MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
Page 1 of 15
Dossier: 2015-26
C/ Argentona nº 20
Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
REF: 2015-26-INF-1738 v1
Target: Expediente
Date: 19.10.2016
Created by: CERT10
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2015-26 SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government v1.1
Applicant: SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC
References:
[EXT-2826] Certification request of Solarwinds Orion v1.1
[EXT-3172] Evaluation Technical Report of Solarwinds Orion v1.1.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government
V1.1, as requested in [EXT-2826] dated 14/10/2015, and evaluated by the laboratory
Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A., as detailed in the Evaluation Technical
Report [EXT-3172] received on 07/10/2016.
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................3
TOE SUMMARY4..............................................................................................................................................................3
SECURITYASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................4
SECURITYFUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ..........................................................................................................5
IDENTIFICATION................................................................................................................................................................6
SECURITY POLICIES ........................................................................................................................................................6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................................7
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS...............................................................................................8
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY...........................................................................................8
ARCHITECTURE ..............................................................................................................................................................10
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE........................................................................................................................................10
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE......................................................................................................................................10
DOCUMENTS......................................................................................................................................................................11
PRODUCT TESTING........................................................................................................................................................12
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION...............................................................................................................................13
EVALUATION RESULTS ...............................................................................................................................................14
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ...........................................14
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................................................15
GLOSSARY..........................................................................................................................................................................15
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................................................15
SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................................15
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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Email: organismo.certificacion@cni.es
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government v1.1.
The SolarWinds Orion suite is a set of software applications and services executing
on one or more Windows servers. The applications monitor a configured set of
network-attached devices and applications for status, performance and configuration
settings. Depending on the size of the network, multiple instances of the applications
may be deployed on different servers to provide adequate performance. For
enhanced availability and robustness, a failover configuration may be deployed.
Developer/manufacturer: SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC.
Sponsor: SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF:Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A..
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 - EAL2+ALC_FLR.2.
Evaluation end date: 06 October 2016.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 (augmented
with ALC_FLR.2) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the
laboratory Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to
the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the
EAL2+ALC_FLR.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1
R4.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government V1.1, a positive
resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY4
The Orion software suite acts as a monitoring and management tool for use by
network managers. It maintains a list of the managed elements in the network,
monitors their operation, and alerts the network managers to specified conditions.
Managed elements are network devices (e.g. routers and switches), servers, storage
devices or applications that can be monitored by standard mechanisms such as
SNMP, ICMP, Syslog or WMI. NCM functionality may be used to track configuration
changes on the network devices for products that are able to download a copy of
their current configuration parameters.
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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Users interact with the TOE via multiple mechanisms. The EOC Web Console and
Orion Web Console are provided for remote interaction with the EOC and Orion
functionality. Application programs to manage FoE (Failover Engine) operations may
also be invoked from the Windows Start menu by authorized users.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL2 and the evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.2,
according to Common Criteria v3.1 R4.
ASE: Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_INT.1. ST Introduction
ASE.CCL.1. Conformance claims
ASE_SPD.1. Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.2. Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1. Extended component definition
ASE_REQ.2. Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1. TOE summary specification
ADV: Development ADV_ARC.1. Security architecture
ADV_FSP.2. Functional specification
ADV_TDS.1. TOE design
AGC: Guidance
documents
AGD_OPE.1. Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1. Preparative procedures
ALC: Life cycle support ALC_CMC.2. CM capabilities
ALC_CMS.2. CM Scope
ALC_DEL.1. Delivery
ALC_FLR.2. Flaw remediation
ATE: Tests ATE_COV.1. Coverage
ATE_FUN.1. Functional tests
ATE_IND.2. Independent testing
AVA: Vulnerability AVA_VAN.2. Vulnerability analysis
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CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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assessment
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria v3.1 R4:
FAU: Security audit FAU_GEN.1. Security audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1. Security audit review
FAU_SAR.2. Security audit review
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_ATD.1. User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2. User authentication
FIA_UAU.7. User authentication
FIA_UID.2. User identification
FIA_USB.1. User-subject binding
FMT: Security
management
FMT_MTD.1. Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1. Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1. Security management roles
FNM: Network
management
FNM_MDC.1. Monitor Data Collection
FNM_ANL.1. Monitor Analysis
FNM_RCT.1. Management React
FNM_RDR.1. Restricted Data Review
FNM_STG.1. Guarantee of Monitor Data Availability
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_FLS.1. Fail secure
FRU: Resource utilisation FRU_FLT.2. Fault tolerance
FTA: TOE access FTA_SSL.3. Session locking and termination
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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IDENTIFICATION
Product: SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government v1.1
Security Target: SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target, version 1.8, July 4,
2016.
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 R4 - EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government v1.1 shall
implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and
security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
Policy 01: P.ACCACT
Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the TOE.
Policy 02: P.ACCESS
All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for authorized
purposes.
Policy 03: P.ANALYZ
Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about element or network
problems must be applied to data received from managed elements and appropriate
notification to users generated.
Policy 04: P.DBMONITOR
The Administrator shall monitor disk space usage of the databases used by the TOE
and take proactive steps to protect against data loss. The TOE will be configured to
monitor the databases and alert the Administrator to high disk usage levels.
Policy 05: P.DISCLOSURE
Credentials passed between the TOE and remote users will be protected from
disclosure.
Policy 06: P.HIGHAVAIL
The TOE shall be able to continue providing all of its functionality to authorized users
in a secure manner in the event of a failure of a single TOE component.
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
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Policy 07: P.INTGTY
Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from modification.
Policy 08: P.MANAGE
The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.
Policy 09: P.PASSWORDS
Passwords for User Accounts defined in the TOE are only configured by
Administrators.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption 01: A.ACCESS
The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.
Assumption 02: A.ASCOPE
The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT Systems the TOE monitors.
Assumption 03: A.DATABASE
Access to the database used by the TOE via mechanisms outside the TOE boundary
is restricted to use by authorized users.
Assumption 04: A.ENVIRON
The TOE will be located in an environment that provides physical security,
uninterruptible power, and temperature control required for reliable operation.
Assumption 05: A. INSTALL
The Administrator will install and configure the TOE according to the administrator
guidance.
Assumption 06: A.NETWORK
There will be a network that supports communication between distributed
components of the TOE. This network functions properly.
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
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Assumption 07: A.NOEVILADMIN
Administrators are non-hostile and follow the administrator guidance when using the
TOE. Administration is competent and on-going.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product SolarWinds Orion Suite for
Federal Government v1.1, although the agents implementing attacks have the attack
potential according to the basic attack potential of EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2 and always
fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
Threat 01: T.INTERCEPT
An unauthorized network entity may intercept data exchanged between distributed
TOE components to compromise the operation of the TOE or gain unauthorized
access to TSF data.
Threat 02: T.MASQUERADE
A user or process may masquerade as another entity in order to gain unauthorized
access to data or TOE resources.
Threat 03: T.TSF_COMPROMISE
A user or process may cause, through an unsophisticated attack, TSF data to be
modified.
Threat 04: T.UNIDENT_ACTIONS
The administrator may not have the ability to notice potential security violations such
as attempts by users to gain unauthorized access to the TOE, thus limiting the
administrator’s ability to identify and take action against a possible security breach.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Environment objective 01: OE.COMM
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
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ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
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The Operational Environment will protect communication between the TOE and
systems outside the TOE boundary from disclosure.
Environment objective 02: OE.CRYPTO
The Operational Environment will provide cryptographic functionality needed to
provide confidentiality with the protocols used for communication with remote IT
Systems.
Environment objective 03: OE.DATABASE
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that access to the TOE database via
mechanisms outside the TOE boundary (e.g., DBMS) is restricted to authorized
users only.
Environment objective 04: OE.DBMONITOR
The Administrator shall monitor disk space usage of the databases used by the TOE
and take proactive steps to protect against data loss. The TOE will be configured to
monitor the databases and alert the Administrator to high disk usage levels.
Environment objective 05: OE.ENVIRON
The Administrator will install the TOE in an environment that provides physical
security, uninterruptible power, and temperature control required for reliable
operation.
Environment objective 06: OE.INSTALL
The Administrator will install and configure the TOE according to the administrator
guidance.
Environment objective 07: OE.INTROP
The TOE is interoperable with the IT Systems it monitors.
Environment objective 08: OE.NETWOKR
The Administrator will install and configure a network that supports communication
between the distributed TOE components. The administrator will ensure that this
network functions properly.
Environment objective 09: OE.NOEVILADMIN
Administrators are non-hostile and follow the administrator guidance when using the
TOE. Administration is competent and on-going.
Environment objective 10: OE.SSL
The Operational Environment will require incoming connections to the Orion Web
Console and EOC Web Console to use SSL/TLS.
Environment objective 11: OE.TIME
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The Operational Environment will provide reliable timestamps.
Environment objective 12: OE.WINDOWSACCESS
Users invoking the Orion Server functionality via Windows application programs
must successfully perform identification and authentication functions with Windows
first, and access to the applications that invoke ORION Server functionality must be
limited to users authorized to invoke TOE management functionality.
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in
the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE subsystems fall into one of three categories:
1. Orion monitoring and management subsystems (consisting of the subsystems
associated with NPM, SAM, NCM, NTA, IPAM, VNQM, UDT, SRM, and
WPM).
2. The FoE subsystem for monitoring and synchronizing of EOC and/or Orion
applications and servers
3. EOC subsystems for aggregation of information from multiple Orion Servers
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The TOE consists of the SolarWinds Orion software identified in section 1.2
executing on multiple dedicated Windows servers:
1. EOC Server - EOC installed on a dedicated server.
2. Orion Server - Orion Suite components (other than EOC) installed on a
dedicated server. Any combination of components may be installed with each
instance. Any combination is generically referred to as an Orion Server.
3. Failover Server – FoE components are installed on a dedicated secondary
server(s) as well as on primary EOC Servers or Orion Servers. The passive
server monitors the health of the active EOC Server or Orion Server, and the
passive server automatically assumes the active role of any failed server. The
components on the active EOC Server or Orion Server ensure that data files
required by the passive EOC Server or Orion Server are supplied to the
passive server for replication.
The physical architecture of the TOE is depicted in the figure below, with TOE
components shaded. The operating systems (including the network protocol stacks
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
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and cryptographic functionality), web servers and DBMS are outside the TOE
boundary.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
1. SolarWinds® Enterprise Operations Console Administrator Guide
(OrionEOCAdministratorGuide.pdf)
2. SolarWinds® Orion® Common Components Administrator Guide
(OrionCoreAdministratorGuide.pdf)
3. SolarWinds® Orion® Network Performance Monitor Administrator Guide
(OrionNPMAdministratorGuide.pdf)
4. SolarWinds® Server & Application Monitor Administrator Guide
(SAMAdminGuide.pdf)
5. SolarWinds® Network Configuration Manager Administrator Guide
(OrionNCMAdministratorGuide.pdf)
6. SolarWinds® IP Address Manager Administrator Guide
(OrionIPAMAdministratorGuide.pdf)
7. SolarWinds® NetFlow Traffic Analyzer Administrator Guide
(NetFlowAdministratorGuide.pdf)
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CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
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8. SolarWinds® User Device Tracker Administrator Guide
(UDTAdministratorGuide.pdf)
9. SolarWinds® Orion® VoIP and Network Quality Manager Administrator
Guide (VNQMAdministratorGuide.pdf)
10. SolarWinds® Web Performance Monitor Administrator Guide
(WPMAdminGuide.pdf)
11. SolarWinds Storage Resource Monitor Help Guide (SRMHelpGuide.pdf)
12. SolarWinds® Failover Engine v6.7 Administrator Guide
(OrionFailoverEngineAdministratorGuide.pdf)
13. SolarWinds® Technical Reference Orion® Failover Installation Walkthrough
(Failoverinstallwalkthrough.pdf)
14. SolarWinds® Technical Reference Preparing an Orion® Failover Engine
Installation (PreparingOrionFailoverEngineInstallation.pdf)
15. SolarWinds® Orion® Suite for Federal Government Version 1.1 Common
Criteria Supplement (OrionCommonCriteriaSupplement.pdf)
All guidance documentation is distributed as PDF files. Core product guidance
documentation (items 1 through 12 above) is distributed within the component
download files. Technical References (items 13 and 14 above) are downloaded from
the Knowledgebase of the SolarWinds Customer Portal.
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer established a testing approach in order to test the main functionalities
of the most important subsystems and security mechanisms of TOE. In doing so, the
test performed covered all TSFIs but one (Orion Report Writer) and all the SFRs
except for FTA_SSL.3, however this TSFI and SFR have been tested as part the
independent testing plan done by the evaluator.
All the tests have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a
satisfactory result. During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test
checking that the security functionality that covers is identified and also that the kind
of test is appropriate to the function that is intended to test.
All the tests were developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the
architecture defined in the security target. It has also been checked that the obtained
results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
The evaluator has executed a set of test over a sampling of the developer’s testing
plan by considering the following factors:
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• SFRs.
• TSFIs.
• Subsystems.
• Specially complex or critical interfaces.
• Interfaces on which there are doubts about its operation.
• Developer testing effort.
In terms of security, the approach taken has been to prioritize the coverage of SFRs
that have not been tested or that have a big implication in the overall security of the
TSF data.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are
indicated below. Therefore, for the operation of the product SolarWinds Orion Suite
for Federal Government v1.1 it is necessary the disposition of the following software
components:
• Orion Network Performance Monitor v11.5.2 with NPM-v11.5.2-CCC-HotFix.
• Orion Server & Application Monitor v6.2.2.
• Orion Network Configuration Manager v7.4.0.
• Orion NetFlow Traffic Analyzer v4.1.1.
• Orion IP Address Manager v4.3.0.
• Orion Voice & Network Quality Manager v4.2.2.
• Orion User Device Tracker v3.2.2.
• Orion Web Performance Monitor v2.2.0.
• Orion Storage Resource Monitor v6.2.0.
• Orion Enterprise Operations Console v1.6.2.
• Orion Failover Engine v6.7.0.
Regarding the non-TOE hardware components, the only requirement is that they
shall support the software elements previously detailed.
Among all the possibilities offered by these software and hardware requirements, the
configuration selected for the evaluation is the following:
1. EOC Server - EOC installed on a dedicated physical server. EOC installed on
a dedicated server includes the Orion Enterprise Operations Console (EOC)
V1.6.2 and Orion Failover Engine (FoE) V6.7.0.
2. Orion Server - Orion installed on a dedicated physical server with all the
components included within the scope of the evaluation (except for EOC):
SolarWinds Orion Network Performance Monitor (NPM) V11.5.2, Orion Server
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& Application Monitor (SAM) V6.2.2, Orion Network Configuration Manager
(NCM) V7.4.0, Orion Netflow Traffic Analyzer (NTA) V4.1.1, Orion IP Address
Manager (IPAM) V4.3.0, Orion VoIP & Network Quality Manager (VNQM)
V4.2.2, Orion User Device Tracker (UDT) V3.2.2, Orion Web Performance
Monitor (WPM) V2.2.0, Orion Storage Resource Monitor (SRM) V6.2.0 and
Orion Failover Engine (FoE) V6.7.0.
3. DB server. DMBS installed on a dedicated physical server. The specifications
of the three mentioned physical server are identical (except the RAM memory
of the Orion server) and they are shown in the table below.
Item Specification
Operating System Windows Server 2012 R2 64 bits
Web Server IIS 8.5, SSL required
CPU I5-4570 @ 3.2 GHz
RAM memory
8 GB (except for Orion server that has 10
GB)
Secondary memory 465 GB
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government v1.1 has been evaluated
against the Security Target SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target, version 1.8,
July 4, 2016.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Applus LGAI
Technological Center S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation
due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL2 +
ALC_FLR.2, as defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 R4 and the CEM v3.1 R4.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
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The fulfilment of the assumptions indicated in the security target is a key point as it
implies TOE environment configurations that leave some potential vulnerabilities out
of the scope.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product SolarWinds Orion Suite for Federal Government v1.1, a positive
resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
OC Organismo de Certificación
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R4 Final, September 2012.
SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body: SolarWinds Orion Software Security Target,
version 1.8, July 4, 2016.