TrustCB B.V.
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nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
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TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2023-06
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Certification Report
SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1
Sponsor and developer: Autotalks Ltd.
Grand Netter Building, POB 3846
40593 Kfar-Netter
Israel
Evaluation facility: Riscure B.V.
Delftechpark 49
2628 XJ Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300173-01
Author(s): Kjartan Jæger Kvassnes
Date: 28 November 2023
Number of pages: 11
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 7
2.6 IT Product Testing 7
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 7
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 8
2.6.3 Test configuration 8
2.6.4 Test results 8
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 8
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 8
2.9 Evaluation Results 8
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 9
3 Security Target 10
4 Definitions 10
5 Bibliography 11
Page: 3/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR, dated 28 November 2023
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
Page: 4/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR, dated 28 November 2023
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
Page: 5/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR, dated 28 November 2023
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1. The developer of the SECTON/CRATON2
Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1 is Autotalks Ltd. located in Kfar-Netter, Israel and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective
consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their particular
requirements.
The TOE is an HSM composed by hardware and software which is embedded in a SoC. This SoC can
be delivered in two architectures, called SECTON or CRATON2, that constitute the operational
environment of the TOE while the TOE contained in them, is the same.
The TOE is designed to be used in vehicle or in stationary deployments, for supporting global V2X
(Vehicle to anything) communication devices for Cooperative Intelligent Transport System (C-ITS).
The TOE provides secure cryptographic services and key management services to the VCS element
that reside in the same SoC.
The TOE has been evaluated by Riscure B.V. Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation was completed
on 28 November 2023 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has been conducted
in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT
Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM
CUT 3.1, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which
the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the SECTON/CRATON2
Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1 are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL4 augmented (EAL4+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation)
and AVA_VAN.4 (Methodical vulnerability analysis).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
Page: 6/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR, dated 28 November 2023
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM
CUT 3.1 from Autotalks Ltd. located in Kfar-Netter, Israel.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery item type Identifier Version
Hardware Wafer VA83D
On-chip software. Stored
in the ROM of the TOE.
Firmware 0xC1010400
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the
SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of
this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST] or [ST-lite], Chapter 1.3.4.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE major security features are:
• V2X Key Management
• Digital signature generation
• User data ECIES encryption/decryption
• ECC Key derivation
• Random number generation
• Self-protection
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 4.3 of the [ST] or [ST-
lite].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
Page: 7/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR, dated 28 November 2023
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2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture can be depicted as follows:
The TOE (also called eHSM or V2X eHSM) is an HSM composed by hardware and software which is
embedded in a SoC. This SoC can be delivered in two architectures, called SECTON or CRATON2,
that constitute the operational environment of the TOE while the TOE contained in them, is the same.
The TOE provides cryptographic and key management services required for supporting V2X (Vehicle-
to-Everything) communications.
The TOE is conceived as a subsystem of the SoC and uses the SoC-internal NIC400 InterConnect
bus to communicate and provide services to other subsystems within the SoC, in particular Cortex-A7
and Cortex-M3 CPU cores.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
SECTON-CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT3.1 Functional
Specification-FSP
1.4
SECTON-CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT3.1 Operational User
Guidance-OPE
0.9
SECTON-CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT3.1 Preparational
Guidance-PRE
1.3
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were
tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The
testing was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were
used extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
Amount of developer testing performed:
ITS Interface
V2X Station
or Internet
Part of the
TOE
Not part of
the TOE
TOE
boundary
Legend
Vehicle
V2X VCS V2X HSM
IVN Interface
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• The tests are performed on security mechanisms and on subsystem and module level with a
total amount of 535 test scenarios.
• The developer tested all security mechanisms and TSFIs.
• The developer tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design and
against the security architecture description.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have verified the execution of a selection of the developer tests and
conducted a number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The evaluator considered whether potential vulnerabilities could already be identified due to the TOE
type and/or specified behaviour in such an early stage of the evaluation.
A thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE focussed on the TOE
hardware and the ROM. During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE is analysed
using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of
additional potential vulnerabilities. The analysis was performed taking into account the attack methods
in [JIL-AM] and applicable attack papers with rating according to [JIL-AAPS].
All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes and
information from the public domain. A judgement was made on how to assure that these potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was 76 days. During that test campaign, 53% of the
total time was spent on Perturbation attacks and 47% on side-channel testing.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The TOE was tested in the following configuration:
• SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of 6 Site Technical Audit Reports.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X
HSM CUT 3.1.
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Page: 9/11 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300173-01-CR, dated 28 November 2023
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Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the SECTON/CRATON2
Embedded V2X HSM CUT 3.1, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 4 augmented with AVA_VAN.4 and ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product
satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP_V2XHSM].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: <none>.
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3 Security Target
The SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT3.1 Security Target , Version 2.0, Dated 12
November 2023 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
HSM Hardware Security Module
C-ITS Cooperative Intelligent Transport System
ECIES Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
V2X Vehicle to anything
ECC Elliptic-curve cryptography
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II
and III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report for SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM
CUT 3.1, 20190381-D2, Version 1.3, Dated 28 November 2023
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2, November
2022
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.4, January
2020 (sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_V2XHSM] CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium, Protection Profile V2X Hardware
Security Module, version 1.0.1, release 1.6.0, dated 30 November 2021
[ST] SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT3.1 Security Target , Version
2.0, Dated 12 November 2023
[ST-lite] SECTON/CRATON2 Embedded V2X HSM CUT3.1 Security Target Lite
Version 2.0, dated 12 November 2023
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)