© 2024 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. This document may be reproduced in full without any modification.
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Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.1 for Red
Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2
Security Target
Version: 0.5
Date: May 7, 2024
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Table of Contents
Document Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................... 6
1. Security Target Introduction.................................................................................................................................................................. 8
1.1. ST and TOE Reference.................................................................................................................................................................. 8
1.1. TOE Overview ................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
1.2. TOE Product Type............................................................................................................................................................. 9
1.3. Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware...................................................................................................... 9
1.4. TOE Description ........................................................................................................................................................................... 10
1.5. TOE Evaluated Configuration..................................................................................................................................................... 10
1.5.1. Tested Configuration ....................................................................................................................................................... 11
1.6. Physical Scope of the TOE ......................................................................................................................................................... 11
1.7. Logical Scope of the TOE ........................................................................................................................................................... 12
Cryptographic Support.................................................................................................................................................................... 12
User Data Protection ...................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................................................................. 12
Security Management..................................................................................................................................................................... 12
Privacy............................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Protection of the TSF...................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Trusted Channels ............................................................................................................................................................................ 13
1.8. Excluded Functionality................................................................................................................................................................ 13
2. Conformance Claims............................................................................................................................................................................. 13
2.1. Common Criteria Conformance Claim ...................................................................................................................................... 13
2.2. Protection Profile Conformance Claim ..................................................................................................................................... 13
2.3. Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale ................................................................................................................... 16
TOE Appropriateness...................................................................................................................................................................... 16
TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ........................................................................................................................... 16
Statement of Security Requirements Consistency..................................................................................................................... 16
3. Security Problem Definition................................................................................................................................................................. 17
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3.1. Assumptions ................................................................................................................................................................................. 17
3.2. Threats........................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.3. Organizational Security Policies ................................................................................................................................................ 21
4. Security Objectives ............................................................................................................................................................................... 22
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................................................................................ 22
4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment.................................................................................................................................. 24
5. Security Requirements ......................................................................................................................................................................... 25
5.1. Conventions .................................................................................................................................................................................. 25
5.2. Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)........................................................................................................................................ 28
5.2.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.1. Cryptographic Key Generation Services ........................................................................................... 28
5.2.2. FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation......................................................................................... 28
5.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment................................................................................................................ 28
5.2.4. FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE) .............................................................................................. 28
5.2.5. FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption........................................................................... 29
5.2.6. FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing................................................................................................... 29
5.2.7. FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication.................................... 29
5.2.8. FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing........................................................................................................ 30
5.2.9. FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage .................................................................................................................. 30
5.2.10. FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction......................................................................................................... 30
5.2.11. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services....................................................................................................... 30
5.2.12. FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials......................................................................................................................... 30
5.2.13. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol.................................................................................................................................... 31
5.3. Class: User Data Protection (FDP).......................................................................................................................................... 32
5.3.1. FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources............................................................................................................. 32
5.3.2. FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications..................................................................................................................... 32
5.3.3. FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data .......................................................................................... 32
5.3.4. FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection............................................................................................................. 32
5.4. Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA) ....................................................................................................................... 32
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5.4.1. FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation................................................................................................................... 32
5.4.2. FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication .......................................................................................................... 33
5.5. Class: Security Management (FMT)........................................................................................................................................ 33
5.5.1. FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism................................................................................................ 33
5.5.2. FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration......................................................................................................... 34
5.5.3. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions.................................................................................................... 34
5.5.4. FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN).............................................................................. 34
5.6. Class: Privacy (FPR)................................................................................................................................................................... 34
5.6.1. FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information ........................................ 34
5.7. Class: Class: : Protection of the TSF (FPT).......................................................................................................................... 34
5.7.1. FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs .................................................................................................... 34
5.7.2. FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities ............................................................................................................... 34
5.7.3. FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test................................................................................................................................. 35
5.7.4. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update ................................................................................................... 35
5.7.5. FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update ................................................................................................... 35
5.7.6. FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries ................................................................................................................... 35
5.7.7. FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions.................................................................................................... 36
5.8. Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) ...................................................................................................................................... 36
5.8.1. FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit.................................................................................................................. 36
5.9. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale............................................................................................................................................ 36
5.10. Security Assurance Requirements ............................................................................................................................................ 36
5.11. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .......................................................................................................................... 37
5.12. Assurance Measures................................................................................................................................................................... 37
6. TOE Summary Specification................................................................................................................................................................ 38
7. CAVP Certificates.................................................................................................................................................................................. 54
8. References.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 56
8.1. Acronyms and Terms................................................................................................................................................................... 56
8.2. Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request.............................................................................................. 58
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8.3. Contacting Cisco .......................................................................................................................................................................... 58
Table of Tables
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification................................................................................................................................................................ 8
Table 2. Required IT Environment Components .......................................................................................................................................... 9
Table 3. Tested Platforms ............................................................................................................................................................................. 11
Table 4. Excluded Functionality and Rationale.......................................................................................................................................... 13
Table 5. Protection Profile Conformance.................................................................................................................................................... 14
Table 6. NIAP Technical Decisions.............................................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 7. TOE Assumptions ............................................................................................................................................................................ 17
Table 8. Threats.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 18
Table 9. Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................................................................................... 22
Table 10. Security Objectives for the Environment ................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions ............................................................................................................................................ 25
Table 12. Security Functional Requirements.............................................................................................................................................. 26
Table 13. Assurance Requirements ............................................................................................................................................................. 36
Table 14. Assurance Measures .................................................................................................................................................................... 37
Table 15. TSS Rationale ................................................................................................................................................................................ 38
Table 16. CAVP Certificates.......................................................................................................................................................................... 54
Table 17. References ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 56
Table 18. Acronyms and Terms .................................................................................................................................................................... 56
Table of Figures
Figure 1. TOE and Environment.................................................................................................................................................................... 11
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Document Introduction
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Cisco Secure Client -
AnyConnect 5.1 for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2. This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the
aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of
security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE administrators, semi-
privileged, privileged administrators, and security administrators in this document.
Revision History
Version Date Change
0.1 July 25, 2023 Initial Version
0.2 November 14, 2023 Updates
0.3 November 27, 2023 Updates for Checkout
0.4 February 14, 2024 Additional Updates for Checkout
0.5 May 7, 2024 Updates to Address Check-out Comments.
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mentioned are the property of their respective owners. The use of the word partner does not imply a partnership
relationship between Cisco and any other company. (1110R)
© 2024 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Security Target Introduction
This Security Target contains the following sections:
■ Security Target Introduction
■ Conformance Claims
■ Security Problem Definition
■ Security Objectives
■ Security Requirements
■ TOE Summary Specification
■ CAVP Certificates
■ References
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1,
Annex A, and Part 2.
1.1. ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 1. ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.1 for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8.2
ST Version 0.5
Publication Date May 7, 2024
Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.1 for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8.2
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1.1. TOE Overview
The TOE is Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.1 for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 (herein after referred to as the, Cisco
Secure Client, VPN client, or the TOE). The TOE enables remote users within an organization to communicate securely as
if their devices were directly connected to a private network.
The TOE is a VPN Client software application. A virtual private network (VPN) extends the organization’s private network
across a shared or public network. A VPN client establishes a IKEv2/IPsec connection to a VPN Gateway allows the
remote user to securely connect to the organization’s private network.
1.2. TOE Product Type
The TOE product type is a VPN client. A VPN client provides protection of data in transit across a shared or public
network. The TOE implements IPsec which establishes a cryptographic tunnel to protect the transmission of data
between IPsec peers. The VPN client is intended to be located outside an organization’s private network, protecting data
flows between a host and the VPN Gateway.
Use case 3 (Communication) as described in [PP_APP_V1.4] and use case 1 (TOE to VPN Gateway) as described in
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4] both apply to the TOE.
1.3. Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
The TOE requires the following hardware/software/firmware in the IT environment when the TOE is configured in its
evaluated configuration
Table 2. Required IT Environment Components
Component Usage/Purpose/Description
Certificate Authority The Certification Authority provides the TOE with valid
certificates. The CA also provides the TOE with a
method to check the certificate revocation status of the
VPN Gateway.
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 platform provides an
execution platform for the TOE to run. Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 8.2 has been evaluated for
conformance with the Protection Profile for Operating
Systems v4.2.1 and listed on the NIAP Product
Compliant List (PCL).
ASA 5500-X series VPN Gateway The Cisco ASA 5500-X with software version 9.2.2 or
later functions as the head-end VPN Gateway. The
Cisco AnyConnect TOE communicates only with the
Cisco ASA 5500-X Series Gateway.
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ASDM Management Platform The ASDM 7.7 or later operates from any of the
following operating systems:
■ Windows 7, 8, 10
■ Windows Server 2008, 2012, 2012 R2, 2016 and
Server 2019
■ Apple OS X 10.4 or later
Note that that ASDM software is installed on the ASA
appliance and the management platform is used to
connect to the ASA and run the ASDM. The only
software installed on the management platform is a
Cisco ASDM Launcher.
1.4. TOE Description
This section provides an overview of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The Cisco AnyConnect TOE is a client application
that provides remote users a secure VPN tunnel to protect data in transit on both IPv4 and IPv6 networks. The TOE
provides IPsec to authenticate and encrypt network traffic travelling across an unprotected public network. By protecting
the communication from unauthorized disclosure or modification, remote users can securely connect to an organization’s
network resources and applications.
1.5. TOE Evaluated Configuration
The following figure provides a visual depiction of the TOE and IT Environment.
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Figure 1. TOE and Environment
The TOE is a software app running on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 which is denoted by the hashed red line in figure 1.
Refer to the Common Criteria Administrator’s Guide for instructions on installing and configuring the TOE.
1.5.1. Tested Configuration
The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE was tested on the following platform in the IT Environment:
Table 3. Tested Platforms
Device Name Model Processor Validated/Certified OS ST
Dell Inspiron 5502 Intel Core i5-1135G7
(Tiger Lake)
https://www.niap-
ccevs.org/Product/Compliant.cfm?PID=112
02
1.6.Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a software-only VPN client application. The underlying Linux platform on which the TOE resides is considered
part of the IT environment.
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1.7. Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several
security functionalities, as identified below.
■ Cryptographic Support
■ User Data Protection
■ Identification and Authentication
■ Security Management
■ Privacy
■ Protection of the TSF
■ Trusted Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
Cryptographic Support
The TOE incorporates a cryptographic module, CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module, to provide the cryptography in support
of IPsec with ESP symmetric cryptography for bulk AES encryption/decryption and SHA-2 algorithm for hashing. In
addition the TOE provides the cryptography to support Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the derivation
function used in the IKEv2 and ESP protocols. The cryptographic algorithm implementation has been validated for
CAVP conformance. See Table 15 for certificate references.
The TOE platform provides asymmetric cryptography, which is used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication using
digital signature and hashing services. In addition the TOE platform provides a DRBG.
User Data Protection
The TOE platform ensures that residual information from previously sent network packets processed through the
platform are protected from being passed into subsequent network packets.
Identification and Authentication
The TOE and TOE platform perform device-level X.509 certificate-based authentication of the VPN Gateway during
IKE v2 key exchange. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted VPN
Gateway. The secure channel is established only after each endpoint successfully authenticates each other.
Security Management
The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway provide the management functions to configure the security functionality
provided by the TOE. The TOE provides a Security Administrator role and only the Security Administrator can perform
the above security management functions.
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Privacy
The TOE does not store or transmit Personally Identifiable Information (PII) over a network.
Protection of the TSF
The TOE performs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of its CAVP tested algorithms.
Upon execution, the integrity of the TOEs software executables is also verified.
The TOE Platform provides for verification of TOE software updates prior to installation.
Trusted Channels
The TOE’s implementation of IPsec provides a trusted channel ensuring sensitive data is protected from unauthorized
disclosure or modification when transmitted from the host to a VPN gateway.
1.8. Excluded Functionality
The functionality listed below is not included in the evaluated configuration.
Table 4. Excluded Functionality and Rationale
Function Excluded Rationale
Non-FIPS mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed
operations.
SSL Tunnel with DLTS tunneling options [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] permits only an IPsec VPN tunnel.
2. Conformance Claims
2.1. Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 5, dated: April 2017. The TOE and ST
are CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
2.2. Protection Profile Conformance Claim
The TOE and ST are conformant with the following Protection Profiles:
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Table 5. Protection Profile Conformance
Protection Profile Version Date
PP-Configuration for Application Software and Virtual
Private Network (VPN) Clients
1.3 07 April 2023
The PP-Configuration includes the following components:
• Base-PP: Protection Profile for Application Software,
Version 1.4 (PP_APP_V1.4)
1.4 18 October 2021
• PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Clients, Version 2.4 (MOD_VPNC_V2.4)
2.4 31 March 2022
This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions:
Table 6. NIAP Technical Decisions
PP TD
Number
Title Applicabl
e
Exclusion Rational
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0815 Addition of Conditional TSS Activity for
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5
Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0798 Static Memory Mapping Exceptions Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0780 FIA_X509_EXT.1 Test 4 Clarification Yes
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PP TD
Number
Title Applicabl
e
Exclusion Rational
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0756 Update for platform-provided full disk
encryption
Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0747 Configuration Storage Option for Android No The TOE is not for
Android Platforms
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0743 FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 Selection exclusivity Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0736 Number of elements for iterations of
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1
No The TOE does not
claim HTTPS
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0719 ECD for PP APP V1.3 and 1.4 Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0717 Format changes for PP_APP_V1.4 Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0664 Testing activity for FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0650 Conformance claim sections updated to
allow for MOD_VPNC_V2.3 and 2.4
Yes
[PP_APP_v1.4] TD0628 Addition of Container Image to Package
Format
Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0788 Terminology Change in MOD_VPNC:
Extended to Functional Package
Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0753 MOD_VPNC FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Alignment
for App PP 1.4
Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0725 Correction to FCS_CKM_EXT.2/4
selections
Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0711 FMT_SMF.1 direction when using MDF
3.3
No The TOE does not
claim MDF as the Base
PP.
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0697 Alignment with App PP V1.4 for required
NIST curves in FCS_CKM.1/AK
Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0690 Missing EAs for FDP_VPN_EXT.1 Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0672 VPN Client PP-Module updated to allow
for new PP and PP-Module Versions
Yes
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PP TD
Number
Title Applicabl
e
Exclusion Rational
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0662 Changes to Testing IPsec NAT
Transversal and XAUTH in MOD_VPNC
2.4
Yes
[MOD_VPNC_V2
.4]
TD0647 Table 2 Applicability Yes
2.3. Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale
TOE Appropriateness
The TOE provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the U.S.
Government Protection Profiles listed in Table 5.
TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency
The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the
Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] for
which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Security Problem Definition
are included in the Security Target Statement of Security Objectives Consistency.
The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in [PP_APP_V1.4]
and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile’s
Statement of Security Objectives are included in the Security Target.
Statement of Security Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional
Requirements specified in [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All
concepts covered the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Requirements are included in the Security Target.
Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in the Security Target are identical to the Security
Assurance Requirements included in the claimed Protection Profiles.
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3. Security Problem Definition
This section identifies the following:
■ Assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the
development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
■ Threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment.
■ Organizational Security Policies imposed by an organization on the TOE to address its security needs.
The security problem definition below has been drawn verbatim from [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
3.1. Assumptions
Table 7. TOE Assumptions
Assumption Assumption Definition
A. PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform
with a reliable time clock for its execution. This includes
the underlying platform and whatever runtime
environment it provides to the TOE.
A.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully
negligent or hostile, and uses the software in
compliance with the applied enterprise security policy.
A.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not
careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the software in compliance with the applied enterprise
security policy.
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the
VPN client's host is connected without passing through
the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided
by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational
environment will follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
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3.2. Threats
Table 8. Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.NETWORK_ATTACK An attacker is positioned on a communications channel
or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers
may engage in communications with the application
software or alter communications between the
application software and other endpoints in order to
compromise it.
T.NETWORK_EAVESDROP An attacker is positioned on a communications channel
or elsewhere on the network infrastructure. Attackers
may monitor and gain access to data exchanged
between the application and other endpoints.
T.LOCAL_ATTACK An attacker can act through unprivileged software on the
same computing platform on which the application
executes. Attackers may provide maliciously formatted
input to the application in the form of files or other local
communications.
T.PHYSICAL_ACCESS An attacker may try to access sensitive data at rest.
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T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS This PP-Module does not include requirements that can
protect against an insider threat. Authorized users are
not considered hostile or malicious and are trusted to
follow appropriate guidance. Only authorized personnel
should have access to the system or device that con-
tains the IPsec VPN client. Therefore, the primary threat
agents are the unauthorized entities that try to gain ac-
cess to the protected network (in cases where tunnel
mode is used) or to plaintext data that traverses the
public network (regardless of whether transport mode or
tunnel mode is used).
The endpoint of the network communication can be both
geographically and logically distant from the TOE, and
can pass through a variety of other systems. These in-
termediate systems may be under the control of the ad-
versary, and offer an opportunity for communications
over the network to be compromised.
Plaintext communication over the network may allow
critical data (such as passwords, configuration settings,
and user data) to be read and/or manipulated directly by
intermediate systems, leading to a compromise of the
TOE or to the secured environmental system(s) that the
TOE is being used to facilitate communications with. IP-
sec can be used to provide protection for this communi-
cation; however, there are myriad options that can be
implemented for the protocol to be compliant to the pro-
tocol specification listed in the RFC. Some of these op-
tions can have negative impacts on the security of the
connection. For instance, using a weak encryption algo-
rithm (even one that is allowed by the RFC, such as
DES) can allow an adversary to read and even manipu-
late the data on the encrypted channel, thus circumvent-
ing countermeasures in place to prevent such attacks.
Further, if the protocol is implemented with little-used or
non-standard options, it may be compliant with the
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protocol specification but will not be able to interact
with other, diverse equipment that is typically found in
large enterprises.
Even though the communication path is protected, there
is a possibility that the IPsec peer could be duped into
thinking that a malicious third-party user or system is
the TOE. For instance, a middleman could intercept a
connection request to the TOE, and respond to the re-
quest as if it were the TOE. In a similar manner, the TOE
could also be duped into thinking that it is establishing
communications with a legitimate IPsec peer when in
fact it is not. An attacker could also mount a malicious
man-in-the-middle-type of attack, in which an interme-
diate system is compromised, and the traffic is proxied,
examined, and modified by this system. This attack can
even be mounted via encrypted communication channels
if appropriate countermeasures are not applied. These
attacks are, in part, enabled by a malicious attacker cap-
turing network traffic (for instance, an authentication
session) and “playing back” that traffic in order to fool
an endpoint into thinking it was communicating with a
legitimate remote entity.
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION Configuring VPN tunnels is a complex and time-
consuming process, and prone to errors if the interface
for doing so is not well-specified or well-behaved. The
inability to configure certain aspects of the interface
may also lead to the mis-specification of the desired
communications policy or use of cryptography that may
be desired or required for a particular site. This may
result in unintended weak or plaintext communications
while the user thinks that their data are being protected.
Other aspects of configuring the TOE or using its
security mechanisms (for example, the update process)
may also result in a reduction in the trustworthiness of
the VPN client.
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T.USER_DATA_REUSE Data traversing the TOE could inadvertently be sent to a
different user; since these data may be sensitive, this
may cause a compromise that is unacceptable. The
specific threat that must be addressed concerns user
data that is retained by the TOE in the course of
processing network traffic that could be inadvertently
re-used in sending network traffic to a user other than
that intended by the sender of the original network
traffic.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE generally build up from
a primitive set of mechanisms (e.g., memory
management, privileged modes of process execution) to
more complex sets of mechanisms. Failure of the
primitive mechanisms could lead to a compromise in
more complex mechanisms, resulting in a compromise of
the TSF.
3.3. Organizational Security Policies
There are no organizational security policies defined in [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
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4. Security Objectives
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the
responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the security needs.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to
counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been drawn
verbatim from [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
Table 9. Security Objectives for the TOE
Environment Security Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.INTEGRITY Conformant TOEs ensure the integrity of their
installation and update packages, and also leverage
execution environment-based mitigations. Software is
seldom if ever shipped without errors. The ability to
deploy patches and updates to fielded software with
integrity is critical to enterprise network security.
Processor manufacturers, compiler developers,
execution environment vendors, and operating system
vendors have developed execution environment-based
mitigations that increase the cost to attackers by adding
complexity to the task of compromising systems.
Application software can often take advantage of these
mechanisms by using APIs provided by the runtime
environment or by enabling the mechanism through
compiler or linker options.
O.QUALITY To ensure quality of implementation, conformant TOEs
leverage services and APIs provided by the runtime
environment rather than implementing their own
versions of these services and APIs. This is especially
important for cryptographic services and other complex
operations such as file and media parsing. Leveraging
this platform behavior relies upon using only
documented and supported APIs.
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O.MANAGEMENT To facilitate management by users and the enterprise,
conformant TOEs provide consistent and supported
interfaces for their security-relevant configuration and
maintenance. This includes the deployment of
applications and application updates through the use of
platform-supported deployment mechanisms and
formats, as well as providing mechanisms for
configuration. This also includes providing control to the
user regarding disclosure of any PII.
O.PROTECTED_STORAGE To address the issue of loss of confidentiality of user
data in the event of loss of physical control of the
storage medium, conformant TOEs will use data-at-rest
protection. This involves encrypting data and keys stored
by the TOE in order to prevent unauthorized access to
this data. This also includes unnecessary network
communications whose consequence may be the loss of
data.
O.PROTECTED_COMMS To address both passive (eavesdropping) and active
(packet modification) network attack threats,
conformant TOEs will use a trusted channel for sensitive
data. Sensitive data includes cryptographic keys,
passwords, and any other data specific to the
application that should not be exposed outside of the
application.
O.AUTHENTICATION To address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information in transit, a compliant TOE’s
authentication ability (IPsec) will allow the TSF to
establish VPN connectivity with a remote VPN gateway
or peer and ensure that any such connection attempt is
both authenticated and authorized.
O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC_FUNCTIONS To address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information in transit, a compliant TOE will
implement cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities
are intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for
detection and modification of data that is transmitted
outside of the TOE.
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O.KNOWN_STATE The TOE will provide sufficient measures to ensure it is
operating in a known state. At minimum this includes
management functionality to allow the security
functionality to be configured and self-test functionality
that allows it to assert its own integrity. It may also
include auditing functionality that can be used to
determine the operational behavior of the TOE.
O.NONDISCLOSURE To address the issues associated with unauthorized
disclosure of information at rest, a compliant TOE will
ensure that non-persistent data is purged when no
longer needed. The TSF may also implement measures
to protect against the disclosure of stored cryptographic
keys and data through implementation of protected
storage and secure erasure methods. The TOE may
optionally also enforce split-tunneling prevention to
ensure that data in transit cannot be disclosed
inadvertently outside of the IPsec tunnel.
4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment
The following table identifies the Security Objectives for the Environment. These security objectives reflect the stated
intent to counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies. The security objectives below have been
drawn verbatim from [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4].
Table 10. Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy computing platform
for its execution. This includes the underlying operating
system and any discrete execution environment provided
to the TOE.
OE.PROPER_USER The user of the application software is not willfully
negligent or hostile, and uses the software within
compliance of the applied enterprise security policy.
OE.PROPER_ADMIN The administrator of the application software is not
careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and administers
the software within compliance of the applied enterprise
security policy.
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OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the
VPN client's host is connected without passing through
the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the
TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided
by the environment.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational
environment will follow the applicable security
configuration guidance.
5. Security Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements in this
section are drawn from [CC_PART2], [PP_APP_V1.4], [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] and NIAP Technical Decisions.
5.1. Conventions
[CC_PART1] defines operations on Security Functional Requirements. This document uses the following conventions to
identify the operations permitted by [PP_APP_V1.4], [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] and NIAP Technical Decisions.
Table 11. Security Requirement Conventions
Convention Indication
Assignment Indicated with italicized text
Refinement Indicated with bold text and strikethroughs
Selection Indicated with underlined text
Assignment within a Selection Indicated with italicized and underlined text
Iteration indicated by adding a string starting with ‘/’ (e.g.
‘FCS_COP.1/Hash’)
Where operations were completed in the [PP_APP_V1.4] or [MOD_VPNC_V2.4], the formatting used in the PP has been
retained.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are identified in the following table are described in more detail in the
following subsections.
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Table 12. Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component Identification Component Name Drawn From
FCS: Cryptographic
Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
Services
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric
Key Generation
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key
Establishment
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_CKM.1/VPN VPN Cryptographic Key
Generation (IKE)
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation –
Encryption/Decryption
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation –
Hashing
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation –
Keyed–Hash Message
Authentication
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation –
Signing
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key
Destruction
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation
Services
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials [PP_APP_V1.4]
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FDP: User Data
Protection
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources [PP_APP_V1.4]
FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications [PP_APP_V1.4]
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive
Application Data
[PP_APP_V1.4]
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FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information
Protection
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation [PP_APP_V1.4]
FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate
Authentication
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FMT: Security
management
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration
Mechanism
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default
Configuration
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management
Functions
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management
Functions (VPN)
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FPR: Privacy FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for
Transmission of Personally
Identifiable Information
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FPT: Protection of the
TSF
FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services
and APIs
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities [PP_APP_V1.4]
FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and
Update
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and
Update
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries [PP_APP_V1.4]
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and
Versions
[PP_APP_V1.4]
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit [PP_APP_V1.4]
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5.2.Class: Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.1. FCS_CKM_EXT.1. Cryptographic Key Generation Services
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall [implement asymmetric key generation]
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] and application of NIAP TD0717
5.2.2. FCS_CKM.1/AK Cryptographic Asymmetric Key Generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK The application shall [
■ implement functionality
] to generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [
■ [ECC schemes] using [“NIST curves” P-256 P-384 and [P-256, no other curves] that meet the following:
[FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4], and,
■ no other key generation methods
]
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] and application of NIAP TD0717
5.2.3. FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_CKM_2.1 The application shall [implement functionality] to perform cryptographic key establishment in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method:
■ [Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes] that meets the following: [NIST Special Publication
800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography”]; and,
■ [No other schemes].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
5.2.4. FCS_CKM.1/VPN Cryptographic Key Generation (IKE)
FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN The TSF shall [invoke platform-provided functionality] to generate asymmetric cryptographic
keys used for IKE peer authentication in accordance with: [
■ FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes,
■ FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS),” Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes and
implementing “NIST curves,” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves]
]
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and specified cryptographic key sizes [equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits] that meet
the following: [assignment: list of standards].
5.2.5. FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation – Encryption/Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1/SKC The application shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
■ AES-CBC (as defined in NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
■ AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D) mode,
and [
■ no other modes
] and cryptographic key sizes [128-bit, 256-bit].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
5.2.6. FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation – Hashing
FCS_COP.1.1/Hash The application shall perform [cryptographic hashing services] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [
■ SHA-256,
■ SHA-384,
■ No other
] and message digest sizes [
■ 256,
■ 384,
■ No other
] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by application of NIAP TD0717
5.2.7. FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation – Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
FCS_COP.1.1/KeyedHash The application shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [
■ HMAC-SHA-256
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■ HMAC-SHA-384
and [
■ no other algorithms
] with key sizes [256, 384 bits used in HMAC] and message digest sizes [256 384] and [no other size] bits that meet
the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code and FIPS Pub 180-4 Secure Hash
Standard].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by application of NIAP TD0717
5.2.8. FCS_COP.1/Sig Cryptographic Operation – Signing
FCS_COP.1.1/Sig The application shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)] in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [
• RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-
4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 4 5],
• ECDSA schemes using [“NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves]] that meet the following: FIPS
PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5 6].
].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by application of NIAP TD0717
5.2.9. FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1 The [TOE Platform] shall store persistent secrets and private keys when not in use in platform-
provided key storage.
5.2.10. FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The [TOE, TOE Platform] shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and
CSPs when no longer required.
5.2.11. FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation Services
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke platform-provided DRBG functionality] for its cryptographic
operations.
5.2.12. FCS_STO_EXT.1 Storage of Credentials
FCS_STO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
■ not store any credentials
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] to non-volatile memory.
5.2.13. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise
unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the
cryptographic algorithms [AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106, [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256
(both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [
■ IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 7296 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), RFC
8784, RFC 8247, and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic
algorithms [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and [AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in
RFC 5282]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that [IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by [VPN Gateway] based on
[length of time]]. If length of time is used, it must include at least one option that is 24 hours or less for Phase 1 Sas
and 8 hours or less for Phase 2 Sas.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH groups [19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20
(384-bit Random ECP), and [no other DH groups]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (“x” in
g^x mod p) using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [256 (for DH
Group 19), 384 (for DH Group 20)] bits.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner such that the probability
that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^[384].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using a [ECDSA, RSA]
that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [no other method].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TSF shall not establish an SA if the [IP address, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)]
and [no other reference identifier type] contained in a certificate does not match the expected value(s) for the entity
attempting to establish a connection.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TSF shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not match the configured
reference identifier of the peer.
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The [VPN Gateway] shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric
algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv2 IKE_SA] connection is greater
than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to
protect the [IKEv2 CHILD_SA] connection.
5.3.Class: User Data Protection (FDP)
5.3.1. FDP_DEC_EXT.1 Access to Platform Resources
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict its access to [network connectivity].
FDP_DEC_EXT.1.2 The application shall restrict its access to [no sensitive information repositories].
5.3.2. FDP_NET_EXT.1 Network Communications
FDP_NET_EXT.1.1 The application shall restrict network communication to [
■ user-initiated communication for [IKEv2/IPsec tunnel establishment]
].
5.3.3. FDP_DAR_EXT.1 Encryption Of Sensitive Application Data
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1 The application shall [
■ not store any sensitive data
] in non-volatile memory.
5.3.4. FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The [TOE platform] shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.
5.4.Class: Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.4.1. FIA_X509_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoked platform-provided functionality] to validate certificates in
accordance with the following rules:
■ RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation
■ The certificate path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate
■ The application shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints extension,
that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates, and that any path constraints are met
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■ The application shall validate that any CA certificate includes caSigning purpose in the key usage field
■ The application shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [OCSP as specified in RFC 6960].
■ The application shall validate the extendedKeyUsage (EKU) field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code
Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the EKU field.
o Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the EKU field.
o S/MIME certificates presented for email encryption and signature shall have the Email Protection
purpose (id-kp 4 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) in the EKU field.
o OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the EKU field.
o Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority (RA) purpose (id-
kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the EKU field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The application shall treat a certificate as a CA certificate only if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.4.2. FIA_X509_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The application shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication
for IPsec and [no other protocols].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When the application cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the
TSF shall [not accept the certificate].
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]
5.5.Class: Security Management (FMT)
5.5.1. FMT_MEC_EXT.1 Supported Configuration Mechanism
FMT_MEC_EXT.1.1 The application shall [invoke the mechanisms recommended by the platform vendor for storing
and setting configuration options].
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5.5.2. FMT_CFG_EXT.1 Secure by Default Configuration
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.1 The application shall provide only enough functionality to set new credentials when configured
with default credentials or no credentials.
FMT_CFG_EXT.1.2 The application shall be configured by default with file permissions which protect the
application’s binaries and data files from modification by normal unprivileged user.
5.5.3. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions [
■ no management functions
].
5.5.4. FMT_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN)
FMT_SMF.1.1/VPN The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
■ Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,
■ Specify client credentials to be used for connections,
■ Configure the reference identifier of the peer
]
5.6.Class: Privacy (FPR)
5.6.1. FPR_ANO_EXT.1 User Consent for Transmission of Personally Identifiable Information
FPR_ANO_EXT.1.1 The application shall [not transmit PII over a network].
5.7.Class: Class: : Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.7.1. FPT_API_EXT.1 Use of Supported Services and APIs
FPT_API_EXT.1.1 The application shall use only documented platform APIs.
5.7.2. FPT_AEX_EXT.1 Anti-Exploitation Capabilities
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1 The application shall not request to map memory at an explicit address except for [no exceptions].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2 The application shall [
■ not allocate any memory region with both write and execute permissions
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].
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3 The application shall be compatible with security features provided by the platform vendor.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4 The application shall not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files
unless explicitly directed by the user to do so.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.5 The application shall be built with stack-based buffer overflow protection enabled.
5.7.3. FPT_TST_EXT.1/VPN TSF Self-Test
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1/VPN The [TOE] shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate
the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2/VPN The [TOE platform] shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF
executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the [digital signature verification using SHA256
and RSA or ECDSA key provided by the TOE platform].
5.7.4. FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The application shall [provide the ability] to check for updates and patches to the application
software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The application shall [provide the ability] to query the current version of the application software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The application shall not download, modify, replace or update its own binary code.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.4 The application updates shall be digitally signed such that the application platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.5 The application is distributed [as an additional software package to the platform OS].
5.7.5. FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Integrity for Installation and Update
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1 The application shall be distributed using [the format of the platform-supported package
manager].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2 The application shall be packaged such that its removal results in the deletion of all traces of the
application, with the exception of configuration settings, output files, and audit/log events.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3 The application installation package shall be digitally signed such that its platform can
cryptographically verify them prior to installation.
5.7.6. FPT_LIB_EXT.1 Use of Third Party Libraries
FPT_LIB_EXT.1.1 The application shall be packaged with only [OpenSSL, Boost, libcurl].
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5.7.7. FPT_IDV_EXT.1 Software Identification and Versions
FPT_IDV_EXT.1.1 The application shall be versioned with [[sequence-based versioning control]].
5.8.Class: Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
5.8.1. FTP_DIT_EXT.1 Protection of Data in Transit
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1 The application shall encrypt all transmitted [sensitive data] using IPsec as specified in
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 for [VPN tunnel] and [no other protocols] between itself and another trusted IT product.
Application Note: This SFR has been modified by [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] and application of NIAP TD0753
5.9. TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale
[PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] contain all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the
dependencies are not applicable since the PPs themselves have been approved.
5.10. Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] which are
derived from [CC_PART3]. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.
Table 13. Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Components Description
Security Target (ASE) Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives for the operational environment
(ASE_OBJ.1)
Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV) Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD) Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
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Life Cycle Support (ALC) Labeling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
Tests (ATE) Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
5.11. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Functional Requirements included in the ST represent all mandatory, optional, and selection-based SFRs
specified in [PP_APP_V1.4] and [MOD_VPNC_V2.4] against which exact compliance is claimed.
All dependency rationale in the ST are considered to be identical to those that are defined in the claimed PP.
5.12. Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. The table below identifies the Assurance Measures applied by
Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements.
Table 14. Assurance Measures
Assurance Component Rationale
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_OBJ.1
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.1
ASE_TSS.1
Cisco provided this Security Target document.
ADV_FSP.1 No additional “functional specification” documentation
was provided by Cisco to satisfy the Evaluation
Activities.
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Cisco will provide the guidance documents with the ST.
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ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
Cisco will identify the TOE such that it can be
distinguished from other products or versions from the
Cisco and can be easily specified when being procured
by an end user.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1 Cisco will provide a Security Vulnerability Policy.
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for Vulnerability Analysis.
6. TOE Summary Specification
The table below identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified above are met by the TOE.
Table 15. TSS Rationale
TOE SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1/AK
Key generation for asymmetric keys used by IPsec for key establishment is provided by
the TOE and is implemented using ECDSA with NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384
according to FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4.
FCS_CKM.2 To support IPsec the TOE implements the following algorithms to perform key establish-
ment:
ECC key establishment schemes that meet SP800-56A.
FCS_CKM.1/VPN The TOE Platform provides a specified key generation algorithm to generate asymmetric
cryptographic keys for IKE authentication. The key sizes are 2048-bit for RSA scheme
and NIST curve sizes P-256 and P-384 when ECDSA is used. The key generation func-
tion is invoked by the TOE platform Administrator using the OpenSSL library which cre-
ates keys and certificates used by the TOE for IKE authentication.
FCS_COP.1/SKC The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES support-
ing the following modes:
■ CBC mode as specified in NIST SP 800-38A.
■ GCM mode as specified in NIST SP 800-38D.
The TOE uses AES in IPsec using the following modes and key sizes: CBC mode with
key size of 128 and 256 bits. GCM mode with key sizes of 128 and 256 bits.
FCS_COP.1/Hash The TOE provides cryptographic hashing services in support of IKEv2 and IPsec using
SHA-256 and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.”
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TOE SFR Rationale
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHa
sh
The TOE provides keyed-hash message authentication services in support of IKEv2 and
IPsec. The TOE supports both HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-384 cryptographic
algorithms with supported key size of 256 and 384 bits used in HMAC. The message
digest sizes supported are 256 bits and 384 bits.
FCS_COP.1/Sig The TOE provides cryptographic signature services using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm with a key size of 256 and 384 bits and RSA Digital Signature Algorithm with
key size of 2048 and greater, as specified in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature
Standard.”
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FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The TOE ensures volatile memory areas containing the following keys are zeroized:
Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method
SK_ei IKE SA Initiator Encryp-
tion Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_er IKE SA Responder En-
cryption Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_ai IKE SA Initiator Integrity
Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_ar IKE SA Responder Integ-
rity Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
IKE v2 SA setup Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_d IKEv2 SA key from which
child IPsec keys are de-
rived.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
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TOE SFR Rationale
Initiator encryption and
integrity key
IPsec child SA key that
encrypts and authenti-
cates outgoing ESP traf-
fic.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
Responder encryption
and integrity key
IPsec child SA key that
decrypts and authenti-
cates incoming ESP traf-
fic.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
The TOE platform zeroizes private keys it manipulates and stores on the TOE platform:
Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method
Asymmetric ECDSA Pri-
vate Key stored on the
Linux platform
ECDSA digital signature
verification
Performed exclusively
by the TOE Platform.
Asymmetric RSA Private
Key stored on the Linux
platform
RSA digital signature ver-
ification
Performed exclusively
by the TOE Platform.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE invokes /dev/urandom on the platform when needed to generate a crypto-
graphic key. This applies to the following SFRs:
FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 – IPsec Protocol
FCS_STO_EXT.1 The Cisco AnyConnect TOE does not store any credentials to non-volitive memory. The
TOE retrieves the private key during IKE authentication from platform-provided key
storage but is not responsible for storing it. Private keys are stored on platform-
provided key storage in accordance with FCS_CKM_EXT.2.
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TOE SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 The TOE platform stores ECDSA and RSA private keys used by the TOE for IKE peer au-
thentication. Private Keys are stored on the Linux platform in a hidden directory. Access
to the directory is limited with strict file permissions.
The TOE does not use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 The TOE’s implementation of the IPsec standard (in accordance with RFC 4301) uses
the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to provide authentication, encryption
and anti-replay services. By default ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is
required by the user or administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode.
Remote access policies managed by the administrator of the ASA VPN Gateway provide
an interface to create ACLs defining network segments that require IPsec protection.
The default behavior of the remote access policy is for the TOE to protect all traffic with
IPsec.
If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the
ASA VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the organiza-
tion’s network(s) but bypass protection for other traffic.
The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE is distributed as a separate software package
to the platform OS.
The TOE relies on the TOE Platform’s SPD table, which processes packets in a very
specific order. The TOE only injects SPD rules into the table based on rules to protect
all traffic or to protect specific traffic. Effectively, this allows the TOE to be configured in
either Protect and Drop or Protect and Bypass mode. When the VPN is connected, one
of the two mentioned configurations for packet processing is enforced, and the TOE will
always protect traffic first before determining whether or not traffic should be discarded
or bypassed. The TOE allows configuring packet processing from one of three options:
1. Tunnel All Networks - Explicitly disable split-tunneling, protects all network
traffic (default action).
2. Tunnel Network List Below - Protect only specified networks specified in the
Network List.
3. Exclude Network List Below - Bypass networks specified in Network List, and
protect all other traffic.
The Tunnel All Networks configuration will protect all network traffic. The tunnel will al-
ways force traffic through the tunnel. Any network that cannot be reached on the other
end of the IPsec tunnel is ultimately dropped.
The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1.
IPsec Internet Key Exchange is the negotiation protocol that lets the TOE and a VPN
Gateway agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). IKE separates nego-
tiation into two phases: phase 1 and phase 2.
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During IKE Phase 1, the TOE authenticates the remote VPN Gateway using device-level
authentication with ECDSA or RSA X.509v3 certificates provided by the TOE platform.
The TOE compares its reference identifier to the identifier presented by the VPN Gate-
way peer. The TOE supports reference identifiers as configured by the Administrator to
be either FQDN or IP address and compares it to the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or
the Common Name (CN) fields in the certificate of the peer. The order of comparison is
SAN followed by CN. If the TOE successfully matches the reference identifier to the pre-
sented identifier, IKE Phase 1 authentication will succeed. Otherwise it will fail if it does
not match.
Phase 1 creates the first tunnel, which protects later IKE negotiation messages. The key
negotiated in phase 1 enables IKE to communicate securely in phase 2. The TOE sup-
ports only IKEv2 session establishment. As part of this support, the TOE by default does
not support aggressive mode used in IKEv1 exchanges.
The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 19 (256-bit Random ECP) and 20 (384-bit Ran-
dom ECP) in support of IKE Key Establishment negotiated in phase 1. These keys are
generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 having 256 bits of entropy. The
administrator is instructed in the CC Configuration Guide to select a supported DH
group using one of the following corresponding key sizes (in bits): 256 (for DH Group
19), and 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.
For each DH Group, the TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hell-
man key exchange ('x' in gx
mod p) using its DH private key, the IPsec peer’s public key
and a nonce. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a spe-
cific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2256
.
The nonce is likewise generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
During Phase 2, IKE negotiates the IPsec SA and includes:
• The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec SA parameters;
• The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is used for the construction of keying ma-
terial for cryptographic algorithms used in the SA.
• The establishment of IPsec Security Associations to protect packet flows using
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).
The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security
depending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers. The VPN Gate-
way ensures by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number
of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or
equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the
key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.
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TOE SFR Rationale
After IKE phase 2 completes, the IPsec SA is established, providing a secure tunnel to a
remote VPN Gateway. The TOE uses active SA settings or creates new SAs for initial
connections with the ASA VPN Gateway. The TOE supports administratively configured
lifetimes for both Phase 1 SAs and Phase 2 SAs. The default time value for Phase 1 SAs
is 24 hours. The value for Phase 2 SAs is configurable to 8 hours. Both values are
configurable using management functions provided by the VPN Gateway.
All ESP processing to authenticate, encrypt, and tunnel the traffic is performed by the
TOE. The TOE performs IKEv2 payload and bulk IPsec encryption using AES-GCM-128,
AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, or AES-CBC-256 algorithms. The VPN Gateway allows
the administrator to configure AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-
CBC-256 encryption algorithms.
FDP_DEC_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE restricts access to network connectivity
resources.
FDP_NET_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE limits network communication to user
initiated communication for IKEv2/IPsec tunnel establishment
FDP_DAR_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE does not maintain any sensitive data of its
own. It cannot write sensitive data to platform-provided non-volatile storage.
FDP_RIP.2 The processing of network packets for residual information is handled by the TOE
platform and therefore is responsible for clearing residual information.
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TOE SFR Rationale
FIA_X509_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE invokes functionality provided by the TOE
platform to validate X.509 certificates used for IPsec connections.
The X.509 certificates are validated using the certificate path validation algorithm de-
fined in RFC 5280, which can be summarized as follows:
• the public key algorithm and parameters are checked
• the current date/time is checked against the validity period
• revocation status is checked using OCSP
• issuer name of X matches the subject name of X+1
• extensions are processed
The certificate validity check is performed when the TOE receives the certificate during
an IPsec connection to the ASA VPN Gateway.
When the certificate being validated is for an OCSP response, the Cisco Secure Clint-
AnyConnect TOE invokes functionality provided by the TOE platform to ensure the Ex-
tended Key Usage extension contains the OCSP signing purpose.
The Cisco Secure Clint-AnyConnect TOE invokes functionality provided by the TOE plat-
form to ensure all CA certs contain the basic constraints extension and that the
CA=TRUE flag is set.
The Cisco Secure Clint-AnyConnect TOE invokes functionality provided by the TOE plat-
form to ensure that the certificate path terminates in a trusted root CA (i.e. a CA certifi-
cate configured on the TOE as trusted).
These checks ensure certificate validation results in a trusted root certificate. At any
point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the CC Configuration Guide
instructs the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for
continuing the connection. In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be
validated, the TOE will not establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted ASA VPN
Gateway.
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TOE SFR Rationale
FIA_X509_EXT.2 During TOE installation the user imports a new certificate to the certificate store. The IT
environment must be configured according to the "Configure Certificates" section in the
administrative guidance.
The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE compares the FQDN of the server it is
establishing connectivity with, against the Subject Alternate Name-dnsName attributes
in the certificate. If AnyConnect determines there is a mismatch, it will not establish
the IPsec trusted channel.
At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the CC Configuration Guide
instructs the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for
continuing the connection.
In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE will not
establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.
FMT_MEC_EXT.1 All IPsec configuration for the Cisco AnyConnect TOE is stored remotely on the Cisco
ASA VPN Gateway.
As described in guidance the user controls the following settings which must enabled
(set to true) in the Local Policy:
■ Exclude Firefox NSS Cert Store
■ FIPS Mode
■ Strict Certificate Trust
■ OCSP Revocation
FMT_CFG_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE requires client credentials to be used for
connections but the TOE is not installed with any preset default credentials. In context
of the Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE, client credentials are a X.509 certificate
which is used to authenticate the ASA VPN Gateway during establishment of an IPsec
session.
Users can only access files which are associated to the installation that user performed.
FMT_SMF.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE does not perform any security management
functions from [PP_APP_V1.4].
FMT_SMF.1/VPN The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE is capable of the following security manage-
ment functions from [MOD_VPNC_V2.4]:
■ Specify VPN gateways to use for connections
■ Specify client credentials to be used for connections
■ Configuring the reference identifier of the peer
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FPR_ANO_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE does not transmit PII.
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FPT_API_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE uses the following platform APIs
■ getifaddrs
■ if_nametoindex
■ freeifaddrs
■ fork
■ execvp
■ exit
■ waitpid
■ kill
■ system
■ getpriority
■ setpriority
■ gettimeofday
■ readlink
■ select
■ ioctl
■ sysctl
■ fcntl
■ dlopen
■ dlclose
■ dlsym
■ chown
■ fchown
■ writev
■ readv
■ Other POSIX APIs
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o bind
o connect
o socket
o pipe
o open
o recv
o close
o setsockopt
o getsockopt
o shutdown
o sleep
o stat
FPT_AEX_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE enables ASLR and stack protection by fPIE -
pie and the -fstack-protector-all flags.
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TOE SFR Rationale
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.2
ALC_TSU_EXT.1
The TOE has specific versions that can be queried by a user. A TOE update is not a
patch applied to the existing TOE, it is a new version of the TOE. The Cisco AnyConnect
for Linux TOE is distributed as an additional package to the platform OS.
When TOE updates are made available by Cisco, an administrator can obtain and install
the update. Upon installation of a TOE update, a digital signature verification check will
automatically be performed to ensure it has not been modified since distribution. The
authorized source for the digitally signed updates is "Cisco Systems, Inc.".
All Cisco communications relating to security issues are handled by the Cisco Product
Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT). Cisco aims to provide fixes in 30 days but
depending on the timing it may be greater than 30 days though not more than 60 days
for most security issues. Fixes may be delayed longer for low-risk security issues. Up-
dates are then made available at Cisco Software Central available at: https://soft-
ware.cisco.com.
Customers can subscribe to the Cisco Notification Service allows users to subscribe and
receive important information regarding product updates. Full information is provide in
the Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy available at:
https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/security_vulnerability_policy.html
FPT_LIB_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE is packaged with the following third-party li-
braries:
■ OpenSSL
■ Boost
■ libcurl
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TOE SFR Rationale
FPT_IDV_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE uses a sequence-based versioning control
system. The application uses the major.minor.build format for versioning control. For ex-
ample: 5.1.05043
■ Major (5 in the example above) designates a release where significant new fea-
tures are added.
■ Minor 1 in the example above) designates a release where minor new features
are added.
■ Build (05043 in the example above) designates a software build number.
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FPT_TST_EXT.1 As a software product incorporating a cryptographic module, the TOE runs a suite of
self-tests during start-up to verify its correct operation.
These tests include:
■ AES Known Answer Test – For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt
a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is
compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt operation is
working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key
is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is
compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is
working correctly.
■ RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) – This test
takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public
key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to
verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then
decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext
value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly.
■ ECDSA Signature Test – This test takes a known plaintext value and Pri-
vate/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is
compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt operation is work-
ing properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This
value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt opera-
tion is working properly.
■ HMAC Known Answer Test– For each of the hash values (256 and 384), the
HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These val-
ues are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to
verify that the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly.
■ SHA Known Answer Test – For each of the values (256 and 384), the SHA im-
plementation is fed known data and key. These values are used to generate a
hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match and the
hash operations are operating correctly.
■ Software Integrity Test - The Software Integrity Test is run automatically when-
ever the module is loaded and confirms the image has maintained its integrity.
If any self-test fails subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls is
prevented.
A self-test is performed each time the AnyConnect TOE is loaded to verify the integrity
of the TOE’s executable files. Digital signature verification is performed by the Linux
platform using SHA256 and a RSA 2048-bit key provided by the Linux platform. If the
integrity verification fails to successfully complete, the GUI will not load, rendering the
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app unusable. The Linux log file will contain a
CERTIFICATE_ERROR_SIGN_VERIFY_FAILED message.
If the integrity verification is successful, the app GUI will load and operate normally.
The Linux log file will contain a ‘code-signing verification succeeded’ message.
FTP_DIT_EXT.1 The Cisco Secure Client-AnyConnect TOE itself is the application and does not maintain
any sensitive data of its own. Therefore, there is no need to protect (through
FTP_DIT_EXT.1.1) VPN-client-specific data.
7. CAVP Certificates
The TOE incorporates a cryptographic module, CiscoSSL FIPS Object Module version 7.2a. The table below lists the CAVP
certificates for the TOE.
Table 16. CAVP Certificates
SFR Selection Algorithm Certificate
Number
CPU
FCS_CKM.1.1/AK P-256
P-384
ECDSA KeyGen and
KeyVer
A1420
(Cisco)
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
FCS_CKM.2.1 P-256
P-384
ECC Key
Establishment(KAS-ECC
Component)
A1420
(Cisco)
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
FCS_COP.1/SKC 128-bit
256-bit
AES-CBC
Encrypt/Decrypt
AES-GCM
Encrypt/Decrypt
A1420
(Cisco)
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
FCS_COP.1/Hash SHA-256
SHA-384
SHS A1420
(Cisco)
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
FCS_COP.1/Sig RSA schemes using
cryptographic key sizes of
2048-bits
RSA SigGen and SigVer A1420
(Cisco)
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
ECDSA schemes using
“NIST curves” P-256, P-
384
ECDSA SigGen and
SigVer
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
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SFR Selection Algorithm Certificate
Number
CPU
FCS_COP.1/
KeyedHash
HMAC-SHA-256
HMAC-SHA-384
HMAC A1420
(Cisco)
Intel Core i5-
1135G7 (Tiger
Lake)
The functionality for following cryptographic SFRs is satisfied by the platform from the listing referenced in section 1.5.1:
■ FCS_CKM.1.1/VPN
■ FCS_RBG_EXT.1
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8. References
The documentation listed below was used to prepare this ST
Table 17. References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
and general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-
04-002
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-
04-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
Methodology, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
[PP_APP_V1.4] Protection Profile for Application Software Version 1.4, 18 October 2021.
[MOD_VPNC_V2.4] PP-Module for VPN Client Version 2.4, 31 March 2022
[SD] Supporting Document – PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Client, Version
2.4, 31 March 2022
8.1. Acronyms and Terms
The following acronyms and terms are common and may be used in this Security Target.
Table 18. Acronyms and Terms
Acronym/Term Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM Configuration Management
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
Cisco Secure Client - AnyConnect 5.1 for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8.2 Security Target
References
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EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC-DH Elliptic Curve-Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
NGE Next Generation Encryption
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
PRF Pseudo-Random Functions
RFC Request For Comment
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SPD Security Policy Database
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TIMA TrustZone Integrity Measurement Architecture
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User datagram protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
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References
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AES Advanced Encryption Standard
8.2.Obtaining Documentation and Submitting a Service Request
For information on obtaining documentation, using the Cisco Bug Search Tool (BST), submitting a service request, and
gathering additional information, see What’s New in Cisco Product Documentation.
To receive new and revised Cisco technical content directly to your desktop, you can subscribe to the What’s New in
Cisco Product Documentation RSS feed. The RSS feeds are a free service.
8.3. Contacting Cisco
Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website
at www.cisco.com/go/offices.