BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
for
Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220
software consisting of Versatile Routing Platform
(VRP, V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate
Platform (CAP) and underlying OS,
V200R006C10SPC030
from
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 (*)
Router Software
Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software consisting of
Versatile Routing Platform (VRP, V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate
Platform (CAP) and underlying OS, V200R006C10SPC030
from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the
Certification Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
(CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC
18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 5 December 2016
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Thomas Gast L.S.
Head of Division
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication....................................................................................................................10
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11. Security Target............................................................................................................21
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................21
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................26
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
A. Certification
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates
issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition
agreement.
The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The
current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition,
and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government
representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This certificate is recognized under CCRA-2014 for all assurance components selected.
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
The product Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software consisting of Versatile
Routing Platform (VRP, V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) and
underlying OS, V200R006C10SPC030 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software
consisting of Versatile Routing Platform (VRP, V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate
Platform (CAP) and underlying OS, V200R006C10SPC030 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 16 November
2016. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd..
The product was developed by: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd..
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require
a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on
5 December 2016 is valid until 4 December 2021. Validity can be re-newed by
re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5. Publication
The product Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software consisting of Versatile
Routing Platform (VRP, V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) and
underlying OS, V200R006C10SPC030 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Bantian Longgang
Shenzhen 518129
P.R. of China
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a software TOE consisting of Huawei’s Versatile Routing
Platform (VRP, V200R006) supported by the Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) and
the underlying OS. The main purpose of the TOE is Layer 3 routing of incoming IP traffic.
The software is part of the Service Router AR1220.
At the core of each router is the Versatile Routing Platform (VRP) deployed on Main
Processing Unit (MPU), the software for managing and running the router’s networking
functionality. VRP provides extensive security features. These features include different
interfaces with associated access levels for administrators; enforcing authentications prior
to establishment of administrative sessions with the TOE; auditing of security-relevant
management activities; as well as the correct enforcement of routing decisions to ensure
that network traffic gets forwarded to the correct interfaces.
The Main Processing Unit also provides network traffic processing capacity. Network traffic
is processed and forwarded according to routing decisions.
The MPU consists of two CPU cores. On one core VRP is running. On the other core the
Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) is running. CAP is supporting VRP by directly
forwarding L3 traffic, in case the route is already known to CAP and no decision by VRP is
required. Both, VRP and CAP rely on the GLIBC library and the system call interface of the
Linux kernel of the underlying OS.
There exists only one configuration of the TOE, referenced as indicated above.
The TOE in its certified version only runs on the specific HW platform AR1220. This type is
referenced on a label on the bottom side of the casing. The identifier for the hardware
used for testing for the VRP PCB Version is AR01BAK1A VER.A and for the MPU PCB
Version is AR01SRU1B VER.C.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
Authentication (AUTH) This Security Function provides authentication of
users by unique IDs. Access to any TSF
management interface is only granted after
successful authentication.
Access Control (AC) This TSF regulates all access by external entities
to operations of the TOE which are only executed
after this TSF allowed access.
L3 Traffic Forwarding (L3TF) This function provides network traffic forwarding
which includes enforcing decisions about the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
correct forwarding interface and assembling the
outgoing network packets using correct IP
addresses.
ACL (ACL) This TSF provides Access Control Lists (ACLs) to
filter traffic destined to the TOE to prevent internal
traffic over-load and service interruption.
Cryptographic functions (CRYPTO) This function provides an interface to
cryptographic functions.
Communication Security (COMM) This Security Function provides communication
security.
Auditing (AUDIT) This function provides audit abilities by receiving
all types of logs and processing them according
to user’s configuration.
Security Management (SM) Provides management capabilities for the
security functions through the local management
terminal (LMT) or the remote management
terminal (RMT).
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The AR1220 is capable of L2 and L3 forwarding. Only Layer 3 forwarding is regarded as
TOE functionality. Also, among others, Service of TELNET and FTP have to be disabled to
use the TOE in the certified configuration. For more details on the certified configuration
please see the Security Target [6], chapter 1.4.2.2, and especially the number of detailed
product configuration settings that must be configured in the stated manner in [9] to
achieve the certified TOE configuration.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software consisting of Versatile Routing
Platform (VRP, V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) and underlying
OS, V200R006C10SPC030
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of
Delivery
1 HW/
SW
Huawei AR Series Service
Router AR1220 Software
(VRP, CAP and OS)
Software TOE already
implemented as part of the
router
Version V200R006C10SPC030
SHA-256 hash sum:
ace4677fcf652423c35618974374e74
c7f354cc50b669fe6152248eee8ad85
26
SW included
in HW.
Physical
goods
delivered in
a card-board
box
2 DOC CC Huawei AR Service
Router AR1220 Software
V200R006C10SPC030 -
AGD_PRE_Production_V1.1
Version 1.1, 2016-09-14, [8]
SHA-256 hash sum:
e7cdf2ab785c7bd0be28dd2f003dd5c
d764cd784e9031f4e1f337cb3668dbb
5c
-
3 DOC CC Huawei AR Service
Router AR1220 Software
V200R006C10SPC030 -
AGD_PRE_User_V1.2
Version 1.2, 2016-09-23, [9]
SHA-256 hash sum:
d3bb9dd9154b8fcc00ebd808518f12d
36fd4fba5c7ecc28ad309f025a90650
5c
CD
4 DOC CC Huawei AR Service
Router AR1220 Software
V200R006C10SPC030 -
AGD_OPE_V1.1
Version 1.1, 2016-09-14, [10]
SHA-256 hash sum:
7d3a8c8f2a6b76c16bac671518b0a3
b6a4089fa7d9ef2981335643b977cce
3b2
CD
5 DOC CC Huawei AR Service
Router AR1220 Software
V200R006C10SPC030 -
Configuration and
Reference V1.1
Version 1.1, 2016-09-14, [11]
SHA-256 hash sum:
c850e54d0a60896b7cf5b17fcfbcf75d
9990a85c5bffb65290f8a36c28cfd6a6
CD
6 DOC CC Huawei AR Service
Router AR1220 Software
V200R006C10SPC030 -
Security Target Lite
Version 3.7, 21.10.2016 [6]
SHA-256 hash sum:
fdee5c2270784a174c5767d844da1e
9f18eb2ebdcb5ef2d30aafd5d08c8b5
9ec
CD and
Annex to
this report
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Please note that the end user cannot verify the hash value in item 1 of the table above
since the software is already on the device and cannot be extracted for hashing. For the
TOE user this hash value is irrelevant.
The TOE in its certified version only runs on the specific HW platform AR1220. This type is
referenced on a label on the bottom side of the casing. The identifier for the hardware
used for testing for the MPU PCB Version is AR01SRU1B VER.C.
The physical goods are delivered in a cardboard box and contain:
● Product AR1220 with implemented TOE software,
● CD with Guidance documentation that is relevant to the TOE consumer.
The CD excludes [8] which is dedicated only to production.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
The TOE with the above mentioned items is packed into cardboard boxes and sealed with
anti-tamper tags.
Physical goods are directly delivered using national delivery services. The box includes the
product hardware with TOE firmware and CD containing guidance. Physical protection
measures of the packaging include undamaged boxes and tamper evident measures. The
customer shall validate the delivery chain and return the good if box or tamper evident
measures has been broken. The administrator of the TOE is required to compare the
reported firmware version with the version stated in the Security Target. The TOE is
labelled with its reference "Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software
V200R006C10SPC030". After receipt the administrator is required to check the fingerprint
of the documentation parts of the TOE on the CD against the reference hash values
provided in the Security Target. The guidance [9] requires the administrator to compare the
reported firmware version with the version stated in the Security Target by using the
command "display version" on the command line interface. To identify the TOE the
document [9] is providing the required information in chapter 2.
Documentation is provided on CD within sealed box and alternatively via web. The
customer is required to validate the SHA-2 value against the values stated in the Security
Target.
Please note that although the AR1220 product documentation can also be downloaded
from Huawei’s support website, that form of delivery has not been explicitely considered
during the evaluation. The scope of the evaluation covers the delivery of the SW installed
on the HW, and the documentation delivered on CD ROM together with the AR1220 in a
sealed box.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the issues VRP access control and information control
as described in the security target [6] chapter 6.2.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics as stated in
the Security Target [6] chapter 3.2 are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software product consisting of Huawei’s Versatile Routing Platform (VRP,
V200R006) supported by the Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) and the underlying
OS. The TOE’s software architecture consists of two logical planes to support centralized
forwarding and control and distributed forwarding mechanism: Data plane and control
management plane. The control and management plane is the core of the system. It
controls and manages the system. The control and management unit processes protocols
and signals, configures and maintains the system status, and reports and controls the
system status. The data plane is responsible for high speed processing and non-blocking
switching of data packets. It encapsulates or decapsulates packets, forwards them,
completes inner high speed switching, and collects statistics.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016
The security functions of the TOE are enforced by the following subsystems:
● AM Subsystem (supports the TSFs Access Control, Authentication, Communication
Security and Cryptographic Functions),
● CM Subsystem (supports the TSF Security Management),
● IM Subsystem (supports the TSF Auditing),
● TF Subsystem (supports the TSFs L3 Traffic Forwarding and ACL).
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
There exists only one configuration of the TOE. The parameters and the commands are
described in [11]. Details of the physical configuration of AR1220 are:
● Processing unit: 500MHz 2 Core
● SDRAM: 512MB
● 256MB internal NOR Flash
● No SD Card support
● 450K PPS Forwarding Performance
● Fixed interface Fast Ethernet (FE) / Gigabit Ethernet (GE) (8FE + 2GE)
The developer test plan structure corresponds to the TSF description. Each claimed
security function is covered by a corresponding test. The tested TSFs are Authentication,
Access Control, L3 Traffic Forwarding, ACL, Cryptographic functions, Communications,
Auditing, Security Management.
For each security function the developer provides at least one test case. General approach
of the developer's test cases is a positive / negative concept to demonstrate correctly
implemented functionality.
For each test case the developer defined an expected result and were compared to the
actual results.
All test cases were executed successfully and with the expected result.
The independent testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing
environment, as well as using the test environment of the evaluation facility.
First the evaluator reproduced the developer test setup including the provided TOE and
repeated each developer test.
Then the evaluator defined individual tests to cover the SFRs claimed in the Security
Target [6].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
Based on the knowledge of the TOE, his own experience and a public search of common
design flaws and potential malfunction, the evaluator defined additional independent test
cases to cover issues like design flaws and potential malfunction.
Test cases include:
● traffic routing and forwarding of the TOE by configuring different network address
scenarios and sending and monitoring packets,
● accessibility of SSH service dependent to the configured Ethernet interface,
● establish SSH connection with cipher suites and parameters,
● examination of SSH including re-keying,
● possibilities to weaken TOE security by account password misconfiguration,
● bypass enforcement of client public key and invalid stored public keys,
● varying different CLI parameters,
● acquire RNG data and assess that the entropy of the RNG state is not diminished by
implementation errors,
● verify reliability of timestamps in logs,
● examine that user passwords are not stored in plain text,
● erasing of temporary session keys from volatile memory after terminating SSH session.
Additionaly, the evaluator repeated every developer test without any deviations.
Vulnerability testing contained of tool-supported known vulnerability search and execution
of vulnerability tests resulting from the analysis of potential vulnerabilities. In that context,
the SSH interface to protect the TSFI was identified as a probable attack target. Therefore, the
authentication by certificates to initialize an SSH session was tested by defining a probable
attack scenario. In the defined scenario an attacker attempts to establish an SSH
connection to the TOE without or with invalid or mismatching certificates. Also, the
Cryptographic support (FCS) regarding to SSH (authentication) and RSA were penetration tested.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
There exists only one configuration of the TOE. The TOE is software only, that is delivered
together with specific Hardware that it is running on. The Hardware itself is not part of the
TOE.
Please see detailed information on the TOE identification in chapter 1.2 of the Security
Target [6].
The TOE runs on a specific hardware platform AR1220 identified and specified in chapter
1.4.1 of the Security Target [6].
The 'display-version' command will identify the TOE. The result printout will include:
Huawei Versatile Routing Platform Software
VRP (R) software, Version 5.160 (AR1200 V200R006C10SPC030)
Copyright (C) 2011-2016 HUAWEI TECH CO., LTD
Huawei AR1220 Router uptime is 0 week, 0 day, 4 hours, 5 minutes
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BKP 0 version information:
1. PCB Version : AR01BAK1A VER.A
2. If Supporting PoE : No
3. Board Type : AR1220
4. MPU Slot Quantity : 1
5. LPU Slot Quantity : 2
MPU 0(Master) : uptime is 0 week, 0 day, 4 hours, 3 minutes
SDRAM Memory Size : 512 M bytes
Flash 1 Memory Size : 256 M bytes
NVRAM Memory Size : 512 K bytes
MPU version information :
1. PCB Version : AR01SRU1B VER.C
2. MAB Version : 0
3. Board Type : AR1220
4. CPLD0 Version : 104
5. BootROM Version : 934
Note that not all displayed information are relevant to identify the correct version. The
above example printout is from the actually tested TOE. For example, the SIC/WSIC
extension slots are not relevant to the evaluation, as the SIC/WSIC cards represent
additional network sockets. Also, the BKP version is not relevant, as it refers to the
backplane board that is HW only and does not contain any software. The BootROM and
CPLD0 versions however are fixed and will return exactly the version information as
displayed above.
The printout 'Version 5.160' is not the version of the TOE in the CC-sense. The relevant
TOE identification is represented by the string 'V200R006C10SPC030' because it is more
specific.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: None
● for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose Cryptographi
c Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
1 Authentication RSA signature RSA:
PKCS#1_V2.1,
RSASSA-PKCS1
-v1_5
modulus
length =
2048
yes Signing
(FCS_COP.1/RSA), using
SHA256, applied during
server authentication for
SSH Verifying
(FCS_COP.1/RSA), using
SHA256, applied during
client authentication for
SSH.
2 Key Generation Diffie-hellman-
group14-sha1
PKCS#3
RFC3526
(2048-bit MODP
Group)
modulus
length =
2048
yes (FCS_CKM.1/DH), used in
SSH V2.0. Generation of
session keys for
AES-128-CTR encryption
and decryption as well as
HMAC-SHA1 keys for
generation and verification
of integrity protection
information are derived
during DH key agreement
according to RFC 4253,
chap. 7.
3 Key Exchange Diffie-hellman-
group14-sha1
PKCS#3
RFC3526
(2048-bit MODP
Group)
modulus
length =
2048
yes (FCS_CKM.2/DH), used in
SSH V2.0. Exchange of
session keys for
AES-128-CTR encryption
and decryption as well as
HMAC-SHA1 keys for
generation and verification
of integrity protection
information are derived
during DH key agreement
according to RFC 4253,
chap. 7.
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No. Purpose Cryptographi
c Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above
100 Bits
Comments
4 Confidentiality AES-128 in
CTR mode
AES:
FIPS 197
FIPS SP
800-38A
|k|=128 yes Secure messaging for
SSH V2.0
(FCS_COP.1/AES)
5 Integrity HMAC-SHA1 FIPS 198-1 n/a yes Secure messaging for
SSH V2.0
(FCS_COP.1.1/HMAC-SH
A1)
6 Trusted
Channel
SSH V2.0 RFC4344
RFC 4251
RFC 4252
RFC 4253
RFC 4254
n/a yes Trusted channel using
SSH V2.0 using the
crypto-graphic algorithms
speci-fied in lines
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,
(FTP_TRP.1) Client
authentication mode is
restricted to public key.
Server authentication is
supported according to
chap. 6.6 of RFC 4253,
ssh-rsa.
7 Cryptographic
Primitive
Deterministic
RNG DRG.2
ANSI
X.9.31(aes-128)
n/a n/a Generation of the random
number (FCS_RNG.1).
8 Cryptographic
Primitive
Generation of
prime numbers
for RSA
None n/a n/a Miller-Rabin-Test is used
as primality test.
9 Cryptographic
Primitive
SHA256 SHA256: FIPS
180-4
n/a yes FCS_COP.1/SHA256
Hashing for RSA signature
for SSH Server authen-
tication, Hashing for
password storage
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 3 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
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should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
The security measures may require special configuration of the product to obtain the
evaluated configuration, including the Hardware and non TOE portions of the product. For
this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the administrator of the product on how to securely use the
certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security
requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BKP Backplane
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CAP Concurrence Accelerate Platform
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CLI Command Line Interface
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETH Ethernet
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FE Fast Ethernet
FTP File Transfer Protocol
GE Gigabit Ethernet
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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LMT Local management terminal
LPU Local Processing Unit
MPU Main Processing Unit
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
PPS Packets Per Second
RMT Remote management terminal
RNG Random Numer Generator
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SIC Smart Interface Card
SSH Secure shell
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VRP Versatile Routing Platform
WSIC Double Width SIC
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
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Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016, Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220
software consisting of Versatile Routing Platform (VRP, V200R006), Concurrence
Accelerate Platform (CAP) and underlying OS, Version V3.7, Date: 2016-10-21,
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (confidential document)
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016, Huawei AR Series Service Router
AR1220 software consisting of Versatile Routing Platform (VRP, V200R006),
Concurrence Accelerate Platform (CAP) and underlying OS, Version 3.7, Date
2016-10-21, Huawei Technologies Co. (public sanitized document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) for Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220
Software (VRP, CAP and OS), BSI-DSZ-CC-0992, Version 1.4, Date: 2016-10-17,
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Preparative Procedures for Production, Huawei AR Service Router AR1220
Software V200R006C10SPC030, v1.1, 14.09.2016, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[9] Preparative Procedures for Users, Huawei AR Service Router AR1220 Software
V200R006C10SPC030, v1.2, 23.09.2016, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[10] Operational User Guidance, Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220 software
consisting of Versatile Routing Platform (VRP,V200R006), Concurrence Accelerate
Platform (CAP) and underlying OS V200R006C10SPC030, v1.1, 14.09.2016,
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
[11] Configuration and Reference, CC Huawei AR Series Service Router AR1220
V200R006, v1.1, 14.09.2016, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
8
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0992-2016 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
● describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
● Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
● Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
● PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
● Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE: Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1 EAL 2 EAL 3 EAL 4 EAL 5 EAL 6 EAL 7
Development ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5
ALC_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASR_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
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