MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
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CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
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REF: 2013-17-INF-1269 v1
Target: Expediente
Date: 05.02.2014
Created by: CERT8
Revised by: CALIDAD
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File: 2013-17 PSTfile
Applicant: B82015181 Autek Ingenieria S.L.
References:
[EXT-2221] PSTfile Certification request.
[EXT-2333] PSTfile Evaluation Technical Report.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product PSTfile, as requested in [EXT-2221] dated
26/06/2013, and evaluated by the laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U., as detailed in
the Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-2333] received on 25/10/2013.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................................... 3
TOE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................................... 4
ASSURANCE CLASS ................................................................................................................................................... 4
ASSURANCE COMPONENTS ....................................................................................................................................... 4
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................... 5
CLASS......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
COMPONENTS ............................................................................................................................................................ 5
IDENTIFICATION..................................................................................................................................................... 6
SECURITY POLICIES .............................................................................................................................................. 6
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................... 8
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS........................................................................................ 8
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY..................................................................................... 9
ARCHITECTURE.....................................................................................................................................................10
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE.............................................................................................................................10
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE...............................................................................................................................11
DOCUMENTS............................................................................................................................................................11
PRODUCT TESTING ..............................................................................................................................................12
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION.......................................................................................................................12
EVALUATION RESULTS ......................................................................................................................................13
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM.........................................13
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................................................................................14
GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................................................14
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................................................................14
SECURITY TARGET ..............................................................................................................................................15
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product PSTfile v4.4.2.
The TOE is part of a complete product called „PSTfile Gateway‟. The product is
made up of two „appliances‟ (including hardware, generic software (operating
system) and specific software) and additional software installed on general purpose
computers.
The TOE consists of specific software that is pre-installed on the appliances and
provides the functionality of a secure application level file gateway. In addition, the
TOE includes a software tool stored on an auto-start CD-ROM that allows updating
of the software installed on the appliances and verifying their integrity.
The use of the TOE is to transfer files (FTP, FTPS and SMB file transfer protocols
are supported) between two isolated networks whilst maintaining the networks in
isolation and guaranteeing that the only information transferred between the
networks is the one transferred by the gateway itself. To do this, the gateway
discontinues the TCP/IP protocol stack at all levels.
The TOE provides the security level of EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
Developer/Sponsor:
Autek Ingeniería, S.L.
Avda. de Burgos 9, oficina 1.
28036 Madrid
SPAIN
Certification Body:
Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF:Epoche & Espri S.L.U..
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 r4 / CEM v3.1 r4 / EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1).
Evaluation end date: 25/10/2013.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2 (augmented
with ALC_FLR.1) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the
laboratory Epoche & Espri S.L.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole
evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1), as
defined by the Common Criteria v3.1 r4 ([CC_P1], [CC_P2] and [CC_P3]) and the
Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
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Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product PSTfile v4.4.2, a positive resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The TOE is part of a complete product called „PSTfile Gateway‟. The product is
made up of two „appliances‟ (including hardware, generic software (operating
system) and specific software) and additional software installed on general purpose
computers.
The TOE consists of specific software that is pre-installed on the appliances and
provides the functionality of a secure application level file gateway. In addition, the
TOE includes a software tool stored on an auto-start CD-ROM that allows updating
of the software installed on the appliances and verifying their integrity.
The use of the TOE is to transfer files (FTP, FTPS and SMB file transfer protocols
are supported) between two isolated networks whilst maintaining the networks in
isolation and guaranteeing that the only information transferred between the
networks is the one transferred by the gateway itself. To do this, the gateway
discontinues the TCP/IP protocol stack at all levels.
The two networks are not equivalent: one is considered as having a higher security
level or classification. The system is administered from the secure network which is
also referred to as the internal network. Only digitally signed files will be transferred
from the internal to the external network.
A high-availability version of the TOE exists that allows service to be maintained in
the event of hardware configuration are described separately. Unless mentioned
explicitly, documentation applies to both configurations. Sections that apply to the
high-availability configuration only will state this explicitly.
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL2 and the evidences required by the additional component ALC_FLR.1,
according to [CC_P3].
Assurance Class Assurance Components
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
CCL.1 Conformance claims
ECD.1 Extended components definition
INT.1 ST introduction
OBJ.2 Security objectives
REQ.2 Derived security requirements
SPD.1 Security problem definition
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TSS.1 TOE summary specification
AGD: Guidance documents
OPE.1 Operational user guidance
PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support
CMC.2 Use of a CM system
CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
DEL.1 Delivery procedures
FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ADV: Development
ARC.1 Security architecture description
FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
TDS.1 Basic design
ATE: Tests
COV.1 Evidence of coverage
FUN.1 Functional testing
IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA: Vulnerability
Assessment
VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the [CC_P2]:
Class Components
FMT
SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles
SMF.1 Specification on Management Functions
MSA.1/IFF Management of security attributes
MSA.1/ACC Management of security attributes
MSA.3/IFF Static attribute initialization
MSA.3/ACC Static attribute initialisation
FIA
UID.1 Timing of identification
UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FDP
ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
ACC.2 Complete access control
IFC.2/IN Complete information flow control
IFF.1/IN Simple security attributes
IFC.2/OUT Complete information flow control
IFF.1/OUT Simple security attributes
FAU
GEN.1 Audit data generation
SAR.1 Audit review
SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FRU FLT.1 Degraded fault tolerante
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FPT
FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure
TRC.1 Internal TSF consistency
ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
IDENTIFICATION
Product: PSTfile v4.4.2
Security Target: Declaración de seguridad PSTfile. Revisión 3. 07/10/2013.
Security Target Lite: Security Target Lite. Revision 3.1. 31/01/2014
Protection Profile: None.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria v3.1 release 4
CEM v3.1 release 4
EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1).
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product PSTfile v4.4.2 shall implement a set of security policies
assuring the fulfilment of different standards and security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
Policy 01: P.SEP
Both networks must remain separate. There should be no possibility of establishing
TCP/IP connections between the two networks.
Policy 02: P.CRYPT
The TOE will use cryptography for the following purposes:
- The information (regarding configuration and the one processed by the system)
which is stored on the disk drives in the units (PSTi and PSTe) must be
encrypted.
- Communications with PSTadm for remote administration and with PSTaud for
logging of auditing data must be encrypted.
- The user information sent in the outgoing data flow (from the internal to the
external network) must be authorized using a digital signature.
Policy 03: P.ROLES
The product must implement the following roles, which the indicated capabilities:
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1. Root Administrator:
1. Establishes the CNs of certificates which are considered valid for the
administration of the gateway, and their associated permissions.
2. Security Administrator:
1. Sets monitoring configuration: parameters which affect the system
events and transfers logging.
2. Can obtain a copy of security events files (which are stored locally on
the internal unit of the gateway).
3. Can send system commands (system time set and reboot).
3. Services Administrator:
1. Establishes all the configuration of services (inbound and outbound file
services).
2. Can start and stop inbound and outbound file services.
3. Can obtain a copy of operation events files (which are stored locally on
the internal unit of the gateway).
4. Monitoring Administrator:
1. Monitors de operating status of the gateway.
2. Can reset statistical information of the services (inbound and outbound
file services).
5. Local Administrator:
1. Establishes the local configuration of internal units.
2. Performs integrity checks of both units and deploys updates.
These roles and capabilities will be implemented through the authentication features
that allow the policies and access control functions that regulate the authorized
exercise of the capabilities indicated, to be established.
Policy 04: P.AUDIT
The TOE will implement a mechanism to log its activity.
Policy 05: P.AVAIL
A high availability configuration must be possible where a peer element can take
over the services of a failing element. (This policy only applies to high availability
configuration).
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ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption 01: A.PHYSEC
The TOE is deployed in a physically secure environment. Only authorized personnel
has physical access to the TOE.
Assumption 02: A.LOCNOEVIL
Administrators with physical access to the TOE will not attempt to circumvent the
TOE‟s security functionality.
Assumption 03: A. SINGLECHAN
There are no channels for information to flow between the networks apart from the
TOE itself.
Assumption 04: A. SECPLAT
The platform (TOE environment) will be designed and securely configured so as to
avoid attacks through the platform itself.
Assumption 05: A. NETS
The internal network is an isolated network, securely configured and trustworthy. The
external network is a physically controlled network with security measures in place
but it is connected by TCP/IP to other networks.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product PSTfile v4.4.2, although
the agents implementing attacks have the attack potential according to the Basic of
EAL2 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security policies
satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
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Threat 01: T.INTOUTLEAK
An unauthorized user on the internal network causes data on the internal network to
leak to the external network.
Threat 02: T. EXTOUTLEAK
An attacker on the external network gains access to the internal network data
through the TOE.
Threat 03: T. EXTINFEED
An attacker on the external network manages to introduce data to the internal
network, other than the data available in the configured sources.
Threat 04: T. INTINFEED
An authorized user on the internal network (rogue user or malicious code) manages
to introduce data to the internal network through the system, other than the data
available in the configured system.
Threat 05: T. INTACCESS
An unauthorized user on the internal network gains remote access to the TOE and
alters or deletes security sensitive data on the TOE.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Environment objective 01: OE.PHYSEC
No access will be granted to the hardware of either of the two units (except for the
Local Administrator). It is assumed that the obvious ways to circumvent the system
(for example, connect both units directly through a network cable) are ruled out by
physical or organizational measures within the operational environment.
Environment objective 02: OE.SECPLAT
The platform (TOE environment) will be designed and securely configured so as to
avoid attacks through the platform itself..
Environment objective 03: OE. CRYPT
The cryptographic operations use a third party trusted cryptographic module for the
following:
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- Disk encryption on internal units (PSTi). Encryption is done on internal units with
a key that is stored in an external device and is retrieved during each start-up for
decryption.
- Disk encryption on external units (PSTe). Encryption is done on external units
with a session key. This grants that there will be no persistence between
sessions.
- TLS connection establishment for administration and sending of auditing data.
- Verification of the signature of outgoing files.
Environment objective 04: OE. NETS
The internal network is an isolated network, securely configured and trustworthy. The
external Network is a physically controlled network with security measures in place
but it is connected by TCP/IP to other networks.
Environment objective 05: OE. SEP
Network separation. The hardware architecture must be designed in a way that a
different host exists on each of the networks. Communication between the hosts
must be made using a passive information exchange device.
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are included in
the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE
The fundamental component of PSTfile consists of two computers called „units‟,
these two unit forms an „element‟. Each unit is connected to one of the networks.
The one connected to the internal network is called PSTi and the one connected to
the external network is called PSTe. These are dedicated computers; i.e. no
software application is executed on them apart from those of PSTfile. The element
also includes the hardware device necessary for communication between the units.
There are two possible configurations:
- Standard: formed by an element.
- High availability: formed by two elements in an active-passive redundancy
scheme.
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LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
Additionally to the software installed on the units, the system is also formed by the
following software components, which will run on general purpose stations or servers
located on the internal network:
- PSTadm – Administration application.
The administration of the complete system is carried out from a station on the
internal network. The unit located on the external network (PSTe) requires no
administration.
- PSTaud – Audit records reception service.
Activity data (data of the files transferred through the gateway) is recorded on a
database separate from PSTfile. The job of PSTaud is to enter the data ir
receives from the unit into the database.
Alternatively, transfer data can be recorded to files on the computer where
PSTaud is installed.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
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Type Reference
Security Target Security Target Lite
Revision 3.1. 31/01/2014
Installation and Deployment Guide Manual de instalación y puesta en servicio
Revisión 2. 03/09/2013
Operation Guide Manual de operación
Revisión 2. 02/10/2013
PRODUCT TESTING
The developer has executed tests for all the security functions. All the tests have
been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the
security functionality that covers has been identified and also that the kind of test is
appropriate to the function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the appropriate testing scenario to the
established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the
obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluator has repeated all the
developer functional tests in the developer premises, testing all the SFRs defined for
the TSFIs of the TOE.
In addition, the lab has extended the tests coverage for every interface, changing the
input parameters: searching for critical parameters in the interaction with the TSFIs,
wrong behaviour according to specific input values.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The software and hardware requirements, as well as the referenced options are
indicated below. Therefore, for the operation of the product PSTfile v4.4.2 it is
necessary the disposition of the following software components:
- The main part of the TOE run in two specific servers provided in a inseparable
way to the product. It supports S3 series or higher for the servers which their
internal units include an internal hardware device for communication between the
units. The evaluated configuration uses a customized version of Windows
Embedded Standard 2009.
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- The environment where the TOE runs includes:
o PSTadm (Administration application). PSTadm requires a standard PC with
enough CPU and memory is needed to run Windows XP SP3 or higher.
o PSTaud (Audit records reception service). PSTaud requires a standard PC
with enough CPU and memory is needed to run Windows XP SP3 or higher.
o Public Key Infrastructure.
o Syslog server(s) (Internal network).
o Database server to store the transfers logs, accessible from the internal
network using the ODBC standard. Optionally, text files can be used in order
to store the logs.
o File Transfer Servers (FTP, FTPS or SMB) in both networks.
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product PSTfile v4.4.2 has been evaluated against the Security Target
“Declaración de seguridad de PSTfile”, revision 3, 07/10/2013.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL2+ (ALC_FLR.1)
have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory Epoche & Espri
S.L.U. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator
actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL2, as defined by the [CC-P3] and
the Evaluation Methodology [CEM] version 3.1 r4.
COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
EVALUATION TEAM
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
- It is essential to trust in the Public Key Infrastructure which the product hinge
upon.
- Authentication is based on the Common Name, independently of the CA used
(the CA must be stored in the TOE), so the CAs stored in the TOE should be
reliable.
- Due to the product design it is necessary that the user password accounts are
known by the administrators of the product. The users of the product must be
aware of it.
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- The product allows plain text communication to the file servers but it is
recommended to secure those communications in the operational environment.
- It would be advisable not to use certificates which use MD5 as hash algorithm or
for authorization sign purposes.
- Revoked certificates: The TOE does not declares any mechanism for the revoked
certificates management; although the TOE makes an intensive use of the
Operating System for all the operations concerning the use of certificates and
their validations, it‟s possible the TOE to accept a revoked certificate if the URLs
of the certificate revocation list distribution points weren‟t declared during the
generation in the PKI. This fact has to be taken into account while the product
utilization.
CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product PSTfile v4.4.2, a positive resolution is proposed.
GLOSSARY
CCN Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
TOE Target Of Evaluation
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
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SECURITY TARGET
Along with this certification report, the complete security target of the evaluation is
available in the Certification Body: “Declaración de seguridad PSTfile revisión 3,
07/10/2013” and a lite version is available on the Certification Body website:
“Security Target Lite. Revision 3.1. 31/01/2014”.