
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL187PEM /
m2984-a11, SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11,
SLE66CL88PEM / m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-
a11, SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and SLE66CL48PE /
m2983-a11 all with specific IC dedicated software. The TOE is uniquely identified with its
chip identification number. This chip identification number is chip specific as the chip type,
lot number, wafer, chip coordinates on the wafer, production date, production site (e.g.
upper nibble of (08000AH) “2” stands for Infineon’s IC fabrication in Dresden/Germany “a”)
and design step (e.g. “0B” at address (080009H) stands for design step “11”) are part of
the number. If the TOE gives the user the possibility to read the chip identification number,
the corresponding format is defined in the [11, chapter 7.9] and [12, chapter 6.7].
The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following manner:
• C8 hex for version m2984
• C9 hex for version m2985
• CA hex for version m2986
• CF hex for version m2995
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
• CE hex for version m2994
• CC hex for version m2992
• CD hex for version m2993
• CB hex for version m2991
• D0 hex for version m2983
The STS is identified by its unique version number which is stored in three additional
control bytes of the Chip Identification Number [11, chapter 7.9.1]. The RMS is identified
by its unique version number. As the RMS is part of the ROM mask, one can get the RMS
version number for a specific chip by using the ROM type bytes and asking the data base
system at Infineon Logistic Department. It is also accessible by the operating system
function SleRmsVersion [11, chapter 6.16.2.1].
The version numbers of the current TOE are listed in Table 2 above.
3 Security Policy
The security policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against
abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during TOE
Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6, chapter 4.2].
5 Architectural Information
The TOEs are integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6, chapter
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
2.1]. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to
be found in the Data Book [11] and other guidance documents delivered to the customer,
see table 2.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the central processing unit
(CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM, EEPROM, security logic,
interrupt module, bus system, Random Number Generator (RNG) and the cryptographic
operation of the chip are used. Security measures for physical protection are realised
within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip memories
provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of the TOE.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of the
embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for EEPROM
programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE manufacturer in a
reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by the users embedded software.
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the Triple-DES operation only.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
• Simulation tests: These tests are performed before starting the production to develop
the technology for the production and to define the process parameters.
• Qualification tests: These tests are performed after the first production of chips. The
tests are performed in test mode. With these tests the influence of temperature,
frequency, and voltage on the security functions are tested in detail.
• Verification tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check the
functionality in the end user environment. The results of the qualification and
verification tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the TOE is released to
production.
• Security evaluation tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check the
security mechanisms aiming on the security functionality and the effectiveness of the
mechanisms. The random numbers are tested as required by AIS 31 and fulfill the
criteria.
• Production tests: These tests are performed at each TOE before delivery. The aim of
the production tests is to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
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• Penetration Tests: Penetration Tests are performed to find security flaws in the
product.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, the high level design and the low level design. Chips from
the production site Dresden (see part D, annex A of this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators testing effort can be summarised into the following classes of tests: Module
tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests, Tests in user mode, Tests in test mode and
Hardware tests. The evaluators performed independent tests to supplement, augment and
to verify the tests performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was done. With
these kind of tests performed in the developer’s testing environment the entire security
functionality of the TOE was verified. Overall the evaluators have tested the TSF
systematically against the functional specification, the high-level design and the low-level
design.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the current version of the TOE with production line
indicator “2” for Dresden (Germany) provides the Security Functions as specified.
For this re-evaluation the evaluators re-assessed the penetration testing and confirmed the
results from the previous certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0538-2008 where they took
all Security Functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed at
that time to consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated
equipment and expertised know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks were
performed in the course of this evaluation.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The SLE66CL187PEx, the SLE66CL88PEx, the SLE66CL87PEx, and the SLE66CL48PE
are identically from hardware perspective. The difference is that in the SLE66CL88PEx,
the SLE66CL87PEx, and the SLE66CL48PE the memory is blocked to smaller size. All
types can be distinguished by a different chip ident. The difference in the memory size
does not influence the security of the TOE as neither an asset nor a security enforcing
function is affected.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
• SLE66CL187PEM/m2984-a11,
• SLE66CL187PE/m2985-a11,
• SLE66CL187PES/m2986-a11,
• SLE66CL88PEM/m2995-a11,
• SLE66CL88PE/m2994-a11,
• SLE66CL87PEM/m2992-a11,
• SLE66CL87PES/m2993-a11,
• SLE66CL87PE/m2991-a11,
• SLE66CL48PE/m2983-a11.
All with the specific IC Dedicated Software and with production line indicator “2” for
Dresden/Germany. After delivery the TOE only features one fixed configuration (user
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mode), which cannot be altered by the user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All
the evaluation and certification results therefore are only effective for this version of the
TOE. For all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the
results are valid for the user mode, too.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
• The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
• The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
• Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the class ASE
● All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures), AVA_MSU.3
(validation of analysis) and AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant). augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
● All components claimed in the Security Target [6, chapter 6] and defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0538-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on implemented cryptolibrary ECC
and RSA2048.
The evaluation has confirmed:
• PP Conformance: Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9]
• for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Teil 2 extended
• for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
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• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
SEF2 – Phase management with test mode lock-out,
SEF3 – Protection against snooping,
SEF4 – Data encryption and data disguising,
SEF5 – Random number generation
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, 26 and AIS
31 (see [4]) were used. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and
production environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
● algorithms for the encryption and decryption:Triple-DES
● This holds for the following security functions: SF9
This security enforcing function SEF9 is introduced to include the cryptographic operation
in the scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function itself is not used from the TOE
security policy. On the other hand these functions are of special interest for the use of the
hardware as platform for the software. The component is a hardware DES encryption unit.
The keys for the cryptographic Triple-DES operations are provided from the Smartcard
Embedded Software.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to [31] the algorithms are suitable for
encryption and decryption. The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official
catalogue [31].
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The TOE is delivered to the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer and the Card
Manufacturer. The actual end user obtains the TOE from the Card Manufacturer together
with the application which runs on the TOE.
The operational documents as outlined in Table 2, deliverables of the TOE, contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
All security hints described in the user guidance documentation [11], [13] and the delivered
application notes [16]..[30] have to be considered. For secure usage of the TOE the
fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6] and
especially the recommendations of the Security Programmers Manual [13] have to be
taken into account.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ACE Advanced Crypto Engine
API Application Programming Interface
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRC Checksum module
CPU Central Processing Unit
DES Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DDC DES accelerator
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electrical Code Block
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA Electro magnetic analysis
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption unit
MMU Memory Management Unit
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
RMS Resource Management System
SEF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
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SOF Strength of Function
SPA Simple power analysis
ST Security Target
STS Self Test Software
SW Software
TOE Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
UCP Unified Channel Programming
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
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SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2] Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6] Security Target, SLE66CL187PEM/m2984-a11, SLE66CL187PE/m2985-a11
SLE66CL187PES/m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM/m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE/
m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM/m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES/m2993-a11,
SLE66CL87PE/m2991-a11, SLE66CL48PE/m2983-a11, Version 1.1, date
2008-10-22, Infineon AG
[7] EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT (ETR), Version: 2, date: 2008-11-13, ID:
8104918415 / BSI-DSZ-CC-0572. Product: SLE66CL187PEM/m2984-a11,
SLE66CL187PE/m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES/m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM/
m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE/ m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM/m2992-a11,
SLE66CL87PES/m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE/m2991-a11, SLE66CL48PE/m2983-
a11, Evaluation Body for IT Security of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[8] Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP), SLE66CL187PEM/m2984-a11,
SLE66CL187PE/m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES/m2986-a11,
SLE66CL88PEM/m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE/m2994-a11,
SLE66CL87PEM/m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES/m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE/m2991-
a11, SLE66CL48PE/m2983-a11, Version 1.1 from 2008-10-22, Infineon AG
(confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including
JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
• AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
• AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
resp. CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
[9] Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration
ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon
Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), Version: 2, Date:
2008-11-13, ID: 8104918415/BSI-DSZ-CC-0523, Product: SLE66CL187PEM/
m2984-a11, SLE66CL187PE/m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES/m2986-a11,
SLE66CL88PEM/ m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE/m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM/
m2992-a11, SLE66CL87PES/m2993-a11,SLE66CL87PE/m2991-a11,
SLE66CL48PE/ m2983-a11, Evaluation Body for IT Security of TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] Data Book – Data Book – SLE66C(L)(X)xxxPE(M/S) Security Controller Family incl.
the errata sheet, Version 2008-09, from 2008-09-03, Infineon AG
[12] Confidential Errata & Delta Sheet - SLE66C(L)(X)xxxPE(M/S) Controllers - Product
and Boundout, Version 2008-10 from 2008-10-15, Infineon AG
[13] Security Programmers’ Manual -SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers, Version 08.07 from
2007-08-14, Infineon AG
[14] Security & Chip Card ICs – SLE 66CxxxPE – Instruction Set, Version 07.04 from
2004-07, Infineon AG
[15] Chip Card & Security ICs - SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Instruction Set and Special
Function Registers – Quick Reference, Version 11.06 from 2006-11, Infineon AG
[16] SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Contactless Protocol Type A Type B (source v18092),
Version 2008-07 from 2008-07, Infineon AG
[17] SLE 66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) - Contactless Card Coil Design Guide, Version 2008-10
from 2008-10, Infineon AG
[18] SLE 66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) - Optimized Contactless Energy Performance, Version
2008-09 from 2008-10-06, Infineon AG
[19] SLE 66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) - Contactless Performance for Payment Applications,
Version 2008-10 from 2008-10-03, Infineon AG
[20] SLE 66CLXxxxPE - Implementation of Transmission Protocol according to ISO/IEC
14443 Part 3 and 4, Version 2006-02 from 2006-02-23, Infineon AG
[21] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, DDES - EC2 Accelerator Version 04.02 from
2004-02, including complementary Application Note SLE 66CxxxPE DDES
Accelerator, Version 07.05 from 2005-07, Infineon AG
[22] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using MicroSlim NVM (cLib), confidential, Version
05.05 from 2005-05, Infineon AG
[23] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Memory Encryption Decryption confidential,
Version 11.04 from 2004-11, Infineon AG
[24] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, MMU-Memory Management Unit (PDF+SW)
confidential, Version 12.04 from 2004-12, Infineon AG
[25] SLE66C(L)xxxPE - Optimized Usage of Data NVM Above 64k, Version 08.05 from
2005-08, Infineon AG
[26] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Testing the RNG, confidential, Version 11.04
from 2004-11, Infineon AG
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[27] Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Using RNG a.t. FIPS140 (PDF+SW),
confidential, Version 02.04 from 2004-02, Infineon AG
[28] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using the active shield, confidential, Version
12.04 from 2004-12, Infineon AG
[29] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - UART basic (PDF), Version 02.07 from 2007-02,
Infineon AG
[30] Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - Static UART (PDF), Version 01.07 from 2007-01,
Infineon AG
[31] Bundesnetzagentur: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem
Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete
Algorithmen), German "Bundesanzeiger Nr. 19", published February 5th, 2008,
page 376
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
– Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
– Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
– PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
ACM: Configuration management
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
ADV: Development
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
ALC: Life cycle support
Development security (ALC_DVS)
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
ATE: Tests
Coverage (ATE_COV)
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008 Certification Report
Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA
1 2 2
AVA_MSU
1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF
1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA
1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment 37
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0572-2008
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL187PEM / m2984-
a11, SLE66CL187PE / m2985-a11, SLE66CL187PES / m2986-a11, SLE66CL88PEM /
m2995-a11, SLE66CL88PE / m2994-a11, SLE66CL87PEM / m2992-a11,
SLE66CL87PES / m2993-a11, SLE66CL87PE / m2991-a11 and SLE66CL48PE / m2983-
a11 all with specific IC dedicated software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated
at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 25 November 2008, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
• ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
• ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Address Function
Altis-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Center
Amkor Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
Module Mounting
Augsburg Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
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Site Address Function
Bangkok Smartrac Technology,
142 Moo 1
Hi-Tech industrial Estate,
Ban Laean, Bang,
Pa-In Phra na korn Si Ayatthaya,
13160 Thailand
Inlay Antenna Mounting
Bukarest Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6, Sector 2
020335 Bucharest, Romania
Development
Dresden Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden, Germany
Production
Dresden-Toppan Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden, Germany
Mask Center
Erfurt Assa Abloy Identification Technologies GmbH
(former Sokymat GmbH)
In den Weiden 4b, 99099 Erfurt
Module Mounting with
Inlay Antenna Mounting
Graz / Villach / Klagenfurt Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz, Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach, Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt, Austria
Development
Großostheim Infineon Technology AG, DCE, Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 - Building 8A
63762 Großostheim, Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
Distribution Center
Lustenau New Logic Technologies AG, - A Wipro Company,
Millenium Park 6,
6890 Lustenau, Austria
Development
Munich Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg, Germany
Infineon Technologies AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München (Perlach), Germany
Development
Regensburg-West Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg, Germany
Smartrac Technology GmbH,
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg, Germany
Module Mounting Inlay
Antenna Mounting,
Distribution Center
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Site Address Function
Singapore Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Distribution Center
Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting
Tokyo Kintetsu World Express, Inc.
Tokyo Import Logistics Center
Narita Terminal
Tokyo, Japan
Distribution Center
Wuxi Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu, P.R. China
Module Mounting,
Distribution Center
Table 3: Production Sites
The chip versions of the TOE are manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in Dresden,
Germany, indicated by the first nibble of the batch number which gives the production line
indicator "2".
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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