ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Security Target
for the Evaluation of the Product
ORGA 6141 online
of
Worldline Healthcare GmbH
according to the Common Criteria 3.1
Level EAL3+
Certification Id:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0519 - V4
Version: 4.1.13
Date: 01.06.2022
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Table of Contents
1 ST Introduction ................................................................................4
1.1 ST Reference .............................................................................4
1.2 TOE Reference ...........................................................................5
1.3 TOE Overview ............................................................................5
1.3.1 TOE Description ...................................................................5
1.3.2 TOE major security features for operational use .......................7
1.3.3 TOE type and Physical Scope .................................................9
1.3.4 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware .......................9
1.3.5 Optional non-TOE hardware/software....................................10
1.3.6 Logical Scope of the TOE.....................................................10
2 Conformance Claims........................................................................10
2.1 ST Claim .................................................................................10
2.2 PP Claim .................................................................................11
2.3 Package Claim .........................................................................11
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale ....................................................11
3 Security Problem Definition ..............................................................11
3.1 Assets.....................................................................................11
3.2 Subjects..................................................................................13
3.3 Threats ...................................................................................14
3.4 Organizational Security Policies ..................................................16
3.5 Assumptions ............................................................................16
4 Security Objectives .........................................................................19
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE..................................................19
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.....................21
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................23
4.3.1 Countering the threats........................................................24
4.3.2 Covering the OSPs..............................................................26
4.3.3 Covering the assumptions ...................................................26
5 Extended Components Definition.......................................................26
6 Security Requirements.....................................................................26
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE..............................27
6.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ...............................................28
6.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/Connector Cryptographic key generation for
connector/SAC communication.......................................................28
6.1.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/Management Cryptographic key generation for
remote Management.....................................................................29
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction for communication
29
6.1.1.4 FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym Cryptographic operation for
connector/SAC communication (symmetric algorithm) ......................29
6.1.1.5 FCS_COP.1/SIG Cryptographic operation for signature
generation/verification ..................................................................30
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
6.1.1.6 FCS_COP.1/Management Cryptographic operation for remote
management ...............................................................................30
6.1.1.7 FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW Cryptographic operation for firmware
signature verification ....................................................................31
6.1.1.8 FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP Cryptographic operation for verification of
TSP CA lists .................................................................................31
6.1.2 User data protection (FDP) ..................................................32
6.1.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/Terminal Subset access control for terminal
functions32
6.1.2.2 FDP_ACC.1/Management Subset access control for
management ...............................................................................32
6.1.2.3 FDP_ACF.1/Terminal Security attribute based access control for
terminal functions ........................................................................32
6.1.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/Management Security attribute based access
control for management................................................................34
6.1.2.5 FDP_IFC.1/PIN Subset information flow control for PIN ........36
6.1.2.6 FDP_IFF.1/PIN Simple security attributes for PIN.................36
6.1.2.7 FDP_IFC.1/NET Subset information flow control for network
connections .................................................................................37
6.1.2.8 FDP_IFF.1/NET Simple security attributes for network
connections .................................................................................37
6.1.2.9 FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection................39
6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)..................................39
6.1.3.1 FIA_AFL.1/PIN Authentication failure handling ....................39
6.1.3.2 FIA_AFL.1/C&R Authentication failure handling ...................40
6.1.3.3 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition....................................40
6.1.3.4 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets ......................................40
6.1.3.5 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication for management ..........41
6.1.3.6 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms ..................41
6.1.3.7 FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback.....................42
6.1.3.8 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification .....................................42
6.1.4 Security Management (FMT) ................................................43
6.1.4.1 FMT_MSA.1/Terminal Management of security attributes for
Terminal SFP ...............................................................................43
6.1.4.2 FMT_MSA.1/Management Management of security attributes
for Management SFP.....................................................................43
6.1.4.3 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes ...............................43
6.1.4.4 FMT_MSA.3/Terminal Static attribute initialisation for Terminal
SFP 44
6.1.4.5 FMT_MSA.3/Management Static attribute initialisation for
management SFP .........................................................................44
6.1.4.6 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions .............44
6.1.4.7 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles ................................................45
6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)..................................................46
6.1.5.1 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state.............46
6.1.5.2 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection...........46
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
6.1.5.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack ...................46
6.1.5.4 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack.............................47
6.1.5.5 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing .....................................................47
6.1.6 TOE Access........................................................................47
6.1.6.1 FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE Default TOE access banners for secure
state 47
6.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ................................................48
6.1.7.1 FTP_ITC.1/Connector Inter-TSF trusted channel for
connector/SAC communication.......................................................48
6.1.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Management Trusted path for remote management
48
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ..............................49
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale ................................................50
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale...........................50
6.3.2 SFR Dependency Rationale ..................................................53
6.3.2.1 Justification for missing dependencies................................55
6.3.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale........................55
6.3.3 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal
Consistency....................................................................................56
7 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) ..............................................56
7.1 Security Functions ....................................................................56
7.1.1 SF_1: Trusted Communication Channels................................56
7.1.2 SF_2: Identification & Authentication....................................56
7.1.3 SF_3: Network Connections.................................................57
7.1.4 SF_4: Secure Update..........................................................58
7.1.5 SF_5: Secure PIN-entry ......................................................58
7.1.6 SF_6: Secure Data Deletion.................................................59
7.1.7 SF_7: Secure Management-Functions ...................................59
7.1.8 SF_8: Self-Test ..................................................................60
7.1.9 SF_9: Secure Fail-State ......................................................61
7.1.10 SF_10: Physical Protection of the TOE...................................61
7.2 Security Measures ....................................................................61
7.2.1 SM_1: Sealing ...................................................................61
7.3 Mapping of the Security functions...............................................61
8 Glossar ..........................................................................................62
9 References .....................................................................................63
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST Reference
Certification Id: BSI-DSZ-CC-0519 - V3
CC-Version: 3.1
Evaluation Assurance Level:EAL 3, augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 and AVA_VAN.4
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Title Security Target for the Evaluation of the Product
ORGA 6141 online of Worldline Healthcare GmbH
according to the Common Criteria 3.1 Level
EAL3+
Document Version: 4.1.13
Date: 01.06.2022
1.2 TOE Reference
Target of Evaluation: Card Terminal with graphical display
(ORGA 6141 online)
Herstellcode: HC 03000000010301
HC 03000000020301
Firmware-Version 3.8.2
Hardware-Version 1.2.0
Manufacturer / Vendor: Worldline Healthcare GmbH, Flintbek
1.3 TOE Overview
This Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the
Electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT) ORGA 6141 online based on the regu-
lations for the German healthcare (GHC) system. Furthermore the TOE can be
irreversibly configured to be used as a secure PIN entry device controlled by a
Signature Application Component (SAC).
1.3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is a card terminal with 2 ID1 Slots (HPC and eGK) und 2 SMC Slots
(SM-KT (supporting SMC-B and SMC-KT cards), 20 key keypad, USB and LAN
interfaces for the use in the German healthcare system with KVK, HPC and eGK
generation 1+ and generation 2. Connection to a connector/SAC is possible via
LAN and TCP/IP-protocol.
The ORGA 6141 online is a card terminal with graphical display:
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) described in this Security Target is a smart card
terminal which fulfils the requirements to be used with the German electronic
Health Card (eHC) and the German Health Professional Card (HPC) based on
the regulations of the German healthcare system. Please refer to [7] for further
information about card compatibility.
The TOE fulfils the requirements to be used as a secure PIN entry device for
applications according to [6], [7] and [9] (i.e. SAC), which specifically means
that a PIN, which has been entered by a user at the TOE, never leaves the TOE
in clear text, except to smart cards in local card slots.
This terminal is based on the specification for a “Secure Interoperable ChipCard
terminal” ([6]) extended and limited by the specifications for the e-health ter-
minal itself (see [7]). In its core functionality the TOE is not different from any
other smart card terminal which provides an interface to one or more smart
cards including a mean to securely enter a PIN.
Additionally the TOE provides a network interface which allows routing the com-
munication of a smart card to a remote IT product (i.e. SAC) outside the TOE.
The TOE provides the following main functions:
• Access to one or more slots for smart cards,
• Secure network connectivity,
• Secure PIN entry functionality,
• Enforcement of the encryption of communication,
• User authentication,
Figure 1.1 ORGA 6141 online
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• Management functionality including update of Firmware.1
• Passive and active physical protection
The TOE for use in the GHC system or with a SAC is based on the specification
SICCT [6], which is adapted for operation by profiling as eHealth card terminal
(see [7]).
The TOE works with a cryptographic key for i.e. authentication, integrity assur-
ance and to ensure the confidentiality of data transmitted over the LAN inter-
face. Due to the very high protection requirements of the information objects
transmitted over the LAN interface, a secure key store (SM-KT) is required for
the key. As physical characteristics of the SM-KT the TOE supports gSMC-KT
cards. IPv4 is supported. To ensure the sustainability of the TOE, it is technically able
to support IPv6 in addition or instead of IPv4 by a future certified firmware update. For
the recent TOE version IPv6 functionality is outside of the TOE scope.
In its environment, the TOE communicates either with a so called connector or
a SAC. The connector is the secure connection between the local network of the
medical supplier and the remote network of the telematic infrastructure. It pro-
vides the medical supplier with secure access to the services of the telematic
infrastructure. The SAC is the secured connected controlling instance for signa-
ture generation using signature creation devices (typically electronic signature
smart cards) by the /Signature user.
For the connection of the TOE to a connector/SAC via the LAN interface, the
protocol with the SICCT commands is mandatory.The interfaces of the TOE are
provided in Figure 1.2: TOE Boundary, showing a schematic representation:
1.3.2 TOE major security features for operational use
To protect the communication between the connector/SAC and the TOE the TOE
has to possess a cryptographic identity (in form of a X.509 certificate) and
functionality for encryption/decryption as well as signature creation (see also
[7]).
For its cryptographic functionality the TOE relies on the services of the so called
SM-KT2
.
The SM-KT (Secure Module Kartenterminal) is a secure module that represents
the cryptographic identity of the TOE in form of a X.509 certificate.
This module - in form of an ID-000 smart card – provides:
• Protection of the private key,
• Cryptographic functions for encryption/decryption and signature crea-
tion,
• A random number generator, and
1
A firmware downgrade is not implemented in the TOE. However, it is possible
to install a previous version of a firmware if the firmware image has been
assigned a new version number.
2
Please note that the SM-KT is only responsible for the core functions of the
asymmetric cryptography (RSA and ECC) and for random number genera-
tion. The TOE will be responsible for negotiating the session with the con-
nector/SAC and for encryption/decryption using a symmetric AES key.
More details can be found in [7] and the following chapters.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• A function to read out the public key
Though this SM-KT will be physically within the body of the TOE it does not
belong to the logical and physical scope of the TOE as to see in Figure 1.2: TOE
Boundary. More information about the SM-KT can be found in the Protection
Profile Card Operating System 2 (PP COS G2) [20] and the gematik specification
on the gSMC-KT object system [24].
According to the gematik release OPB3 specifications the TOE is capable to sup-
port RSA and alternatively ECC cryptography for TLS connectivity (see [21] ECC
migration). The ability to support ECC encryption/decryption and ECDSA for
signature creation and approval depends on the SM-KT provided functionality
as defined by [7], [24] and [25].
For the case the TOE uses a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-KT, which is addressable
via the connector/SAC, the TOE is accessing this DF.KT via the base-channel 0.
During use of the SM-KT by the TOE the terminal card commands of the TOE
have to be priorized and the processing of possibly existing client SICCT com-
mands have to be interrupted and continued only after completion of the inter-
nal command sequence. The connector/SAC has to make sure that a DF.KT of
a gSMC-KT as SM-KT which is addressable via the connector/SAC shall only be
accessed by the TOE and not be used by any other system than the TOE.
The TOE provides functionality to update its firmware. This firmware update is
done with the PULL method, i.e. the TOE actively “pulls” the firmware update
from a TFTP server. The configuration is preserved and indicated after a firm-
ware update (see [7] for further information).
Firmware update can also be triggered remotely from a trusted Push Server in
the internal network of the medical supplier/Signature user. The TOE allows
initiating batch signatures for the creation of more than one signature at a time
without providing the PIN for each signature process. Batch signature is a func-
tionality of the signing card.
In addition to the cryptographic identity of the TOE, the TOE stores a shared
secret which is generated by the connector/SAC and transferred to the TOE
during the pairing process of TOE and connector/SAC. This shared secret is not
stored in the SM-KT, but in a separate storage area of the TOE. As the SM-KT
might be removed and placed into another card terminal, the shared secret is
necessary to ensure that communication to the connector/SAC is performed
using the already paired card terminal (the TOE). The whole identity of the TOE
is therefore represented by the SM-KT certificate AND the shared secret. Please
note that as part of the pairing process, there are three processes:
• Initial pairing:
This provides a logical connection from the perspective of the con-
nector/SAC by using shared secret between card terminal and SM-KT
• Review of pairing- information:
The connector/SAC checks as a second step of authentication, if the card
terminal is in the possession of the shared secret after establishing the
TLS connection.
• Maintenance-pairing:
Announcement of a new connector/SAC certificate on the card terminal
by using a known shared secret. Please see [7]) for further information
on the pairing process.
In addition to [7] and [PP] the TOE provides a restricted VPN Client for optional
establishment of a single VPN tunnel to a remote VPN gateway in front of a
remote connector/SAC. The usage of the VPN client is restricted and dedicated
only to secure state condition and to be additionally used for the network con-
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
nectivity. The VPN tunnel relies on IPsec over IPv4 and is completely transpar-
ent for the remote connector/SAC. Please note that the mentioned establish-
ment of a single VPN tunnel is not part of the TSF.
The TOE is also able to send/receive a PIN to/from a remote card terminal. This
communication is routed via the connector/SAC. The connector/SAC never sees
the PIN in clear text, as the authorized cards (SMC-B, HPC) in the local and the
remote card terminal are used to encrypt/decrypt the PIN. In this SAC operation
still all SFRs are valid.
The TOE receives Trusted Service Provider certificate authority lists (TSP CA lists) by
management functionality. Such a TSP CA list is configuration data with a white list
which lets the TOE decide which TLS-certificate to accept or refuse when a con-
nector/SAC is opening a secure communication channel. By default the TOE is pre-con-
figured to accept certificates from the eHealth CA driven on behalf of gematik. To be
used in the SAC context the TOE is capable to be once irreversibly configured for such
operation by loading an alternative TSP CA list especially built by the TOE vendor holding
CA certificates from selected known and trusted SAC vendors. After this alternative con-
figuration the TOE is not able to accept TLS-certificates from the eHealth CA anymore.”
1.3.3 TOE type and Physical Scope
The TOE is a stand-alone desktop card terminal for stationary use and thus the
physical scope of the TOE comprises:
• All hardware components, cage and interfaces,
• the update file with application firmware and
• the related guidance documents
◦ user guide version 20.6.1 (Bedienungsanleitung Stationäres eHealth
Kartenterminal ORGA 6141 online mit Firmware-Version 3.8.2)
◦ brief instruction version 20.2.1 (Kurzanleitung Stationäres eHealth
Kartenterminal ORGA 6141 online mit Firmware-Version 3.8.2) for
installation of the TOE.
Three seals are attached to the cage of the terminal allowing the user of the
TOE to detect whether the TOE has been tampered with. The description on
how to check the sealing is part of the TOE guidance documentation.
Note, that the SM-KT is a necessary requirement in the operational environment
of the TOE. During the delivery and setup phase the SM-KT may have to be
installed into the card terminal. Functionality that is relying on the SM-KT for
secure operation may not work as intended before the SM-KT is installed.
1.3.4 Required non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
The TOE is intended to be used as a smart card terminal which fulfils the re-
quirements to be used with the German electronic Health Card (eHC) and the
German Health Professional Card (HPC) based on the regulations of the German
healthcare system.
The following non-TOE hardware is required for the use of the TOE:
• An ID-000 smart card as a secure module representing the crypto-
graphic identity of the TOE in form of an X.509 certificate. The secure
module can be a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-KT. Although this secure
module is usually physically placed within the cage of the TOE it does
not belong to the logical and physical scope of the TOE.
• A connector as a secure connection between the local network of the
medical supplier and the remote network of the telematic infrastructure.
The connector further observes the TOE and is the only entity in the
context of the GHC which can interact with a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-
KT as mentioned above.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Furthermore, the TOE requires a TFTP server to update its firmware.
1.3.5 Optional non-TOE hardware/software
Following an option of the [PP] the TOE can be used as secure PIN entry device
controlled by a SAC instead of a eHealth connector. In this optional case the
following non-TOE hardware is required for the use of the TOE:
• A secure connected Signature Application Component (SAC) instead of
a connector. The SAC observes the TOE and is the only entity in the
context of signature creation processes outside the GHC which can in-
teract with a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-KT as mentioned above.
The following non-TOE hardware is optional for the use of the TOE:
• An USB stick as an external temporarily storage medium for the admin-
istrator in order to import FW images and configuration data (i.e. VPN
gateway credential data) as well to export configuration data for instal-
lation protocol and control purposes.
• A Smartphone App for the administrator to read out a Quick Response
(QR) Code in order to display configuration and internal statistical data.
An optional external WEB Site in order to receive, interpret and display
configuration and internal statistical data.
1.3.6 Logical Scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE is represented by its core security features:
• Access to one or more slots for smart cards,
• Secure network connectivity,
• Secure PIN entry functionality,
• Enforcement of the encryption of communication,
• User authentication,
• Management including update of Firmware,
• Passive physical protection
and is limited by the functionality for which the TOE relies on the services of
the SM-KT.
As an augmentation of the logical scope of the TOE listed above, the function-
ality of the TOE comprises:
• active physical protection.
2 Conformance Claims
2.1 ST Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1: Introduction and general model; Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2: Security functional components; Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3: Security assurance components; Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
as follows:
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• Part 2 conformant,
• Part 3 conformant.
The
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
is taken into account.
The design of the TOE takes into account the [TR-03120] concerning security
seals and case design.
2.2 PP Claim
This Security Target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile Common
Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Terminal (eHCT), BSI-CC-PP-0032-
V2-2015-MA-01, Version 3.7, 21.09.2016.
2.3 Package Claim
The current Security Target is conformant to the following security require-
ments package:
• Assurance package EAL3 augmented by ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 and AVA_VAN.4.
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
This Security Target is strictly conformant to the Protection Profile Common
Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health Terminal (eHCT), BSI-CC-PP-0032,
Version 3.7, 21.09.2016.
• Compared to the PP, there is a further threat (T.F-SAC) in the ST for
the secure PIN entry device configuration.
Signature Application Component (SAC) is introduced next to the con-
nector subject.
• OSPs in the ST are identical to the OSPs in the PP. In addition to the
"medical suplier", the “signature user” (subject) is introduced.
• Compared to PP, there is another assumption (A.SAC) in ST for the SAC
configuration. In addition to the "medical suplier", the “signature user”
(subject) is introduced.
• Compared to PP, there is another security objective (OE.SAC) in ST for
the SAC environment which is introduced as Security Objectives
OE.SAC for the environment
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Assets
The following assets need to be protected by the TOE as long as they are in the
scope of the TOE:
Asset Description
Card PIN (short PIN) The TOE interacts with the user to acquire a PIN and
sends this PIN to one of the cards in a slot of the TOE.
The TOE has to ensure the confidentiality of the PIN. For
remote-PIN verification the TOE sends/receives the PIN
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Asset Description
to/from another card terminal via the connector/SAC.
This asset is user data.
Management creden-
tials
The TOE stores credentials (e.g. passwords) to authen-
ticate TOE administrators for management activities.
The TOE has to ensure the confidentiality and integrity
of these credentials. This asset is user data.
The administrator PIN has the attribute “admin-
istrator PIN validity”, which indicates whether
the current PIN is valid. The PIN is only invalid
directly after delivery, after successfully perform-
ing a Challenge & Response operation with the
TOE and after or during a reset to factory defaults.
Under these circumstances the attribute ensures
that the TOE forces the administrator to set a
valid management interface PIN in order to pre-
vent an attacker from gaining easy access to man-
agement functionality. The modification of the va-
lidity of the management interface PIN is tied to
the change of the management interface PIN. By
setting the PIN, the administrator changes the va-
lidity of the PIN to valid.
Shared secret The TOE stores a shared secret which is generated by
the connector/SAC during the initial pairing process.
The shared secret and the SM-KT represent the identity
of the card terminal. This identity is used for secure
identification and authentication of the card terminal by
the connector/SAC. The TOE has to ensure the confi-
dentiality and integrity of the shared secret. This asset
is TSF data.
Patient Data In the context of the GHC this data comprises health
information and billing data that is related to patients.
The TOE gets patient data from the cards in its slots,
encrypts this data and sends it to the connector. Further
the TOE accepts patient data from the connector, de-
crypts it, and sends it to the corresponding eHC in its
slot. The TOE has to ensure the confidentiality and au-
thenticity of this data. This asset is user data.
SAC Data In the context of the SAC usage this data com-
prises user data that is related to the signature
creation process. The TOE gets SAC data from the
cards in its slots, encrypts this data and sends it
to the SAC. Further the TOE accepts SAC data from
the SAC decrypts it, and sends it to the corre-
sponding smart card in its slot. The TOE has to en-
sure the confidentiality and authenticity of this
data. This asset is user data.
Communication data Confidential data that is transmitted between the TOE
and the connector/SAC. This data comprises at least
patient/user data and PINs for remote-PIN verification.
The TOE has to ensure the confidentiality and authen-
ticity of this data. This asset is user data.
Configuration data Data on which the TOE relies on for its secure operation.
This data comprises at least the management creden-
tials for local management and remote management
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Asset Description
and the list of TSP CAs. The TOE has to ensure the in-
tegrity, confidentiality, and authenticity of the manage-
ment credentials. It has to ensure integrity and authen-
ticity of the list of TSP CAs
This asset is user data.
TSF Data The TOE stores TSF data which is necessary for its own
operation. The TOE has to ensure the confidentiality and
authenticity of this data. This asset is TSF data.
Statistics Data The TOE is capable to store statistical data on its
own operation which is only available to the ad-
ministrator PIN and helpful in case of operational
troubleshooting. The statistical data consists of
data alike i.e. uptime, cumulated number of card-
in events, which is user data that does not contain
personnel or secure data content. The TOE has to
ensure the integrity and confidentiality of this
data.
This asset is user data.
Challenge The TOE generates challenge data to perform the
challenge/response operation to reset the admin-
istrator PIN.
Response The TOE processes response data to perform the
challenge/response operation to reset the admin-
istrator PIN.
Table 1: Assets
3.2 Subjects
The following subjects are interacting with the TOE:
Subject Description
TOE Administrator The TOE administrator is in charge of managing the se-
curity functions of the TOE.
Attacker A human, or a process acting on his behalf, located out-
side the TOE. The main goal of the attacker is to access
or modify application sensitive information. The at-
tacker has a moderate level attack potential.
Authorized card Authorized cards (HPC, SMC-B) are able to perform
card-to-card authentication which is used for remote-
PIN verification.
Card The TOE is handling the communication for one or more
smart cards in its card slots.
Connector In the context of the GHC the connector is the only
entity in the environment of the TOE (except for users
of the management interface) which is foreseen to com-
municate with the TOE. It is the interface for the TOE to
securely communicate with the telematic infrastructure
of the German healthcare system.
SAC In the context of the SAC usage the SAC is the
only entity in the environment of the TOE (except
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Subject Description
for users of the management interface) which is
foreseen to communicate with the TOE.
Medical supplier In the context of the GHC the medical supplier (e.g. a
physician) uses the TOE together with his HPC (or SMC-
B). With the HPC it is also possible for medical suppliers
to generate qualified digital signatures. Other than the
patient the medical supplier can be held responsible for
the secure operation of the TOE.
Patient In the context of the GHC the patient uses the TOE
together with his eHC. The patient uses the TOE for
other services of the eHC. A patient will never use the
services of the TOE alone but will always be guided by
the medical supplier.
Signature user In the context of the SAC usage the Signature
user uses the TOE together with his signature cre-
ation device (signature smart card). The Signa-
ture user does not use the services of the TOE
alone but services of the SAC which controls the
eHCT operation.
Push Server The Push Server is a trusted entity in the internal net-
work of the medical supplier/Signature user which
updates firmware on card terminals that are connected
to that network. The Push Server uses the SICCT inter-
face or another network interface of the card terminal
for remote update. See A.PUSH_SERVER for assump-
tions on the Push Server.
SM-KT The SM-KT represents the cryptographic identity of the
TOE. It is a secure module that carries a X509 certificate
and provides :
• Protection of the private key
• Cryptographic functions for encryption/decryp-
tion and signature creation
• A random number generator
• A function to read out the public key
TOE Reset Adminis-
trator
The TOE Reset Administrator is the only user role that
is able to perform a reset of the TOE settings when man-
agement credentials are lost. The type of authentication
for this role depends on the particular implementation.
The TOE Reset Administrator could be the developer
himself.
User A user is communicating with the TOE in order to use
its primary services, i.e. to access a smart card which
has been put into one of the slots of the TOE before.
The TOE is used by different kinds of users including
medical suppliers, patients, Signature users and ad-
ministrators.
Table 2: Subjects
3.3 Threats
This chapter describes the threats that have to be countered by the TOE.
The attack potential of the attacker behind those threats is in general charac-
terized in terms of their motivation, expertise and the available resources.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
As the TOE handles and stores information with a very high need for protection
with respect to their authenticity, integrity and confidentiality it has to be as-
sumed that an attacker will have a high motivation for their attacks.
On the other hand the possibilities for an attacker are limited by the character-
istics of the controlled environment (specifically addressed by A.ENV).
Summarizing this means that an attacker with a moderate attack potential has
to be assumed.
The assets that are threatened and the paths for each threat are defined in the
following table:
Threat Description
T.COM An attacker may try to intercept the communication be-
tween the TOE and the connector/SAC in order to gain
knowledge about communication data which is trans-
mitted between the TOE and the connector/SAC or in
order to manipulate this communication. As part of this
threat an authorized user, who is communicating with
the TOE (via a connector/SAC) could try to influence
communications of other users with the TOE in order to
manipulate this communication or to gain knowledge
about the transmitted data.
T.PIN An attacker may try to release the PIN which has been
entered by a user from the TOE in clear text. As part of
this attack the attacker may try to route a PIN, which
has been entered by a user, to a wrong card slot.
T.DATA An attacker may try to release or modify protected data
from the TOE. This data may comprise:
• Configuration data the TOE relies on for its se-
cure operation
• The shared secret of TOE and connector/SAC
• Communication data that is received from a card
and stored within the terminal before it is sub-
mitted to the connector/SAC.
An attack path for this threat cannot be limited to any
specific scenario but includes any scenario that is pos-
sible in the assumed environment of the TOE.
Specifically an attacker may
• use any interface that is provided by the TOE
• physically probe or manipulate the TOE
T.F-CONNECTOR In the GHC context unauthorized personnel may try to
initiate a pairing process with a fake connector after an
unauthorized reset to factory defaults, e.g. to initiate an
unauthorized firmware update or to receive confidential
(patient) data.
Table 3: Threats
T.F-SAC Threat T.F-SAC (outside the scope of [PP])
In the context of the SAC usage unauthorized personnel may try to in-
itiate a pairing process with a fake SAC after an unauthorized reset to
factory defaults, e.g. to initiate an unauthorized signature creation or
to receive confidential (Signature user) data.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall be implemented according to the following specifications:
Policy Description
OSP.PIN_ENTRY The TOE shall fulfil the requirements to be used as a
secure PIN entry device for applications according to
[22].
This specifically means that a PIN, which has been en-
tered by a user at the TOE, must never leave the TOE
in clear text, except to smart cards in local card slots.
For the case that a terminal implements an insecure
mode (e.g. a mode, in which it cannot be guaranteed
that the PIN will not leave the TOE or a mode in which
not trustworthy entities are allowed to communicate
with the TOE) the TOE has to be able to inform the med-
ical supplier/Signature user whether it is currently in
a secure state or not.
Table 4: Organisational Security Policies
3.5 Assumptions
The following assumptions need to be made about the environment of the TOE
to allow the secure operation of the TOE.
Assumption Description
A.ENV It is assumed that the TOE is used in a controlled envi-
ronment.
Specifically it is assumed:
• The card terminal prevents (not visible) physical
manipulations for at least 10 minutes. The envi-
ronment ensures beyond these 10 minutes that
the card terminal is protected against unauthor-
ized physical access or such is perceptible,
• That the user handles his PIN with care; specifi-
cally that the user will keep their PIN secret,
• That the user can enter the PIN in a way that
nobody else can read it
• That the user only enters the card PIN when the
TOE indicates a secure state,
• That the medical supplier/Signature user
checks the sealing and the physical integrity of
the TOE regularly before it is used,
• That the network of the medical supplier/Sig-
nature user is appropriately secured so that
authorized entities are trustworthy, see also
[23].
A.ADMIN The administrator of the TOE and the medical sup-
plier/Signature user shall be non- hostile, well trained
and have to know the existing guidance documentation
of the TOE.
The administrator and the medical supplier/Signature
user shall be responsible for the secure operation of the
TOE. Specifically it shall be ensured:
• That they enforce the requirements on the envi-
ronment (see A.ENV),
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Assumption Description
• That the administrator ensures that the medical
supplier/Signature user received the neces-
sary guidance documents (especially for firm-
ware updates),
• That the physical examination of the TOE is per-
formed according to the process described by
the manufacturer in the evaluation process (e.g.
seal checking),
• That the administrator checks the integrity of
the terminal before the initial start-up procedure
(every new pairing process) and the medical
supplier/Signature user checks the integrity of
the terminal before every start-up procedure,
• That they react to breaches of environmental re-
quirements according to the process described
by the manufacturer in the evaluation process
(e.g. reshipment to the manufacturer).
A.CONNECTOR The connector in the environment is assumed to be
trustworthy and provides the possibility to establish a
Trusted Channel with the TOE including a mean for a
mutual authentication. It is assumed that the connector
has undergone an evaluation and certification process
in compliance with the corresponding Protection Pro-
files. Further it is assumed that for the case the TOE
uses a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-KT which are address-
able via the connector, the TOE accesses this DF.KT via
the base-channel 0. During the use of the SM-KT by the
TOE the terminal card commands of the TOE have to be
given precedence and the processing of possibly exist-
ing client SICCT commands have to be interrupted and
continued only after completion of the internal com-
mand sequence. The developer may queue the inter-
rupts internally or implement error messages as an-
swers to the commands.
It is also assumed that the connector makes sure that
a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-KT which is addressable
via the connector can only be accessed by the TOE and
cannot be used by any other system than the TOE.
Further, it is assumed that the connector periodically
monitors the pairing state with the TOE and provides
warning mechanisms to indicate unexpected results like
paired terminals which lack the
shared secret.
A.SM The TOE will use a secure module (SM-KT) that repre-
sents the cryptographic identity of the TOE in form of
an X.509 certificate.
It is assumed that the cryptographic keys in this module
are of sufficient quality and the process of key genera-
tion and certificate generation is appropriately secured
to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
of the private key and the authenticity and integrity of
the public key/certificate.
The random number generator of the SM-KT is assumed
to provide entropy of at least 100 bit for key generation.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Assumption Description
It is further assumed that the secure module is secured
in a way that protects the communication between the
TOE and the module from eavesdropping and manipu-
lation and that the SM-KT is securely connected with
the TOE (according to TR-03120 [TR-03120] and its ap-
pendix [TR-03120-A]).
The secure module has undergone an evaluation and
certification process in compliance with the correspond-
ing gematik card Protection Profile [20] and complies
with the specification [24].
A.PUSH_SERVER It is assumed that the internal network of the medical
supplier/Signature user is equipped with a so called
Push Server for automatic firmware updates according
to the push update mechanism described in [7].
The TOE administrator is assumed to be responsible for
the operation of the Push Server and able to select the
particular firmware version that the server is allowed to
install on the card terminals.
It is further assumed that every time an update process
is performed for a card terminal the Push Server logs
the following information: identifier of involved card ter-
minal, version of firmware to install, result of the update
process.
A.ID000_CARDS It is assumed that all smart cards of form factor ID000
are properly sealed after they are brought into the TOE.
Further, the developer is assumed to provide guidance
documentation on how a TOE administrator could renew
a sealing after an ID000 card is replaced by another
one.
Table 5: Assumptions
A.SAC Assumptions SAC (outside the scope of [PP])
The SAC in the environment is assumed to be trustworthy and pro-
vides the possibility to establish a Trusted Channel with the TOE in-
cluding a mean for a mutual authentication. Further it is assumed that
for the case the TOE uses a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT as SM-KT which are
addressable via the SAC, the TOE accesses this DF.KT via the base-
channel 0. During the use of the SM-KT by the TOE the terminal card
commands of the TOE have to be given precedence and the processing
of possibly existing client SICCT commands have to be interrupted
and continued only after completion of the internal command se-
quence. The developer may queue the interrupts internally or imple-
ment error messages as answers to the commands.
It is also assumed that the SAC makes sure that a DF.KT of a gSMC-KT
as SM-KT which is addressable via the SAC can only be accessed by the
TOE and cannot be used by any other system than the TOE.
In this SAC context the SAC acts logically like a connector in the way
that it provides and performs the same secure network connectivity
functionality including authentication, pairing and enforcement of en-
cryption of communication. Because the SAC does not provide a SM-K
security module it uses its own secure X.509 certificate and key store
for authentication instead.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Further, it is assumed that the SAC periodically monitors the pairing
state with the TOE and provides warning mechanisms to indicate un-
expected results like paired terminals which lack the shared secret.
4 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security ob-
jectives for the environment of the TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following security objectives have to be met by the TOE:
Objective Description
O.ACCESS_CONTROL To protect the configuration of the TOE against unau-
thorized modifications only an authorized user shall be
able to read out information about the current configu-
ration of the TOE and only the administrator shall be
able to modify the settings of the TOE.
Therefore the TOE shall provide an access control func-
tion based on the identity of the current user.
Further the access control mechanism of the TOE has to
ensure that the PIN cannot be read from the TOE.
The TOE shall also ensure that the TOE administrator’s
credentials for local management are set before access
to other TOE functionality is possible.
O.PIN_ENTRY The TOE shall serve as a secure PIN entry device for the
user and the administrator.
Thus the TOE has to provide the user and administrator
with the functionality to enter a PIN and ensure that the
PIN is never released from the TOE in clear text, except
to smart cards in local card slots.
For remote-PIN verification the PIN shall be encrypted,
so that it can only be decrypted by the receiving smart
card (HPC or SMC-B).
O.I&A For its access control policy and for parts of the man-
agement functionality the TOE has to be aware of the
identity of the current user.
Thus the TOE has to provide a mean to identify and au-
thenticate the current user. The TOE shall maintain at
least two distinct roles: administrators and users3
.
O.MANAGEMENT In order to protect its configuration the TOE shall pro-
vide only an authenticated and authorized administrator
with the necessary management functions.
The TOE shall enforce an access control policy for man-
agement functions, as some functions shall only be ac-
cessible by administrators authenticated by the local
management interface. Further, the following manage-
ment functions can be used by unauthenticated users
• Display the product version number of the TOE
• View card terminal name for card terminal
The TOE shall provide a local management interface,
and management over SICCT interface.
A firmware consists of two parts: (1) the so-called
“firmware list” and (2) the “firmware core” which in-
cludes the whole firmware except the firmware list.
3
It should be noted that the scope of the identification and authentication of
the user is only to determine the role the current user belongs to.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Objective Description
Firmware lists and cores have to versioned inde-
pendently.
The firmware list states all firmware core versions to
which a change is allowed: An update of the firmware
core is only allowed if the core version is included in the
firmware list.
A firmware update of the TOE shall only be possible af-
ter the integrity and authenticity of the firmware has
been verified and the following holds:
• The TOE provides functionality to update and
downgrade its firmware. This includes both the
change to a newer firmware as a downgrade to
a firmware which is approved with the concept
of firmware-group.
• The configuration, such as terminal type, IP ad-
dress or pairing- information shall be preserved
and indicated after a firmware update or a down-
grade (see [7] for further information).
• The developer of the TOE shall ensure that in
case of a downgrade of the firmware the TOE
must warn the Administrator (e.g. within the
Guidance) before the installation that the action
to be performed is not an upgrade. The TOE
must offer a chance to cancel the installation.
The developer- specific update component shall
warn the administrator about taking the respon-
sibility in case of performing a downgrade.
The administrator shall be able to manage the list of
TSP CAs which is used to verify the authenticity of con-
nectors/SAC. An update of the TSP CA list shall only be
possible after the integrity and authenticity of the list
has been verified.
The TOE shall ensure that for all security attributes,
which can be changed by an administrator or the user,
only secure values are accepted. This includes the en-
forcement of a password policy for the management in-
terfaces.
In addition to the update component the TOE supports
update features of the SICCT specification, whereby a
trigger component is able to update the TOE (e.g. the
Configuration and Software Repository- Service (KSR)
of the telematic infrastructure).
O.SECURE_CHANNEL When establishing a connection between the TOE and
the connector/SAC both parties shall be aware of the
identity of their communication partner. Thus the TOE
has to provide a mean to authenticate the con-
nector/SAC and to authenticate itself against the con-
nector/SAC in accordance with [7]. The TOE shall only
have one connection to one connector/SAC at a time.
For all communications which fall into either the context
of the electronic health card or SAC application the TOE
shall only accept communication via this secure channel
to ensure the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality
of the transmitted data.
Only functions to identify the TOE in the network (ser-
vice discovery) may be available without a secure chan-
nel.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Objective Description
O.STATE The TOE shall be able to indicate whether it is currently
in a secure state, i.e. whether all TSP as required by
this Security Target are actually enforced.
O.PROTECTION The TOE shall be able to verify the correct operation of
the TSF. To ensure the correct operation of the TSF the
TOE shall verify the correct operation of all security
functions at start-up and specifically verify the correct
operation of the secure module (see A.SM).
The TOE shall provide an adequate level of physical pro-
tection to protect the stored assets and the SM-KT4
. It
has to be ensured that any kind of physical tampering
that might compromise the TSP within 10 minutes can
be afterwards detected by the medical supplier/Signa-
ture user.
To avoid interference the TOE has to ensure that each
connection is held in its own security context where
more than one connection of a TOE to a connector/SAC
is established.
Also if more than one smart card in the slots of the TOE
is in use the TOE has to ensure that each connection is
held in its own security context.
The TOE shall delete
• PINs
• cryptographic keys
• all information that is received by a card in a slot
of the TOE or by the connector/SAC (except the
shared secret)
in a secure way when it is no longer used.
In case a TOE comprises physically separated parts, the
TOE shall prevent the disclosure and modification of
data when it is transmitted between physically sepa-
rated parts of the TOE.
Table 6: Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The following security objectives have to be met by the environment of the
TOE:
Objective Description
OE.ENV It is assumed that the TOE is used in a controlled envi-
ronment.
Specifically it is assumed:
• The card terminal prevents (not visible) physical
manipulations for at least 10 minutes. The envi-
ronment ensures beyond these 10 minutes that
the card terminal is protected against unauthor-
ized physical access or such is perceptible,
• That the user handles his PIN with care; specifi-
cally that the user will keep their PIN secret,
4
Please note that the SM-KT provides its own physical protection for the
stored keys. However according to [7] it has to be ensured that the SM-KT
is securely connected with the TOE. Thus the physical protection provided
by the TOE has to cover the SM-KT.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Objective Description
• That the user can enter the PIN in a way that
nobody else can read it,
• That the user only enters the card PIN when the
TOE indicates a secure state,
• That the medical supplier/Signature user
checks the sealing and the physical integrity of
the TOE regularly before it is used,
• The medical supplier/Signature user sends the
TOE back to the developer in case he suspects
an unauthorized reset to factory defaults has
been performed by unauthorized personnel, and
• That the network of the medical supplier/Sig-
nature user is appropriately secured so author-
ized entities are trustworthy, see also [23].
OE.ADMIN The administrator of the TOE and the medical sup-
plier/Signature user shall be non- hostile, well trained
and have to know the existing guidance documentation
of the TOE.
The administrator and the medical supplier/Signature
user shall be responsible for the secure operation of the
TOE. Specifically it shall be ensured:
• That they enforce the requirements on the envi-
ronment (see A.ENV),
• That the administrator ensures that the medical
supplier/Signature user received the neces-
sary guidance documents (especially for firm-
ware updates),
• That the physical examination of the TOE is per-
formed according to the process described by
the manufacturer in the evaluation process (e.g.
seal checking),
• That the administrator checks the integrity of
the terminal before the initial start-up procedure
(every new pairing process) and the medical
supplier/Signature user checks the integrity of
the terminal before every start-up procedure,
• That they react to breaches of environmental re-
quirements according to the process described
by the manufacturer in the evaluation process
(e.g. reshipment to the manufacturer), and
• that the administrator checks the secure state of
the TOE regularly5
.
OE.CONNECTOR The connector in the environment has to be trustworthy
and provides the possibility to establish a Trusted Chan-
nel with the TOE including a mean for mutual authenti-
cation. The connector has to undergo an evaluation and
certification process in compliance with the correspond-
ing Protection Profiles.
Further the connector has to periodically check the pair-
ing state with the TOE and warn the administrator ac-
cordingly.
5
The secure state can be indicated by e.g. the pairing information with the
connector/SAC, the firmware version or other security events which the
developer has to define within the Guidance documentation.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Objective Description
OE.SM The TOE will use a secure module (SM-KT) that repre-
sents the cryptographic identity of the TOE in form of
an X.509 certificate.
It is assumed that the cryptographic keys in this module
are of sufficient quality and the process of key genera-
tion and certificate generation is appropriately secured
to ensure the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
of the private key and the authenticity and integrity of
the public key/certificate.
The random number generator of the SM-KT shall pro-
vide entropy of at least 100 bit for key generation.
It is further assumed that the secure module is secured
in a way that protects the communication between the
TOE and the module from eavesdropping and manipu-
lation and that the SM-KT is securely connected with
the TOE (according to TR-03120 [TR-03120] and its ap-
pendix [TR-03120-A]).
The secure module has undergone an evaluation and
certification process in compliance with the correspond-
ing Protection Profile [20] and complies with the speci-
fication [24].
OE.PUSH_SERVER The internal network of the medical supplier/Signa-
ture user is equipped with a so called Push Server for
automatic firmware updates according to the push up-
date mechanism described in [7].
The TOE administrator is responsible for the operation
of the Push Server and able to select the particular firm-
ware version that the server is allowed to install on the
card terminals.
Every time an update process is performed for a card
terminal the push server logs the following information:
identifier of involved card terminal, version of firmware
to install, result of the update process.
OE.ID000_CARDS All smartcards of form factor ID000 shall be properly
sealed after they are brought into the TOE6
.
Further, the developer shall provide guidance documen-
tation on how a TOE administrator could renew a sealing
after an ID000 card is replaced by another one.
Table 7: Security Objectives for the environment of the TOE
Security Objectives OE.SAC for the environment (outside the scope of
[PP])
The SAC in the environment has to be trustworthy and provides the
possibility to establish a Trusted Channel with the TOE including a
mean for mutual authentication. Further the SAC has to periodically
check the pairing state with the TOE and warn the administrator ac-
cordingly.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage. The
following chapters provide a more detailed explanation of this mapping:
6
Please see TIP1-A_3192 in [7].
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.PIN_ENTRY
O.I&A
O.MANAGEMENT
O.SECURE_CHANNEL
O.STATE
O.PROTECTION
OE.ENV
OE.ADMIN
OE.CONNECTOR
OE.SAC
OE.SM
OE.PUSH_SERVER
OE.ID000_CARDS
T.COM X X X X
T.PIN X X X X
T.DATA X X X X X
T.F-CON-
NECTOR
X X X
T.F-SAC X X X
OSP.PIN_EN-
TRY
X X X
A.ENV X
A.ADMIN X
A.CONNECTOR X
A.SAC X
A.SM X
A.PUSH_SERV
ER
X
A.ID000_CARD
S
X
Table 8: Security Objective Rationale
Note: T.F-SAC, A.SAC and OE.SAC are outside the scope of [PP].
4.3.1 Countering the threats
The threat T.COM which describes that an attacker may try to intercept the
communication between the TOE and the connector/SAC is countered by a com-
bination of the objectives O.I&A, O.SECURE_CHANNEL and O.PROTECTION.
O.SECURE_CHANNEL describes the secure channel, which is used to protect the
communication between the TOE and the connector/SAC. This objective basi-
cally ensures that an attacker is not able to intercept the communication be-
tween the TOE and the connector/SAC and removes this threat since both par-
ties have to be aware of the identity of their communication partner. O.I&A
requires that the TOE has to be able to authenticate the connector/SAC. This
authentication is part of the establishment of the secure communication be-
tween the TOE and the connector/SAC and contributes to removing the threat.
O.PROTECTION ensures that each communication of the TOE with a con-
nector/SAC or cards in its slots is held in a separate security context so that
authorized users of the TOE can’t influence the communication of other users.
It further protects the TOE against physical tampering for 10 minutes. OE.ENV
finally ensures that the network of the medical supplier/Signature user is ap-
propriately secured so that it cannot be accessed by unauthorized entities and
that the TOE is protected against physical tampering if the TOE is unobserved
for more than 10 minutes. Furthermore OE.ENV assures that the medical sup-
plier/Signature user checks the sealing and the physical integrity of the TOE
regularly before it is used.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
The threat T.PIN, which describes that an attacker may try to release the PIN
from the TOE, is countered by a combination of the objectives O.ACCESS_CON-
TROL, O.PIN_ENTRY and O.PROTECTION. O.ACCESS_CONTROL defines that ac-
cording to the access control policy of the TOE nobody must be allowed to read
out the PIN. In this way it can be ensured that an attacker cannot read out the
PIN via one of the logical interfaces of the TOE O.PIN_ENTRY defines that the
TOE shall serve as a secure PIN entry device for the user and the TOE admin-
istrator and contributes to countering T.PIN as it ensures that the PIN cannot
be released from the TOE in clear text. This is the main objective that serves to
remove the threat. O.PROTECTION contributes to countering T.PIN as it ensures
that the TOE provides an adequate level of physical protection for the PIN for
10 minutes. It further protects the PIN when it is transmitted between physi-
cally separated parts, ensures that the PIN is securely deleted when it is no
longer used and ensures that the PIN is sent to the correct card as the commu-
nication to every card slot is held in a separate context. OE.ENV finally ensures
that that the network of the medical supplier/Signature user is appropriately
secured so that it cannot be accessed by unauthorized entities. The TOE is pro-
tected against physical tampering if it is unobserved for more than 10 minutes
and that the medical supplier/Signature user checks the sealing and the phys-
ical integrity of the TOE regularly before it is used. Furthermore OE.ENV con-
tributes to countering T.PIN by ascertaining that the user enters the PIN in a
way that nobody else can read it and that this can only be done when the TOE
indicates a secure state.
The threat T.DATA, which describes that an attacker may try to release or
change protected data of the TOE, is countered by a combination of O.AC-
CESS_CONTROL, O.I&A, O.MANAGEMENT and O.PROTECTION. O.AC-
CESS_CONTROL ensures that only authorized users are able to access the data
stored in the TOE. O.I&A authenticates the user as the access control mecha-
nism will need to know about the role of the user for every decision in the
context of access control. O.MANAGEMENT ensures that only the TOE adminis-
trator is able to manage the TSF data and removes the aspect of the threat
where an attacker could try to access sensitive data of the TOE via its manage-
ment interface. O.PROTECTION provides the necessary physical protection for
the data stored in the TOE for 10 minutes and defines additional mechanisms
to ensure that secret data cannot be released from the TOE (delete secret data
in a secure way keep communication channels separate and protect data when
transmitted between physically separated parts of the TOE). OE.ENV finally en-
sures that the network of the medical supplier/Signature user is appropriately
secured so that it cannot be accessed by unauthorized entities and that the TOE
is protected against physical tampering if the TOE is unobserved for more than
10 minutes. Furthermore OE.ENV assures that the medical supplier/Signature
user checks the sealing and the physical integrity of the TOE regularly before it
is used and that the user only enters the card PIN when the TOE indicates a
secure state.
The threat T.F-CONNECTOR, which describes that unauthorized personnel
may try to initiate a pairing process with a fake connector after an unauthorized
reset to factory defaults, is countered by a combination of OE.ENV, OE.ADMIN
and OE.CONNECTOR. OE.ENV ensures that the medical supplier sends the TOE
back to the developer in case he suspects an unauthorized reset to factory
defaults has been performed by unauthorized personnel. OE.ADMIN ensures
that the administrator checks the secure state of the TOE regularly before it is
used. OE.CONNECTOR ensures that the connector in the environment is trust-
worthy and provides the possibility to establish a Trusted Channel with the TOE
including a mean for mutual authentication. It further ensures that the con-
nector has to undergo an evaluation and certification process in compliance with
the corresponding Protection Profiles. OE.CONNECTOR further ensures that the
connector periodically checks the pairing state with the TOE and warns the ad-
ministrator accordingly.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Note: Threat T.F-SAC and OE.SAC are outside [PP].
The threat T.F-SAC which describes that unauthorized personnel may try to
initiate a pairing process with a fake SAC after an unauthorized reset to factory
defaults, is countered by a combination of OE.ENV, OE.ADMIN and OE.SAC.
OE.ENV ensures that the Signature user sends the TOE back to the developer
in case he suspects an unauthorized reset to factory defaults has been per-
formed by unauthorized personnel. OE.ADMIN ensures that the administrator
checks the secure state of the TOE regularly before it is used. OE.SAC ensures
that the SAC in the environment is trustworthy and provides the possibility to
establish a Trusted Channel with the TOE including a mean for mutual authen-
tication. OE.SAC further ensures that the SAC periodically checks the pairing
state with the TOE and warns the administrator accordingly.
4.3.2 Covering the OSPs
The organizational security policy OSP.PIN_ENTRY requires that the TOE has
to serve as a secure PIN entry device (i.e. that the PIN can never be released
from the TOE) and that the TOE has to be able to indicate whether it is work-
ing in a secure state or not.
The secure PIN entry device is specified in O.PIN_ENTRY. This objective de-
fines that the TOE has to provide a function for secure PIN entry and (as the
TOE has more than one card slot) that the TOE will inform the user to which
card slot the PIN will be sent. O.STATE ensures that the TOE is able to indicate
to the medical supplier/Signature user, whether it is currently working in a se-
cure state as required by OSP.PIN_ENTRY. Such a secure state includes (but is
not limited to) that the secure PIN entry can be guaranteed. Finally O.PRO-
TECTION ensures that the TOE is able to verify the correct operation of the
TSF and that an adequate level of physical protection is provided.
4.3.3 Covering the assumptions
The assumption A.ENV is covered by OE.ENV as directly follows.
The assumption A.ADMIN is covered by OE.ADMIN as directly follows.
The assumption A.CONNECTOR is covered by OE.CONNECTOR as directly fol-
lows.
The assumption A.SM is covered by OE.SM as directly follows.
The assumption A.PUSH_SERVER is covered by OE.PUSH_SERVER as directly
follows.
The assumption A.ID000_CARDS is covered by OE.ID000_CARDS as directly
follows.
Note: Assumption A.SAC and Security Objective OE.SAC are outside [PP].
The assumption A.SAC is covered by OE.SAC as directly follows.
5 Extended Components Definition
This Security Target uses no components which are not defined in CC part 2.
6 Security Requirements
This chapter defines the functional requirements and the security assurance
requirements for the TOE and its environment.
Operations for assignment, selection, refinement and iteration have been made.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
All operations which have been performed from the original text of [2] are writ-
ten in italics for assignments, underlined for selections and bold text for refine-
ments. Furthermore the [brackets] from [2] are kept in the text.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
The TOE has to satisfy the SFRs delineated in the following table. The rest of
this chapter contains a description of each component and any related depend-
encies.
Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1/Connector Cryptographic key generation for connector/SAC
communication
FCS_CKM.1/Management Cryptographic key generation for remote manage-
ment
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction for communication
FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym Cryptographic operation for connector/SAC com-
munication (symmetric algorithm)
FCS_COP.1/SIG Cryptographic operation for signature genera-
tion/verification
FCS_COP.1/Management Cryptographic operation for remote management
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW Cryptographic operation for firmware signature ver-
ification
FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP Cryptographic operation for signature verification of
TSP CA lists
User data protection (FDP)
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal Subset access control for terminal functions
FDP_ACC.1/Management Subset access control for management
FDP_ACF.1/Terminal Security attribute based access control for terminal
functions
FDP_ACF.1/Management Security attribute based access control for manage-
ment
FDP_IFC.1/PIN Subset information flow control for PIN
FDP_IFF.1/PIN Simple security attributes for PIN
FDP_IFC.1/NET Subset information flow control for network con-
nections
FDP_IFF.1/NET Simple security attributes for network connections
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Identification and Authentication (FIA)
FIA_AFL.1/PIN Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1 / C&R Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Security Management (FMT)
FMT_MSA.1/Terminal Management of security attributes for Terminal SFP
FMT_MSA.1/Management Management of security attributes for management
SFP
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3/Terminal Static attribute initialisation for Terminal SFP
FMT_MSA.3/Management Static attribute initialisation for management SFP
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
TOE Access (FTA)
FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE Default TOE access banners for secure state
Trusted path/channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1/Connector Inter-TSF trusted channel for connector/SAC com-
munication
FTP_TRP.1/Management Trusted path for remote management
Table 9: Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
6.1.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/Connector Cryptographic key generation for con-
nector/SAC communication
FCS_CKM.1.1/Connector
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[Diffie–Hellman ephemeral (DHE_RSA) key exchange using
DH-group 14, ECDHE ] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [AES (128 bits) and AES (256 bits), HMAC (512 bits)]
that meet the following: [[7] under consideration of [15]
Appendix F.1.1.3 compliance.]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 1: The cryptographic session keys, generated by
FCS_CKM.1/Connector are used for the TLS encryption/de-
cryption between the TOE and the connector/SAC (for fur-
ther information see [7] also chapter 6.1.1.4).
The generation (actually negotiation) of this key is done in
accordance with the Diffie-Hellman protocol. It should be
noted that this negotiation includes a mutual authentication
of the TOE and the connector/SAC based on certificate val-
idation (see [7]) and validation of a shared secret. The TOE
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
determines the role from the connector/SAC certificate pre-
sented during the build-up of the TLS connection. The TOE
checks that the determined role corresponds with the role
"Signature Application Component (SAC)" (see [7]).
The TOE uses the SM-KT for Signature generation and Sig-
nature Verification (see also A.SM) or/and its own function-
ality required by FCS_COP.1/SIG. For random number gen-
eration the TOE does not rely on the SM-KT. Instead it uses
the Linux blocking random number generator which is con-
tinuously seeded during operation of the TOE by a certified
TPM [ST33TPHF20].
The connection to network based management interfaces is
always secured with TLS Version 1.2 [15]7
.
6.1.1.2 FCS_CKM.1/Management Cryptographic key generation for re-
mote Management
FCS_CKM.1.1/Management
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[Diffie–Hellman ephemeral (DHE_RSA) key exchange using
DH-group 14 ] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[AES_128 and AES_256 ] that meet the following: [7].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 2:
According to [PP, Application Note 20] the Remote Manage-
ment functionality is optional. Therefore this SFR is also op-
tional and not relevant for the TOE.
6.1.1.3 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction for communication
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method [writing
the memory to be deallocated with 0x00] that meets the
following: [none].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
6.1.1.4 FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym Cryptographic operation for con-
nector/SAC communication (symmetric algorithm)
FCS_COP.1.1/Con_Sym
The TSF shall perform [encryption, decryption] in accord-
ance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CBC,
AES-GCM] and cryptographic key sizes [128 bit and 256
7
Contrary to the TLS 1.1 requirement indicated in the [PP], the support of TLS
1.1 is dropped in consideration of the Gematik eHealth KT Specification [7]
- (TIP1-A_3415 - Securing network communication).
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
bit ] that meet the following: [[7] and RFC3268,
RFC5289, FIPS-197].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 3:
The symmetric cryptographic algorithm in
FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym is used to set up the trusted channel
with a connector/SAC. The cryptographic functionality com-
plies with the requirements of the PKCS#1.
6.1.1.5 FCS_COP.1/SIG Cryptographic operation for signature genera-
tion/verification
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG
The TSF shall perform [signature generation/verification] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, ECDSA] and cryptographic key
sizes [RSA2048, SHA256, SHA384] that meet the following:
[[7] and [17]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 4:The signature generation/verification in FCS_COP.1/SIG to
establish the trusted channel with the connector/SAC is
done using the SM-KT, see chapter 28. Further the TOE ver-
ifies that the connector/SAC certificate is trusted by the
TSP_CA using signature verification of FCS_COP.1/SIG.
6.1.1.6 FCS_COP.1/Management Cryptographic operation for remote
management
FCS_COP.1.1/Management
The TSF shall perform [encryption, decryption ] in accord-
ance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [ AES-CBC ]
and cryptographic key sizes [128bit and 256bit ] that meet
the following: [7 and RFC3268, FIPS-197].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 5:
The cryptographic functionality in FCS_COP.1/Management
and FCS_CKM.1/Management is used to establish the
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
trusted path for remote management. The cryptographic
functionality complies with the requirements of the PKCS#1
standard. This SFR can implicitly be fulfilled by the mecha-
nisms for cryptographically secured communication with
the connector/SAC, see FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym.
According to [PP, Application Note 20] the Remote Manage-
ment functionality is optional. Therefore this SFR is also op-
tional and not relevant for the TOE.
6.1.1.7 FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW Cryptographic operation for firmware sig-
nature verification
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_FW
The TSF shall perform [signature verification for firmware
updates] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algo-
rithm [RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5, SHA256] and cryptographic
key sizes [RSA4096] that meet the following: [7].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security
attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 6: The functionality for signature verification is used to check
the integrity and authenticity of a potential firmware up-
date. The functionality relies on hashing and a public key
operation. The public key is part of the installed firmware.
6.1.1.8 FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP Cryptographic operation for verification
of TSP CA lists
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_TSP
The TSF shall perform [signature verification] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [RSASSA-PKCS1-
v1_5] and cryptographic key sizes [RSA4096, SHA256 ]
that meet the following: [[7] and [17]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Application Note 7:
Potential updates of the TSP CA list are performed only as
part of a firmware update with signature verification accord-
ing to 31. As the vendor chooses to provide TSP_CA list
updates via the firmware update mechanism, this SFR will
be fulfilled accordingly.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
6.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
6.1.2.1 FDP_ACC.1/Terminal Subset access control for terminal func-
tions
FDP_ACC.1.1/Terminal
The TSF shall enforce the [Terminal SFP] on [
Subjects: all subjects
Objects: PIN, TSP_CA lists, shared secret, management
credentials, firmware, cryptographic keys, Communication
data [ none] Operations: Read, modify, [none]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
6.1.2.2 FDP_ACC.1/Management Subset access control for manage-
ment
FDP_ACC.1.1/Management
The TSF shall enforce the [Management SFP] on [
Subjects: users, [none]
Objects: manageable objects, i.e. management functions
Operations: execute].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
6.1.2.3 FDP_ACF.1/Terminal Security attribute based access control
for terminal functions
FDP_ACF.1.1/Terminal
The TSF shall enforce the [Terminal SFP] to objects based
on the following: [
Subjects: all subjects, attribute: user role8
Objects: PIN, shared secret, management credentials, firm-
ware, cryptographic keys, attribute: firmware version, En-
able/Disable the functionality of an unauthorized reset to
factory defaults
[administrator PIN validity attribute]
].
FDP_ACF.1.2/Terminal
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects
is allowed: [
If a firmware update is initiated, a modification of the firm-
ware of the TOE shall only be allowed after the integrity and
authenticity of the firmware has been verified according to
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW and :
• The card terminal shall recognize non- authentic
transmissions. The security anchor required for this
action shall be placed in a writing-protected area of
the external interfaces of the TOE.
8
The role of the user (e.g. medical supplier/Signature user, TOE administrator)
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• Furthermore, the security anchor shall be located in
a read- only area of the device and shall only be able
to be replaced with an administrative action.
• The transmission mechanism shall be in a position
to detect transmission errors independently.
• An update of the firmware of the TOE shall only be
allowed by an authenticated administrator:
◦ A firmware consists of two parts: firstly the so-
called “firmware list” and secondly the “firmware
core” which includes the whole firmware except the
firmware list. The firmware list states all firmware
core versions to which a change is allowed. Firm-
ware lists and cores have to be versioned inde-
pendently.
◦ An update of the firmware core is only allowed if
the core version is included in the firmware list.
Firmware lists must only contain version numbers
of firmware cores which are certified according this
Security Target. For the use in the German
Healthcare System the named versions must also
be approved by the gematik.
◦ In case of downgrades of the firmware the TOE
must warn the administrator before the installation
that he is doing a downgrade, not an upgrade. The
TOE must offer him the chance to cancel the instal-
lation.
◦ In case of a common update the TOE has to install
the new firmware list at first. The new list is used
to decide whether an update to the accompanying
firmware core is allowed.
◦ Updates of the firmware list are only allowed to
newer versions. Use higher version numbers to dis-
tinguish newer versions.
◦ Installation of firmware cores and lists are only al-
lowed after the integrity and authenticity of the
firmware has been verified using the mechanism as
described in FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW.
If a TSP CA list update is initiated, a modification of the list
shall only be allowed after the integrity and authenticity of
the new TSP CA list has been verified according to
FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP.
The developer of the TOE ensures that in case of a down-
grade of the firmware the TOE must warn the Administrator
(e.g. within the Guidance) before the installation that the
action to be performed is not an upgrade. The TOE must
offer a chance to cancel the installation. A downgrade of the
TOE shall only be possible after warning the administrator
about the risks of this action. This warning shall be per-
formed by the developer- specific update component.
The following management functions shall be executable by
authenticated TOE administrators (excluding SICCT inter-
face):
• [none]
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
[none]
].
FDP_ACF.1.3/Terminal
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to ob-
jects based on the following additional rules: [Authorise the
administrator to set the security attribute ”validity of the
management interface PIN” to “not valid” after successfully
performing a Challenge & Response operation with the
TOE.]
FDP_ACF.1.4/Terminal
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules [
• No subject shall access any object but the TOE ad-
ministrator’s local management credentials before
the TOE administrator’s credentials are initially set,
i.e. the administrator PIN is set to “valid”.
• No subject shall read out the PIN, shared secret,
management credentials or secret cryptographic
keys while they are temporarily stored in the TOE
• No subject shall modify the public key for the signa-
ture verification of firmware updates unless a new
public key is part of a firmware update .
].
Application note 8: No more objects are subject to Access Control so no more
granular rules for Access Control are needed. Unauthorized
reset to factory defaults is not implemented by the devel-
oper.
6.1.2.4 FDP_ACF.1/Management Security attribute based access con-
trol for management
FDP_ACF.1.1/Management
The TSF shall enforce the [Management SFP] to objects
based on the following: [
Subjects: users, [none]
Subject attributes: role(s), management interface9
, [none]
Objects: management functions,
Object attributes: none
].
FDP_ACF.1.2/Management
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects
is allowed: [
The following management functions shall be executable by
all roles:
• Display the product version number of the TOE
• Manage own login credentials
• View card terminal name for card terminal10
9
The subject attribute management interface specifies the interface from
which the user is connecting (local, remote, SICCT).
10
The TOE offers no unauthorized reset to factory default
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• [View the available network configuration]
• [Display the MAC-address(es) of the TOEs network
interface(s)]
[ • generate challenge data for a C&R operation
• enter response data for a C&R operation]
The following management functions shall be executable by
authenticated TOE administrators (excluding SICCT inter-
face):
• [Manage the available network configuration]
• [Set card terminal name for card terminal]
• [Enable/Disable remote update functionality for
firmware update]
• Manage local and remote management login creden-
tials
• Secure deletion of pairing information from all three
possible pairing processes (initial pairing, review of
pairing- information and maintenance-pairing)
• Manage the list of TSP CA
• Perform a firmware update
• Reset the TOE settings to factory defaults
[none]
The following management functions shall be executable by
TOE administrators that were authenticated using the
SICCT interface:
• [Set card terminal name for card terminal]
• Perform a firmware update
The following management functions shall be only executa-
ble by TOE administrators that were authenticated using
the local management interface:
• Enable/disable the remote management interface (if
applicable)
• Perform the initial pairing processes with the con-
nector/SAC
[none]
The TOE Reset Administrator shall only be able to execute
the following management function:
• Reset the TOE settings to factory defaults (fallback)
[none]
].
FDP_ACF.1.3/Management
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to ob-
jects based on the following additional rules: [none].
FDP_ACF.1.4/Management
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules [none]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Application Note 9: FDP_ACF.1.2/Management has been amended.
According to [PP, Application Note 20] the Remote Management functionality is
optional. Therefore the remote management parts of this SFR are also optional
and not relevant for the TOE.
6.1.2.5 FDP_IFC.1/PIN Subset information flow control for PIN
FDP_IFC.1.1/PIN
The TSF shall enforce the [PIN SFP] on [
Subjects: user, card, connector, SAC, remote card termi-
nal11
Information: PIN
Operation: Entering the PIN].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
6.1.2.6 FDP_IFF.1/PIN Simple security attributes for PIN
FDP_IFF.1.1/PIN
The TSF shall enforce the [PIN SFP] based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes: [
Subject attribute: slot identifier12
, [none]].
FDP_IFF.1.2/PIN
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a con-
trolled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold: [
PINs shall never be stored in the non-volatile memory of
the TOE.
The PIN entered by the user shall only be sent via the se-
cure channel targeting the card in the card slot of the TOE
or a remote card terminal for remote-PIN verification.
In the latter case the TOE shall assure that the connection
to the connector/SAC is TLS secured.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3/PIN
The TSF shall enforce the [PIN digits shall never be dis-
played on the display during entry of the PIN. The TOE shall
rather present asterisks as replacement for digits.].
FDP_IFF.1.4/PIN
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based
on the following rules: [none].
FDP_IFF.1.5/PIN
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on
following rules: [
• The PIN shall never leave the TOE in clear text for
remote-PIN verification.
].
11
A remote card terminal either sends or receives a PIN for remote-PIN verifi-
cation.
12
This is the slot the user plugged his smart card in
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Application Note 10:
For local PIN entry feedback the display of the TOE is used.
For remote-PIN verification the TOE may send the PIN to
another card terminal via the connector/SAC. The PIN is
then encrypted and transferred using card-to-card authen-
tication of the smart cards in both card terminals. Remote-
PIN verification is initiated by the connector/SAC. There-
fore, it is responsible to select the participating card termi-
nals and to initiate card-to-card authentication between
both. Communication between TOE and connector/SAC is
additionally secured using FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym.
6.1.2.7 FDP_IFC.1/NET Subset information flow control for network
connections
FDP_IFC.1.1/NET
The TSF shall enforce the [NET SFP] on [
Subjects: Connector, SAC, the TOE,
Information: all information arriving at the network inter-
face
Operation: accept the communication].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
6.1.2.8 FDP_IFF.1/NET Simple security attributes for network connec-
tions
FDP_IFF.1.1/NET
The TSF shall enforce the [NET SFP] based on the following
types of subject and information security attributes: [
Subject: Connector, SAC
Information: Passwords, patient data, SAC data, shared se-
cret, any other information
Information attribute: sent via the trusted channel,
[none]].
FDP_IFF.1.2/NET
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a con-
trolled subject and controlled information via a controlled
operation if the following rules hold: [
Any information arriving at the network interface from the
connector/SAC must only be accepted if the communication
path is encrypted and the connector/SAC has been success-
fully authenticated13
The TOE shall have only one connection to one con-
nector/SAC at a time.
].
13
See the trusted channel in section 6.1.7.1 and the verification section
6.1.1.5.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
FDP_IFF.1.3/NET
The TSF shall enforce that [
for PIN verification (SICCT PERFORM VERIFICATION) and
PIN modification (SICCT MODIFY VERIFICATION DATA)
only the Format-2 PIN-Block format is permitted].
FDP_IFF.1.4/NET
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based
on the following rules: [
The TOE shall accept the following SICCT commands arriv-
ing at the network interface even if no pairing process is
established and no valid connector/SAC certificate is pre-
sented:
• SICCT CT INIT CT SESSION
• SICCT CT CLOSE CT SESSION
• SICCT GET STATUS
• SICCT SET STATUS
• SICCT CT DOWNLOAD INIT
• SICCT CT DOWNLOAD DATA
• SICCT CT DOWNLOAD FINISH
The TOE shall additionally accept the following EHEALTH
commands arriving at the network interface if no pairing
process is established but a valid connector/SAC certifi-
cate14
is presented:
• EHEALTH TERMINAL AUTHENTICATE
Commands to identify the TOE in the network (service dis-
covery) may be accepted and processed even without an
encrypted or authenticated connection.
].
FDP_IFF.1.5/NET
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on
the following rules: [
• Passwords for management interfaces shall never
leave the TOE
• The shared secret shall never leave the TOE in clear
text (even over trusted channel)
• Patient data shall not be transferred via the man-
agement interfaces
].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Application Note 11:
Please note that the information flow policy defined in
FDP_IFC.1/NET and FDP_IFF.1/NET is focused on the com-
munications, which fall into the scope of the application for
14
For the steps in verifying signatures of the certificate application component
see [7], Table 2.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
the electronic health card and which happen between the
connector/SAC and the TOE.
Connections for administration of the TOE may not be ini-
tiated by a connector/SAC. Therefore such connections are
not covered by this policy.
Further, according to [7] the terminal is free to accept un-
encrypted communications for other applications, which
may be additionally realized by the terminal (or during the
migration phase). In these cases the terminal indicates to
the user that it is working in an insecure state.
The control byte for the bits b2..b1 of the Command-To-
Perform Data Object CMD DO do not contain other values
than {b 2 = 1, b1 = 0} or {b 2 = 1, b1 = 1}.
6.1.2.9 FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content
of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of
the resource from] the following objects: [PIN, crypto-
graphic keys, all information that is received by a card in a
slot of the TOE or by the connector/SAC (except the shared
secret), [none]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application Note 12 is not applicable: no batch Signatures implemented.
6.1.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.1.3.1 FIA_AFL.1/PIN Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PIN
The TSF shall detect when [at least 3] unsuccessful authen-
tication attempts occur related to [management authenti-
cation excluding authentication for the TOE Reset Adminis-
trator].
FIA_AFL.1.2/PIN
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been [met, surpassed], the TSF shall [lock the
particular management interface for that account for a time
period according to Table 10 depending on the number of
consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Consecutive
unsuccessful
authentication
attempts
Lockout time
3-6 1 minute
7 - 10 10 minutes
11 – 20 1 hour
> 20 1 day
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Table 10: Lockout Times
Application note 13:
Both, the PIN-based authentication mechanism (see
FIA_AFL.1/PIN above) and the authentication mechanism
for the C&R interface (see FIA_AFL.1/C&R below) have
their own counter for unsuccessful authentication at-
tempts.
6.1.3.2 FIA_AFL.1/C&R Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/C&R
The TSF shall detect when [5] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to [performing the Challenge&Re-
sponse operation with the TOE with the same Challenge].
FIA_AFL.1.2/C&R
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been [met, surpassed], the TSF shall [block
any response data entry unless a new challenge has been
generated by the TOE].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
6.1.3.3 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attrib-
utes belonging to individual users: [
TOE Administrator15
, [administrator PIN], TOE Reset Ad-
ministrator, [Challenge]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note 14: list of assignments is not empty.
6.1.3.4 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets
meet the following:
[
Passwords for management shall
• Have a length of at least 8 characters,
• Be composed of at least the following characters:
“0”-“9”,
• Not contain the User ID/logon name shall not be a
part of the password for the management interface,
• Not be saved on programmable function keys,
• Not be displayed as clear text during entry,
].
15
The role of the user (e.g. medical supplier/Signature user, TOE administra-
tor).
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application note 15: All PINs / Passwords fulfill FIA_SOS.1.
6.1.3.5 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication for management
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow [
• Display the product version number of the TOE
• [Display the MAC-address(es) of the TOEs network
interface(s)]
• [
◦ generation of challenge data for a C&R operation
◦ response data input for a C&R operation16
◦ shutdown the TOE
◦ display product status, feature and health infor-
mation]
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authen-
ticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on
behalf of that user.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
6.1.3.6 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide [
• A password based authentication mechanism,
• A remote authentication mechanism using the
SICCT interface
• An authentication mechanism for the TOE Reset Ad-
ministrator
• [ an interface for authentication of the TOE reset ad-
ministrator by performing a Challenge & Response
operation with the TOE.]
] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity ac-
cording to the [following]: [
• The local authentication mechanism is used for au-
thentication of TOE administrators for management
and other users
• The remote authentication mechanism is used for
authentication of TOE administrators for manage-
ment (if applicable)
16
No unauthorised Reset to factory defaults ist implmented by the TOE.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• The remote authentication for the SICCT interface is
used for authentication of TOE administrators for
management
• The authentication mechanism for the TOE Reset
Administrator is used to authenticate the TOE Reset
Administrator who alone is able to reset the TOE set-
tings to factory defaults (fallback) when the man-
agement credentials are lost
• [The TOE provides for an interface to perform a
Challenge & Response operation with the TOE reset
administrator for authentication and accepts input of
a matching response value to TOE generated chal-
lenge value for the authentication of the administra-
tor.]
]
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application note 16:
For each C&R operation a TOE produces a distinct and
unique challenge. The response token that has to be pre-
sented to the TOE is valid only for five unsuccessful at-
tempts. After five unsuccessful attempts and after a suc-
cessful attempt this response token is not longer valid and
a new challenge has to be generated, requiring a new re-
sponse.
6.1.3.7 FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [asterisks for password charac-
ters during PIN entry] to the user while the authentication
is in progress.
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Application note 17: no further action required.
6.1.3.8 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow [
• Display the product version number of the TOE
• View card terminal name for card terminal
• [Display the MAC-address(es) of the TOEs network
interface(s)]
• [
◦ generation of challenge data for a C&R operation
◦ response data input for a C&R operation17
◦ shutdown the TOE
◦ display product status, feature and health infor-
mation]
17
No unauthorised Reset to factory defaults ist implmented by the TOE.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf
of that user.
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application note 18:
With a C&R operation in operation (thus response entry
pending) only the operations stated in FIA_UID.1/Man-
agement are possible prior to identification of the user.
6.1.4 Security Management (FMT)
6.1.4.1 FMT_MSA.1/Terminal Management of security attributes for
Terminal SFP
FMT_MSA.1.1/Terminal
The TSF shall enforce the [Terminal SFP] to restrict the abil-
ity to [modify,] the security attributes [Enable/Disable the
functionality of an unauthorized reset to factory defaults] to
[authenticated TOE administrators (excluding SICCT inter-
face)].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Application Note:
According to Application Note 8 in [19], an unauthorized
reset mechanism is optional, and the management func-
tion to enable/disable the mechanism is only required if it
is implemented (which is not the case for the current
TOE). Therefore this SFR is trivially fulfilled.
6.1.4.2 FMT_MSA.1/Management Management of security attributes
for Management SFP
FMT_MSA.1.1/Management
The TSF shall enforce the [Management SFP] to restrict the
ability to [query, modify, delete, [set and reset]] the secu-
rity attributes [all management functions] to [TOE admin-
istrators].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
6.1.4.3 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted
for [role(s)].
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
6.1.4.4 FMT_MSA.3/Terminal Static attribute initialisation for Terminal
SFP
FMT_MSA.3.1/Terminal
The TSF shall enforce the [Terminal SFP] to provide [re-
strictive] default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Terminal
The TSF shall allow the [no roles] to specify alternative ini-
tial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
6.1.4.5 FMT_MSA.3/Management Static attribute initialisation for man-
agement SFP
FMT_MSA.3.1/Management
The TSF shall enforce the [Management SFP] to provide [re-
strictive] default values for security attributes that are used
to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2/Management
The TSF shall allow the [no roles] to specify alternative ini-
tial values to override the default values when an object or
information is created.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Application note 19:
Remote update functionality for firmware update
functionality are disabled by default.
6.1.4.6 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following man-
agement functions: [
• Manage local and remote management login creden-
tials18
• Perform the pairing process (initial pairing, review of
pairing- information and maintenance-pairing) with
the connector/SAC
• Secure deletion of pairing information from all three
possible pairing processes
18
On first start-up the TOE forces the administrator to specify a password for
local management.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• Manage the list of TSP CAs19
• View/set card terminal name20
for card terminal
• Perform a firmware update
• Reset the TOE settings to factory defaults21
• Reset the TOE settings to factory defaults
(fallback)22
• Display the product version number of the TOE
• Display the installed firmware group version
• Return self-assessment through the user interface
of the administration interface
• Enable/disable remote management functionality
• [Managing network configuration]
• [Enable/Disable remote update functionality for
firmware update]
• [Display the MAC-address(es) of the TOEs network
interface(s)] 23
[
• generate challenge data for a C&R operation
• enter response data for a C&R operation].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application note 20:
No Failure counter for any management interface is reset on
firmware update.
According to [PP, Application Note 20] the Remote Manage-
ment functionality is optional. Therefore the remote manage-
ment parts of this SFR are also optional and not relevant for
the TOE.
6.1.4.7 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [user, TOE administrator,
TOE reset administrator,[none]].
19
Management of TSP-CAs includes the update of TSP-CA lists as described in
[7] as well as a selection of a particular TSP-CA list to be used in case of
multiple TSP-CA lists residing in the firmware (e.g. a separate TSP- CA list
for test purposes).
20
The card terminal name is a unique identifier for the card terminal. Note
that the terminal name shall not be set using dhcp.
21
Note that after a reset to factory defaults the TOE is supposed to be in its in-
itial state, and the administrator’s local management credentials have to
be set again.
22
The fallback solution for reset of TOE settings is necessary in case the cre-
dentials for management are lost.
23
Another option would be to attach the MAC-address(es) to the body of the
card terminal.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
6.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.5.1 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following
types of failures occur: [disconnection of connector/SAC24
,
failure during firmware update25
, [
• failure during self-test26
• an alarm condition indicates possible tampering27
• disconnection of gSCM-KT
]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note 21 are met, see Footnotes 24 - 27.
6.1.5.2 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1
The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure, modifica-
tion] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the
TOE.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note 22: TOE is one physical part.
6.1.5.3 FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.1.1
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical
tampering that might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether
physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements
has occurred.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
24
When the TLS connection to the connector/SAC is lost, the secure state is
preserved by resetting all plugged smart cards
25
Failure during self-test results in an error message and a TOE rendered un-
usable.
26
Failure during update causes the use of the old version of the firmware.
27
When an alarm condition is detected an existing TLS-connection to the con-
nector/SAC is terminated and all plugged smart cards are reset. Com-
mands to the card reader result in an error code response.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Application Note 23: FPT_PHP.3 added with active detection.
6.1.5.4 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist [opening the TOE housing and drilling
and probing] to the [the bottom side, left and right side and
rear side of the TOE] by responding automatically such that
the SFRs are always enforced.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
6.1.5.5 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests [during initial start-
up, at the conditions [when activated by an authorised
user]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability
to verify the integrity of [[TSP CA certificates]].
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability
to verify the integrity of [[TSF-relevant applications]].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
Application Note 24:
The ST author has described test functionality for all im-
portant aspects of all Security Functions that the TOE pro-
vides.
6.1.6 TOE Access
6.1.6.1 FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE Default TOE access banners for se-
cure state
FTA_TAB.1.1/SEC_ STATE
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display
a message indicating, whether the TOE is in a secure
state or not.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application Notes 25 and 26:
The term “Before establishing a user session” refers to
every situation a user is about to use the TOE. The TOE
indicates whether it's in a secure state or not by showing
on the display that the user is in a secure state.
This SFR is used to meet O.STATE. The “secure state” refers
to a mode of operation in which all TSPs of this ST are met
and no additional value-added module functionality (as al-
lowed by [7]) is active that could compromise a TSP. Spe-
cifically the TOE guarantees a secure PIN entry within such
a secure state.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
According to [7] a TOE could in principle accept unen-
crypted communications by a third party for applications
that are outside the scope of the German Healthcare Sys-
tem. However as long as an unencrypted connection is es-
tablished the TOE cannot be considered being in a secure
state.
This SFR is implicitly fulfilled in case the TOE doesn’t pro-
vide any additional functionality than the functionality, re-
quired by this ST and can’t operate in an insecure state.
6.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
6.1.7.1 FTP_ITC.1/Connector Inter-TSF trusted channel for con-
nector/SAC communication
FTP_ITC.1.1/Connector
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between
itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/Connector
The TSF shall permit [the connector28
] to initiate communi-
cation via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/Connector
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted chan-
nel for [all communication functions used by eHealth appli-
cations, all communication functions used by the SAC].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application Note 27:
The trusted channel will only be active when the TOE is in
“secure state”. Otherwise it will be dropped.
There is only one connection to one connector/SAC at a
time. The TOE authenticates itself with the shared secret
and the certificate of the SM-KT. It is ensured that the TLS
connection will be dropped when the SM-KT is unplugged.
6.1.7.2 FTP_TRP.1/Management Trusted path for remote management
FTP_TRP.1.1/Management
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself
and [remote] users that is logically distinct from other com-
munication paths and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the communicated data from
[modification or disclosure, [none]].
FTP_TRP.1.2/Management
The TSF shall permit [remote users] to initiate communica-
tion via the trusted path.
FTP_TRP.1.3/Management
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [au-
thentication of TOE administrators, remote management].
28
Regarding trusted path/channel the SAC behaves the same as the connector.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Application Note: According to [PP, Application Note 20] the Remote Manage-
ment functionality is optional. Therefore this SFR is also optional and not rele-
vant for the TOE.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The following table lists the assurance components which are applicable to this
Security Target:
Assurance Calss Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture descrip-
tion
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specifica-
tion
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representa-
tion of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation
CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security
measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle
model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ASE: Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analy-
sis
Table 11: Chosen Evaluation Assurance Requirements
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
These assurance components represent EAL 3 augmented by the components
marked in bold text. The complete text for these requirements can be found in
[3].
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements
coverage:
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.PIN_ENTRY
O.I&A
O.MANAGEMENT
O.SECURE_CHANNEL
O.STATE
O.PROTECTION
FCS_CKM.1/Connector29
x
FCS_CKM.1/Management x
FCS_CKM.4 X x x
FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym x
FCS_COP.1/SIG x
FCS_COP.1/Management x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW x
FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP x
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal x x x
FDP_ACC.1/Management x
FDP_ACF.1/Terminal x x x
FSP_ACF.1/Management x
FDP_IFC.1/PIN x
FDP_IFF.1/PIN x
FDP_IFC.1/NET x
FDP_IFF.1/NET x
FDP_RIP.1 x
FIA_AFL.1/PIN x
FIA_AFL.1/C&R X
FIA_ATD.1 x
FIA_SOS.1 x
FIA_UAU.1 x
FIA_UAU.5 x
FIA_UAU.7 x
FIA_UID.1 x
FMT_MSA.1/Terminal x x
FMT_MSA.1/Management x
FMT_MSA.2 x x
FMT_MSA.3/Terminal x x
FMT_MSA.3/Management x
FMT_SMF.1 x
29
Regarding trusted path/channel the SAC behaves the same as the connector.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
O.ACCESS_CONTROL
O.PIN_ENTRY
O.I&A
O.MANAGEMENT
O.SECURE_CHANNEL
O.STATE
O.PROTECTION
FMT_SMR.1 x
FPT_TST.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x
FPT_ITT.1 x
FPT_PHP.1 x
FPT_PHP.3 X
FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE x
FTP_ITC.1/Connector30
x
FTP_TRP.1/Management x
Table 12: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The Security Objective O.ACCESS_CONTROL is met by a combination of the
SFR FDP_ACC.1/Terminal, FDP_ACF.1/Terminal, FMT_MSA.1/Terminal and
FMT_MSA.3/Terminal. FDP_ACC.1/Terminal defines the access control policy for
the terminal and FDP_ACF.1/Terminal defines the rules for the access control
policy. It is specifically defined in FDP_ACF.1/Terminal that nobody must be
allowed to read out the PIN or private cryptographic keys from the terminal.
FMT_MSA.1/Terminal defines, who will be allowed to manage the attributes for
the access control policy while FMT_MSA.3/Terminal defines that the terminal
has to provide restrictive default values for the access control policy attributes.
The Security Objective O.PIN_ENTRY is met by a combination of the SFR
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal, FDP_ACF.1/Terminal, FDP_IFC.1/PIN, FDP_IFF.1/PIN,
and FIA_UAU.7. As part of the access control policy of the terminal
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal and FDP_ACF.1/Terminal define that nobody must be able
to read out the PIN from the terminal, which is required by O.PIN_ENTRY.
FPD_IFC.1/PIN and FDP_IFF.1/PIN build an information flow control policy for
the PIN and define that the PIN, which is entered by the user, will only be sent
to the card slot as indicated. Finally, FIA_UAU.7 requires that the PIN digits are
presented as asterisks on the display.
The Security Objective O.I&A is met by a combination of FIA_AFL.1/PIN,
FIA_AFL.1/C&R, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UID.1 and
FMT_SMR.1. FIA_AFL.1/PIN requires that the password policy is enforced.
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 require each user to be authenticated and identified
before allowing any relevant actions on behalf of that user. Further the objective
requires that the TOE will at least maintain the roles, TOE administrator. This is
defined in FMT_SMR.1, which defines the roles and FIA_ATD.1, which defines
the user attribute for the role. FIA_UAU.5 defines all the authentication mech-
anism that shall or can be implemented by the TOE, in particular for local man-
agement. FIA_AFL.1/C&R defines the authentication failure for the Challenge &
Response operation.
The Security Objective O.MANAGEMENT is met by a combination of
FCS_CKM.1/Management, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/Management,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW, FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP, FDP_ACC.1/Terminal,
FDP_ACF.1/Terminal, FDP_ACC.1/Management, FDP_ACF.1/Management,
FIA_SOS.1, FMT_MSA.1/Terminal, FMT_MSA.1/Management, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3/Terminal, FMT_MSA.3/Management, FMT_SMF.1, and
30
Regarding trusted path/channel the SAC behaves the same as the connector.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
FTP_TRP.1/Management. FCS_CKM.1/Management requires that adequate
keys are generated for remote management communication. FCS_CKM.4 re-
quires that keys are adequately destroyed. FCS_COP.1/Management requires
that remote management shall enforce TLS. FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW is used to de-
fine the mechanism to check the authenticity of a firmware update.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP is used to define the mechanism to check the authenticity
of a TSP CA list update. The access control policy defined in FDP_ACC.1/Termi-
nal and FDP_ACF.1/Terminal define the rules under which a firmware update is
possible. FDP_ACC.1/Management and FDP_ACF.1/Management define the ac-
cess control policy that determines under what circumstance a particular man-
agement function is accessible and by whom. FIA_SOS.1 defines the password
policy for management credentials. FMT_MSA.1/Terminal and
FMT_MSA.1/Management define, which roles are allowed to administer the at-
tributes of the access control and the information flow control policies.
FMT_MSA.2 requires that only secure values are accepted for security attrib-
utes. FMT_MSA.3/Terminal defines that the terminal has to provide restrictive
default values for the terminal access control policy attributes.
FMT_MSA.3/Management defines that the terminal has to provide restrictive
default values for the management access control policy attributes. FMT_SMF.1
describes the minimum set of management functionality, which has to be avail-
able according to the Security Objective. Finally, FTP_TRP.1/Management de-
fines the trusted path between the TOE and the management client.
The Security Objective O.SECURE_CHANNEL is met by a combination of the
SFR FCS_CKM.1/Connector, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym,
FCS_COP.1/SIG, FDP_IFF.1/NET and FDP_IFC.1/NET., FMT_MSA.2, and
FTP_ITC.1/Connector. FCS_CKM.1/Connector, FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym, and
FCS_COP.1/SIG define the cryptographic operations, which are necessary for
this objective. FCS_CKM.1/Connector defines that the TOE has to be able to
generate (negotiate) cryptographic keys, which can be used to secure the com-
munication with the connector/SAC. FCS_CKM.4 defines the functionality to se-
curely destroy cryptographic keys. The information flow control policy in
FDP_IFF.1/NET and FDP_IFC.1/NET defines that at the network interface only
a command to locate the TOE may be available without an encrypted connection
and that all other communications must only be accepted if the secure channel
to the connector has been established before. FMT_MSA.2 defines that only
secure values shall be used for security attributes. Finally FTP_ITC.1 defines
the trusted channel itself, which is used to secure the communication between
the TOE and the connector/SAC.
O.STATE is directly and completely met by FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE as this SFR
requires that the TOE shall be able to indicate, whether it is working in a secure
state.
The Security Objective O.PROTECTION is met by a combination of the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1.
FCS_CKM.4 defines that cryptographic keys have to be securely deleted when
they are no longer used. FDP_RIP.1 defines the same additionally for the PIN
and also ensures that an attacker cannot read other protected information from
the TOE even if the TOE is no longer in its protected environment. FPT_ITT.1
defines that the TOE has to protect TSF data when it is transmitted between
physically separated parts of one TOE. FPT_PHP.1 and FPT_PHP.3 build the
physical protection for the stored assets. FPT_PHP.3 will automatically respond
on detecting opening the TOE housing and drilling or probing attacks on the
bottom side, left, right and rear side of the TOE and guarantee that the SFRs
are always enforced, FPT_TST.1 defines the necessary test functionality for the
underlying abstract machine. FPT_FLS.1 defines a list of failures in the TSF for
which the TOE has to preserve a secure state. Finally FPT_TST.1 defines that
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
the TSF have to run a suite of self-tests to demonstrate the correct operation
of the TSF at start-up and during the normal operation of the TOE.
6.3.2 SFR Dependency Rationale
SFR Dependencies Support of the De-
pendencies
FCS_CKM.1/Con-
nector
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution,
or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by the use of
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/Man-
agement
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution,
or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by the use of
FCS_COP.1/Manage-
ment and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without se-
curity attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
Fulfilled by the use of
FCS_CKM.1/Con-
nector
FCS_CKM.1/Manage-
ment
FCS_COP.1/Con_
Sym
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without se-
curity attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by the use of
FCS_CKM.1/Con-
nector and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without se-
curity attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by the use of
FCS_CKM.1/Con-
nector and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/Man-
agement
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without se-
curity attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by the use of
FCS_CKM.1/Manage-
ment and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_
FW
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without se-
curity attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
See chapter 6.3.2.1
for FDP_ITC.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_
TSP
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without se-
curity attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security
attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
See chapter 6.3.2.1
for FDP_ITC.1 and
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1/Ter-
minal
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACF.1/Terminal
FDP_ACC.1/Man-
agement
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access
control
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACF.1/Manage-
ment
FDP_ACF.1/Ter-
minal
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal
and FMT_MSA.3/Ter-
minal
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
SFR Dependencies Support of the De-
pendencies
FDP_ACF.1/Mana
gement
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/Manage-
ment and
FMT_MSA.3/Manage-
ment
FDP_IFC.1/PIN FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes Fulfilled by
FDP_IFF.1/PIN
FDP_IFF.1/PIN FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Fulfilled by
FDP_IFC.1/PIN
See chapter 6.3.2.1
for FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFC.1/NET FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes Fulfilled by
FDP_IFF.1/NET
FDP_IFF.1/NET FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Fulfilled by
FDP_IFC.1/NET
See chapter 6.3.2.1
for FMT_MSA.3
FDP_RIP.1 No dependencies -
FIA_AFL.1/PIN FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1
FIA_AFL.1/C&R FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1 No dependencies -
FIA_SOS.1 No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled
FIA_UAU.5 No dependencies -
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled
FIA_UID.1 No dependencies -
FMT_MSA.1/Ter-
minal
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal,
FMT_SMR.1 and
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Man-
agement
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/Manage-
ment, FMT_SMR.1
and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.2 [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attrib-
utes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by
FPD_ACC.1/Terminal,
FPD_ACC.1/Manage-
ment
FDP_IFC.1/PIN,
FDP_IFC.1/NET,
FMT_MSA.1/Termi-
nal, and
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3/Ter-
minal
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attrib-
utes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by
FMT_MSA.1/Terminal
and FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3/Man-
agement
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attrib-
utes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by
FMT_MSA.1/Manage-
ment and
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies -
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
SFR Dependencies Support of the De-
pendencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification Fulfilled
FPT_TST.1 No dependencies -
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies -
FPT_ITT.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.1 No dependencies -
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies -
FTA_TAB.1/SEC_
STATE
No dependencies -
FTP_ITC.1/Con-
nector
No dependencies -
FTP_TRP.1/Man-
agement
No dependencies -
Table 13: Dependencies of the SFR for the TOE
6.3.2.1 Justification for missing dependencies
The dependencies of the information flow policies FDP_IFF.1/PIN and
FDP_IFF.1/NET to FMT_MSA.3 was considered to be not applicable as both in-
formation flow policies do not require initialisation of their security attributes.
For the case that the ST author would extend these information flow policies in
a way that they require security attributes they shall consider the dependency
to FMT_MSA.3.
The dependencies FDP_ITC.1 and FMT_MSA.2 of FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW and
FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP result out of the original scope of FCS_COP.1 to specify
the implementation of encryption functionality within a TOE. These dependen-
cies deal with the import (or creation) and destruction of a secret key that is
needed for encryption. However, as in the context of this Security Target
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW and FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP are used for a requirement on
signature verification for which no secret key is necessary these dependencies
do not need to be considered.
6.3.2.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Evaluation Assurance Level for this Security Target is EAL 3 augmented by
AVA_VAN.4 (and consequently with its dependencies ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3 and ALC_TAT.1).
The main decision about the Evaluation Assurance Level has been taken:
• based on the fact that the TOE described in this Security Target shall
serve as a secure PIN entry device (see also OSP.PIN_ENTRY), and
• based on the fact that the TOE is used in a controlled environment but
also needs to provide an adequate level of protection for its assets.
This leads to an Evaluation Assurance Level of 3 augmented by the following
component:
• AVA_VAN.4
These components have the following direct and indirect dependencies, which
have to be satisfied within the evaluation:
• ADV_FSP.4
• ADV_TDS.3
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• ADV_IMP.1
• ALC_TAT.1 (required by ADV_IMP.1)
6.3.3 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal
Consistency
The core TOE functionality in this Security Target is represented by the require-
ments for access control (FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1) and information flow con-
trol (FDP_IFC.1/PIN, FDP_IFF.1/PIN, FDP_IFC.1/NET and FDP_IFF.1/NET).
Further functionality to protect the communication is defined by the require-
ments for cryptographic support and the trusted channel.
In the end this Security Target contains a set of SFRs which deal with the de-
tection and defeating of attacks to the TOE, resp. SFRs which are used to show
that the TOE is working correctly (e.g. FPT_PHP.1, FPT_TST.1). By this way the
SFRs in this Security target mutually support each other and form a consistent
whole.
From the details given in this rationale it becomes evident that the functional
requirements form an integrated whole and, taken together, are suited to meet
all security objectives. Requirements from [2] are used to fulfil the security
objectives.
7 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
7.1 Security Functions
7.1.1 SF_1: Trusted Communication Channels
For all communication functions used by eHealth/SAC applications to the con-
nector/SAC and remote users via the trusted channel the TOE will always es-
tablish a trusted communication channel to the connector/SAC or remote user
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides as-
sured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from
modification or disclosure.
The card terminal permits the connector/SAC and remote users to initiate com-
munication via the trusted channel.
The TOE only allows one connection to one connector/SAC at a time.
According to the gematik release OPB3 specifications the TOE is capable to sup-
port RSA and alternatively ECC cryptography for TLS connectivity (see [21] ECC
migration). The ability to support ECC encryption/decryption and ECDSA for
signature creation and approval depends on the SM-KT provided functionality
as defined by [7], [24] and [25].
The cryptographic keys will be destroyed by writing of 0x00 to the memory
before it is deallocated.
All SICCT communication, except service discovery will be encrypted.
(FTP_ITC.1/Connector, FTP_TRP.1/Management, FCS_CKM.1/Connector,
FCS_CKM.1/Management, FCS_COP.1/SIG, FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym,
FCS_COP.1/Management, FDP_IFC.1/NET, FDP_IFF.1./NET, FCS_CKM.4 )
7.1.2 SF_2: Identification & Authentication
The TOE provides several authentication mechanisms for administrators and for
other users:
• a PIN based local authentication mechanism
• a remote authentication mechanism for the SICCT-interface
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• an interface for authentication of the administrator by performing a
Challenge & Response operation with the TOE
To perform the secured management function (see 59) the administrator of the
TOE first must identify and authenticate himself.
On at least 3 consecutively unsuccessful authentication attempts the TOE will
lock the authentication mechanism for a period of time, specified in Table 14:
Unsuccessful
authentication
attempts
Lockout interval
3 – 6 1 minute
7 - 10 10 minutes
10 – 20 1 hour
> 20 24 hours
Table 14: Lockout Intervals (TSF)
On delivery, after reset to factory defaults and after successfully performing a
Challenge / Response operation between TOE and administrator the validity of
the administrator PIN (management interface PIN ) is set to not valid. When
the validity of the administrator PIN is set to not valid the administrator is forced
by the TOE to set the administrator PIN before any other action can be
performed by the TOE. After setting the administrator PIN the validity is set to
valid.
After 5 unsuccessful response entries for a challenge the TOE will block further
response data entries unless a new challenge has been generated.
( FDP_ACC.1/Terminal, FDP_ACF.1/Terminal, FDP_ACC.1/Management,
FDP_ACF.1/Management, FIA_AFL.1/PIN, FIA_AFL.1/C&R, FIA_ATD.1,
FIA_UAU.5, FMT_MSA.1/Management, FMT_MSA.3/Terminal)
7.1.3 SF_3: Network Connections
The TOE will accept any information arriving at the network interface from the
connector/SAC only if the communication path is encrypted and the con-
nector/SAC has been successfully authenticated. A connector/SAC authentica-
tion is not required for SICCT commands by unauthorized users as listed in the
following paragraph.
The TOE accepts the following SICCT commands arriving at the network inter-
face even if no pairing process is established, no valid connector/SAC certificate
is required for unauthorized users (FDP_IFF.1.4/NET):
• SICCT CT INIT CT SESSION
• SICCT CT CLOSE CT SESSION
• SICCT GET STATUS
The TOE accepts the following SICCT commands arriving at the network inter-
face even if no pairing process is established, no valid connector/SAC certificate
is presented for administrator (FDP_IFF.1.4/NET):
• SICCT CT INIT CT SESSION
• SICCT CT CLOSE CT SESSION
• SICCT GET STATUS
• SICCT SET STATUS
• SICCT CT DOWNLOAD INIT
• SICCT CT DOWNLOAD DATA
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• SICCT CT DOWNLOAD FINISH
The TOE additionally accepts the following EHEALTH commands arriving at the
network interface if no pairing process is established but a valid connector/SAC
certificate is presented:
• EHEALTH TERMINAL AUTHENTICATE.
The information flow is based on the following rules:
• never lets Passwords for management interfaces leave the TOE
• never lets the shared secret leave the TOE in clear text (even over
trusted channel)
• never transfers patient data via the management interfaces.
( FDP_IFC.1/NET, FDP_IFF.1/NET )
7.1.4 SF_4: Secure Update
The TOE enforces that a modification of the firmware of the TOE only is allowed
after the integrity and authenticity of the firmware has been verified by check-
ing the signature over the update file.
An update of the firmware of the TOE shall only be allowed by an authenticated
administrator where
• A firmware consists of two parts: firstly the so- called “firmware list” and
secondly the “firmware core” which includes the whole firmware except
the firmware list. The firmware list states all firmware core versions to
which a change is allowed. Firmware lists and cores are versioned inde-
pendently.
• An update of the firmware core is only allowed if the core version is
included in the firmware list. Firmware lists only contain version num-
bers of firmware cores which are certified according this Security Target.
For the use in the German Healthcare System the named versions are
also approved by the gematik.
• In case of a common update the TOE installs the new firmware list at
first. The new list is used to decide whether an update to the accompa-
nying firmware core is allowed.
• Downgrades of the firmware list are not allowed.
• No subject can modify the public key for the signature verification for
firmware updates
Installation of firmware cores and lists are only allowed after the integrity and
authenticity of the firmware has been verified using the mechanism as de-
scribed in FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW.
Updates of the TSP CA list are performed only as part of a firmware update with
signature verification.
( FDP_ACC.1/Terminal, FDP_ACF.1.2/Terminal, FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW )
7.1.5 SF_5: Secure PIN-entry
No subject shall read out the PIN or management credentials while they are
temporarily stored in the TOE. All PINs are stored in volatile memory only.
PINs for a card in a slot of the TOE or a remote card terminal will never be
stored in a non-volatile memory of the TOE when the PIN is entered.
The PIN entered by the user will only be sent to the addressed card in the card
slot of the TOE or via a TLS secured connection to the connector/SAC to a re-
mote card terminal for remote-PIN verification.
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
For PIN entry the TOE supports a secure PIN-entry mode. This mode can only
be activated by the TOE and is indicated by a padlock symbol for every PIN digit
that has to be entered. For every entered PIN digit the padlock symbol is re-
placed by an asterisk symbol. PINs and PIN digits will never be displayed. The
administrator-PIN will never leave the TOE.
PIN entry will be checked for PIN length of 8 digits for the management inter-
face . A PIN must be composed of at least the following characters: “0”-“9”.
PINs for management cannot be saved on programmable function keys.
( FDP_ACC.1/Terminal, FDP_ACF.1.4/Terminal, FDP_IFC.1/PIN, FDP_IFF.1/PIN,
FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.7, FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE )
7.1.6 SF_6: Secure Data Deletion
Memory no longer used for storage of PIN, cryptographic keys, all information
that is by a card in a slot of the TOE or by the connector/SAC (except the shared
secret), will be erased by overwriting with 0x00 and then be made available for
further use. Memory areas for PINs will be overwritten with 0x00 as soon as
the PIN has been sent to the chip card. When selected by an authenticated TOE
administrator (excluding SICCT interface) pairing information from all three
possible pairing processes (initial pairing, review of pairing- information and
maintenance-pairing) will securely deleted and written with 0x00.
( FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1, FDP_ACC.1/Management, FDP_ACF.1/Management )
7.1.7 SF_7: Secure Management-Functions
The TOE is aware of three roles: administrator, reset administrator and user. To
identify and authenticate the roles administrator and reset administrator the
TOE provides PIN based identification and authentication. The secure manage-
ment functions are only available to the TOE administrator after successful iden-
tification and authentication. Details are as described:
Only if the TOE administrator’s local management PIN has been set, which also
changes the PIN validity attribute from not valid to valid, a subject can access
objects under TOE control.
The TOE allows the TOE administrator in addition to functions executable by all
roles to perform the following management functions:
• Manage local management login credentials
• Perform the pairing process (initial pairing, review of pairing- infor-
mation and maintenance-pairing) with the connector/SAC
• Secure deletion of pairing information from all three possible pairing
processes
• View/set card terminal name for card terminal
• Perform a firmware update
• Reset the TOE settings to factory defaults
• Perform self-test by verifying the integrity of the TSF data and the TSF
and receive results
• Managing network configuration
• Enable/Disable remote update functionality for firmware update
The following management functions are executable by all roles:
• Display the product version information of the TOE
• Manage login credentials if unset in factory delivery state
• View card terminal name for card terminal
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
• View the available network configuration
• Display the MAC-address of the TOEs network interface
• generate challenge data for a C&R operation
• enter response data for a C&R operation
The following management functions are executable by TOE administrators that
were authenticated using the SICCT interface:
• Set card terminal name for card terminal
• Perform a firmware update
The following management functions are only executable by TOE administrators
that were authenticated using the local management interface:
• Perform the initial pairing possible pairing processes with the con-
nector/SAC.
The TOE Reset Administrator only is able to execute the Reset the TOE settings
to factory defaults (fallback).
and requires each user to be successfully identified and authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user (external pro-
cess).
After a successful performance of a Challenge & Response operation the man-
agement credentials attribute validity is set to not valid.
According to Application Note 8 in [19], an unauthorized reset mechanism is
optional, and the management function to enable/disable the mechanism is
only required if it is implemented (which is not the case for the current TOE).
Therefore FMT_MSA.1/Terminal is trivially fulfilled.
The TOE restricts the ability to query, modify, delete the security attributes of
all management functions to the TOE administrator.
( FMT_SMR.1, FDP_ACC.1/Terminal, FDP_ACF.1/Terminal, FMT_SMF.1,
FPT_TST.1, FDP_ACC.1/Management, FDP_ACF.1/Management, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UID.1, FMT_MSA.1/Terminal, FMT_MSA.1/Management, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3/Terminal, FMT_MSA.3/Management )
7.1.8 SF_8: Self-Test
The TOE can perform self-test on power-on and after activation by an author-
ised user.
The following tests are performed at after activation by an authorized user:
1. Integrity tests of parts of the TSF (all applications, scripts and shared
libraries in the root file system are verified),
1. Known-answer test for the cryptographic algorithms that are used for
TLS (i.e. AES128, AES256, MD5, SHA1, and SHA256), and
2. Integrity tests of parts of the TSF data (TSP CA certificates).
During start-up and after activation by an authorized user the following tests
are performed by the TOE:
3. Integrity tests of parts of the TSF (all applications, scripts and shared
libraries in the root file system are verified),
4. Known-answer test for the cryptographic algorithms that used for firm-
ware update (i.e. RSA4096 and SHA256), and
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
5. Status check of the tamper detection realizing FPT_PHP.3.
By performing these integrity tests and the hardware test the correct operation
of the TSF is ensured at every start-up.
For integrity-verification, a SHA256 hash calculation is used.
( FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3 )
7.1.9 SF_9: Secure Fail-State
In case of
• an alarm condition indicates possible tampering or if a
• self-test detects an error or
• failure during firmware update
the TOE will be put into a secure fail state.
When the TOE detects a disconnection of connector/SAC all plugged smart cards
will be reset.
( FPT_FLS.1 )
7.1.10 SF_10: Physical Protection of the TOE
The TOE is protected against unnoticed tampering by security seals which will
be visibly destroyed on attempts to tamper with the TOE body. The TOE has an
alarm function constantly checking switches triggering an alarm on opening the
TOE housing and a drill and probing protection foil for alarm conditions which
are drilling and probing attacks to the bottom side, the left and right side and
the rear side of the TOE causing short-cuts or interruption of the circuit paths
on the foil. On alarm (indicating possible tampering) the alarm function will put
the TOE in a defined non-functioning state (see SF_9) and will display a mes-
sage on the TOE display. The alarm condition remains even after a TOE reset.
( FPT_FLS.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.1, FPT_PHP.3 )
7.2 Security Measures
7.2.1 SM_1: Sealing
The TOE is protected against unnoticed manipulations by security seals.
The seals are sticky seals, carry authenticity attributes and fulfil the require-
ments of security level 2 according to BSI 7500.
The seals are placed over the jointing of the body parts.
Seal positions, their look and how to identify broken security seals with be de-
scribed in the guidance documents.
7.3 Mapping of the Security functions
SF_1
SF_2
SF_3
SF_4
SF_5
SF_6
SF_7
SF_8
SF_9
SF_10
FCS_CKM.1/Connector X
FCS_CKM.1/Management X
FCS_CKM.4 X X
FCS_COP.1/Con_Sym X
FCS_COP.1/SIG X
FCS_COP.1/Management X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_FW X
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
SF_1
SF_2
SF_3
SF_4
SF_5
SF_6
SF_7
SF_8
SF_9
SF_10
FCS_COP.1/SIG_TSP X
FDP_ACC.1/Terminal X X X X
FDP_ACC.1/Management X X X
FDP_ACF.1/Terminal X X X X
FDP_ACF.1/Management X X X
FDP_IFC.1/PIN X
FDP_IFF.1/PIN X
FDP_IFC.1/NET X X
FDP_IFF.1/NET X X
FDP_RIP.1 X
FIA_AFL.1/PIN X
FIA_AFL.1/C&R X
FIA_ATD.1 X
FIA_SOS.1 X
FIA_UAU.1 X
FIA_UAU.5 X
FIA_UAU.7 X
FIA_UID.1 X
FMT_MSA.1/Terminal X
FMT_MSA.1/Management X X
FMT_MSA.2 X
FMT_MSA.3/Terminal X X
FMT_MSA.3/Management X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
FPT_TST.1 X X
FPT_FLS.1 X X
FPT_ITT.1 X
FPT_PHP.1 X
FPT_PHP.3 X X
FTA_TAB.1/SEC_STATE X
FTP_ITC.1/Connector X
FTP_TRP.1/Management X
Table 15: Mapping Security Function to SFRs
8 Glossar
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BCS Basic Command Set
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CA Certification Authority
CT Card Terminal
DF.KT Dedicated File Kartenterminal
DMS Dokumentenmanagementsystem
eGK elektronische Gesundheitskarte
eHC Electronic Health Card
eHCT Electronic Health Card Terminal
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptograhie
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
HPC Health Professional Card
ID Identity
KSR Configuration and Software Repository- Service of the
telematics infrastructure
KT Kartenterminal
KVK Krankenversichertenkarte
LAN Local Area Network
LED Light Emitting Diode
MAC-Address Media Access Control-Address
PIN Personal Identification Number
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
RSA Asymmetrical Cryptographie (Rivest, Shamir und Adleman)
SAC Signature Application Component
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SICCT Secure Interoperable Chip Card Terminal
SMC Security Module Card
SM-KT Security Module Kartenterminal
SM-K Security Module Konnektor
ST Security Target
TBD to be defined
TFTP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP Trust-Service Provider that issues connector/SAC certificates
USB Universal Serial Bus
9 References
Common Criteria
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components; Ver-
sion 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components; Ver-
sion 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
Specifications
[6] TeleTrusT SICCT-Spezifikation as referenced by [7]
[7] gematik: Spezifikation eHealth-Kartenterminal, Version
3.12.0 , Stand 02.03.2020
ORGA 6141 online Security Target
[9] Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Partliament of
the council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification
and trust services for electronic transactions in the in-
ternal market (eIDAS)
[15] RFC5246 The TLS Protocol, Version 1.2
[17] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Labor-
atories, June 14, 2002
[21] gematik:Verwendung kryptographischer Algorithmen in
der Telematikinfrastruktur, Version 2.15.0, 02.10.2019
[22] Konzept Architektur der TI-Plattform, Version 1.5.0,
Stand 23.07.2015
[24] gematik: Spezifikation der gSMC-KT Objektsystem, Ver-
sion 3.9.0, Stand 24.08.2016, gemSpec_gSMC-
KT_ObjSys, Generation G2
[25] gematik: Spezifikation der gSMC-KT Objektsystem, Ver-
sion 4.2.0, Stand 14.05.2018, gemSpec_gSMC-
KT_ObjSys_G2.1, Generation G2.1
[TR-03120] BSI - Technische Richtlinie Sichere Kartenterminalidenti-
tät (Betriebskonzept) , Version 1.1, 09.07.2010
[TR-03120-A] BSI TR-03120 Appendix, „Anhang: Kartenterminal-
schutz“ zur Technischen Richtlinie BSI TR-03120, Ver-
sion 1.1
[ST33TPHF20] Datasheet ST33TPHF20SPI, ST | Trusted Platform Mod-
ule 2.0 with TCG SPI interface , März 2016
Protection Profiles
[19] / [PP] Common Criteria Protection Profile Electronic Health
Terminal (eHCT), BSI-CC-PP-0032-V2-2015-MA-01, Ver-
sion 3.7, 21.09.2016.
[20] Common Criteria Protection Profile Card Operating Sys-
tem Generation 2 (PP COS G2), BSI-CC-PP-0082, Bun-
desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Analysis
[23] Common Criteria Protection Profile - Schutzprofil 2: An-
forderungen an den Konnektor Online-Rollout (Stufe 1),
BSI-CC-PP-0046, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Infor-
mationstechnik (BSI)