KECS-CR-19-69
Hancom xDB V2.8
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0976-2019
2019. 11. 15.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2019.11.15. -
Certification report for Hancom xDB V2.8
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Hancom xDB V2.8 of
Hancom With Inc.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Information Security Technology (KOIST)
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Table of Contents
Certification Report ......................................................................................................1
1. Executive Summary...............................................................................................5
2. Identification ........................................................................................................10
3. Security Policy..................................................................................................... 11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope...........................................................13
5. Architectural Information....................................................................................14
6. Documentation.....................................................................................................14
7. TOE Testing..........................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration .....................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation....................................................................................16
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE).............................................................16
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) .......................................................17
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) .................................................17
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) .............................................................17
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE) ..............................................................................18
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)...............................................................18
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary.....................................................................19
10. Recommendations...............................................................................................20
11. Security Target.....................................................................................................20
12. Acronyms and Glossary .....................................................................................21
13. Bibliography.........................................................................................................21
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the evaluation of Hancom xDB V2.8 of Hancom With Inc. with reference to
the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC”
hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation(TOE) is database encryption software that encrypts and
decrypts the user data in a column of a database to be protected. The TOE consists
of Hancom xDB V2.8 Policy Server, Hancom xDB V2.8 APIAgent, Hancom xDB V2.8
PluginAgent.
The Hancom xDB V2.8 Policy Server ("Policy Server" hereinafter) will be located in
the environment that uses cryptographic services. Therefore, it is independent of the
environment where data is stored. The Hancom xDB V2.8 APIAgent (“APIAgent”
hereinafter) requests encryption and decryption policies from the Policy Server to
perform encryption and decryption. The Hancom xDB V2.8PluginAgent
(“PluginAgent” hereinafter) is a PluginAgent installed in the database server. it is in
charge of receiving the user data delivered from the application server when
encryption is in progress, performing DB encryption and decryption according to the
policy of the Policy Server at the time of DBMS storage.The TOE includes
cryptographic modules(XecureCrypto 2.0.1.1) validated under the Korea
Cryptographic Module Validation Program (KCMVP).
There are two types of the TOE operational environments: plug-in and API types. In
the plug-in type, PluginAgent is installed in a database server, while APIAgent is
installed in an application server
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Information Security
Technology (KOIST) and completed on October 29, 2019. This report grounds on the
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evaluation technical report(ETR) KOIST had submitted [5] and the Security Target
(ST) [6]. The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National PP for Database
Encryption V1.0 [7]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are
based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the
SARs of the PP [7]. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3
conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and newly defined components in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST.
Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show the operational environments of the TOE.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE (API type)
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[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE (Plug-in type)
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
TOE OS Division Minimum Requirements
Hancom xDB
V2.8
Policy Server
Linux
OS CentOS 6.10 kernel 2.6.32 (64 bit)
CPU Xeon E3-1220 3.1 GHz or faster
RAM 16 GB or more
HDD
Disk space for TOE installation and
operation: 100 GB or more
NIC
1 port or more of 10/100/1000 Ethernet
card
Hancom xDB
V2.8
APIAgent
Linux
OS CentOS 6.10 kernel 2.6.32 (64 bit)
CPU Xeon E3-1220 3.1 GHz or faster
RAM 16 GB or more
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HDD
Disk space for TOE installation: 10 MB
or more
NIC
1 port or more of 10/100/1000 Ethernet
card
Hancom xDB
V2.8
PluginAgent
Linux
OS CentOS 6.10 kernel 2.6.32 (64 bit)
CPU Xeon E3-1220 3.1 GHz or faster
RAM 16 GB or more
HDD
10 MB or more space required for TOE
installation
NIC
1 port or more of 10/100/1000 Ethernet
card
AIX
OS AIX 5.3 64 bit
CPU PowerPC POWER64.2 GHz or faster
RAM 16 GB or more
HDD
10 MB or more space required for TOE
installation
NIC
1 port or more of 10/100/1000 Ethernet
card
HP-
UX
OS HP-UX 11.23 64 bit
CPU Intel Itanium(IA64) 1.4 GHz or faster
RAM 16 GB or more
HDD
10 MB or more space required for TOE
installation
NIC 1 port or more of 10/100/1000 Ethernet
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card
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
[Table 2] shows minimum requirements necessary for the administrator’s PC.
TOE Division Minimum Requirements
H/W
CPU Intel ® Core™ i5-7500 3.4 GHz or faster
Memory 4 GB or more
HDD 1000 GB or more
NIC 1 port or more of 10/100/1000 Ethernet card
S/W
OS
Windows 7 Professional SP1(x86/x64)
Windows 10 Pro(x86/x64)
Web
Browser
Chrome 76.0
[Table 2] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE Hanacom xDB V2.8 (Version: 2.8.2.3)
TOE
Component
Hancom xDB V2.8 Policy Server 2.8.2.3
(z_package.Hancom_xDB_V2.8_Policy_Server.2.8.2.3.tar.gz)
Hancom xDB V2.8 APIAgent2.8.2.3
(z_package.Hancom_xDB_V2.8_APIAgent.2.8.2.3.Linux.x86_64.64bit.tar.gz)
Hancom xDB V2.8 PluginAgent2.8.2.3
(z_package.Hancom_xDB_V2.8_PluginAgent.oracle.2.8.2.3.Linux.x86_64.64bit.tar.gz)
(z_package.Hancom_xDB_V2.8_PluginAgent.oracle.2.8.2.3.AIX.5.3.tar.gz)
(z_package.Hancom_xDB_V2.8_PluginAgent.oracle.2.8.2.3.HP-UX_IA.B.11.23.tar.gz)
Manual
Preparative
Procedure
Hancom xDB V2.8 Preparative Procedure (PRE) v1.9
(HancomxDB_V2.8_PreparativeProcedure(PRE)_v1.9.pdf)
Operation
Guide
Hancom xDB V2.8 Operation Guide (OPE) v1.8
(HancomxDBV2.8_OperationGuide(OPE)_v1.8.pdf)
[Table 3] TOE identification
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor,
evaluation facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT
Security (August 24 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT
Security (September 12 2017)
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Protection Profile
Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption
V1.0
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Common
Methodology
Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5,
CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
EAL
EAL1+
(augmented by ATE_FUN.1)
Developer Hancom With Inc.
Sponsor Hancom With Inc.
Evaluation Facility Korea Information Security Technology (KOIST)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
October 29 2019
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center (ITSCC)
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [6] for the TOE claims strict to the Korean National PP for Database
Encryption V1.0 [7], and complies security policies defined in the PP [7] by security
requirements. Thus, the TOE provides security features defined in the PP [7] as
follows:
1) Security Audit
The TOE creates and maintains audit records of auditable events such as the
operation of security functions provided by the TOE and the history of security
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management.
2) Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptographic key generation, distribution, destruction, and
cryptographic operations to protect the transmitted data between TOE components
and encrypt and decrypt user data. In addition, it provides a random number
generation function for secure encryption key generation. The TOE uses the
encryption target cryptographic algorithm of “XecureCrypto v2.0.1.1,” a validated
cryptographic module whose security and implementation conformance are verified
through the cryptographic module verification system (KCMVP) for the encryption of
user data and TSF data to generate the encryption key.
3) User Data Protection
The TOE provides the function of encrypting and decrypting user data by column.
4) Identification & Authentication
To allow access to the security management functions provided by the TOE, the
authorized administrator must be successfully identified and authenticated before
allowing all actions related to the security functions
5) Security Management
The TOE provides the security management function for the authorized administrator
to set up and manage the security policy and important data.
6) Protection of the TSF
When the TSF data is transmitted between the separated parts of the TOE using the
cryptographic target algorithm of the validated cryptographic module “XecureCrypto
v.2.0.1.1,” a validated cryptographic module whose safety and implementation
conformity are verified through the cryptographic module verification
system(KCMVP)
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The TOE protects the passwords, encryption keys, critical security parameters, TOE
configuration values (security policies, configuration parameters), and audit data of
authorized administrators and DB encryption users stored in the TSF data repository
from unauthorized exposures and modifications.
The TOE executes self-tests periodically at startup and during normal operation to
verify the correct operation of the Policy Server, PluginAgent, and APIAgent.
7) TOE access
The TOE blocks the maximum number of concurrent sessions to 1 to disable
concurrent login from the same account.
The TOE also blocks simultaneous access to the same authorization. The TOE
terminates the session if there is no activity for 5 minutes after the authorized
administrator logs in.
The TOE controls access to it so that only the registered IP (two default values or
less) can access the security management interface.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions
section in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational
environment are added to those of the PP [7] in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used (For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives
of the operational environment, refer to the ST [6], chapter 3.)
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5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
- Hancom xDB V2.8 Policy Server provides security features of identification and
authentication of administrators, cryptographic key managements, and security
management to the TOE and TSF data.
- Hancom xDB V2.8 APIAgent encrypt and decrypt the user data in a column of a
database.
- Hancom xDB V2.8 PluginAgent encrypt and decrypt the user data in a column
of a database.
Note that all the three components perform the same functionalities of audit data
generation, cryptographic key management, cryptographic operations, protection of
TSF data, and mutual authentication between the components. For the detailed
description on the architectural information, refer to the ST [6], chapter 1.4.2.
6. Documentation
The following documentations are evaluated and provided with the TOE by the
developer to the customer.
Idenfifier Date
Hancom xDB_V2.8_Preparative Procedure(PRE)_v1.9.pdf Sep. 25, 2019
Hancom xDB_V2.8_Operation guide(OPE)_v1.8.pdf Sep. 25, 2019
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by
each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test
case includes the following information:
- Test no : Identifier of each test case
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- Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
- Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
- Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
- Expected result: Result expected from testing z Actual result: Result obtained
by performing testing
- Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by
the evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based
upon test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for
potential vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Hancom xDB V2.8 (version number V2.8.2.3). See table 3 for detailed
information on the TOE components.
The TOE is installed from the CD-ROM distributed by Hancom With Inc. After
installing the TOE, an administrator can identify the TOE version through the
product’s Info check menu. The guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6,
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[Table 5] were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE
in a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and
TOE description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1. The Conformance Claim
properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC and how the ST
conforms to packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_CCL.1. The
Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1. The Extended Components Definition
has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and it is necessary. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1. The Security Requirements is defined
clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally consistent. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1. The TOE Summary Specification addresses all
SFRs, and it is consistent with other narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1. Thus, the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for the TOE evaluation. The verdict
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PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has uniquely identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_CMC.1.The configuration list includes the TOE and the evaluation
evidence required by the SARs in the ST. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1. The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1. The operational user guidance describes for each user
role the security functionality and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides
instructions and guidelines for the secure use of the TOE, addresses secure
procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention and detection of
insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1. Thus, the guidance documents are adequately
describing the user can handle the TOE in a secure manner. The guidance
documents take into account the various types of users (e.g. those who accept,
install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect actions could adversely
affect the security of the TOE or of their own data. The verdict PASS is assigned to
the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore,
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the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1. The verdict PASS is assigned to the
assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test
documentation. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1. By
independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1. Thus, the TOE behaves as
described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence (described in the
ADV class). The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development
and anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs. The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class
AVA.
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9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Requirements
for evaluator
actions
Verdict
Requirements
for evaluator
actions
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1.1E PASS
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
AGD
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
ALC
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1
ATE_IND.1.1E PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1
AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS
PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
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10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated
by complying with the followings:
 The administrator should install and operate the TOE and DBMS in a
physically secure environment that is accessible only by the authorized
administrator, and should not allow remote management from the outside.
 The authorized administrator shall periodically check the free space of the
audit data storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records and
perform the backup of the audit records so that the audit records are not
deleted.
 Developers who link the encryption function to the application or DBMS
should ensure that the security functions of the TOE are applied safely in
accordance with the requirements of the manual.
 The authorized administrator should maintain the secure state, such as
applying the latest security patches to the operating system and DBMS, and
removing unnecessary services, when operating the product.
 The time information of each operating system where the TOE is installed
should be synchronized to keep accurate time information.
11. Security Target
Hancom xDB V2.8 Security Target v1.10 [6] is included in this report for reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
KCMVP the Korea Cryptographic Module Validation Program
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
13. Bibliography
The evaluation facility has used the following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
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[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 24, 2017)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (September 12, 2017)
[5] Hancom xDB V2.8 Evaluation Technical Report V1.10, October 29, 2019
[6] Hancom xDB V2.8 Security Target V1.10, October 21, 2019
[7] Korean National PP for Database Encryption V1.0 (KECS-PP-0820-2017,
August 18, 2017)