KECS-CR-20-73
KSignSecureDB V3.6
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-1059-2020
2020. 12. 3.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2020.12.03. -
Certification report for KSignSecureDB V3.6
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for KSignSecureDB V3.6 for
KSign Co., LTD.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KoSyAs)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.......................................................................................................10
3. Security Policy ................................................................................................... 11
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................12
5. Architectural Information ..................................................................................12
6. Documentation...................................................................................................13
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................14
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................15
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................15
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................15
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................16
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................16
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................17
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................17
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................18
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................18
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................19
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................20
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the evaluation facility on the results
of the KSignSecureDB V3.6 developed by KSign Co., Ltd. with reference to the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It describes
the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is database encryption software to prevent
unauthorized exposure of the information from DBMS. Also, the TOE shall provide a
variety of security features: security audit, cryptographic operation using cryptographic
module, the user identification and authentication including mutual authentication
between TOE components, security management, the TOE access session
management, and the TSF protection function, etc..
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on October 29, 2020.
The ST claims strict conformance to the Korean National Protection Profile for Database
Encryption V1.1[3]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based
only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs.
Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both functional components in CC Part
2 and a newly defined component in the Extended Component Definition chapter of the
PP, therefor the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the
resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE is comprised of the KSignSecureDB Server, KSignSecureDB DBAgent and
KSignSecureDB APIAgent and can be installed 'Plug-in' and 'API' type. [Figure 1], [Figure
2] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
[Figure 1] shows a typical operational environment of the plug-in type.
The plug-in operational environment is composed of the Management Server and DB
Agent. First, the Management Server manages the information on policies established
by the authorized administrator and manages the keys and the audit records. It also
encrypts the information on a distributed key and loads it on the shared memory. Second,
the DB Agent is installed inside the Database Server where the DB under the protection
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is located, and encrypts the user data received from the Application Server before they
are stored in the DB. In addition, it decrypts the encrypted user data to be transmitted
from the Database Server to the Application Server.
[Figure 1] Plug-in type operational environment of the TOE
(Agent, Management Server separate type)
The application service user requests the encryption or decryption of the user data
through the Application Server in accordance with the scope of the encryption as required
by the security policy. The requested data are encrypted by the DB Agent and stored in
the DB. The authorized administrator accesses the Management Server to perform the
security management of the encrypted data stored in the DB.
[Figure 2] shows the API type operational environment. The API type consists of the API
Agent and the Management Server. The API Agent is installed and operated outside the
DB under the protection, and performs the encryption and decryption of the important
data in accordance with the policy established by the administrator. The authorized
administrator can access the Management Server and perform the security management.
The TOE components may be subject to change depending on the roles including the
encryption and decryption of the important information, security management and
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cryptographic key management.
[Figure 2] API-type operational environment of the TOE
(API module, management server separate type)
The application service user performs the encryption and decryption of the user data
through the API Agent on the Application Server in accordance with the scope of the
encryption as required by the security policy. The authorized administrator accesses the
Management Server to perform the security management of the encrypted data stored
in the DB.
The cryptographic algorithm subject to the validation in the validated cryptographic
module is used for the communication between the TOE components for the purpose of
secure communication. In case the administrator accesses the Management Server
through a web browser, a secure path (SSL/TLS V1.2) is generated to carry out the
communication.
As other external entities necessary for the operation of the TOE, there is email server
to send alerts by email to the authorized administrator.
The requirements for hardware, software and operating system to install the TOE are
shown in [Table 1].
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Classification Minimum Requirement
KSignSecureDB Server
HW
CPU PowerPC POWER5 2.1 GHz or higher
Memory 8 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
: 3 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Mbps x 1 EA or higher
SW
OS AIX 7.1 (64 bit)
DBMS Oracle 12c R2
etc
Java(JRE) 1.8.0_261
(IBM-AIX pap6480sr6fp16-20200902_01)
Apache Tomcat 8.5.59
KSignSecureDB DBAgent
for Oracle_AIX
HW CPU PowerPC POWER5 2.1 GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
: 1 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Mbps x 1 EA or higher
SW OS AIX 7.1 (64 bit)
DBMS Oracle 12c R2
etc Java(JRE) 1.8.0_261
(IBM-AIX pap6480sr6fp16-20200902_01)
KSignSecureDB DBAgent
for Tibero_AIX
HW CPU PowerPC POWER5 2.1 GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
: 1 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Mbps x 1 EA or higher
SW OS AIX 7.1 (64 bit)
DBMS Tibero 6
etc Java(JRE) 1.8.0_261
(IBM-AIX pap6480sr6fp16-20200902_01)
KSignSecureDB APIAgent
for JAVA_AIX
HW CPU PowerPC POWER5 2.1 GHz or higher
Memory 4 GB or higher
HDD
Space required for installation of TOE
: 1 GB or higher
NIC 100/1000 Mbps x 1 EA or higher
SW OS AIX 7.1 (64 bit)
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etc Java(JRE) 1.8.0_261
(IBM-AIX pap6480sr6fp16-20200902_01)
[Table 1] TOE Hardware and Software specifications
Administrator uses the pc that can operate web browser to use the security management.
Administrator pc minimum requirements are shown in [Table 2]
Classification Minimum Requirement
SW Web Browser Google Chrome 86.0
[Table 2] The minimum requirements for the administrator’s PC
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of Republic
of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the certificate, is either
expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following software components and related
guidance documents.
TOE KSignSecureDB V3.6
Version V3.6.1
TOE
Components
KSignSecureDB
Server
KSignSecureDB Server V3.6.1
(KSDBV36-Server_V3.6.1.tar)
KSignSecureDB
DBAgent
KSignSecureDB DBAgent For Oracle_AIX V3.6.1
(KSDBV36-DBAgent_For_Oracle_AIX_V3.6.1.tar)
KSignSecureDB DBAgent For Tibero_AIX V3.6.1
(KSDBV36-DBAgent_For_Tibero_AIX_V3.6.1.tar)
KSignSecureDB
APIAgent
KSignSecureDB APIAgent For JAVA_AIX V3.6.1
(KSDBV36-APIAgent_For_API_JAVA_AIX_V3.6.1.tar)
Guidance
Document
KSignSecureDB V3.6 Preparative Procedure V1.6
(KSignSecureDB V3.6 Preparative Procedure V1.6.pdf)
KSignSecureDB V3.6 Operation Guide V1.5
(KSignSecureDB V3.6 Operation Guide V1.5.pdf)
[Table 3] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered contained in a CD-ROM.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 24, 2017)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(September 12, 2017)
TOE KSignSecureDB V3.6
Common Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~
CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
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Protection Profile Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1
Developer KSign Co., LTD.
Sponsor KSign Co., LTD.
Evaluation
Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date
of Evaluation
October 29, 2020
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [4] for the TOE claims strict to the Korean National PP for Database Encryption
V1.1 [3], and complies security policies defined in the PP by security requirements. Thus,
the TOE provides security features defined in the PP as follows:
 Security audit: The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events such
as the start-up/shutdown of the audit functions, integrity violation, self-test
failures, and stores them in the DBMS.
 Cryptographic support: The TOE performs cryptographic key management such
as key generation, distribution, and destruction, and cryptographic operations
such as encryption and decryption using the cryptographic modules
(KSignCrypto for Java V1.0.1.0) validated under the KCMVP.
 User data protection: The TOE provides encryption and decryption for the user
data in a column of a database.
 Identification and authentication: The TOE identifies and authenticates the
administrators using their ID/password and mutually authenticates TOE
components.
 Security management: The TOE allows only an authorized administrator to
access the management interface provided by the TOE.
 Protection of the TSF: The TOE implements secure communications between
the TOE components to protect the transmitted data. The TOE encrypts the
stored TSF data to protect them from unauthorized exposure and modification.
The TOE performs self-tests on the TOE components, which includes the self-
test on the validated cryptographic module.
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 TOE access: The TOE manages authorized administrators’ sessions based on
access IP addresses and administrator rights, and terminates the sessions after
predefined time interval of inactivity.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There is no explicit Security Problem Definition chapter, therefore no Assumptions secti
on in the low assurance ST. Some security aspects of the operational environment are
added to those of the PP [3] in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used
(For the detailed and precise definition of the security objectives of the operational envir-
onment, refer to the ST [4], chapter 3.).
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
 KSignSecureDB Server
 KSignSecureDB DBAgent
 KSignSecureDB APIAgent
In [Figure 3], the three components are provided by the TOE Logical scope and boundary
of TOE. For the detailed description on the architectural information, refer to the ST [4].
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[Figure 3] Logical scope of the TOE
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identification Date
KSignSecureDB V3.6 Preparative Procedure V1.6
(KSignSecureDB V3.6 Preparative Procedure V1.6.pdf)
November 13, 2020
KSignSecureDB V3.6 Operation Guide V1.5
(KSignSecureDB V3.6 Operation Guide V1.5.pdf)
October 12, 2020
[Table 5] Documentations
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7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each
TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE. Each test case
includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected
and actual result
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the assurance
component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator installed and prepared the TOE in accordance to the preparative
procedures, and conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the
evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are identical to the developer’s tests.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are
summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software consisting of the following components:
TOE: KSignSecureDB V3.6 (V3.6.1)
 KSignSecureDB Server V3.6.1
 KSignSecureDB DBAgent For Oracle_AIX V3.6.1
 KSignSecureDB DBAgent For Tibero_AIX V3.6.1
 KSignSecureDB APIAgent For JAVA_AIX V3.6.1
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The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6
were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore,
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined, and
it is necessary. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and they are internally
consistent. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMC.1.
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The configuration management document verifies that the configuration list includes the
TOE and the evaluation evidence. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the software is installed in device.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The functional specification specifies a high-level description of the SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
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The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetration testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The TOE must be installed and operated in a physically secure environment
accessible only by authorized administrators and should not allow remote
management from outside.
 The administrator shall maintain a safe state such as application of the latest
security patches, eliminating unnecessary service, change of the default
ID/password, etc., of the operating system and DBMS in the TOE operation.
 The administrator should periodically check a spare space of audit data storage
in case of the audit data loss, and carries out the audit data backup to prevent
audit data loss.
 The developer who uses the TOE to interoperate with the user identification and
authentication function in the operational environment of the business system
shall ensure that the security functions of the TOE are securely applied in
accordance with the requirements of the manual provided with the TOE.
11. Security Target
KSignSecureDB V3.6 Security Target V1.10 [4] is included in this report for reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
Application Server The application server defined in this PP refers to the
server that installs and operates the application, which
is developed to provide a certain application service by
the organization that operates the TOE. The pertinent
application reads the user data from the DB, which is
located in the database server, by the request of the
application service user, or sends the user data to be
stored in the DB to the database server.
Critical Security Parameter
(CSP)
Information related to security that can erode the
security of the encryption module if exposed or changed
(e.g., verification data such as secret key/private key,
password, or Personal Identification Number).
Policy Key Key generated from the validated cryptographic module.
It is generated by the authorized administrator in the
security management interface to be used for the
encryption and decryption of the user data
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Secret Key Cryptographic key that is used along with a secret key
cryptographic algorithm and can be uniquely combined
with an entity or more / It shall not be made public.
Self-test Pre-operational or conditional test executed by the
cryptographic module
Validated Cryptographic
Module
A cryptographic module that is validated and given a
validation number by validation authority
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001 ~ CCMB-2017-04-003, April, 2017.
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April, 2017.
[3] Korean National Protection Profile for Database Encryption V1.1, KECS-PP-
0820a-2017, December 11, 2019.
[4] KSignSecureDB V3.6 Security Target V1.10, Nov 13, 2020.
[5] KSignSecureDB V3.6 Evaluation Technical Report(ETR) Lite V2.00, Nov 19,
2020.