BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
for
Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905
A11 with optional ACL v2.07.003 and v2.09.002
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.53
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 (*)
Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11 with optional
ACL v2.07.003 and v2.09.002
from Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
valid until: 3 November 2030
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CEM:2022
extended by Scheme Interpretations, and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC). CC:2022.
CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bonn, 4 November 2025
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Fabian Hodouschek L.S. Sandro Amendola
Head of Certification Director-General Directorate General S
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................15
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................20
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................20
13. Definitions................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................23
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 24
5 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licensing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 4
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs – Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) – dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
6 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), CC:2022 [2] also published as
ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesamtes für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik vom 14. April 2023 auf
https://www.bsi.bund.de
7 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11 with optional ACL
v2.07.003 and v2.09.002, has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-
certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V9-2024. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V9-2024 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11 with
optional ACL v2.07.003 and v2.09.002, was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH.
The evaluation was completed on 1 October 2025. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG.
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
evaluated guidance documentation are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the
product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor
should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity
program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis. Therefore the BSI reserves the right to revoke the certificate, especially if a
exploitable vulnerability of the certified product gets to known.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 4 November
2025 is valid until 3 November 2030. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11 with optional ACL
v2.07.003 and v2.09.002, has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly in the listing found at the BSI Website
https://www.bsi.bund.de/dok/Zertifizierung-Gesamtlisten. Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Infineon Technologies AG
Melli-Beese-Str. 9
86159 Augsburg
9 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11
with optional ACL v2.07.003 and v2.09.002.
The TOE provides a real 32-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the ARMv7-M
instruction set. The major components of the core system are the 32-bit CPU (Central
Processing Unit), the Cache system, the MPU (Memory Protection Unit) and MED
(Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit).
The TOE consists of the hardware part, the firmware parts and the software parts. The
soft-ware parts are differentiated into the asymmetric cryptographic libraries EC, Toolbox
and Base, all in two different versions. The firmware of the TOE comprises the Boot
Software (BOS), Resource Management System (RMS), the high-level firmware Flash
Loader (FL) and the NRG software.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating
systems and applications stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The Security Target [5] and [8] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [5] and [8], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [5] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [5] and [8],
chapter 4.1.2. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [5] and [8], chapter 4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
11 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11 with optional ACL v2.07.003
and v2.09.002
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1 HW M9905 A11 A11 (design step) Customer chooses delivery
method.
2 FW Boot Software (BOS) and the
Resource Management System
(RMS), Flash Loader (FL) and the
NRG software.
80001151 (BOS-
V1)
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
3 SW NRG Management (optional) 01.03.0927 Secure download of object file
via iShare.
4 SW NRG Reader (optional) 01.02.0800 Secure download of object file
via iShare.
5 SW ACL (optional) 2.07.003 or
2.09.002
Secure download of object file
via iShare.
6 DOC 32-bit Security Controller M9900
Hardware Reference Manual
3.0 / 2019-08-28 Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
7 DOC M9900 Security Guidelines User´s
Manual
2025-06-06 Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
8 DOC ARMv7-M Architecture Reference
Manual, ARM DDI 0403E.e
DDI 0403E.e /
2021-02-15
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
9 DOC SLE97 security controllers
Programmer's Reference Manual
SLCx7_DFP Document release
reference: Z8F80731571-A
5.9 / 2024-11-25 Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
10 DOC SLE97 / SLC14 Family Production and
Personalization User´s Manual
2014-08-10 Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
11 DOC M9905 M9906 Errata Sheet 3.1 / 2019-09-05 Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
12 DOC CL97 Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto@2304T RSA / ECC / Toolbox,
User Interface (optional)
2.07.003 / 2024-08-
26
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
13 DOC ACL97-Crypto2304T-L90 Asymmetric
Crypto Library for Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security
Controller User interface manual
2.09.002 / 2024-06-
27
Personalized PDF via secure
iShare server.
12 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
(optional)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that the NRG software is not part of the certification scope.
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. The
identification data contains the lot number, the wafer number and the coordinates of the
chip on the wafer. Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus
assigned to the entire development and production process.
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the TOE Manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Composite Product Manufacturer to include mechanisms in the implemented software
(developed by the IC Embedded Software Developer) which allows detection of
modifications after the delivery.
In detail, regarding identification:
The TOE can be delivered in various configurations, achieved by means of blocking and
depending on the customer order.
All product derivatives of this TOE, including all configuration possibilities differentiated by
the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) data and the configuration information output,
are manufactured by Infineon Technologies AG. However, the Smartcard Embedded
Software respectively user software is not part of the TOE.
New configurations can occur at any time depending on the user blocking or by different
configurations applied by the manufacturer. In any case the user is able to clearly identify
the TOE hardware, its configuration and proof the validity of the certificate independently,
meaning without involving the manufacturer. The various blocking options, as well as the
means used for the blocking, are done during the manufacturing process or at user
premises. Entirely all means of blocking and the firmware respectively software parts
involved in the blocking used at Infineon Technologies AG and/or the user premises, are
subject of the evaluation. All resulting configurations of a TOE derivative are subject of the
certificate. All resulting configurations are either at the predefined limits or within the
predefined configuration ranges. For more information about blocking, see chapter 8
below.
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by M9905 A11. Another characteristic of the
TOE is the chip identification data. The chip identification data is accessible via the
Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM).
The Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) can be activated on the ISO/IEC 7816-3
interfaces after power-on with a dedicated signalling sequence and is also accessible by
the user software. This GCIM outputs amongst other identifiers for the platform, chip
mode, ROM code, chip type, design step, fabrication facility, wafer, die position, firmware
identifier, temperature range, and frequency.
For further, detailed information regarding TOE identification see [5] and [8], p.7f (remark
1).
In detail, regarding delivery:
“TOE Delivery” is uniquely used to indicate
13 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
● after Phase 3 (or before Phase 4) if the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn
wafers (dice) or
● after Phase 4 (or before Phase 5) if the TOE is delivered in form of packaged products.
Therefore three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE manufacturer to the IC embedded software developer.
● Delivery of the IC embedded software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalization data, Bundle Business package) from the IC embedded software
developer to the TOE manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE manufacturer to the composite product
manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna).
The TOE is delivered via the logistics sites:
● DHL Singapore,
● KWE Shanghai,
● K&N Großostheim.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of Security Functional
Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the confidentiality of plain text
data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a
random number generation of appropriate quality.
The EC library is used to provide a high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography
implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures
against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, and EC cryptographic functions performed by
the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations
and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
• maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
• maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 and 8 of the Security Target (ST).
14 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The ST only includes two security objective for the IC Embedded Software Developer, the
objectives OE.Plat-Appl and OE.Resp-Appl.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a SmartCard (Security IC). Detailed information on the TOE hardware
architecture is to be found in [5] and [8] section 2.1.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer performed five categories of tests:
● Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
● Qualification Tests / Software Verification,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Tests, and
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed
forthe underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
15 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The M9905 A11 is produced at IFX Dresden.
The TOE hardware offers different configuration options, which a customer can choose.
The mechanism to choose a configuration can be done by the following methods:
• by product selection or dialog-based in Tools,
• via Bill-per-Use (BpU) and Flash Loader (FL),
The degree of freedom for configuring the TOE is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG.
The list of TOE configurations is given in the confidential ST.
Beside fix TOE configurations, which can be ordered as usual, this TOE implements
optionally the so called Bill-Per-Use (BPU) ability. This solution enables the customer to
tailor the product on his own to the required configuration by blocking parts of the chip on
demand into the final configuration at his own premises, without further delivery or
involving support by Infineon Technology AG. Customers, who are intended to use this
feature receiving the TOE in a predefined configuration including the Flash Loader
software, enhanced with the BPU blocking software. The blocking information is part of a
chip configuration area and can be modified by customers using specific APDUs. Once a
final blocking is done, further modifications are disabled.
The BPU software part is only present on the products which have been ordered with the
BPU option. In all other cases this software is not present on the product.
The hardware of this TOE can be delivered with the following configuration options:
• both crypto co-processors accessible
• with a blocked Crypto2304T
In the case the Crypto2304T is blocked, no EC computation supported by hardware is
possible. No accessibility of the deselected cryptographic co-processors is without impact
on any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the
user decides just not to use the cryptographic co-processors.
The TOE can be delivered with the following optional libraries
• ECC
• Asymmetric Base library for ECC
In case of deselecting one or several of these libraries the TOE does not provide the
respective functionality.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [6] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
16 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [9] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this platform
evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on top of it.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V9-2024, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible.
The focus of this re-evaluation was on change to the new CC-version 2022, user guidance
updates and scope reduction. More precisely:
• The re-evaluation is done according to CC:2022 instead of CC v3.1.
• For the M9905 A11 there are no changes to the hardware of the TOE. The derivates
M9900 A22/C22/D22/G11 and M9906 A11 were removed from the certification
scope.
The following changes to the software and firmware are described:
• The asymmetric library (ACL) in version 2.09.002 is added,
• All PSL, SCL and HCL library versions are removed,
• The ACL in version 2.05.005 is removed,
• The Flash Transition Layer is removed,
• The Security claims for RSA are removed for both ACL,
• The Security claims for ECDSA Verify are removed for both ACL.
There are changes to guidance documents.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
17 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level above
120 Bits
Key
Agreement
ECDH [X963, 5.4.1]
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
corresponding to the
used elliptic curves
NIST: P-{192, 224, 256,
384, 521}, K-{163, 233,
283, 409}, B-{163, 233,
283, 409} [FIPS186-4];
brainpool: P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320, 384,
512}t1, P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320, 384,
512}r1 [RFC5639]
Key sizes
160, 163, 192, 224: no
Key sizes
>= 256 : yes
Cryptograp
hic
Primitive
3DES in modes
ECB, CBC
[NIST SP800-67]
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 112 , 168 no
AES in modes
ECB, CBC
[FIPS197]
[NIST SP800-38A]
|k| = 128, 192, 256 CBC: yes
ECDSA signature
generation
[X962, 7.3]
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
Key sizes
corresponding to the
used elliptic curves
NIST: P-{192, 224, 256,
384, 521}, K-{163, 233,
283, 409}, B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-4];
brainpool: P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320, 384,
512}t1, P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320
Key sizes
160, 163, 192, 224: no
Key sizes
>= 256 : yes
Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A n/a
Key ECC [X962, A.4.3] Key sizes Key sizes
18 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Security Level above
120 Bits
Generation [FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
corresponding to the
used elliptic curves
NIST: P-{192, 224, 256,
384, 521}, K-{163, 233,
283, 409}, B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-4];
brainpool: P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320, 384,
512}t1, P{160, 192,
224, 256, 320
160, 163, 192, 224: no
Key sizes
>= 256 : yes
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the [Auswahl im Einzelfall: IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded
Software] using the TOE. For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see
table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on
top on how to securely use this certified TOE and which measures have to be
implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the product
layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also
consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation"
[9].
The Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents (listed in Table 2) have to be
considered.
● The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and
hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
The delivery procedure from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is required.
19 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [5] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation – The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension – The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal – Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Object – A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Package – named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
20 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
Protection Profile – A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target – An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Target of Evaluation – An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality – Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation/CC
ISO-Version:
ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
CCRA-Version:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirement
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Gemeinsame Evaluationsmethodologie für die Prüfung und Bewertung der
Sicherheit von Informationstechnik (Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology
ISO-Version:
ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT
security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
CCRA-Version:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licensing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
21 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] Confidential Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025, Version 6.2, 2025-07-18,
“Security Target M9905 with optional ACL Software Libraries”, Infineon (confidential
document)
[6] Evaluation Technical Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025, Version 3, 2025-09-26,
“EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY)”, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-
PP-0035-2007
[8] Security Target Lite for BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025, Version 6.2, 2025-07-18,
“Security Target Lite M9905 with optional ACL Software Libraries”, Infineon
(sanitised public document)
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation for the M9905 A11, Version 3,
2025-09-26, “EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE
EVALUATION (ETR COMP)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.6, 2025-06-23, “Configuration Management
Scope M9905 including optional Software Libraries EC”, Infineon (confidential
document)
[11] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies IT Services GmbH,
Klagenfurt”, version 2, 2025-09-26, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[12] “Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) DNP Photomask Europe S.p.A., Agrate, Italy”,
version 1, 2025-05-30, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[13] “Impact Analysis for Common Criteria with Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5
augmented (EAL5+) M990X Including optional Software Libraries – EC”, Version
2.2, 2025-10-21, Infineon (confidential document)
22 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria in its CCRA Documents can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC:2022 part 1 chapter
10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC:2022
Part 3 chapter 6.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to
CCRA CC:2022 Part 5.
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC:2022 Part 3
chapter 9
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC:2022 Part 3 chapters 7 to 15
• The table 1 in CC:2022 part 5, Chapter 4.2 summarizes the relationship between
the evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published as the CCRA Version at
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm
The CC are published as the ISO/IEC Version at
https://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html
23 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
24 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0827-V10-2025
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Technologies Security Controller M9905 A11 with optional ACL
v2.07.003 and v2.09.002, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
CEM:2022 extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 4 November 2025, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE.
For the sites, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the
Security Target [5] and [8]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and
requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target
[5] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
25 / 25